Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East - Ray Jureidini - Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper Number 2 December 2003
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Migrant Workers and
Xenophobia in the Middle East
Ray Jureidini
Identities, Conflict and Cohesion United Nations
Programme Paper Number 2 Research Institute
December 2003 for Social DevelopmentThis United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Programme Paper was written for the 2001
UNRISD International Conference on Racism and Public Policy. This conference was carried out with the support of the
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). UNRISD also thanks the governments of Den-
mark, Finland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom for their core funding.
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ISSN 1020-8194Contents Acronyms ii Summary/Résumé/Resumen iii Summary iii Résumé iv Resumen vi Introduction 1 Historical Context 2 Xenophobic Practices 3 Conditions and vulnerability of temporary contract labour 3 Preference for nationals and racialization of labour markets 4 Foreign Female Domestic Employees 6 Violence or the threat of violence 6 Denial of freedom of movement 7 Exploitative working conditions 8 Notes on the Gulf 8 International Conventions 9 International Labour Organization conventions 9 Conventions within the Arab region 10 United Nations conventions 10 Redress Mechanisms and Public Policy 11 Conclusion 12 Bibliography 14 UNRISD Programme Papers on Identities, Conflict and Cohesion 17
Acronyms ESCWA Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia GCC Gulf Cooperation Council ILO International Labour Organization KAKAMMPI Association of Filipino Migrant Workers and Families OFW Overseas Filipino Workers UAE United Arab Emirates ii
Summary/Résumé/Resumen
Summary
This paper analyses trends in migration to oil-rich and other labour-receiving countries in the
Middle East. Patterns of migrant employment in the host countries will serve as indicators of
the extent to which a “racialization” of particular occupational and industry sectors has devel-
oped. The paper will examine causes, patterns and cases of discriminatory or xenophobic prac-
tices by employers, civil society and the state. Formal redress mechanisms and non-state assis-
tance will be examined to determine the extent to which local problems that migrants face can
be, and are, addressed. Finally, policy suggestions are offered for improving relations between
migrants and host communities, employers, recruitment agencies and governments.
The major influx of foreign workers into the Middle East began following the oil price boom in
1973, which resulted in an enormous surge of wealth for the Arab Gulf states (United Arab
Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, comprising the Gulf Cooperation
Council, or GCC). The Gulf countries were faced with grand development plans and the funds
to pay for them, but with a totally inadequate workforce: the GCC countries had a combined
workforce of only 1.36 million. Initially, both skilled and unskilled workers from other Arab
countries (principally Egyptians, Yemenis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese and Sudanese)
and from Asia (mainly Pakistanis and Indians) almost doubled the populations of Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait within the decade between 1975 and 1985. By the early 1980s, an increasing number
of migrants were recruited from Southeast Asia. Until the end of the 1980s, these comprised
over half of the Asian migration to the Middle East.
In 1985, oil prices fell rapidly, prompting a cutback in infrastructure development in the Gulf
states, and migration from Asia dropped by almost one-third. This fall was less severe because
of the growth in employment in the service sector, which absorbed large numbers of workers,
especially women from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. At the same time,
the numbers of expatriate migrants from other Arab states were being reduced, as often for
political reasons as for economic.
Unlike the Arab sending countries, Asian governments pursued active policies for overseas
employment, partly to alleviate unemployment and partly to generate foreign income. Their
labour force became a major export item that generated considerable earnings. For example, in
1999 total remittances to Sri Lanka from workers abroad totalled $1 billion, which constituted
around 20 per cent of foreign goods imports for the previous year and more than the trade
deficit of $0.7 billion.
As increasing numbers of “cheap” foreign workers from Asian and African countries have
fulfilled the demand for unskilled workers, so the particular kinds of jobs found in the
secondary labour markets have become racialized. That is, the dirty, dangerous and difficult
jobs become associated with foreign (Asian and African) workers to such a degree that nationals
in these countries refuse to undertake them, despite high levels of poverty and unemployment.
This paper addresses, in particular, the peculiarities of temporary foreign contract labour in
Middle Eastern receiving countries. It argues that temporary foreign workers are not formally
“free” in receiving countries, because they cannot access the local labour markets in the
receiving country without express permission from the state. In other words, temporary
employees are normally legally attached to a sponsor/employer until the completion of an
employment contract, at which time the employee is required to either receive a renewal of a
work permit or leave the country. Temporary workers who do leave their employers/sponsors
(or attempt to run away) are rendered illegal and are subject to arrest and deportation. Periodic
“crackdowns” are undertaken to find and deport these illegal foreign residents. In most
countries, many people in this category continue to live and work, although precise numbers
are unknown.
