Decolonizing the Second Republic: Austria and the Global South from the 1950s to the 1970s
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Decolonizing the Second Republic: Austria and the Global
South from the 1950s to the 1970s
Berthold Molden
Journal of Austrian Studies, Volume 48, Number 3, Fall 2015, pp. 109-128
(Article)
Published by University of Nebraska Press
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/oas.2015.0051
For additional information about this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/598619
[ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ]Decolonizing the Second Republic
Austria and the Global South from the 1950s to the 1970s
Berthold Molden
“Der Österreicher hat es nicht verdient und verdient es auch weiterhin nicht,
zum Kolonialdasein erniedrigt zu werden.”
Ernst Koref, Socialist mp, 1950
The First Republic of Austria, a small remnant of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire, was founded in September 1919, ending the year-long episode of the Re-
public of German-Austria (Republik Deutschösterreich) through its recogni-
tion of the Treaty of St. Germain. The peace treaty imposed by the victorious
alliance prohibited any union between Austria and the German Empire. The
First Republic lasted until Austrofascist chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß created
a one-party dictatorship in 1933 that, in turn, disappeared when the Third Re-
ich annexed Austria in March 1938. Although Austria proclaimed its indepen-
dence in April 1945, it was only on May 15, 1955, with the signing of the State
Treaty by the four Allied Powers, the withdrawal of their occupation forces,
and the Austrian declaration of everlasting neutrality, that full sovereignty
was restored to the country.
Coinciding with a “victim’s doctrine” that would successfully deflect
most responsibility for Nazi crimes until the 1980s,1 several interpretations
of this short history of limited sovereignty circulated in post–World War II
Austria. Among them was a narrative according to which Austrians had never
gotten to decide their own fate since the end of the Habsburg Empire: first,
France, Britain, and the United States would not allow them to join Germany,
then Austria was annexed by the Nazi Reich, and finally it was occupied by
U.S., Soviet, British, and French forces. In a nutshell, different empires held
JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES, VOL. 48, NO. 3 © 2015 AUSTRIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION110 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
Austria in bondage and, while Lenin’s Right of Nations to Self-Determination
did not seem to apply to the shrunken metropole, Wilson’s Fourteen Points
were in fact explicitly formulated against Austrian (and Ottoman) interests
(Manela). Hence the heartland of the former Austrian Empire did not get to
enjoy the most important doctrines of decolonization at the time, which left
it at the mercy of other empires, until it finally shook off its shackles in 1955.
Did this common interpretation of history bring about a form of antico-
lonial self-identification among Austrians? Did it perhaps even create a sen-
timent of solidarity with those “darker nations” of the so-called Third World
that were in the process of actual decolonization? As the opening quotation
of this essay indicates, this question is less far-fetched than it may appear at
first glance. The quotation is taken from a parliamentary debate about the
positioning of occupied Austria vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the West in
1950, and it touches on the complex dialectics of Austrian identity-building
and global intellectual South-North transfers during the first decades after
World War II. While all other parties shared a common rejection of the Al-
lied occupation as a form of colonialism that Austrians did not “deserve,” the
Communist Party used a different rhetoric of colonial victimhood; it was di-
rected against the penetration of Austria by the capitalist West, primarily the
United States. “Sie wollen eine amerikanische Kolonie!” shouted the Com-
munist mp Franz Honner, interrupting the speech of his Socialist colleague
Ernst Koref. And he warned of the “völligen Kolonisierung Österreichs durch
das amerikanische Monopolkapital” (Stenographic protocol of the 18th ses-
sion of the Austrian Nationalrat, 6th legislative period, March 14, 1950, 507,
511). Conversely, both Socialists and Christian Democrats accused the Soviet
Union of exhibiting a “Willen zur kommunistischen Weltherrschaft” (Bruno
Kreisky, quoted in Hödl 73). Certainly, Austrian politicians, journalists, and
intellectuals mostly interpreted their struggle for full sovereignty within the
global constellation of the Cold War. But they also reduced the Global South
to a secondary actor within the same political grid. This article will analyze
Austria’s “colonized” self-perceptions and its perception of the Global South
as intertwined discourses and seek to identify the specific significance pro-
duced by this entwinement.
While some research has been conducted on related topics, this is the
first closer look at the contradictory construction of a decolonizing self-
perception in post–World War II Austria. The most important study on
Austria’s relations with the Third World is Gerhard Hödl’s book on the fieldsMolden: Austria and the Global South | 111
of foreign policy and development aid. Although Hödl connects pragmatic
foreign policy cooperation with countries like India, Brazil, and Yugoslavia
to the rhetoric of politicians and a broader public discourse in Austria, there
is still much insight to be gained by linking this field with sources from film,
literature, and media. These less-charted territories will be examined here by
means of three short Austrian case studies: a propaganda film of 1952, the
discourse of a leading moderate conservative journalist in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, and the “non-aligned” diplomacy of the Socialist politician and
longtime chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, up to the early 1970s.2
In 1952 a new Austrian science fiction film hit national cinemas. The
government-funded movie, titled 1. April 2000, projected Austria’s Allied oc-
cupation decades into the future. Exasperated by decades-long foreign rule,
the annoyed prime minister unilaterally declares the country’s independence.
