Belarusians' views on the political crisis - Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021 - Chatham House
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Belarusians’ views on the political crisis Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021
Notes on methodology Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus's urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level. Previous waves of the survey did not correct for educational level, so in order to make previous data comparable, we recalculated our weightings for earlier waves. This means that in this report the data from previous waves will differ from the same data in previous reports by a few percentage points. The poll was conducted using the Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI) method, which in practice means that it was limited to internet users. Although various sources claim that only 75–82 percent of the population in Belarus uses the web, internet users do remain more economically and socially active. Therefore, despite the fact that our sample has been weighted to accurately reflect the make-up of Belarusian society, it is possible that support for Lukashenka and his policies may be slightly higher than this poll indicates, since Lukashenka's supporters tend to be less socially and economically active than his detractors. We selected the CAWI method because the repressive nature of Belarusian legislation, as well as additional risks faced by researchers collaborating with us for this study, make face-to-face interviews impossible. The statistical margin of error of our sample of 937 people (with a 95 percent confidence level) does not exceed 3.2%. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2
Electoral Preferences Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 3
QUESTION 1
Which of these people do you know (you are familiar with who they
are and what they do)?
Aliaksandr Lukashenka 96% Mikhail Miasnikovich 50%
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya 92% (0%) Siarhei Rumas 50% (-2%)
Viktar Babaryka 87% (+2%) Mikalai Statkevich 50%
Siarhei Tsikhanouski 81% (+1%) Aleh Haidukevich 42%
Valery Tsapkala 74% (+1%) Maksim Znak 37% (-4%)
Marya Kalesnikava 71% (-1%) Pavel Seviaryniec 37%
Pavel Latushka 66% (-1%) Volha Karach 28%
Natalia Kachanava 60% (+2%) Raman Halouchanka 27%
Jury Karaeu 60% (-3%) Jury Vaskrasenski 27%
Uladzimir Makey 59% (+2%) Andrei Dzmitryeu 27% (-6%)
Uladzimir Karanik 59% (-2%) Maksim Bahratsou 10% (+2%)
Zianon Pazniak 54% (-4%)
Pro-protest Pro-regime
Changes since November 2020 in parentheses
4
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International AffairsQUESTION 2
Which of the people on this list do you believe would make a good
president of Belarus? Choose up to three answers.
Viktar Babaryka 34%
Aliaksandr Lukashenka 25%
Pavel Latushka 14%
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya 10%
Valery Tsapkala 9%
Marya Kalesnikava 8%
Siarhei Tsikhanouski 8%
Siarhei Rumas 8%
Mikalai Statkevich 4%
Andrei Dzmitryeu 2%
Zianon Pazniak 2%
Uladzimir Makey 2%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 5QUESTION 3
Which of these people do you believe would make the best president
of Belarus? Choose one answer.
Viktar Babaryka 25%
Aliaksandr Lukashenka 23%
Pavel Latushka 8%
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya 4%
Valery Tsapkala 3%
Siarhei Tsikhanouski 3%
Siarhei Rumas 3%
Marya Kalesnikava 2%
Mikalai Statkevich 2%
Andrei Dzmitryeu 1%
Uladzimir Makey 1%
Zianon Pazniak 1%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 6QUESTION 4
Which of the listed people would you never vote for in a presidential
election? (based on the share of respondents who know of the
person, sorted from best-known to least-known candidate)
Aliaksandr Lukashenka 51% Mikhail Miasnikovich 49%
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya 39% Siarhei Rumas 32%
Viktar Babaryka 21% Mikalai Statkevich 29%
Siarhei Tsikhanouski 35% Aleh Haidukevich 47%
Valery Tsapkala 28% Maksim Znak 18%
Marya Kalesnikava 30% Pavel Seviaryniec 26%
Pavel Latushka 27% Volha Karach 37%
Natalia Kachanava 63% Raman Halouchanka 51%