iiiTypically, temporary foreign contract employees are the preferred migrants to Middle Eastern countries, as there are no expectations of permanent settlement or citizenship rights. Most countries do not cover such employees under local labour laws, and no UN or ILO conventions that offer national or international protection are in force or ratified, particularly for unskilled labourers. However, despite the temporary nature of such labour contracts, there remains a permanent pool of migrant workers in the receiving countries. Depending upon the numbers, ethnic community development often results. Particular focus is given to the racist dimensions of the treatment of Asian domestic workers in the Middle East. Asian female live-in domestic workers in Lebanon live under conditions that have been likened to slavery. The structural arrangements, including the threat of violence, restriction of movement and exploitative employment conditions, have led to significantly widespread abuse of these women, who constitute a particularly vulnerable group. The study of domestic employees is significant because they comprise the bulk of foreign workers from Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Similar conditions and treatment may be found in other Middle Eastern countries. In the case of Lebanon, the presence of Syrian workers—who are largely undocumented, but continue to work freely because of the Syrian political and military presence in the country— has an added political dimension. Further, Palestinian refugees, who, since 1948 have been treated formally as foreigners, have been prevented from working in various occupations and professions because (i) granting citizenship rights and naturalization is seen as contrary to the legitimate demands of rights of return to Palestine, and (ii) the assimilation of Palestinians would mean a large influx of Sunni Muslims, which would undermine the so-called sensitive demographic “balance” of the population. The xenophobic dimension has three aspects. First, it is evident in the preference of temporary contract labour that excludes possibilities of citizenship. Second, preferential treatment is usually given to nationals, although particular kinds of menial work have now been “allocated” to foreigners. Third, the attitude of disdain toward those who are visibly different (particularly Asians) is observed in public places such as supermarkets, airports and government offices. While a number of suggestions are made with regard to formal redress mechanisms to alleviate or eliminate forms of racism and slavery in Middle Eastern countries, it will also be noted that such reforms may affect the labour market in terms of the demand for foreign workers. If this is the case, governments of both receiving and sending countries may not be sufficiently suppor- tive of serious reform. Ray Jureidini is associate professor of sociology at the American University of Beirut. Résumé L’auteur analyse ici l’évolution des migrations à destination des pays pétroliers et autres pays d’accueil du Moyen-Orient. Les emplois typiquement réservés aux migrants dans les pays d’accueil indiquent dans quelle mesure des secteurs professionnels ou des secteurs d’activité particuliers souffrent de “racialisation”. Il étudie les causes des pratiques discriminatoires ou xénophobes des employeurs, de la société civile et de l’Etat, en dégage les caractéristiques communes avant de se pencher sur des cas particuliers. Il passe en revue les mécanismes officiels de recours et les aides apportées par des acteurs autres que l’Etat pour déterminer dans quelle mesure les problèmes locaux que rencontrent les migrants peuvent être résolus et le sont effectivement. Enfin, il propose des mesures politiques susceptibles d’améliorer les relations entre les migrants et la population locale, les employeurs, les agences de recrutement et les gouvernements des pays d’accueil. Les travailleurs migrants ont commencé à arriver en masse au Moyen-Orient à la suite du boom pétrolier de 1973, qui a entraîné un énorme enrichissement pour les Etats du golfe d’Arabie (les iv
Emirats arabes unis, l’Oman, l’Arabie saoudite, le Qatar, le Koweït et le Bahreïn, membres du
Conseil de coopération du golfe ou CCG). Les Etats du golfe avaient alors des plans de déve-
loppement gigantesques, de quoi les financer mais une main-d’œuvre totalement insuffisante:
les pays du CCG ne comptaient en tout que 1,36 millions d’actifs. Initialement, les travailleurs,
manœuvres ou employés qualifiés, venaient d’autres pays arabes (c’étaient principalement des
Egyptiens, des Yéménites, des Palestiniens, des Jordaniens, des Libanais et des Soudanais) et
d’Asie (surtout du Pakistan et d’Inde). Entre 1975 et 1985, ils ont entraîné un quasi-doublement
de la population de l’Arabie saoudite et du Koweït. Au début des années 80, le nombre des mi-
grants recrutés en Asie du Sud-Est s’est mis à augmenter. Jusqu’à la fin des années 80, plus de la
moitié des migrants d’Asie au Moyen-Orient provenaient de l’Asie du Sud-Est.
En 1985, les prix du pétrole ont connu une baisse rapide, les programmes d’équipement ont été
fortement réduits dans les Etats du golfe et l’immigration d’Asie a diminué de près d’un tiers.
Ce repli a été atténué par la croissance de l’emploi dans le secteur tertiaire, qui a absorbé un
grand nombre de travailleurs, en particulier des femmes venues de Sri Lanka, du Bangladesh,
d’Indonésie et des Philippines. En même temps, le nombre des migrants d’autres Etats arabes a
été réduit, pour des raisons autant politiques qu’économiques.
A la différence des pays d’émigration arabes, les gouvernements asiatiques ont activement
encouragé l’emploi à l’étranger, dans lequel ils voyaient à la fois un moyen de faire baisser le
chômage et une source de revenus. Leur main-d’œuvre est devenue un important article
d’exportation, générateur de recettes considérables. Par exemple, les fonds envoyés dans leur
pays par les Sri-Lankais travaillant à l’étranger se sont élevés en 1999 à 1 milliard de dollars, ce
qui représentait environ 20 pour cent des importations de biens étrangers de l’année précédente
et dépassait le déficit commercial, qui était de 0,7 milliard de dollars.
Comme le nombre croissant de travailleurs étrangers “bon marché”, venus de pays d’Asie et
d’Afrique, satisfaisaient à la demande de manœuvres dans les Etats du golfe, les emplois que
l’on trouvait sur les marchés secondaires du travail ont pris une couleur raciale. Autrement dit,
les emplois sales, dangereux et difficiles furent assimilés aux travailleurs étrangers (d’Asie et
d’Afrique), à tel point que les nationaux de ces pays les refusent, malgré des niveaux élevés de
pauvreté et de chômage.
L’étude traite en particulier des spécificités du contrat de travail temporaire délivré aux tra-
vailleurs étrangers dans les pays d’immigration du Moyen-Orient. L’auteur explique que les
travailleurs étrangers temporaires ne sont pas “libres” officiellement, parce qu’ils ne peuvent
pas accéder aux marchés locaux du travail dans leur pays d’accueil sans l’autorisation expresse
de l’Etat. En d’autres termes, les employés temporaires sont d’ordinaire attachés légalement à
un répondant/employeur jusqu’à l’expiration de leur contrat de travail, date à laquelle ils doi-
vent soit obtenir le renouvellement de leur permis de travail soit quitter le pays. Ceux qui quit-
tent leur employeur (ou s’évadent) tombent dans la clandestinité et risquent d’être arrêtés et
expulsés. Des opérations “coups de poings” sont organisées régulièrement pour retrouver et
expulser ces étrangers clandestins. Dans la plupart des pays, beaucoup continuent à vivre et à
travailler dans la clandestinité mais on n’en connaît pas le nombre exact.
