Breaking Down Hitler's Magic: An Analysis of Adolf Hitler's "Unifying" Rhetoric in 1934 and 1939
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Breaking Down Hitler’s Magic:
An Analysis of Adolf Hitler’s “Unifying” Rhetoric in
1934 and 1939
Jennifer Liu | University of Texas – Austin
Adolf Hitler dealt with several rhetorically difficult situations in the years leading up to Word War II. One
was his announcement of the invasion of Poland in September 1939. This should not have been a well-re-
ceived message—public sentiment and general domestic conditions did not create a favorable
environment for another war—yet it was. The same phenomenon had occurred five years earlier, after
the Night of Long Knives, in July 1934. This analysis looks at the rhetorical strategies Hitler employed in
both speeches which contributed to his success, specifically in the context of what Kenneth Burke refers
to as Hitler’s “unifying device.” I conclude by determining that Hitler’s use of several rhetorical strate-
gies detailed by figures such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Althusser, Koutsantoni, and
Roberts-Miller were key to his rhetorical success.
Hitler’s armed forces invaded Poland on people. Kenneth Burke describes this as
September 1, 1939 as the first step of opera- Hitler’s rhetorical “magic.”
tion “Fall Weiss.” What would result in six American war correspondent William
years of hostile occupation began aggres- Shirer wrote on the morning of August 31,
sively—the operation was “ambitious” and 1939 —just one day before the invasion of
“maximum-effort,” with “more than 60 Poland—that “everybody [was] against the
divisions—nearly two-thirds of the entire war.” Germans felt this sentiment so strongly
German army” assigned to it (Axelrod). that people were actually “talking openly”
And while the beginnings of World War II about their opposition to it, that they were
may have been an impressive display of “kicking about being kept in the dark” (Berlin
German strength, the sentiments of the 145). Shirer mentions how a German com-
global community didn’t necessary reflect plained to him that, “‘We know nothing.
that. Hitler’s invasion might very well have Why don’t they tell us what’s up?’” (145). It
even been condemned by his own parlia- was clear that the German public was strongly
ment, the Reichstag, as its members were opposed to the idea of war, and all of this even
representatives of a war-weary German peo- prompted Shirer to ask, “How can a country
ple who were still feeling the effects of the go into a major war with a population so
recent “Great War.” But because of a rhetor- against it?” (145). And Hitler—either already
ical foundation Hitler had established five aware of this sentiment or fearing for good
years before, that never happened—instead, reason that the public might feel this way—
he was able to carry out his invasion with- withheld very important information from
out any real objection from the German the public regarding the possibility of war.
Liu | 7The German populace was also war- somehow able to pull off these rhetorical weary because of the difficult German feats, what is more valuable is examining spe- economy. In addition, the “war guilt clause” cific instances of demagoguery. Roberts- of the Treaty of Versailles had assigned all Miller argues that “an incident of demagogu- blame and moral responsibility for damage ery matters to the degree that it is part of a done to the Allies during the first world larger discourse” (3). And while Burke refers war to Germany (“Reparations”). This was to Hitler’s rhetoric as being “Nazi magic,” especially humiliating for the country— Roberts-Miller states that the process of “try- “Germans across the political spectrum ing to identify demagogues is too often were offended by the implication that the grounded in the notion that particular fig- war was a result of German aggression, and ures are nearly magical, and they control the that Germany alone was responsible for it” prejudiced, emotional, feminized masses (“Reparations”). The first world war had with a word wand” (3). also distressed global economies, and What then made Hitler’s medicine so Germany especially suffered from inflation effective that it unified a shattered country? on a massive scale—its hyperinflation was That the country was still reeling from the “the most spectacular the world had seen” effects of that war, economic and otherwise, (Allen). The implications of this problem meant that convincing the German public would extend far beyond just the immediate that invading Poland and guaranteeing effects on the German economy—so much themselves entry into another undoubtedly so that in hindsight, many scholars now costly war should have been a difficult—if actually “blame the episode of German not impossible—hurdle to overcome for hyperinflation