Death in the beer-glass: the Manchester arsenic-in-beer epidemic of 1900-1 and the long-term poisoning of beer
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Death in the beer-glass: the Manchester arsenic-in-beer
epidemic of 1900-1 and the long-term poisoning of beer
Matthew Copping
For an unknown number of years running ers consistently attributed the cause of
up to the end of nineteenth century, the neuritis to the excessive consumption
beer-drinkers in Manchester and the of alcohol. Thus, the innocent victims of
north-west of England suffered an insidi- poisoned beer were routinely categorised
ous assault to their health - a form of as the culpable victims of chronic alco-
paralysis termed peripheral neuritis. The holism.
condition was the result of consuming
dangerous quantities of arsenic con- The misdiagnosis continued even as
tained - unsuspected and undetected - in prevalence of the condition burgeoned
their beer. The source of the poison was into epidemic. It was only at this point, in
contaminated barley malt used unwit- the Autumn of 1900, and a dramatically
tingly by brewers, with the extent of the more extensive source of arsenic in beer -
contamination sufficient to provide contaminated brewing sugar - that a num-
Manchester hospitals with a steady ber of local medical practitioners began
throughput of severely debilitated beer seriously to question the diagnostic para-
drinkers. However, the ongoing failure of digm that had hitherto led them habitually
brewers to realise that they were slowly to alcoholic, rather than arsenical neuritis.
poisoning many of their customers was
facilitated by the systematic misdiagnosis With this reappraisal came the revelation
by local medical practitioners of these - and public announcement - that a
same beer-drinkers. Their clinical eye substantial proportion of the local beer
prejudiced by assumptions about the supply was dangerously contaminated
habits and honesty of poor working-class with arsenic. As such, local brewers were
drinkers, and by a largely unquestioned rendered immediately culpable, and
belief in the special symptomatology of thrust into the public arena to remedy the
local alcoholism, these medical praction- problem of arsenical beer in the market-
place, to institute safety precautions to
prevent a recurrence of the problem, and
to stage a defence - both commercial and
legal - for their obvious failure to protect
* This article has undergone peer review. their customers.
Brewery History Number 132 31The Manchester arsenic-in-beer epidemic Previous accounts have focused on the
of 1900-1 was a serious and widespread Manchester epidemic either as an
food poisoning outbreak affecting several episode in the history of brewing,1agricul-
thousand people across the North-West ture,2 consumer protection legislation,3
and Midlands, with many cases proving or environmental poisoning.4 What these
fatal. It exposed lax quality control and approaches have in common is that they
dangerous levels of complacency have effectively excused the medical
amongst brewing companies, and profession for its role in facilitating the
revealed that many brewers had been epidemic - and, more seriously, for the
poisoning their customers, unnoticed, for long-term misdiagnosis of chronic
many years prior to the epidemic. arsenic poisoning as alcoholic. This arti-
Ultimately, the brewing industry emerged cle, however, argues that local brewers
from the crisis largely unscathed. This and medical practitioners were jointly cul-
resulted in part from the speed and pable for the long-term poisoning of poor
openness of the industry in working with Mancunians, the former for producing
local authorities to remove contaminated contaminated beer, and the latter for fail-
beer from the market place, in part by ing to question their assumptions about
generating their own positive publicity the consequences of working-class drink-
material to reassure anxious drinkers, in ing, and in so doing, allowing the poison-
part by instituting new analytical safe- ing to go undetected for so long.
guards, and in part by transferring the
weight of legal repercussions - and
hence 'official' blame - onto the manu- An epidemic of alcoholic neuritis
facturer of the contaminated brewing
sugar. In the late summer and autumn of 1900,
Dr Ernest Septimus Reynolds of the
However, the epidemic was not just a Manchester Royal Infirmary (M.R.I.) and
'wake up' call for the brewing industry. Manchester Workhouse Infirmary (M.W.I.)
The epidemic opened up a debate about began to see an unusually high number
the existence of a medical condition that of out-patients complaining of numbness
had hitherto been regarded as endemic and 'pins and needles' in the feet and
to the Manchester region. Ultimately, the hands, loss of strength and painfulness
elimination of arsenic contamination (or of the limbs, and the appearance of
rather the reduction of the contamination itchy rashes on the skin.5 Some of these
to non-hazardous levels) from local beer cases he diagnosed as erythromelalgia,
resulted in the effective elimination of a condition characterised by redness and
alcoholic neuritis from the hospital burning pain in the extremities, and some
wards - and in doing so revealed the as Addison's disease, the symptoms of
extent and duration of the previous mis- which included weakness, fatigue and
diagnosis. discolouration of the skin. Reynolds also
32 Journal of the Brewery History SocietyFigure 1. ‘“Jane H”, a typical case of alcoholic neuritis.' Medical Chronicle, February 1890.
noted a ‘remarkable’ increase - perhaps medicine. As Dr T.N. Kelynack of the
as much as four-fold - in cases of herpes M.R.I. later noted:
zoster (shingles), characterised by a
painful cutaneous rash and blistering Multiple neuritis has long been recognised as
around the lower torso.6 These condi- a common penalty borne by those who
tions were commonest in his pauper indulge in alcoholic drinks in Manchester and
patients, but what all sufferers had in district.9
common was a history of beer drinking.
The others, running into several hun- Indeed, to demonstrate that this long-
dreds, he judged as being clear cases of held belief was more than anecdotal,
'alcoholic peripheral neuritis'.7 Kelynack conducted his own investiga-
tion into the frequency of alcoholic
Alcoholic peripheral neuritis was a neuritis in Manchester compared to other
common condition amongst the poor of large population centres, the results of
late-nineteenth century Manchester. which were published in the July 1901
Characterised by progressive paralysis, edition of the Medical Magazine. Based
'dropping' of the hand and feet, and upon statistics supplied from hospitals
extreme tenderness of the soles and leg around Britain, Kelynack found that
muscles, the condition provided a stark Manchester did indeed occupy an ‘unen-
demonstration of the degenerative viable prominence’ in terms of both the
effects of alcoholism.8 Indeed, the condi- frequency and severity of cases.10 He
tion was so common as to be regarded calculated that during the period 1892-
as a special feature of Mancunian public 1898 alcoholic peripheral neuritis
Brewery History Number 132 33accounted for approximately 1.2% of all accompanied by a smaller, but neverthe-
admissions to the M.R.I.; this was two to less marked increase in the occurrence
three times the rate for London hospitals, of several other conditions characterised
and five to ten times that of Belfast, by distinctive skin discolouration.
