PERSISTENCE OF THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UNDERSTANDING IN ORDER TO ACT - FES
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d Security
an
e
Se
Peac
ries
FES
M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent,
Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce,
Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
PERSISTENCE OF THE CRISIS IN
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:
UNDERSTANDING IN ORDER TO ACT
M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond PERSISTENCE OF THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UNDERSTANDING IN ORDER TO ACT
Translated from French by Diom Richard Ngong diomngongr@yahoo.com Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Yaounde (Cameroon), 2018. Tel. 00 237 222 21 29 96 / 00 237 222 21 52 92 B.P. 11 939 Yaounde / Fax: 00 237 222 21 52 74 E-mail : info@fes-kamerun.org Site : www.fes-kamerun.org Editorial design by PUA : www.aes-pua.com ISBN: 978-9956-532-06-1 Any commercial use of publications, brochures or other printed materials of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is strict- ly forbidden unless otherwise authorized in writing by the publisher This publication is not for sale All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photo print, microfilm, translation or other means without written permission from the publisher
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …………………………………….....…………………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....………….….........……......... 5
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………….....…………….........……………………………………….......…………….........6
INTRODUCTION …………………………………….....…………….........………………………..........................………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…………….........7
CHAPTER I: ACTORS OF INSTABILITY IN THE CAR: INTEREST AND DISINTEREST
IN SUSTAINABLE PEACE…………………………………….....…………….........……………………………….....…………….........……………………………………........…………….........9
1- Internal actors: interests, motives, and ability to act or to harm …………………………………….....……..........………......... 9
a- Political and security actors …………………………………….....….................................................................................................................................………….........9
b- Military and paramilitary actors: Defense and security forces and armed groups ................10
c- Other actors .…………………………………….....…………….…………………………………….....……………..........…………………………………….....…….......……….........12
2- External actors …………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…….........………......... 13
a- State actors …………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…....…………......... 13
b - Intergovernmental organizations involved in the crisis ……………………………………............................…………….........16
CHAPTER II: DYNAMIICS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:
A STATE IN FRAGILITY!…………………………………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…………….......…………….....…………….........19
1- Factors perpetuating the crisis: is the CAR a “failed” State or a “State in Fragility”? ………......... 20
a- The internal vulnerability of the country …………………………………………………….....…….........…………………….....……………......... 20
b- Splintering of armed groups and worsening of intercommunity tensions …….....……………......... 20
c- Absence of a collective memory …………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....……....................……......... 21
2- Recommendations …………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…...................................................................................………….........22
a- To the government to enable it to restore State authority throughout the country ......22
b- To political parties …………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…………….........……………………….....……………......... 24
c- To civil society …………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....…………….........………………………………….....……………......... 24
d- The international and African communities should …………………………………….....…………………….....…………….........24
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………….....…………….........…………………………………….....……………................................……………………….....…………….........25Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS and writer on the crisis in the Central African
Republic (Une Centrafrique au bord du dése-
This publication is the outcome of research spoir-2015) and Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflo-
and a security dialogue commissioned by the rine Grâce, Associate Researcher in CREPS/
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in April 2017. The UYII, who drafted this publication.
dialogue brought together security experts Finally special thanks go to the former Resi-
from the Central African Republic to examine dent Representative, Mrs. Susanne STOLLRE-
ways to help the country to put an end to the ITER and the Coordinator of the Peace and
persistent crisis. These experts were drawn Security Programme, Mrs. Susan BAMUH
from universities, civil society, the media and APARA, for the enormous amount of time
political parties. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and work they put in to organize the work-
would like here to thank them sincerely for shops, follow up the activities and publish this
their individual and collective contributions. study.
We would also like to thank Dr. MOGBA
Zéphirin Jean Raymond, Associate Professor Mr. Friedrich Kramme-Stermose
from the University of Bangui, M. BENINGA
Resident Representative
Paul-Crescent, Researcher in political sciences
FES Cameroon and Central Africa
5M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND sory Mission in the Central African Republic
ABBREVIATIONS EUFOR: European Union Forces
FACA: Forces Armées Centrafricaines
AEF: French Equatorial Africa (Armed forces of the Central African Repub-
APRD: Armée populaire pour la Restaura- lic)
tion de la République et de la Démocratie FOMUC: Force Multinational de la CEMAC
(Popular Army for the Restoration of the Re- (CEMAC Multinational Forces)
public and Democracy)
GDP: Gross domestic product
AU: African Union
IGO: Intergovernmental Organization
BONUCA: The United Nations Peace-build-
IMF: International Monetary Fund
ing Support Office in the Central African Re-
KNK: Kwa Na Kwa (work and work only)
public
MICOPAX: Peace Consolidation Mission in
CAR: The Central African Republic
the Central African Republic
CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Commu-
MINURCA: The United Nations Mission in
nity of Central African States
the Central African Republic
DDRR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Re-
MISCA: The International Support Mission
habilitation and Reintegration
to the Central African Republic
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
NGO: Non -governmental organization
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central
OPEX: external operation
African States
UN: United Nations
EU: European Union
EUMAM: European Union’s Military Advi-
6Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
INTRODUCTION The Central African Republic has had limit-
ed experience with democratic institutions.