for creating the political con- Hitler. And it might have been, had Hitler ditions that led to Hitler’s rise to power” not already succeeded in what was supposed (Allen). Yet at the time, this level of eco- to be another impossible rhetorical moment nomic instability meant that for the vast five years earlier, on July 13, 1934. But he majority of the country, another war was did, using three key rhetorical moves to the last thing on their minds. override a skeptical audience’s hesitance. In his 1957 book The Philosophy of Literary And so, he did it again on September 1, Form, Kenneth Burke describes Hitler as 1939. In an effort to understand how this being a “man who swung a great people into was accomplished, this essay will analyze his wake,” a “medicine-man” who “found a those two speeches in the context of Hitler’s panacea … that made such sinister unifying unifying, “medicinal” rhetoric. possible within his own nation” (165). We might, and often do, call him a dema- Laying the Groundwork for Poland gogue—one of history’s most notorious. But Both Hitler’s July 13, 1934 and September labeling Hitler as a demagogue doesn’t tell us 1, 1939 addresses to the Reichstag were much by itself. In Rhetoric and Demagoguery, instances in which he especially needed to Patricia Roberts-Miller claims that dema- work his medicinal magic. The former was goguery is a continuum, “neither an identity Hitler’s public explanation and justification nor a discrete category” (2). Instead of simply for the Night of Long Knives, a political resigning ourselves to the fact that Hitler was purge, and the latter announced his 8 | Young Scholars in Writing
watershed decision to invade Poland and In introducing his plan for Poland, Hitler
begin what would become the deadliest war begins laying the foundation for his reason-
in history. Both were addressed to a tired ing by first telling the Reichstag that “[for]
and worn public, and both sought to excuse months [Germany has] been suffering under
and even build support for actions that the torture of a problem which the Versailles
divided public opinion. Diktat created,” a problem that “has deterio-
But Hitler was able to circumvent these rated until it [has become] intolerable”
obstacles by employing three main strate- (“1939”). Hitler adds that “Danzig was and is
gies: common knowledge markers, paired a German city,” that “[the] Corridor was and
terms, and ingroup and outgroup identifica- is German,” and that “[both] these territories
tion. The first, common knowledge markers, owe their cultural development exclusively to
is a rhetorical device that stresses points of the German people.” He says in addition to
shared interest between the author and the the fact that “[more] than 1,000,000 people
reader—or in this case, the speaker and the of German blood had in the year 1919 –1920
audience. Paired terms contrast certain ideas to leave their homeland,” “all German
and images to create ideological dichoto- minorities living [in the Corridor] have been
mies, and in/outgroup identification is a ill-treated in the most distressing manner.”
common method of unification. To best Although Hitler’s first couple of state-
understand how Hitler effectively used ments might be subjective and could
these strategies, this paper will look at the possibly be put up for debate, the last one is
latter speech—September 1, 1939 —first, as less so. Even though Hitler uses absolutes—
its success appears to have been built upon like “all” and “most”—the claim is a little
Hitler’s earlier rhetorical victory in 1934. harder to argue with on the merit that there
does exist some empirical evidence support-
Common Knowledge Markers ing it. But it is clear in this introduction
Common knowledge markers, Hitler’s first that Hitler attributes Germany’s hardships
strategy, are described by Koutsantoni in as arising solely from the harsh terms of the
Developing Academic Literacies as rhetorical Treaty of Versailles. By doing so, Hitler
devices that “stress common knowledge shifts blame away from something that
between authors and readers” to “support their might be found within the state to an exter-
own claims and therefore strengthen them, by nal factor that is out of his control. Painting
stressing the fact that they are based on knowl- Germany as being unfairly subjected to this
edge that everyone in the field is (or should be) abuse creates a feeling of helplessness and
familiar with” (146-47). These markers can be victimization that he will gather as momen-
“expressions of generalized attribution”—such tum in continuing his argument.
as it is known—which work by “[referring] to After airing out these grievances, Hitler
points that are considered … self-explanatory” begins recounting the events that he says
(147). They can also be adjectives such as com- factored in to his decision to invade Poland.