Cambridge and Dundee.11 The reason
why alcoholic neuritis was far commoner What Reynolds did not know was that
in Manchester hospitals than anywhere this epidemic extended far beyond
else in Britain was unclear, and as Manchester and its immediate district.
Kelynack informed the Society for the Manchester had the highest concentration
Study of Inebriety in July 1901, seemingly of sufferers, but other medical practition-
unquestioned other than by speculation: ers working in northern England and the
Midlands were also experiencing dramat-
I have long been in the habit of teaching that ic rises in cases of alcoholic neuritis. At
either the drinking habits of the people or the the Mill Road Infirmary, Liverpool, for
character of the drinks taken led to more dis- example, Dr Nathan Raw recorded a
tinct pathological results in Manchester and four-fold increase in cases during 1900.16
district than elsewhere.12 In common with Reynolds's experience,
some of these exhibited marked skin pig-
Manchester aside, the condition had a mentation and eruptions, which Raw also
long and distinguished history, traceable diagnosed as Addison's disease.
to antiquity and the writings of Seneca Similarly at Stourbridge in Worcester-
who first made the connection between shire, and Seaforth in Lancashire, local
the characteristic symptoms and exces- medical practitioners were perplexed by
sive consumption of wine.13 a steady increase in admissions for
alcoholic neuritis with the complicating
By November 1900, alcoholic neuritis symptoms of scaly skin and sores. The
accounted for a nearly a quarter of acute sufferers were all drinkers of beer. This
admissions to the M.W.I., and an equally pattern was repeated as epidemic alco-
high proportion of out-patient cases at the holic neuritis was recorded across central
M.R.I. - a vast increase on the usual and northern England.17
average incidence of approximately one
percent.14 Inquiring locally, Reynolds dis- The diagnosis of alcoholic neuritis, even
covered that colleagues working in on such a large scale, was supported by
Salford and other districts of Manchester the fact that all the sufferers admitted to
were faced with comparable increases in drinking beer on a regular basis. In
the incidence of alcoholic neuritis. At the almost every local epidemic, this was
nearby Ancoats Hospital, for example, recognised as the universal feature; as
nearly half of all out-patients showed the one Poor Law medical officer remarked,
characteristic symptoms.15 Reynolds ‘it was soon abundantly clear that the one
concluded that they were facing an epi- thing common to all was beer drinking’.18
demic of alcoholic peripheral neuritis, Next to a history of beer drinking, the
34 Journal of the Brewery History Societymost common factor in the various epi- blamed for dramatically increased drink-
demics was social class. The overwhelm- ing - the Boer War and the general elec-
ing majority of sufferers were working tion of 1900.19 War fever was seen by
class, mostly from the lower echelons - some as an item of particular concern,
labourers and paupers. Together they especially the drunken celebrations that
constituted the 'drinking class', and followed British victories such as the
hence those naturally likely to be afflicted relief of Mafeking, or the safe return of
by alcoholic neuritis; thus, the diagnosis volunteers.20 Indeed, so notable were the
fitted both demographically and symp- Mafeking night celebrations that the term
tomatologically. But if the diagnosis of 'maffick' was quickly coined as being fig-
alcoholic neuritis was correct, the ques- urative of wild rejoicing. The so-called
tion was, how had it developed into an 'khaki' election of October 1900 was
epidemic in a relatively short period of called early by Lord Salisbury, the
time? - after all, it was not a contagious Conservative Prime Minister, who hoped
disease. The simplest answer had to be to be carried back into power on a wave
that a corresponding increase in drunk- of extreme patriotism. Irrespective of any
enness had taken place, whose harmful special circumstances, many critics
effects were now showing in the bodies of regarded elections as an open invitation
drinkers. to excessive drinking. Liberal politicians
and members of the anti-drink lobby
That hard drinking was widespread frequently, and without any evidence,
amongst the working class was readily accused a supposedly powerful lobby of
apparent to those medical practitioners brewers and publicans of bribing work-
who dealt with them on a regular basis. ing-class electors with free drinks.21 The
This was especially true in Manchester, election of 1900 was judged to be no
where patients exhibiting the physical different.
symptoms of alcoholism were far com-
moner than anywhere else in Britain. More puzzling though, was that while
Why this should be was not clear, but some patients admitted drinking, they
prior to the epidemic this was regarded nevertheless insisted that their daily
as a local medical peculiarity rather than alcohol intake was much lower than that
a cause for special concern. usually deemed capable of causing neu-
ritis. Throughout the previous decade,
The existence of this alcoholic residuum and well into the early stages of the
did not, however, explain why within a epidemic, any such claims to moderation
few months cases were reaching epidem- were not regarded as problematic in diag-
ic numbers; what could, was if a spate of nosing the condition due to its very
acute 'binge' drinking was superimposed nature. Since those suffering from the
onto the background of chronic intemper- condition were assumed to be heavy
ance. And two recent events were drinkers, and hence thought liable to
Brewery History Number 132 35dissembling, concealment, mental The amount [of alcohol] taken has been most
derangement or confusion, it was deemed carefully inquired into, and, as the patient fully
entirely appropriate for the physician to understands the importance of the inquiry, her
doubt or even discount the veracity of answers may be relied upon.25
their narratives - more so if they were
also poor and working class. Thus, the Similarly, Dr R.T. Williamson of the
doctor/patient relationship was framed by Ancoats Hospital, was prepared to accept
the understanding of the disease, not claims to moderate consumption, even
vice-versa. Potential anomalies could not though ‘unable to prove [them]’.26 If these
be allowed to undermine the certainty of patients were telling the truth, the unified
the diagnosis; rather patient testimony diagnosis of alcoholic neuritis was no
was interpreted in a manner that max- longer sustainable. And so, independent-
imised their consumption. Indeed, the ly, several months after the epidemic had
condition's explanatory framework begun, and at least ten years since the
insisted that such assumptions were a modern description of the condition, a
necessary part of orthodox diagnosis.22 A number of medical practitioners started to
pseudonymous letter to the Times reappraise their diagnosis.