Dans les pays du Moyen-Orient, la préférence va typiquement aux travailleurs migrants au bé-
néfice d’un contrat temporaire pour étrangers car ceux-ci ne peuvent pas espérer s’installer dé-
finitivement dans le pays ni en obtenir la nationalité. Dans la plupart des pays, ces travailleurs
ne sont pas visés par le droit interne du travail et aucune des conventions des Nations Unies ou
de l’Organisation internationale du Travail qui apportent une protection nationale ou interna-
tionale n’y est en vigueur ou n’a été ratifiée, surtout pour les travailleurs sans qualification. Ce-
pendant, malgré la nature temporaire de ces contrats de travail, les pays d’accueil gardent en
permanence un réservoir de travailleurs migrants. Selon leur nombre, on voit souvent se former
des communautés ethniques.
vL’auteur s’attarde particulièrement sur les dimensions racistes du traitement des employés de maison d’origine asiatique au Moyen-Orient. Au Liban, les employées de maison asiatiques lo- gées chez leurs employeurs vivent dans des conditions que l’on a assimilées à de l’esclavage. Les arrangements structurels, notamment l’usage de la violence, l’absence de liberté de mou- vement et l’exploitation inhérente aux conditions d’emploi, ont abouti à des abus généralisés dans le cas de ces femmes, qui constituent un groupe particulièrement vulnérable. L’étude des employés de maison est intéressante car dans cette catégorie entrent la plupart des travailleurs étrangers de Sri Lanka et des Philippines. De telles conditions et traitement peuvent se trouver dans d’autres pays du Moyen-Orient. Toujours dans le cas du Liban, la présence de travailleurs syriens, qui, bien que sans papiers pour la plupart, continuent de travailler librement à cause de la présence politique et militaire de la Syrie dans le pays, revêt en outre une dimension politique. Quant aux réfugiés palesti- niens qui, depuis 1948, sont traités officiellement comme des étrangers, ils se sont vu interdire de facto l’accès de divers métiers et professions parce que 1) la naturalisation et l’octroi de droits civils sont considérés comme contraires à la légitime revendication d’un droit de retour en Palestine et que 2) l’assimilation des Palestiniens entraînerait une arrivée massive de musul- mans sunnites, ce qui perturberait le délicat “équilibre” démographique de la population. La dimension xénophobe se présente sous trois aspects. Premièrement, elle est évidente dans la préférence donnée au contrat de travail temporaire qui exclut toute possibilité d’acquérir la nationalité du pays. Deuxièmement, les nationaux jouissent généralement d’un traitement préférentiel, bien que certains types de travaux subalternes soient “attribués” aux étrangers. Troisièmement, l’attitude de mépris adoptée envers ceux qui sont visiblement différents (les Asiatiques en particulier) est visible dans des lieux publics tels que les supermarchés, les aéroports et les administrations. Si l’auteur fait diverses suggestions sur les mécanismes officiels de recours susceptibles d’atténuer ou d’éliminer ces formes de racisme et d’esclavage dans les pays du Moyen-Orient, on notera aussi que de telles réformes peuvent affecter le marché du travail et la demande de travailleurs étrangers. Si tel est le cas, il se peut que les gouvernements des pays d’envoi et des pays d’accueil ne se montrent pas franchement favorables à une réforme en profondeur. Ray Jureidini est maître de conférences et enseigne la sociologie à l’Université américaine de Beyrouth. Resumen Este documento analiza las tendencias de la migración hacia los países ricos en petróleo y otros países receptores de mano de obra en el Medio Oriente. Los patrones de empleo de migrantes en los países receptores sirven como indicadores de la magnitud de la “racialización” que se ha des- arrollado en determinadas ocupaciones y sectores de la industria. En este documento se examinan las causas, los patrones y los casos de prácticas discriminatorias y xenófobas observadas entre los empleadores, la sociedad civil y el Estado. También se examinan los mecanismos correctivos formales y el apoyo no estatal para determinar el grado en que pueden abordarse, y se abordan efectivamente, los problemas locales a que se enfrentan los migrantes. Por último, se formulan propuestas de política para mejorar las relaciones entre los migrantes y las comunidades, los em- pleadores, las agencias de colocación y los gobiernos de los países receptores. La mayor afluencia de trabajadores extranjeros en el Medio Oriente comenzó en 1973, cuando se disparó el precio del petróleo, lo que incrementó de forma espectacular la riqueza de los Esta- dos del Golfo Arábico (Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Omán, Arabia Saudita, Qatar, Kuwait y Bah- rein, que integran el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo o CCG). Los países del Golfo se encon- traron con importantes planes de desarrollo, y con los fondos para pagarlos, pero con una fuerza de trabajo totalmente inadecuada: la fuerza de trabajo combinada de los países del CCG ascendía a tan sólo 1.36 millones de personas. En un principio, los trabajadores cualificados y no vi
cualificados procedentes de otros países árabes (principalmente egipcios, yemenitas, palestinos,
jordanos, libaneses y sudaneses) y de países asiáticos (fundamentalmente Pakistán y la India)
prácticamente duplicaron la población de Arabia Saudita y Kuwait entre 1975 y 1985. A princi-
pios del decenio de 1980, se contrató a un número creciente de migrantes procedentes de países
del sudeste asiático. Hasta fines de dicho decenio, éstos representaron más de la mitad de los
migrantes asiáticos al Medio Oriente.
En 1985, el precio del petróleo cayó en picado, frenando el desarrollo de la infraestructura en los
Estados del Golfo, lo que provocó la reducción de la migración procedente de Asia en casi un
tercio. Esta caída fue menos grave gracias al crecimiento del empleo en el sector de los servicios,
que absorbió muchos trabajadores, en particular mujeres de Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia y
Filipinas. Asimismo, se redujo el número de migrantes expatriados procedentes de otros Esta-
dos árabes, por motivos tanto políticos como económicos.
A diferencia de los países árabes emisores de mano de obra, los gobiernos asiáticos aplicaron
políticas para fomentar de manera activa el empleo en el extranjero; en parte para mitigar el
desempleo y en parte para generar el ingreso de divisas. La fuerza de trabajo llegó a ser su
principal producto de exportación, generando ingresos considerables. Por ejemplo, en 1999, el
total de remesas enviadas a Sri Lanka por los trabajadores que se encontraban en el extranjero
ascendieron a mil millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos, equivalente a cerca del 20 por
ciento del valor de las importaciones el año precedente, y superior al déficit comercial de 700
millones de dólares.
