Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy model - Ciencia Politica UC
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Concurrences REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE | COMPETITION LAW REVIEW Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy model International l Concurrences N° 3-2020 l pp. 204-208 Umut Aydin uaydin@uc.cl Associate Professor Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago Javier Tapia jtapia02@gmail.com Former Judge Competition Tribunal of the Republic of Chile, Santiago Associate Member Centre for Law, Economics and Society, University College London
International
Umut Aydin*
Chile: A hybrid
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
uaydin@uc.cl
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
Associate Professor
competition law
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile,
Santiago
Javier Tapia
jtapia02@gmail.com
Former Judge
Competition Tribunal of the Republic
of Chile, Santiago
and policy model
Associate Member
Centre for Law, Economics and Society,
University College London
ABSTRACT I. Introduction
This article presents a brief overview
of the Chilean competition law and policy and
1. This article presents the current state of Chilean competition law and policy,
analyses its current state of enforcement. with a comparative approach to the United States (US) and the European Union
We argue that the Chilean system is a mix (EU) antitrust.1 From an institutional perspective a tribunal-based model exists
between the United States and European in Chile since 2003, where an administrative agency investigates and prosecutes,
Union competition regimes. It relies on
decisions by a specialized competition and a specialized tribunal decides the cases. However, as we describe below, the
tribunal, which additionally has extensive tribunal also has a vast number of important administrative or regulatory duties.
regulatory powers and duties. In this sense, it resembles much more a commission than a regular, US-style
The competition agency, which is responsible
for investigating and bringing cases
court, making the system a hybrid between an archetypical judicial system and a
to the tribunal, has also contributed to classic administrative model as exists in the EU.
the development of administrative case law.
In terms of the recent enforcement record,
there have been few abuse of dominance
2. The system entertains all the features of the toolkit of any other “modern”
cases, and the number and importance competition regime—including highly dissuasive fines and other sanctions (such
of collusion cases have grown. as incarceration for cartel members up to ten years, or disqualification orders in
Cet article présente un aperçu du droit et some cases) and powerful investigative powers for the agency (such as wiretapping
de la politique de la concurrence au Chili et and dawn raids). Overall, the system has been rather successful in prosecuting
analyse l’état actuel de son application. cartels and tackling other barriers to competition. However, there has been
Nous faisons valoir que le système chilien
est un mélange entre les régimes de
a lack of cases on unilateral conduct—arguably, an important topic given the
concurrence en place aux États-Unis et dans characteristics of Chilean markets.
l’Union européenne. Il repose sur les
décisions d’un tribunal spécialisé en matière
de concurrence, qui dispose en outre
de pouvoirs et de devoirs réglementaires
étendus. L’agence de la concurrence,
qui est chargée d’enquêter et de porter
II. The Chilean institutional
les affaires devant le tribunal, a également
contribué au développement
de la jurisprudence administrative.
model in perspective
En ce qui concerne le bilan récent en matière 3. In order to analyse the Chilean institutional model compared to that of the US
d’application de la législation, il y a eu peu
d’affaires d’abus de position dominante,
and Europe, we first consider a simplified version of these two models.2
et le nombre et l’importance des affaires
d’ententes ont augmenté. 4. The US model is judicial—i.e., it is largely based on judgments issued by
generalist judges with common knowledge of the law. Hence, its approach is
mainly “backward-looking,” meaning that the activity of judges (as in any other
area) is to “rebuild” the past considering the facts of the actual case and to
adjudicate accordingly. In the US, private litigation is more important than public
litigation, albeit the two competition agencies (the Federal Trade Commission—
FTC—and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice—DOJ) have
1 For a comparison with other Latin American jurisdictions (Brazil and Colombia), see J. Tapia and A. Ditzel Faraco, Latin American
antitrust law and policy: An overview of three jurisdictions – Brazil, Chile and Colombia, in Comparative Competition Law, J. Duns,
A. Duke and B. Sweeney (eds.), Edwards Elgar, 2015, pp. 472–499.
*All opinions expressed here are strictly personal
and do not purport to reflect those of the 2 The description that follows is dichotomic—to some extent considers“antitrust”as opposed to“regulation.”In a nutshell, we consider
institutions we represent or other people working the US model closer to the former and the EU model closer to the latter. We are aware that in the literature this dichotomy has been
in it. Umut Aydin acknowledges the financial largely surpassed. We use it here only for descriptive purposes. For a more detailed discussion see D. J. Gerber, Global Competition:
support of CONICYT, FONDECYT Regular Project Law, Market, and Globalization (OUP, 2010); and D. A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (OUP, 2011),
No. 1201779. esp. chapter 5.