Jury Karaeu 68% Jury Vaskrasenski 66%
Uladzimir Makey 47% Andrei Dzmitryeu 29%
Uladzimir Karanik 61% Maksim Bahratsou 16%
Zianon Pazniak 47%
Pro-protest Pro-regime
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 7QUESTION 5
Which of the people listed do you trust? (Pro-regime and Siarhei
Rumas, based on the share of respondents who know the person)
Trust Not sure Don’t trust
Aliaksandr Lukashenka 31% 12% 57% Jan. 21 Siarhei Rumas 32% 23% 45% Jan. 21
29% 17% 53% Apr. 21 29% 40% 31% Apr. 21
21% 19% 60% Jan. 21
Uladzimir Makey Raman Halouchanka
17% 33% 51% Apr. 21 14% 33% 53% Apr. 21
15% 13% 72% Jan. 21
Natalia Kachanava Aleh Haidukevich
13% 19% 68% Apr. 21 11% 42% 47% Apr. 21
12% 13% 74% Jan. 21
Jury Karaeu Mikhail Miasnikovich
9% 23% 68% Apr. 21 17% 32% 51% Apr. 21
15% 17% 68% Jan. 21
Uladzimir Karanik Jury Vaskrasenski
12% 23% 65% Apr. 21 8% 23% 69% Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 8QUESTION 5
Do you trust these people? (Pro-protest, based on the share of
respondents who know the person)
Trust Not sure Don’t trust
65% 16% 18% Jan. 21 46% 15% 40% Jan. 21
Maksim Znak Siarhei Tsikhanouski
57% 27% 16% Apr. 21 38% 27% 35% Apr. 21
52% 13% 35% Jan. 21 54% 22% 24% Jan. 21
Marya Kalesnikava Maksim Bahratsou
51% 21% 28% Apr. 21 47% 45% 7% Apr. 21
44% 12% 44% Jan. 21 54% 14% 32% Jan. 21
Sviatlana Tsikanouskaya Viktar Babaryka
37% 21% 42% Apr. 21 48% 22% 30% Apr. 21
50% 15% 35% Jan. 21 46% 21% 33% Jan. 21
Valery Tsapkala Mikalai Statkevich
37% 30% 33% Apr. 21 36% 38% 26% Apr. 21
50% 15% 35% Jan. 21 56% 22% 22% Jan. 21
Andrei Dzmitryeu Pavel Seviaryniec
37% 30% 33% Apr. 21 45% 36% 19% Apr. 21
56% 14% 30% Jan. 21
Pavel Latushka Volha Karach
50% 20% 30% Apr. 21 41% 30% 28% Apr. 21
32% 19% 49% Jan. 21
Zianon Pazniak
19% 41% 40% Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 9Trust index (difference between trust in and mistrust of politicians
based on the share of respondents who know the person)
Pro-regime and Siarhei Rumas Pro-protest
Siarhei Rumas -2% Maksim Znak 41%
Aliaksandr Lukashenka -24% Maksim Bahratsou 40%
Uladzimir Makey -34% Pavel Seviaryniec 25%
Mikhail Miasnikovich -35% Marya Kalesnikava 23%
Aleh Haidukevich -36% Pavel Latushka 20%
Raman Halouchanka -38% Viktar Babaryka 18%
Uladzimir Karanik -54% Volha Karach 13%
Natalia Kachanava -54% Mikalai Statkevich 10%
Jury Karaeu -59% Andrei Dzmitryeu 5%
Jury Vaskrasenski -61% Valery Tsapkala 4%
Siarhei Tsikhanouski 2%
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya -4%
Zianon Pazniak -20%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 10QUESTION 6
Do you trust these organizations? (regime institutions)
Trust Not sure Don’t trust
39% 18% 43% Jan. 21 26% 17% 58% Jan. 21
Army State security bodies
30% 30% 40% Apr. 21 24% 23% 53% Apr. 21
17% 16% 67% Jan. 21 20% 22% 58% Jan. 21
State-owned media Official labour unions
15% 20% 65% Apr. 21 19% 30% 51% Apr. 21
25% 18% 57% Jan. 21 Central Election 16% 18% 66% Jan. 21
Constitutional court Commission
23% 24% 53% Apr. 21 14% 24% 62% Apr. 21
21% 17% 62% Jan. 21 27% 17% 56% Jan. 21
President
Local authorities
17% 28% 55% Apr. 21 26% 20% 54% Apr. 21
28% 12% 60% Jan. 21 Council of Ministers 21% 20% 59% Jan. 21
Police (Government)
22% 20% 57% Apr. 21 21% 24% 54% Apr. 21
20% 21% 59% Jan. 21 21% 17% 62% Jan. 21
Parliament Courts
19% 26% 55% Apr. 21 18% 22% 61% Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 11QUESTION 6
Do you trust these organizations? (independent and pro-protest
institutions)
Trust Not sure Don’t trust
46% 22% 32% Jan. 21 34% 27% 39% Jan. 21
Independent media Coordination Council
40% 38% 22% Apr. 21 30% 42% 28% Apr. 21
36% 31% 33% Jan. 21 34% 23% 43% Jan. 21
Independent labour unions Tsikhanouskaya’s team
33% 43% 24% Apr. 21 30% 28% 42% Apr. 21
37% 29% 34% Jan. 21 19% 45% 35% Jan. 21
National Anti-Crisis
My company’s management
28% 38% 34% Apr. 21 Management 20% 55% 25% Apr. 21
46% 22% 32% Jan. 21 Babaryka’s team / 38% 28% 35% Jan. 21
Orthodox church Babaryka’s Razam party
39% 36% 25% Apr. 21 36% 35% 29% Apr. 21
37% 33% 30% Jan. 21
Catholic church Independent human rights
30% 44% 25% Apr. 21 organizations 38% 43% 19% Apr. 21
17% 42% 41% Jan. 21
Protestant church