revealed the extent to which social diag-
nosis was colouring clinical investigation:
The search for a different cause
As the name implies, their condition was con-
sidered to be undoubtedly due to the exces- In his search for the cause of the epi-
sive use of alcohol, and, though the sufferers demic, Ernest Reynolds turned to the
invariably denied this.., they were naturally principal medical textbook, Judson Bury
not believed.23 and James Ross's A Treatise on
Peripheral Neuritis (1893), and the
But as more and more sufferers claimed detailed categorisation of the various dif-
moderation, it became harder to disre- ferent categories of neuritis. One key
gard their testimony. symptom of alcoholic neuritis was
extreme tenderness of the muscles,
Although it is difficult to get to know the exact especially the large muscles of the
amount of beer taken a day [Reynolds noted] limbs. This was a particularly pronounced
yet I am convinced after careful enquiry that symptom amongst Reynolds's patients
in some cases at least not more than four at the M.W.I. Indeed, he remarked that
glasses a day have been consumed.24 he was able to perform a perfunctory
diagnosis simply by grasping their leg
In some cases, trust seems to have been muscles and observing the ‘sudden
made easier by the social status of the expression of pain’ on their faces.27
patient. As Dr J.W. Crawshaw wrote of Based on Bury and Ross, this muscular
one middle-class sufferer: tenderness was associated with only
36 Journal of the Brewery History Societythree known causes of neuritis - alcohol, the facts and it was easily capable of proof or
beriberi, and arsenic. disproof. This hypothesis I imagined on Nov.
15th 1900.28
However, Reynolds's major breakthrough
was to connect some of the cases of Reynolds accordingly obtained speci-
neuritis with some of the cases of skin mens of beer from outlets frequented by
discoloration. Hitherto, and elsewhere, some of his patients. On 18th November
the two sets of symptoms had been he tested the beer samples and found
regarded as unrelated. Reynolds, howev- arsenic: ‘thus, the hypothesis became a
er, noted that some patients at the M.W.I. fact’.29 His analysis was confirmed two
had both skin and neuritis symptoms, days later by Professor Dixon Mann of
which he now reassessed in terms of Owens College, Manchester, who
them possibly being part of a single com- passed on news of the arsenic contami-
mon condition. According to Bury and Ross, nation to Dr C.H. Tattersall, medical offi-
only one substance was known to cause cer of health for Salford. Reynolds
the characteristic symptoms of peripheral announced his findings at a meeting of
neuritis and extreme muscular tender- the Manchester Medical Society on 21st
ness and skin discolouration - arsenic. November, and had them published in
the British Medical Journal (B.M.J.) three
Having identified arsenic as a possible days later. The Manchester public
cause, Reynolds's next deductive leap learned of the poisoned beer epidemic
was to find a means of transmission. It one day earlier through the daily newspa-
was an established 'fact' of the epidemic pers.
that all the sufferers were beer drinkers.
But Reynolds had also noted that people Unbeknown to Reynolds, Tattersall had
who drank only spirits remained unaffect- been carrying out his own investiga-
ed by alcoholic neuritis, in spite of the tion into the epidemic in conjunction
quantities of alcohol consumed. For with Dr R.D. Cran, a Salford Poor-Law
Reynolds, this confirmed that alcohol per medical officer, and Sheridan Delépine,
se was not the cause of the sickness, and professor of pathology at Owens
suggested where the arsenic was most College.30 Cran suspected beer as early
likely to be coming from. Beer drinking as 9th November, but was unsure of what
was the only factor common to all suffer- agent was causing the illness. He also
ers, therefore this must be the source of had a large numbers of patients suffering
the arsenic. Reynolds justified his hypoth- from various skin complaints, but, unlike
esis in almost Holmesian language: Reynolds, none were also affected by
neuritis, and so he did not consider the
Improbable as this hypothesis at first two as parts of a common condition.
seemed, yet it was a valid hypothesis, for it Nevertheless, like Reynolds, he eventu-
was not known to be untrue; it explained all ally deduced that the cause of the neuri-
Brewery History Number 132 37tis was some form of poison contained in in the sugar production process.
beer, but could not narrow the range of Pursuing their investigation to its logical
possible causes any further. On 12th conclusion they next visited Nicholson &
November, he visited James Groves, Sons, the Leeds-based manufacturer of
M.P., the Chairman of Groves & Whitnall, the sulphuric acid. Here they discovered
Salford's largest brewing company and that the sulphuric acid was produced
informed him of his concerns. Cran from pyrites which typically resulted in
obtained samples of beer and sent them acid containing arsenic. Having estab-
to Charles Estcourt, Manchester's public lished the provenance of the poison,
analyst, but Estcourt failed to detect Tattersall and Delépine published their
arsenic because Cran and Tattersall were findings in the Lancet, where they
unable to give him a better idea of what expressed the conviction that not only
toxin he was supposed to be looking for. had they positively identified all the guilty
Tattersall, Delépine and Cran neverthe- materials, but that they had also effec-
less concluded that beer definitely was tively eliminated all other possibly
the means by which the toxin was trans- sources of contamination.31
mitted, a belief supported by the fact that
several of Cran's patients were brewery Equally quick to react to news of arsenic
employees. Meeting to discuss the epi- in beer was Dr T.N. Kelynack, who, in
demic one week later, they decided to common with Reynolds and Tattersall,
obtain more beer samples for analysis, had witnessed an increased incidence of
but before these could be tested, alcoholic neuritis in connection with his
Tattersall was informed by Dixon Mann role of medical registrar at the
that he and Reynolds had both found Manchester Royal Infirmary, and hon-
arsenic in beer. orary medical officer at the Salford Royal
Infirmary. Convinced that some form of
Also finding arsenic in some of their sam- beer contamination was responsible for
ples, Tattersall and Delépine continued the illness, Kelynack sought out the
their investigations one step further, assistance of William Kirkby, a pharma-
obtaining samples of all brewing materi- cologist at Owens College, and Dr
als from one of the brewers whose beer Forsyth, medical officer to Groves &
had proved arsenical. Tests revealed that Whitnall. With the co-operation of James
all the ingredients were arsenic-free apart Groves, samples of beer were obtained,
from one sample of glucose and another this time bottled during the previous
of invert sugar, both of which had been three months, in all of which arsenic was
supplied by the same sugar manufactur- present. This proved not only that con-
er - Bostock & Co. of Liverpool. Visiting tamination had been taking place for
Bostock's the next day, Tattersall and some time, but also that all possible
Delépine procured further samples that sources between the brewery and the
linked the poison to sulphuric acid used customer could be discounted. Armed
38 Journal of the Brewery History Societywith the results of his investigations,
Kelynack then informed the Manchester
and Salford medical officers of health and
the implicated brewers. And, as with
Reynolds, Tattersall and Delépine and
Kelynack and Kirkby were quick to have
their role in understanding the emerging
epidemic ratified through publication in
the Lancet, where Kelynack declared his
satisfaction in knowing ‘that as a result of
… [their] labours the source of the intro-
duction of arsenic … was localised within
a few hours’.32
News of the Manchester epidemic and its
suspected cause was followed by a
veritable rash of similar epidemics in
other districts of the north-west. Medical
practitioners puzzled by inexplicably high Figure 2. The human cost of the epidem-
incidences of alcoholic peripheral neuri- ic. Complete paralysis of the lower limbs
tis, realised that they too were facing epi- with much atrophy, nails thinkened, and
slight pigmentation of the skin. From
demic chronic arsenic poisoning. The Kelynack, T.N., & Kirkby, W. (1901)
B.M.J., one week after Reynolds's article, Arsenical Poisoning in Beer Drinkers,
carried news of outbreaks in Lancashire, Baillière, Tyndall & Cox: London, p.39.
