FEMINIST europeAn union - FOREIGN POLICY - Centre for ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
A Feminist
Foreign Policy
for the
A union
europeAn
FEMINIST
By the Centre for
Feminist Foreign Policy
FOREIGN POLICY
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
By the Centre for
Feminist Foreign Policy
BY THE CENTRE FOR FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY Authors: Nina Bernarding and Kristina Lunz with support in the editorial and research process by Marissa Conway and Damjan Denkovski. June 2020 The research was funded by The Greens/EFA.
I Introduction
p.11 1. Purpose of the Study
p.11 2. Timing of the Study
p.13 3. Limitations of the Study
p.13 3.1 Lacking Consultations
p.13 3.2 Definition of Foreign and Security Policy
p.14 3.3 The Gendered Discourse on Foreign Policy
II The Status Quo of Feminist Foreign Policy
p.17 1. Feminist Foreign Policy in the World
p.17 1.1 The Prevalence of Feminist Foreign Policies
p.18 1.1.1 Sweden
p.20 1.1.2 Canada
p.21 1.1.3 France
p.22 1.1.4 Mexico
p.23 1.1.5 Criticism towards existing
Feminist Foreign Policies
p.24 1.2 Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework
of Contents
p.24 1.3 State of the Art Research: Understanding Gender
Table
Equality in Foreign Policy
p.26 2. Feminist Foreign Policy within
the EU External Action
p.27 2.1 A Flawed Understanding of Gender
and Gender Equality
p.27 2.1.1 A Limited Understanding of Gender
p.29 2.1.2 Equality for the Sake of Efficiency
p.30 2.2 The Consequences:
Flawed and Inconsistent Policies
p.31 2.2.1 Gender-blind policies
p.33 2.2.2. Lacking Policy Coherence and Flawed Under
standing of Security
III Moving Forward: A Feminist Foreign Policy for the EU
p.39 1. Purpose of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.40 1.1 Priorities of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.40 1.2 Principles of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.41 2. Definition of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.42 3. Reach of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.42 3.1 Adapt and institutionalise an inclusive
and comprehensive definition of gender
p.43 3.2. Reverse the militarisation
of EU external action
and prioritise human security
p.49 3.3. Actively pursue intersectional
gender equality as a guiding principle
of the EU external action
p.51 3.4 Enhance Cooperation with
and support to feminist civil society
p.52 3.5 Show political leadership towards
implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy,
enhance institutional capacities
to do so, and ensure institution-wide
gender parity
p.54 4. Intended Outcomes and Benchmarks
to Achieve over Time
p.54 5. Plan to Operationalise
IV Conclusion
p.57
V Annex
p.61 Annex 1: Measures of Success
p.62 Annex 2: External and Outcome
Measures including respective
Accountability Measures
VI Bibliography
p.65
IV Experts Interviewed
p.77list
of
AbbreviationsCEDAW: CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination
Convention on of
theAll Forms
Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination ofAgainst Women Against Women
Discrimination
CFFP: CFFP: Centre for Feminist Foreign
Centre Policy Foreign Policy
for Feminist
CEDAW:
COP25: CEDAW:
COP25: Convention on the
2019 United NationsConvention
Elimination
United on
2019Climate of
theAll
Change
Nations Elimination
Forms Change
Conference
Climate of All Conference
Forms
CSDP: CSDP: of Discrimination
Common of
Security Against
Discrimination
and
Common Women
Defence
Security Against
Policy
and Defence WomenPolicy
CFFP:
EBA: CFFP:
EBA: Centre for Feminist
Centre
Expert Group onExpert Foreign
for
Aid Studies Feminist
Policy Foreign
Group on Aid Studies Policy
COP25:
EEAS: COP25:
EEAS: 2019 United Nations
European External 2019 Climate
United Nations
ChangeAction
Action External
European Service Climate
Conference Change Conference
Service
CSDP:
ENAAT: CSDP:
ENAAT: Common Security
European NetworkCommon
and Defence
against
European Security
ArmsPolicy
Network and
Trade Defence
against ArmsPolicy
Trade
EBA:
EPF: EBA:
EPF: Expert Group onExpert
Aid
European Peace Facility Studies
Group on
European Peace Facility Aid Studies
EEAS:
EPLO: EEAS:
EPLO: European External
European
European Peacebuilding Action
European External
Service
Liaison Action
Office
Peacebuilding Service
Liaison Office
ENAAT:
ESDP: ENAAT:
ESDP: European Network
European Security European
against
and Defence
European Network
Arms Trade
Policy
Security against Arms
and Defence PolicyTrade
EPF:
ESS: EPF:
ESS: European Security
European Peace Facility
European Peace Facility
StrategySecurity
European Strategy
EPLO:
EU: EPLO:
EU: European Peacebuilding
European
European UnionEuropean Union Liaison
Peacebuilding
Office Liaison Office
ESDP:
EUSR: ESDP:
EUSR: European Security
European UnionEuropean
and Defence
Special
European Security
UnionPolicy
Representative and Defence
Special Policy
Representative
ESS:
FIAP: ESS:
FIAP: EuropeanInternational
Feminist Security
European
Strategy
Feminist SecurityPolicy
Assistance
International Strategy
Assistance Policy
EU:
FFP: EU:
FFP: European Union European
Feminist ForeignFeminist Union
Policy Foreign Policy
EUSR:
GBA+: EUSR:
GBA+: European Union European
Special
Gender-based Analysis Representative
Plus
Gender-based Union
(GBA+) SpecialPlus
Analysis Representative
(GBA+)
FIAP:
HR/VP: FIAP:
HR/VP: Feminist International
High RepresentativeFeminist Assistance
the Union for of the Union Policy
International
HighofRepresentative Policy Assistance for
FFP: FFP: Feminist Foreign
Foreign Affairs andFeminist
Policy Foreign
Security
Foreign AffairsPolicy Policy
and Security Policy
GBA+:
IcSP: GBA+:
IcSP: Gender-based Analysis
Gender-based
Instrument contributing Plus
Instrument (GBA+)
Analysis
to Stability andPlus
contributing (GBA+) and Peace
Peace
to Stability
HR/VP:
ICRW: HR/VP:
ICRW: High Representative
International Highof
Center Representative
forthe Union
Research
International Centerfor of
forthe
on Women Union for
Research on Women
Istanbul Istanbul Foreign Affairs and
Foreign
Security
AffairsPolicy
and Security Policy
IcSP: IcSP:
Convention: Convention: Instrument contributing
Convention Instrument
on preventing
Convention toand
Stability
contributing
and Peace
oncombating
preventing toand
Stability and Peace
combating
ICRW: ICRW: International
violence Center
against International
women for and
violence ResearchCenteron Women
domestic
against women for Research
violence
and on Women
domestic violence
Istanbul
LGBTQI+: Istanbul