However, the Global Union that would govern the Earth in the future, as a
more powerful version of the still-young un of the 1950s, rushes in to con-
demn Austria for threatening world peace and to erase it from the political
map once and for all. In a series of patriotic orchestrations, the charming
prime minister finally wins over the president of the Global Union, a steely
woman determined to destroy the country. She eventually is “feminized” and
falls for his charms, resigning her position in an exhilarating waltz after ac-
quitting Austria.3 As this short summary indicates, the film was a political sat-
ire produced by the Austrian Press Service to foster a new national identity
in Austria and to create a popular narrative of an innocent nation that might
contribute to a change of mind in and an eventual retreat by the Allied lib-
erators, who after all were viewed by Austrians primarily as occupiers. In an
attempt to broaden its international impact, the movie was entered into the
official selection of the Cannes Film Festival in 1953.
The movie’s scriptwriters and director represented the “classic” main-
stream ideological blend of post–World War II Austria: a Christian Demo-
crat, a Socialist, and a former Nazi. Co-writer Ernst Marboe had a Catholic-
nationalist background and during both the First Republic and the
Austrofascist regime had been, as a leading member of the Volksdeutscher
Arbeitskreis österreichischer Katholiken, committed to a Pan-German Reich.
According to Walter Wiltschegg’s account of German nationalism in the First
Austrian Republic, Marboe’s Catholic-nationalist circles included bridge-
builders to Nazi ideology (Wiltschegg 163–64), although other authors call
for caution in this interpretation (Rumpler 233).4 After 1945 he headed the112 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
cultural section of the Federal Press Service on behalf of the Catholic Peo-
ple’s Party (övp). It was in this function that he had commissioned the film
in the first place, amounting to a situation in which the federal government
produced its own propaganda movie with the crème de la crème of Austrian
actors, such as Hilde Krahl, Josef Meinrad, Hans Moser, and Paul Hörbiger.
Marboe’s co-writer was Rudolf Brunngraber, a socialist author in the First Re-
public and former collaborator of sociologist and economist Otto Neurath.
Brunngraber had been banned from publishing by the Austrofascist regime,
but not in Nazi Germany, where he enjoyed a strange popularity. After 1945
he became a Socialist again. And finally, director Wolfgang Liebeneiner had
been one of the Third Reich’s most successful filmmakers and the production
manager of the Reich’s biggest movie company, Ufa; his wife Hilde Krahl,
who like him enjoyed a career uninterrupted by any regime change, played
the female lead in the movie.
But while this production background is revealing with regard to Aus-
trian postwar society, the film itself is also telling in its depiction of a global
community, typified in the World Security Commission that arrives at the be-
ginning of the movie in front of Vienna’s famous Schönbrunn Palace aboard
a spherical chrome spaceship. The commission’s members represent all the
major regions of the world, with the exception of the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe, and are portrayed in appalling stereotypes through their names,
appearance, and habitus. These culturalist-racist clichés are especially striking
when it comes to the Global Southern continents: Africa is represented by
“Moderator Robinson,” played by a black-faced Austrian actor who is greet-
ed by the crowd with the remark, “Do is a Neger!” (1. April 2000, 00:17:54);
Latin American council-member “Ina Equiquiza” dresses in ponchos and re-
peatedly is overcome by fits of her hot-blooded nature; the representative
of the “Arabian Union” is called “Hajji Halef Omar,” which in all German-
comprehending ears resonated as a reference to the exoticist novelist Karl
May’s famously comical character Hadschi Halef Omar.5 Only the Asian del-
egate “Wei Yao Chee” is shown as actually cultured (echoes of Hegel?); later
in the movie he discovers the 1943 Moscow Declaration submitting it to the
tribunal as the founding document of Austrian independence, but when the
crowd draws closer as he appears from the spaceship a policeman mutters, “A
so a Gedräng’ wegen den Chinesa!” (1. April 2000, 00:17:50).
According to the film scholar Ines Steiner, these stereotypes work par-
ticularly well because the Austrian characters are also depicted as “inland ex-Molden: Austria and the Global South | 113
oticist” (“binnenexotisch”) clichés (177). To whitewash Austrian history by
reducing Austria to an eternally harmless country interested only in wine and
music seems to create a relative common ground with the “peoples without
history” outside Europe, insofar as this narrative implies that Austria never
did anyone any harm. However, as Steiner points out: “Der vermeintlich fre-
mde Blick, der das Vertraute in Frage stellen soll, bleibt von vornherein der ei-
gene” (178). Given that the movie projected official propaganda and therefore
was careful in its use of popular and comical visual and dramatic language,
it is hardly surprising that it correlates to Gerald Hödl’s assessment of the
perceptions that Austria’s political elite held of the Global South: “Selbst der
Kolonialismus wurde zunächst primär in Relation zur eigenen Nachkrieg-
swirklichkeit gesetzt—man verglich sich mit seinen Opfern, um sich in ei-
nem weiteren Schritt über sie zu erheben” (66). This differentiation can be
seen clearly in yet another quotation from the same speech by the Social-
ist mp Ernst Koref quoted in the beginning: “Denn alle Erleichterungen und
schönen Phrasen können nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß wir, was unsere
Rechte betrifft, kaum viel besser als ein Kolonialvolk abschneiden, wobei nur
die Frage offen bleibt, wer oder was bei uns kolonisiert wird” (Stenographic
protocol of the 18th Session of the Austrian Nationalrat, VI legislative period,
14 March 1950, 491). Austrians did not think of themselves as requiring the
same guidance toward Enlightenment and civilization that they thought nec-
essary for non-Europeans. They were no savages, after all.
Although the Global South is thus depicted in a rather deprecatory way
from the Austrian perspective of a self-proclaimed European “cultural super-
power,”6 the movie’s official storyline contains astonishing parallels to de-
colonizing narratives of struggles for self-determination and independence.
