CSDP and NATO Post-Libya: Towards the Rubicon?
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No. 35
July 2012
CSDP and NATO Post-Libya:
Towards the Rubicon?
Jolyon Howorth
Rubicon or will they take fright at their own
In the wake of Libya and the American temerity and abandon the CSDP experiment?
pivot to Asia, CSDP-NATO relations must
be recalibrated. The buzz word for CSDP Free-riding is a deeply engrained European
should be: integrated through the EU and habit. For forty years, West Europeans became
empowered through NATO. accustomed to dependence on the United
States, via NATO, for their very survival.
The EU’s Common Security and Defence Debates over burden-sharing were constant.
Policy (CSDP) is currently approaching its Even during the Cold War, all too few long-
Rubicon. For twenty years, the member states term NATO member states came close to
dallied with cooperation in security and defence spending the agreed NATO target of 3% of
policy. But when the Libyan crisis broke in GDP on “defence”. By 2010, only three of
spring 2011, their willingness and their ability to them, the UK, France and Greece, spent
handle a regional operation of medium intensity above the new post-Cold War benchmark of
were shown to be severely wanting. It is 2%, while the remaining 21 European member
difficult to over-state the extent to which Libya states of NATO spent an average of 1.3%.
was precisely the type of mission for which the With the end of the Cold War, there was a
EU, ever since its collective defection in the scramble in Central and Eastern Europe for
Balkans in the early 1990s, had been preparing. NATO membership. By 2004, ten former
Yet, when push came to shove, political members of the Warsaw Pact had been
divisions and military inadequacy rode admitted and these were joined in 2009 by
roughshod over strategic necessity. In the most Albania and Croatia. To secure membership,
serious crisis on the EU’s borders since the all these states temporarily boosted their
birth of CSDP, the Union proved quite defence spending. But by 2010, none of them
incapable of action. This raises an existential was spending 2% and half of them were closer
question: are the EU member states serious to 1%. In 1990, the US covered 60% of
about being in the security and defence NATO’s overall expenditure. By 2011, the
business at all? How much are they prepared to figure was 75%. There is little wonder that, in
pay for it? Will they decide to actually cross the his valedictory speech in June 2011, Defence
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 1
Secretary Robert Gates warned that if this occasionally explicit) that Washington expects
pattern continued, the new generation of US Europe increasingly to assume responsibility
politicians, who had not come of age during the for crisis management in its own
Cold War, would cease to feel that the US neighbourhood. The pressure on the
investment in NATO was worthwhile. Europeans to stand up and be counted is
mounting. The Libyan mission Operation Unified
Some say that Europe, in 2012, faces no real Protector introduced the concept of the United
threats. Why therefore should it devote large States “leading from behind”. This was
sums to “defence”? Europe may be internally technically a misnomer. Without massive US
at peace with itself. But can it count on military inputs, the Libyan mission could not
continuing to live in peace? A mere glance at have been brought to a (relatively) successful
the map is sufficient to answer in the negative. conclusion. But the Obama administration’s
From the Arctic Circle (the latest “new insistence that Europeans should at least be
frontier”) to the Baltic Sea and down to the perceived to be “taking the lead” in Libya
Black Sea, from the Bosphorus to the Straits of represented a paradigm shift in both political
Gibraltar, destabilisation hovers around the and symbolic ways. The US signalled quite
EU’s entire periphery. The Middle East, clearly that, henceforth, it wished to transfer
Europe’s “next abroad”, is in effervescence and responsibility, in the European theatre, to the
the Caucasus the site of multiple frozen (and Europeans. We may still be a long way from
not so frozen) conflicts. The sea-lanes which the full operationalization of such a shift, but
facilitate Europe’s trade with the rest of the there is no doubt which way the balance must
world, from the Suez Canal to Shanghai, are swing. Europeans have been served notice that
rife with piracy and emerging-power naval Uncle Sam believes it is time they came of
rivalries. To imagine that the EU can rely on its strategic age. In order for this to happen,
own internal Kantian pact to avoid engagement leadership in the European area is going to
with a turbulent external world is not simply have to change hands. As long as the US either
naïve. It is irresponsible. insists upon or (de facto) assumes leadership in
Europe, the Europeans will continue to free-
CSDP HAS ISSUES ride and will continue to fail to deliver.