LGBTQI+: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Lesbian, Transsexual,
Gay, Bisexual, Queer, Intersex Queer, Intersex
Transsexual,
Convention:
NAP: Convention:
NAP: Convention on preventing
Convention
National Action National and
Plan (for Action on combating
preventing
the Implementation and combating
Plan (for the Implementation
violence
for the UNagainst violence
women
Security
for and
against
Council
the UN domestic
women
Resolution
Security violence
and domestic
1325
Council on Women,
Resolutionviolence
1325 on Women,
LGBTQI+: LGBTQI+: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Peace and Security)Lesbian, Transsexual,
Gay,
Peace and Security)Bisexual,
Queer,
Transsexual,
Intersex Queer, Intersex
NAP:
NPT: NAP:
NPT: National
Treaty onAction National
Plan (foronAction
the
the Non-Proliferation
Treaty theImplementation
Plan
of (for the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Implementation
Weapons
of Nuclear Weapons
NDCI: NDCI: for the UN Security
for the
Council
Neighbourhood,Neighbourhood,UN Security
Resolution
Development Development Council
1325 Resolution
on Women, 1325 on Women,
Peace and Security)
and International Peace and Security)
Cooperation
and International Instrument
Cooperation Instrument
NPT:
ODA: NPT:
ODA: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
Treaty
Official Development on the
Assistance
Official Non-Proliferation
Development of Nuclear Weapons
Assistance of Nuclear Weapons
NDCI:
OECD: NDCI:
OECD: Neighbourhood,
Organisation forNeighbourhood,
Development for Development
Economic Cooperation
Organisation Economic andCooperation
Developmentand Development
PESCO: PESCO: and International and
Permanent Structured Cooperation
International
Cooperation
Permanent Instrument
Cooperation
Structured Cooperation Instrument
ODA:
SIDA: ODA:
SIDA: Official
Sweden’sDevelopmentOfficial
International Assistance
Sweden’s Development
Development
International Assistance
Cooperation
Development Agency
Cooperation Agency
OECD:
SIPRI: OECD:
SIPRI: Organisation forOrganisation
Economic
Stockholm International
Stockholm Cooperation
Peace for Economic and
Research Institute
International Cooperation
Development and Development
Peace Research Institute
PESCO:
TPNW: PESCO:
TPNW: Permanent
Treaty on theStructured
Permanent
TreatyCooperation
Prohibition onof Structured
theNuclear Cooperation
Weapons
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
SIDA:
SRE: SIDA:
SRE: Sweden’s International
Sweden’s
Secretaría de Relaciones Development
Secretaría International
Exteriores Cooperation
Development
(Mexico)
de Relaciones ExterioresAgency
Cooperation Agency
(Mexico)
SIPRI:
UN: SIPRI:
UN: Stockholm International
United Nations Stockholm Peace
United Nations International
Research Institute
Peace Research Institute
TPNW:
UNCTED: TPNW:
UNCTED: Treaty
United on the Prohibition
Nations Treaty
United on ofthe
Counter-Terrorism
Nations Nuclear
Prohibition
Weapons of Nuclear Weapons
Counter-Terrorism
SRE: SRE: Secretaría
CommitteedeExecutive
Relaciones
SecretaríaExteriores
deExecutive
Directorate
Committee Relaciones
(Mexico) Exteriores (Mexico)
Directorate
UN:
WILPF: UN:
WILPF: United
Women’s Nations United
International
Women’s Nations
League for PeaceLeague
International and Freedom
for Peace and Freedom
UNCTED:
WIIS: UNCTED:
WIIS: United Nations Counter-Terrorism
United
Women In International
Women In Nations
Security Counter-Terrorism
International Security
WPS: WPS: Committee Executive
‘Women, Peace and Committee
Directorate
Security’
‘Women, Executive
PeaceAgenda Directorate
and Security’ Agenda
WILPF: WILPF: Women’s International
Women’s League
International
for PeaceLeague
and Freedom
for Peace and Freedom
WIIS: WIIS: Women In International
Women In Security
International Security
WPS: WPS: ‘Women, Peace and ‘Women,
Security’
PeaceAgenda
and Security’ AgendaForeword
When women sit at the negotiation table, peace deals last longer. When all people of all colour and LGBTQI+ are represented, policies become more inclusive and respon- sive to the needs of increasingly diverse societies. The EU has recognised these principles in rhetoric but not in practice. The EU has had an external Gender Action Plan since 2010 – yet, clear gender equality goals and indi- cators on the relevant EU policies are entirely missing in the upcoming proposal of the Multiannual Financial Framework. This prevents the monitoring of the expenditure dedicated to gender equality in any policy area. What is more, since 2009, the EU has a task force on Women Peace and Security – yet, men still lead 12 out of 12 Common Security and Defence Policy missions. Since 2018, the EEAS has a Gender Equal Opportunities Strategy – but again, the three newly ap- pointed political directors are all men. While the strategies exist, in practice, their application is limited. If we continue down the same path, full gender equality in the EU’s external action will not be a reality any- time soon. Gender equality is at the core of the Greens policy agenda. While we welcome gen- der equality being prominently featured in the foreign policy strategies of Germa- ny, France, Spain, Luxembourg, and the other Member States, being spearheaded by Sweden, we want to make this an EU-wide reality. We commissioned this study, conducted and written by the Centre for Feminist For- eign Policy (CFFP), to bring gender equality in foreign policy to the top of the EU agenda. It aims to set the foundation for an EU feminist foreign policy, which trans- forms the patriarchal structures embedded in foreign policy and security. This study calls for the mandatory representation of women in foreign policy and recommends increases in financial and human resources to make this possible. It calls for addressing and understanding the experiences of ethnic and sexual minorities and breaking down the male-dominated hierarchy in foreign policy arenas. We embrace these recommendations and hope that this study will contribute to tear down preju- dices embedded in the EU’s external action policies. We are encouraged by the impressive work of civil society groups in this area. We await the ambitious Gender Action Plan that the European Commission is due to publish during the second half of 2020. This year we also commemorate the 20th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security. We hope this milestone will enhance and quicken our efforts to push for a feminist foreign policy worldwide. Hannah Neumann Ernest Urtasun
Part 1
I
IntroductionI
Introduction
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY developments, some of which encourage an EU
