N. 21 THRIVING ON UNCERTAINTY: COVID-19-RELATED OPPORTUNITIES FOR TERRORIST GROUPS
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N. 21
Policy Study
THRIVING ON UNCERTAINTY:
COVID-19-RELATED OPPORTUNITIES
FOR TERRORIST GROUPS
Abdelhak Bassou Johannes Claes
Coordinator
Kars de Bruijne
Youssef Tobi
Sophie Mertens
Coordinator
Eman Ragab
Clara-Auguste Süß
N. 21
Policy Study
THRIVING ON
UNCERTAINTY:
COVID-19-RELATED
OPPORTUNITIES FOR
TERRORIST GROUPS
Abdelhak Bassou
Coordinator
Youssef Tobi
Coordinator
Johannes Claes
Kars de Bruijne
Sophie Mertens
Eman Ragab
Clara-Auguste Süß
EuroMeSCo has become a benchmark for policy-oriented research on issues related to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, in particular economic development, security and migration. With 104 affiliated think tanks and institutions and about 500 experts from 29 different countries, the network has developed impactful tools for the benefit of its members and a larger community of stakeholders in the Euro- Mediterranean region. Through a wide range of publications, surveys, events, training activities, audio- visual materials and a strong footprint on social media, the network reaches thousands of experts, think tankers, researchers, policy-makers and civil society and business stakeholders every year. While doing so, EuroMeSCo is strongly engaged in streamlining genuine joint research involving both European and Southern Mediterranean experts, encouraging exchanges between them and ultimately promoting Euro-Mediterranean integration. All the activities share an overall commitment to fostering youth participation and ensuring gender equality in the Euro-Mediterranean experts’ community. EuroMesCo: Connecting the Dots is a project co-funded by the European Union (EU) and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) that is implemented in the framework of the EuroMeSCo network. As part of this project, five Joint Study Groups are assembled each year to carry out evidence-based and policy-oriented research. The topics of the five study groups are defined through a thorough process of policy consultations designed to identify policy-relevant themes. Each Study Group involves a Coordinator and a team of authors who work towards the publication of a Policy Study which is printed, disseminated through different channels and events, and accompanied by audio-visual materials. POLICY STUDY Published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean Peer Review Academic Peer Reviewer: anonymous Policy Peer Reviewer: Kamel Akrout, Chairman and Founder, Institute for Prospective and Advanced Strategic and Security Studies (IPASSS) Editing Karina Melkonian Design layout Maurin.studio Proofreading Neil Charlton Layout Núria Esparza Print ISSN 2462-4500 Digital ISSN 2462-4519 June 2021 Arabic version available This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean.
The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), founded in 1989, is a think and do tank specialised in Euro-Mediterranean relations. It provides policy-oriented and evidence-based research underpinned by a genuine Euromed multidimensional and inclusive approach. The aim of the IEMed, in accordance with the principles of the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), is to stimulate reflection and action that contribute to mutual understanding, exchange and cooperation between the different Mediterranean countries, societies and cultures, and to promote the progressive construction of a space of peace and stability, shared prosperity and dialogue between cultures and civilisations in the Mediterranean. The IEMed is a consortium comprising the Catalan Government, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, the European Union and Barcelona City Council. It also incorporates civil society through its Board of Trustees and its Advisory Council. The Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) is a Moroccan think tank aiming to contribute to the improvement of economic and social public policies that challenge Morocco and the rest of Africa as integral parts of the Global South. The PCNS pleads for an open, accountable and enterprising “new South” that defines its own narratives and mental maps around the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins, as part of a forward-looking relationship with the rest of the world. Through its analytical endeavours, the think tank aims to support the development of public policies in Africa and to give the floor to experts from the South. This stance is focused on dialogue and partnership, and aims to cultivate African expertise and excellence needed for the accurate analysis of African and global challenges and the suggestion of appropriate solutions. As such, the PCNS brings together researchers, publishes their work and capitalises on a network of renowned partners, representative of different regions of the world. The PCNS hosts a series of gatherings of different formats and scales throughout the year, the most important being the annual international conferences “The Atlantic Dialogues” and “African Peace and Security Annual Conference” (APSACO).
Policy Study
Content Executive Summary 8 Introduction 10 Abdelhak Bassou COVID-19 in the Sahel: Litmus Test for State Capacity Rather Than Fuel for Extremists 16 Johannes Claes, Kars de Bruijne, Sophie Mertens Recruitment Strategies of Terrorist Groups in the Mashreq Region Amidst COVID-19 40 Eman Ragab The Pandemic and its Handling as Crisis Intensifiers? Taking Stock of Mobilisation, Terrorism and COVID- 19 in the Maghreb 60 Clara-Auguste Süß List of acronyms and abbreviations 84
Executive Summary The COVID-19 pandemic has had a cataclysmic impact on all aspects of the functioning of our world. The relevance of the possibility of the spread of a global virus with the spread of terrorism is not immediately obvious as it is difficult for a direct causal link to be scientifically established. However, taking into consideration how state responses and pre-existing socioeconomic grievances can be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic can lead to innovative findings on how terrorist groups have adapted and conducted their activities during the pandemic. Analysing how the response of states impacts socioeconomic grievances and how it interacts with terrorist activities, the authors have found that the pandemic has impacted the operational and ideological frameworks of terrorist groups in multiple ways. COVID-19 was interpreted as an opportunity to spread extremist propaganda and ideology. The pandemic was presented as an act of God, punishing the ungodly and weakening enemy governments. In terms of propaganda, this virus was presented as a soldier of Allah and was used for online recruitment strategies. Concerning the operational front, poor state responses to the pandemic may have reinforced the legitimacy of terrorist groups among populations as they were continuously used as arguments advancing the agenda of these groups in their areas of intervention. In the first chapter, poor state responses and their interactions with terrorists’ activity was analysed especially in the Sahel region where the longstanding fragilities of states have been exacerbated by the pandemic. However, at this stage, a clear correlation between COVID-19 and the increase of terrorist activity is yet to be established. This property of COVID-19 as a crisis intensifier is a strong argument in the last chapter focusing on the Maghreb region: taking into account the various databases and academic viewpoints, this chapter examines the link between the growing popular discontent of the populations of Maghreb countries and the surge of the COVID-19 pandemic. As in the Sahel region, a potent and clear connection between COVID-19 and a possible increase of terrorist activities was contested. The role of state responses and their effect on the surge of terrorist activity was also addressed, especially in the second chapter of this study: for instance, when examining the changing recruitment strategies of terrorist groups in the Mashreq region, strengthening the resilience of the state and society was the viable strategy for countering violent extremism. For the European Union (EU) to achieve this endeavour, this study argues that the EU’s efforts need to work on remediating the vulnerability of fragile groups within societies and to consider the core governance fragilities leading to the surge of terrorist activities in the regions covered, namely the Sahel, the Mashreq and the Maghreb. Exploring the opportunities offered by COVID-19 to terrorist groups in these regions deepens the understanding of terrorist tactics and propaganda strategies. This enables the adoption of a more comprehensive approach with regards to responding to and assisting states on the ground. Policy recommendations derived from this study not only aim to mitigate and assess risks deriving from the Policy Study n. 21
interlinkage between the turmoil caused by the virus and terrorism in the regions,
but also focuses on state responses and the assessment of innovative and
applicable ways of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in an
uncertain and novel landscape. Indeed, this study does not solely focus on the
capabilities of terrorist groups but also explores the different components of the
interaction between the pandemic and terrorism. It thus proposes a wider range of
recommendations that address both the challenge of mitigating the risks of
terrorist activities but also, in the long term, the core factors that increase and
encourage the spread of terrorist violence in the regions covered.