In a culminating scene just prior to the final verdict of the Commission on
Austria’s Fate, a politician addresses the crowd: “Nicht um Österreich al-
lein geht es heute. Es geht um den kleinen Mann in der ganzen Welt. Wenn
die Weltmächte unsere Rechte anerkennen, so wird es der Anfang für eine
bessere Weltordnung sein” (1. April 2000, 01:18:23–01:18:48).7 This description
of Austria as a country ready to have its sovereignty granted from imperial
powers is more than just an analogy to decolonization—it presents Austria’s
desired independence as a possible example for other countries, especially in
Eastern Europe8 but possibly also in the Global South.
Although not in response to the movie 1. April 2000, the Allied powers
did eventually grant Austria its full sovereignty on May 15, 1955. During the114 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
days preceding this momentous event, all Austrian newspapers and radio
broadcasts were naturally more than excited. As the analysis of editorial com-
mentary at this has shown,9 the tone was set by a phrase written by Hugo Por-
tisch, foreign policy analyst of Neuer Kurier, at the time Austria’s most highly
circulated daily: Austrians were finally, again, “Herr im eigenen Haus” (“Blick
nach vorn”). Portisch’s article told of seventeen years of bondage, confirm-
ing the aforementioned “victim’s doctrine” as the dominant interpretation
of Austria’s recent history. Less than a month earlier, on April 17, 1955, Indo-
nesian president Sukarno opened one of the single-most important interna-
tional events of global decolonization, the Afro-Asian conference of Band-
ung, where twenty-nine recently or soon-to-be decolonized countries met to
discuss the role of the Third World in world politics and laid the groundwork
for the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Sukarno said: “Our
nations and countries are colonies no more. Now we are free, sovereign and
independent. We are again masters in our own house” (Kahin 40).
While Sukarno had certainly not invented this phrase and no direct cau-
sality can be deduced between him and Portisch, it is unlikely that the Austri-
an journalist who covered international politics would not have been aware of
Bandung (see Wassermann 514–41). Its wording is capable of evoking a whole
set of highly divergent memories of a lack of national self-determination, mem-
ories that include both those of former imperial colonies and those of the de-
flated center of a former continental empire, such as Austria. Hence, despite
such striking historical disparities, Austria’s regained independence was soon
transformed into an example for the world. The editor-in-chief of the influen-
tial Socialist daily Arbeiter-Zeitung, Oscar Pollak, wrote on the first anniversary
of the last Allied soldier’s departure: “Ja, an diesem Tage wird es uns wieder
bewusst und sollte es aller Welt bewusst werden: was die Existenz eines freien
Österreich für die Welt bedeutet.” Portisch’s phrase also echoed strongly in the
years to come. The newsreel agency Austria Wochenschau used it in a review of
the year 1956, strongly colored by the first real challenge to Austrian neutrali-
ty, which occurred during the Hungarian crisis: “Im Jahre 1956 verschwanden
Gottseidank manche unliebsame Erinnerungszeichen an die Zeiten der Un-
freiheit. Wir sind souverän, sind Herren im eigenen Haus und gedenken, es
zu bleiben.” The speaker uttered these words in a menacing tone, as if to say,
“Don’t dare to return—we will defend our freedom!” This message was easi-
ly decoded by the Austrian audience as a reference to what had happened in
Hungary and not some location in the Global South (Austria Wochenschau).Molden: Austria and the Global South | 115
Other echoes were in fact connected with the Third World, albeit in a
contradictory manner typical of Austria’s paradoxical intersection of polit-
ical memory, group identities, and contemporary Cold War constellations.
The protocols of a session of the National Council (the more powerful “low-
er house” of the Austrian parliament) from October 23, 1973, contain a debate
about a hostage crisis in the Austrian town of Marchegg caused by the Pales-
tinian terrorist group As-Sa’iqa. The hostages were released after Chancellor
Bruno Kreisky gave in to the terrorists’ demands: most pertinently, to close
a transit center at the Austrian border where Jewish emigrants from the So-
viet Union frequently passed through on their way to Israel. This ultimatum
led to long-term tensions not only with the Israeli government but also with
the international community in general. In Austria, on the other hand, the
fact that a chancellor of Jewish descent (which had often led to anti-Semitic
attacks during earlier election campaigns) would stand up to the Israeli de-
mands triggered a wave of national pride (Röhrlich 301–29).
This reaction had more to do with Austrian anti-Semitism than with pro-
Arab sentiments, let alone any solidarity with revolutionary terrorists. None-
theless, in a parliamentary debate on this matter, the Christian Democratic mp
Franz Karasek, while criticizing Kreisky and rejecting assertions in the Arab
press that Austria had displayed a “wahrhaft neutrale Haltung” in this affair,
declared that it was even more unacceptable for Austria to be rebuked by oth-
er Western powers because, “Österreich [hat] Herr im eigenen Haus zu sein
und wir [müssen] uns wirklich von niemandem belehren lassen, was wir tun
und was wir nicht tun sollen” (Stenographic protocol of the 81st Session of the
Austrian Nationalrat, xiii legislative period, 23 October 1973, 7749). Portisch
himself had signed a declaration of public intellectuals criticizing chancellor
Kreisky for his “opportunism” (Stenographic protocol of the 81st Session of the
Austrian Nationalrat, xiii legislative period, 23 October 1973, 7756).