Feminist Foreign Policy, whilst others demand
The purpose of this study is to mark the begin- such a foreign policy approach. Those develop-
ning of a discussion on a Feminist Foreign Po- ments that encourage a Feminist Foreign Policy
licy of the European Union (EU). It will outline are: an increasing number of states within and
the window of opportunity for the EU to adopt outside the EU adopting a Feminist Foreign
a Feminist Foreign Policy (Part I), provide an Policy; a growing number of states making
overview of the status quo of Feminist Foreign gender equality a priority within and for their
Policies in the world (Part II), and analyse the foreign policies; the new EU Commission’s pri-
dominant narratives around gender, gender orities on addressing the climate emergency,
equality and existing initiatives aimed at pro- strengthening our democracies, and promoting
moting gender equality within EU external ac- a union where everyone has the same access
tion. Finally, the study will propose a definition to opportunities; the EU Commission’s new
of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy, outline its Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as well as
purpose and underlying principles, and suggest Germany’s Presidency of the EU Council in the
concrete priorities and steps aimed at advan- second half of 2020. Moreover, 2020 is a year
cing a feminist approach to EU external action of historic anniversaries for the international
(Part III). The authors of the study are fully feminist movement, including the 20th anni-
cognizant of the limitations of the study: a 50- versary of the United Nations Security Council
page study cannot do justice to the fundamental Resolution 1325 as well as Beijing +25. Such
transformation of foreign policy structures, pri- developments are conducive for a European
orities, and means – which a feminist approach
necessitates. However, they hope that the study
can contribute to the process of systematically “There has never been a
changing how foreign policy operates, whom it more opportune time to
is made for, and whom it is informed by.
implement an EU Feminist
2. TIMING OF THE STUDY Foreign Policy.“
There has never been a more opportune time
to implement an EU Feminist Foreign Policy. Feminist Foreign Policy.
This is driven by several current and paralleled On the other hand, several global trends de-12
mand a Feminist Foreign Policy. These factors der equality in German foreign policy and in
include a growing European nativist populism, the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt,
a rise of authoritarian political leaders around 2020). Moreover, the ‘Women, Peace and Secu-
the world, increasing attacks on women’s and rity’ agenda is one of the priorities of Germany’s
LGBTQI+ rights, and ongoing calls by nume- current non-permanent membership in the UN
rous actors for a common foreign and security Security Council.
policy. By providing a vision for a more just and equal
With regards to the aforementioned encoura- world and by linking the individual and collec-
ging developments, European states that have tive emancipation to societal transformation,
adopted or plan to adopt a Feminist Foreign including the redistribution of power and re-
Policy include Sweden and France. Denmark, sources, a foreign policy based on the values of
Switzerland, and Norway have a strong gender intersectional feminism is the most promising
equality-focused foreign policy, and Spain, Lux- response to many of the worrying external de-
embourg, and Cyprus have very recently anno- velopments at the moment (Wichterich, 2016)1.
unced their intent to either develop a Feminist These include the international unprecedented
Foreign Policy or make gender equality a prio- backlash on women’s and human rights (Pro-
rity. Non-European countries that have adop- vost and White, 2017), the mainstreaming of
ted a Feminist Foreign Policy include Canada, nativist populism ideas in countries including
and most recently in January 2020, Mexico. Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
Furthermore, Ursula von der Leyen, a strong
advocate for gender equality is leading the EU
Commission. Her Union of Equality (Von der “There cannot and will
Leyen, 2019) describes a feminist vision for not be peace without
the EU and the early March 2020 publication
of the Commission’s Gender Equality Strategy
feminism.“
2020-2025 (EU Commission, 2020a). With a
more progressive approach than previous re- and Northern Ireland, Hungary, Denmark, Po-
ports (though substantial criticism remains (see land, and beyond (Raj, 2020).
II.2), the 2020 report can be seen as the domes- While finalising this study, another driver de-
tic starting point for the development of an EU manding a Feminist Foreign Policy has emer-
Feminist Foreign Policy. Additionally, some of ged: the Covid-19 pandemic. The current
the Commission’s priority areas can also be seen global health crisis has unveiled new and rein-
as a good starting point for a Feminist Foreign forced existing structural inequalities between
Policy. For example, the focus on the clima- genders and beyond, perhaps more than any
te emergency and the so-called “promotion of crisis before. Women are more vulnerable to
the European way of life”, and, more specifi- becoming sick, as they constitute the majority
cally, the core area of “fighting discrimination of the front-line health workers most exposed
and promoting gender equality, particularly by to the infectious disease, across most nations
safeguarding the rule of law and fundamental (Gupta, 2020). While intimate partner violence
rights” (EU Commission, 2020b). was a huge issue before the crisis, the increase
Another encouraging factor is the German Pre- in gender-based violence across nations is stag-
sidency of the European Council in the second gering (Wanqing, 2020). In many places across
half of 2020. The German Federal Foreign Mi- the world, conservative and right-wing poli-
nistry is increasingly prioritising gender equali- ticians are using the crisis to restrict women’s
ty. In March 2020, it launched the report Gen- reproductive rights by declaring these services
1
Intersectionality is a framework the ways multiple forms of inequalities
because of one’s gender, race, class, sexuality, ability, etc. overlap, exac-
erbate each other and create unique modes of discrimination (Crenshaw,
2018).13
as ‘non-essential’. Most importantly, the crisis sations across the world.2