204 Concurrences N° 3-2020 I International I Umut Aydin, Javier Tapia I Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy modea significant role in most of the main cases. Fines are of up to 60,000 tax units.3 In calculating the fines, the
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
generally not high, but damage litigation is important, TDLC takes into account the financial benefits received
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
the parties having the chance to claim treble damages in from the infringement, the severity of the breach and the
certain cases. Incarceration is possible in cartel cases, and offenders’ recidivism, among other factors.
the action may only be brought by the DOJ. This model
is sometimes referred to as the “crime-tort” approach. 8. Cases are brought before the TDLC either by a public
Regarding the objectives of the system, traditionally, agency, the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (FNE)
efficiency and deterrence have been at its core. or private parties, indistinctively. However, as in the EU,
the system is largely based on public prosecution—private
5. By contrast, the EU model is administrative—that is, litigation is still infrequent, and there is no chance to
it is mostly based on decisions made by an administrative recover treble damages. Despite being an administrative
agency, the European Commission, which is also vested agency, the FNE is fully independent. It is headed by the
with powers to investigate and prosecute. Despite serious National Economic Prosecutor, who must be a lawyer
efforts to boost it, private litigation is still scarce and by profession and is appointed by the President of Chile
there is no chance to recover treble damages; however, after a public contest handled by the special State agency
administrative fines may be very high. Regarding the in charge of recruiting high-level public officials. The
objectives, competition law is part of EU law and, Economic Prosecutor may only be removed by cause and
therefore, it is informed by many interrelated policies. subject to a prior motion at the Supreme Court.4
Since its inception, the protection of the common market
has traditionally played a more important role than 9. Prior to a procedure before the TDLC there is an
efficiency. Perhaps due to this reason, but also because it administrative investigation. Investigations can begin
is the common approach of administrative agencies, the either through receiving a complaint or through FNE’s
approach of the Commission is, in principle, “forward- own initiative. The FNE has extensive powers to
looking”—i.e., when dealing with cases, it considers investigate. It can compel the production of documents
future developments and possible consequences for the and the co-operation of public agencies, state-owned
common market. Furthermore, non-economic objectives, companies, firms and individuals. It can also summon
such as fairness and proportionality, have been at the anyone with potential knowledge of an infringement
forefront of many discussions. to testify as a witness (including the defendant’s
representatives, managers and advisors); to inspect the
premises of the investigated entities on a voluntary basis;
1. A highly specialized model to conduct search and seizure of company premises (so-
called “dawn raids”); and intercept communications.
6. The Chilean competition law system is unusual in Dawn raids and wiretapping require authorization from
the international context, being somewhat of a mix the TDLC and the issuance of an order from a judge of
between the EU and the US models. As in the US, it is the Court of Appeals.
based on decisions made by judges. However, cases are
brought to a tribunal that specializes in competition 10. There is no time limit on the FNE’s investigation,
law and policy—the Tribunal for the Defence of Free apart from a rule stipulating a statute of limitations
Competition (TDLC), which lies at the heart of the of five years for collusion cases and three years for
system. The TDLC is headed by a president (a lawyer with other conducts. The results of an investigation may be
experience in competition law) and has four other expert an administrative decision closing the investigation; a
members (two economists and two lawyers, also experts report to the TDLC in a proceeding, in which the TDLC
on competition). The members are called “judges.” The asks for the FNE’s opinion; or an ex officio complaint
five members are appointed for fixed six-year terms, (requerimiento) seeking a fine or other remedy.5
renewable once, and all the five of them attend hearings
and vote on decisions. 11. Decisions of the TDLC are subject to judicial oversight
of the Supreme Court of Justice—Chile’s highest court—
7. The Competition Act allows the TDLC to impose under a special recourse called “complaint recourse”
fines and/or behavioural or structural remedies. Orders
can amend or eliminate anticompetitive acts, contracts,
agreements, schemes or arrangements in violation of the
Act. The TDLC can also order divestiture or dissolution 3 Tax units are a special monetary measure of value used by the legislation to keep the value of
of partnerships, corporations or business companies sanctions, exemptions, tax purposes and others, in line with inflation.