10% 53% 36% Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 12ELECTORAL PREFERENCES
Conclusions
AWARENESS TRUST
• After Lukashenka, the most well-known political figures in Belarus • As with the ratings, protest leaders are notably more trusted than
are pro-protest: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, officials. The exception is former prime minister Siarhei Rumas,
Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. who lives outside Belarus and whom many do not consider a part
• In general, people are far more familiar with the protest leaders of the Lukashenka’s regime.
than they are with state officials. Lukashenka’s supporters know • Znak and Bahratsou, who lead in the trust index with more than
their functionaries less well than their opponents do, which 40%, are poorly known by people who do not support the protest
explains the extremely low ratings and trust levels of officials. movement and this explains their high rankings. However, better-
RATINGS known opposition leaders such as Kalesnikava, Latushka and
Babaryka are still highly trusted with 23%, 20% and 18%
• The ratings of protest leaders are much higher than those of state respectively.
officials, while functionaries lead in negative ratings (“anti-rating”).
• In general, attitudes towards both state and protest figures is
• Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate changing, with growing numbers of people expressing
among Belarusian urban citizens, with 25% finding him the most uncertainty.
worthy and 34% thinking he would make a good president. His
anti-rating is also relatively low, with only 21% of Belarusians • State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than
saying that they would never vote for him. half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than
other bodies.
• Lukashenka comes second to Babaryka with 23%, but he has
only 25% support in general: his electorate is more consolidated, • Independent media, labour unions and human rights
whereas those opposed to him could choose between politicians organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
with similar views. At the same time, more than half of urban • Babaryka’s team remains the most trusted pro-protest body.
Belarusians say that they would never vote for him.
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 13International relations Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 14
QUESTION 7
Which of the following statements about Lukashenka do you agree
with?
Lukashenka doesn’t care about Belarusian independence 48%
Lukashenka is the major obstacle for achieving political stability in Belarus 47%
Lukashenka is one of the major obstacles for economic development in Belarus 47%
Lukashenka trades in Belarusian independence 44%
Lukashenka today is the main threat to Belarusian independence 39%
Belarus would not exist as an independent state without Lukashenka 27%
I agree with none of the above 19%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 15QUESTION 8
How do you feel about the following countries?
EU
Russia countries USA China Lithuania Poland Ukraine
10% 13%
17% 14% 18% 15%
33%
Very positive
43%
Somewhat positive
48%
Not sure 53% 58% 49% 55%
Somewhat negative
46%
Very negative
24%
21%
16%
15%
18%
8% 15% 22%
11% 13% 11%
10% 9%
9% 6% 5% 5%
3% 2% 1% 5%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 16QUESTION 9
How would you evaluate the following politicians’ positions on the
world stage, where 1 is an outsider and 7 is a world leader?
Aliaksandr Joe Vladimir
Lukashenka Biden Putin
3.03 4.38 5.38
1 2 3 4 5 Xi Angela 6 7
Outsider Jinping Merkel World leader
5.15 5.57
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 17QUESTIONS 10
How do you assess the similarities between Belarusians and these
nationalities in their mentality, character or culture, where -3 is very
far apart and 3 is very close?
2.3
Russians
2.2
1.8
Ukrainians
1.6
0.6
Poles
0.5
0.1
Lithuanians
-0.1
-1.4
Germans
-1.6
-1.9 April 2021
Americans
-2.0 November 2020
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 18QUESTION 11
How do you assess current relations between Russia and Belarus?