Main recommendations:
• Attention should be paid to redirecting existing funding towards COVID-
19 responses. Shrinking aid budgets in the medium term can have
negative effects further down the line, especially when it concerns
programming geared towards service provision in fragile areas.
• Urge European countries to launch on the national level large-scale
awareness campaigns that explain how to report suspicious online
recruitment related to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
and other terrorist groups, and the type of help and protection offered in
return. For such campaigns to be effective they should be carried out in
cooperation with all stakeholders including local mosques, Imams, Islamic
centres, schools, universities, and hacker communities.
• Establish an effective cooperation strategy for the exchange of information
and expertise between the countries of the region but also with the EU
and the broader international level.
• Encourage an evidence-based approach when it comes to the handling of
the COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis intensifier.
• P/CVE needs to be understood not only as a mere security task but also
requires broader efforts and joint solutions with regard to legal migration
and sustainable economic growth.
• Dedicate financial support to encourage Iraqi and Syrian Sunni youths to
launch small and micro-enterprises, especially in areas destroyed during
the war on ISIS.
Introduction Abdelhak Bassou Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South (PCNS)
Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 11
Jihadist movements build their specific ments which wage asymmetric wars,
strategy according to the operational the population is a primary target and
possibilities offered by the field, the influencing public opinion is a major
tactics that can be executed in view of objective. In these asymmetric wars the
the training of these combatants, and population is the prize between the in-
the logistical availabilities. There is, surgents (terrorist groups) and the gov-
however, an almost unchanging aspect ernment institutions. Each party tries to
operating in spite of the circumstances; engage it to have the population on its
that is, the doctrine. Jihadist move- side (de Courrèges et al., 2010). Terror-
ments, like all ideological schools, base ist propaganda techniques make it
their actions on a normative and theor- possible to legitimise false ideas and
etical corpus that allows them to ex- fallacious principles obtained by the
plain to the public and their followers distortion of the true norms of religion,
the correctness of their causes and jus- with the aim of expanding terrorist
tifies the actions taken on the ground. doctrine; instilling a climate of fear
This corpus of theories and norms is among opponents as a dissuasive tool;
made up of a constant and immutable and highlighting the pull factors like
core and of elements introduced ac- the appetite for violence and the ap-
cording to each context. Does this peal to fight injustice, which attracts
mean that the Jihadist doctrine is fixed people in the targeted circles – mainly
and constant? While its core is, it is the youth. Terrorist groups have histori-
continually and opportunely enriched cally exploited upheavals in the world
by everything that Jihadist theorists to skilfully exploit them in their propa-
find useful to enable the doctrine to ganda and recruitment efforts, as well
meet the goal. This doctrine also obeys as to profit from crises, plagues or any-
the laws of evolution despite the thing that weakens the institutions and
steadfastness of an almost immutable governance structures. As stated in
dogmatic core. Nothing is therefore Ragab’s chapter of this study, crises
static in the Jihadist strategy, and the that weaken states and exhaust popu-
declination of the global strategy into lations provide supporters of terrorist
specific and adapted strategies does groups with the opportunity to present
not concern only the operational side themselves as the saviours and the al-
but also the doctrinal aspect. Jihadist ternative.
strategies therefore do not only rely on
invasion and operational actions on the As the world is facing an unpreced-
ground. Narratives also have an in- ented global health, social and econ-
fluence. The Jihadist doctrine is there- omic emergency as a result of the
fore the umbilical cord that links all COVID-19 pandemic, it has been
similar Jihadist groups, despite the dif- viewed by terrorist groups as a golden
ferences that may exist in the environ- opportunity to strengthen the prin-
ments in which they operate. It consists ciples of their respective doctrines and
of a body of documents and speeches fuel the propaganda (Boussel, 2020).
containing the beliefs, norms and prin- First, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda
ciples that govern the existence of the and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq
group. and Syria (ISIS), which seek to behave
like a state and even to substitute the
Propaganda can be seen as a vehicle state, have tried to seize the pandemic
of doctrine. In insurrectionary move- to increase this strategy and to fill any12 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
vacuums left by governance institu- plained the extremist point of view of
tions. Indeed, these groups have not the pandemic and have given instruc-
been reticent to point out the short- tions to their followers to guard against
comings of governments in tackling the virus. However, these documents
the pandemic, and to engage in exten- have not been limited to simply giving
sive propaganda and disinformation prevention advice. Rather, they have
campaigns, to strengthen their nar- conveyed elements of indoctrination.
