Commentary Labor Administration and Inspection in Post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh - Brill
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international labor rights case law
3 (2017) 457-462
brill.com/ilarc
Commentary
⸪
Labor Administration and Inspection in Post-Rana
Plaza Bangladesh
By Jennifer Bair, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of
Virginia, United States
Introduction
On 29 April 2013, Rana Plaza—a large commercial and industrial complex in
the Savar district of Dhaka housing multiple garment factories—collapsed,
killing 1,129 people. More than two thousand workers were injured, some
gravely. The scale of this tragedy focused the world’s attention on Bangladesh’s
export-oriented apparel, or ready-made garment (rmg), sector, which had ex-
perienced multiple industrial disasters in the decade before the disaster. In
the immediate aftermath of the collapse, a flood of international media cov-
erage put a spotlight on the health and safety risks facing many of the coun-
try’s approximately four million formal sector garment workers, galvanizing a
long-standing international campaign by student activists, labor rights non-
governmental organizations (ngos), and other advocacy groups to improve
conditions in the industry.
Among the stakeholders that have come under increased pressure since the
tragedy are the foreign brands and retailers sourcing clothing in Bangladesh.
A number of these companies responded by creating two programs to inspect
and remediate electrical, fire, and structural safety hazards in the thousands
of garment factories filling their orders. The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and
Building Safety is a joint effort of more than two hundred global brands, two
global trade union federations (IndustriALL Global Union and uni Global
Union), and eight Bangladeshi garment worker union federations. The Alli-
ance for Bangladesh Worker Safety is a private-sector initiative including more
than two dozen mostly u.s.-based retailers.
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A second stakeholder under pressure after Rana Plaza was the Bangladesh
government. In July 2013, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) signed an
agreement, the Sustainability Compact, negotiated with the participation of
the International Labour Organization (ilo) and representatives of the two
major markets for Bangladesh’s apparel exports: the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union. The Sustainability Compact commits the GoB to pursuing three
broad objectives: enhancing worker protection and respect for labor rights,
improving occupational safety and health in the rmg sector, and support-
ing responsible business conduct by all stakeholders. It also outlines specific
action items necessary to realize these goals, including a major expansion of
the national labor inspectorate and creation of a registry listing all garment-
exporting facilities in the country.
The Sustainability Compact also calls on the GoB to reform the Bangladesh
Labor Act (bla) of 2006. This task was completed when the Bangladeshi Par-
liament passed a bill including amendments to eighty-seven sections of the
bla on July 15, 2013. However, because the government did not promulgate the
regulations necessary to put the law into effect until September 2015, imple-
mentation of the reforms was delayed for an additional two years.
These reforms, however, have not succeeded in bringing Bangladesh into
compliance with core labor standards, particularly with regard to enabling
rights. In 2015, the ilo’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations (ceacr) expressed concerns about the lack of
meaningful progress on implementation of ilo Convention concerning Free-
dom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1947 (No. 87), and
the final report of the 2016 International Labour Conference included a special
paragraph on Bangladesh.
In its 2017 report, the ceacr returned to the question of Bangladesh, includ-
ing in its Report iii (Part 1A), in which it devoted several pages to the GoB’s
observance of ilo Convention concerning Labour Inspection in Industry and
Commerce, 1947 (No. 81).1 This commentary addresses the following issues ref-
erenced in the ceacr report: the scope, frequency, and content of labor in-
spections and the functions performed by inspectors; the nature of sanctions
for noncompliance; and the exemption of the Export-Processing Zone sector
from the bla.
1 ilo Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Observations on
the Application of the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81)¸ International Labour Con-
ference, 106th Session, Report iii (Part 1A), June 2017.
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Labor Inspections
Referencing Articles 3(1)(a) and (b), 13, 17, 18, 20, and 21 of the Labor I nspection
Convention, the ceacr expressed concern about the scope of the GoB’s in-
spection activities. Recent efforts to improve labor inspections have been
heavily concentrated in the rmg sector. In addition to the two international
inspection regimes created after Rana Plaza, the GoB, with the support of the
ilo, created a third program, the National Tripartite Plan of Action (often re-
ferred to as the National Initiative). The National Initiative is a government in-
spection program responsible for inspecting all factories that export apparel to
any international buyer that is not a signatory of either the Accord or A lliance.
Of the approximately 3,780 garment-exporting factories in Bangladesh as of
April 2017, 1,549 were the responsibility of the National Initiative.
Although the government’s focus on apparel is understandable, given the
size of the labor force the sector employs and the high incidence of safety
hazards in garment factories, other segments of Bangladesh’s manufactur-
ing sector—let alone its productive economy overall—have not received the
same international support for inspection efforts that has benefited the rmg
industry. For example, textile and clothing factories that subcontract or pro-
duce e xclusively for the domestic market are much less likely to be inspected,
even though in some respects they may have poorer working conditions than
their export-oriented counterparts.
Accordingly, in its comments on Bangladesh’s labor inspection system,
the ceacr pointedly asks about the GoB’s progress in inspecting other kinds
of workplaces beyond the clothing factories that supply foreign brands.
Reiterating the need to ensure that inspection activities are strengthened and
expanded more broadly, the ceacr also called on the GoB to increase the
transparency of its inspection efforts by making available inspection statistics
disaggregated by sector.