mon, which work to “convey normality” (146). He talks about his many attempts at mak-
And Hitler, whose ideas were far from normal, ing “proposals for revision … of this
clearly stood to benefit by inserting such mark- intolerable position” that Germany finds
ers throughout his speech. itself in, which he reminds the Reichstag,
Liu | 9“as you know, have been rejected.” Hitler positions issues in ways that portray them as tells them, “You know the proposals that I being extremely evident or obvious. The have made. … You know the endless order of his argument may be reversed so attempts I made for a peaceful clarification that his conclusion is first and his premise is and understanding.” And regarding the second, but he is still assuming and imply- British government’s proposal that Poland ing that it is just as clear to Russia as it is to and Germany should try again at arriving at Germany what the nature of their relation- a compromise, Hitler says to the Reichstag ship and the basis of their agreement is. that he had “worked out a basis for these The latter part of Hitler’s 1939 speech negotiations which are known to you.” Yet focuses on his many attempts to address he never actually elaborates on what those and improve Germany’s relations with negotiations entailed. Instead, he continues Poland. He repeatedly tells the Reichstag, I as if he assumes that his audience both have done this or that. He says, “On my own remembers and understands what those initiative I have, not once but several times, negotiations were. made proposals for the revision of intolera- This is a strategic assumption. There are ble conditions” and that “[in] the same way, certain phrases Hitler continually uses I have also tried to solve the problem of when addressing the Reichstag—specifi- Danzig, the Corridor, etc., by proposing a cally, you know and known to you—that he peaceful discussion.” But when his efforts offers in lieu of evidence proving he actually were proving to be futile, he tells the did what he said he did. Hitler seems to be Reichstag, “I made one more final effort to justifying his claims with them. But he accept a proposal for mediation on the part never does his audience the favor of actually of the British Government.” Hitler tells explaining what he’s referring to when he them that when he accepted it, “[for] two uses these phrases, even though he repeats whole days [he] sat in [his] government and them multiple times throughout the speech. waited … for the Polish Government to Hitler then reminds the Reichstag that he send a plenipotentiary,” but still, “they did “tried to solve the problem of Danzig, the not send us [one].” By offering these Corridor,” simply because “[that] the problems attempts he had made as proof that he gen- had to be solved was clear.” He does not qual- uinely tried to resolve the issue peacefully, ify that statement to clarify that in his opinion, Hitler eliminates a possible objection to war this was clear. It just was. And he does the on the grounds that there might be other exact same thing when he starts talking about non-violent avenues to take. Germany’s relationship with Russia. Essentially, Hitler gives the German people Hitler says that, “[given] the fact that his personal account of what happened and Soviet Russia has no intention of exporting states as fact that they do remember—or at its doctrine to Germany, [he] no longer least recognize—what he refers to in his [sees] any reason why [they] should still speech. But in reality, what he said never hap- oppose one another,” because “[on] both pened. At least not in the way he said it did. sides [they] are clear on that.” So, not only According to Shirer, Hitler agreed to the does Hitler insist that his audience already British government’s proposal only on the knows what he’s talking about, he also condition that a “Polish emissary, with full 10 | Young Scholars in Writing
powers to conclude negotiations, must done everything possible to maintain the
arrive in Berlin the next day” (20th 436). peace,” which “explains [his] generous offer
This was impossible, and Hitler was well about Danzig and the Corridor” (20th 438).
aware of it. He had only given his proposal It also explains why Hitler says to the
to Henderson, the British ambassador to Reichstag that, “when [he] now [asks] sacri-
Germany, the night before, so there was fices of the German people and if necessary
legitimately no way that the Polish govern- every sacrifice,” that “[he has] a right to do so”
ment could have received Hitler’s message (“1939”). Hitler was using those proposals as
and sent an emissary down in time to meet proof for the Germans that he had exhausted
Hitler’s deadline. Shirer says this proves that every possibility, when he really had not. And
Hitler’s proposals were “never meant to be by giving his audience that illusion, Hitler is
taken seriously,” that they were only “a sham able to overcome that hurdle and take the lib-
to fool the German people and, if possible, erty of continuing with his argument.
world opinion into believing that Hitler, at Given this information, it seems that Hitler
the last moment, in an attempt to reach a was using those common knowledge markers
reasonable settlement had made a fair offer in the first half of his speech to lay the foun-
to Poland and that the Polish government dation for this “proof.” By assuming that his
would not even send an emissary to Berlin audience already remembered what he was
to discuss it” (438). So, the proposal Hitler talking about, Hitler was able to create some
said he had accepted from the British facsimile of a logical chain of reasoning.