has triggered a debate about how states prepare
and finance to ensure citizens are safe (Ache- 3.2 Definition of Foreign and Security Policy
son, 2020). From protective gear to intensive
care beds and ventilators – governments across The study focuses on the EU external action, le-
the globe are struggling to provide its citizens aving aside the EU’s policies on trade, develop-
with appropriate medical care when, in 2019, ment cooperation, humanitarian aid, and mig-
they increased military expenditure by the lar- ration. A Feminist Foreign Policy, however,
gest annual growth in a decade (SIPRI, 2020). requires a feminist approach to all parts of
The launch of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy foreign and domestic policy, as even the most
would be an important and timely message to
communicate, as civil society around the world
“As such, any trade and
is being suppressed at unprecedented levels,
with women’s rights and feminist organisations economic policies that
being hit the hardest. As the Atlas der Zivil- are not feminist and not
gesellschaft (Jakob et al., 2020) by Civicus and
striving to pro-actively
Brot für die Welt shows, only 3 percent of the
world’s population lives in countries where ci- eradicate inequalities are
vil society is not suppressed. likely to perpetuate injus-
Consequently, the time is ripe for an EU Femi-
tice and consequently fuel
nist Foreign Policy. A Feminist Foreign Policy
can achieve the goals stipulated in the EU Glo- conflict.“
bal Strategy, including the preservation of peace
and the strengthening of international security, feminist approach to foreign policy would be
because, as illustrated throughout this report, undermined by ‘business as usual’ in other po-
there cannot and will not be peace without fe- licy areas. In the case of the EU, this holds true
minism. for its policies on migration and trade, in parti-
cular. Given the timing of the study, we deem
3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY it important to highlight the inhumane situa-
3.1 Lacking Consultations tion at the Turkish-Greek border, where Greek
authorities – with support from Brussels – are
The authors have strived to include as many preventing displaced people from entering the
perspectives as possible in this study. However, territory of the EU, including using military
given the limited scope and timeframe, the force. The authors of the study would thus like
study has been produced with limited consul- to draw the reader’s attention to the Statement on
tations with feminist organisations within EU the Situation at the EU-Turkish Border by the Eu-
member states and, most importantly, without ropean Network for Migrant Women, in which
the consultation of feminist actors in EU part- the organisation “urge[s] the European Union to
ner countries: those who are impacted, positi- produce an urgent response, based on equal sha-
vely and negatively, by the EU external action. ring of burden and responsibilities among the EU
Thus, one of the most important recommenda- Member states, in line with the Refugee Conven-
tions of this study is to hold inclusive consulta- tion and international obligations. We call on the
tions in all of the EU partner countries and to European Union to sustain a human rights-based
host consultations on an EU Feminist Foreign migration policy and to safeguard both internatio-
Policy with representatives of feminist organi- nal protection and solidarity between the Member
2
Acknowledging the risk of consultation reinforcing structural discrim-
ination, the authors would like to draw the attention to the tool ‘Beyond
Consultations’ developed by GAPS UK and other organisations (2019),
which gives concrete guidance to meaningful engagement with women in
fragile and conflict-affected states.14
states” (European Network of Women, 2020). 3.3 The Gendered Discourse on Foreign Policy
Moreover, the authors deem it important to
highlight how crucial it is to reform the in- “If the application of a feminist foreign policy
ternational economy and the EU’s trade sys- doesn’t change practice, it isn’t feminist” (Rid-
tem, including the trade-militarism nexus. If ge et al., 2019, p.5).
the external action of the EU is to be aligned While writing this study, the authors felt the
with a feminist approach that promotes pea- consequences of the gendered discourse on
ce and human security, this is imperative. In peace and security every step of the way. Ai-
1919, the Women’s International League for ming to compile a useful study for policyma-
kers in Brussels and beyond, they have often
reflected: Is the recommendation too utopian?
“Implementing a Will it be taken seriously? Feminist organisa-
tions have endured such critiques for the last
Feminist Foreign Policy
century as they have advocated for an end of
requires radical shifts in the international arms trade and a revised de-
how foreign policy is being finition of security. However, implementing a
Feminist Foreign Policy requires radical shifts
conducted.“
in how foreign policy is being conducted, how
it is talked about, and who is making the deci-
Peace and Freedom identified economic injus- sions. Taking this seriously requires substantial
tice and competition for economic resources as policy shifts, which disrupt existing power in-
a root cause of conflict. As such, any trade and equalities, and will unsettle many actors across
economic policies that are not feminist and not the EU and beyond. Our criticism and recom-
striving to pro-actively eradicate inequalities mendations are aimed at encouraging this radi-
are likely to perpetuate injustice and consequ- cal shift in the EU external action. Nevertheless,
ently fuel conflict. Thus, we advocate for an we attempt to use existing narratives and poli-
EU Feminist Foreign Policy to include a com- cies by and within the EU as a starting point, to
prehensive and thorough analysis based on the recommend concrete steps that can lead to this
principles of a feminist political economy, that change, and encourage and support those inside
goes beyond the inclusion of gender chapters in and outside advocating for this radical shift.
free trade agreements but also “denounce[s] the
unjust effects of neoliberal economic policies
and co-operation on human rights, particularly
on women’s rights” (WILPF, 2019) and advoca- “Taking this seriously re-
tes for an international treaty that would create quires substantial policy
obligations for states to prevent human rights shifts, which disrupt ex-
abuses by corporations.