This extended look at Hugo Portisch is certainly warranted because his
influence on Austrian public opinion in the 1950s and 1960s can hardly be
overstated. After heading the foreign politics desk at Neuer Kurier, he became
the paper’s editor-in-chief in 1958. As a journalist with outstanding ethical and
professional standards, he organized one of Austria’s first referendums in 1964
in order to rid the public broadcasting network orf of party-affiliated influ-
ence. Shortly thereafter, he joined that very network to become its decades-
long chief foreign reporter and political commentator. In addition Portisch
created the incredibly popular orf documentary “Austria II” about the Sec-116 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
ond Republic. His extensive and influential oeuvre made him the generally
well-liked and trusted and nonpartisan “history teacher of the nation,” who
explained to his newspaper and tv audiences the complex constellations of
international politics and their historical background. However, his exper-
tise was not limited to the entanglement of Europe and the two superpowers
in Cold War dialectics. Portisch also traveled extensively through the non-
Western world and particularly through the Global South. For Neuer Kurier
he sent dozens of reports from the Soviet Union, Africa, and Latin America
and later published them as monographs that were reprinted several times.
Limitations of space prevent a comprehensive discussion of Portisch’s dis-
course about Africa and Latin America, although some further observations
would be appropriate. A brief look must suffice here.
Hugo Portisch’s reports from Africa and Latin America in the late 1950s
and early 1960s were characterized by a moderate form of anti-Communism
and a surprising appraisal of colonial “achievements,” both of which led to his
criticism of, if not outright contempt toward, the practices of anticolonialism,
including even scorn for the postcolonial denunciation of colonial crimes and
neocolonial exploitation. Cultural stereotypes can be identified:
Denn von den 180 Millionen schwarzen Einwohnern von Afrika (das
arabische Nordafrika gehört hier ausgeklammert) sind nur einige
Zehntausend im europäischen Sinne zivilisiert. Einige Hunderttau-
send stehen an der Schwelle dieser Zivilisation, aber Millionen leben
heute noch so, wie sie vor Jahrhunderten gelebt haben, folgen den
Stammesbräuchen, denen schon ihre Urahnen folgten. . . . So eng
nebeneinander liegen in Schwarz-Afrika die Grenzen der Steinzeit
und des 20. Jahrhunderts. (Portisch, So sah ich die Sowjetunion 273)
This corresponded to his earlier analysis of decolonizing wars and mas-
sacres against white populations, describing black militias and armies as
“Heuschreckenschwärme.” To the Austrian reader, his reports reaffirmed
racist stereotypes of the African “savage” who is not ready for independence
and freedom and destroys the colonial achievements of white civilization.
Portisch credited European colonialism not only with the creation of infra-
structure but also with the development of raw materials, the education of
Africans into “respectable” beings, and the proliferation of medical care.
Portisch’s “teachings” to the readers of Austrian newspapers were in all
likelihood well received. Similar imaginaries, tying in with “Traditionen ko-Molden: Austria and the Global South | 117
lonialer Afrikabilder,” were detected among representatives of the right-wing
Freedom Party of the early 1960s (Hödl 71). As editor-in-chief of Neuer Kuri-
er, Portisch was an extremely popular journalist with a high level of credibil-
ity, to an unlikely degree considering that for the most part he did practice
quality journalism and reject the oversimplifications and stereotypes typical
of tabloid newspapers. Therefore, his impact on public opinion cannot be
overestimated. Very few Austrian journalists who widely enjoyed the trust
of the public made the effort to travel the world and report back to their less-
educated audience. If even this moderate mind was so critical of African de-
colonization and depicted African social, political, and cultural structures as
inhabiting a savage Stone Age, then popular stereotypes among the populace
were thus confirmed by the highest nationwide authority.
At this point it is important to note that Portisch stands out as one of
the most ethically driven journalists and intellectuals of post–World War
II Austria, with a deep and respectful interest in culture and politics. Even
so, the profound and unchallenged conviction of European superiority and
the idea of the grand virtues of colonization resonate throughout his reports
from Africa and, to a lesser degree, Latin America. These are not the ideas of
an extreme supremacist, which Portisch was certainly not; rather, they echo
and exemplify the common discourse of their time. Against this backdrop of
Portisch’s writings on the Third World, the possible connection between his
and Sukarno’s use of the same phrase becomes clear. Regardless of the pos-
sibility that the two utterances resulted from a common intellectual source,
Portisch would not have measured Austrian and African struggles for self-
determination with the same yardstick. To the contrary, he declared that “Af-
rika ist ein Kind Europas” that still has to be guided by its “mother” (So sah
ich die Sowjetunion 278) and that “ohne Europa gäbe es heute kein Afrika, das
heißt, nur einen fast menschenleeren, unerschlossenen Kontinent, wie es
etwa einst Australien war” (275).
In this context, African (or Asian, or Latin American, for that matter)
criticism against colonialism and neocolonialism was depicted as but a cheap
excuse, a rhetorical phrase of incompetent postcolonial politicians (Portisch,
So sah ich die Sowjetunion 274–76). In short Portisch did not accept early
avant la lettre “postcolonial” critique or dependency theory. However, while
being highly critical toward the protagonists of anticolonialism themselves—
he called Fidel Castro’s Cuba a “bösartiger kleiner Bruder” of the United
States (461)—he did welcome the concepts of development aid designed by118 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
the governments of the North Atlantic “Free World,” such as John F. Kenne-
dy’s Alliance for Progress. By comparing them favorably to the Marshall Plan
(347), his thoughts coincided with those of another great intellectual of the
Second Republic: the Socialist politician Bruno Kreisky.
