Assessing China and Russia's Influence on the German Parlia-mentary Elections - German Council on Foreign Relations
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German Council on Foreign Relations
No. 10
August 2021
COMMENTARY
Assessing China and
Russia’s Influence on
the German Parlia-
mentary Elections
Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Senior Fellow, Asia Program
China and Russia want to maintain Germany’s political status quo: Centrist, at
times mercantilist policies, have often worked in their favor. Now, with the Green
Party ascendant and public opinion shifting, neither Russia nor China can be sure
that classic “centrism” will emerge after September. Russia and China will in-
crease their influence and interference efforts in the run-up to the election and
beyond, using informational, political, and cyber tactics, and economic and po-
Andras Rácz litical networks.
Senior Fellow, Security and
Defense Program
For the first time in 16 years, Ger- Russia on military and economic proj-
man federal elections in September ects is a cause for concern among for-
will deliver a new leader when Chan- eign policy planners in the West.
cellor Angela Merkel steps down. The
change of leadership takes place amid But China and Russia are also draw-
a shifting global power balance caused ing closer in the realm of inf luence
first and foremost by the rise of Chi- operations, an “authoritarian learn-
na. While most German voters may ing” trend that bodes ill for the fu-
not think much about China’s impact ture. Their shared objective? Weaken-
on their daily lives, China’s Commu- ing the credibility and functionality of
nist Party (CCP) continuously seeks to liberal democratic systems. Russia in-
expand its efforts to influence the de- tends to generate chaos and expand its
cision-making of German businesses role as an international spoiler, where-
and political leaders. as China would like to see democracy
lose legitimacy in order to protect its
Russia, too, has paid close attention to own system from internal and exter-
China’s rise over the past decade and nal challenges and bring other govern-
has sought partnership and alignment ments more in line with its economic
in key policy areas where it serves the and political interests. Both countries
wider political objectives of maintain- have shown they have the means and
ing and expanding Russian power in willingness to influence the outcome
its neighborhood and beyond. Already, of elections in other countries. Germa-
overt collaboration between China and ny will not be an exception.No. 10 | August 2021 2
COMMENTARY Assessing China and Russia’s Influence on the German Parliamentary Elections
STRATEGY, TACTICS, es, including intellectual and human Moscow’s tactics are not limited to
EXECUTION: RUSSIA’S capital, diplomatic, informational, in- soft approaches or the shaping of pub-
AND CHINA’S ELECTION telligence, cyber, economic, and oth- lic opinion. Both the 2015 cyberat-
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS er tools, to understanding and influ- tack on the Bundestag and the March
encing German politics. Few people 2021 hack of German parliamentarians’
Russia are more deeply versed in the pow- email accounts show that Russia has
er broker role that Germany can play the means and the will to target Ger-
Russia’s influence strategy is charac- than President Putin himself, who as a man politicians ahead of critical re-
terized by the systematic exploitation former KGB operative in East Germany gional elections. As was attempted in
of existing social and political cleav- feels personally invested in advancing other countries, information acquired
ages within democratic societies. In Russia’s interests in Germany. through hacks could end up with po-
the context of the 2016 and 2020 US litical opponents and help their cam-
presidential elections, Russian-based Putin’s Russia has a well-developed in- paigns, unless media, politics and civil
or -steered operatives thus focused on formation apparatus at work in Ger- society are sufficiently aware and re-
further polarizing the country’s pop- many and in the German language, in- silient. Russia has also been known to
ulation around questions of race, in- cluding Russia Today and Ruptly, a market data mined via Russia’s sprawl-
equality, and religion, in addition to highly active, Berlin-based global vid- ing information apparatus to exert
highlighting existing divisions in the eo channel. Russia also publishes a pressure via leaks, fake content, or by
party-political landscape using a series German edition of Sputnik News and making false allegations.