whose existence rests on anticompetitive arrangements. 4 According to the Competition Act, the FNE is “a decentralised public service, with legal
Administrative fines may be imposed upon the infringing status and own assets, independent from any other agency or service” and the Economic
Prosecutor is directed by law to “discharge his duties independently,”to “defend the interests
legal entity and on its directors and managers and entrusted to him (…) based on his own discretion” and to represent “the general economic
persons who participated in the infringement. According interests of the community.” Only for budget purposes, the FNE is part of the Ministry of
to the current version of the Competition Act, amended the Economy.
in 2016, the TDLC can fine the companies up to double 5 Besides investigations, the FNE fulfils an important advocacy role, stated in the Competition
the economic benefit obtained due to the infringement, Act laconically as “promoting competition.”Although the Act does not specify how this task
should be accomplished, the common understanding is that the FNE may, among others,
or 30% of the companies’ sales in the line of products issue non-binding guidelines highlighting the benefits of competition in a specific area or
in which the infringement occurred. If neither of these market. Some of these guidelines, such as the Trade Association Guidelines or the Guidelines
for Compliance have played a crucial role in practice—particularly since the TDLC started
amounts can be calculated, the TDLC can impose a fine embracing them in cases.
Concurrences N° 3-2020 I International I Umut Aydin, Javier Tapia I Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy mode 205(recurso de reclamación). The scope of the review is not 15. The TDLC’s broad powers are reflected in the procedures
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
defined in the Act, but the Supreme Court has interpreted established in the Competition Act. Before the TDLC,
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
it in the broadest possible terms, comprising questions of there are two main procedures—the adversarial procedure,
law, policy or fact, and, on occasions, even substituting which ends in “judgments,” and the non-adversarial one,
its judgment for that of the TDLC, undermining the which ends in “decisions.” Procedurally, the main difference
specialization feature of the system.6 That means the between both procedures is the lack of a formalized period
recourse has functioned in practice as an appellate review. to interview witnesses in the latter. Beyond this, however,
only adversarial procedures are “judicial” sensu stricto, as
12. The functioning of the Chilean system is summarized they seek to establish the liability of a firm or person for its
in Figure 1. coordinated or unilateral conducts and may lead to sanctions.
For these purposes, the tribunal adopts a “backward-
Figure 1. Chilean competition system looking” approach to cases. In contrast, the non-adversarial
procedure serves to implement most of the regulatory
powers given to the TDLC. Accordingly, it does not lead to
Supreme Court liability and sanctions, albeit most of the measures (other
than fines) that can be imposed are in practice similar to
(resolves appeals) those that can be imposed after an adversarial procedure.
←
16. Beside adversarial procedures, the TDLC also acts as
judicial authority when it carries out judicial review of
TDLC merger decisions made by the FNE. This may only be
(makes decisions) done when the merger is blocked. If the TDLC imposes
new remedies not previously discussed between the
←
parties and the FNE, the Supreme Court may review
←
the TDLC’s judgment. Also, the TDLC acts as judicial
authority in private litigation between parties seeking
Private FNE damages (in both follow-on and stand-alone litigation).
plaintiffs (investigates,
lodges complaints) 17. The regulatory aspects of the system may also be
highlighted if one observes the FNE’s powers and
performance in practice. For instance, as we mentioned,
the FNE decides administratively on merger cases (in
Source: Authors’ creation
both phases 1 and 2). Moreover, the FNE usually closes
some of its investigations subject to the commitments of
13. The system also contemplates possible incarceration parties to follow certain course of action. This practice,
for persons involved in collusive agreements. The whose legal base is not entirely clear, has allowed the
criminal procedure may only be initiated by the FNE’s agency to develop an extensive and quite coherent body
head, through a criminal complaint to the country’s of administrative case law.
public prosecutor, after the TDLC has ruled on the case.