Yorkshire, Cheshire, Leicestershire, Wor-
cester and Staffordshire.33 Numerous
cases were reported in Liverpool at the the Ancoats Hospital. Just to the north, in
Mill-road Infirmary, and also across the Heywood, it was estimated that two to
Mersey at the Tranmere Workhouse infir- three hundred persons had been affect-
mary.34 At Chester approximately thirty ed.36 According to Dr J. Niven, medical
cases of a similar nature were announc- officer of health for Manchester, by early
ed, with new patients presenting them- December 1900, the total number of
selves daily. In the West Midlands, similar arsenic poisoning cases in the city had
numbers of sufferers were recorded at risen to between one and two thou-
both Stourbridge and Birmingham.35 In sand.37
Manchester, sufferers remained the most
numerous; as well as the Royal and Although the nature and source of the
Crumpsall Workhouse infirmaries, further poison had been isolated within one day
admissions were recorded at the of the public announcement of the epi-
Witherington Workhouse Infirmary and demic's discovery, in the mass of conjec-
Brewery History Number 132 39that cheap Sinhalese tea contaminated
during drying was to blame.39 Charles
Estcourt, the Manchester city analyst,
who had earlier failed to detect arsenic in
samples sent to him, was initially promi-
nent among those opposed to the idea of
beer as the guilty agent. In a letter to the
Manchester Guardian he dismissed the
arsenic in beer theory as ‘improbable’,
and suggested that pursuing this line of
investigation would, ‘retard the discovery
of the real cause’.40 According to
Estcourt, if beer was the cause, three
thousand, not three hundred persons
Figure 3. ‘Dropped’ hands from paralysis would be affected, which later proved to
of the extensors, with much muscular be a fairer estimate of the number of peo-
atrophy. From Kelynack, T.N., & Kirkby, ple affected.
W. (1901) Arsenical Poisoning in Beer
Drinkers, Baillière, Tyndall & Cox:
London, p.64. In spite of these other theories, the con-
sensus of expert opinion was that beer
was the means by which the poison had
ture that followed, the 'facts', as under- reached the public, and brewing sugar,
stood by Reynolds, Tattersall and contaminated by impure sulphuric acid
Kelynack, became only one theory was the source of the arsenic. Much as,
among the many which sprang into circu- half a century earlier, John Snow had
lation. Indeed, far from constituting a fait traced the source of the Golden Square
accompli, announcement of the epidemic cholera epidemic to the Broad Street
and its cause triggered increased specu- pump, so Ernest Reynolds had traced
lation on what was occurring, why it was epidemic peripheral neuritis back to the
occurring, and how it might be prevented beer-pumps of local public houses;
in future. Reynolds had originally however, in Reynolds's case, preventing
believed that the arsenic resulted from further sickness would involve more
hops that had been treated with sulphur than simply removing pump handles.41
as an insecticide, while others conjec- Rather, the brewing industry was
tured that the cause was completely immediately and inextricably involved in
unconnected with beer, being perhaps a the crisis, and regardless of any further
new form of enteric fever brought back developments, brewers needed to act
from South Africa, or else the result of swiftly to prevent further supplies of
contamination of local water supply.38 poisonous beer reaching the general
One imaginative Chester brewer suggested public.
40 Journal of the Brewery History SocietyThe brewers' response activities, both before, during and after
the crisis.
Bad publicity aside, the poisoning epi-
demic carried a number of serious Having been apprised of the problem
implications for the brewing industry, several days before the general public,
both immediate and long-term. Most James Groves was provided with an
apparent was the fact that they had poi- opportunity to co-ordinate action that
soned a large number of their regular would go some way toward pre-empting
customers, possibly killed some of them, negative publicity. Following Cran's visit
and caused considerable distress, albeit on 12th November, Groves travelled to
unwittingly. Somewhere in the beer pro- London to discuss the crisis with A.
duction process a lethal poison had Gordon Salamon, a London-based
gained entry and passed undetected to chemist often employed as a consultant
consumers. Furthermore, brewers were by brewing companies. They agreed that
still manufacturing and distributing poi- if the problem was as widespread as sus-
sonous beer, and would continue to do so pected, Groves should involve the whole
if special measures were not introduced. industry through the appointment of a
The financial impact of the crisis had also commercially independent commission of
to be considered: just one day after news experts.
of the crisis broke, a ‘considerable falling
off’ in beer consumption was being At Groves's instigation, a specially con-
reported.42 vened meeting of the Manchester
Brewers' Central Association (M.B.C.A.)