The Central African Republic has experi- Most political institutions in the country are
enced repeated sociopolitical crises since either considered illegitimate or illegal. So,
the tragic death of its founder, Barthélémy instead of elections, many actors believe that
Boganda, the year before the county’s inde- the best way to power is through mutiny, re-
pendence. Today there is a general tendency bellion and military takeovers. Indeed, there
by foreign observers and analysts who are have been five coup d’états so far (1965,
not conversant with the history of this coun- 1979, 1981, 2003 and 2013). All of this is
try, to simply ignore or minimize this aspect the direct result of the failure to forge a na-
of the political background of the CAR. This tion based on the rule of law with a united
has resulted in poor understanding of the people, common history and culture. The
diachronic and holistic causes of the identity failure of the judicial system, which is almost
crises, and of the recurrent cycles of violence nonexistent outside the capital, Bangui, has
this country has been experiencing through created an atmosphere of impunity that has
the years. led to small scale wars and terrible atrocities.
It should be recalled that Boganda had not It should be noted that knowing the history
finalized his political vision to turn the Cen- of the country is necessary for the under-
tral African Republic into a nation that would standing of these repeated crises. Resistance
truly unite the colonies of the French Equato- to colonial rule and to slave trade by Muslim
rial Africa (AEF). His sudden death in a plane Peul in the 19th Century, led to a culture of
crash on 29 March 1959 when the country confrontation and self-defense that can be
was still under French colonial rule prevent- seen even today in the form of village mili-
ed the people of the Central African Republic tias. The Anti-Balaka is simply a manifesta-
from realizing his dream of building a nation tion of this culture. To these internal causes,
that could provide its people with access to others have been added. These are rivalries,
food, housing, health and education. Also, ambitions, geopolitics and geo-strategies
he had not had the time to fully develop his to demonstrate economic prowess. Men-
political vision or to build a politically savvy, tion should also be made of the influence
enlightened and dynamic team that could of France and other emerging petroleum
replace him. His sudden death was thus a countries within the Central African sub re-
double blow to the Ubangui people, particu- gion (Gabon under Bongo, Chad under Idriss
larly to the young and inexperienced leaders Déby and Congo under Sassou). There was
who were thus forced to inherit a complex some short-lived hope when Faustin Arch-
situation that was far beyond their capabili- ange TOUADERA was elected president of
ties. From that time on, the CAR spiraled into the Republic in 2016. This hope was quickly
chaos and a long period of instability that dashed by the resurgence of violence and
has lasted well over 50 years. insecurity in the country.
7M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
The numerous armed groups in the various were both followed by a sharp increase in
parts of the country, which have more or rape and other sexual abuses. In 2015, some
less replaced government armed forces, 693 women were raped, and in the first six
have contributed to the permanent climate months of 2016 alone 501 women, includ-
of fear and insecurity. ing 81 minors, suffered the same fate. This
At the socioeconomic level, the amount bleak security situation resulted in 500.000
needed to provide security, basic social ser- displaced persons and 70.000 refugees.
vices and life saving food security for some However, at the end of 2015, there were
1.6 million people in 2017 was estimated at just 450.000 displaced persons, a number
399.5 million US dollars (UNOCHA report, that further dropped by 14.27% by end of
2016). The discovery of new resources and a September 2016 to 384.884. On the oth-
chronically weak government have fostered er hand, the number of refugees fleeing to
corruption and a ferocious struggle for con- neighboring countries increased by 2.24%,
trol over precious stones and other natu- going from 442.069 in July 2015 to 467.960
ral resources. Currently, the CAR is twenty persons in September 2016. This situation
times poorer than it was 40 years ago. In was further aggravated by food insecurity,
the 1970s, the country had 460 industrial violation of human rights, enrolment of child
enterprises, but today there are barely ten of soldiers, rape, extrajudicial killings, etc. Since
them. In 1970, the CAR had one university then, the country has been experiencing re-
with 1000 students, today, it still has one current multidimensional crises (political,
university with more the 20 000 students. security, economic, social, humanitarian,
That same year, per capita income stood at etc.) with regional and international reper-
more than 400 USD, now it is below 100 cussions.