10%
19%
Good and friendly 2% (+2%)
(+3%)
(+1%)
Quite good, neighbourly
Neutral 18%
Quite bad, tense (-1%)
Bad, hostile
Not sure
Changes since November 33%
2020 in parentheses 18% (-2%)
(-3%)
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 19QUESTION 12
How have relations between Russia and Belarus changed over the
last year?
14%
Improving (+3%)
27%
Worsening (+11%)
No change
Not sure
36%
Change since November (-5%)
2020 in parentheses 23%
(-10%)
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 20QUESTION 13
What position should Russia take regarding Belarus?
19%
(-3%)
Support the protest movement
Support Lukashenka
Refrain from interfering
58%
(0%) 23%
(+3%)
Change since November
2020 in parentheses
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 21QUESTION 14
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following
statements about Russia?
Totally agree Somewhat agree Not sure Somewhat disagree Totally disagree
My opinion on the Russian
Russian government actions
government has changed 29% 16% 24% 17% 14% Nov. 20 6% 18% 28% 22% 25% Nov. 20
in solving the crisis are
since it supported
mostly focused on helping
Lukashenka in the political 23% 17% 27% 16% 17% Apr. 21 10% 21% 33% 18% 18% Apr. 21
the Belarusian people
crisis
5%
Nov. 20
Russia should discuss the Nov. 20
33% 39% 16% 29% 20% 21% 11% 20%
Russia is the only support 7% crisis not only with
Lukashenka has 30% 43% 19%
3%
Apr. 21
Lukashenka, but also with 23% 19% 26% 13% 19% Apr. 21
5% Tsikhanouskaya
If Lukashenka left, I would It would be acceptable if
32% 26% 24% 12% 6% Nov. 20 10% 22% 34% 22% 13% Nov. 20
not support a political force there were an openly pro-
which decided to break off Russian party in the
30% 26% 29% 7% 8% Apr. 21 8% 14% 45% 19% 14% Apr. 21
the relationship with Russia Belarusian parliament
11% 5%
Free trade between Russia 43% 38% Nov. 20 Russian media present the 24% 23% 34% 13% 6% Nov. 20
3%
and Belarus is good for both situation in Belarus
11% 2% 4%
countries 42% 43%
2%
Apr. 21 absolutely incorrectly 18% 21% 45%
12%
Apr. 21
12%
32% 29% 16% 19% 4% Nov. 20 I think that the Belarusian 4% 14% 29% 41% Nov. 20
Russia and Belarus should
protests are aimed against
not have any physical border
26% 36% 21% 11% 6% Apr. 21 Russia 6% 12% 28% 27% 27% Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 22QUESTIONS 15, 16
Which political union should Belarus be in? Which option of union
with Russia seems the most appropriate in your view?
Nov. 20 Jan. 21 Apr. 21 Nov. 20 Jan. 21 Apr. 21
In the EU 9% 8% 9% 6%
None 13% 12%
In a union with Russia 27% 28% 33%
32%
30%
Free trade zone 34%
In a union with
Russia and the 41% 42%
EU simultaneously 44%
46% Single market without 43%
38%
political integration
Single market
Belarus should stay with single foreign
23% 21% 11% 10%
outside any unions policy and army 11%
13%
Incorporation into Russia 5% 4% 7%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 23QUESTIONS 17, 18
How do you feel about Vladimir Putin? Has your opinion changed in
the last few months?
November 2020 January 2021 April 2021 November 2020 January 2021 April 2021
Improved 7% 10% 11%
Very positive 19% 18%
22%
Not changed 30%
35% 35%
40% 34%
Somewhat positive 41%
16%
Not sure 14% 19% Worsened 63%
55% 54%
Somewhat negative 14% 16%
14%
Very negative 11% 10% 11%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 24QUESTIONS 19, 20
How would Belarusian foreign policy change if a pro-protest
government came to power? How should it change?
Would Should
change change
22% 25%
38% 42%
Oriented toward friendship and cooperation with Western states
Oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both
Western states and Russia 58% 51%
Oriented toward friendship and cooperation with Russia
57% 48%
20% 25%
5% 10%
Nov. 20 Apr. 21 Nov. 20 Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 25QUESTIONS 21, 22
How will relations with Russia change if a pro-protest government
comes to power? Should Belarus stay in the CSTO (ODKB), leave it
and stay neutral, or leave it to join NATO?