Government, “that Poland and Germany When Hitler was addressing his audience
should come into direct contact and once using those common knowledge markers,
more pursue negotiations,” the proposal he when he was making those assumptions,
said he “worked out a basis for … that were what he was doing was essentially priming
known to [the Reichstag],” was purely a stra- them to be his enablers. Jasinski says this
tegic and manipulative tactic. And when “process of hailing or being called on” is
Hitler says in his speech that he waited “two similar to Althusser’s definition of interpel-
whole days” for a Polish plenipotentiary, he lation, which occurs when “the act of
was simply lying. But Hitler pulled it off addressing [a] person does something: it
well—Shirer writes that on 3:30 AM of positions the person in a certain way” (320).
September 1, listening to the German broad- Interpellation works because “[when] the
cast announcing the proposals to Poland, he person recognizes or acknowledges that he
was “taken aback by their reasonableness,” or she is being called on, the person is
and that, “having to translate them for our ‘recruited’ … into [that] position” (320).
American listeners immediately … [he] Hitler recruited his audience through inter-
missed the catch”—that catch being Hitler’s pellation by using those prompting phrases,
attempt to warp time (Berlin 146). by positioning them to support his decision
Hitler later even admitted that he was to invade Poland despite the fact that audi-
lying. Shirer says that Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s ence members opposed what that decision
interpreter, had overheard Hitler say that actually meant—war. But by layering his
“[he] needed an alibi ... especially with the lies in between those phrases, by acting
German people, to show them that [he] had both like his audience agreed with him and
Liu | 11that what he was saying made complete log- that this suspicion was so prevalent that “local
ical sense, Hitler made it nearly impossible police authorities [even] reported an atmo-
to refute what he was saying. sphere of widespread rumor and speculation,
Hitler took full advantage of the fact that ‘grumbling’ and ‘carping’” (38). It should
those common knowledge markers were have been extremely difficult for Hitler to
supposed to be self-explanatory. He used explain away this deadly event to such a wary
those phrases to make his audience feel that public. But surprisingly, Evans concludes,
they were supposed to be familiar with what this “open confession of the complete illegal-
he was talking about, that they should rec- ity of his action in formal terms,” this candid
ognize and accept it. By doing so, he called listing of lives lost on that night, “did not run
them to be part of an imaginary “commu- into any criticism from the judicial authori-
nity” of people who supported his actions. ties” (38). In fact, Hitler’s speech was so
effective that the Reichstag “enthusiastically
The Night of Long Knives applauded Hitler’s justification and passed a
Five years earlier, Hitler had used the exact resolution thanking him for his action”; a law
same tactic in his public speech addressing was even passed soon after, which gave
the events of June 30, 1934 —also known as Hitler’s actions “retroactive legality” (38).
the Night of Long Knives. His purpose this Evans gives an account of a schoolteacher
time was similar; Hitler had to convince his named Luise Solmitz who had initially
audience of the existence of a problem he described that day’s events as one that had
characterized as being an imminent reality “shattered all of us right down to our inner-
and needing to be urgently solved. most heart” (39). But “[as] details began to
The Night of Long Knives was just as emerge” during Hitler’s public address,
deadly as it sounds. It was a purge of Hitler’s Solmitz began to “[find] herself overcome
political dissidents that ended in the deaths with admiration for Hitler’s conduct” (39).
of—as he lists out—nineteen high-ranking She quickly reversed her position, saying
SA leaders, thirty-one other SA leaders and that, “The personal courage, the decisive-
members, three SS leaders, five non-SA ness and effectiveness [Hitler] showed in
party comrades, and “three members of the Munich, the decisiveness and effectiveness,
SS … guilty of disgraceful abuse of prison- that is unique” (39). Moreover, Evans says
ers in protective custody” who were shot; that her reaction was “not untypical” of the
thirteen SA leaders and civilians who had public (38). Hitler’s speech had apparently
“resisted arrest and sacrificed their lives in worked its magic.
the process”; and finally, “three other lives” The way in which Hitler introduced the
that were “ended by suicide” (“1934,” 498). problem in 1934 was a prequel to the way he
The SA, the Sturmabteilung, was the Nazi would start his Poland speech five years later.