USD. Strangely this deteriorating situation All the local and international initiatives that
does not seem to bother anyone. The vari- have been implemented so far to help the
ous regimes that have succeeded each other country have not had the expected results.
every 10 years or so, all seem to be looking Even the dozen or so international peace-
to development partners for solutions to the keeping missions to the CAR have failed to
enormous challenges facing the country. All bring peace to the country. This publication
of them have constantly turned to the World identifies the various actors, their involve-
Bank, the IMF, the European Union, and the ment in the crisis and the factors that have
UN or to Paris for solutions to the country’s led to these recurrent cycles of violence. It
day to day problems. makes recommendations that if implement-
The takeover by François BOZIZE and his ed, could lead to lasting peace in the Central
armed rebellion in 2003, and by the Sele- African Republic.
ka coalition of Michel DJOTODIA in 2013,
8Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
CHAPTER I: ACTORS OF ing, motivating or encouraging the citizens
INSTABILITY IN THE CAR: of the country to fight for change that can
INTEREST AND DISINTEREST IN bring about lasting peace. A culture of cor-
ruption, impunity and lack of transparency
SUSTAINABLE PEACE
permeates the entire political structure, and
The conflict in the CAR has been fueled and has rendered the system incapable of fully
aggravated by the interests and involvement carrying out its responsibilities and providing
of internal actors, some foreign countries much needed public services to its citizens.
and international organizations. Political leaders in the country are incapable
of managing crises and political change. All
1- Internal actors: interests, motives, political changes have almost always led to
and ability to act or to harm violence, corruption, nepotism, hatred and
insecurity.
The conflict in the CAR involves actors from
The intellectual elite in the CAR have been
different sociological backgrounds, often
so politicized that they have ceased to be
with conflicting or sometimes overlapping
a source of enlightenment and knowledge.
political and, or financial interests.
They have failed abjectly in their duty to pro-
These numerous actors can be classified ac- vide the population, the political class and
cording to the nature of their activity. These those in power with objective analyses of
include: political and security actors, military the nation’s social ills, to enable them to un-
and paramilitary actors, as well as other enti- derstand and find appropriate solutions. The
ties within the political system of the Central lure of instant gratification, power and riches
African Republic. has blunted the ability of these intellectuals,
and made them incapable of proposing cre-
a- Political and security actors
ative solutions. Their goals and approaches
The political and security actors promoting to politics are completely at variance with
instability in CAR are members of the ruling the legitimate aspirations of the citizens of
political class and of the opposition. the country. Unholy alliances between the
The political elite have always had full con- various political actors (government and
trol and enjoyed almost unlimited political armed opposition) in the country have made
power in the country. These elite include matters significantly worse and rendered the
the President of the Republic, Members of search for solutions even more complex.
Government and officials ranking as: senior The political opposition has always tried to
officials, functionaries in the central admin- act as a counterweight to the government.
istration, politicized intellectuals and top Unlike the armed opposition, they have al-
military brass. Unfortunately, none of these ways sought to gain power through the bal-
political elite in the CAR has been able to lot box and not through arms. Even though
emerge as a leader capable of truly influenc- this is to their credit, it must be pointed out
9M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
that even this political opposition has its own ka with Muslims and the Anti Balaka with
weaknesses. These shortcomings are often Christians and non Muslims. Some civil soci-
rooted in the selfish desire of most opposi- ety actors and the media, especially foreign
tion leaders to gain power or put their per- media also played a role in promoting such
sonal interests at the forefront. Worse, many tensions.
political parties in the CAR, which identify
either with the ruling party or with the op- b- Military and paramilitary actors:
Defense and security forces and armed
position, do not have a political platform or
groups
a clear and convincing vision for a nation
with a united people. All of them have failed There is urgent need to improve the securi-
to provide a performance framework that ty situation in the Central African Republic,
can be used to evaluate their actions. This especially with the current surge in violence
is compounded by their inability to strategi- in Bangui and in the rest of the country. So
cally translate their rhetoric into action. The far, there is no official security force that the
civilian political opposition relies on patron- State can use to protect the population. The
age rather than on its own ability to take ini- existence of numerous armed groups has
tiative. Because of their inability to propose a made it virtually impossible for the govern-
viable alternative to the ruling party or to de- ment to build a strong and legitimate secu-
velop the political awareness of the people, rity force.
opposition parties share responsibility for The Security and Defense Forces (SDF) that
the crisis in the country. As in most African do exist are paradoxically at the root of polit-
countries, the proliferation of political parties ical instability and social conflict in the CAR.
in the CAR reflects the inability of political Many rebel leaders are either former soldiers
leaders to develop a vision, or common plat- of the Forces armées centrafricaines (the
form that can bring people together. Most armed force of the Central African Republic
often, people join parties because of their - FACA) or members of the political elite. The
ethnic or tribal relations with the party lead- security problems in the CAR can therefore
ers. During the 2014 and 2015 elections for also be traced to the collapse of the securi-
example, there were 69 duly registered po- ty sector. The FACA is often in conflict with
litical parties, with 21 others in the process the country’s regimes because all presidents
of registration. All these parties were unable have tried at one time or the other to impose
to stop the Seleka and its leader DJOTODIA their preferred military leader on it, most of-
from seizing power through violence and ten from their ethnic group. Should tribalism
sowing terror in the country. Even after the be a method of governance? Is it not possi-
takeover by the Djotodia regime, the politi- ble to gain trust and political authority simply
cal class continued to promote social tension through the impartial management of the
by pitting communities and religious groups various ethic and tribal groups in the coun-
against each other. They identified the Sele- try? These questions are not naïve. When
10Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
you look at the political and security history fouth, another controversial figure who
of the CAR, the answers to these questions played a role in Samba-Panza’s transitional
become obvious: governing through tribal- government. Also, President Bozize’s party
ism and favoritism has had harmful conse- Kwa na Kwa (KNK work and work only) sup-
quences on the population and the country. ported the Anti Balaka, who were retaliating
The armed political opposition, as opposed against the Seleka which had removed him
to the “democratic opposition”, refers to from power in 2013.