CSDP faces three main sets of problems. First,
in addition to disagreements with the US over The second main problem has to do with
burden-sharing, there is the growing reality of military (and civilian) capacity for the
American military disengagement from Europe. mounting of overseas missions under CSDP.
In relative terms, this has been inevitable since So much has now been written about the need
the fall of the Berlin Wall. There is no doubt for “pooling and sharing” that it is difficult to
that the US and the EU remain each other’s say anything new or different. Many pooling
most important partners in an emerging multi- and sharing projects have already been
polar world. In terms of economics, trade and initiated. The Belgian and Dutch navies
investment, the transatlantic relationship is the formed a single integrated command in the
most important bilateral relationship in the 1990s. In 2010, the European Air Transport
world. But from a strategic perspective, the US Command (EATC) was established at
no longer sees Europe as the centre of gravity Eindhoven Airbase in the Netherlands. It
of its military effort. The January 2012 US offers a joint set of assets to the air transport
Strategic Guidance paper makes it clear that fleets of France, Germany, the Netherlands
henceforth America’s focus will be on the Asia- and Belgium. The European defence
Pacific region and the Middle East. There is an ministers, meeting in Ghent on 9 December
unequivocal assumption (always implicit but 2010, agreed to examine ways of categorising
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
2defence assets under three heads: those that, achieve in the world – issues of capacity and
for reasons of strategic imperative, would responsibility become almost meaningless.
remain under national control but could be There is an urgent need for a trans-European
made more interoperable at EU level; those debate about the real ambitions and objectives
that could offer potential for pooling; and those of CSDP. In an age when inter-state conflict
that could be re-examined on the basis of role- seems to be on the wane and when Afghanistan
and task-sharing. In November 2011, the and Iraq have demonstrated the limited political
European Defence Agency (EDA) identified usefulness of military force, what sort of role
eleven priority areas for cooperative do the Europeans wish to play in the world –
development, including helicopter pilot particularly in their own back-yard? What role
training, maritime surveillance, medical field should military capacity play in their projects?
hospitals, air-to-air refuelling, future military How do they understand power – their own
and that of others? Assuming they can
reach agreement on any of these issues,
“For twenty years, CSDP has they then need to start planning. For
muddled through in an ad-hoc that, they need a strategic planning
agency. They need more meetings of the
way. That is no longer an option.” Council of Defence Ministers à la Ghent.
They need the synthesisation of those
satellite communications, ISR (intelligence, national strategic plans that already exist.
surveillance and reconnaissance), and smart They need a European Defence Review. They need
munitions. In March 2012, the EDA Steering a European strategic plan.
Board adopted a Franco-German-Dutch
project for the joint procurement of air-to-air For twenty years, CSDP has muddled
refuelling aircraft. Much is already happening. through in an ad-hoc way. That is no longer an
The problem is that it is essentially a small option. Libya demonstrated unequivocally that,
handful of the same EU member states which even after twenty years of preparation, the EU’s
are actively engaged in European initiatives, capacity to mount a significant military mission
while the majority take refuge in discursive in its own backyard is grossly inadequate. It can
support. For pooling and sharing to be be argued that it is difficult and requires time to
seriously effective in terms of deployable coordinate the efforts of twenty-seven
European capacity, significant transfers of sovereign member states. Perhaps, but time is
sovereignty will have to be agreed. This may be not likely to wait for those states to catch up.