China
China’s strategic influence objectives
Russia has a well-developed are more targeted. It aims to deliv-
er concrete benefits to its own indus-
information apparatus at try and infrastructure, and sway polit-
ical and economic decision-makers in
work in Germany its favor. It has used the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), industrial espionage,
and intellectual property (IP) theft, as
well as selective investments in Euro-
pean markets to further this goal stra-
of hybrid tactics. Across Europe and benefits from a series of “black hat” tegically and buy influence on the lo-
the Western Balkans, Russia has em- influencer tactics using Facebook net- cal, regional, and national level. In
ployed similar strategies to weaken in- works, Twitter botnets (collections of addition, it has – more recently – de-
ternal European solidarity and amplify internet-connected devices infected ployed cyber interference as a tool at
structural tensions both within tar- by malware and controlled by hackers), scale: On July 19, EU leaders disclosed
get countries and between the EU and and chain email messages. that hackers in China were behind a
NATO, using direct and covert finan- massive March 2019 hack launched via
cial support to right-wing or national- At home and abroad, Russia-affiliat- the Microsoft Exchange server, known
ist parties (including parties in France, ed media outlets regularly opine nega- as the Hanfium attack, targeting tens
Italy, generally Atlanticist Poland, and tively on German politics and conduct of thousands of companies in Germa-
beyond the EU in Moldova, Ukraine, smear campaigns against Chancellor ny alone. These were “malicious cyber
and even Madagascar) alongside large- Angela Merkel. One of the most infa- activities that significantly affected our
scale, sophisticated information op- mous campaigns, the “Lisa Case” in economy, security, democracy, and so-
erations and hacking attacks. It has January 2016, involved publishing and ciety,” the EU Council said in a state-
targeted critical infrastructure and in- virally sharing a fake news story about ment, without naming China’s Ministry
dustrial giants, in part merely to prove the kidnapping of a Russian-German of State Security as the main culprit,
that it can. girl, to provoke unrest. RT and Sputnik unlike the US and UK. In addition, ad-
seek to amplify stories around Germa- vanced persistent threat (APT) groups
Moscow has a rich history of involve- ny’s failures to integrate its immigrants 40 and 31 have “targeted government
ment in German politics, including and both outlets are openly supportive institutions and political organizations
elections, dating back to Soviet times. of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a in the EU and member states, as well
It has dedicated significant resourc- party Russia favors even over the CDU.No. 10 | August 2021 3
COMMENTARY Assessing China and Russia’s Influence on the German Parliamentary Elections
as key European industries,” according As the German election approaches, young Europeans, offering up to
to the EU. China is developing new tactics and is $10,000 in prizes for candidates who
likely to deploy them as part of an “in- successfully become “Media Challeng-
For decades, China relied mostly on fluence mix,” with more measurably ers” – presenters, on-camera report-
deeper techniques of persuasion, aim- “aggressive disinformation and propa- ers, DJs and social media influencers –
ing at winning over German pub- ganda campaigns in Germany’s pub- to “report and create content from all
lic opinion and, above all, elite con- lic media space,” according to the Bf V over the world,” according to its web-
stituencies in business and politics, annual report. For instance, China’s so site. CGTN already has a network of
thus building economic dependency. called “wolf warrior“ diplomats aggres- foreigners producing disinformation
This process has deepened in recent sively pushed subjective coverage of over controversial international issues,
years. In its 2020 annual report, Ger- the 2019 Hong Kong democracy pro- such as the treatment of China’s Ui-
many’s domestic intelligence agency, tests, and privately contacted German ghur population.
the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
(Bf V), said China’s inf luence efforts
were steadily increasing and had tar-
geted, among others, “well-networked
active and former German politicians
as ‘lobbyists’ for Chinese interests.”
China is developing
The 2019 establishment of “Chi-
new tactics to deploy as
na-Brücke” (China Bridge), an elite net-
working club, by Hans-Peter Friedrich,
part of an “influence mix”
a vice-president of the Bundestag, is a
vivid example. It is creating a signifi-
cant “in” for Chinese interests among
a select, but largely anonymous, group officials requesting support spreading HOW RUSSIA AND
of highly influential people in politics, a victorious narrative of China’s man- CHINA ARE LEARNING
business, healthcare, digital econo- agement of the COVID-19 pandemic FROM EACH OTHER
my, academia, and industry in Ger- that originated in China and swept the
many. Mirroring the secrecy of the world. These tactics will only increase. Often feeling at a disadvantage in con-
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on- necting to Western audiences for cul-
ly the identities of board members are Like Russian traditional media efforts, tural and linguistic reasons, Chinese
public, while regular members’ iden- Chinese state media continues to find propaganda officials have closely stud-
tities are kept anonymous. Overall, a market for its propaganda supple- ied Russia Today, described as an “ex-
members are selected via unanimous ments in major German media outlets, ternal propaganda aircraft carrier” in a
agreement. China-Brücke’s key liaison including business newspaper Han- 2014 article published in People’s Daily.