The authors strongly recommend accompany- isting power inequalities,
ing this study with a feminist analysis of all other and will unsettle many
foreign policy areas. Where possible within this actors across the EU and
study, we have pointed out the implications of
these other policies for the EU external action beyond.“
to highlight their interconnectedness.Part 2
II
The Status Quo
of Feminist
Foreign PolicyII
The Status Quo
of Feminist
Foreign Policy
1. FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WORLD These developments paved the way for the
1.1 The Prevalence of Feminist Foreign Policies Swedish government to announce its Femi-
nist Foreign Policy in 2014, which has inspired
When looking at the history and the status many other governments to rethink their app-
quo of Feminist Foreign Policy, and feminism roach to foreign policy. Most recently, in Janu-
in international affairs more broadly, many ary 2020, Mexico announced its Feminist Fo-
observers often begin with then Foreign Mi- reign Policy, while Canada has been pursuing a
nister Margot Wallström’s announcement of feminist development cooperation and France
Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014. has been developing a feminist diplomacy. This
However, the authors of the study – as many section gives an overview of the state of the art
other feminist organisations – consider it im- of Feminist Foreign Policy. It outlines Sweden,
perative to acknowledge the decades-long work Canada, and France and Mexico’s approaches to
feminists have done to enable Wallström’s an-
nouncement in the first place. As early as 1915
1500 women and feminists gathered in The
“As early as 1915 1.500
Hague and held the International Congress of women and feminists
Women, demanding an end to the First World gathered in The Hague
War and the dismantling of the military-in-
dustrial complex. Many of the 20 resolutions
and held the International
adopted at this 1915 conference are of acute Congress of Women,
relevance today for feminists in foreign policy demanding an end
(Adams et al., 2003). From this conference, the
Women’s International League for Peace and
to the First World War
Freedom emerged, one of the most influenti- and the dismantling of
al feminist international affairs organisations. the military-industrial
Over the years, feminist international relations
theory has gained ground owing to prolific aca-
complex.“
demics and theorists including Cynthia Enloe,
whose 1990 book Bananas, Beaches and Bases – Feminist Foreign Policy. It also introduces Fe-
Making Feminist Sense of International Politics minist Foreign Policy: A Framework, developed
(Enloe, 2014) revolutionised how scholars and by leading thinkers under the leadership of the
activists understand conflict and militarism. International Center for Research and Women,18
and briefly discusses the paper Understanding cracy and the rule of law, and disarmament and
Gender Equality in Foreign Policy by the Coun- non-proliferation. The concrete objectives, di-
cil on Foreign Relationship. By providing this rection, and measures for 2019-2022 are arti-
information, this study gives an overview of the culated in the Swedish Foreign Service Action
state of the art of Feminist Foreign Policy. Plan for Feminist Foreign Policy (Government
Office of Sweden, 2018). The international fra-
1.1.1 Sweden meworks that form the basis for Sweden’s fo-
reign policy include the Universal Declaration
When in 2014, the self-proclaimed feminist go- of Human Rights, the Convention on the Eli-
vernment of Sweden introduced their Feminist mination of All Forms of Discrimination aga-
Foreign Policy, it was initially met with skep- inst Women, the declarations and action plans
ticism (Rothschild, 2014). Sceptics questioned from the UN World Conference on Women
what a Feminist Foreign Policy entailed, and in Beijing (1995), and the International Confe-
whether such an ‘utopian’ approach to foreign rence on Population and Development in Cairo
policy was appropriate and timely, just months (1994), as well as the final documents from the
after Russia had illegally annexed Crimea with follow-up conferences, UN Security Council
using military force. Over time, the Swedish Resolution 1325 (2000), the Sustainable Deve-
government defined the concepts, and the scep- lopment Goals (2016), as well as the EU’s Gen-
tics quietened. In 2018, it published its Hand- der Equality and Women’s Empowerment in
book – Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy (Go- EU’s External Relations (2016 – 2020), which
vernment Office of Sweden, 2019, p.11) which Sweden is understood to have been a driving
outlines its Feminist Foreign Policy as “a wor- force.
king method and a perspective that takes three It is important to note that Sweden’s Femi-
Rs as its starting points and is based on a fourth nist Foreign Policy is part of a bigger feminist
R.” Sweden’s three ‘Rs’ include the promotion structure, as Sweden’s whole government is
of all women’s and girls’ full enjoyment of hu- self-defined as ‘feminist’. Stockholm has a dedi-
man rights, of women’s participation and influ-
ence in decision-making processes at all levels
(representation) and the allocation of resources “The Swedish government
to promote gender equality. The Swedish go- attaches great
vernment attaches great importance to the fact importance to the fact
that its Feminist Foreign Policy is not only ba-
sed on an idealistic normative idea but also has that its Feminist Foreign
a solid empirical basis, hence adding the fourth Policy is not only based
‘R’ for reality. Alongside these initial pillars, the on an idealistic normative
Swedish government emphasises intersectio-
nality, taking into account that it is insufficient idea but also has a solid
to, for example, consider sexist discrimination empirical basis, hence
without simultaneously acknowledging racism, adding the fourth ‘R’ for
classism, or overlapping forms of oppression.
Swedish foreign policy is divided into three reality.“
main areas: foreign and security policy, deve-
lopment cooperation, and trade and promotion cated Minister for Gender Equality who has the
policy. Foreign and security policy is divided overall responsibility for their gender equality
into peace and security, human rights, demo- policies, and each ministry has a person in char-19
ge of the respective ministry’s gender equality first dedicated Strategy for development coope-
work. “Sweden actually has 23 gender equali- ration for global gender equality and women’s
ty ministers, not just one. All ministers in the and girls’ rights 2018-2022 encompasses app-
Government pursue a feminist policy in their rox. 105 million USD (1.000 million SEK). The
respective policy areas,” says Åsa Lindhagen, strategy reinforces its Feminist Foreign Policy
Minister for Gender Equality (Quoted in Nils- and enables support for strategic partners that
son, 2019, p. 3). drive the development for a more gender-equal
To realise their feminist vision, the Swedish society on a global and regional level. However,
government is implementing the following with development cooperation being only one
working methods within the Swedish Foreign area of Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy, it
Service: leadership, ownership, guidance, and remains unclear how much money is invested
support. ‘Leadership’ includes continuous refe- overall to achieve the feminist policy goals
rences to the policy in speeches, articles, and so- within Sweden’s foreign policy.
cial media; a prioritisation of these issues during According to Bernes, there are multiple moni-
visits as well as concrete policy decisions and in- toring and evaluation schemes in place.3 This
itiatives. The Swedish government has further includes the Action Plan for Feminist Foreign
appointed a Coordinator of Feminist Foreign Policy 2019-2022, which is integrated into the
Policy, Ann Bernes. Bernes and her team are
responsible for lending ‘support’ to the whole
system. “All employees of the Swedish Foreign “When it comes to
Service can contact the coordination team, but resources, 90 percent
they can also contact the focal point(s) for the
of Sweden’s Official
Feminist Foreign Policy appointed at every de-
partment and mission abroad” (Government Development Assistance
Office of Sweden, 2019, p. 39). (ODA) is earmarked
When it comes to resources, 90 percent of
for gender equality,
Sweden’s Official Development Assistance
(ODA) is earmarked for gender equality, “either “either as a principal or
as a principal or significant objective, although significant objective,
the precise dollar amount invested is unclear”
although the precise
(Thompson and Clement, 2019, p.2). Sweden’s
dollar amount
“To realise their invested is unclear.“
feminist vision, the
Swedish government is Foreign Service’s regular action plan and sys-
tematically updated annually. The Action Plan
implementing the also provides guidance and working methods
following working for the implementation of the Feminist Fo-
methods within the reign Policy and complements and reinforces
other relevant tools such as Sweden’s National
Swedish Foreign Action Plan for the implementation of the UN
Service: leadership, Security Council’s Resolutions on Women,
ownership, guidance, Peace and Security 2016–2020. Furthermore,
in 2019, the Swedish government presented the
and support.“
3
Private conversation on 12 March 2020.20
first Government Communication on Feminist central element of our policy. In fact, during
Foreign Policy to the Swedish Parliament. The this mandate, I will strengthen the foundations
communication accounts for Feminist Foreign of this policy by working with civil society to
Policy, its tools and arenas, and for the different launch a white paper on Canada’s feminist fo-
ways in which the policy has contributed to the reign policy” (Government of Canada, 2020a).
