Commodifying Oppression: South African Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki

Commodifying Oppression: South African Foreign Policy towards
                                   Zimbabwe under Mbeki

                                        Dr Dale T. McKinley*
      Published in Roger Southall (Ed.) – South Africa’s role in conflict resolution and
                  peacemaking in Africa (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2006): 85-104

Since the late 1990s onset of what has been called, the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’, virtually all attempts at
explaining (or rationalising) South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe have been dominated
by a one-dimensional focus on the political context of policy-making. In the few instances where
economic considerations have come into play, the arguments have focused on altruistic motivations
to avert a complete ‘collapse’ of the Zimbabwean economy and prevent any associated domestic
and/or regional contagion. 1

In contrast, this chapter argues that South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, while certainly
constituent of historical and more contemporary political dynamics and considerations, has been,
and continues to be, driven by the combined, and in this case complementary, class interests of
South Africa’s emergent black and traditional (white) bourgeoisie (whether located in the public
and/or private sectors).       Put another way, South African policy cannot be understood, and
explained, without critical reference to, and analysis of, the political economy of a renewed South
African sub-imperialism.

The poverty of the Zimbabwe ‘debate’

Under the stewardship of Thabo Mbeki (whose ascension to the office of the President in 1999 was
paralleled by intensifying political and economic problems in Zimbabwe) South African policy
towards Zimbabwe has been the subject of a great deal of both positive and negative attention. In
South Africa, public opinion and analysis has generally, if often unevenly, been divided along racial
lines with the obvious exception of the large number of black Zimbabweans now residing in South
Africa as a direct result of the multiple crises afflicting their home country.2

The main reason for this racial divide has been the dominant perception amongst South Africans that
the land ‘reform’ policy of the Mugabe regime, which is an integral component of the contemporary

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Zimbabwean crisis, is fundamentally defined by issues of race. For Mbeki’s ANC government, and
many black South Africans, Mugabe’s land policies represent, at their core, a genuine attempt to
address what Mbeki calls “one of the enduring legacies of colonialism”, namely large-scale white
ownership of land at the expense of the black majority. For the majority of the white population and
the predominately white political opposition in South Africa, Mugabe’s land programme is viewed as
a disingenuous and politically motivated attempt to maintain power at the expense of white
Zimbabweans (and, to a much lesser extent, a sizeable portion of black Zimbabweans who do not
support Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party and government). Since Mbeki became President, this divide
has been fuelled by the constant playing of the race and ‘liberation struggle’ cards by Mbeki and the
ANC government on the domestic political and economic front3, complemented by the predictable
white, liberal ‘victim’ response – a discourse of the arrogant and the deaf that has only served to
cloud meaningful debate/analysis of South Africa’s post-1994 political economy, the existence and
cohesion of a dominant deracialised capitalism and the more specific class interests of an emergent
black bourgeoisie from the womb of the ‘liberation struggle’.

This racial divide on the Zimbabwean ‘question’ is also reflected at the international level. The
result is that the majority of nations positioning themselves ‘against’ Mugabe are predominately
Northern and white, while most of those siding ‘with’ Mugabe are predominately Southern and non-
white. The most publicly visible manifestation of this racialised divide at the international level has
taken place at the level of the ongoing ‘battle’ within the Commonwealth, especially as applied to
the ‘troika’ of Commonwealth nations (South Africa, Nigeria and Australia) tasked with monitoring
and evaluating the situation in Zimbabwe. Besides what has been a regular ‘war of words’ over the
character of the Commonwealth’s response to the Zimbabwe crisis during the past several years
between the respective political leaders of these countries4, the widely divergent practical
approaches adopted by Northern and Southern countries respectively, has buttressed public
perceptions (real or imagined) that racial solidarity has been the driving factor behind policy stances
towards the Zimbabwe crisis. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the diametrically opposed
positions taken in 2003 when the Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement gave unqualified political
support to the Mugabe regime at virtually the same time that Australia, Britain and the United States
were successfully pushing for the renewal and extension of ‘smart sanctions’ against Mugabe and his
cronies.

Not surprisingly, the Mugabe regime has taken full advantage of this state of affairs in order to
propagate the idea that its ‘land reform’ programme and associated crackdown on political

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opposition and civil society organisations are part and parcel of a continuing post-independence
(third world) ‘anti-imperialism’ designed to finally ‘free’ Zimbabwe from the shackles of Western
(read: white) interests.     As    Congress of South African Trade Unions General Secretary,
Zwelinzima Vavi has pointed out: “Any person who is critical of their awful human rights track
record is casually labelled an agent of (British Prime Minister) Blair or western interests … anyone
critical of their policies that have resulted in record unemployment and hunger is seen to be working
with the enemies of Zimbabwe” (Vavi, 2004).

Just as crucially though, the Mugabe regime has enjoined the dual discourses of race and nationalism
as a means of forging an opportunistic and reactionary, but extremely helpful, (third world)
nationalist solidarity predominately defined by considerations of an internationalised racial
differentiation. In the Mbeki government, Mugabe has found a willing and often energetic ‘partner’
in pursuing such ‘solidarity’ at the regional, continental and global level. Zimbabwean academic and
activist Brian Raftopoulos, has captured Mugabe’s strategy brilliantly:

        “One of the central features of the Zimbabwean crisis, as it has unfolded since
        2000, has been the emergence of a revived nationalism delivered in a particularly
        virulent form, with race as a key trope within the discourse, and a selective
        rendition of the liberation history deployed as a an ideological policing agent in the
        public debate … Mugabe has not only defined the national project around a
        selective reading of nationalist history and an exclusivist construction of the nation,
        he has also sought to ensure that this message resonates in other black struggles
        both regionally and internationally” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 1,11).