3% 2%
12%
20%
63% 58%
Will definitely improve 43%
35% Should remain in CSTO
Will somewhat improve
Should leave CSTO and remain neutral
Will remain unchanged
Should leave CSTO and join NATO
Will somewhat worsen
Will definitely worsen 25% 29%
31% 35%
16% 14%
6% 7%
Nov. 20 Apr. 21 Nov. 20 Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 26QUESTION 23
What will happen if pro-protest forces come to power?
Belarus will strive to enter the EU 45%
Russian military facilities will be withdrawn 38%
Belarus will conduct a pro-European foreign policy 37%
There will be a border between Belarus and Russia 35%
Belarus will leave the Union State with Russia 34%
Russian investors will not be allowed to take part in privatization 32%
Belarus will strive to enter NATO 31%
NATO military facilities will be placed in Belarus 27%
Trade between Russia and Belarus will fall drastically 26%
Visa requirements will be established between Russia and Belarus 25%
People will be persecuted for pro-Russian views 25%
WW2 history will be revised 25%
Belarus will conduct an anti-Russian foreign policy 24%
The Russian language will lose its official status 23%
There will be a mass demolition of Soviet monuments 23%
Belarus will lose some of its western territory 21%
Belarus will lose some of its eastern territory 18%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 27INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Conclusions
ATTITUDES TO FOREIGN STATES AND LEADERS • One in five Belarusians assesses relations with Russia as friendly
• Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes: one in three and one in as neighborly, which combined amounts to about half
Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79% feel the population assessing relations as good. 18% assess relations
positive in general. as neutral and 10% do not have a firm position, while the
remaining 20% feel that relations are tense or even hostile.
• 71% Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next
highest indicator. At the same time, only 7% feel negative about • 23% think that relations have recently deteriorated, and 27% that
China; the lowest indicator among all the states compared. they have improved.
• Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU • The position on Russian interference is consolidated enough:
states are still perceived generally positively by more than 60% of 58% think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost
Belarusians, with fewer than 20% feeling negative about them. equally divided between those who think Russia should support
the protests (19%) and those who think Russia should support
• The USA is a slight outlier: 24% of Belarusians perceive it Lukashenka (23%).
negatively and only 53% positively. However, it also has the
highest share of people who are uncertain – 24%. • 40% have changed their attitude to the Russian government after
it supported Lukashenka in the crisis and 73% are sure that
• Among the leaders of Russia, Germany, the USA and China, Russia is his sole support – while only 31% believe that Russia’s
Angela Merkel has the strongest reputation as a world leader, actions are focused on supporting the people of Belarus.
while Joe Biden has a lower score, which may be because he
had not been in office long at the time of the survey and was still • Some propaganda claims have only marginal support: just 18%
little known among Belarusians. think that the protests are aimed against Russia and only 16%
disagree that Russian media present the Belarusian crisis
• Belarusians feel a strong affinity with Russians and with inaccurately.
Ukrainians, although slightly less so. Among EU neighbours,
more affinity is felt with Poles than Lithuanians. • Attitudes to Vladimir Putin are more positive (56%) than negative
(27%). However, attitudes towards the Russian president
deteriorated in recent months for more than half of the Belarusian
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs population. 28INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Conclusions
FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE WEST • The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in
• The most popular option for co-operation with Russia is a single the CSTO is 58%, a slight decrease from November. 35% would
market (44%), followed by a free trade zone (33%). Other options like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small
have relatively low or marginal support. Most Belarusians (85%) share (7%) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
consider free trade between the two countries to be a good thing, • The most popular potential changes in foreign policy are: that
and 62% don't see any need for border controls. Belarus should strive to enter the EU and conduct a pro-European
• While 32% of Belarusians see a union with Russia as the most policy; the withdrawal of Russian military facilities and assets; and
appropriate foreign policy, 46% would like to be in a union with establishing border controls with Russia and leaving the Union
both Russia and the EU simultaneously. State.
• Only 22% claim that it is acceptable to have a pro-Russian party • Radical changes, such as persecution for pro-Russian views,
in the parliament, but twice as many people do not have a clear establishing a visa regime or depriving the Russian language of
position. Almost half the population think that Belarusian foreign its official status, are less expected, but are still feared by about a
policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power quarter of the population.
would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both • 21% fear that Belarus would lose its western territories and 18%
Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority its eastern territories.
thinks it should be. 42% expect that foreign policy would lean • Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the
toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only major obstacle for political stability and economic development
25% think it “should”. and is sure he doesn’t care about, and is a threat to,
• Expectations were equal among those who foresee no change in independence.
relations with Russia and those who see them weakening after a
change of power (both 43%); only 14% expect improvement.