Así como el número creciente de mano de obra extranjera “barata” procedente de los países
asiáticos y africanos contribuyó a satisfacer la demanda de trabajadores no cualificados en los
Estados del Golfo Arábico, también ha continuado la tendencia a la “racialización” de determi-
nadas ocupaciones en los mercados laborales secundarios. En otras palabras, los trabajos sucios,
peligrosos y difíciles se han asociado con trabajadores extranjeros (asiáticos y africanos) a tal
grado que los nacionales de los países receptores se niegan a desempeñarlos, a pesar de los altos
índices de pobreza y desempleo.
En este documento se abordan, en particular, las peculiaridades de los contratos de trabajo
temporal de los extranjeros en los países empleadores en el Medio Oriente. Se argumenta que
los trabajadores extranjeros temporales no son, oficialmente, “libres” en los países receptores,
porque no pueden acceder a los mercados laborales locales en estos países sin el permiso ex-
preso de las autoridades estatales. En otras palabras, los trabajadores temporales suelen estar
legalmente vinculados con un patrocinador/empleador por la duración del contrato de trabajo,
a cuya expiración se exige al trabajador renovar el permiso de trabajo o, en su defecto, abando-
nar el país. Los trabajadores temporales que abandonan (o tratan de huir de) su patrocinador/
empleador son considerados en situación ilegal y son sujetos de arresto y deportación. A
intervalos regulares, se organizan “redadas” para hallar y deportar a esos residentes extranjeros
ilegales. En la mayoría de los países, muchas personas que pertenecen a esta categoría siguen
viviendo y trabajando, aunque se desconocen las cifras exactas.
Por lo general, en los países del Medio Oriente se les da preferencia a los trabajadores extranje-
ros con contratos temporales, puesto que no pretenden asentarse de manera permanente ni ob-
tener derechos de ciudadanía. En la mayoría de los países, la legislación laboral local no protege
a tales trabajadores; y no se ha ratificado ni se aplica en dichos países ninguna convención de
las Naciones Unidas, ni ningún convenio de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo que
ofrecen protección nacional o internacional a este tipo de trabajadores, particularmente a los
trabajadores no cualificados. No obstante el carácter temporal de tales contratos de trabajo,
continúa el flujo migratorio de trabajadores hacia estos países. En función de su número, suelen
crearse comunidades étnicas bien establecidas.
Se hace especial hincapié en las dimensiones racistas del trato que reciben los trabajadores
domésticos asiáticos en el Medio Oriente. En el Líbano, las mujeres asiáticas que trabajan en el
viiservicio doméstico, viven en condiciones similares a las de la esclavitud. La red social en la que se encuentran, que incluye la amenaza de violencia, la restricción de movimiento y condiciones de trabajo inhumanas, ha conducido a abusos significativamente extendidos y generalizados, a los cuales están sometidas estas mujeres, que constituyen un grupo particularmente vulnerable. Se ha estudiado detenidamente la situación en que se encuentran los trabajadores domésticos, porque representan la mayor parte de los trabajadores extranjeros procedentes de Sri Lanka y Filipinas. Las condiciones en que viven y el trato que reciben, son similares en otros países de Oriente Medio. En el caso del Líbano, la presencia de los trabajadores sirios—en su mayoría sin papeles, pero que trabajan libremente gracias a la presencia política y militar siria en este país—adquiere una dimensión adicional de índole política. Por otra parte, se ha impedido que los refugiados pales- tinos, a quienes desde 1948 se considera oficialmente extranjeros, ejerzan diversas ocupaciones y profesiones debido a que: (i) se estima que el hecho de otorgarles derechos de ciudadanía es contrario a su solicitud legítima del derecho de retornar a Palestina, y (ii) la integración de los palestinos supondría un aumento considerable del número de musulmanes sunitas, lo que perjudicaría el delicado “equilibrio” demográfico de la población. La dimensión xenofóbica tiene tres aspectos. En primer lugar, se manifiesta claramente cuando se contratan trabajadores temporales, que no pueden solicitar la ciudadanía. En segundo lugar, se suele dar un trato preferencial a los nacionales, aunque se acepta que los extranjeros desem- peñen trabajos serviles. Por último, la actitud de desdén hacia los que son evidentemente dife- rentes (en particular, los asiáticos) se observa en lugares públicos como supermercados, aero- puertos y oficinas gubernamentales. Aunque se han formulado varias propuestas en cuanto a mecanismos correctivos formales con miras a mitigar o eliminar formas de racismo y de esclavitud en los países del Medio Oriente, también debe tenerse en cuenta que tales reformas pueden afectar la situación del mercado de trabajo en lo que respecta a la demanda de trabajadores extranjeros. En tal caso, podría ser que, ni los gobiernos de los países receptores ni los países emisores apoyen suficientemente una auténtica reforma. Ray Jureidini es Profesor Asociado de Sociología en la American University de Beirut. viii
Introduction
Various forms of racism and xenophobia may be found in all societies. Stemming from a fear of
strangers, social groupings or cultures are generally based upon similarities, values and beliefs
that determine the binding forces of individual and social identity to the exclusion of the
“Other”.1 This paper is concerned with contemporary xenophobic issues relating to foreign
migrants in the Arab Middle Eastern countries of Lebanon, Jordan and the Arab Gulf states
(United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, comprising the Gulf
Cooperation Council, or GCC), with particular reference to the status of foreign female
domestic employees (see Jureidini 1998).
On a terminological note, pursuant to Banton (1997:44), it is assumed that “racism” refers to
“any hostility based upon beliefs about inherited biological differences”, while “xenophobia”
refers to hostility “that is based upon beliefs around cultural differences” or a hostility towards
foreigners. In some countries, xenophobia may be translated into hostility towards immigrants.