rative and increase their online span. The ISIS flyer entitled Legal Guidelines
The virus has slowly become a global for Behaviour in Epidemics convinces
test for almost all governments, put- readers that viruses are not contagious
ting pressure on health infrastructure by themselves but by the will of God,
and challenging state legitimacy and and one should rely only on God to be
responses. The measures taken by saved from disease (Benraad, 2020).
states to limit the spread of COVID-19 Other theologians and theorists of ex-
have relied heavily on lockdowns that tremism, such as the Jordanian Islamic
have forced millions of young people scholar Dr. Ahmad Al-Shahrouri, have
to stay at home. This has reduced daily gone so far as to make Jihad an activity
activities and in most cases the con- that purifies the body and protects it
fined found an alternative activity on against pandemics. In addition, each in-
the Internet to overcome the viciss- struction is accompanied by a word of
itudes and boredom of lockdown. The the Prophet considered as the reference The increase in
increase in time spent on the Internet of this instruction. This approach aims to time spent on
the Internet due
due to the lockdown has increased the convince the target audience that Islam
to the lockdown
chances of Jihadists attracting people had advanced long before the Western
has increased
to their sites. Radical groups have also world the ways to cure systemic dis- the chances of
taken steps to ensure that COVID-19 eases, which in turn affirms the legality Jihadists
does not steal their show in the media and legitimacy of orders, instructions attracting
and have strived to be a part of and recommendations given as being in people to their
COVID-19-related news. accordance with Sharia law. sites
Second, and in addition to trying to fill Plagues or catastrophes that have be-
the gap, terrorist groups have tried to fallen the world have often been ex-
feed their doctrinal system. The virtual plained through the centuries in the
Jihad must be constantly nourished context of divine wrath and punish-
and constitutes a system with two com- ment in some religious literature. How-
ponents: the basic doctrine, made up ever, COVID-19 did not spare Muslims
of dogmas, norms and principles and even some Jihadists who consider
framed within a decontextualised and themselves as the most ardent be-
biased interpretation of the prescrip- lievers in God. Jihadist theorists have
tions of Islam; and current salient thus found themselves faced with the
events that are exploited through in- challenge of explaining how a phe-
terpretations that confirm these Jihad- nomenon that is supposed to punish
ist doctrinal approaches. the enemies of Jihad also kills Jihadists,
who as soldiers of God should normally
From the first announcements confirm- be spared.
ing the pandemic nature of COVID-19,
terrorist groups have published declar- Three words largely represent this
ations, articles and fatwas that have ex- idea in Jihadist literature: punishment
Policy Study n. 21Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 13
(Thaa’r), sanction (Qissas) and revenge study have adopted a particular re-
(Intiqam). The effects of COVID-19 are gional scope related to the impact of
therefore presented as a divine action, the global pandemic on terrorist activ-
which intervenes to take revenge on ity while addressing the topic through
the ungodly and make them pay for different levels of analysis: the first
the atrocities they have inflicted on the chapter examines the impact of the
children of the Islamic Ummah. At the evolving COVID-19 situation in the
very beginning of the onset of the pan- Sahel region on both levels of extrem-
demic in China, theorists of extremism ist violence and responses by local and
blamed the country by labelling state authorities, by focusing on the
COVID-19 as a divine revenge to pun- pre-existing conditions that were al-
ish the Chinese for their treatment of ready in place prior to the outbreak of
Muslim Uyghurs (Stalinsky, 2020). How- the pandemic specifically in Mali, Niger
ever, when the pandemic spread, they and Burkina Faso. It then examines the
had to correct their rhetoric to con- potential longer-term implications in
sider that COVID-19 is both a retribu- terms of the appeal of extremist
tion for the ungodly and Muslims who groups in this context. The second
have deviated from God and the chapter discusses the strategies
Prophet and also a trial by which God adopted by terrorist groups to recruit
tests the faith of Muslims and their re- new members and followers during the
silience in the face of adversity. COVID-19 pandemic, with specific
focus on ISIS and its affiliated cells in
The virus also serves the cause of rad- European societies and the Mashreq
ical preachers, who believe that the region, particularly Iraq and Syria. It
pandemic sheds light on the impor- also aims to highlight the “new” types
tance of certain practices of radical of terrorism that ISIS has been urging
Islam. The hygiene measures that have its followers to practise amidst COVID-
been recommended to guard against 19. The last chapter of this study takes
contamination are an opportunity for a similar approach of exploring extrem-
Jihadists to call for conversion to Islam, ist dynamics on the ground and related
a religion where ablution before the actors, state responses and policies, as
five daily prayers is a hygiene measure well as the emerging socioeconomic
already well established by Islam. consequences of the pandemic in the
Maghreb region. Due to COVID-19
Against this background, this study and its accompanying insecurities and
aims at examining the potential link be- travel restrictions, the study predomi-
tween increasing threats of violence nantly relies on qualitative data from
and terrorist activity and the spread of interviews with international experts
COVID-19, and subsequently proposes and local stakeholders, as well as on a
recommendations for the European broad range of primary and secondary
Union to better understand and push sources, including academic publica-
back terrorist groups’ activities amidst tions, policy papers and newspaper ar-
the pandemic. The chapters in the ticles.14 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups References BENRAAD, M. (2020). Quand la propagande djihadiste s’empare de la crise sanitaire. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/ quand-la-propagande-djihadiste-sempare-de-la-crise-sanitaire-135886 BOUSSEL, P. (2020). Covid-19, le djihadisme au défi d’une pandémie. Fondation pour la Rrecherche Stratégique. Retrieved from https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/covid-19-djihadisme-defi-une- pandemie-2020 DE COURRÈGES, H., GERMAIN, E., & LE NEN, N. (2010). Principes de contre- insurrection. ECONOMICA. STALINSKY, S. (2020). What Jihadists are saying about the coronavirus. A magazine describes the pathogen as ‘one of Allah’s soldiers.’ Another passes along CDC hygiene tips. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-jihadists-are-saying-about-the-coronavirus- 11586112043 Policy Study n. 21
COVID-19 in the Sahel: Litmus Test for State Capacity Rather Than Fuel for Extremists Johannes Claes Research Fellow, Sahel Programme, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute Dr. Kars de Bruijne Senior Research Fellow, Sahel Programme, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute Sophie Mertens Intern, Sahel Programme, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute
Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 17
Introduction led to an increase in the short term.