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 29Public sentiment Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 30
QUESTION 24
To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?
Totally agree Somewhat agree Not sure Somewhat disagree Totally disagree
I feel safe in Belarus 10% 22% 16% 26% 26%
Belarus is facing a severe economic
26% 38% 26% 6% 3%
crisis in the very near future
Belarus is coping well with
5% 20% 25% 27% 23%
the coronavirus pandemic
My family’s financial situation
7% 10% 14% 35% 33%
has improved in the last two months
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 31QUESTION 25
Which of these statements do you agree with?
The authorities should negotiate with those who disagree with the election results 65%
All political prisoners must be immediately released 64%
Siarhei Tsikhanouski doesn’t deserve a prison term 51%
Many people in Lukashenka’s entourage do not agree with what is happening 50%
Sanctions on enterprises are unacceptable 48%
Lukashenka should negotiate with Tsikhanouskaya 46%
We should admit that Tsikhanouskaya lost the confrontation with Lukashenka 43%
Some countries, like Poland, are interfering in Belarusian internal affairs 35%
Lukashenka’s opponents should admit they lost 33%
I support harsh sanctions on businesses which support the authorities 32%
Lukashenka’s opponents inside Belarus will be defeated in the very near future 26%
We should boycott goods produced by companies supporting Lukashenka 21%
People fleeing Belarus are traitors 15%
The charges against Babaryka are fair 9%
The borders should be totally closed 5%
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 32QUESTIONS 26
When will Lukashenka step down as president?
When should he step down?
Will step Should step
Before June 2021 down down
Before the end of 2021 11%
5% 6%
4%
In 2022
In 2023-24 8% 21%
(before his term ends) 39%
In 2025 27%
(when his term ends)
In 2030 11%
(after one more term) 33%
In 2035 or later 7%
11% 6%
(at least two more terms) 4% 7%
Immediately
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 33QUESTION 27
What will happen if Lukashenka doesn’t leave?
Talented people will flee Belarus 60%
Repression will continue 56%
Belarus will depend on Russia even more 54%
Repression will spread to all areas of life 47%
Exchange rate will fall dramatically 47%
Unemployment will rise 45%
Healthcare quality will drop 37%
Protests will eventually end 36%
Education system quality will drop 35%
Belarusian enterprises will be sold to Russians 35%
Crime rate will grow 29%
Welfare support will increase 16%
Governance system will improve 15%
Prices will stabilize 13% Expectation of
Economy will recover quickly 13% worsening
Salaries and pensions will grow 12%
Expectation of
My personal financial situation will get better 12%
improving
Law enforcement bodies will lose significance 12%
Foreign relations with the West will stabilize 8% Expectation of
Political prisoners will be released 6% liberalization
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 34QUESTIONS 28, 29
How do you feel about the Belarusian protests? Do you support the
protesters’ demands?
September November January April Support Not sure Don’t support
2021 2020 2021 2021
69% 12% 20% Sep. 20
18% New fair election
Very positive 27% 23% 64% 17% 18% Apr. 21
31%
Fair investigation of 78% 14% 8% Sep. 20
18%
16% violence against protesters
17% by law enforcement bodies 72% 16% 12% Apr. 21
Somewhat positive
15%
53% 22% 25% Sep. 20
21% 25% Lukashenka’s resignation
Not sure 19% 48% 27% 25% Apr. 21
23%
Somewhat negative 13% 17% 17% Releasing all political 65% 17% 19% Sep. 20
12% prisoners 64% 19% 16% Apr. 21
Very negative 24% 23% 22% Total end to use of force
19% 66% 15% 20% Sep. 20
against protesters by law
enforcement bodies 64% 19% 17% Apr. 21
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 35QUESTIONS 30, 31
Do you know the date of September 17th? To what extent do you
agree with these statements (based on the share of respondents who
know the date, n=127)?