2. The “two faces” of the model III. The main
14. Despite being centred on a tribunal and cases that
are subject to US-style litigation, the Chilean system substantive provisions
has relevant regulatory features. The TDLC has a
18. Besides the institutional structure, legislation
wide variety of broader powers that go beyond dealing
governing competition has its own particularities.
with firms’ conduct and adjudication. For example,
The Competition Act is unusually broad—both in terms
the Competition Act gives the TDLC the power to
of objectives and substantive provision. Article 1 states
rule whether an act it is in accordance with the law; to
that the purpose of the Act “is to advocate and defend free
propose executive amendments to the legislation; or to
competition in the markets. Affronts to free competition
issue reports on some regulatory sectors such as ports,
in economic activities will be corrected, prohibited or
telecoms or broadcasting, among others. Furthermore,
repressed in the manner and with the sanctions provided in
the TDLC may even dictate general rules for any sector
this law.” This is supplemented in Article 2 by the mandate
of the economy. As we will show, due to these extensive
to competition authorities “to enforce the present law to
powers and duties, in reality the tribunal resembles a
safeguard free competition in the markets.” Beyond these
commission to a large extent.
general statements, no explicit objectives are stipulated.7
6 Commenting on the nature of the reclamación, the Supreme Court has stated that it has 7 As a consequence, for a number of years before the creation of the TDLC, freedom to compete
jurisdiction to “fully” review all the grounds considered by the TDLC, “including the legal was considered more important than efficiency. This may be explained by the wording of
and economic analysis that allowed it to reach the decision it took”(Supreme Court, Consulta the law and a formal approach to the conducts. However, although some commentators still
de Subtel sobre participación de concesionarios de telefonía móvil en concurso público de advocate this or other objectives, the most recent case law has explicitly mentioned consumer
telefonía móvil digital avanzada, Rol 4797-2008, Decision of 27 January 2009, C. 6º). welfare in a number of particular decisions.
206 Concurrences N° 3-2020 I International I Umut Aydin, Javier Tapia I Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy mode19. The substantive provisions on conducts are contained 23. According to the FNE, of the cases it has reviewed
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
in Article 3, which is as general, broad and flexible as between 2010 and 2018, 33% fall under abuse of
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
Article 1. Article 3 has a wide residual first paragraph dominance, 27% mergers, and 14% collusion.10 In this
stating generally that any deed, act or agreement period, it has imposed a total of US$138 million in fines.
(including a contract) that prevents, restricts or hinders Notable among the fines were the US$40 million imposed
free competition, or tends to do so, is subject to sanctions by the TDLC in 2012 on the three pharmacy chains found
under law. Although subsections in the second paragraph guilty of colluding on the price of over 220 drugs, and
specifically refer to the traditional categories in the US$60 million fine in the case of three poultry meat
competition law, they provide only illustrative detail.8 For producers in 2014. The leniency programme, introduced
this reason, in practice many cases are brought by parties in 2009, has contributed to the FNE’s fight against
or the FNE under the first paragraph. This produces cartels. Since 2010, the FNE has brought 18 collusion
some important procedural differences (particularly cases before the TDLC, of which 7 had at least one of the
in collusion cases) and, to some extent, has curbed parties applying for leniency.
more refined developments on the interpretation of the
provision.9 24. The mandatory merger notification system that
entered into force in June 2017 has meant that the FNE’s
20. Other substantive provisions in the Competition merger review workload has grown considerably. In 2018,
Act refer to merger control (in detail), including judicial the FNE opened investigations on 56 mergers, and closed
review; minority shareholding and interlocking; and the 54 investigations, with 47 of the proposed mergers being
collusion felony. approved without conditions, 5 approved subject to
conditions, and 2 blocked. In 2019, the FNE closed 41
merger investigations, approving 38 without conditions,
IV. The current state 2 with conditions, and blocking 1 merger.
of enforcement
25. To address this increased workload, the Merger
Division of the FNE, which started out in 2014 with 12
staff members, more than duplicated in size, currently
21. The Chilean competition regime has experienced employing 29 staff members. The FNE also raised the
significant advances in enforcement since the current thresholds for notification of mergers in 2019. From
institutional structure was introduced in 2003. Our August 2019 onwards, mergers have to be notified if
analysis of the current state of enforcement relies the total domestic sales of the merging parties exceeds
on official statistics of investigations, cases and fines approximately US$100 million, and the domestic sales of
reported by the FNE and the TDLC, and is limited by at least two of the companies involved in a merger equal
the fact that these statistics have not been reported in a to or exceed US$17.5 million.