party’s paramilitary organization; the SS, He says that there had been “prattle of a new
the Schutzstaffel, was Heinrich Himmler’s revolution, of a new upheaval, of a new upris-
paramilitary force. ing,” that eventually became “no longer
Historian Richard Evans reports that many possible to simply dismiss as empty chatter”
people already “suspected that there was more (488). Hitler says that his “[repeated] attempts
to the events of 30 June than met the eye,” to remedy this [problem] through normal
12 | Young Scholars in Writingofficial channels failed each time” (489). Just Honor and obedience forced us to
like how he would frame the problem of refuse to obey [to the usurpers]; love
Poland to be one that he was finally forced to of the nation and Vaterland obliged us
address, Hitler establishes that he had “repeat- to wage war on them; the amorality of
edly” tried being peaceful in the events leading their laws extinguished in us the con-
up to the Night of Long Knives, but reluctance viction of the necessity for complying
and lack of cooperation by others meant he with them—and hence we became
eventually had to resort to using violence. revolutionaries. However, even as rev-
Hitler then says that he has “always olutionaries, we had not disassociated
stressed that an authoritarian regime bears ourselves from the obligation to apply
particularly great responsibilities,” that he to ourselves the natural laws of the
has “always insisted that higher demands be sovereign right of our Volk and to
placed upon the behavior and conduct of respect these laws. (486)
National Socialist leaders than upon the
other Volksgenossen” (490). By using the Hitler emphasizes the fact that he took
phrase I have always, Hitler tries not just to action out of necessity, saying that:
lend credibility to what he is saying, but It was not our intention to violate the
frames it in a way that there is no excuse for will and the right of self-determina-
his audience to have thought otherwise. tion of the German Volk, but to drive
Unless his audience knows every single one away those who violated the nation …
of his actions, which they did not, this was a When a deathly check is violently
non-rebuttable phrase. In this situation, they imposed upon the natural develop-
had no choice but to take him at his word. ment of a Volk, an act of violence may
Hitler tells his audience that he hopes the serve to release the artificially inter-
purge will “hopefully [live] on in … history rupted flow of evolution to allow it
for all time as both a sad reminder and a once again the freedom of natural
warning,” saying that it had grown out of “a development. (486)
combination of objective circumstances and
personal guilt, of human incompetence and Hitler says these dissidents are nothing
human defects” (485). He does his victims more than a “little colony of drones,” claim-
no favors in painting them as a slothful ing that they are “without any living contact
enemy, saying their “inborn incompetence” with life, with the feelings, hopes and cares
meant that they were “unable … to prove of the rest of the Volk” (488). And they are
their worth by positive, useful work” (486). especially dangerous, since they are “verita-
But the enemy were also “deserters and ble germ-carriers for unrest, uncertainty,
mutineers,” and Hitler tells the Reichstag rumors, allegations, lies, suspicions, slander,
that they must “inwardly disassociate [them- and fear,” “[breaking] every single law of
selves] from these concepts” (486). These decency and modesty” and poisoning what
concepts, he says, are “oppositional ele- should be a “healthy Volk,” making it so
ments” to the German Volk (487). that it has become “difficult to recognize or
In describing what compelled him to act draw the natural boundaries between them
as harshly as he did, Hitler says: and the Volk” (488).