This unfortunate, but by now somewhat predictable racial polarisation, combined with the
opportunistic ‘revival’ of a distorted nationalism and liberation struggle history has impoverished
much of the ‘debate’ on the historic origins and contemporary character of the Zimbabwe crisis.5 In
the context of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe though, it has tended to completely
obscure any meaningful analysis of the very real economic motivations behind South Africa’s policy
and the attendant politics that so effectively conceals such motivations. The result has been the
domination of a very narrow analytical approach to explaining the primary factors behind South
African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.

A classic example of this can be found in the analysis of Dr. Sipho Buthelezi, formerly of the
influential and pro-government South African think-tank, The Africa Institute6, and now a
government bureaucrat. According to Buthelezi, the primary explanatory factor behind South

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Africa’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy is the desire to ensure that there is no collapse of the
‘sister’ Zimbabwean economy (whose health is so important to South Africa’s export-oriented
economic ‘drive’ into the region and continent) and thus to prevent the possibility of a civil war in
Zimbabwe (Buthelezi, 2003). Interestingly, such an analysis has been repeated more than once, as
informing official South African government policy, by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz
Pahad.7 The analysis is then further extended by Buthelezi’s argument that the ‘quiet diplomacy’ of
the Mbeki government is under-girded by fears of South Africa being seen as the “hegemon” in the
region (and continent) as well as the acceptance of a consensus model of regional and continental
decision-making, predominately through institutions such as the Southern Africa Development
Council (SADC), the African Union (AU) and the New Economic Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD). Such an approach is presented as being respectful of national ‘sovereignty’
and of avoiding a ‘unilateralism’ that would be at the expense of weaker/smaller African nations
such as Zimbabwe (Buthelezi, 2003). Furthermore, it provides a ready-made explanation for the
South African government’s ‘cautious’ approach towards the Mugabe regime on issues of political
repression and general abuse of human rights, the parallel desire clearly being to coax ‘Comrade’
Mugabe into gradual political changes (and/or a possible ‘exit strategy’) that would prevent the
‘collapse’ and avert a civil war.

It does not take a leap of analytical faith to see that the dominant ‘effect’ of such an analysis is to
confirm the primacy of racial and political solidarity in deciphering South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy.
The inherent analytical assumptions being made by Buthelezi (and others) is that there has not
already been a ‘collapse’ of the Zimbabwean economy for the majority of Zimbabweans and that a de
facto (if low intensity) civil war does not already exist within Zimbabwe’s borders – both of which
do not measure up to the factual realities of the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ and lend credence to
acceptance of the political legitimacy and economic governance performance of the Mugabe regime
(see final section in this chapter). Similarly, the policy rationalisations employed around fears of
South African hegemony and adherence to consensual regional/continental institutional processes do
not hold much analytical ‘water’ when it is clear that these are only applied by South Africa when
they suit the relevant political and economic interests of the ruling class (encompassing both the
public and private sectors).

While other secondary, and often contradictory, explanations have been put forward by political
analysts, such as Mbeki’s continued adherence to a political Pan-Africanism, his global ambitions to
be the ‘voice’ of the under-developed South and the sorry state of land reform and wealth ownership

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in South Africa itself (Calland, 2003; Barrow, 2001)8, Buthelezi’s arguments capture the main
contours of what has passed as the dominant analytical foundation for understanding and explaining
South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.         The widespread acceptance, either actively or
passively, of such primary explanations indicates the extent to which an alternative, and more
relevant, class analysis of South African foreign policy has been sorely lacking.

The class basis of South African policy

Just before Zimbabwe’s national parliamentary elections in early 2000, that took place within a
context in which Mugabe’s ZANU-PF regime was facing the first real political challenge to its 20-
year rule from the upstart opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the Mbeki
government announced an economic “rescue package” for the Mugabe regime of close to R1 billion.
Not surprisingly, the predictable explanation that came from sympathetic economists and foreign
policy analysts at the time was that such financial support was a pre-emptive move by the Mbeki
government to halt the decline of the Zimbabwean economy in the interests of the Zimbabwean
people, South Africa and the Southern African region (United Nations, 2000a)9.

However, upon a closer inspection of the targets of the “rescue package” it becomes clear that the
real beneficiaries of this evidently neighbourly philanthropy were South African government
parastatals (all of which are now either partially privatised and/or corporatised) and government-
controlled financial institutions. By early 2000 one of the targets, the Zimbabwean electricity
parastatals (ZESA), was estimated to owe its South African counterpart (ESKOM) in the region of
R300 million.      Similarly, the government owned-National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, the
country’s sole oil procurement agency, was estimated to owe over R250 million to its suppliers,
with one of the key suppliers at that stage being the South African oil/coal parastatal – SASOL.
Part of the “rescue package” also included more than twenty joint investment projects in Zimbabwe,
in the areas of infrastructure, tourism and natural gas exploration “involving South Africa's state-
owned corporations such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial
Development Corporation” (Ibid.)10.