consistent and systematic manner over the years by either
of these institutions. Nor has there been an effort to work 26. Since the changes in the Competition Act introduced
together on a common system of reporting. Systematic, in 2016, the FNE has the power to conduct market
consistent and common reporting of the number of studies. While market studies cannot result in the
investigations and cases, correctly broken down by imposition of sanctions or measures, the FNE can make
conduct and sectors, as well as fines, would aid academic recommendations in its report on the analysed market.
research on competition law and policy in Chile and The FNE established a Market Studies Division and
improve transparency and accountability of the FNE generated a guideline on market studies in 2017. Since
and the TDLC’s actions in the eyes of the stakeholders. then, a number of influential market studies has been
published: on notaries, and annuities (pensions) in 2018,
22. In terms of its case load, the FNE has reviewed on school textbooks in 2019, and medicines in January 2020.
average 144 cases per year in the past four years. Of these,
the FNE each year litigates only a handful as contentious 27. Another important activity of the FNE has been the
cases before the TDLC—on average 4.7 cases since 2004 publication of guidelines. Some of these are designed to
when the TDLC started its operations. increase the predictability and transparency of the FNE’s
activities in different areas, such as guidelines on leniency,
fines, market studies, and remedies. Another set of
guidelines are those directed at economic agents and state
organs, such as the guidelines for trade associations, and
for public procurement, which have become important
advocacy tools for the FNE.
8 The categories in the second paragraph are closer to the competition provisions of European
law than the Sherman Act. This fact, along with the existence of paragraph one, shows that
despite its old American origins, Chilean competition law currently is far from being a mere
“transplantation of American antitrust and Chicago School of Economics” adapted to the
local context, as some have mistakenly argued (e.g., M. D. Bauer, Chilean Competition Law
and Policy: The Extraterritorial Transplantation of American Antitrust Law and Chicago 10 Fiscalía Nacional Económica, FNE en Cifras, 2018, p. 11. Available at https://www.fne.gob.
School of Economics in the Chilean Context, 11 Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law [2011]). cl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/FNE-en-cifras.pdf. The rest of the cases are distributed
Moreover, most substantive standards diverge from those proposed by the Chicago School. as follows: unfair competition (3%), vertical restraints (3%), anticompetitive acts of state
authorities (6%), and non-compliance with TDLC decisions or with conditions agreed with
9 These aspects, however, go beyond the scope of this work. the FNE (14%).
Concurrences N° 3-2020 I International I Umut Aydin, Javier Tapia I Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy mode 20728. The FNE’s human resources and budget have grown 30. With respect to the enforcement of the law, official
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
in parallel to its growing workload. Currently the FNE statistics show that historically the large majority of
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
employs 115 personnel—compared to 60 in 2003, when FNE’s investigations and the cases it brought before the
the current institutional structure was set up—of which TDLC have concerned abuse of dominance, collusion,
82 are working directly on competition issues, and the rest and administrative actions of state organs. Actions
are support staff.11 Of the 82 professionals, 47 are lawyers against non-compliance with previous decisions or
and 32 are economists. In 2018, 45% of those working on commitments made to the FNE, unfair competition,
competition issues had either Master’s or Ph.D. degrees.12 and others have made up the rest of competition
In the past five years, the FNE’s budget averaged US$9.5 investigations and cases. Lately, however, the FNE has
annually. The TDLC, on the other hand, currently has brought only a handful of abuse of dominance cases, and
a personnel of 25 (including the judges and the support no case of major significance. At the same time, collusion
staff), and a budget of US$2.8 million.13 cases have gained importance and more publicity in the
last ten years, and large fines have been imposed in some
of them.