Referencing Article 3(2), the Committee also commented on the functions
being carried out by government labor inspectors, and specifically on the al-
location of responsibilities between the two departments within the GoB’s
Ministry of Labour & Employment: the Department of Labor (dol) and the
Department of Inspections for Factories and Establishments (dife). Under
the amended bla, dife inspectors may perform conciliation functions in re-
spect of wages only; dol officials are to undertake conciliation and mediation
functions for all other issues. Noting the narrow scope of the labor inspector-
ate’s remit, the Committee requested “the Government to provide detailed in-
formation on the proportion of time devoted to conciliation and mediation
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functions by dife labour inspectors in 2015 and 2016.”2 It further requested
that “the Government give consideration to entrusting the mediation and con-
ciliation of individual labour disputes concerning wages and benefits to an-
other public body, such as the dol.”3
This observation diagnoses the need for further development of the Labour
& Employment Ministry’s dispute resolution capacities. In early 2017, the gov-
ernments of Bangladesh and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understand-
ing whereby employees of Bangladesh’s Labour & Employment Ministry will
travel to Singapore to learn about that country’s dispute resolution system. The
ilo office in Bangladesh is also contributing to this effort in the form of a five-
year Social Dialogue project, which will extend through 2022. Funded by the
Swedish and Danish governments, the initiative will train conciliators and in-
vestigators in the dol and support the establishment of an independent panel
of arbitrators in Bangladesh. However, strengthening the capacities of the dol
in this regard will require clarifying how the dol’s dispute resolution proce-
dures relate to the separate arbitration mechanism that currently operates un-
der the auspices of the country’s main rmg sector employer association, the
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (bgmea).
Other ceacr observations relate to Articles 12(1), 15(c), and 16, which con-
cern the frequency and nature of inspections. Specifically, the report notes
that in 2014, only 2.5 percent of labor inspections carried out (668 of 25,525)
were unannounced. This is problematic for two reasons. First, because em-
ployers may be able to temporarily rectify or conceal instances of noncompli-
ance prior to a scheduled inspection, the overall effectiveness of the regime is
undermined by excessive reliance on announced visits. Second, because the
incidence of random visits is so low, unannounced inspections are likely to
be (or perceived as being) triggered by a complaint, which potentially under-
mines confidentiality. In addition to asking the GoB to provide information
regarding its efforts to ensure that enough unannounced (whether random or
complaints-driven) inspections are carried out, the Committee also repeated
an earlier request that the Government enshrine in regulation the duty of con-
fidentiality regarding complaints made to the ministry.
The 2017 ceacr report referenced Articles 17 and 18 in regard to the general
enforcement of the bla, emphasizing in particular the importance of effective
sanctions for noncompliance. Although the 2013 amendments to the bla made
a few changes in this area, most fines were either increased only m odestly or
2 Ibid., p. 451.
3 Ibid.
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left unchanged. For example, the maximum fine that can be assessed for failing
to report a workplace accident resulting in serious bodily injury remains 1,000
taka (a little under $13). Noting that the GoB does not “provide information
on any proposed steps directed at improving the effective enforcement of
labour law, nor . . . on the outcome of cases referred to the labour courts,” the
Committee urged the GoB to furnish “information on the measures introduced
or envisaged to ensure that penalties for labour law violations are sufficiently
dissuasive and that fines are effectively enforced.”4
Labor Inspections in Export-Processing Zones
About 10 percent of Bangladesh’s rmg sector workers are employed in export-
processing zones (epzs). These factories are not subject to the bla; instead,
they are covered by a separate piece of legislation, the epz Labour Act. The epz
Labour Act, in turn, is administered not by the Ministry of Labour & Employ-
ment, but rather by a separate body, the Bangladesh Export Processing Zone
Authority, which reports directly to the office of the prime minister. Trade
unions are not permitted in the epz factories, though workers may join bodies
known as Workers Welfare Associations. While some expected that the 2013
reforms would change the status of the epzs, they continue to be exempt from
the main labor code.
Referencing Articles 2, 4, and 23 of the Labor Inspection Convention, the
Committee expressed a number of concerns about the status of Bangladesh’s
epzs. Although the GoB has no immediate plans to bring the sector under the
bla, in an earlier response to the ceacr it did emphasize that it was in the
final stages of reforming the epz Labour Act. The Committee reiterated its
“firm hope that the [reforms to the] epz Labour Act will bring epzs under the
purview of the labour inspectorate as requested by the Conference Committee
and the Committee of Experts.”5
The status of the country’s epzs will likely continue to be a matter of con-
cern for the ceacr, given the Bangladesh government’s plans to create one
hundred new epzs across the country—part of an ambitious goal to increase
Bangladesh’s garment exports, which totalled just under $25.5 billion in 2014,
to $50 billion, in time for the celebration of Bangladesh’s fiftieth year of inde-
pendence in 2021.
4 Ibid., p. 452.
5 Ibid., p. 453.
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Conclusion
Most of the flurry of activity around the inspection of workplaces in Bangladesh
since 2013 has focused on factories, such as those destroyed in Rana Plaza, that
produce apparel for export. The reforms to the country’s labor code are an ini-
tial step toward better compliance with core labor standards both in the rmg
industry and more broadly. However, as the ceacr’s observations regarding
Bangladesh’s application of the Labour Inspection Convention suggest, much
work remains. Increasing the capacity of the country’s labor inspectorate by re-
cruiting, training, and retaining staff should be a key priority—still, a strength-
ened inspection regime is just one element of a broader effort to improve the
overall climate for workers’ rights.
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