Moreover, the interaction between
The link between the COVID-19 pan- COVID-19 and structural drivers of vi-
demic and terrorism in the Sahel is far olent extremism is multifaceted, non-
from obvious, yet all too often as- linear and in the Sahel largely absent.
sumed. From March 2020 onwards, Hence, disease containment measures
analysts speculated that the pandemic and extremist activity are so far unre-
would create opportunities for Violent lated, even though effects might be-
Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the come apparent later.
Sahel. VEOs were expected to exploit
governance vacuums as state security This chapter analyses the ongoing re-
forces could have been forced to scale sponses to the COVID-19 outbreak in
down their activities due to lockdowns the Sahel, focusing specifically on Mali,
and the need to provide health ser- Niger and Burkina Faso. It focuses on
vices, while foreign military forces, the the pre-existing conditions that were
argument went, could be forced to already in place prior to the outbreak
concentrate on troubles at home. of the pandemic, the state responses
VEOs would then be able to expand in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, and
their reach. the potential longer-term implications
of the appeal of extremist groups in
Moreover, it was believed that struc- this context. The study seeks to under-
tural problems – already sponsoring vi- stand how the evolving COVID-19 situ-
olence – would be adversely impacted ation in the three countries has
by the pandemic. Economic griev- impacted both levels of extremist viol-
ances, discontent with political orders ence and responses by local and state
and harsh military responses to extrem- authorities.
ism were drivers of violence prior to
the COVID-19 outbreak. Many specu- This chapter is based on ongoing
lated that COVID-19 would reinforce analysis by the Clingendael Institute of
these drivers as states would increas- the situation in Mali, Niger and Burkina
ingly use violence against civilians, Faso. It reviews the drivers of VEO re-
muzzle opposition voices and benefit cruitment in the Sahel, and analyses
from weak governance models that data from the Armed Conflict Location
allow for corruption and elite capture. and Event Data Project (ACLED) on vi-
This could in turn contribute to the fer- olence since the outbreak of the pan-
tile grounds for recruitment of extrem- demic. It is also supported by a small
ist groups throughout the Sahel. But number of interviews with experts that
did COVID-19 indeed have this effect? work on governance and violent ex-
Data analyses on the distribution and tremism in the Sahel.
intensity of violence and evidence col-
lected in the Sahel for the purpose of The first section presents a number of
this chapter casts doubt on both predictions on the relations between
claims. The reality is that supporting violent extremism and COVID-19. Then
evidence is so far non-existent. Viol- a section follows on the spread of
ence throughout the Sahel has con- COVID-19 in the Sahel. A third section
tinued at a level that was already presents data analysis of ACLED. The
extremely concerning prior to the out- final section explores the complicated
break of the virus. COVID-19 has not relationship between root causes and18 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
the spread of the pandemic. The piece munities by offering such basic ser-
closes with recommendations for pol- vices, relying on the theory that the
icy and programming. success of disruptive groups depends
on their ability to exploit chaos. The
Fears of COVID-19 further strain on government resources was
seen as hampering states’ ability to
fuelling extremist activity provide basic services to their popu-
in the region lations, providing a good opportunity
for VEOs to strengthen their local sup-
As the first cases of COVID-19 started port by offering financial incentives, se-
to appear in the Sahel while the virus curity and other basic services
had a catastrophic impact on the Glo- (Coleman, 2020). Additionally, seg-
bal North, several reports warned that ments of the population were said to
VEOs could take advantage of COVID- be at risk of being further disen-
19 in the Sahel. These warnings came franchised in the event of state COVID-
primarily against the backdrop of com- 19 measures enforcement that lack
munication efforts by the leaderships respect for fundamental rights. As
of extremist organisations, both in the Sahelian states rolled out containment Analysts argued
Middle East and in West Africa, in measures that in some cases seemed that the link
which the virus was portrayed as a pun- to point to a crackdown on civil lib- between
ishment for crusader nations (Berlin- erties, analysts argued that the link be- political
gozzi, 2020). As Süß argues in her tween political discontent and discontent and
chapter of this study, such warnings extremism might backfire (De Bruijne extremism
were also present in the Maghreb re- & Bisson, 2020). might backfire
gion. It was argued that they could use
it to strengthen their positions and in- Besides warnings about the exploita-
crease violent attacks. Additionally, tion of states’ shortcomings, the pan-
warnings emerged about the virus pro- demic was predicted to further stretch
viding fertile ground for recruitment available security assets in the fight
strategies of such organisations. The against the virus, and thereby poten-
sections below provide an overview of tially weaken the capacity to respond
the key arguments advanced at that to domestic security threats (Columbo
time. & Harris, 2020). The argument about
extremist groups’ opportunistic behav-
As COVID-19 reached Sahelian capi- iour was advanced as a potential rea-
tals, warnings were issued that the po- son to worry in light of the pandemic
tential for VEOs to continue exploiting as groups might try to exploit disorder
governance shortcomings would in- and carry out violent attacks or gain
crease (Coleman, 2020). The inability of territory (Burkati, 2020; International
Sahelian governments to provide basic Crisis Group, 2018 & 2020). Such a de-
services such as healthcare and security velopment could have left Sahelian
would likely deepen as resources were states more vulnerable to attacks. On
shifting towards fighting COVID-19 in- such a basis, some predicted that invol-
stead of providing basic healthcare ser- ving security forces to enforce curfews
vices, which were already under strain and isolation measures would give
in a pre-pandemic era. As a result, it room to VEOs to strengthen their posi-
was assumed that VEOs would be able tions (Fletcher & Rouget, 2020). This
to increase their influence in local com- could mean, as a result, that violent ac-
Policy Study n. 21Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 19
tions by VEOs would not be met with and their operation Takouba in Mali
the necessary force to contain them have tried to maintain the scope of
(Dahir, 2020). Reports that the Malian their operations, some noted that in
army detachment deployed in the areas general their presence on the ground
of Mopti and Tenenkou have aban- decreased (Diall, 2020).