As has been clearly evident in South Africa since Mbeki ascended to the political throne, the main
means of facilitating the construction and expansion of a black bourgeoisie politically and
economically tied to the ruling ANC party, has been through the direct and/or indirect
manipulation of state resources and power.          The majority of the so-called ‘black economic

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empowerment’ schemes have been initiated by ANC aligned politicians-cum-capitalist
entrepreneurs, who have used their political and personal connections with ANC leaders in
government to gain financial backing for the launch of private corporations, most all of which have
sizeable stakes in the largest government parastatals. To name but a few of the more prominent
ANC-aligned individuals that are now to be found in the private sector - Cyril Ramaphosa, Nthato
Motlana, Shaiber Shaik, Brigette Radebe, Patrick Mosepe, Saki Macazoma and Tokyo Sexwale.
Additionally, within the public sector there has emerged a sizeable class of individuals, all Rand
millionaires via the salaries and share deals they receive, whose new found class status is wholly
dependent on the continued privatisation and corporatisation of public assets being carried out by
the Mbeki government.

In an indication of just how rapid has been the ascent of this new black bourgeoisie, a late 2002
article in the New York Times, quoting from a study done by the University of South Africa, revealed
that back in 1996 blacks' share of the after-tax income received by the wealthiest fifth of South
Africans was 13 percent. Only four years later, blacks' share of the income of the richest group had
risen to 23 percent (Swarns, 2002). It is this emergent black capitalist class (alongside their political
counterparts in the ANC government) who benefit, politically and economically, from the
privatisation and corporatisation of parastatals that proceeds apace. Likewise, this class has benefited
handsomely from the billions of Rands that continue to be pumped into ‘black economic
empowerment’ via government-controlled financial institutions and through the national fiscus11.

Against such a backdrop, the “rescue package” provided to the Mugabe regime was anything but a
genuine attempt by the Mbeki government to help the Zimbabwean people out of a rapidly
escalating political and economic crisis and in the process shield the region from the associated
‘contamination’. Rather, it was the first major step in what has become a race against both time and
Mugabe, to secure the economic (read: class) interests of an emergent black South African
bourgeoisie, in both the state and private sectors, through the auspices of a ‘foreign policy’
smokescreen. While there is little doubt that the package assisted Mugabe’s ZANU-PF in narrowly
scraping through the 2000 elections (with the help of some serious state intimidation, violence and
electoral fraud), the longer-term importance resided in the considerable economic (class) foothold
gained via Zimbabwean indebtedness and South African investment and trade options.

Indeed, the ANC government’s cynical political support for Mugabe during the 2000 elections is
best understood as a pre-emptive political tactic to stave off the potentially negative consequences

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that an electoral victory by a relatively unknown and potentially unfriendly political force, the
MDC, could well have engendered. If the MDC had (formally) won the 2000 election, the ANC
government and the South African capitalist interests it incubates and supports could have found
themselves at a distinct disadvantage in relation to the contending interests of capitalists (both
Zimbabwean and international) that supported the MDC. By providing political support and
legitimacy to the (victorious) Mugabe regime, Mbeki’s government was taking another step in
ensuring the longer-term security and expansion of South Africa’s (capitalist) economic
‘investments’ in Zimbabwe while simultaneously tying the future health of Zimbabwean capitalists
to South African investment/patronage12.

Somewhat ironically, given the overt racial politics that most often has provided the contextual
milieu to Mbeki’s approach to Africa-specific foreign policy issues, initiatives such as the Zimbabwe
“rescue package” have also provided white South African capital with political space for pursuing
their own economic interests in that country. Mbeki has made a veritable religion out of his public
pronouncements assuring domestic (white) South African capital, as well as international capital,
that the ANC government will never follow Mugabe’s example of either land ‘reform’ or contempt
for the ‘rule of law’. And yet, Mbeki’s political rhetoric, as exemplified in the rationalisation of
economic ‘support’ for the Mugabe regime and the embracing of the fraudulent results of
Zimbabwe’s 2000 elections, played to the ANC’s majority black constituency whilst providing
political cover for investment in Zimbabwe by both black and white South African capital (Barrow,
2001)13. South African Foreign Minister, Nkosozana Dlamini-Zuma provided the classic (foreign
policy) rationalisation for the government’s stance – “we are not going to be combative with
Zimbabwe … we will exercise responsibility” (Granelli, 2001).

Once the more immediate ‘challenge’ of the 2000 elections had been dealt with, Mbeki launched
into a disingenuous and racialising rhetoric as a means to deflect attention (and analysis) away from
the objective realities of both South African policy and Mugabe’s continued (mis)rule. On a visit to
Zimbabwe not long after the elections, and completely ignoring the fact that the majority of
Zimbabweans negatively affected by Mugabe’s actions were black workers (both urban and rural),
Mbeki claimed that the “clamour over Zimbabwe reveals (the) continuing racial prejudice in South
Africa” and announced that, “President Mugabe and I will meet … to pursue the objectives of peace,
stability, democracy and social progress for Zimbabwe, South Africa and the rest of the region”
(Mbeki, 2001).14 Indeed, this kind of approach, combining a continuous racialisation of the
Zimbabwean ‘question’ with repeated promises that diplomatic manoeuvring/behind-the-scene

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talks with Mugabe would result in progress and change in Zimbabwe, was to become the standard
response of Mbeki and the South African government to the ongoing crisis. This, despite the fact that
since the onset of the crisis, it has been black Zimbabweans that have borne the overwhelming brunt
of Mugabe’s authoritarian misrule and the much-heralded talks/meetings with ZANU-PF have
produced nothing of substance.