Halting the epidemic as quickly as pos- was held on 23rd November, where it was
sible, and instituting measures that resolved that:
would prevent any future recurrence
was vital, both to the brewing industry's every possible facility and assistance shall be
short-term profitability, and its long- given in the way of elucidating the mystery,
term commercial freedom. As the crisis and … local authorities (shall) be given every
had entered into the arena of public help in arriving at a definite conclusion.43
debate, it would be necessary for brew-
ers to be as transparent in their actions Groves told reporters that in anticipation
and inquiries as they had been in their of the M.B.C.A. appointing its own special
failure. Neither would it be to the brew- investigatory committee, he had ‘taken
ing industry's advantage to sit idly by steps to secure the assistance of the
while other organisations, possibly most eminent men in the scientific and
informed by anti-brewing agendas, car- medical worlds’.44 Declaring himself
ried out their own investigations. Rather, ‘completely puzzled’ by what was occur-
brewers would be better served by con- ring, Groves was nevertheless able to
ducting a robust defence of their own demonstrate to anxious Mancunians
Brewery History Number 132 41that local brewers had reacted swiftly, Brunton, the eminent pharmacologist.
positively and decisively to news of the Already involved in investigating the epi-
epidemic, with the prime objective of demic, Gordon Salamon was seconded
identifying and eradicating the source of into the expert commission as resident
the poison.45 chemist of brewing. The commission was
headed by Fletcher Moulton, Q.C., M.P.
The principal difficulty facing both brew- Chosen by James Groves, Moulton was
ers and local authorities in containing the a specialist in legal cases involving scien-
epidemic was that its source was diffused tific issues, and had amassed a fortune
through an unknown number of brew- defending patent cases: he would be of
eries. If sugar was to blame, this ingredi- special value if, or when, the M.B.C.A.
ent came from a single supplier who became involved in any legal actions.
served a large number of consumers, so The commission's depth of medical
it was likely that more breweries were knowledge was further strengthened by
involved than had so far been identified. Dr Samuel Buckley who joined several
As the Manchester Courier explained, days later. The M.B.C.A. also announced
that steps were being taken by brewers
if all the cases had been traceable to one to withdraw contaminated stocks of beer
brewery, just as an outbreak of scarlet fever from the marketplace, with all new ship-
can generally be traced to a particular milk ments being tested before supply.48
supply, the matter would have been probed at Signalling its approval, the Manchester
once, but several firms were involved.46 Courier considered that in appointing the
expert committee the brewers, ‘have
But, reassured that the source of the taken the only wise course open in the
epidemic had been isolated, the article matter’.49 However, the worst of the epi-
concluded that it was now a relatively demic had not yet been reached, and
simple matter for local authorities to halt within two days of the Courier predicting
further sickness: ‘the analysts will have that no further illness would arise, the first
no problem in settling the matter one way deaths were reported.
or the other, and it may fairly be sup-
posed that no further cases of illness will Although it was already understood that
arise.’47 This prognosis was to prove the use of contaminated sugar was not
overly optimistic. confined to one brewery, Tattersall's
ongoing investigations revealed that
On 26th November, the M.B.C.A. announ- Bostock's supplied approximately 200
ced the appointment of its expert com- breweries in the north of England and the
mission. Senior Home Office analysts Dr Midlands.50 Reynolds wrote to the news-
T. Stevenson and Dr A.F. Luff were papers on 27th November, stating that he
recruited to perform similar functions for just bought beer openly from a shop and
the M.B.C.A., as was Sir Thomas Lauder found it contaminated with arsenic.
42 Journal of the Brewery History SocietyAssured that sugar, not hops, was to beer’ - the crucial point being the interre-
blame, he felt that the risks were still such latedness of cheapness and poor quali-
that ‘…it is really necessary to warn the ty.54
public against drinking beer, especially
the cheaper kinds’.51 While the use of sugar in beer production
did present brewers with a number of
In advising against the drinking of 'cheap' financial advantages, this was a quite
beers, Reynolds was highlighting the different proposition to suggestions that
fact that beers likely to contain arsenic they were indulging in wanton and reck-
were those brewed using sugar or glu- less cost-cutting, of which the eventual
cose, which were generally the cheaper result was toxic beer. In large towns and
varieties. More expensive beers were cities, beer prices were governed by a
typically brewed using malt and hops highly competitive marketplace, dominat-
only and therefore not likely to be con- ed by large breweries whose extensive
taminated. The link between low price consumer bases were sustained by the
and likelihood of poison was also evi- tied-house system and low prices. And in
denced by the demography of the epidem- maintaining low prices, sugar provided
ic - the vast majority of sufferers were brewers with a number of advantages.
lower working-class, whose purchasing Sugar used in conjunction with low grade
power tended to limit them to the cheap, barley-malt was a cost effective substi-
‘four-penny beers’.52 This led to immedi- tute for expensive premium-grade barley,
ate speculation that cheapness was a while the use of priming sugar reduced
dominant rather than subsidiary factor in conditioning times, thereby improving
arsenic being present in the beer. In an throughput. Finally - and crucially in
uncharacteristically critical leading arti- terms of de-emphasising the financial
cle, the Manchester Courier attributed advantages of using brewing sugar -
blame to brewers claimed that in the period follow-
ing the abolition of the Malt Tax (1880),
… the mania for cheapness which taints the public tastes had changed, and drinkers
whole of commercial life to-day, [which had now preferred light, sparkling ales, which
provided] an object lesson in the evils of drink could only be brewed with the additional
[by suppliers] … careless of the most ele- use of sugar.55
mentary principles of honesty so long as they
can squeeze a little extra profit out of the Aware that the epidemic was rapidly
transaction.53 developing into an item of national
concern, and was being fuelled by much
Similarly, the Liverpool Mercury reported unsubstantiated speculation, H.A.
that, ‘in Liverpool as elsewhere ..., Newton, the secretary of the London
everything seems to point to the fact based Country Brewers' Society, wrote to
that poor people have been drinking poor the Times, expressing the hope that until
Brewery History Number 132 43the facts were known, ‘judgement may be press’.61 Regardless of the best efforts of
suspended’.56 James Groves made a its critics, the brewing journals remained
similar plea for, defiantly proud of the industry's achieve-
ments:
the press and public to reserve their judge-
ment, and continue to give them [the brewing We emphatically assert that never in the his-
industry], in their exceeding trying, difficult, tory of the trade was beer produced of a
anxious and heartrending moment, their sym- higher standard as regards quality and free-
pathy.57 dom from adulterants, than it is today.62
Elsewhere, the brewing press was quick However, it was not enough for brewers
to condemn what it saw as the anti-indus- to hope that the press and public would
try bias of much of the popular press in suspend judgement: they needed to end
which, further speculation by publicly identifying
the source of the arsenic. Accordingly, on
[e]very petty reporter and Grub Street journal- 2nd December, the M.B.C.A. expert com-
ist in the land [had] immediately blossomed mission issued an interim report which
forth an expert on beer, and with a display of identified the hitherto anonymous sugar
sublime ignorance … forthwith proceeded to manufacturer. The commission reported
blacken and defame an honourable trade.58 that all materials used in brewing in
Manchester were free from arsenic
Worse still, in these same newspapers, except for certain sugars supplied by
‘every wild ridiculous statement… that is Bostock & Co. of Liverpool. The commis-
damaging to the trade, is readily pub- sion recommended therefore, that any
lished and apparently accepted as beer brewed from Bostock's sugars
true’.59 It was undeniable, however, that should be immediately recalled, and, if
the arsenic epidemic had provided the found to be contaminated, destroyed.