doned their positions since the begin-
ning of the pandemic further fuelled Lastly, a concern voiced by some in the
such concerns as it was believed that it wake of the spread of the virus was
would allow VEOs to re-establish them- that VEOs in the Sahel could use the
selves in some of those areas (Diall, pandemic as an opportunity to recruit
2020). In addition, some argued, the se- and radicalise fighters, based on ideo-
curity disengagement could lead to the logical arguments. COVID-19’s spread
targeting of critical COVID-19-related in- could potentially be exploited in a nar-
frastructure (Asare-Bediako, 2020). rative where it was portrayed, the ar-
gument goes, as a divine punishment
A similar argument was raised in rela- against the West and all those who op-
tion to the presence of foreign troops press Muslims (Burkati, 2020). State-
in the Sahel. It was suggested that ments made by Al-Qaeda and the
there could be a lower level of engage- so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ment due to the pandemic. Several (ISIS) in the Middle East were inter-
think tanks warned about the risk of preted by some as a clear intention to
such international disengagement utilise the turmoil created by the pan-
(Coleman, 2020; Burchill, 2020; Col- demic to convince more people to join
umbo & Harris, 2020). It was argued their ranks (Coleman, 2020). There was
that countries that were providing sup- concern that VEOs in the Sahel could
port and expertise might decide to follow this propaganda strategy and
focus on their domestic priorities, leav- use COVID-19 to justify their cause
ing Sahelian countries even more vul- (Columbo & Harris, 2020).
nerable to VEOs. In a similar fashion,
analysts pointed out that while peace- Several months after the outbreak of
keeping missions and international the pandemic and the issuing of these
counter-terrorism efforts adjusted to warnings, the emerging picture is
COVID-19 containment measures, it rather that the early rhetoric of VEO
could leave more space to VEOs to leadership has not brought about sig-
carry out violent attacks and gain con- nificant changes on the ground in
trol over resources (ACAPS, 2020; Edu- terms of COVID-19-induced shifts in
Afful, 2020). When delays in the operational realities or VEOs’ recruit-
deployment of troops and the altering ment strategies. The next section will
of rotation schedules were announced, first look at the spread of the virus
it was argued that they might throughout the region by focusing on
negatively impact the fight against Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. After
VEOs (Burkati, 2020). While inter- briefly introducing the numbers and
national operations including the containment measures, the section will
United Nations Multidimensional Inte- focus on how far these developments
grated Stabilization Mission in Mali are relevant against the backdrop of
(MINUSMA), Operation Barkhane, the the known drivers of VEO recruitment,
regional G5 Sahel Joint Force, two as well as against the evolution of viol-
European Union (EU) training missions ent incidents in 2020.20 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
COVID-19 in the Sahel lower-than-expected infection rates
is, nevertheless, clearly visible.
Despite early fears about its potential
to wreak havoc on the African conti- There are various reasons for lower
nent, the COVID-19 pandemic spread numbers in the Sahel and West Africa:
at a relatively slow pace throughout first, the age pyramid of many West Af-
West Africa and the Sahel, especially rican countries shows a distribution op-
when compared to its spread in the posite to many western countries,
Global North. The number of infec- where elderly populations were signifi-
tions and COVID-19-related deaths cantly affected by the early spread of
remained relatively low (Worldometer, the virus. Second, a strong and early
n.d.-a). It is clear that there are large public health response by countries
variations across West African coun- mitigated its impact. Third, an experi-
tries due to differing levels of testing ence with recent disease outbreaks
capacity and tracing policies. While such as Ebola and Polio provided a
this makes it hard to directly compare context in which such responses were
countries within the region and to the more readily available (Dusoulier, 2020;
Global North, the overall tendency of IFRC, 2020).
Table1. COVID-19 figures per country
Total cases Total deaths Cases/one Testing
million capacity/one
inhabitants million
inhabitants
Mali 8,203 339 398 7,083 tests
Niger 4,656 167 188 3,096 tests
Burkina Faso 11,426 134 538 No data
available
Source: Worldometer (n.d.-a).
The first cases of COVID-19 virus ap- per one million inhabitants (Worldom-
peared in Mali, Niger and Burkina eter, n.d.-a). The first wave of the pan-
Faso in the middle of March 2020. demic hit its highest numbers in May
The following section will look at the and June with a total of 51 deaths in
evolution of the numbers of the out- May and 916 recorded new cases in
break as well as the current situation. June (Johns Hopkins University, n.d.-
b). As of late 2020, early 2021, after a
Numbers and policies long period of low cases being de-
tected, numbers started rising again
In Mali a total of 8,203 cases of and were much higher than during the
COVID-19 and 339 deaths have been first wave. The month of December
recorded since the beginning of the 2020, for instance, broke records with
pandemic.1 This amounts to 398 cases 2,380 recorded new cases. These
1
Sources accessed and numbers as of 11 February 2021.