political parties that have their own armies. Today armed groups are considered a nor-
These are parties with a two-faced policy, mal part of the political and security set up
one face legal and the other illegal, hidden of the country. Indeed violence is seen as the
and always threatening. As far back as 1981, fastest way to gain power, and politicians
such a party was involved in the bomb at- have consistently used such armed groups
tack on a cinema club in Bangui. This party to get to power or, when in power, to fight
was against the David Dacko regime that bandits and other small criminal groups in
was seen as being propped up by France. remote parts of the country. Today, the com-
Again, the Rassemblement démocratique position of these groups is changing con-
centrafricain (RDC) of André Kolingba played stantly. They are often made up of self de-
a significant role in the rebellions of 1996 fense militia, highway robbers, and former
and 1997 and in the coup attempt against members of the security and defense force.
President Ange-Félix Patasse on the 21 of Armed groups have been at the forefront of
May 2001. The latter himself helped to set numerous rebellions, mutinies and coups in
up the Armée Populaire pour la Restauration the country. At least 14 armed groups were
de la République et la Démocratie (APRD), in identified between 2002 and 2017.
2009, which was led by Jean-Jacques Dema-
Source: jeuneafrique.com Centrafrique-JeuneAfrique.com 2013
11M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
Before 2012, the armed opposition was not protect them in the absence of State security
very interested in carving out territories for institutions. Others even assumed judiciary
themselves. This changed with the over- functions and started acting as procureurs
throw of President Bozize in 2013. Taking and local magistrates, demanding pay-
advantage of the vacuum in some regions of ment for legal services. This further eroded
the country, armed groups suddenly started the legitimacy of official State institutions.
occupying such spaces to consolidate their (National recovery and Peace building Plan
influence. By 2014, Seleka, Anti-Balaka and 2017-2021)
the LRA controlled vast territories within the The priorities of the State and interests of
country. In the areas under their control, these armed groups are thus frequently at
they performed functions that fell under the odds. This is made even more complex by the
purview of the State such as mining, selling fact that these armed groups are constant-
diamonds and collecting taxes on agricultur- ly breaking up and forming alliances with
al and commercial activities. Cattle breeders breakaway factions form other groups. This
were either killed or had their cattle stolen, has made it difficult to untangle the under-
sometimes as many as 1 500 cattle per week. lying factors so as to find solutions to end
That is about 750 million FCFA per week or 3 the crisis.
billion per month, or 36 billion per year. They
also set up road blocks to extort money from c- Other actors
road users, with nearly 40 road blocks on the Under the category “other actors”, we have
road between Bangui and Bambari alone. civil society organizations, religious leaders,
At each road block road users had to pay a sects and the youth. All these actors have
toll according to their social standing. Timber at one time or the other, depending on the
trucks moving from the south to the west political regime in place, played a role in the
paid between 150 000 to 200 000 FCFA per violence in the CAR. Civil society in the CAR
truck on such road blocks. is split between those trying to foster a dem-
A phenomenon also appeared that can only ocratic and peaceful society, and those that
be described as “unholy or incestuous alli- are merely positioning themselves for well
ances”. This is the implosion/breakdown, paid and influential administrative and po-
and re-composition/reconstruction of new litical posts. The many civil society organiza-
alliances between factions with sometimes tions have not been able to suggest viable
opposing objectives. As a result of internal solutions to the problems facing the people
wrangling, some well-known armed groups of the Central African Republic. The vast ma-
like the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka split into jority of these organizations are based in the
factions, and some of these factions linked capital, Bangui. They have all failed to either
up with factions from other militia, or with promote a change of mentality or to edu-
whole militia groups that were being paid cate the population on democracy and so-
by local communities, or business entities to cial communication. Many of them have no
12Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
solutions to the pressing challenges facing them into armed groups, militias and politi-
the nation as a whole. These shortcomings cal movements. (Karako, Balawa, COCORA,
might be due to the often heterogeneous COAC, Anti Balaka, Seleka). Also, many of
sociological backgrounds, and sometimes these idle and abandoned youths are turning
opposing objectives of these organizations. to crime for a living.