Bruno Kreisky lived in exile from 1934 to 1945, then became a diplomat,
state secretary (beginning in 1953), foreign minister (after 1959), and chancel-
lor from 1970 to 1983. He is the single most important politician of the Second
Republic, often referred to as the “Sun King,” modernizing Austria’s conser-
vative society from within while repositioning the small state internationally
with a highly active foreign policy. The latter achievement, although always
committed to the “Free World” of the West and clearly anti-Communist, de-
terminedly steered between the Cold War blocs and at times sought prox-
imity to the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, while much of Kreisky’s foreign
policy was framed in the East-West coordinates of the Cold War, as well as in
European affairs, he also acquired a strong profile with regard to issues of de-
velopment policy.
This interest, as Elisabeth Röhrlich has pointed out, was not least based
on “biographische Aspekte” such as “die eigene Flüchtlingserfahrung eben-
so wie die frühe Beschäftigung mit den Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen in den
Kolonialreichen” (255).10 In the 1920s and 1930s Kreisky had been shaped by
Socialist (and, of course, Communist) anti-imperialism, and he participated
in the related debates of the International Group of Democratic Socialists as
an exile in Stockholm during World War II (255). He first found an oppor-
tunity to convert this interest into more concrete political ideas when he be-
came state secretary in the Foreign Ministry in 1953 and then foreign minister
in 1959. His speeches about and travels to the Third World, where he met with
Jawaharlal Nehru and others, increased in the early 1960s and led to the foun-
dation of the Wiener Institut für Entwicklungsfragen in 1962. With associates
from the Global South in leadership positions, this institute quite aptly repre-
sented the political discourse of Bandung, Belgrade, and Havana, calling for
empowerment rather than economic aid.
Notwithstanding Kreisky’s own central focus on the Middle East and his
contacts with a number of Arab leaders, from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Yasser
Arafat, which contributed to difficult relations with Israel,11 he also promot-
ed the concept of a “Marshall Plan for the Third World” that would, however,
eventually fail in the context of the late Cold War. The superpowers’ com-
petitive courting (or, if need be, bullying and overthrowing) of postcolonialMolden: Austria and the Global South | 119
governments, as well as a strong Non-Aligned agency in the United Nations
known as Third Worldism (see Bunzl, Luif), impacted global politics from
the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, when they were superseded by G7 necolo-
nialism (see Prashad). However, at that time the idea of creating a global proj-
ect similar to what had been done in Western Europe after 1945 seemed quite
real, all the more so as President John F. Kennedy had already created the
Alliance for Progress as an anti-Communist development program for Lat-
in America. As mentioned earlier, moderate conservative intellectuals like
Hugo Portisch also embraced this idea.
As far as is known, the Austrian public reacted rather reluctantly to any
official emphasis on development cooperation. Apart from letters to the ed-
itor and opinion polls (which did not survey this topic at the time), one in-
direct but quite reliable indicator of public sentiment is the political cabaret,
which derived its punch lines by “listening to the man on the street.” A case
in point is the appallingly racist song “Die Unterentwickelten” by the other-
wise brilliant team of Gerhard Bronner, Helmut Qualtinger, and Peter Wehle.
The song’s criticism is aimed at allegedly lazy and greedy Africans insisting on
development aid as well as Alpine dairy farmers demanding subsidies to sur-
vive: “Negerkral und Alpental vereint jetzt ein Choral: Ja, bei uns ist halt alles
so arm und so klein und so unterentwickelt” (Bronner et al.). Two years later,
in 1962, another great Viennese cabaret songwriter, Georg Kreisler, rhymed in
a surrealist tango piece: “Man gibt dem Araber sein eig’nes Dromedar, aber
wozu?” (Kreisler). Although it is true that the audiences of these artists were
urban and close to the cultural elite and belonged to the upper middle class,
they shared these criticisms and recognized the vernacular of Austrian popu-
lar discourse; this was, after all, why it was regarded as funny.
Much has been written about Kreisky’s foreign policy and its allegedly
“non-aligned” course (Molden, “Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe” 753–57). The
debate about the Vietnam War is of particular interest here, because it indi-
cates an important turning point when Kreisky’s interest in self-determination
ceased to match the more radical demands of a new left. Austrian public
opinion in the early 1970s was not unanimously pro-American; indeed, anti-
American sentiments were increasing. The Vietnam War was a central factor
in this process, as were the marks left by the student uprisings of 1968 that
became tangible in Austria after a certain delay, famously having lasted only
“eine heiße Viertelstunde” (Keller). However, when it became known that
President Richard Nixon, on his way to signing the salt I Treaty in Mos-120 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
cow, would have a stopover in Salzburg from May 20 to 22, 1972, whereupon
he would be welcomed there by Kreisky, Austria’s left-wing opposition orga-
nized protests. An opinion article in the conservative newspaper Die Presse
compared Nixon’s pending arrival and the expected demonstrations in the
traditionally conservative, German nationalist milieu of Salzburg with the
ideological confrontations of the interwar period; the extreme left and the
extreme right would again clash like they had in the 1930s (Oberleitner).