Policy Study n. 21Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 21
numbers are believed to underesti- COVID-19 hit the country in April with
mate the true spread of the virus in the a record 692 new confirmed cases that
country. While having an open testing month, and May followed with a record
policy which includes asymptomatic of 32 deaths (Johns Hopkins University,
patients (Our World in Data, n.d.), Mali n.d.-c; Worldometer, n.d.-b). In the fol-
has a low testing rate of 7,083 tests per lowing months, the number of cases
one million inhabitants (Worldometer, steadily fell to less than 10 cases a day
n.d.-a). Such rates stand in sharp until the start of the second wave in
contrast to countries in the Global November. A similar upsurge as ob-
North, where rates are usually several served in neighbouring Mali is ongoing
hundreds of thousands of tests per one in recent months with higher detected
million inhabitants.2 infection rates than in spring. De-
During the early cember 2020 saw a record 1,175 new
stages of the During the early stages of the virus out- cases and 46 new deaths (Johns Hop-
virus outbreak break in the country, Malian authorities kins University, n.d.-c). Despite an
in the country, took drastic measures to prevent the open public testing policy (Our World
Malian spread of the virus, including border, in Data, n.d.), these numbers are ex-
authorities took school and university closures, as well pected to largely underestimate the
drastic
as restrictions on public gatherings of actual spread of the virus. Niger has a
measures to
prevent the
over 10 people (Reuters COVID-19 testing capacity of 3,096 tests per one
spread of the Tracker, n.d.-b; University of Oxford, million inhabitants, which is signifi-
virus n.d.). Measures were significantly cantly lower than Mali (Worldometer,
scaled down as the number of infec- n.d.-a). In reaction to the first wave of
tions decreased over the summer the pandemic and in order to slow the
(Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, n.d.-b). In spread of the virus, authorities im-
reaction to a higher case rate, Malian posed a stay-at-home requirement
authorities announced a nationwide (University of Oxford, 2020-2021c), a
state of emergency on 18 December restriction on public gatherings (Uni-
2020 accompanied by new measures versity of Oxford, 2020-2021b), as well
including the closure of all bars, res- as border and school closures (Univer-
taurants and nightclubs, and gather- sity of Oxford, 2020-2021d). Measures
ings were limited to a maximum of 50 were lifted progressively in the follow-
people.3 Big markets were to close at ing months with schools re-opening
6 pm and schools were announced to from June onwards and borders re-
close for a minimum of two weeks opening with screening measures on
(Jeune Afrique, n.d.). arrival since the beginning of August
(University of Oxford, 2020-2021d).
In Niger a total of 4,656 cases of Consecutive months only saw minor
COVID-19 and 167 deaths have been changes being implemented, until
recorded since the beginning of the major new measures were announced
outbreak in the country, which equals mid-December 2020. In light of the
188 cases per one million inhabitants second wave with COVID-19 cases ris-
(Johns Hopkins University, n.d.-c; Worl- ing since the beginning of December
dometer, n.d.-a). The first wave of (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, n.d.-c),
2
Some examples include Spain (615,316), France (610,094) and Germany (433,132).
3
Declared until 26 June 2021.22 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
authorities announced a new school tion. Since the beginning of August, ar-
closure (Chahed, 2020), a ban on rivals into the country are subject to
gatherings of over 50 people and clo- quarantine measures or screening on
sure of all bars, night clubs and enter- arrival, and stay-at-home recommen-
tainment venues until further notice dations were lifted in September (Uni-
(IciNiger, 2020). versity of Oxford, 2020-2021c).
Gatherings of over 50 people have
At the time of writing, Burkina Faso been banned. Contrary to other coun-
had recorded a total number of tries, Burkina Faso did not take new
11,426 COVID-19 cases and 134 deaths measures when facing an increase of
since the start of the outbreak in March COVID-19 cases in September, nor
2020. The average number of cases since the exponential surge since De-
per one million inhabitants in Burkina cember, giving the reported evolution
Faso is 538 (Worldometer, n.d.-a). The of cases a different trend than in Niger
country faced a first wave in March and Mali (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker,
and April followed by an increase in n.d.-a).
cases in September and October
similar in numbers. The second wave Main observations
brings the number of cases of COVID-
19 at the time of writing to record From this brief overview of dynamics,
highs in the country. December saw a three conclusions can be drawn. First,
record 3,821 new cases reported, al- the COVID-19 pandemic put an addi-
though the number of deaths re- tional strain on already fragile public
mained below the reported April health systems in the three countries
threshold of 29 deaths (Johns Hop- under study. The impact, however, was
kins University, n.d.-a). While Burkina limited to mostly urban areas and re-
Faso offers an open testing policy, it mained nearly absent further afield. In
can reasonably be expected that the such areas the cases recorded, including
number of recorded COVID-19 cases in the ongoing second wave of infec-
largely underestimates the real spread tions, remain below the scenarios that
of the virus in the country (Jeune Af- were drawn at the onset of the pan-
rique, n.d.). demic.
During the first wave of COVID-19 Second, major changes to service provi-
cases in Burkina Faso, the authorities sion by state actors have remained
required people not to leave their relatively limited. There has been some There is some
homes and provided a couple of ex- but generally little diversion of large evidence that
ceptions (University of Oxford, 2020- parts of state assets in a response ongoing
2021c), put internal movement against the COVID-19 outbreak. international
development
restrictions in place, restricted gather-
project
ings (University of Oxford, 2020- Third, there is some evidence that on- resources have
2021b) and closed schools (University going international development pro- been diverted
of Oxford, 2020-2021a). Schools re- ject resources have been diverted away in order to
opened in June and the stay-at-home away in order to respond to the virus respond to the
requirements became a recommenda- outbreak.4 Such examples remain virus outbreak
4
Crisis Group has signalled such a case in the Mopti region of Mali (International Crisis Group,
2021).