numerous critics of the brewing industry Furthermore, no beer was to be sent out
with an ideal occasion for denouncing it without having first been tested, and cer-
publicly that was unlikely to be spurned: tificates verifying its freedom from arsenic
‘So excellent an opportunity for the exer- should be issued with the beer. In order
cise of malice was not to be thrown to ensure uniformity of response, the
away’.60 But if the industry's critics were experts proposed that all certificates be
prepared to use the crisis to defame an issued in the name of the M.B.C.A.,
honourable trade, then the industry was which would supervise the testing
prepared to be equally scathing of their process.63 At a meeting of the M.B.C.A.
motives for doing so, variously categoris- the next day, the expert commission's
ing them as ‘teetotal fanatics’, ‘alarmists’, recommendations were unanimously
‘veiled protectionists’, and ‘irresponsible adopted, with the secretary of the associ-
paid agitators, both in and out of the ation declaring his satisfaction with their
44 Journal of the Brewery History Societyefforts so far: ‘no more critical and com- their own analysts to ensure that their
plete inquiry could be made than that products were pure were destroying
conducted by the experts’.64 suspect materials without reference to
external authority. As well as having tests
In identifying Bostock & Co. as the carried out by their own analysts, many
source of the poison, the M.B.C.A. were brewers took the additional precaution of
doing far more than simply assisting sending samples to their local medical
other brewers to confirm whether or not officer of health for 'official' confirmation
they had used contaminated sugar. that their products were pure.
Rather, they were providing the press
and the public with a name that would By January, 1900, the extent of the
allow the industry to distance itself from arsenic epidemic had been largely
responsibility for the epidemic. Now that realised. Approximately 3,000 persons
Bostock's had been identified and the had been diagnosed as suffering from
association formed, this could be sub- chronic arsenic poisoning as a result of
stantially reinforced in legal actions taken drinking contaminated beer, with upward
by individual brewing companies. The of 70 cases proving fatal; the final total
brewers had fulfilled their promise of elu- number of sufferers was estimated at
cidation, and identified their scapegoat. 6,000.66 The number of fatalities may
also have been significantly higher, as it
Equally beneficial for the brewers was the was admitted by the medical authorities
fact that the epidemic was showing signs that many deaths attributed to 'alcoholic'
of abating. By early December, newspa- neuritis in the preceding months might
pers reported that at the various hospitals instead have been due to arsenic poi-
involved in the epidemic new admissions soning.
were greatly reduced.65 This was largely
a result of the actions taken in concert by As a pro-active counter to the negative
local public health and sanitary authori- publicity generated by the daily newspa-
ties and brewers. In Manchester and pers, many brewing companies decided
Salford, as soon as news of Dr to generate their own positive publicity
Reynolds's conclusions was received, material. This took the form of leaflets
Food and Drugs Act inspectors had distributed among customers, notices
begun collecting samples of beer from posted in retail outlets, advertisements in
throughout the region, passing them to local newspapers, and written guaran-
public analysts for testing. Contaminated tees sent out with supplies of beer, all
stock found at public houses and other declaring the purity of a particular manu-
outlets was sealed under the authority of facturer's products.67 In Birmingham, for
the Food and Drugs Act, and was then instance, local brewers issued circulars
withdrawn by the brewers and destroyed. declaring that they did not use sugar from
Meanwhile, brewers who had employed Bostock & Co. in their products, while in
Brewery History Number 132 45This policy was not confined to brewers
operating in those areas which had expe-
rienced poisoning outbreaks. In the panic
that ensued from the epidemic, brewers
across the country were presented with
the choice of either mounting a public
defence of their products, or else risk los-
ing their market share to a competitor
who was prepared to use publicity to their
own advantage. Those brewers who did
not use brewing sugar were especially
keen to advertise this fact, emphasising
that their product purity did not result
from the imposition of analytical safe-
guards - even though these were now
offered as an additional reassurance for
customers - but was the result of using
'natural' brewing ingredients.
Arsenic epidemics occurring elsewhere
in the north-west and midlands, generat-
ed similar policies of co-operation
between local authorities and brewers,
based upon the systematic analysis,
Figure. 4. Advertisements of beer purity'. withdrawal and destruction of contami-
Liverpool Mercury, 5th December 1900. nated beer and brewing ingredients. In
Liverpool, for example, a special meeting
of the L.B.A. was called on 28th
Liverpool newspaper advertisements November, which resolved unanimously
emphasised the fact that brewers' to appoint an expert committee to investi-
products had been tested by public or gate the crisis, while rendering every
independent analysts and had been assistance to public officials in their
found to be arsenic-free. Some Liverpool inquiries.69 A press release two days later
brewers even made use of official replies confirmed that the L.B.A. had engaged
from district medical officers of health as their own expert commission, and that
advertisements for their products, to the ‘severe analytical … tests [were] being
annoyance of the city council.68 In applied to all ingredients’.70 Not only
Manchester, Groves & Whitnall began would they destroy all impure beer with-
issuing certificates of purity with all beer out hesitation, but also any ‘which is in
from 27th November. the least suspected’.71
46 Journal of the Brewery History SocietyOn 3th December, the Manchester confident to recommend that brewers
Courier expressed the hope that the epi- should extend their analysis of raw mate-
demic was at last on the wane, a fact rials to malt as well as sugar. Writing
confirmed one week later by what it again five days later, Estcourt, confirmed
described as a ‘marked decrease’ in the his earlier findings, alleging that certain
number of new cases of peripheral neu- samples of contaminated barley-malt
ritis.72 Deaths attributable to arsenical were capable of polluting beer well above
poisoning continued, but these were the level deemed dangerous to health.76
considered to be the result of poisoning Estcourt concluded that the arsenic was
that had occurred prior to the cause of not natural to the barley, but had been
the epidemic being understood, or during transmitted onto its surface during kiln-
the first few days afterward. ing. Typically, malt grains were dried in a
kiln where they were exposed to the hot
Confidence was also growing that the vapours of a coal or coke fire; if the fuel
region's beer was again safe, with one contained arsenic, which it often did, this
'leading Manchester brewer' prepared to was then carried into the combustion
state that ‘no infected beer is now on the fumes, and thence onto the malt grains.