in China is Politburo member Wang delsblatt. In March 2021, it took out a In parallel, China has expanded CGTN,
Chen, a high-ranking former propa- full-page advertisement in the Frank- the international wing of China Central
ganda and internet official. Others in- furter Allgemeine Zeitung that looked Television (CCTV), the state-controlled
clude Li Zhanshu, one of seven men like an article about the CCP’s achieve- broadcaster. Its stories and tone have
on the Politburo Standing Commit- ments. The source given was an office become increasingly assertive in re-
tee, and Qian Hongshan, a deputy di- address in Beijing. In addition, China’s cent years. However, the longevity and
rector of the International Department opaque domestic politics are spill- ambition of the CCP’s global propagan-
of the Communist Party of China. Out- ing over into Germany via the Ger- da efforts should not be underestimat-
reach targets in Europe include cur- man-language Himalaya Farm, the Eu- ed, just because they have been more
rent and former members of the Bund- ropean arm of propaganda efforts by subtle than Russia’s. In 1956, Mao Ze-
estag and European Parliament. Thus, Guo Wengui, a controversial Chinese dong called for CCP media to “manage
China-Brücke represents a classic CCP living in exile in the United States For the world”; today Xi Jinping exhorts it
influence and interference operation – now, at least, its reach appears to be to “tell the China story well.”
similar to tactics deployed in Asia-Pa- small.
cific and Australia – reaching deep into There are more indications of a con-
Germany’s economy and politics. To support propaganda activities, Chi verging Chinese and Russian infor-
na Global Television Network (CGTN) mation space. At the third meeting of
has launched a “talent search” among the China-Russia Internet Media CloudNo. 10 | August 2021 4
COMMENTARY Assessing China and Russia’s Influence on the German Parliamentary Elections
Forum in Beijing, in December 2020, influence in Germany is perceived as a benefit Russia, too. Laschet’s support
Zhou Shuchun, the publisher and ed- way for both countries to weaken the for Nord Stream 2 remains unbroken
itor-in-chief of China Daily, said, “in US alliance system to their advantage. and he has encouraged continuous ex-
the future, the two countries’ medias change with Russia, at times display-
will transmit authoritative and real in- Over the course of her 16 years in of- ing much-discussed reticence to chas-
formation … deepen their cooperation fice, Chancellor Merkel has positioned tise the Putin regime on human rights
and jointly raise the discourse power herself as a bridge-builder to Russia violations.
of the two countries’ online media.” and China, pushing back diplomatical-
ly against egregious Russian overreach Conversely, Annalena Baerbock, the
(the annexation of Crimea, military in- Green Party Chancellor candidate
WHY GERMANY cursions in Ukraine and into NATO presents a potential threat to Russian
MATTERS TO BOTH airspace, the human rights violations and Chinese interests. Her party’s po-
MOSCOW AND BEIJING against Russian citizens on European litical program highlights a commit-
soil, the suppression of democratic ex- ment to “human rights driven foreign
To realize its ambitious “Made in Chi- pression in Belarus, and the poisoning policy,” underscoring the impres-
na 2025” plan, access to cutting-edge of Alexei Navalny), while continuing to sion that coalition participation by the
technology, innovation capabilities, seek dialogue, as evidenced most re- Green Party could force a harder line
machine-building, and engineering cently by the suggestion of a EU-Rus- against both countries. Their manifes-
will continue to be vital to the Chinese sia Summit to follow the Biden-Putin to explicitly calls on China to end its
government over the coming years. meeting in Geneva. On China, her pol- “blatant” human rights abuses, singling
China revels in the codependency it icy stance has been described as mer- out the treatment of Uighurs, Tibet-
has created with several key industri- cantilist, advancing the interests of ans, and Hong Kong. Asked at the end
of April if China was concerned the
Greens would make China’s position in
Europe more difficult, Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Wang Wenbin delivered
a thinly-veiled warning: “China oppos-
There are indications of es wanton allegations based on lies and
rumors and rejects politicizing nor-
a converging Chinese and mal trade, investment, and commer-
cial cooperation.” State-approved me-
Russian information space dia and social media warn the Greens
“will follow the United States closely”
and have “vowed to be a pawn in the
global strategy of the US Democratic
al sectors across European countries, German business and concluding the Party.” Most recently, Germany’s Min-
particularly in Germany. European Comprehensive Investment Agreement ister of Interior issued a warning that
consumers remain an important ingre- (CAI) between China and the Europe- Russia may inf luence the upcoming
dient to China’s economic success. Its an Union under Germany’s EU Coun- German elections through information
regional investments, including in the cil Presidency. and cyber means, and also target An-
port city of Duisburg, have amplified nalena Baerbock personally.