Policy Study n. 21Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 23
anecdotal, however, and their oper- This question is addressed in two parts.
ational implications are likely to remain The first part explores levels of political
limited. Moreover, the institutional violence on the basis of ACLED data
logic of many organisations (losing analysis. It finds that, despite the
budget if one does not deplete re- multiple warnings about the potential
sources) meant that reserved budgets for increasing VEO activity, there is
were still spent – though later in the hardly any quantitative evidence for
year.5 changes in the patterns of political dis-
order. Overall levels of violence have
Exploring data on the been and are still driven by factors not
related to the pandemic.
relation between VEO
activity and COVID-19 The second part of this section ex-
plores indirect patterns – does COVID-
Although the impact of COVID-19 has 19 interact with structural drivers of
been more limited than initially as- violence? The overall observation is
sumed, the pandemic still constituted that there is presently also very little
a major health crisis. So what has been evidence for the effect of COVID-19 on
the effect of this crisis on violence in these drivers, although it might still be
the region? too early to tell.
Figure1. VEO violence in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (January 2016-January 2021)
Source: ACLED (2016-2021).
5
Interviewed researchers pointed to this logic being used by some EU member states in their
financial processing of COVID-19 on external aid budgets. Interview with Sahel researcher (personal
communication, January 2021).24 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
What quantitative data on uptrend in terms of armed clashes, at-
political violence in the tacks and improvised explosive devices
Sahel tells us by armed actors in Mali, Niger and Bur-
kina Faso.7 Re-running the analysis to
COVID-19 has not had a structural effect only include VEOs as violent actors does
on levels of political violence in the not generate different dynamics. Hence,
Sahel. Figure 1 presents ACLED data increasing violence in 2020 fits a long-
from 2016 to early 2021 for political vi- term uptrend without clear outliers.
olence in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.6
It is clear that there is a general multi-an- Figures 2a to 5b present types and per-
nual – and thus predating COVID-19 – petrators/victims of political violence
Figure 2a/b. Actor activity and types of violence (October 2019-January 2021)
Source: ACLED (2016-2021).
6
Definitions: Battles (armed clashes, non-state and government overtake territory), remote violence
(air/drone strikes, remote explosives, shelling), violence against civilians (attack, sexual violence,
abductions). Data only presents VEO activity.
7
The list of actors selected in the ACLED database: Ansaroul Islam, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
Boko Haram, ISIS, Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin (JNIM), Katiba Macina. Such a confirmation of
an existing longer-term trend is also observed by Süß in her chapter on the Maghreb.
Policy Study n. 21Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 25
around the first wave (March/April 2020) are unrelated to COVID-19 and are
and second wave (November 2020-Ja- driven by endogenous conflict dy-
nuary 2021) in all three countries. There namics. The largest change in political
are some potential visible effects of activity levels took place in Mali, at the
COVID-19 on political violence levels. end of November, beginning of De-
However, upon closer inspection, as ar- cember, with a large drop in battles co-
gued below, none of these effects are inciding with new COVID-19-induced
really driven by the virus outbreak. restrictions on movement being imple-
mented. However, the drop in violence
During the first wave there were three was driven by a series of local peace
small and temporary changes in pat- agreements between Fulani and Dogon
terns of violence. In Mali, the number groups. In Niger, violence against civil-
of battles went up from the end of ians increased slightly during the second
March for about three weeks – most of wave, as did activity by non-state armed
this activity was executed by VEOs, Ja- groups, but this development fitted a
maat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin pattern from early September of in-
(JNIM) in particular. However, the in- creased Islamic State in the Greater Sa-
crease in activity was temporary and hara (ISGS) activity in the Tillabery
confined to Mopti. In Mopti, it was local region. No change whatsoever to levels
dynamics between Dogon and Fulani, of political violence can be observed in
two ethnic groups present in the central Burkina Faso.
Sahel, that drove increased JNIM activ-
ity. In Burkina Faso, there was a major in- Hence, the trends from 2016 to 2021,
crease in protests in the first week of as well as weekly levels of violence,
March but this was before COVID-19 ac- show no noteworthy impact on the
tually became a problem and restrictive number of registered incidents during
measures were implemented. Finally, in the first and second COVID-19 waves
early April 2020, Niger saw a small drop in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. As
in violence against civilians and activities figure 3 shows, activity by groups as-
by non-state actors. However, this drop, sociated with JNIM (e.g., Katiba
which endured for just a few weeks, was Macina, Katiba Serma, Ansar Dine, Al
confined to the Tillabery region and was Mourabitoune) and ISGS activity do
a direct result of the French-led Oper- not vary with COVID-19. Hence, simi-
ation Barkhane offensive that kicked off lar to Süß’s findings in this study for
before the pandemic. violence in the Maghreb, COVID-19
has had no impact on the intensity,
Very similar dynamics can be observed distribution and composition of politi-
for the second wave; apparent anomalies cal violence in the Sahel.26 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
Figure 3. Activity by VEOs (January 2019-January 2021)
Source: ACLED (2016-2021).
Did COVID-19 impact for self-fulfilment or prestige or ad-
vancing religious arguments. The set of
structural drivers of drivers requires context-specific analy-
violence in the Sahel? sis that often needs to take place at a
very local level in order to capture the
The absence of significant immediate extent to which different drivers are at
and longer-term effects might be ex- play in a given situation. The following
plained by the ways in which VEOs op- section will outline these main drivers
erate in the Sahel. They use a range of in the Sahel and briefly discuss the in-
recruitment techniques to attract new, terplay with the virus outbreak.
often young, individuals into their or-
ganisations. Those range from socio- The effects of COVID-19 on
economic arguments to tapping into local power structures and
intercommunal or inter-ethnic cleav-
ages, filling in for state absence and
local economies
protecting against violence from the Changes in local power structures are
state, as well as catering to the need often a key driver of VEO recruitment.
Policy Study n. 21Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 27
Reports show that Ibrahim Malam also partially aided by the prospects of
Dicko, the founder of the VEO Ansa- material gains and redistributive pol-
roul Islam in Burkina Faso, used local icies for their new members (Thurston,
frustrations and a sense of inequality 2020, p. 157). Furthermore, some indi-
felt by young individuals due to their viduals are mainly motivated by self-in-
low social status to gather support (Le terest, sometimes alongside other
Roux, 2019, p. 4). In Mali, Katiba reasons, to join VEOs (Baldaro & Diall,
Macina’s success at the local level has 2020, p. 76). Accounts from the 1980s
been partly helped by young herders’ report that radical groups attracted
rejection of local elites and by subvert- young individuals across West Africa by
ing local power structures. Similarly, offering them social services and by
the presence of local youths who felt being able to provide them with new
excluded because of their lower social social statuses with more authority and
status facilitated their recruitment responsibility (Ismail, 2013, p. 215).