Liu | 13So, Hitler says, there could be “no ques- Hitler’s choice of terms focuses on con-
tion of the fact that it would be better to trasting the evils he says Germany is
destroy a hundred mutineers, plotters and currently dealing with—namely, the “amoral,”
conspirators than to allow ten thousand “germ-carrying” conspirators—with what
innocent SA men on the one hand and ten he says the country should be striving
thousand equally innocent persons on the toward and working to protect—the true
other to bleed to death” (498). With this, he German Volk. When Hitler emphasizes the
warns that “[the] nation should know that importance of dissociating from the enemy,
no one can threaten its existence—which is he makes sure to draw a distinction between
guaranteed by inner law and order—and the revolutionaries that the enemy is and the
escape unpunished!” (497). revolutionaries he says the National Socialist
State is composed of. He says that the for-
Paired Terms mer are revolutionaries who have “lost all
Throughout this entire disparaging narra- inner connection to a regulated human
tive, Hitler also speaks in paired terms, social order,” while his revolutionaries are
pitting the opposition’s vision of what he tied to “the obligation to apply to ourselves
calls a “Communist paradise” against his the natural laws of the sovereign right of our
goals for the National Socialist State (485). Volk” (486). The terms Hitler uses to por-
Paired terms are a rhetorical concept essen- tray the enemy are placed above the terms he
tial to the idea of dissociation that is uses to describe his own forces. Each con-
outlined by Chaim Perelman and Lucie trast these terms draw builds upon each
Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New Rhetoric. other to bolster his message.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to
them as “philosophical pairs,” describing Table 1
them as “notions that are formed on the Paired terms in Hitler’s 1934 Speech to
model of the ‘appearance-reality’ pair” typi- the Reichstag
cally found in philosophy (24). Here, each “Lower” Term “Higher” Term
pair is actually an opposition that symbol-
Deserters, mutineers, Revolutionaries,
izes a dissociation of certain ideas—“in each plotters, conspirators innocent persons
case, reality is opposed to appearance” (24).
“Germ-carriers” Healthy Volk
A philosophical pair works toward dissocia-
tion by “[depreciating] … an accepted Amoral laws Natural laws
value” and replacing it with another that is Unrest, uncertainty, Inner law and order
then “accorded the original value” (24). The rumors, allegations, lies,
only requirements are that an opposing con- suspicion, slander, fear
ception must be “shown to be valuable,
relevant, as well as incompatible with the Hitler would later use the same tactic in
common use of the same notion” (24). his 1939 speech to highlight the contrasts
Essentially, the paired terms work to create a between his characterizations of Poland and
comprehensive picture of two dichotomous Germany—specifically, that Poland was
images that each derive part of their image “strangling … the Free City of Danzig,” that
from their opposition of the other. they were placing “undue pressure” and
14 | Young Scholars in Writinginflicting “terror” on German citizens. revolutionaries who were shaken and
Hitler himself, however, had a “love of peace uprooted in 1918 in regard to their relation
and … patience” and was striving toward a to the State and who thus,” according to
“peaceful co-existence.” To Hitler, Germany Hitler, “have lost all inner connection to a
represents freedom, while Poland is the regulated human social order”; they are
oppressive perpetrator of “serious atrocities” “pathological enemies” of the State (486).
against peaceful German people. Finally, the fourth are those who “have
nothing to do and thus find the time and
Table 2 opportunity to deliver oral reports on every-
Paired terms in Hitler’s 1939 Speech to thing capable of bringing some interesting
the Reichstag and important variety to their lives which
Freedom Oppression, are,” in Hitler’s eyes, “otherwise completely
persecution meaningless” (487). Hitler harshly criticizes
Peace, patience “Serious atrocities” the fourth group of people as being those
whose “sole activity consists of doing noth-
By using these paired terms, Hitler is able ing, followed by more of the same to
to subtly illustrate two different group recuperate from having done nothing”—
memberships. Roberts-Miller says this tech- meanwhile, “the overwhelming majority in
nique is inherent to demagoguery, because the nation is made to earn its daily bread by
“the accusation of bias is made through toilsome labor, in certain classes of life”
assertions about group membership, and (487). By saying this, by characterizing
such assertions release the rhetor from the these groups as being the complete opposite
responsibility of actually engaging the argu- of what he says real “Volk” are, Hitler
ment” (17). And so, Hitler’s reasons for focuses his audience’s attention on that
invading Poland appear to be truly justified stark contrast. By polarizing these two main
even without him having to prove a legiti- groups—the Volk and the “usurpers”—
mate argument. Hitler encourages his audience to foster
resentment and direct enmity and hostility
Ingroup / Outgroup Association towards those he claims are lazy and have
Hitler then builds upon this villainous nothing better to do with their time but
characterization of the enemy by delving incite violence and revolution.