Many are run by young unemployed gradu-
ates, civil servants in search of additional in- 2- External actors
come, public sector employees or dismissed
Due to its enclaved location, the CAR shares
political party leaders or members trying to
long and porous boundaries with many oth-
earn a living. Many see civil society merely
er countries. This porosity is further com-
as a stepping stone to social, economic or
pounded by the close ethnic and cultural
political advancement.
relations between people on both sides of
Other actors include the many religious such borders (Chad, Sudan, Congo-Kinsha-
groups and occult circles in the CAR (Ros- sa and Cameroon) and the lack of State in-
icrucian, Freemasons, Lion’s Club, etc.). stitutions in border regions. The conflict in
These groups have greatly influenced the the CAR therefore has direct implications for
thinking and actions of people in the CAR. insecurity in the Central and the West Afri-
The leaders of these groups or sects and can sub regions. As a matter of fact, foreign
their followers are always fighting those actors, both States and international organi-
from other sects, during sub regional initia- zations, have always played an outsized role
tives, to position themselves and their sects in the history of the Central African Repub-
for promotion or appointment to high level lic. As indicated above, there are two main
government posts. Even though it is difficult types of external actors: States (neighboring
to determine the extent to which these sects or not) and intergovernmental organizations
have influenced the thinking of the people, it (IGOs – continental or international)
is obvious that they have played a significant
role in the crisis in the CAR. In fact, their pro- a- State actors
liferation can be seen as both the cause and Foreign States often intervene officially or
effect of the crisis in the country. unofficially in the internal affairs of the CAR
Finally the youth: government has not been for economic, geopolitical or geostrategic
able to provide them with the type of train- reasons. These include Chad and France and
ing and education that can turn them into to a lesser extent Cameroon, Congo, Sudan,
veritable development actors. The youth to- South Africa and the US.
day in the CAR are easily manipulated. Since
1990, politicians have taken advantage of - Chad
the vulnerable youths by recruiting them Chad has intervened most frequently in the
into militias and diverse armed groups. They various crises in the CAR. This can be at-
easily fall prey to various gurus who recruit tributed to geographic, historic, cultural,
13M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
political, economic and security factors. of Congo. This was on display when they
The relationship between Chad and the disagreed over the road map to resolve the
CAR is several centuries old. But the mili- crisis, notably when the Chadian president’s
tary and political influence of Chad in the proposal was approved by the African Union
country increased sharply when Idriss Déby to grant amnesty to former rebels.
came to power in 1990 and started back-
- France
ing rebels in the CAR. Some observers even
believe that Chad considers the CAR as its France has close ties with the CAR because
24th region. It was the political and military of colonization, the franc zone, defense
backing from Idriss Déby ITNO that enabled agreements, military cooperation and the
General François Bozize to overthrow the French energy group Areva in the CAR. It
democratically elected Ange Félix Patassé in played a major political role when it backed
2003. Ten years later, the same Déby turned heads of state like David DACKO and Bar-
against him and provided rebel groups with thelemy BOKASSA. It has also participated
the means to overthrow him. A survey in in many bilateral and multilateral military in-
2003 by an American firm, Western Geo- terventions during the various crises in the
physical, shows that Chad and the CAR share CAR. These include “Operation Barracuda”
the same oil reserves in two blocks in Doba, of 1979 that brought down Bokassa and his
to the north of the CAR near the Doseo and empire and installed Dacko as president; op-
Salamat basins (Les dynamiques de la crise erations “Furet” and “Almandin I , 2, and 3”
centrafricaine, Libération, 10 January 2014; alongside the Forces of the Central African
also see “Aperçu sur le potentiel minier de Republic (FACA) to protect President Patasse
la République centrafricaine” by the Central under threat from the 1996 revolt. Others in-
African Republic’s ministry of mines, petro- clude the EUFOR-Chad/RCA 2007 and then,
leum, energy and water resources). How- EUFOR-RCA 2014 (under the banner of the
ever, many believe that Chad would like to European Union); the Sangaris force in 2013
keep the crisis alive in the CAR (but far from (as part of a UN mission) alongside the Inter-
the north), so that it can continue to exploit national Support Mission to the Central Af-
the common oil reserves unchallenged. rican Republic (MISCA). French involvement
in efforts to end the crises in the CAR has to
Chad also has geopolitical and geostrategic
a certain extent been beneficial, especially as
ambitions as it tries to emerge as a sub-re-
other countries and the international com-
gional power in central Africa. This can be
munity which have no strategic interests to
seen in the active participation of Chadian
protect in the CAR, have generally ignored
troops in support of continental and inter-
this country.
national forces in the CAR. This can also be
explained by the struggle for leadership be- France has mostly abandoned its Françaf-
tween Presidents Idriss DEBY of Chad and rique policy and now purportedly acts only
Denis SASSOU NGUESSO of the Republic with “the legal backing of the UN and the
14Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
legitimacy conferred on it by the AU”. But ing interests which often generate a lot of
the people of the CAR are doubtful about negative publicity, there are rumors of links
the alleged humanitarian intentions of between French logging companies and
France. It would be naïve to think that all local armed groups. This is reminiscent of
the operations in the CAR or elsewhere are the Lafarge scandal in which Lafarge was
for purely altruistic reasons. France’s inter- suspected of indirectly financing the Islamic
est in the CAR is not based on some kind State in Syria in 2013.
of altruism. It may not be underpinned by The geostrategic interests of France are
the Françafrique policy, but, as we all know, mostly regional. Because of the central lo-
relations between states are always based cation of the CAR, which is flanked on many
on interests. Its interests in the Central Af- sides by countries in which France has inter-
rican Republic are economic, geostrategic ests (Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Gabon
and geopolitical. which is not far off), any chaos there would
Concerning its economic interests, even provide a base for all armed groups from
though the volume of trade between the Chad, Sudan and the RDC that could pose
CAR and France is negligible, and the trans- a threat to the entire region, and especially
national group Areva which had signed an to countries in which France has vast and
agreement in 2008 with the CAR to mine direct interests.