market’.73 Mr C.K. Redfern, the secretary Estcourt attributed different degrees of
of the M.B.C.A., confirmed that £40,000- contamination to variations in drying
50,000 worth of beer had been run into times and arsenic levels in the fuel used.
the sewers in order to secure a safe
supply for the city.74 With the epidemic now under control and
the number of sufferers diminishing daily,
If brewers and public health authorities the M.B.C.A. expert commission present-
now believed that they had successfully ed a further report to the Association.77
identified and contained the source of the Although it added little to what was
epidemic, further developments in known about the epidemic, the report
Manchester were threatening to prove was nevertheless important in further
them premature in their assumptions. A reinforcing public association of guilt with
letter to the Times from Charles Estcourt, Bostock & Co. rather than any individual
the Manchester city analyst, revealed brewing companies. The commission
that he had uncovered a new and also reported that their recommendations
apparently unsuspected source of regarding the testing and certification of
arsenic contamination. After examining all new beer supplies had been fully
various samples of barley-malt, he had implemented, and, as all beer brewed
discovered that several of them were with Bostock's sugar had now been
contaminated with arsenic in quantities destroyed, no further danger arose from
sufficient to register in the finished this source. The recent discovery of
beer.75 Although he had not finished his arsenical malt meant that their work was
investigations, Estcourt felt sufficiently not yet over, but by apportioning blame
Brewery History Number 132 47for the source of current epidemic and Bostock & Co., casting themselves as
instituting safeguards against its reoccur- honest tradesmen temporarily disap-
rence, they had effectively fulfilled their pointed by an incompetent supplier.
original terms of reference. By rendering According to the brewers, as soon as the
their investigations and conclusions problem was realised, they had done
public, the M.B.C.A. had demonstrated everything within their power to halt it.
that brewers had nothing to hide. Now the courts would provide an oppor-
tunity for them to demonstrate to the pub-
The M.B.C.A. expert commission contin- lic and the Government exactly what they
ued its investigations to their conclusion, had done, and that it had been enough.
presenting its final report in early May, Equally, the courts could damn them as
1901.78 The report confirmed that beer reckless, avaricious poisoners, defiling
brewed using arsenical malt was capable the national beverage with noxious
of endangering human health - indeed, chemicals in pursuit of ever greater prof-
dangerous levels of arsenic had been its. The successful defence of any legal
detected in several samples of beer action was thus of the utmost importance.
brewed using malt and hops only. In common with this objective, counsel
However, now that regular and system- representing the brewing interest would
atic testing of ingredients had been be superintended by Fletcher Moulton,
instituted by brewers, arsenical malt was Q.C., M.P., who was already enrolled on
as easily allowed for as arsenical sugar. the M.B.C.A. expert committee.
The commission's final recommendation
was that brewers should insist upon The first prosecutions connected with the
written guarantees of purity with all pur- epidemic were of retailers from whom
chases of brewing materials. In fact, the contaminated beer samples had been
discovery of arsenical malt was ultimate- obtained, and which were judged to con-
ly of greater long-term consequence to stitute offences under the Sale of Food
the medical profession than it was to the and Drugs Act (S.F.D.A., 1875). Initially,
brewing industry. local authorities had allowed beer sellers
an amnesty whilst all efforts were
directed at identifying and removing
Legal repercussions contaminated beer from the marketplace.
But, by the end of November, this for-
Suffering of the nature and scale wit- bearance was being withdrawn. On 30th
nessed in Manchester was bound to November, the sanitary committee of
result in some form of legal process, and, Manchester Corporation gave notice that
possibly, for retribution to be meted out any samples now taken that tested
on those deemed responsible. Until now positive for arsenic would result in prose-
the brewing industry's defence had been cution of the vendor. Similarly, Dr
based upon the public denouncement of Tattersall, issued a circular to every drink
48 Journal of the Brewery History Societyseller in Salford, informing them that from the question of establishing criminal lia-
now on, it would be considered an bility resolved into two test-cases; inter-
offence to sell contaminated beer.79 This est was such that they were reported at
hardening attitude reflected the desire of length in the B.M.J., Lancet, Brewers'
local authorities to deflect criticism that in Journal and Brewers' Guardian, as well
spite of widespread suffering, they had as the daily papers. The Manchester
yet to institute any legal proceedings. inquest was into Mary Dyer, who had
Reiterating points raised during a ‘heated died at the Crumpsall Workhouse in
debate’ of Manchester City Council, the November 1900; Dyer had been an habit-
Manchester Guardian asked why, two ual consumer of Groves & Whitnall's
weeks after discovery of the poison, pros- beers. Assisting the brewers in their
ecutions of those involved had not begun defence, Dr Tattersall stated that they
- a sentiment echoed in other local news- had been ‘perfectly frank and free’ in
papers.80 assisting him in tracing the source of
the contamination.83 Building upon
The first conviction at Manchester was of Tattersall's testimony, James Groves
Elizabeth Goulder, a liquor license holder, gave the court a detailed account of how
with a further 17 retailers convicted and his company had acted swiftly and
fined for contravening the S.F.D.A.81 decisively the moment it was ‘suggested’
Similar convictions were secured across that arsenic might be present in beer.84
the north-west and midlands. However,
aside from negative publicity, the materi- The inquest next focused on where,
al threat to brewers of such prosecutions between Bostock's and Nicholson's, ulti-
was not great since the maximum penal- mate responsibility lay. In the event, the
ties allowed by the S.F.D.A. were low in history of transactions between the two
business terms - £50 and £20 respec- companies proved to be so confusing as
tively.82 to defy the jury's best efforts to unravel
and apportion blame. Bostock's main-
Potentially far more serious for the tained that the fault lay with Nicholson's
incriminated parties were coroner's court for supplying them with impure acid when
inquests into the deaths of beer drinkers they had always previously supplied
certified as having resulted from arsenic pure; Nicholson's, held that since
poisoning. A verdict of criminal neglect, Bostock's contract did not specifically
culpable negligence or reckless indiffer- request pure acid, they had been quite
ence could lead to criminal prosecutions justified in supplying impure. What did
for manslaughter and the possibility of become clear during cross-examination
custodial sentences and hefty fines. was that Nicholson's explanation for the
change of supply was highly question-
At Manchester and Liverpool, where the able, and Bostock's procedures for
greatest number of deaths had occurred, testing raw materials and finished prod-
Brewery History Number 132 49Figure 5. Advertisement for Bostock & Co. from less-trying times. Country Brewers'
Gazette, 4 January 1882.