32% 35% 17.09.39 is a tragic date
10% 23% 28% 22% 17%
18% for Western Belarusians
15% 16%
10% 10% 7%
Western
regions 17.09.39 is the result of 7%
Total Brest Vitsebsk Homel Hrodna Minsk Mahiliou Minsk agreements between 27% 27% 33%
Region Region Region Region Region Region City 6%
USSR and Nazi Germany
We need serious and
Totally agree Not sure Totally disagree detailed public 9%
14% 26% 38%
discussion about 14%
Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree
17.09.39
Reunion of Belarusian 3% 17.09.39 is a
18% 43% 26% 7% 24% 25% 28% 16%
lands started on 17.09.39 9% holiday
We should recognize 17.09.39
as liberation of Western 17.09 is suitable for a 10%
11% 30% 28% 16% 15% 12% 27% 40%
Belarus from Polish occupation “Belarusian unity day” 11%
What happened on 17.09.39 Regardless of historical context
it is right that territories that 4%
was violent takeover of 16% 21% 28% 16% 19% 21% 39% 23%
Western Belarus by USSR joined the BSSR on 17.09.39 12%
became part of Belarus
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 36QUESTIONS 32, 33, 34
Have you watched NEXTA’s movie “Lukashenka: Gold Mine”? Do you
trust the information it presents? How would you rate the movie on a
scale where 1 is “didn’t like at all”, and 10 is “absolutely loved it”?
10
9
Watched full movie Totally trust 27%
8
26%
7
6.32
Somewhat trust 36% 6
57% 5
4
17% Not sure 17%
3
Didn’t watch Somewhat
Watched fragments 13%
mistrust 2
Totally mistrust 7%
1
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 37QUESTION 35
Which of these statements about abortions do you agree with the
most?
11%
(+2%)
Abortions should be allowed in all cases 4%
(0%)
Abortions should be allowed in most cases 35%
Abortions should be banned in most cases (+1%)
15%
Abortions should be totally banned (+2%)
Not sure/don’t want to answer
Change since November
2020 in parentheses
36%
(-5%)
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 38QUESTION 36
Some Belarusian media presented the opinion that Belarusian
society is not ready to vote for women. Do you agree with this
statement?
7%
13%
(-1%)
(+2%)
Totally agree 13%
Somewhat agree (+4%)
Somewhat disagree
Totally disagree
Not sure/don’t want to answer
37%
Changes since November (-7%) 30%
2020 in parentheses (+2%)
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 39QUESTION 37
Is wage inequality between women and men widespread in Belarus?
10% 10%
(-1%) (0%)
Widespread
Somewhat common
17%
Somewhat uncommon
(+1%)
Very uncommon or non-existent 27%
(+2%)
Not sure/don’t want to answer
Change since November
2020 in parentheses
35%
(-1%)
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 40PUBLIC SENTIMENT
Conclusions
GENERAL SENTIMENT THE FUTURE OF BELARUS AND LUKASHENKA
• The political crisis has led to a high level of uncertainty in • More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave
Belarus: more than half of Belarusians do not feel safe in their immediately or before the end of 2021. 27% think that he should
own country. leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka
• Two-thirds of Belarusians don’t agree that their family’s financial should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only
situation has improved lately. 62% expect a severe economic 10% support this.
crisis in the very near future. • Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26% believe he
• Every second Belarusian thinks that Belarus has coped badly will leave office this year. One in three think he will leave in 2025,
with the pandemic, while only a quarter think it is coping well. a further 19% that he will stay on for further terms in office.
• In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the • If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in
authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in
political prisoners. all areas of life, falling exchange rates and increased dependency
on Russia.
• More than 90% of the population is convinced that the charges
against Viktar Babaryka are unfair: even many Lukashenka • Positive changes are expected by very few: from 12% to 16%
supporters share this viewpoint. believe that welfare support and wages will increase or that the
economy will stabilize.
• The release of political prisoners seems impossible without
Lukashenka’s resignation for 94% of Belarusians, while the vast
majority of the population believe that the law enforcement
agencies will retain the political significance they gained recently.
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 41PUBLIC SENTIMENT
Conclusions
PROTESTS • Those who know this historical event mostly agree that it was the
• The number of people feeling positive about the protests is slowly date when reunion started and, regardless of the historical
declining. context, think it is right that western Belarus became part of the
BSSR. People also agree that what happened was the result of
• Most people (72%) support a fair investigation into the use of agreements between the USSR and Nazi Germany.
force against protesters, with only 12% being against an
investigation (a slight increase from 8% in September). • However, opinions on whether it was a violent takeover and
whether it is a “tragic” date are highly mixed. Only 31% consider
• Other demands, such as for a new fair election, the release of all the date a holiday and 61% disagree or are not sure if it is
political prisoners, and the cessation of the use of force, are suitable as the basis of a “Belarusian Unity Day”.
supported by 64%, with 17-19% uncertain.