thematic and geographical areas of Sweden’s Thompson and Clement (2019) outline that the
foreign policy. Moreover, the development launch of FIAP in 2017 was accompanied by
cooperation channelled through Sweden’s In- concrete financial commitments: Canada com-
ternational Development Cooperation Agency mitted to a 95 percent benchmark of its foreign
(Sida), is also evaluated both internally and by assistance to gender equality as a target, with 15
external evaluators. percent as principal target (according to OECD
standards). “This is a significant hike from just
1.1.2 Canada 2.4 percent from 2015-2016 and 6.5 percent
from 2016-2017 on gender as a principal mar-
In June 2017, Canada announced its feminist ker and 68 percent and 75 percent on gender
development policy when Canada’s aid pro- significant for the same years” (Thompson
gramme was renamed into Feminist Interna- and Clement, 2019, p.3). Furthermore, in June
tional Assistance Policy (FIAP) (Open Canada, 2019, Canada’s government pledged another
2017). The impetus for this shift was to “reduce 330 million Canadian dollars to women’s rights
extreme poverty and build a more peaceful, in- organisations (Little, 2019). Thirty millions of
clusive and prosperous world” (Ibid). In addi- this pledge are dedicated to domestic feminist
tion to FIAP, Canada has introduced a series of organisations, while the remaining amount was
other gender equality initiatives as part of their given to the newly established Equality Fund to
foreign and security policy, including its new fund ‘Feminist Futures’, predominantly in de-
National Action Plan For the Implementation veloping countries. The Equality Fund is the
of the UN Security Council Resolution on Wo- single largest investment in women’s rights or-
men, Peace and Security 2017-2022, a feminist ganisations by a government (Bigio and Vogel-
approach to trade, and the Elsie Initiative for stein, 2020). Canada is prioritising this, as “[a]
Women in Peace Operations (Ibid). Canada’s ccording to the OECD, globally only 0.5% of
FIAP covers six action areas (Government of international assistance earmarked for gender
Canada, 2020b): gender equality and the em- equality goes to women’s rights organizations”
powerment of women and girls, human dignity (Government of Canada, 2019).
(health and nutrition, sexual and reproducti- Putting Canada’s financial commitments into
ve health and rights, education, humanitarian perspective: the advocacy group lobbying the
action), growth that works for everyone, en- G7 on women’s rights – known as the Wo-
vironment and climate action, inclusive gover- men 7 – “called for the G7 to embrace Feminist
nance, and peace and security. Foreign Policies that included feminist offici-
Whilst Canada has applied a gender lens to a al development assistance, which they define
diverse set of foreign policy there has not yet as committing to a floor of 20 percent of fun-
been a comprehensive Feminist Foreign Poli- ding for programs that seek to promote gender
cy. However, in a speech on 21 February 2020, equality as a principal goal, and 85 percent for
Canadian Foreign Minister François-Philippe programs that seek to advance gender equality
Champagne announced extending their femi- as at least a significant goal, as defined by the
nist approach beyond their FIAP, saying “[o] OECD’s Development Assistance Committee”
ur agenda on women, peace and security is a (Thompson, 2019). While this recommenda-21
tion is lower than the aforementioned commit- cuses only on allocating resources to the French
ment by Canada (95 percent), it is in line with Development Agency (AFD): 120 million Euros
the EU’s recommendation for its member sta- by 2022 the budget for initiatives primarily ai-
tes, and significantly more than what most G7 med at reducing gender inequality is expected
members are currently spending (Ibid). to reach a total of 700 million Euros annually.
Canada has also focused on evaluation and It also cited an intention to combat sexualised
analysis, using Gender-based Analysis Plus and sexist violence, promoting the education of
(GBA+). This is a tool for policy analysis, which girls and women as well as boys and men, and
Canada also integrates into all of its foreign po- lastly, fostering women’s economic empower-
licy and defence analysis. According to Bigio ment with a focus on Africa.
and Vogelstein (2020, p.7), “GBA+ has a long As stipulated in France’s International Strategy
history in Canada, beginning with a governme- On Gender Equality (2018 – 2022) (French Mi-
nt commitment to GBA+ as part of Canada’s nistry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2018),
response to the 1995 Beijing Platform for Ac- the French government acknowledges that
tion.” They add: “in the 2000s, GBA+ was ma- gender cannot be limited to development coo-
instreamed across central agencies, and in 2016 peration but needs to be mainstreamed throug-
the government strengthened accountability hout all areas of foreign policy to be effective
metrics, including by requiring GBA+ memos (Ibid). France’s International Strategy on Gen-
in submissions to the Cabinet and Treasury and der Equality is the groundwork behind its an-
mandating that all federal staff receive training” nouncement of a feminist diplomacy in 2019. It
(Ibid). has five main objectives: promotion of a strong-
In 2018, Canada held the G7 Presidency, put er institutional culture of gender equality; step-
gender equality – for the first time – on the ag- ping up France’s political advocacy efforts on
enda for the G7 annual meeting, and established gender equality; increasing and improving inte-
a G7 Gender Equality Advisory Council. The gration of gender equality in ODA; improving
following year, France continued this approach and strengthening the visibility, transparency
during their G7 Presidency. and accountability of action taken by the Mi-
1.1.3 France
“Amongst others, the
Calling “gender equality the great cause of Presi- French High Council
dent Macron’s term”, French Foreign Minister for Gender Equality,
Jean-Yves Le Drian and Secretary of Equality
comprising of academics,
Marlenè Schiappa announced a feminist app-
roach to their diplomacy (France Diplomatie, activists, and researchers,
2019) in an op-ed on International Women’s is in charge of regularly
Day in 2019. The responsibility for France’s
evaluating France’s
feminist diplomacy sits with both the Ministry
for European and Foreign Affairs and the Mi- Strategy for Gender
nistry for Gender Equality. This was the first Equality. In each French
time that France’s foreign policy was dubbed
Ministry, there is one civil
‘feminist’ despite gender equality strategies ha-
ving been in place for several years. However, servant at the director’s
despite deliberately using the term ‘Feminist level responsible for
Foreign Policy’ in the op-ed, the text itself fo-
gender equality.“22
nistry and its agencies for gender equality; and discrimination and climate justice,4 is the Go-
strengthening ties with civil society actors, the vernment’s commitment and leadership during
private sector and research stakeholders to the 2019 United Nations Climate Change Con-
fight gender inequality. In 2007, France defi- ference (COP25) in Spain, where it “promoted
ned its first Gender and Development Strategy, gender equality as a non-negotiable component
and a second iteration was adopted in July 2013 of any agreement on climate change” (Thomp-
(2013-2017). France’s International Strategy son, 2020b).