into specifics, naming the four main groups Outlining these outgroups gave Hitler’s
he has identified as being particularly audience the tools to achieve identification
“destructive elements” (“1934” 486 ). The through antithesis, a method of unification
first he calls a “phenomenon which poisons within an ingroup that occurs when the group
and makes dupes of the Volk,” while “the “focuses on uniting in the face of a shared
second group of discontented is comprised enemy” (Jasinski 305). Identification is a
of those political leaders who regard their concept described by Kenneth Burke that
futures as having been settled by January 30 deals intimately with the role of language—
but who have never been able to reconcile language, and rhetoric more specifically, must
themselves to the irreversibility of this fact” be used to “promote identification or over-
(485). The third group is “made up of those come division” within people who are
Liu | 15inherently divided (Jasinski 305). Yet identifi- analyze their interactions and effects.
cation is not incompatible with the Sometimes, the effects are big. And Hitler’s
preservation of personal identity: Burke says 1939 speech announcing the invasion of
that two people, A and B, are not identical; Poland wasn’t even just monumental; it
however, “insofar as their interests are joined, changed the trajectory of world history.
A is identified with B” (qtd. in Jasinski 305). With the use of strategies as simple as com-
In Hitler’s demagoguery, the ultimate mon knowledge markers, paired terms, and
ingroup is the Volk, the German people. In ingroup/outgroup identification, Hitler was
his 1939 speech, Hitler not only reinforced able to justify the unjustifiable.
this idea by portraying Poland, the enemy, as Hitler had told his audience at the begin-
being the ultimate “other,” but by targeting ning of his 1934 speech that he would be
German “traitors” as well. He says, “We have “completely frank” with them regarding the
nothing to do with traitors,” that “It is quite events that occurred on the night of June 30
unimportant whether we ourselves live, but it (485). To his credit, Hitler did present an
is essential that our people shall live, that extensive list of the people who had been
Germany shall live.” Poland and any traitors killed during the purge. And given this
stand in opposition to Hitler’s community extremely clear and straightforward depic-
that he says is “bound together by vows, ready tion of the enemy, it truly might have
for anything, resolved never to surrender.” appeared to his audience that Hitler really
The overwhelming sentiment created by was just getting to the point. Using com-
this in- and out-grouping is that of the need mon knowledge markers that subtly
for self-preservation and self-defense. Hitler positioned his audience to readily support
was fully aware of the power of this strategy, him only added to this illusion. The things
saying that, “As a whole, and at all times, the Hitler publicly admitted to doing were so
efficiency of the truly national leader consists inhumane that they should have been inex-
primarily in preventing the division of the cusable. But by using paired terms, he was
attention of a people, and always in concen- able to portray the enemy to be so terribly
trating it on a single enemy … It is part of the evil that his actions would be seen as a
genius of a great leader to make adversaries of response of the appropriate magnitude. In
different fields appear as always belonging to addition, Hitler had offered forth four clear
one category only” (qtd. in Burke 165). outgroups. He gave his audience an enemy
to focus on and band together against,
Conclusion essentially providing them with everything
Rhetoric attempts to explain the ways in they needed to participate in identification
which words move people to action. How through antithesis.
these words are used, how they are arranged, All of these factors—common knowledge
and the context in which they live—these all markers, reinforced by paired terms, combined
affect the final impact of those words. While with clear ingroup and outgroup identifica-
it may not give us the ability to determine tion—made for a deadly but extremely
for certain an individual’s motive, rhetoric effective cocktail of drugs. Administered
gives us the power to identify the connec- against the backdrop of the chaos lingering
tions between certain words and phrases, to from the First World War, it gave Hitler his
16 | Young Scholars in Writingseemingly magical ability to unite the country carefully,” so that we might know “exactly
and rise to power. Kenneth Burke described what to guard against, if we are to forestall the
Hitler’s Mein Kampf as “the well of Nazi concocting of similar medicine in America”
magic,” as a “testament of a man who swung a (164-65). In 2019, it’s not difficult to find simi-
great people into his wake” (164-65). Seventy- lar rhetorical strategies at play in the realm of
eight years ago, in 1957, Burke said that “[a] US political leadership—so let us hope we
people trained in pragmatism should want to continue to do so.
inspect this magic,” to “[let] us watch it
Acknowledgements
To Trish, thank you so much for everything. I could not have asked for a better mentor, professor, and role
model, and I am so grateful to have learned from the best. A big thank you as well to Dr. Doug Downs for
his guidance on this paper, and last but never least, thank you to my friends and family for always
supporting me, even when I’m writing about Hitler.
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