Such diversionary ploys, which effectively masked the realities of both the oppressive internal
situation in Zimbabwe and the self-serving exigencies of South Africa’s policy approach, only
provided added space for the corresponding intensification of South African economic ‘intervention’
in Zimbabwe and Mugabe’s assault on the Zimbabwean people. Meanwhile, the ANC government
and its capitalist counterparts continued with their business of ‘buying-up’ more of Zimbabwe,
complemented by the Mugabe regime’s unremitting pursuit of untrammelled political power and
the interests of the parasitic and predominately bureaucratic capitalist class which he leads.15

The rationale of South African sub-imperialism

The cumulative effect of South Africa’s policy approach between the 2000 parliamentary elections
and the presidential elections in March 2002 was to effectively institutionalise Zimbabwe’s political
and economic crisis. Knowing full well that the Mbeki government would continue to provide
political cover and economic sustenance to his regime (despite the occasional public criticism to
mollify western governments and capital16), Mugabe was ‘free’ to intensify the scope of state
repression against any political opposition, pursue the corrupt and commandist programme of ‘land
reform’ and gain maximum elite ‘booty’ (while bleeding the national fiscus) from the Zimbabwean
army’s presence in the DRC.

By the time of the 2002 elections, Mugabe’s proto-fascist rule, solidified by the crucial backing of
the Mbeki government, had all but guaranteed the outcome of the election. On the eve of the
election, and realising the need (at the rhetorical level) to give a veil of legitimacy to an electoral
process that had already been completely hijacked and raped by Mugabe and his thugs, Mbeki once
more played the race card. Rather than face up to the reality of what was about to happen, Mbeki
defended Mugabe by accusing the “white world” of a “stubborn and arrogant mind-set (that) at all
times must lead … its demands must determine what everybody else does”. With a cynicism that
would have made Machiavelli proud, Mbeki went on to “appeal to all our brothers and sisters

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beyond the Limpopo river and province to reaffirm their commitment to democracy” (Mbeki,
2002).

Mugabe’s ‘victory’, was helped along by the political naiveté of the MDC, whose political strategy
sought to appease “big business, the (remaining white) commerical farmers, western governments
and NGOs … rather than focusing on the bread and butter issues affecting the masses” that
supported it (Gwisai, 2001). The character of the MDC’s strategic approach effectively pigeon-
holed it into legitimising an election under conditions that virtually assured an illegitimate outcome
and provided Mbeki and the South African government with a ready excuse for their policy positions
on Zimbabwe [i.e., “we support the real liberators despite their problems and that is why we must
adopt a ‘soft’ approach” (Ibid.)]. In the event, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF succeeded in making a mockery
out of even the limited (bourgeois) democracy that had survived up until the election, with the
‘Crisis in Zimbabwe’ group of civil society organisations reporting that between the two elections
over 300 000 cases of serious human rights violations had occurred (Crisis in Zimbabwe, 2002).

Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the ANC issued a statement gleefully
proclaiming that, “the will of the people of Zimbabwe has prevailed … President Robert Mugabe
has won the presidential elections with an overwhelming majority” (ANC, 2002). Likewise, the
ANC dominated Parliament and the National Cabinet of Ministers quickly followed suite, giving
unqualified endorsement to its electoral observer mission report that the elections had been
“credible and legitimate” (Mail & Gaurdian, 2002). Such hypocritical rationalisation was to be
expected from those whose own class interests and accompanying economic strategy effectively
demanded the political survival of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF regime.

More important though, was the ANC’s framing of what was now required of the Mugabe regime,
the South African government and the region as a whole in order to find “solutions” to the
“problems” facing Zimbabwe. In absolute synchronicity with the overall strategic thrust of the
Mbeki government’s policy approach to Zimbabwe up to this point (and the class interests it
represents), the ANC stated that, the “focus” must be “on the fundamental task of reconstruction and
development to ensure a better life for all Zimbabweans” (ANC, 2002). What better and more
opportunistic way to provide the necessary policy framework for codifying and expanding the
presence of South African capital (alongside its western counterparts) in Zimbabwe than to present
the ‘challenge’ as one which could only realistically be ‘met’ by increased penetration, and
ownership, of that same capital with the political backing of the South African state?

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In the months following the 2002 elections, the Mbeki government and the ANC itself made every
attempt, through public statements and diplomatic manoeuvring, to push such a strategy. Whether
as applied to their calls for the dropping of ‘smart sanctions’ against Mugabe and his cronies or to the
attempts to quietly persuade Mugabe to tone down internal repression, the underlying principle
remained the same: managing the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ through its political rationalisation, as a
means of ensuring shorter-term benefit from, and longer-term control of, the Zimbabwean
economy combined with a political influence (ostensibly through regional and continental
institutions such as the SADC and AU) that would maintain and enhance South Africa’s role as sub-
imperial power number one in the neighbourhood. MDC President, Morgan Tsvangirai became so
exasperated at the South African strategy (partly because the MDC itself had shown no willingness
or capacity since the election, to mobilise the majority of Zimbabweans in the face of an intensified
political repression and economic crisis) that he launched a bitterly worded attack on Mbeki and
South African policy at the end of 2002. Tsvangirai accused Mbeki of being a “dishonest broker” and
South Africa of becoming “part of the Zimbabwe problem because its actions are worsening the
crisis” (Tsvangirai, 2002).