V. Concluding 31. While the Chilean competition law and policy has
remarks
all the main features of established competition regimes,
and its enforcement institutions are professional and
count on sufficient human and financial resources,
29. The objective of this paper was to present a brief there are aspects of the system that can be improved.
analysis of Chilean competition law and policy from a In March 2020 a draft bill was sent to the Congress,
comparative perspective, and describe its current state of introducing longer prison sentences for individuals
enforcement. We have argued the Chilean system is a mix involved in cartels affecting markets in basic necessities,
between the US and the EU models. While it is based on giving greater investigative powers to the FNE, and
the decisions of the judges, as in the US, its tribunal is creating a whistle-blower programme. Besides aspects of
specialized in competition law and policy. Moreover, the legislation, arguably more cases on abuse of dominance
tribunal has broad regulatory powers, and in this sense are needed—especially given Chilean economy’s reality
it resembles a regulatory agency. Similarly, the FNE, of concentrated markets and entrenched dominant firms.
the body responsible for investigating and presenting It makes sense to focus investigations on where there are
cases before the TDLC, has also been responsible for high levels of dominance and to consider the obvious
developing a large body of administrative law. types of conducts by which they will seek to exclude rivals.
These cases are important in bringing change in these
markets, and also in creating precedents and establishing
an appropriate balance between legal tests that provide
certainty, on the one hand, and basic economic rules for
assessing possible abuse of dominance, on the other. n
11 Ibid., p. 3.
12 Ibid., p. 4.
13 OECD, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Chile 2018, 2019. Available
at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2019)5/en/pdf.
208 Concurrences N° 3-2020 I International I Umut Aydin, Javier Tapia I Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy modeConcurrences
Editoriaux Droit & économie
Jacques Attali, Elie Cohen, Claus‑Dieter Emmanuel Combe, Philippe Choné,
Ehlermann, Jean Pisani Ferry, Ian Forrester, Laurent Flochel, Frédéric Jenny,
Eleanor Fox, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Gildas de Muizon, Jorge Padilla,
Laurence Idot, Frédéric Jenny, Arnaud Penelope Papandropoulos, Anne Perrot,
Montebourg, Mario Monti, Gilbert Parleani, Nicolas Petit, Etienne Pfister, Francesco Rosati,
Jacques Steenbergen, Margrethe Vestager, David Sevy, David Spector...
Bo Vesterdorf, Denis Waelbroeck,
Marc van der Woude...
Chroniques
Concurrences est une revue Interviews Ententes
Ludovic Bernardeau, Anne-Sophie Choné
trimestrielle couvrant l’ensemble Sir Christopher Bellamy, Lord David Currie,
des questions de droits de Thierry Dahan, Jean-Louis Debré, Isabelle Grimaldi, Michel Debroux, Etienne Thomas
l’Union européenne et interne de Silva, François Fillon, John Fingleton, Pratiques unilatérales
de la concurrence. Les analyses Renata B. Hesse, François Hollande,
William Kovacic, Neelie Kroes, Laurent Binet, Frédéric Marty,
de fond sont effectuées sous Anne Wachsmann
forme d’articles doctrinaux, Christine Lagarde, Johannes Laitenberger,
de notes de synthèse ou Emmanuel Macron, Robert Mahnke, Pratiques commerciales
Ségolène Royal, Nicolas Sarkozy, déloyales
de tableaux jurisprudentiels.
Marie‑Laure Sauty de Chalon,
L’actualité jurisprudentielle Tommaso Valletti, Christine Varney... Frédéric Buy, Valérie Durand,
et législative est couverte par Jean‑Louis Fourgoux, Rodolphe Mesa,
onze chroniques thématiques. Marie‑Claude Mitchell
Dossiers Distribution
Nicolas Ereseo, Dominique Ferré,
Jacques Barrot, Jean-François Bellis, Didier Ferrier, Anne-Cécile Martin
David Bosco, Murielle Chagny, John Connor,
Damien Géradin, Assimakis Komninos, Concentrations
Christophe Lemaire, Ioannis Lianos, Jean-François Bellis, Olivier Billard,
Pierre Moscovici, Jorge Padilla, Emil Paulis, Jean‑Mathieu Cot, Ianis Girgenson,
Robert Saint-Esteben, Jacques Steenbergen, Sergio Sorinas, David Tayar
Florian Wagner-von Papp, Richard Whish...