OTHER INSIGHTS
• The least popular protest demand is Lukashenka’s resignation,
which is supported by 48% and unsupported by 25%. • 26% of Belarusians watched the whole movie “Lukashenka: Gold
Mine” by NEXTA, with a further 17% having seen at least
excepts. Just 20% distrust the information in the film, while 63%
SEPTEMBER 17th, 1939 trust it.
• The date of the Soviet invasion of Poland, which led to the • Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19% thinking
annexation of eastern Poland and the reunion of Belarusian they should be banned in most or all cases.
lands, has recently been promoted by the Belarusian authorities • The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that
as a possible “Belarusian Unity Day” holiday. However, only 18% society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only
of Belarusians know the date. Residents in the western regions of 20% agree with this opinion.
Brest and Hrodna have better-than-average knowledge – 32%
and 35% respectively. • 52% don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between
men and women in Belarus, while 37% do see an issue.
Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 42The five most frequently asked questions Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 43
Are your critics right to say the polling is politicized? Sufficient information on the methodology is included in each research report, and everyone is free to make their own value judgments. By reading our research methodology, a reader can assess any criticism leveled against the polling. We strive to be as objective as possible, which is why we provide information on the methods and timing of the study, on the sample, and on the wording of the questions and all response options. Also, for transparency’s sake, we publish the raw data (all respondents' answers) for each round of polling. Anyone can check our statistical calculations and carry out their own analysis based on these data. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 44
What methods do you use in your research? We interview about a thousand people every two months. The composition of our sample corresponds to the general structure of the urban population of Belarus by gender, age, education and size of the city of residence of the respondents. The statistical error in our research is 3%; our data can be wrong by that in either direction. We conduct the survey via an online panel using the computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI) method, which in practice means that it is limited only to internet users. Thanks to this, we are able to carry out these studies very quickly. Very importantly, survey participants feel more secure when they fill out the online survey themselves than they would if they were answering the questions over the phone. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 45
Is a sample size of under a thousand people enough? Yes, it is. There are several sampling models that are used for Belarus and which represent the entire population of the country with a specified error (“the sampling error”). The sizes of these samples range from about 600 to 2,500 people. For example, the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences conducts research with a sample of 600 people. The choice of model used to obtain a representative sample population is determined by the objectives of the study, the resources available, and time constraints. In conditions of political instability, the time factor is critical: the situation is changing rapidly and therefore surveys need to be conducted in a short timeframe or else there is a risk that information collected at the very beginning of the study becomes out-of-date. For these reasons, a sample size of 1,000 people was chosen. This is sufficient for our research objectives. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 46
Why are you using computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI)? Sociologists constantly change their methods of collecting data. Initially, sociologists collected data live (face-to- face), later telephone interviewing became the dominant method, and now sociologists most frequently use online surveys. This is not a significant methodological problem, since the number of internet users in Belarus is among the highest in the former republics of the USSR. According to a study by DataReportal, in 2020 Belarus had 7.8 million internet users, which is 83% of the total population. According to rough estimates, this is about 90-95% of the population over 15 years old. CAWI is widely used both on its own and in combination with the traditional face-to-face and/or telephone surveys. Its main advantages are the speed of data collection and the relatively low cost, without any loss of data quality. For example, online polls are used by reputable social science services such as Gallup and the Pew Research Center. In addition to these features of CAWI methodology, we took into account the epidemiological situation in the country. Remote polling allowed us to "maintain social distancing" and minimize the risk of the spread of coronavirus. Another important motivation is the restrictions on sociological research in Belarus. We cannot risk the freedom and wellbeing of our interviewers. Accordingly, the CAWI technique seems optimal. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 47
Why doesn't your research include rural populations? There are both organizational and methodological difficulties. Despite these we are working on solutions and planning to expand the study to this segment of the population. It is not yet possible to give exact dates, but rural populations will certainly be included in the sample in the future. At the same time, our preliminary analysis of the situation showed that, due to the level of urbanization in the country and the specifics of the information and communication space, there are no critical differences between answers given by rural and urban residents. Undoubtedly, Belarusian villagers differ from the inhabitants of Minsk, but their worldview is similar to that of residents in small towns. Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 48
Contact information Dr Ryhor Astapenia Belarus Initiative Director astapenia@protonmail.com Chatham House | The Royal Institute of International Affairs 49
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