What Tsvangirai failed to grasp however, was that the “worsening of the crisis” (in relation that is, to
the material existence, human rights situation and political opinions of the majority of
Zimbabweans) is not the primary concern of Mbeki and his government’s policy towards Zimbabwe.
By any rational standard, the socio-economic situation of most Zimbabweans had, by the end of
2003 become a veritable horror story. Inflation had risen to over 600 percent, the Zimbabwean
dollar was worth 500 percent less than it had in 2000, unemployment had risen to more than 70
percent (with 80 percent of the population living below the poverty datum line) and most basic food
stuffs and fuel had become unaffordable (when they were available) for anyone but the elites.
Meanwhile, most domestic and foreign corporations “continued to declare above-inflation profits in
the billions with corporate bosses earning anything in the range of 20-30 million Z$ a month, while
for those few workers with employment, the average monthly wage stood at Z$100 000 (ISO,
2004).

On the political repression front, it clearly made no difference to Mbeki and the South African
government that the human rights situation in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate, with the Mugabe
regime intensifying its viscious assault on the political opposition. A comprehensive report released
by the Zimbabwe Institute (ironically based in Johannesburg) in early 2004, revealed that over 90

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percent of MDC members of parliament reported violations against themselves, 60 percent reported
attacks on their families and staff and over 50 percent reported having their properties vandalised or
destroyed (Zimbabwe Institute, 2004:16). Indeed, at the same time that Mbeki was running around
the continent and world spreading the South African foreign policy ‘gospel’ of respect for human
rights, free and fair elections, institutionalised democracy, peace-making and an ‘African
Renaissance’, the Mugabe regime had been busy arresting, torturing and often killing MDC
politicians/members along with farm workers and civil society activists as well as passing a slew of
repressive legislation that virtually outlawed any meaningful political and socio-economic
activity/advocacy not approved by Mugabe and ZANU-PF.                 Such was the South African
government’s apologia for the Mugabe regime, that it mobilised and led a move at the United
Nations Human Rights Comission in Geneva to block criticism of Zimbabwe’s human rights record
(Wetherall, 2003). For Lovemore Madhuku, chairperson of Zimbabwe’s largest civic group the
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), this and other examples of Mbeki’s opportunistic support
for the man and regime busily ruining their country and lives was too much: “It’s nauseating to see a
man who leads the African Union teaming up with his ministers to do all they can to endorse a thug
like Mugabe” (Peta, 2003).

Mbeki’s riposte to such withering critique and intensified domestic and global opposition to his
government’s Zimbabwe policy,17 was to stay the course, present his government’s policy as
occupying the moral high ground and wonder out loud what all the fuss was about:

        “As patriots who occupied the same trench of struggle with the people of
        Zimbabwe when we, together, battled to end white minority rule in our region and
        continent, we have no choice but to lend a hand to the effort of the people of
        Zimbabwe to enjoy the fruits of their hard-won liberation, of independence,
        freedom, democracy, peace and stability, and prosperity. Righteous and self-
        serving indignation, and the attitude of superior rectitude will not give us this
        outcome … Our greatest and most enduring strengths as a movement and a people
        derive from our humility, our respect for others, our commitment to principle, our
        love of Africa, our commitment to serve the interests of the poor of the world, as
        best we can, our refusal to abandon what we believe in because of battle fatigue.
        These we must never lose, simply because some among us tell us to act in an
        arrogant and superior manner towards another human being who lies by the
        roadside         in        pain,          bleeding”        (Mbeki,         2003).

Throughout 2004, as the situation in Zimbabwe worsened and hundreds of thousands more
Zimbabweans streamed across the South African border fleeing the economic meltdown and

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Mugabe’s youth militia and police/army thugs18, Mbeki and the South African government
continued to ‘hold the line’ on Zimbabwe policy. In a feeble attempt to defend what had become
indefensible, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Aziz Pahad publicly stated that, “there is no alternative
to quiet diplomacy’ (a position that mirrored similar homilies on macro-economic policy choices in
the early years of the South African transition). He then proceeded to announce that June would be
the month in which a ‘deal’ – brokered by the South African government between ZANU-PF and
the MDC - for the long promised “government of national unity” was imminent (Pahad, 2004).

Not surprisingly, no ‘deal’ occurred despite previous behind-the-scenes attempts, facilitated by the
South African government and ANC-aligned capitalists, to strike an agreement with disgruntled
ZANU-PF leaders (Sparks, 200319), attempts to forge more cordial ties to the MDC (The Witness,
200420) and the recently publicised efforts of a South African spy network involving senior members
of ZANU-PF (Gandu, 2005). All the while though, the South African government has continued to
provide the Mugabe regime with electricity supplies, facilitate the processing of Zimbabwe’s raw
minerals in South Africa (Bell, 2004), encourage intensified ‘investment’ by South African capital in
the fire-sale Zimbabwean economy and simultaneously issue a cynical denial (despite every
indication to the contrary) that there were any Zimbabweans starving as a result of a politically
manipulated food crisis (Adams, 2004)21.        When a small COSATU delegation ventured into
Zimbabwe on a ‘fact finding’ mission in late 2004 to hear about the political repression against
workers and see the socio-economic conditions of the populace for themselves, ANC leaders
labelled the trip, “irresponsible games that do not contribute anything towards solving the crisis in
Zimbabwe” (Ibid.).