The key personalities in this protest were the chancellor’s own son, Peter
Kreisky; Helmut Kramer, a rebellious assistant at the Institut für Höhere Stu-
dien in Vienna; and journalists like Günther Nenning of neues forvm and
Barbara Coudenhove-Kalergi of the Arbeiter-Zeitung. The Social Democratic
Indochina Committee, a hot spot of inner-party left-wing opposition, was re-
sponsible for the orchestration of media outreach and demonstrations. They
clearly defied the chancellor’s policy and challenged him publicly. Although
Bruno Kreisky had called for an end to the war in Asia and Vietnam during his
yearly May Day speech, this did not satisfy the Indochina Committee. It had
published a list of demands in the internal party newspaper Welt der Arbeit as
well as a sixty-page informational pamphlet very similar to publications writ-
ten by Bertrand Russell or the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(sncc), to name but two of many examples from a decidedly global discourse
(Molden, “Vietnam, the New Left, and the Holocaust”).
The Indochina Committee urged the Socialist leadership to condemn in
no uncertain terms the Vietnam War “ebenso eindeutig wie [die] sowjetische
Okkupation der cssr.” It articulated sharp criticism against the information
politics of the orf, demanding
eine faire Indochina-Berichterstattung im orf. Es geht nicht länger
an, dass Rundfunk und Fernsehen einseitig und tendenziös die Ag-
gressionspolitik der usa verteidigen. Es geht nicht an, dass ein Mann
mit unbewältigter faschistischer Vergangenheit wie Alfons Dalma
das staatliche Rundfunkmonopol zur Desinformation der Bevöl-
kerung missbraucht.12 Die spö muss die Propaganda des orf in der
Indochinafrage verurteilen. Beim bevorstehenden Nixon-Besuch in
Salzburg darf sich Österreich nicht durch eine Medien-Kampagne
zum Komplizen des US-Präsidenten und seiner Politik machen”
(Sozialdemokratisches Indochinakomitee, printed on the inside
fold of the dust jacket).Molden: Austria and the Global South | 121
We can see how the issue of anticolonialism is conflated with that of Austria’s
Nazi past. The pamphlet had more to say on this question:
Es gibt Sozialisten, die auf die orf-Berichterstattung, die jede nati-
onalrevolutionäre Unabhängigkeitsbewegung als “kommunistisch”
abstempelt, hereinfallen, obwohl sie sich, wenn es um innenpoli-
tische Fragen geht, über die Manipulation der Massenmedien be-
schweren. Der blinde Antikommunismus macht sie empfänglich für
diese Manipulation, sobald es sich nicht um Österreich, sondern um
die Dritte Welt, insbesondere um Indochina handelt.
Moreover, the committee commented on the knee-jerk pro-Americanism of
most Austrian media:
Hinzu kommt die weit verbreitete, auch von manchen Sozialisten
unkritisch akzeptierte Meinung: Das österreichische Volk hat die
Pflicht, Amerika dankbar zu sein, für die Hilfe, die es nach dem
Zweiten Weltkrieg erhalten hat. Daher wäre die Verurteilung der
usa im Zusammenhang mit den blutigen Ereignissen in Indochina
Ausdruck “österreichischer Undankbarkeit.” (Sozialdemokratisches
Indochinakomitee 52)
Although the approximately three thousand demonstrators in Salzburg
managed to get a lot of public attention,13 their ability to change the discourse,
whether that of decision-makers or of the public at large, was very limited.
The chancellor greeted Nixon in person at the Salzburg airport, an event cov-
ered by Hugo Portisch and a tv news crew that included unfocused imag-
es of an attempted, unsuccessful breakthrough of the protesters through a
police cordon (orf 1972).14 As a result of the unregistered and unapproved
demonstration, fifty-three demonstrators faced criminal charges. Images of
police brutality were published in most newspapers, as were many letters to
the editor and surveys among readers, as the escalation between “Left” and
“Right,” between “hippies” and the repressive police, in Mozart’s own city
stirred up political emotions. Only the Communist Volksstimme denounced
police abuse and wrote of a “battle” (Volksstimme, 24 May 1972, cited in Mold-
en, “‘Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe’” 735). The Arbeiter-Zeitung on the other
hand was critical and wrote that the demonstrators “haben damit ihrer Sache
in der österreichischen Öffentlichkeit zweifellos keinen guten Dienst erwi-
esen” (Scheuch, “Kein Weg der Überzeugung”). Yet its chief editor Manfred122 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
Scheuch also tried to explain the Austrian political establishment’s peculiar
pro-Americanism by a special kind of “inferiority complex”—namely, a fear
of Soviet occupation, the memory of which was still fresh among most Aus-
trians (Scheuch, “Zu den Fragen eines Norwegers”). The conservative Salz-
burger Nachrichten joked about a “Familienfehde in der spö” with regard to
Bruno and Peter Kreisky (Salzburger Nachrichten, 27 May 1972, cited in Mold-
en, “‘Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe’” 736); the demagogic columnist “Staberl” of
Austria’s leading tabloid Kronen Zeitung made fun of them: “Hei! Wie tanzten
da bald österreichische reaktionäre Schlagstöcke auf den hohlen, aber stets
progressiven Köpfen der Protestierer!” (“Staberl”). In short, there was little
public sympathy for the anti-Nixonites in 1972.
Nonetheless, the movement against the Vietnam War had confronted an
Austrian public that was, for the most part, used to obedience to authority
with street protests as a form of political dissent, albeit without being able to
change the hegemonic media discourse on the issue. Yet, it is worth noting
that key protagonists of political journalism themselves may well have been
undergoing a change of heart at this time. A content analysis of editorial texts
written by Hugo Portisch between 1948 and 1967 came to the conclusion that
his attitude toward the United States evolved from a position of absolute ap-
proval to one of critical distance, while at the same time becoming visibly
more positive toward the Soviet Union (Ekl, 55, 67). And by the time Richard
Nixon had another layover in Salzburg on his way to the Middle East, from
June 10 to 11, 1974, public sentiment had turned. During the second layover,
the Austrian security agencies were more concerned with possible Palestin-
ian terrorist acts, and the Watergate scandal had significantly tarnished the
image of the U.S. president. Once again demonstrations were organized, but
they received little public attention.