(Thurston, 2020, p. 157). This suggests
that the recruitment rhetoric put for- More recently, Katiba Macina in Mali
ward by VEOs tapped into their feeling was joined by individuals for personal
of rejection and inequality. It leads reasons. Some were motivated by the
some analysts to suggest that part of reasons outlined above, but others
the appeal of VEOs may originate from joined following prison breaks believ-
promises to restructure social order, an ing it was their best post-escape op-
order in which some of the youths do tion (Thurston, 2020, p. 158). Young
not believe anymore (Thurston, 2020, individuals also join armed groups to
Given the p. 167). Given the pandemic’s relatively gain community recognition and re-
pandemic’s low impact in the region, its effects on spect. A young man from an anti-gov-
relatively low power structures have so far not be- ernment group in Timbuktu said, “My
impact in the come apparent, if there are any at all. source of motivation is the support I
region, its Peripheral areas further away from receive from my community for the
effects on urban centres where most COVID-19 safeguarding of property and
power
cases were detected – areas where people” (Mercy Corps & Think Peace,
structures have
so far not
VEOs often operate – are unlikely to 2017, p. 14). Economic hardship re-
become feel any impact at all. sulting from the pandemic’s impacts
apparent, if on local economies, remittances and
there are any at Recruitment strategies based on econ- state finances might in principle have
all omic arguments might see an impact, a longer-term bearing on economic
as they often provide incentives for drivers of VEO recruitment. In addi-
joining VEOs. For example, ISGS com- tion, analysts have argued that shrink-
batants are encouraged to keep and ing economies in the Global North
use the loot from attacks as they could have a negative impact on mili-
please, distinguishing themselves from tary and development budgets that
other groups like Katiba Macina that are used to finance operations and
tend to centralise the management of programmes in the Sahel (International
gained resources. The horizontal Crisis Group, 2021). However, as Süß
mechanism of resource redistribution is also argues in her chapter on the
a helpful recruitment argument for Maghreb, such links are far from
ISGS (Baldaro & Diall, 2020, p. 77). Ad- causal, and interviewed Sahel experts
ditionally, the second large wave of agree that to date such an impact has
JNIM recruitment coalition in Mali was not manifested itself.28 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
The effect of COVID-19 institutions such as schools in a bid to re-
duce their service provision and rein-
on exploiting community force the narrative of state
grievances abandonment that the group promotes
(Le Roux, 2019, p. 4). Generally, a sense
Intercommunal and inter-ethnic cleav- of grievance and limited confidence in Intercommunal
ages and local grievances are exploited the government has been shown to be and inter-ethnic
by VEOs to recruit fighters. Existing re- regionally correlated with a high level of cleavages and
search based on interviews with custom- VEO recruitment (UNDP RBA, 2017, p. local grievances
ary leaders in the region of Mopti, Mali, 68). A United Nations Development Pro- are exploited by
confirmed this technique used by ISGS gramme report surveyed individuals VEOs to recruit
fighters
(Baldaro & Diall, 2020, p. 76). Similarly, about their personal “tipping points” for
JNIM has used community-based tech- joining a VEO. 71% of respondents re-
niques to exploit local tensions and turn ported “government action”, including
local armed groups into allied groups “killing or arrest of a family member or
(Nsaibia & Weiss, 2020, p. 10). Katiba friend” as the specific event that led
Macina, for example, used the feeling of them to join a VEO (UNDP RBA, 2017,
injustice experienced by many Fulani, p. 73). Similarly, Katiba Macina was
especially herders, in the Mopti regions joined by many recruits looking for re-
to expand its following (Thurston, 2020, venge and protection from Malian sol-
p. 157; FIDH & AMDH, 2018, p. 28). Ad- diers or ethnic militias targeting them
ditionally, Peul villagers and herders and their communities. Previous re-
seeking “equitable justice” joined the search in Mali and other African contexts
VEO (Thurston, 2020, p. 157). In Burkina show that individuals seeking protection
Faso, VEOs have used comparable tech- and revenge from the consequences of
niques by taking advantage of social the state absence or violence might ac-
cleavages in northern and eastern re- count for the largest numbers of VEO re-
gions. Responsibility for many deadly at- cruits (Thurston, 2020, pp. 157-58).
tacks carried out by VEOs on religious
sites or ethnic groups in the regions are VEOs use religious arguments to recruit
not officially claimed. It is part of a strat- new members; references to Islam and
egy to create confusion, fuel divisions its presumed precepts are used
between communities and provoke re- throughout declarations made by VEO
prisal from ethnic militias. The insecurity leaders (Baldaro & Diall, 2020, p. 71).
they create allows them to recruit and However, religion is rarely the driving
operate without too much opposition force leading to individuals joining
(Lazarides, 2019, p. 3). VEOs, but rather an additional motiva-
tion in addition to others (Mercy Corps
VEOs are known to profit from state vi- & Think Peace, 2017, p. 16). Among
olence and neglect. According to a others, religion is used as a powerful
former member of the Ansaroul Islam tool for local recruitment and to
group in Burkina Faso, the denigrating strengthen internal cohesion (Baldaro &
actions of the security forces spurred the Diall, 2020, p. 71). In 2015, the second
first armed attack of the group in 2016, wave of recruitment of Katiba Macina in
which is widely considered as the birth Mali partly relied on religious arguments
of Ansaroul Islam (Le Roux, 2019, p. 4). to attract new members (Thurston,
Since then, the group targets state rep- 2020, p. 157). Religion has also been
resentatives, security forces and public used in the past to gather the support
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