What all of this confirms, is that the character of Mbeki’s Zimbabwe foreign policy has very little to
do with political loyalties and considerations of ‘sovereignty’ and nothing at all to do with altruistic
economic motivations. The more recent attempts to forge an elitist political deal (masquerading as a
consensual ‘government of national unity’) should be seen as what it is - confirmation that Mbeki’s
bottom line remains the degree to which the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ facilitates the longer-term
interests of an emergent black bourgeoisie in South Africa that aspires to both regional and
continental ascendancy, whilst simultaneously consolidating his government’s ‘role’ as the main
African arbiter of both a regional and continental capitalist political economy. Further, if Mbeki can
oversee the installation of a ‘new look’ ZANU-PF government – something that is clearly a desired
outcome of the upcoming elections scheduled for March despite the fact that conditions inside
Zimbabwe will once again ensure that Mugabe and ZANU-PF will be able to steal a ‘victory’ - that is

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more ‘acceptable’ to the international financial institutions (World Bank & IMF) and the core
capitalist states in the North, then he will have doubly succeeded, further cementing his ‘point man
status’22 and South Africa’s sub-imperial role. As one of the most active, persecuted and insightful
political groupings in Zimbabwe has predicted:

          “ZANU-PF, with the aid of Mbeki, is likely to continue to offer the carrot of talks,
          including a possible Mugabe-Tsvangirai summit and some constitutional
          amendments to the electoral process, to buy time and cause further confusion in
          the MDC and its allies … the chances are thus quite strong that ZANU-PF will
          increase its parliamentary majority in 2005 in order to get the 2/3rds to allow
          them to unilaterally change the constitution and deal with the Mugabe succession
          issue in a manner that best suits their interests, especially the hardliner faction”
          (ISO, 2004).

The double (and complementary) tragedy of Zimbabwe in the 21st century should be clear for all to
see. On the one hand, the gradual but systematic oppression of the Zimbabwean people by a shrewd
comprador megalomaniac and his acolytes who have sold the lives of the vast majority of
Zimbabweans down the metaphorical ‘river’ of power and greed. On the other, the equally gradual
but systematic loss of any meaningful popular and truly sovereign control over, and ‘ownership’ of,
domestic wealth and economic resources to South African capitalists (using the vehicle of the
government they run) who have commodified the oppression of the Zimbabwean people for their
own class power and greed.

*Dale T. McKinley is an independent writer, lecturer and researcher based in
Johannesburg

1
 Other than a few discussion documents emanating from think tanks (e. g. The Africa Institute, IDASA) as well as from
the ANC and more recently the South Africa Communist Party, there has been precious little analysis of South Africa’s
contemporary foreign policy towards Zimbabwe on offer. Descriptive journalistic and/or advocacy articles have
dominated public discourse on South Africa’s involvement with the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’. The overwhelming focus of
the books and academic journal articles dealing with Zimbabwe, that have appeared since the late 1990s, has been on the
internal character of Zimbabwe’s political economy.
2
  While there are several thousand white Zimbabweans resident in South Africa there are, by anyone’s count, hundreds
of thousands of black Zimbabweans who live in South Africa on a permanent basis, the vast majority of whom can be
classified as economic refugees. Since the elections of 2000 though, there have been growing numbers of black
Zimbabweans who have fled to South Africa to escape the widespread political repression of the Mugabe regime.
3
  For numerous examples of Mbeki’s use of the race and ‘liberation struggle’ card to deal with various critics and often,
to foreclose further serious debate/contestation on matters of crucial importance about South Africa’s post-1994
political economy see his weekly ‘Letters from the President’ at http://www. anc. org. za/ancdocs/anctoday
4
  This ‘war of words’ has been exacerbated by the often crudely right-wing and racially charged discourse adopted by
Australian Prime Minister John Howard on domestic issues such as aboriginal rights and the treatment of refugees from
South-East Asia. Likewise, President Mbeki has regularly drawn on a racialised discourse to attack political opponents in
South Africa as well as to defend his government’s policies such as ‘black economic empowerment’.
5
  There are several exceptions to this. However, the most incisive analyses of the Zimbabwean crisis have come from