Uranium in the east has abandoned its plan Finally, France’s geopolitical interest is the
to do so, France still has economic interests same as that which has always motivated all
to protect. These include France Telecom major powers: to project power. It is a mem-
that has been operating since 2007 in Ban- ber of the UN Security Council and wants to
gui and the Bollore group managing the maintain its stature as an international pow-
container terminal port in Bangui. By pro- er broker. For this reason, France has been
tecting these economic interests in strategic actively involved in UN resolutions relating
areas such as communication and commer- to the CAR, especially Resolution 2127, and
cial shipping, France hopes to maintain links in European Union operations. By its actions
with the CAR at a time when the African in the CAR one can see that France wants
continent, especially sub-Saharan French to keep Central Africa within its sphere of
speaking Africa is growing at a fast pace influence. French involvement is thus not as
(3.7% in 2016 according to the World Bank) disinterested as it would want the world to
and is being actively courted by countries like believe.
Brazil, China, Turkey, etc. Apart from min-
15M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
PHOTO/Scource: humanite.fr, “CAR: Djotodia gone, crisis still to be resolved”, 2013
Sudan and South Sudan conflicts on the entire continent. Currently it
The armed conflict in Sudan with the rebel- has a contingent of 400 soldiers in Bangui
lion of John Garang has caused thousands as part of a 2007 bilateral agreement with
of refugees to flee to the CAR, further wors- the CAR to train military personnel. Again,
ening the security situation there. Indeed, it when President Deby withdrew the Chad-
was the involvement of rebel fighters from ian armed forces that had been protecting
Sudan and Chad that helped Michel Djoto- Bozize in September 2012, the latter turned
dia to seize power. to South Africa for protection. The fall of
Bozize caused political tension to the extent
Uganda that President Jacob Zuma pulled diplomatic
Uganda is facing a security threat of its own strings to get Djotodia removed.
from the LRA that has its base in the south of
the CAR. Ugandan armed forces have there- b - Intergovernmental organizations
fore been deployed in the southeast of the involved in the crisis
CAR alongside American Special Forces to Since 1997, the CAR has had thirteen peace-
fight the LRA. keeping missions, earning the nickname
“land of peacekeepers”.
South Africa
The IGOs involved in the crisis can be
South Africa is not found in the central Africa
grouped into two categories: extra-conti-
sub-region. However, it wants to play a role
nental and intra-continental.
as a continental power by helping to resolve
16Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
• Extra-continental initiatives in the cri- ment of countries of the region in the crisis.
sis in the CAR The Multilateral Forces in the Central African
By extra-continental we mean peacekeeping Republic (FOMUC) failed to act as a buffer
missions by the United Nations or by multi- between the army of President Patasse and
national forces from outside Africa, such as Francois Bozize’s fighters. After Bozize seized
the European Union. power, African countries transformed this
UN missions include: the United Nations force into MICOPAX under ECCAS. This force
Mission in the Central African Republic (MIN- sat passively as the Seleka took over power
URCA, 1998-2000), the United Nations Sup- in 2013 and began to commit exactions on
port Office in the Central African Republic the population. There was no coordination
(BONUCA 2000-2010), the United Nations or even cooperation between CEMAC and
Integrated Office in the Central African Re- ECCAS.