Racism may be identified in two forms. First, “individual racism” relates to essentially isolated
incidents of discriminatory or violent behaviour of individuals, such as attacking a person in the
street because he or she has dark skin (Jureidini 2000). It is often easily identified, but not so
easy to document if it is not officially reported. Institutional racism may occur in the form of
laws (or state-sponsored policies) that specifically discriminate against certain groups, such as
the phenomenon of apartheid in South Africa. It involves “structural relations of subordination
and oppression between social groups” (Abercrombie et al. 1994).
It is often difficult to distinguish between racism and xenophobia. Unless there is clear evidence
of racism in the form of references to biological differences such as skin colour, it is perhaps
more appropriate to refer to xenophobic practices and attitudes. In Arabic, the term Abed is used
to denote both a “black” person and a “slave”, and it may still be heard with reference to
Africans and Sri Lankans. It is in this context that African and Asian migrants are physically
distinguished and often looked upon as inferior, or simply ignored or dismissed. Their
presence, however, is largely associated with their prevalence in positions of servility of one
form or another. Anecdotes abound of African and Asian men and women who hold
prestigious positions (diplomats, professionals) being mistaken for servants and treated with
contempt. It seems ironic that, while anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism, vilification and
stereotyping is widespread in many Western countries (and possibly elsewhere), there is also
Arab racism and xenophobia against others in the Middle East. In this regard, even victimized
ethnic groups cannot automatically be assumed to be, by definition, morally “pure” and devoid
of xenophobic elements (see Jureidini and Hage 2001; Hage 2000).
With regard to domestic workers in the Middle East, prior to the influx of foreign workers into
Arab households, these positions were mainly filled by Arab women or girls. They were less
vulnerable because even if the father visited only once a year, it was as much an act of
protection as an opportunity to collect her wages. There was a shared culture with an
understanding that family honour was at stake. This honour enforced a certain sense of
responsibility on the part of the employing family. However, in the case of Sri Lankan and
Filipina women, their families are remote. They come from a different culture and, in the case of
Sri Lankans, a different religion (mainly Buddhist). Mostly travelling alone and in a foreign
country, with little or no communication with the outside world, their contractual arrangements
are such that they have few rights, no freedom and are kept as virtual prisoners in the
households in which they work. They cannot form or join unions, and there is no serious regard
for their well-being, other than by the embassies and consuls in the host countries. Given the
numbers of migrant workers involved, diplomatic missions cannot keep track or monitor the
many thousands of their nationals in the host countries. In addition, there are economic
interests that militate against undermining the labour market demand for their migrant
workers, who collectively represent a major source of foreign earnings.
1
See Ahmed (2000); Turner (1993); Said (1978).UNRISD P ROGRAMME ON I DENTITIES , C ONFLICT AND C OHESION P APER N UMBER 2 Historical Context The major influx of foreign workers into the Middle East began following the oil price boom in 1973, which resulted in an enormous surge of wealth for the Arab Gulf states. The Gulf states were faced with grand development plans and the funds to pay for them, but with a totally inadequate workforce: Their combined workforce totalled only 1.36 million (Abella 1995). Initially, both skilled and unskilled workers from other Arab countries (principally Egyptians, Yemenis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese and Sudanese) and from Asia (mainly Pakistanis and Indians) almost doubled the populations of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait within the decade between 1975 and 1985. Between 1980 and 1985 the share of Asians in the foreign workforce rose to around 3.2 million, from about 30 per cent to over 63 per cent. Over two million were in Saudi Arabia. By the early 1980s an increasing number of migrants were recruited from Southeast Asia (Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea). Until the end of the 1980s they accounted for over half of Asian migration to the Middle East. By 1990, workers from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka had increased their share of Asian migrants to over 20 per cent of the Asian workforce in the region (see Abella 1995; see also Birks and Sinclair 1980). In 1985 oil prices fell rapidly, prompting a cutback in infrastructure development in the Gulf states, and migration from Asia dropped by almost one-third. As Abella (1995:420) points out, the “fall would have been more severe if not for the growth in employment in the service sector (from hotels to personal services) which absorbed ever-increasing numbers of workers, especially women from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines”. These women became a significant part of the feminization of international migration, travelling alone, rather than as appendages of their husbands, and in many cases becoming the major breadwinners of their households, many leaving husbands and children back home (Campani 1995). At the same time, the volume of expatriate migrants from other Arab states was being reduced, as often for political as for economic reasons. For example, the political activities of Yemenis, Egyptians and Palestinians were considered as potentially threatening, and they were also more expensive. “From the economic standpoint there were advantages in hiring more Asians rather than Arabs. The Asians were reliable, their workers accepted lower wages and they did not require the same social support services as the Arabs, who were more likely to settle and bring their families” (Campani 1995; see also McMurray 1999). One of the distinguishing features of the mass migration experience in the Gulf states, as com- pared with Europe, was the idea that the diversification of nationalities was intended to deflect the potential political encroachment by Arabs from other regions. Although of common cul- tural, religious and linguistic origins, non-national Arabs were a threat, “especially those who have lived in the region since the 1960s or were born there, since they may feel they should have a stake in their country of residence” (Oxford Analytica 2001). Thus, the diversification of nationalities to include East and West Asians was for political, as well as economic, expediency. Unlike the Arab sending countries, Asian governments pursued active policies for overseas employment, partly to alleviate unemployment and partly to generate foreign income (see Abella 1995; Rosales 1999). Their labour force had become a major export item that generated considerable earnings. Castles and Miller cite figures from the International Labour Organiza- tion (ILO) indicating that for countries with serious trade deficits, remittances from migrants abroad can be significant. For example, “Pakistani workers remitted over US$2 billion in 1988, which covered 30 per cent of the cost of imports. Indian workers remitted US$2.6 billion, the equivalent of 15 per cent of imports” (Castles and Miller 1998:148). Most of these funds came from the Middle East. On a somewhat smaller scale, remittances from the Middle East to Sri Lanka between 1980 and 1986 doubled, from $112 to 264 million (Eelens et al. 1992:4). Filipino migrants in 1997 remitted home some $5 billion (KAKAMMPI 1998). In 1999 total remittances to Sri Lanka from workers abroad totalled $1 billion (Kannangara 2000). This constituted ap- 2
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proximately 20 per cent of foreign goods imports for the previous year and more than the trade
deficit of $0.7 billion. In the GCC countries, foreign workers repatriate over $25 billion to their
home countries annually (ESCWA 2000).