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academics, whose work has not been readily available to the general populations of either Zimbabwe or South Africa.
Two examples of such analyses are: Brian Raftopoulos and Lloyd Sachinkonye (eds) (2001), Striking Back: The Labour
Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe, 1980-2000, Harare, Weaver Press; and, Patrick Bond and Masimba
Manyanya (2002), Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice, Scottsville,
University of Natal Press.
6
   It is important to note here that despite claims of ‘independence’, the origins of The Africa Institute (one of the most
influential think-tanks in the realm of South African foreign policy) lie in the desire by the ruling ANC to have a
sympathetic, black intellectual counter-balance to the historic dominance of more oppositional white intellectuals and
think-tanks. Virtually all the public documents, presentations and conferences emanating from, and organised by, The
Africa Institute have provided intellectual support for Mbeki’s foreign policy approach, whether as applied to
Zimbabwe, the African continent or more generally.
7
   The latest example being in a talk on Zimbabwe, given by Pahad at the Human Sciences Research Council in Pretoria
on 27th January 2004 which the author personally attended.
8
  Barrow argues that, “Mbeki has to be very careful not to criticize a leader in a neighbouring country who appears to be
doing more to help rural black people”.
9
   Another secondary explanation can be found in the recent admittance by a senior ANC/SACP politician that, at the
time, the ANC government “analysed the emergence of the MDC as essentially a symptom of ZANU-PF mistakes and
stagnation” (Cronin, 2004). What this confirms is that the ANC government, from the very beginning of the
Zimbabwean ‘crisis’, was not willing to accept the real reason for the emergent and popular political opposition to
ZANU-PF – i.e., that large numbers of Zimbabweans no longer accepted the legitimacy of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and had
been struggling for a fundamantal break from its political authoritarianism and neoliberal economic policies for years.
The ‘loan’ to the ZANU-PF government could thus be seen as consistent with such a misdirected and ignorant analysis,
designed to shore up ZANU-PFs image and act as an avenue for its political regeneration via a new relationship with the
South African government and private sector.
10
    Also see, United Nations (2000b), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information
Network, “Zimbabwe: Economic Rescue Package”, http://www. irinnews. org, electronic news item, 22 February. This
report also quotes a SASOL spokesperson as indicating that SASOL was in talks with the Zimbabwe government to
supply a large portion of the country’s fuel requirements.
11
    In the past four years, The Mbeki government, guided by the neoliberal GEAR macro-economic strategy, has targeted
all of South Africa’s main parastatals for either privatisation and/or corporatisation. Within the framework of GEAR,
Mbeki has made it very clear that one of the priorities of the ANC government is to build a new black capitalist class as
the engine of economic growth in South Africa. As practical indication of this, the 2003 National Budget allocated R10
billion to ‘black economic empowerment’, the majority of which will find its way into the pockets of a very small
minority of aspiring black capitalists. To put this in perspective, in the same budget less than R2 billion was allocated to
combat HIV-AIDs over the next two years (in a country with the highest prevalence of HIV-AIDs in the world) and less
than R4 billion for specific ‘poverty alleviation’ programmes (in a country with an unofficial employment rate of close to
40%).
12
    The ‘capitalist cronies’ are mainly to be found in the ranks of senior politicians, military officers and banking officials
(within both public and private banks), all of who have ‘black economic empowerment’ initiatives to thank for their
position and wealth. They have played (and continue to play) an important role in providing Mugabe with access to
substantial funds (often through black market transactions) for sustaining state patronage and its repressive apparatus.
For an MDC perspective on the role of the bankers in particular. See MDC (2002).
13
    Any South African who has visited Harare and other major urban centres in Zimbabwe over the last 2-3 years will have
felt quite at home given all the South African companies now operating (and dominating) the Zimbabwean retail sector.
Whereas ten years ago, Zimbabwean companies provided a majority of goods and services in the domestic retail sector,
the contemporary situation makes Zimbabwe resemble a tenth province of South Africa. Similarly, South African banks
have, since 2000, been extremely active in either buying up, or going into partnership with, various Zimbabwean
banks/financial services companies
14
    The quotes are referenced by Mbeki to a speech he made in Bulawayo in May 2000, one month after the Zimbabwe
elections.
15
    For a more detailed analysis and discussion of the character of this bureaucratic class see, SACP (2004). The SACP
states that, “the crisis in Zimbabwe is considerably rooted in the social reality of the class force dominant in the
leadership echelons of the ruling party. This class force is a bureaucratic capitalist class reliant on its monopoly of the
state machinery for its own social reproduction. This class force, dominant in ZANU PF ruling circles, is unable to
provide a coherent and hegemonic strategic leadership capable of beginning to address Zimbabwe’s political, moral,
economic and social crisis”.
16
    Even the mild criticisms that emanated from the South African government as a result of ‘playing up’ to the likes of
Australia and Britain in the Commonwealth (and the US and other G-8 countries in order to ‘cover’ support for NEPAD
and the impending African Union), caused enough consternation amongst Mugabe’s cronies for them to issue (through