The regional daily Oberösterreichische Nachrichten examined the atmo-
sphere surrounding the second visit:
Wie sich die politische Landschaft doch in zwei Jahren verändern
kann! Als Richard Nixon Pfingsten 1972 auf seinem Weg nach Mos-
kau, dem ersten Besuch eines US-Präsidenten in der Sowjetunion,
in Salzburg Station machte, stand mit Salzburg ganz Österreich kopf.
Es galt als Auszeichnung ersten Ranges, dem Präsidenten der usa
vor schweren politischen Entscheidungen zwei Tage Denkpausen-
aufenthalt zu gewähren. Gleichzeitig formierten sich erstmals in Ös-Molden: Austria and the Global South | 123
terreich starke linke Kräfte, die gegen den Präsidenten und seine Po-
litik demonstrierten. Am nächsten Montag, dem 10. Juni, wird vielen
offiziellen Begrüßern, denen vor zwei Jahren ihr Buckel nicht tief
genug und ihr Strammstehen nicht stramm genug sein konnte, das
Begrüßungslächeln in den Mundwinkeln einfrieren. Von den Tau-
senden, die dem amerikanischen Präsidenten zujubelten und die
Demonstranten beschimpften, würde sich heute ein Großteil den
Demonstranten anschließen. Richard Nixon ist kein heiler—für vie-
le gleichbedeutend mit heiliger—Präsident mehr. Er ist es so wenig,
dass man aus solchen Studentenkreisen, die für Demonstrationen
zuständig sind, gestern hören konnte, es lohne sich nicht, gegen den
Richard Nixon von heute in Salzburg zu demonstrieren. (Oberöster-
reichische Nachrichten, 5 June 1974, cited in Molden, “Die Ost-West-
Drehscheibe” 736–37)
The world had changed significantly since 1972, and so had public opin-
ion in Austria. But it was merely a countercultural minority that articulated
solidarity with revolutionary movements in the Global South. While official
foreign policy, at least under Socialist governments, was partly motivated by a
doctrine of self-determination, it was still clearly anti-Communist and there-
fore anti-revolutionary. When in late 1975, just a few months after the end of
the Vietnam War, Helmut Kramer was nominated to become a member of
the board of the Gesellschaft Österreich-Vietnam, a classical left-wing bilat-
eral friendship association, the Socialist Party’s executive committee took ac-
tion to prevent it. Party secretary-general Fritz Marsch wrote Kramer a letter
arguing that the association had not been founded “zur Unterstützung der
Bundesregierung” (Marsch). Kramer responded ironically, asking what this
argument would imply if the government were bourgeois and not socialist
(Kramer). He did become a member of the board and has served on it, in a
variety of functions, to the present day. Nevertheless, the general public still
did not feel significantly more connected with the Global South than it had
in the 1950s.
Did “the Austrians,” or rather Austria’s political establishment and in-
tellectual elite, consider themselves to have undergone a similar process of
decolonization as that of many African and Asian countries? Was Kreisky’s
policy of active neutrality, which sometimes brought Austria in proximity to
the Non-Aligned countries, based on a perception of historical solidarity?124 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
The three examples presented above do not support this assumption. In fact,
the relationship between Austrian self-perception and Austrian awareness of
others is more complex. While many protagonists of Austrian postwar poli-
tics did use images of colonial victimhood in order to emphasize the injustice
of their country’s own situation, this indignation was little concerned with
the actual situation in the colonies and their struggle for self-determination.
Where at first glance certain comparisons might suggest an attitude of soli-
darity, a closer look uncovers “ressentimentbehaftete Analogien” (Hödl 67).
Certainly, distinctions must be made with regard to both the political
background of the analyzed discourse and the time of its utterance. Especial-
ly for the early years after World War II it is safe to assert that the position
most in tune with today’s mainstream interpretation of decolonization—and
the most modern attitude, in a way—was to be found among Communist
politicians and journalists. Sure enough, public commentary by the Austri-
an Communist Party has to be understood in one of its central conditions:
that it conform to the party line formulated by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. Whatever reservations this may imply for the party’s relations
to Stalinism, its ideological configuration also accounts for the fact that it is
primarily within the Communist discourse that we find a consistent recog-
nition of the nations of the Global South as full political actors, as well as an
advocacy for their self-determination. The Socialist Party, especially Bruno
Kreisky as its most important conductor of Austrian foreign policy, did dis-
sent resolutely from Communist doctrines of self-determination, but in the
end Kreisky’s interpretation of this historical process was closer to that of Le-
nin than of Wilson. The Socialist government’s intensive diplomacy with the
Non-Aligned Movement and in Middle Eastern affairs showed unambiguous
policy positions that did not shy away from provoking the powerful Ameri-
cans. Moderate conservatives, and to a much higher degree the more extreme
right around the VdU/fpö, on the other hand, appeared to represent posi-
tions closest to colonial stereotypes and European supremacism.
Within the period analyzed here, some of these distinctions seem to blur,
which in itself justifies the diachronic periodization undertaken in this article.