As increasing numbers of “cheap” foreign workers from Asian and African countries have
continued to fulfil the demand for unskilled workers, the particular kinds of jobs found in the
secondary labour markets have become racialized. That is, the dirty, dangerous and difficult
jobs become associated with foreign Asian and African workers, and nationals in these
countries refuse to undertake them, despite high levels of poverty and unemployment. As
discussed below, despite intentions to reduce the foreign labour force in the Gulf states, growth
has actually occurred, primarily because of the demand for unskilled labour.
Xenophobic Practices
Xenophobia with regard to foreign workers, and domestic workers in particular, has three
aspects. First, it is demonstrated by the preference for temporary contract labour that excludes
possibilities of citizenship. Second, preferential treatment is usually given to nationals, although
particular kinds of menial work have now been “allocated” to foreigners. Third, the attitude of
disdain and abuse toward those who are visibly different (particularly Sri Lankans, Filipinas,
and Ethiopians and other Africans) is observed in the kind of treatment that is meted out to
them by nationals, particularly employers.
Conditions and vulnerability of temporary contract labour
The high proportion of foreign nationals working in the GCC countries is a distinguishing
feature of their labour force, compared with other Arab countries. Typically, temporary foreign
contract employees are the preferred migrant workers since there are no expectations of
permanent settlement or citizenship rights. None of the Middle Eastern countries cover such
employees under local labour laws and no United Nations or ILO conventions offering national
or international protection are in force or ratified, particularly for unskilled labourers (see below
on international conventions). However, despite the temporary nature of such labour contracts,
there remains a permanent pool of migrant workers in the receiving countries. Depending upon
the numbers, ethnic community development often results (Evans-Pritchard 2001).
In Middle Eastern countries, there are no quotas on the number of migrants allowed. Nor do
local labour laws and regulations (or indeed international conventions) specifically cover
temporary contract migrants. Domestic workers, among others, are excluded from any legal
protections.2 The peculiarities of temporary contract migrants, however, are not unique to the
Middle East. Many of the restrictions on this category of migrants are implemented in all
countries. Where the Middle East differs from most other countries is that domestic employees
are largely live-in workers for whom further limitations of freedom have become normative
elements in the employer-employee relationship.
The general limitations of temporary foreign contract labour do not allow the freedom of choice
to move from one employer to another in the local labour market of the host country—at least,
not without the express permission of the government. They also require permission from their
employer, who also acts as the “sponsor”. The expectation is that they will leave the country
upon expiration of their contract unless they obtain a renewal of their work and residency
permits, and the contract is extended. As the nature of their stay in the host country is
temporary, citizenship and citizenship rights do not apply. In this sense, temporary foreign
contract labour (whether skilled or unskilled) may be seen as formally “unfree” labour. Those
who do leave their employer or run away and those who do not renew their visas and permits
are rendered illegal and are subject to arrest and deportation. Periodic “crackdowns” are made
2
Jureidini and Moukarbel 2001; Rbeihat 2000; Oxford Analytica 2001.
3UNRISD P ROGRAMME ON I DENTITIES , C ONFLICT AND C OHESION
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to find and deport these illegal foreign residents. In almost all countries, thousands of people in
these categories continue to live and work, although precise numbers are unknown.
Preference for nationals and racialization of labour markets
Figures detailing occupations and industries in the Arab states according to nationality are not
available. Nonetheless, some cursory data is available on the proportion of migrant workers in
the aggregate according to industry or occupation. For example, in Oman, in every industry
sector (for 1993) with the exception of mining and quarrying, the vast majority of employees
were migrant workers—for example in agriculture, 73 per cent; manufacturing, 92 per cent;
construction, 96 per cent; restaurants and hotels, 93 per cent; wholesale and retail, 87 per cent;
and mining and quarrying, 42 per cent. In professional occupations, migrants comprise 49 per
cent; administrative and managerial workers, 44 per cent; clerical and related workers, 30 per
cent; sales workers, 63 per cent; service workers, 92 per cent; and production workers, transport
and labourers, 64 per cent (ILO 2001).
Briefly, the above figures indicate the predominance of migrants in secondary market jobs (in
terms of absolute numbers) and a more or less equal proportion with Omani nationals in the
upper end of professional, managerial and technical positions. The high proportion of locals in
clerical positions reflects their privilege in the public sector. Similar figures apply to Bahrain
and Kuwait, and presumably the other GCC countries as well.
There are also migrants in the high-skills categories who are encouraged, rather than reviled, al-
though most Gulf states are articulating the need to reduce their reliance upon them in favour of
their own nationals. On the other hand, in March 2001, Bahrain announced a scheme to grant citi-
zenship to long-term foreign residents. They needed to fulfil certain conditions, such as sufficient
financial assets, health insurance, a knowledge of Arabic and permanent residence for at least 15
years for Arab nationals and 25 years for non-Arabs (Khaleej Times 2001b, 2000c). The precise
number of foreign nationals who have been granted citizenship in the Gulf states is unknown.
In most cases, GCC nationals refuse to accept low-paying manual jobs that require only minimal
skills. Over the years, more and more GCC nationals have acquired the education and skills for the
better-paying jobs (ESCWA 2000:11). Thus, as nationals increasingly obtain better education and
skills, they are more likely to fill primary sector jobs, leaving secondary sector jobs for foreigners.