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the editors of the government-owned Herald newspaper) a stinging – if opportunistic - rebuke of Mbeki for being in the
“same bed with the architects of apartheid”. See, The Herald, 3 December 2001.
17
   By late 2003 both of the ANC’s alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP, had come out publicly against Mbeki’s
‘quiet diplomacy’. However, both avoided any mention of the economic dimension of Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policy, rather
stressing the need for a ‘political solution’.
18
    The South African government has been accused by several leading human rights NGOs, refugee agencies and
Zimbabwe advocacy groups in South Africa of discriminating against Zimbabwean refugees seeking political asylum and
of treating ‘economic refugees’ with arrogance and contempt (United Nations, 2004). The Lindela Repatriation Centre
outside Johannesburg (and in which several leading ANC Women’s League members have invested) is the transit camp
for ‘illegals’ rounded up by the South Africa police and army and has also come under the spotlight for torturing and
denying medical assistance to those deatined as well as endemic corruption in the deportation process.
19
   Sparks tells the ‘story’ of how MDC MP, David Coltart, flew to Johannesburg in early December 2002 at the behest
of a “prominent South African businessman”, to meet with a relatively unknown ANC politician, Patrick Moseke.
According to Sparks, Moseke informed Coltart that ZANU-PF kingpin, Emmerson Mnangagwa had paid an earlier visit
to talk with the South African government about plans to ease Mugabe into the ceremonial position of President.
Mnangagwa would take over as Prime Minister, get rid of the more “egregious” ZANU-PF leaders (such as Information
Minister Jonathan Moyo and Commissioner of Police, Augustine Chihuri), bring the MDC into the government and
“restore the rule of law”.
20
    After a meeting with Mbeki in October, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai was quoted as saying: “I found the
engagement with President Mbeki very productive and found his attitude to be open, concerned, and of course to be
committed to finding a solution. I have had to revise my view of my attitude towards Mbeki and I found him to be more
robust" (The Witness, 2004)
21
    Aziz Pahad stated that the South African government would intervene “if and when” it received “ concrete
information” that the Zimbabwean people are starving and said that there was no indication that Mugabe and ZANU-PF
were interfering in the food situation in a bid to manipulate the outcome of the elections scheduled for March 2005
(Adams, 2004). Not only did such statements fly in the face of overwhelming and ‘concrete’ evidence to the contrary,
but ignored the fact that the entire food distribution programme in Zimbabwe continues to be run by a ‘Task Force on
Maize Distribution’ dominated by Mugabe’s security apparatus and chaired by the Zimbabwean Minister of State for
Security.
22
   This term refers to the phrase used by US President George W. Bush on his visit to South Africa in mid-2003, when he
announced that Mbeki was his ‘point man’ for the continent. Also, there is growing evidence that the ZANU-PF regime
is, once again, consolidating its neoliberal policy orientation and cosying up to international finanical institutions such as
the IMF (which resumed visits to the country in 2004 to pursue the reintegration of Zimbabwe ‘into the fold’).

                                                    WORKS CITED

Adams, Sheena (2004). ‘Pahad disputes claim about starving Zimbabweans’, The Star, 4th
       November.

ANC (2002). ‘Zimbabwe Presidential Elections: Time for Healing; Time for Reconstruction and
      Development’, ANC Today, Vol.2, No.11 (15-21 March) -
      http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002.

Barrow, Greg (2001). ‘Mbeki's dilemma over Zimbabwe’, The Guardian, 13th March.

Buthelezi, Sipho (2003). Seminar talk on South African policy towards Zimbabwe presented at the
        Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (Johannesburg), 25th February

Calland, Richard (2003). ‘A Betrayal of Democracy’, Mail & Guardian, 14-19 March.

Crisis in Zimbabwe (2002). ‘Government of National Unity: Trick or Treat?’, Press Statement
         reprinted in Socialist Worker (July-August).

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16

Cronin, Jeremy (2004). ‘Zimbabwe must be helped to break impasse’, Sunday Independent, 22
        February.

Granelli, Marco (2001). ‘SA won’t condemn Mugabe’, The Saturday Star, 16th February.

Gwisai, Muyaradzi (2001). As quoted in The Herald (Zimbabwe), 2nd December.

ISO (2004). ‘Crisis in Zimbabwe – Stalemate & Way Forward’, pamphlet by the International
       Socialist Organisation National Co-ordinating Committee (10 January).

Mbeki, Thabo (2001). Letter from the President,‘Clamour over Zimbabwe reveals continuing
       racial prejudice in South Africa’, ANC Today, Vol.1, No.9 (23 - 29 March) -
       http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2001.

Mbeki, Thabo (2002). Letter From the President,‘Zimbabwe: Two blacks and one white’, ANC
       Today, Vol.2, No.10 (8-14 March) - http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002.

Mbeki, Thabo (2003). Letter from the President,‘The people of Zimbabwe must decide their own
       future’, ANC Today, Vol.3, No.18 (9-15 May) -
       http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002.

MDC (2002), 'MDC on Monday: The Dictator's Bankers', Daily News, 9th September.

Pahad, Aziz (2004). Seminar talk on Zimbabwe given at the Human Sciences Research Council
        (Pretoria), 27th January.

Peta, Basildon (2003). ‘Mbeki, Obasanjo “timid with Mugabe”’, Sunday Independent, 26th
        January.

Raftopoulos, Brian (2004). ‘Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics’, Institute of
       Development Studies at the Univeristy of Zimbabwe, unpublished paper.

Sparks, Allister (2003). “Plots Abound as Zanu-PF Leaders Try to Shed Mugabe, Pacify MDC’,
        electronic article, 18th February - http://allafrica.com/stories/200302180512.html.

Tsvangirai, Morgan (2002). Address at a meeting with the MDC members of parliament at the party
        headquarters at Harvest House, Harare, Zimbabwe, 18th December (electronic news item
        via email).

United Nations (2000a). ‘Zimbabwe: SA Economic Aid’, Office for the Coordination of
       Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network, electronic news item, 14
       February 2000 - http://www.irinnews.org.

United Nations (2000b). ‘Zimbabwe: Economic Rescue Package’, Office for the Coordination of
       Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network, electronic news item, 22
       February - http://www.irinnews.org.

Vavi, Zwelinzima (2004). ‘We are not quiet diplomats’, Mail & Guardian (5-11 November).

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Wetherell, Iden (2003). ‘My Enemy’s Enemy’, Mail & Guardian (9-15 May).

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