for Gender Equality pledges to increase deve- According to Cristopher Ballinas, Director Ge-
lopment aid focused on gender equality from 30 neral for Human Rights and Democracy in the
to 50 percent by 2022. Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE),
The French strategy is linked to an accountabi- Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy is not only a
lity framework to monitor progress. Amongst question of gender but of human rights in gene-
others, the French High Council for Gender ral. “For us, it is not only a Feminist Foreign Po-
Equality, comprising of academics, activists, licy, but a Feminist Foreign Policy plus, because
and researchers, is in charge of regularly evalu- we are also including LGBTQI individuals and
ating France’s Strategy for Gender Equality. In
each French Ministry, there is one civil servant
at the director’s level responsible for gender “In January 2020,
equality. Mexico announced its
The announcement of a French feminist dip-
Feminist Foreign
lomacy was mainly a rebranding of the already
existing strategy on gender equality. As noted Policy, becoming the
by Thompson and Clement (2019, p.3), “[t]he first country in the
implications of the op-ed’s recasting of the 2018
Global South to do so.“
policy as a feminist foreign policy seemingly
without having altered either policy or practice
are unclear and merit further discussion”. the disabled”, say Ballinas, adding that “we want
to have a state-of-the-art Feminist Foreign Po-
1.1.4 Mexico licy”.5 According to Ballinas, Mexico’s decision
to announce a Feminist Foreign Policy is also
In January 2020, Mexico announced its Femi- partially a response to strong feminist mobili-
nist Foreign Policy, becoming the first country zation in Mexico and Latin America which aims
in the Global South to do so (Gobierno de Méx- at building a more just and prosperous society
ico, 2020). Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy has (Gobierno de México, 2020).
five main elements: promoting a foreign policy Mexico has outlined precise timelines to
with a gender perspective and feminist agenda; achieve an ambitious number of immediate
achieving gender parity within the Mexican fo- actions across these five areas of engagement.
reign office (currently only one of the eleven “Training, workshops, working groups, and
top positions is filled by a woman (Bigio and manuals are to be developed and deployed
Vogelstein, 2020); combatting gender-based vi- within the first year. By 2024, the government
olence, including within the ministry; making is aiming for full employment parity, equal pay,
equality visible; and practicing intersectional and the application of a gender lens to every
feminism (Gobierno de México, 2020). An ex- foreign-policy position, resolution, and man-
ample of Mexico’s comprehensive approach, date” (Thompson, 2020b). Thompson (2020b)
which also focuses on the link between gender describes Mexican Feminist Foreign Policy as
4
Climate justice recognises that those who are least responsible for climate 5
Private conversation, 11 March 2020.
change suffer the gravest consequences, and that fair and just solutions
must recognise issues of equality, human rights, collective rights and
historical responsibility for climate change’ (Boom, Richards and Leonard
2016, p.7).23
also indicated to announce a Feminist Foreign
“Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy in 2020 and very recently, the Foreign
Policy is not only a Minister of Cyprus has declared to focus on
question of gender but of gender equality within their foreign policy.
Until today, Sweden and Mexico’s Feminist Fo-
human rights in general. reign Policy are the most comprehensive app-
“For us, it is not only a roaches, which also extend to their domestic
Feminist Foreign Policy, policy spheres. Despite being a trailblazer and
a visionary, there has been no shortage of cri-
but a Feminist Foreign ticism towards Sweden’s definition and imple-
Policy plus, because we mentation of its Feminist Foreign Policy by fe-
are also including LGBTQI minist activists. Most criticism centres around
the binary conceptualisation of gender behind
individuals and the Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy and the lack
disabled.“ of accounting for the rights and needs of LG-
BTQI+ individuals (Thompson and Clement,
“a foundation for what is emerging as a global 2019); the continuous export of arms, including
gold standard”. The Mexican Government is to authoritarian regimes, (Irsten, 2019); its mig-
currently developing concrete targets as well as ration and asylum policies, and the treatment of
an evaluation scheme, and together with Fran- indigenous people: “[B]oth Canada and Sweden
ce, was supposed to be hosting the Generation can be criticized for not sufficiently matching
Equality Forums to be held in Mexico City (in their care for distant other women living in
May) and Paris (in July) this to mark the 25th
anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action.6
“Most criticism centres
1.1.5 Criticism towards existing Feminist
around the binary
Foreign Policies
conceptualisation of
By introducing its Feminist Foreign Policy, gender behind Sweden’s
Sweden set in motion a growing movement. In Feminist Foreign Policy
addition to Canada, France, and Mexico, Spain
(‘We will also adopt a feminist foreign policy’ and the lack of
(Gobierno de Espana, 2020)) and Luxembourg accounting for the rights
(‘The coalition agreement stipulates that Lux- and needs of LGBTQI+
embourg will implement a feminist foreign
policy’ (Le Gouvernement Du Grand-Duché de individuals; the
Luxembourg, 2019)) have committed to deve- continuous export
loping a Feminist Foreign Policy. Malaysia has of arms, including to
authoritarian regimes, its
“By introducing its migration
Feminist Foreign Policy, and asylum policies,
Sweden set in motion a and the treatment of
growing movement.“ indigenous people.“
6
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Forums have post been postponed
to 2021.24
conflict or poverty-struck zones with an em- over the use of the word ‘feminist’. The authors
pathetic commitment to their own indigenous of the framework acknowledge the importance
or marginalized refugee population” (Aggestam of articulating the term, because “this can be an
et al., 2019, p.32). Most of these critiques also important signal that a government is ready to
apply to other governments that pursue a Femi- pursue a more transformative approach to the
nist Foreign Policy. advancement of gender equality and inclusion,
Moreover, as feminist organisations like in a manner that is intersectional and that focu-
the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy and ses at its core on transforming power relations,
Reaching Critical Will argue, it is impossible to not just lifting up some women”. However, they
have a genuine Feminist Foreign Policy without also note that “invoking the word ‘feminist’ can