painful for some member states, but it will be History is on the march. Risks and threats are
less painful than the total loss of sovereignty on the rise, not simply on the EU’s direct
implied in a given nation-state being unable to periphery, but across the globe. To fail to
guarantee its own security. produce a policy and a strategy for coping with
them is indeed to risk irrelevance. To date,
This introduces the third problem – which is those responsible for delivering CSDP have
also the most serious. It is the sheer poverty of insisted on the importance of “autonomy” as a
political will and the widespread risk-aversion motivating dynamic and an organisational
which afflicts so many EU member states. It is principle. In order not to be stifled at birth by
the total absence within the EU of any strategic their powerful transatlantic cousins, or micro-
vision. It is the lack, at EU level, of any sign of managed by NATO, the Europeans-as-
leadership. Without a clear sense of strategic international-actors, it was asserted, needed to
objectives – or at a very minimum some clear find their own way in the world, to carve their
notion of what it is the EU is attempting to own path towards actorness. In the initial
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 3stages of CSDP, this approach made perfect an impact on NATO’s member state interests
sense. Alas, the quest for autonomy has not in very different ways. There is little likelihood
delivered either the necessary political will or the of unanimity on anything, particularly at great
appropriate material capacity. There is little distances from Europe. The “alliance” has
reason for confidence that another twenty years become a mechanism for generating coalitions
of the same processes will produce substantially of the willing. Donald Rumsfeld was (for once)
different results. As one that, for the past twenty correct: “the mission determines the
years, fully supported – and attempted to coalition”. NATO’s most recent attempt at
theorise – the need for autonomy, I now believe self-definition, the 2010 New Strategic Concept, is
this is the wrong approach going forward. It is in reality neither new, nor strategic. Nor is it
time to re-think the relationship between CSDP even a concept. It is a document which
and NATO, which, in practice, has led to sub- contains something fairly vague for everybody,
optimal performance on the part of both, to but nothing very precise for anybody.
dysfunctional practices at both institutional and Although NATO’s Prague summit in 2002
operational levels, to many crossed political declared that distinctions between “in area”
wires, and to much waste of resources and and “out of area” were no longer valid and
effort. As long as this continues, neither NATO that the alliance could operate throughout the
nor CSDP is likely to achieve its true objectives. world, and although this precept has been
implemented in Afghanistan, there is
NATO HAS ISSUES henceforth very little prospect of European
In the early stages of the 2011 Libyan crisis, forces signing up to support US grand strategy
there were some, particularly in France, who around the globe. The US drive for a “Global
thought it possible that the EU might mount a Alliance” or for a “League of Democracies”
CSDP military mission under a UN mandate to never found favour with Europeans and has
implement the concept of Responsibility to probably been administered the coup de grâce by
Protect (R2P). Others imagined a Franco-British the experience of Afghanistan, which, however
lead. In the event, the mission became – alost by strong the official spin may be, is almost
default – a “NATO mission”. I use the inverted certain to be judged by history as a military and
commas because questions must be asked about political failure. Washington is, in any case,
the very nature of an alliance half of whose more comfortable with multiple bilateralisms
members were objectively opposed to the than with ever more complicated formal
mission. Furthermore, NATO’s own internal alliances, as the recent agreement with
review of Operation Unified Protector reveals that Australia and the constant quest for new
the mission was very far from being an partnerships indicate. NATO’s Chicago
unqualified military success. This raises some summit in May 2012 formally kept all options
important questions about NATO itself. There on the table, but on-going questions about the
are three key issues here: the nature of the real nature and purpose of NATO are unlikely
alliance; the type and scale of cooperation; and to be resolved any time soon. NATO itself
leadership. needs a radical re-think.
The constraints of the Cold War and bi- CSDP AND NATO: STARTING AFRESH
polarity dictated tight solidarity between all As for CSDP, assuming, in the wake of Libya,
alliance members in all parts of the globe. that it continues to move towards the Rubicon,
NATO was truly an alliance as traditionally its cooperation with NATO remains more
understood. Yet post-1989, in the absence of crucial than ever. It is, I would argue, only
any existential nuclear or other type of threat, through the NATO framework that CSDP can
and in a multi-polar world, regional crises have actually achieve operational effectiveness and,
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 4eventually, autonomy. That suggests three industrial base. There is no question that
things. this European procurement process
should be conducted in tight liaison with
• First, it means that the Alliance should come NATO, but the EU framework is
back to Europe – including its entire indispensable. The role of the EDA
periphery. It should be explicitly re- should be central and Allied Command
designated as a mechanism for guaranteeing Transformation (ACT) should be
regional stability in the European area and transformed into an agency which ensures
its neighbourhood. That stability, unlike liaison with the US defence industrial base.