ucts were inadequate. The jury's verdict that they were unwitting agents in the
was that Mary Dyer's death was caused epidemic, not its perpetrators. As the
by arsenic poisoning as a result of con- Manchester Courier remarked of the
suming contaminated beer. On the question Liverpool verdicts:
of responsibility they returned an open
verdict. after the frank assistance rendered … in their
quest for the source of the evil ..., every fair-
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the near minded man will admit that the brewers come
identical testimony presented, the ver- out of the inquiry with a clean record.85
dicts of the Liverpool jury into the death
of Mary Rankin were as inconclusive However, the process of shifting respon-
as those at Manchester. Minor admon- sibility for the epidemic away from the
ishments aside, the brewers had been brewing industry was not yet complete.
successful in convincing both inquests The method for doing so was the instiga-
50 Journal of the Brewery History Societytion of civil actions for damages against lier inquests. Mr Justice Bruce gave his
Bostock & Co. by brewers forced to judgement on 8th March 1904; his opinion
destroy contaminated beer. As the was that Nicholson's had breached war-
Manchester Courier explained, ranty by supplying impure acid, but if
Bostock's had exercised 'ordinary care',
…the result is of the deepest importance to they would have discovered the presence
the brewers, not merely from the pecuniary of arsenic in the sugar.92 The award of
point of view, but as affording another con- damages was, therefore, limited to the
vincing proof that the liability for the arsenic is value of the arsenical acid and the value
not theirs.86 of the sugar spoilt by using it; crucially,
claims for the damages sought by brew-
The first case against Bostock & Co. was ers were rejected.
heard at Manchester in February 1901;
the plaintiffs were Richard Holden Ltd., of Unsurprisingly, the brewing press was
Blackburn.87 Judgement was given unsympathetic to the plight of Bostock &
against the defendants for £1,980 and Co., even if the outcome of the case
costs, less £93 due to the defendants for meant that individual brewers were likely
goods supplied.88 Following this, and to have their damage claims significantly
bearing in mind several outstanding reduced.
actions, Holden's successfully peti-
tioned for the compulsory winding-up of The moral [opined the Brewing Trade Review]
Bostock & Co. By April, the total value of is that they should have not have relied so
claims against Bostock's had risen to entirely on the warranty, but have found out
£132,443.89 Foremost amongst these for themselves whether the acid was fit for
were Groves & Whitnall, claiming dam- use or no.93
ages amounting to £15,769.90 However,
the payment of any of these claims The irony is that the condemnation was
depended entirely upon Bostock's being equally applicable to the brewing indus-
able to recover damages from try. If Bostock's chemists were lax in
Nicholson's, failing to test their products, then the
same was true of the brewers, whose
for the negligent and wrongful supply of only defence was ignorance and the
sulphuric acid not made from brimstone and misplaced assurance that this had never
not a pure commercial acid in breach of a happened before.
contract to supply the plaintiffs with such
aforementioned acid.91 However, apart from licensee pro-
secutions under the Food and Drugs
This action began in January, 1904, with Act, the trade's legal team, under the
many of the same witnesses called, and leadership of Fletcher Moulton, had been
the testimony largely a rehash of the ear- successful in protecting the good name
Brewery History Number 132 51of the trade. From the outset, the brew- At the forefront of those questioning the
ers had publicly identified Bostock & Co. existence of alcoholic neuritis was Ernest
as the source of the contamination, while Reynolds. He presented his views at the
presenting themselves as innocent December 1900 meeting of the Liverpool
agents doing their utmost to ensure that Medical Society, and repeated them
an episode like this could never happen some three weeks later before the Royal
again. Legal process had confirmed Medical and Chirurgical Society in
this, and Bostock & Co. were left to sink London.94 His contention was simple:
under the burden of guilt - and writs - that that alcoholic neuritis did not in fact exist.
had been placed on them. Reynolds claimed that he had doubted
alcohol was capable of causing peripher-
al neuritis for over ten years, a view that
The disputed existence of alcoholic had been reinforced through his greater
neuritis experience of the condition. The basis of
his doubt was the absence of alcoholic
By mid-December 1900, the consensus neuritis in spirit drinkers. Now, his earlier
amongst medical practitioners was that opinions seemed to be confirmed by
arsenic was to blame for the epidemics of the very feature that had led to alcoholic
peripheral neuritis. The evidence was neuritis being so well described at
compelling; in virtually every locality Manchester - its geographical specificity.
affected by the disease, arsenic had The epidemic proper had been tied to
been detected in beer, and the classic a single local supply of contaminated
symptoms of chronic arsenic poisoning brewing sugar. However, the subsequent
identified in the victims. However, the discovery of arsenic in local barley malt
near-universal acceptance of Reynolds's pointed to arsenical beer having been on
explanation opened up a new debate the marketplace for many years, although
which questioned the very existence of to a considerably lesser extent than dur-
alcoholic neuritis. The realisation that ing the epidemic. This alternative source
arsenic, not alcohol was responsible for of arsenical beer was also restricted to
the Manchester epidemic revealed the Manchester and the north-west of
extent to which clinical diagnosis was England, mirroring the normal geo-
informed by class-based narrative par- graphical prevalence of the disease.
adigms. To some practitioners this Arsenic was thus capable of explaining
suggested that the disease frame of both epidemic and endemic alcoholic
alcoholic neuritis was fundamentally neuritis. Reynolds saw the corollary of
flawed and required substantial rene- his hypothesis in the statement of Sir
gotiation - or, more radically, that the William Tennant Gairdner, the eminent
condition known as alcoholic neuritis Scottish physician, as to the great rarity
could simply be written off as a medical of alcoholic neuritis amongst the
error. whiskey-drinking poor of Glasgow - a
52 Journal of the Brewery History SocietyYou can also read