Aides d’État
Jacques Derenne, Bruno Stromsky,
Articles
Raphaël Vuitton
Procédures
Guy Canivet, Emmanuelle Claudel, Pascal Cardonnel, Alexandre Lacresse,
Emmanuel Combe, Thierry Dahan, Luc Gyselen, Christophe Lemaire
Daniel Fasquelle, Barry Hawk, Nathalie
Homobono, Laurence Idot, Frédéric Jenny, Régulations
Bruno Lasserre, Luc Peeperkorn, Anne Perrot, Orion Berg, Hubert Delzangles,
Nicolas Petit, Catherine Prieto, Patrick Rey, Emmanuel Guillaume
Joseph Vogel, Wouter Wils...
Mise en concurrence
Bertrand du Marais, Arnaud Sée
Pratiques Actions publiques
Jean-Philippe Kovar, Francesco Martucci,
Tableaux jurisprudentiels : Actualité
des enquêtes de concurrence, Stéphane Rodrigues
Contentieux indemnitaire des pratiques Droits européens et
anticoncurrencielles, Bilan de la pratique
étrangers
des engagements, Droit pénal et concurrence,
Legal privilege, Cartel Profiles in the EU... Walid Chaiehloudj, Sophie‑Anne Descoubes,
Marianne Faessel, Pierre Kobel, Silvia Pietrini,
Jean‑Christophe Roda, François Souty,
International
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Livres
Belgium, Brésil, Canada, China, Germany,
Hong‑Kong, India, Japan, Luxembourg,
Switzerland, Sweden, USA...
Sous la direction de Stéphane Rodrigues
Revues
Christelle Adjémian, Mathilde Brabant,
Emmanuel Frot, Alain Ronzano, Bastien ThomasTarifs 2020
Abonnement Concurrences + Devis sur demande
Quote upon request
Revue et Bulletin : Versions imprimée (Revue) et électroniques (Revue et Bulletin) (avec accès multipostes pendant 1 an aux archives)
Review and Bulletin: Print (Review) and electronic versions (Review and Bulletin)
(unlimited users access for 1 year to archives)
Conférences : Accès aux documents et supports (Concurrences et universités partenaires)
Conferences: Access to all documents and recording (Concurrences and partner universities)
Livres : Accès à tous les e-Books
Books: Access to all e-Books
Abonnements Basic HT
Without tax
TTC
Tax included
e-Bulletin e-Competitions l e-Bulletin e-Competitions
Version électronique (accès monoposte au dernier N° en ligne pendant 1 an, pas d’accès aux archives) 825,00 € 842,50 €
Electronic version (single user access to the latest online issue for 1 year, no access to archives)
Revue Concurrences l Review Concurrences
Version électronique (accès monoposte au dernier N° en ligne pendant 1 an, pas d’accès aux archives) 630,00 € 643,50 €
Electronic version (single user access to the latest online issue for 1 year, no access to archives)
Version imprimée (4 N° pendant un an, pas d’accès aux archives) 665,00 € 679,00 €
Print version (4 issues for 1 year, no access to archives)
Pour s’assurer de la validité des prix pratiqués, veuillez consulter le site www.concurrences.com
ou demandez un devis personnalisé à webmaster@concurrences.com.
To ensure the validity of the prices charged, please visit www.concurrences.com
or request a personalised quote from webmaster@concurrences.com.
Renseignements l Subscriber details
Prénom - Nom l First name - Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Courriel l e-mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Institution l Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rue l Street . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ville l City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Code postal l Zip Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pays l Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
N° TVA intracommunautaire l VAT number (EU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Formulaire à retourner à l Send your order to:
Institut de droit de la concurrence
19 avenue Jean Aicard - 75 011 Paris - France l webmaster@concurrences.com
Conditions générales (extrait) l Subscription information
Les commandes sont fermes. L’envoi de la Revue et/ou du Bulletin ont lieu dès réception du paiement complet.
Consultez les conditions d’utilisation du site sur www.concurrences.com (“Notice légale”).
Orders are firm and payments are not refundable. Reception of the Review and on-line access to the Review
and/or the Bulletin require full prepayment. For “Terms of use”, see www.concurrences.com.
Frais d’expédition Revue hors France 30 € l 30 € extra charge for shipping Review outside FranceYou can also read