during the Cold War, will not be secured
through a balance of nuclear forces or • Third, there must gradually and
through existential deterrence, but through progressively be an institutional and
the development of a serious capacity for political merger between CSDP and
regional crisis management. Collective NATO. This sounds outrageously radical,
security will complement collective defence. but in reality the structures of CSDP were
modelled on those of NATO and the
• Second, it means that NATO and CSDP permanent representatives to the two
must stop seeing one another as rivals in a military committees are, for the most part,
beauty contest or as contenders for a the same individuals. Enhanced
functional or spatial division of labour. The cooperation will, over time, lead to
sterile quarrels over duplication in general integration. This paper is not the place to
and HQs in particular must be transcended. go into the details. The key issue is the
In a world of shrinking resources, it must be direction in which the two entities should
recognised that European forces and capacity, be moving. The US position over Libya
whether deployed via NATO or CSDP are indicates a way forward.
all drawn from the same pool. At the level
of procurement, the dynamics of pooling Operational leadership must increasingly be
and sharing should be concentrated in the assumed by the Europeans. This will require
EU. It makes no sense to have two separate serious restraint on the part of Washington
processes, one operating within NATO and extreme seriousness of purpose on the
(smart defence) and another within the EU. part of the Europeans. CSDP must acquire
There is very little chance that mere operational autonomy through and within NATO
coordination of national means would and the Americans must learn to take a
suffice to meet European requirements. genuine back-seat. Progressively the balance
Shared sovereignty is only meaningful if within the Alliance must shift to one in which
accompanied by policy convergence and the Europeans are doing the vast majority of
shared security and strategic objectives – in the heavy-lifting in their own back-yard, and
other words, a process of political the Americans are acting largely as force
integration. Pooling and sharing have enablers. There should be a return to the
political, economic, industrial and original structures of the 1949 Treaty. There is
operational implications. The EU is a global no reason why SACEUR could not be a
political project, whereas NATO deals European flag officer. The European caucus
“merely” with security. The EU is also the within NATO, far from being taboo, must
framework within which Europe generates become the corner-stone of the Alliance.
common interests. Logically, therefore, it is Europeans must stop believing that NATO
the place where these interests can best be cannot work without US leadership. However,
harmonised at the level of the defence this proposal also depends critically on US
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
5willingness to accept regional leadership by the I recognise there are huge practical
Europeans. If that willingness is absent, then problems in going forward. These should not
the entire experiment with European security be projected as obstacles to a progressive
and defence, whether CSDP or an enhanced merger which nevertheless makes sense. This
NATO, will fail. is not an exercise in institutional tinkering. It is
the most effective way in which Europe as a
CONCLUSION consequential security actor can actually
To those with reasonable memories, this emerge. The alternative, for Europeans, is to
recalibration of the CSDP-NATO relationship give up and simply submit to whatever a
may look strangely familiar. It recalls the rapidly changing world delivers. That is no
experiment with the European Security and Defence alternative.
Identity (ESDI) of the mid-1990s. This was the
initial attempt to square the circles of European Prof. Dr. Jolyon HOWORTH is Jean
military incapacity, American political Monnet Professor of European Politics at
disengagement, and actual regional turbulence the University of Bath (UK). He has been a
which constituted the transatlantic response to Visiting Professor of Political Science at
Yale since 2002.
the Balkan crises. But there is one huge
difference. ESDI was predicated on continuing
US primacy and American leadership of an
alliance in which Europeans would simply play
a more functional and operational, but
subordinate, role. It was informed by The Security Policy Brief is a publication of Egmont – Royal
Washington-imposed conditionality (Albright’s Institute for International Relations
“3 Ds”). The US would retain a “right of first
EGMONT
refusal”. The present proposal, by contrast, is
Royal Institute for International Relations
for an arrangement whereby the Europeans will Naamsestraat 69
be encouraged to take over leadership in order 1000 Brussels
to allow the Americans to disengage properly. BELGIUM
It is, therefore, in this sense, the direct opposite
> www.egmontinstitute.be
of ESDI. In the 1990s the ESDI buzz word
was “separable but not separate”. The new 21st The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the authors and
century buzz word for CSDP should be are not those of EGMONT, Royal Institute for International Relations
“integrated through the EU and empowered
through NATO”.
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
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