public (BINUCA, 2009) and the United Na- Unlike FOMUC, MICOPAX had three com-
tions Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza- ponents: military, police and civilian com-
tion Mission in the Central African Republic ponent. It had as mandate to consolidate
(MINUSCA) that replaced MISCA in 2014. peace, coordinate humanitarian aid, ensure
European Union missions include: Europe- human rights, assist in the peace process
an Union Forces (EUFOR) TCHAD/ RCA from through promoting dialogue and national
2007 to 2009, EUFOR-RCA from 2014 to reconciliation, and help in the organization
2015, EUMAM-RCA (European Union Mil- of elections. When Seleka went on the of-
itary Advisory Mission in the Central Afri- fensive in 2012, MICOPAX convened an ex-
can Republic) since 2015, EUTM (European traordinary summit in Ndjamena on the 21st
Union Training Mission in the Central African of December 2012 which ordered MICOPAX
Republic) since 2016. to act as a buffer force, along with an addi-
tional Chadian military unit in Damara. This
All these forces have been of immense help
summit also approved ceasefire agreements
and have provided much needed assistance
that were never enforced for two reasons:
• African initiatives in the CAR
the presence of a powerful contingent of
These include: The Inter-African Mission to Chadian soldiers whose conflicting objec-
Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui tives have been explained above, and the
Agreements (MISAB from 1997 to 1998), inability of ECCAS to enforce sub-regional
CEN-SAD from 2001 to 2003, FOMUC (un- decisions and to even function normally. This
der the CEMAC) from 2002 to 2008, MI- inability to operate normally can be seen in
COPAX (under the auspices of ECCAS) from its budget woes. Indeed, the annual budget
2008 to 2013 and MISCA (international mis- of MICOPAX was estimated at about 30 mil-
sion but led by Africa) from 2013 to 2014. lion Euros, with about 50% of this amount
According to Roland Marchall there has expected from the EU (in equipment and
been some ambivalence about the involve- logistics) and 20% from contributions by
17M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
Member States. Member States of course that acting in a timely manner has always
failed to meet their commitments and it be- been a strategic challenge for central Afri-
came difficult to pay salaries and fund the ca. On deployment, the CAR was backed by
civilian component. 2000 soldiers from the French “Sangaris”
The African-led Mission to the Central Af- force and 600 soldiers from the EU’s EUFOR
rican Republic (MISCA) was deployed in force. Although one of the most significant
collaboration with the United Nations and achievements of MISCA was securing the
ECCAS. This African initiative was intended corridor between Bangui and Cameroon,
to help the transition government of the the lifeline of the Central African Republic’s
Central African Republic in its effort to pro- economy, it failed to reconcile opposing fac-
vide security in the country and to support a tions in the country and to stop the killings
“brother country abandoned by the interna- and exactions against civilians. This failure
tional community”. Initially scheduled for the can also be explained by the fact that this
1st of August 2013, the deployment finally force had only 7000 soldiers (all forces com-
took place on the 19th of December 2013, bined), to cover a surface area of 623 000
confirming Mathias Éric OWONA‘s assertion km2 in conflict or post conflict.
PHOTO/Source: grotius, fr, history-lesson-understanding the Central African crisis.
18Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
CHAPTER II: DYNAMIICS OF ture that would make it a State in the true
THE CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL sense of the word: sovereignty. For it to be
AFRICAN REPUBLIC: A STATE IN a sovereign State, it must have the requisite
and legitimate physical force. Unfortunately,
FRAGILITY!
a closer look at the security situation of the
We will start with an observation which, country shows that the government does
though obvious, is still questionable: the not have monopoly over the use of legiti-
Central African Republic is a State. From a mate violence. This is so because many other
legal point of view, it is a State because it actors causing instability in the country also
has its own territory, its own population, have the capacity to use such force. This is
and its own government even though the the reason why we will examine the factors
latter might not always be stable or legiti- perpetuating the crisis in the CAR and make
mate. However, its status as a State is often useful suggestions that can help to resolve
questioned because of the absence of a fea- it and consolidate lasting peace.
PHOTO/Source: FES expert, Bangui, 2013
19M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
1- Factors perpetuating the crisis: is to buy arms. Unfortunately, weapons are
the CAR a “failed” State or a “State in circulating freely among armed groups that
Fragility”? by their very nature defy such resolutions.
The reluctance of the international commu-
The Republic of Central Africa could have
nity to lift the embargo tied the hands of the
been described as a “failed” State – an un-
Samba-Panza’s transition government and
flattering description by the way – if since its
even today remains a challenge to Touadera.
independence in 1960 it had been able to at
Because of this state of fragility, it will not
least function even a bit normally. In 2015,
be easy for the people of the Central Afri-
the OECD proposed a new multidimensional
can Republic to rebuild the country on their
fragility framework with a working model
own, especially as the adult literacy rate is
based on five dimensions: violence, justice,
just 37% (UNICEF report, 2016). This has
institutions, economic fundamentals and
been compounded by social disharmony
resilience. Depending on the crisis, political,
and the chaos that exists in the education
economic, military, ideological or religious
sector with its numerous and greedy actors.
factors, may be the main cause or may even
As the saying goes, “a hungry belly has no
merge to give specificity to a crisis. For the
ears” and thus no memory!
CAR, all these factors seem to be in play.
b- Splintering of armed groups and
a- The internal vulnerability of the country worsening of intercommunity tensions
One of the major challenges faced by Djoto- Although there is relative stability in Ban-
dia was providing security and restoring the gui, the security situation in the rest of the
authority of the State throughout the coun- country is very poor. There is widespread
try. Lack of the necessary human resources and growing criminal activity to the north,
and absence of State institutions in some re- increased intercommunity tension to the
gions made it impossible to provide even ba- south and a proliferation of armed groups
sic social services. In fact, many of such ser- to the east of the country. About 14 armed
vices were being provided by humanitarian groups are currently controlling nearly 80%
and religious organizations. Humanitarian of the territory.
organizations support State social structures
The Seleka coalition which was formed in
and provide assistance to the population in
2012 to overthrow the Bozize regime split
about 50% of the country (UNOCHA report).
into three factions just three months after
Some years back, the president of the Re-
the coup d’état when a dispute arose be-
public was unable to travel to some parts of
tween the Front Populaire pour la Renais-
the country: the entire northern part of the
sance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and the
country was in the hands of armed groups
Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC),
that considered themselves “sovereign”. Be-
two of the more powerful factions of the
ing under an embargo imposed by UN Reso-
former Seleka, over control of the mining
lution 2127, the government is not allowed
and coffee growing areas.
20Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act
Exactions and looting allegedly by the UPC c- Absence of a collective memory
(mostly Peul) in some southern and eastern
The absence of a collective memory is in fact
parts of the country fueled an anti-Peul sen-
the result of the failure to take advantage of
timent. To retaliate, local self defense groups
peacekeeping initiatives and of the recom-
were organized, sometimes through unnat-
mendations of the numerous forums, semi-
ural alliances with other groups, to carry out
nars and workshops organized to seek ways
targeted attacks against Peul communities.
to kick-start the never ending peace process.
An example of such an attack is the one on
One of such initiatives was the forum in Ban-
Bangassou on the 13th of May 2017 that
gui from May 4th to 11th 2015 which had as
killed about a hundred people. Punitive ex-
objective to create the dynamics necessary
peditions against the Peul and Muslims were
for a successful peace process and nation-
considered by some warlords as an act of
al reconciliation. In other words, the forum
expiation, or an obligation to chase from the
was intended to moderate the greed of the
Central African Republic “foreign Muslims”
actors of the conflict and to reconcile the
who were seen as the incarnation of evil.
population with the regime in power. Unfor-
The escalation of attacks following the frag- tunately, the Samba-Panza transition regime
mentation of armed groups has resulted in was mostly characterized by opportunistic
a sharp increase in the number of killings behaviors at the Presidency with its hordes
of civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian of advisers, the National Transition Council
workers. Today, very few NGOs will venture and in the Government. The main innova-
into some provinces. Some humanitarian tion by her initiative was the possibility giv-
organizations have even suspended opera- en to delegates from the provinces to make
tions in the north of the country because of the voices of people in the hinterlands heard
the increased violence there. The constant by national authorities. Delegates from the
splintering of armed groups has rendered eastern provinces, for example, were able
peace negotiations even more complex and to ask the government to take measures to
made Disarmament, Demobilization, Rein- neutralize the Basse-Kotto Seleka rebels who
tegration, and Rehabilitation (DDRR) more were sowing terror in their provinces. But,
difficult. The failure to reunite some armed for armed groups in general, their demands
groups by mediators like the Organization and intransigence, particularly their various
for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which tried demands for guarantees against legal action
in 2016 to bring the factions of the former or social reintegration were based on their
Seleka back together, shows the extent of strength on the ground.
the rift between such armed groups. Howev-
The recommendations of the forum had
er, the recent attacks against Muslims have
the merit of creating relatively conducive
facilitated the rapprochement between the
security and political conditions under Sam-
UPC and the FPRC.
ba-Panza for the elections that followed. The
21M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond
agreement between the transition govern- lower intercommunity tensions and to build
ment and armed groups on Disarmament, a sustainable society both at individual and
Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabil- collective levels.
itation (DDRR) and absorption into govern- • Median scenario: The Central African
ment forces, was based on objective criteria: Republic will continue to be monitored and
individual (not determined by membership kept on life support by the UN and foreign
in a given group), progressive, after vetting development partners.
(no criminal past) and professionalism. • Best case scenario: There will be a sud-
- Possible future scenarios for the Cen- den and collective reawakening. The people
tral African Republic will start promoting new political, econom-
The manner in which the crises and conflicts ic and social ideals for their country (think
in the CAR have been analyzed, understood ahead to reinvent the future), to enable it to
and managed in the past cannot bring about emerge from the never-ending crises that
lasting peace in the country. In most cases, has been bedeviling them for decades, and
the need to strengthen the resilience of the to make their country a truly independent
communities has been ignored by United and sovereign nation. Such a national re-
Nations initiatives, humanitarian organi- awakening will require a change of mental-
zations and international NGOs. Indeed, a ity, attitudes, governance approaches and
large share of the funds received in the name strategies. It is only after such changes are
of the crisis in the Central African Republic made, that the Central African Republic can
is not spent on efforts to consolidate peace become a truly independent, sovereign and
and build social harmony at grassroots lev- stable nation.
el. The crisis in the Central African Republic
has enriched many external actors. When 2- Recommendations
programming, little or no provision is made Here are few recommendations that can
for the use of local and national forces, en- guide some actors of the crisis in the Central
ergies or intelligence. Most political, securi- African Republic. The various recommenda-
ty and development objectives focus on the tions are directed at specific actors:
priorities of the State and its development
partners, and no thought is given to efficient a- To the government to enable it to
integration. Because of these shortcomings, restore State authority throughout the
country
there are three possible future scenarios for
the crisis in the CAR: • Reform of the FACA: a must for the
• Worst case scenario: The conflict factors government
in the CAR will persist and the State will con- International partners, the government,
tinue to be weak and lack the coercive force armed groups and the population see the
to respond to the proliferation of armed army as indispensable, and this is the only
groups. It will also continue to be unable to
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