Because of the low workforce participation rates of female nationals in the GCC countries, no
more than 15–20 per cent (see ESCWA 1999), the proportion of foreigners in the workforce is
much higher than in the general population. This indicates that the presence of foreigners is
primarily for work rather than for settlement with family members. Foreigners fill jobs ranging
from those with low remuneration and minimal skills to professional positions and those re-
quiring high technical skills. Since the population growth rates for nationals of the GCC coun-
tries are among the highest in the world, averaging 3.5 per cent annually, their governments are
concerned about creating employment opportunities for their nationals. Another economic im-
petus for replacing foreigners is to reduce remittances abroad (ESCWA 2000).
In Kuwait, foreign workers include approximately 295,000 Indians, 274,000 Egyptians, 157,000
Bangladeshis, 101,000 Pakistanis and 100,000 Sri Lankans. Over 90 per cent of nationals work in
the public sector, where salaries and benefits are higher than in the private sector. About
300,000 foreign workers are employed as domestic helpers, with roughly one-third from India
and another third from Sri Lanka (Khaleej Times 2001a). Measures to reduce the foreign presence
in Kuwait include freezing access to free medical and educational services and introducing a tax
on foreign workers, ostensibly to create jobs for Kuwaiti nationals.3
3
Labour and Social Affairs Minister Abdel Wahhab Al Wazzan, quoted in AFP, “Kuwait to Tax Foreign Workers”, 23 December 1999.
4M IGRANT W ORKERS AND X ENOPHOBIA IN THE M IDDLE E AST
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The number of foreign workers in Oman increased by 34 per cent in 2000 as compared with the
previous year (Bahrain Tribune 2001). Recent statements by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour
and Vocational Training have called for “Omani citizens not to exaggerate their demands for
foreign workers in the agricultural sector and for domestic helpers, as there are already many
foreign workers in the country” (Khaleej Times 2001c). The largest populations of foreigners are
Indians and Pakistanis, many of whom arrive with higher levels of skill and a willingness to
work for lower wages than Omanis. Filipinos are estimated at around 20,000 and Sri Lankans
35,000, the vast bulk of them working as domestic employees. The government’s main effort to
reduce the number of foreigners has been to target the many thousands whose legal status is
“irregular”. As with all of the Arab countries, annual “amnesties” are given to those without
valid documents as an enticement to leave the country without penalty. This often means that
the relevant embassies are required to provide their nationals with emergency certificates or
laissez passer to facilitate their departure. Those who do not avail themselves of the amnesty
(from fear or ignorance) become vulnerable to police crackdowns (Ali 2001a, 2001b).
In Bahrain the same concerns exist about reducing the foreign labour presence in the country. It
is estimated that approximately one per cent of foreign workers are “runaways” from their
sponsors and agencies. Urging the private sector to hire more Bahraini nationals, the Minister
for Labour and Social Affairs argued that it was partly to reduce the remittances sent abroad.
Around $480 million was remitted from Bahrain in 1997 (Bahrain Tribune 1999; Farook 1999a).
Other factors included the “unfair competition” with local labourers and the need to alleviate
unemployment and poverty among the poor (Farook 1999b). To further reduce the number of
illegal foreign workers, it was also decided to relax transference rules to allow foreign workers
to change sponsors within the country. This would free them from the obligation to remain with
abusive and exploitative employers (Farook 2000a).
Over the past several years in Saudi Arabia, there has been a policy of “indiginization” in an
attempt to reduce foreign labour in favour of Saudi nationals. For example, between 1994 and
1999, the share of jobs filled by nationals increased from 39.2 per cent to 44.2 per cent. This
policy is to be continued as a top priority in Saudi’s five-year plan for 2000–2005, during which
time it is anticipated that approximately 200,000 positions currently filled by foreigners will be
replaced by nationals. In September 2000 it was decreed that all establishments employing 20 or
more people will be required to employ at least 25 per cent nationals (ESCWA 2000).
In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), foreigners, mainly from India (781,000), comprise over half
the expatriate workforce, together with Pakistanis (262,000) and other Asians (225,000). Some 70
per cent of Indians come from the Kerala region. Those from other Arab countries number
around 155,000 (ESCWA 2000). With a population of around 2.7 million as of the year 2000,
about 85 per cent are now foreign nationals (Khaleej Times 2000b). As in Kuwait, the UAE is also
attempting to limit the inflow of foreign unskilled workers into the country, partly by removing
the indirect supports such as free health services and free education.
In October 1999, the UAE government announced a ban on unskilled Indian and Pakistani work-
ers as part of a process of “restoring the demographic balance” within the country (Hoath 1999).
However, within a month of the ban companies began replacing them with Nepalese labour
“known for being cheap and reliable” (Daniel 1999). By July 2000 the number of Nepalese had
risen to over 15,000 (Dawn 2000b). In August 2000 the government announced the doubling of fees
for labour permits, and in the following month introduced an employment visa requirement that
all foreign workers have at least a secondary education (Gulf News 2000a; Dawn 2000a).