strong political commitment towards a nuclear make people feel uncomfortable” (Thompson et
weapon-free world and towards demilitariza- al, 2020a, p.3).8
tion. However, with the exception of Mexico, The main contribution of the Framework is the
no state pursuing a Feminist Foreign Policy has identification of a Feminist Foreign Policy’s key
signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear ingredients:
Weapons, and France is one of the nine nuclear (1) Purpose (a government’s specific pur-
weapons possessing states. pose of adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy
which must be linked to domestic policies);
1.2 Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework (2) Definition (what does Feminist Fo-
reign Policy mean to government(s) or the in-
At a press conference on 11 March 2020 in ternational organisation (s), based on an inter-
New York City, a group of leading thinkers sectional approach);
and practitioners led by the International Cen- (3) Reach (what is the scope of the policy
tre for Research on Women (ICRW)’s Lyric regarding the policy areas and the responsible
Thompson presented Feminist Foreign Poli- government units);
cy: A Framework (Thompson, 2020a).7 Under (4) Intended outcomes and benchmarks
the leadership of ICRW, this framework was (concrete outcomes that are to be achieved in-
developed over more than a year of research cluding the specification of a timeline);
and global consultations with over 100 orga- (5) A plan to operationalise the Feminist
nizations in more than 40 countries around Foreign Policy (how and when is the policy to
the world. It was further refined at a meeting be implemented) which includes resources, re-
in November 2019, which included repre- presentation and inclusion, a reporting schedu-
sentatives from the governments of Mexico, le, and capacity building.
Sweden, Canada, and France, as well as several This framework informs the structure of this
of foundations, development organisations, and study’s recommendation section for an EU Fe-
advocacy groups, including the Centre for Fe- minist Foreign Policy as well, making it the first
minist Foreign Policy. This framework will be of its kind to do so.
formalised and refined during the Beijing+25
Generation Equality Forums and its process, by 1.3 State of the Art Research: Understanding
a task force of feminist thinkers, advocates, and Gender Equality in Foreign Policy
experts inside and outside of government. The
framework includes key policy and implemen- In March 2020, researchers representing the
tation recommendations for governments, as Council on Foreign Relations presented the
well as supranational organisations. most comprehensive overview to date of how
The framework itself starts with deliberations gender equality is integrated into foreign po-
7
The ground-breaking work of Lyric Thompson (ICRW) is cited heavily However, it is important to note, that the many citations referencing
in this report and the authors are indebted to the contributions her Thompson’s work also draw attention to the lack of academic and policy
work has made to the debate on Feminist Foreign Policy, the ‘Women, research around Feminist Foreign Policy, highlighting both the timeliness
Peace, and Security’ agenda, women’s economic empowerment, violence and importance of this report.
against women, and gender-equitable policies in the international sphere.25
licies globally (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2020). ters.
The research analyses the different approaches Concerning (2) policy, the authors of the report
that governments around the world apply to distinguish between gender equality strategies
contribute to the eradication of gender inequa- and National Action Plans for the Implemen-
lity within and through their respective foreign
policy. This sub-section serves as a summary of
Bigio’s and Vogelstein’s (2020) research, which “2019 saw an all-time
lends invaluable insights into the possibilities of high of women ministers
making foreign and security policy more femi-
globally at 20.7 percent.
nist.
According to this research, governments have Thirty-four countries have
promulgated foreign policy changes concerning women foreign ministers,
gender equality in three areas: (1) leadership;
84 have women trade
(2) policy; and (3) resource allocation.
When it comes to (1) leadership, governme- ministers“
nts have established high-level positions like
ambassadors and envoys for gender equality. tation for the UN Security Council Resolution
For example, in 2009, under President Barack 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. A total
of 20 out of 37 OECD countries have adopted
gender equality strategies within their develop-
“According to this ment agencies, and as of January 2020, 83 go-
research, governments vernments have adopted NAPs, beginning with
the first in Denmark in 2005.
have promulgated foreign Finally, concerning (3) resources, states have
policy changes used four different tools to ensure that the goal
concerning gender of gender equality is being properly funded:
aid targets; gender budgeting; gender equality
equality in three areas: funds; pooled funds, and collective initiatives.
(1) leadership; Regarding aid targets, “the Development As-
(2) policy; and sistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(3) resource allocation. “ (OECD) developed a set of minimum criteria
for programs that have either a principal or a
Obama, the US became the world’s first country significant focus on gender equality, which are
to create an Ambassador-at-Large position for frequently used as benchmarks for targeting
Global Women’s Issues. Since then, 10 more gender equality investments” (Bigio and Vo-
countries have followed suit. Last year Cana- gelstein, 2020, p.6; see below for an overview
da appointed its first Ambassador for Women, of DAC gender principal and general targets).
Peace and Security. Amongst others, these However, overall investments in aid to advance
high-level positions have increased women’s gender equality remain low. “According to the
representation in other senior posts: 2019 saw OECD Development Assistance Committee,
an all-time high of women ministers globally at only 4 percent of bilateral aid by OECD nations
20.7 percent. Thirty-four countries have wo- in 2015-16 was dedicated to gender equality
men foreign ministers, 84 have women trade programming … [o]ne independent review of
ministers, and 20 have women defence minis- seventy-two projects accounting for $6 billion
8
The authors of the study, representing the Centre for Feminist Foreign of years have worked tirelessly and risked their lives to fight for the rights
Policy (CFFP), acknowledge the importance of this debate. However, and liberties that many women today enjoy.
CFFP proudly and deliberately carries ‘feminist’ in its name. One of the
reasons for this is to honour to those fearless activists who for hundredsYou can also read