the influence it hopes to have on all As a result, both Russia and China can
levels of policy making in Germany. For agree that maintaining the political
Russia, Germany is a crucial market for status quo in Germany – with the con- RUSSIA AS A
energy exports, particularly follow- servative CDU/CSU at the helm of a HURRICANE, CHINA AS
ing the green-lighting of Nord Stream governing coalition – is of mutual in- CLIMATE CHANGE
2, and offers channels for Russia to terest. CDU/CSU Chancellor candidate
shape EU and NATO policies through Armin Laschet is seen as a “continuity The precise timing and means Russia
Russlandversteher, politicians, journal- candidate,” expected to pursue a ver- and China deploy to attempt to influ-
ists, and NGO actors who remain com- sion of Germany’s long-term Wandel ence Germany’s election may depend
mitted to dialogue and feel Russia has durch Handel [change through trade] largely on predictions and early poll-
been disadvantaged in favor of an em- policy, giving China some certain- ing data about the outcome. Howev-
phasis on transatlantic ties. Building ty about where it stands, which could er, neither are likely to be idle as cam-No. 10 | August 2021 5
COMMENTARY Assessing China and Russia’s Influence on the German Parliamentary Elections
paigning enters its final stages. Should well become a harsh reality. This will
the CDU emerge strongly during the require keen journalistic judgement,
campaign, interference from Beijing including requisite investigative ca-
and Moscow probably could remain pacities to ensure a broader capaci-
minimal. However, should the Greens ty to identify fake or inaccurate sourc-
make up ground with their campaign- es. Additional training, particularly in
ing in the weeks before the election, local newsrooms, might be necessary
with a chance of winning the chancel- to support the critical assessment of
lery, China and Russia will likely recal- leaked documents including possible
ibrate their respective approaches and fakes, as well as compromising infor-
mount campaigns with structural sim- mation that may be circulated ahead
ilarities but distinct features based on of the elections. The recent flooding
their own interest mapping. crisis in western Germany may be in-
strumentalized, turned into a narra-
US and French intelligence and dis- tive around fundamental failings of
information experts have character- the government system – a narrative
ized the difference between the two China’s state media and some officials
countries using the phrase “Russia as have already begun to pursue. Media
a hurricane, China as climate change”: watchdogs, both within the profession
short-termist Russia and long-termist, and NGOs, should track and share in-
detrimental China. Is Germany ready formation around false or propagan-
for the stormy times ahead? distic reporting by Russia and Chi-
na-affiliated media in Germany, and
coordinated inauthentic behavior on
BETTER BE SAFE THAN social media such as Twitter, driven for
SORRY: HOW GERMANY example by the CCP’s propaganda ap-
SHOULD PREPARE paratus, a phenomenon that exploded
during the Hong Kong demonstrations
The German political elite, media, and and deepened during the coronavirus
public need to be better prepared to pandemic.
anticipate, identify, and counteract po-
tential influence operations ahead of Finally, German intelligence, law en-
the upcoming elections. Preparations forcement, and the political elite will
need to include both precautionary as need to cohesively and credibly mes-
well as damage control measures, par- sage that interference efforts will be
ticularly considering the experience detected, publicly attributed, and ade-
of earlier hacking attacks. Cyber se- quately sanctioned. To serve as cred-
curity and cyber awareness should be ible threats, political and economic
strengthened to the maximum pos- counter-measures must be elaborat-
sible extent among politicians, their ed in advance, and be supported by
campaign teams, and the party appa- concentrated communications mea-
ratuses. Similarly, enhanced protection sures aimed at deterring Moscow and
mechanisms for critical election infra- Beijing.
structure will be vital, given the recent
global experience of Russian-based
hacker collectives bearing down on
critical infrastructure in the United
States, for example.
Journalists and media executives need
to be made aware that direct or indi-
rect efforts from outside players to in-
fluence Germany’s elections are not a
distant, theoretical possibility, but mayNo. 10 | August 2021 6
COMMENTARY Assessing China and Russia’s Influence on the German Parliamentary Elections
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