In Lebanon, the presence of Syrian workers, particularly in agriculture and construction, creates
an added political dimension. These workers are largely undocumented, but continue to work
freely because of the Syrian political and military presence in the country. Further, Palestinian
refugees, who, since 1948, have been treated formally as foreigners, have been prevented from
working in various occupations and professions. The discrimination against Palestinians has
two ostensible justifications. First, allowing citizenship rights and naturalization is seen as con-
5UNRISD P ROGRAMME ON I DENTITIES , C ONFLICT AND C OHESION P APER N UMBER 2 trary to the legitimate demands in terms of rights of return to Palestine; and second, the as- similation of Palestinians would mean a large influx of Sunni Muslims, which would under- mine the politically sensitive demographic “balance” of the population. Foreign Female Domestic Employees Recent studies of foreign female domestic workers have only been conducted in three of the countries under consideration—Lebanon, Jordan and the UAE. By the middle of 1999 some 700,000 Sri Lankan women were working abroad as housemaids (Nonis 1999). Most of these women worked in the Gulf states, mainly in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman, as well as in Lebanon and Jordan. The remainder migrate to Singapore and the Maldives (Kannagara 1999b). Sri Lankans comprise perhaps the largest single group of women working as domestic maids throughout the world today, followed by Filipinas. As of August 1999, Saudi Arabia was the largest labour market for Filipino workers, numbering around 650,000 (Juan 1999a). In 1999, the number of housemaids in the UAE exceeded 200,000, constituting around seven per cent of the population and representing approximately one housekeeper for every two or three nationals. There were some 75,000 Sri Lankan housemaids and another 70,000 working in other manual, unskilled positions (Gulf News 1999). In 2001 in Lebanon, embassies reported that there were between 80,000-100,000 Sri Lankans and 20,000 Filipinas, as well as roughly 5,000 Ethiopian women, almost all in domestic service (Jureidini and Moukarbel 2001). As of August 2000, 35,000 Sri Lankans and 7,000 Filipinas were working as domestic maids in Jordan, according to their respective embassies (Rbeihat 2000). It may be argued that the legal, administrative and working conditions of foreign domestic workers are consistent with Bales’ (1997) concept of “contract slavery”. Bales contends that contract slavery contains three elements: (i) violence or the threat of violence; (ii) restriction of physical movement; and (iii) economic exploitation. The following summary of these conditions and treatment applies to all of the countries addressed in this paper, with some minor variations. Violence or the threat of violence On the issue of violence or the threat of violence or abuse, foreign maids may be subjected to physical, sexual, psychological and/or emotional abuse. Demeaning or degrading treatment is a particularly insidious form of abuse. Aggressively delivered orders, shouting and constant belittling criticism contain an underlying threat of violence or may be seen as violent. Abuse may also include withholding of food, not allowing the worker the freedom to prepare her own food and relying on “handouts” from the mistress of the house, which may be leftovers from the family meal. There have been cases where locks were put on refrigerators and in one case an alarm was installed. Employees may be belittled on a daily basis, such as with name-calling (Hmara, or “donkey” is the most common term used). Sometimes, names are changed to suit the employer. Another form of violence and threat of violence comes from recruitment agencies. An employee who is procured through these agencies is usually “guaranteed” by the agency and will be replaced within the first three months if she is deemed unsuitable. However, it is common knowledge that if an employer returns the maid to the agency, there is a strong likelihood that she will be punished in some way as a disciplinary measure. Reports of serious physical abuse by agencies, bordering on torture, have been revealed (see below). A number of agencies now employ Sri Lankan or Filipina personnel to deal with the workers directly and these employees may also become abusers. 6
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Perhaps the major threat of abuse derives from the practice of withholding passports and other
identity papers that are held primarily by the employer and sometimes by the agency.
Employees cannot leave the house for fear they may be caught by the police or General Security
and arrested or imprisoned because they are not carrying their identity papers. There is a tacit
expectation that being detained by security forces will likely be accompanied by some form of
physical or even sexual abuse.
Newspaper reports of individual cases of severe physical abuse by employers and agencies
have been reported over the past two years in the Lebanese Daily Star. These have included
beatings, slapping, burns from boiling coffee, broken ribs, scars and bruises, sometimes result-
ing in hospitalization. Many so-called suicides have been reported for Sri Lankan, Filipina and
Ethiopian women. Although the suicide rate in Sri Lanka is also high (Gamburd 2000), there are
always suspicions. Yet no arrests or criminal charges have ever been brought against an em-
ployer or agency. One agency was suspended in Lebanon after a particularly brutal assault,
following a formal complaint by the Sri Lankan Ambassador. According to the employer in this
instance, “We took her in [to the agency] and they taught her a lesson. Taamouah atle mrattabe
[they beat her well]”.4 The daily abuse reported to researchers is almost always from the mis-
tress of the house, who normally has the responsibility to manage the maid. This abuse includes
hitting, slapping, pulling or even cutting of hair; pushing around, belittling, verbally insulting,
name-calling and constant criticism of their work.
Part of the dilemma in domestic work is that neither employer nor employee can assume an
arm’s length, rational approach to the contractual relations, for the arena is the ideologically
“natural” sphere of the female domain, with all of the emotional and cultural baggage bound
up with it within this culture. This results in a highly charged set of dynamics between the maid
and the mistress of the house (Tandon 2001).
It is interesting to note that there is relatively little evidence of sexual abuse of domestic workers
in Lebanon and Jordan, while there are widespread reports of rape and sexual harassment in
the Gulf. Sabban (2001:33) states that:
Most complaints of sexual abuse reported by foreign female domestic workers
were against older men, either in Saudi Arabia, or in the Emirates. ... This
phenomenon is one of the outcomes of the oil booms. ... Elderly males find
themselves suddenly rich, but socially frustrated, and with no roles or pleas-
ure. Their first source of pleasure is poor women, whose easier, cheaper and
younger sexuality can alleviate their frustrations.
Denial of freedom of movement
Most recruitment agencies advise their clients not to allow domestic workers to leave the house
unaccompanied. This, they argue, is to maintain control over them so that they will not speak to
other maids and then demand higher wages. It is also assumed that they may engage in sexual re-
lations, possibly getting pregnant, and thus would have to be sent home (abortions are one alter-
native, but they have to remain clandestine). Some maids are actually locked in when the family is
absent. Few are given a key. Few are allowed to make telephone calls. Constraints on freedom of
movement also mean that they cannot form social relations outside the employment relationship.
The withholding of the passport is illegal by all international standards and also serves to re-
strict movement. Regular checks and raids are made in all countries to arrest those whose pa-
pers are irregular. Yet, it is worth noting that this practice has come to be accepted as standard,
not only by agencies and employers, but also by the state, foreign embassies and even some
human rights organizations. On arrival at the airport, for example, the authorities take the mi-
grant’s passport and hand it directly to the employer/sponsor who must be there to take her
home. Withholding of the passport is seen as justified, particularly in the early stages of em-
4
As quoted by a Lebanese female employer (Jureidini and Moukarbel 2001).
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