While in the 1950s we find certain prejudices toward non-European cultures
among Socialists and Christian Democrats, a more open and reflective way
of thinking seemed to develop among the liberal left that had not yet become
mainstream among conservatives by the mid-1970s. The Communist camp
followed the shifting Soviet foreign policy doctrines. The extreme right, onMolden: Austria and the Global South | 125
the other hand, maintained its racist and supremacist discourse throughout
that entire period. Of course, both the actor-specific policy patterns and the
diachronic patterns demonstrated on the foregoing pages are only approxi-
mate guidelines; for the purposes of this essay, however, they allow a gross
classification of Austrian perceptions of the non-European world. They show
a generally contradictory and self-serving exploitation of decolonizing dis-
course by Austrian elites. It is interesting that these findings tally with the as-
sessment of an introductory survey of Austrian foreign policy by two eminent
experts: “Die in den Jahren 1970 bis 1983 intensivierte, auf die Erweiterung
humanistisch intendierter Beziehungen orientierte Außenpolitik gegenüber
den Staaten der Dritten Welt war insofern egoistisch, als Österreich seine da-
raus resultierenden guten Kontakte zur Durchsetzung von Eigeninteressen
zu nutzen verstand” (Filzmaier and Pelinka 6). Austrian intellectuals and
politicians may at some point have cultivated a narrative of colonial victim-
hood, but they never saw their country as a real companion in misfortune
to the Global South. After all, Austria’s historical memory and external self-
promotion were those of a former empire.
Notes
1. This doctrine, also known as “victim’s myth” was effective in terms both of internatio-
nal diplomacy and of internal identity construction. Cf. Bischof 2004 and Uhl 2011.
2. Today’s Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs was known as Sozialdemokratische
Arbeiterpartei Österreichs until 1945, when it was renamed in Sozialistische Partei Öster-
reichs. It adopted its current name in 1991. As the period covered in this paper is that of 1945–
1975, the term Socialist will be used for all party-related issues and persons. It should however
be noted that Kreisky and his generation lived their formative years as Social Democrats.
3. On the sexist aspects of the movie, see Hochholdinger-Reiterer.
4. “Mainstream” is an important qualification, because the first postwar governments
did not include outright ex-Nazis, but it did include the Austrian Communist Party (kpö).
The Verband der Unabhängigen (VdU), later renamed Austrian Freedom Party (fpö), was
founded in 1949. Despite its disappointing turnout in the 1945 elections, the kpö joined the
government coalition until its only minister resigned in 1947. On the other hand, the VdU/
fpö could never attract all ex-Nazi sympathizers, but mainly represented the anti-Catholic
nationalist core. Most former Nazi Party members voted opportunistically for the Christian
Democrats or the Socialists.
5. While it should be noted that Wiltschegg has been publishing his work in notorious
publishing houses of the revisionist right, serious scholars have also cited it continuously.
The film itself also contains a reference to the three-estate ideology of the Austrofascist peri-126 | JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN STUDIES 48:3
od. In the opening credits it reads: “This Film was realized with the most generous support
by state and church administration, as well as with broadest participation of the Austrian
people.” (1. April 2000, dvd 2006, 00:02:38–00:02:45) The construction of this political triad
had been central to Austro-Fascism, also known as the “Corporate State,” from 1934 to 1938:
the state, the Catholic Church, and the people.
6. At one point, the Arab delegate accuses the Austrians of historical mass murder, ba-
sed on the alleged origin of Austria’s red-white-red flag: Legend has it that the flag goes back
to the shirt of Babenberger duke Leopold V, supposedly soaked in Arab blood at the Siege of
Acre during the Third Crusade, except for a white stripe where his belt had been.
7. This rubric represents a frequent national self-description by Austrian politicians and
patriotic intellectuals, especially in the postwar years.
8. The last words of this speech sound from loudspeakers over a crowd of thousands
on Heldenplatz square in Vienna, where Hitler had celebrated Austria’s Anschluss in March
1938, a twisted echo from the country’s most terrible and recent historical period that is ne-
ver mentioned in the entire film.
9. The most problematic emulation of Austria’s eventual independence and Cold War
neutrality would be the Hungarian uprising of 1956: While the Western powers provoked
Hungarians to revolt, they did not come to their help when the Red Army took Budapest.
10. In fact, Portisch confirmed this assumption later, although he could not remember
the connection with full certainty. Interview of the author with Hugo Portisch, 4 July 2013.
11. We know of this “early occupation” mostly through indirect references. One of them
is Kreisky’s diary from his time in the Austrofascist prison in 1935 and 1936. Although this
diary does not allow a comparison with the seminal historical and political writings of the
Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci who died in 1937 after a decade in a Fascist dungeon,
it does in fact indicate that Kreisky, too, paid close attention to the entanglements of histo-
ry and politics. His reading lists (Kreisky, Auch schon eine Vergangenheit 149–52) show that
this interest included the non-European world, containing titles such as René Fülöp-Miller’s
book on Lenin and Gandhi (Fülöp-Miller 1927). In his own memoirs Kreisky deplored the
poor selection of reading material available to him, particularly in terms of international his-
tory (Kreisky, Erinnerungen 176–77).
12. Alfons Dalma had been working with the Croatian Ustaša regime during World War
II and became a successful conservative journalist in Austria after 1945. See Hausjell and
Rathkolb 1989.
13. Photos of Bruno Kreisky with Richard Nixon and of Peter Kreisky leading the de-
monstration even made it on the front page of the Herald Tribune on 22 May 1972, under the
title “Austria Stop Is Marked by Violence.”
14. The following days were also covered and explained in much detail by Hugo Por-
tisch, see tape Z-IX 99.040/1/0.
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