Normalisation and Realignment in the Middle East
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NO. 45 JULY 2021 Introduction
Normalisation and Realignment
in the Middle East
A New, Conflict-Prone Regional Order Takes Shape
Muriel Asseburg and Sarah Ch. Henkel
Between 2020 and 2021, Israel concluded normalisation agreements with four Arab
states. They were celebrated internationally as a breakthrough. Meanwhile, since
2018, and largely unnoticed by the public, Arab states have started repairing their
relations with Syria. Finally, in January 2021, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended their boycott of Qatar during the meeting of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. Changing assessments
of the regional security situation and converging interests have enabled these rap-
prochements. However, these developments do not mean that the region is moving
towards peace and stability; on the contrary, long-lasting conflicts remain unresolved
and the threat perceptions of third actors are being exacerbated. Germany and its
partners in the EU should avoid being co-opted by local and regional conflicting par-
ties and should instead focus on supporting regional conflict management.
Several rapprochements are currently their relations by signing the so-called
taking place between countries in the con- Abraham Accords. Israel also concluded
flict-torn Middle East. They are decisively agreements with Morocco and Sudan on
driven by the Arab Gulf States, especially 22 December 2020 and 6 January 2021,
the UAE, and are largely a symptom of the respectively. All four agreements stipulate
regional power shifts emerging from the mutual recognition and the establishment
so-called Arab Spring. Another contributing of diplomatic relations.
factor can be seen in the fickle nature of However, the depth of the relationships
the US’s Middle East policy as its focus envisaged in the individual agreements
increasingly shifts away from the region. varies significantly. Israel’s agreements
with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco build
upon the Israeli-Arab normalisation of the
Israeli-Arab Normalisation 1990s, which was made possible by the Oslo
peace process between Israel and the Pales-
On 15 September 2020, Israel and the UAE, tine Liberation Organization (PLO). At the
as well as Bahrain, agreed to normalise time, this rapprochement facilitated tradeand tourism between Israel and a number campaigns, and specific national interests
of Gulf and Maghreb states, albeit to that played the most prominent roles.
varying degrees, and enabled the establish- US President Trump sought to distinguish
ment of bilateral diplomatic or trade repre- himself as a peacemaker in the Middle East,
sentations. Yet, these relations suffered especially after his so-called “deal of the
massive setbacks as a result of the Second century” to settle the Israeli-Palestinian
Intifada from 2000 to 2005. conflict remained unsuccessful after being
Today’s rapprochements with the three put forward in January 2020. He also in-
states were possible because none of them tended to mobilise regional support for his
had bilateral conflicts with Israel; nor had maximum pressure campaign against Iran
any of them ever been significantly in- and to strengthen the US economy through
volved in wars with Israel. Israel and the arms deals.
UAE had already developed close intelli- Israel prioritised closing the ranks against
gence, military and civilian ties in recent Iran, while also seeking to establish a new
years. With the agreement, these arrange- paradigm in which the Palestinian leader-
ments are now official, and attempts will ship would no longer have veto power
be made to deepen and expand them to over Israel’s regional relations. In addition,
include a societal dimension. In view of the Israel sought to broaden its economic rela-
previous ties, these accords hardly qualify tions and expand its presence in the Horn
as “peace agreements” – as framed by of Africa. The US’s arms deliveries to Arab
then-US President Donald Trump – but states were offset by its commitments to
rather a “coming out”. maintaining Israel’s qualitative military
The agreement between Israel and Sudan edge.
should be judged differently, as the two The UAE was primarily interested in
countries had been in a state of war up accessing modern weapons systems and
until that point. Sudanese contingents establishing a long-term bond with the US
fought in wars against Israel, and under through extensive arms cooperation. The
Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019), Khartoum Trump administration promised the UAE
maintained close relations with opponents 50 F35 fighter jets and 18 reaper drones for
of Israel, especially Iran and Hamas. Israel their normalisation with Israel. In mid-
had repeatedly attacked convoys in Sudan January 2021, it also designated the UAE
that were transporting weapons to Hamas. and Bahrain as major US security partners.
This agreement, therefore, is in fact a In addition, the UAE was interested in
“peace agreement”, albeit still awaiting improving its reputation following its con-
implementation. troversial involvement in the Yemen war.
Further, Abu Dhabi sought to diversify its
Transactional Agreements economy and develop the country into a
technology hub. The agreement between
The recent normalisations comprise prime Israel and Bahrain, on the other hand, was
examples of transactional agreements. The not so much the result of specific Bahraini
Trump administration played a crucial interests as it was a signal of Saudi support
mediating role in their conclusion, placing for closer cooperation between Bahrain and
Sudan under massive pressure and offering Israel, seeing that Manama has hardly any
the UAE and Morocco additional incentives independent decision-making capacity vis-à-
to sweeten the deal. After all, for all actors vis Riyadh.
involved, interests, not the settlement of Sudan, under de facto President Abdelfat-
conflict, took centre stage. Apart from the tah al-Burhan, had motives for the agree-
convergence of the threat perceptions of ment that actually bore no relation to
Israel and the Arab states, it was the per- Israel at all. Rather, Washington had made
sonal motives of Trump and Netanyahu, Sudan’s removal from its terror list and
who were both in the middle of election immunisation against lawsuits brought by
SWP Comment 45
July 2021
2terror victims conditional upon Khartoum’s In this vein, the Arab “normalisers” can-
normalisation of relations with Israel. This not be expected to exert significant pressure
was crucial for the leadership in Khartoum, on Israel to settle the Israeli-Palestinian
because it not only paved the way for the conflict or Israel’s bilateral conflicts with
receipt of US developmental aid, but also Syria and Lebanon. On the contrary, the
helped Sudan rid itself of the tarnished im- UAE is even falling behind European posi-
age that had been left behind by the Bashir tions on the matter, for example by failing
regime, thereby allowing it to regain access to differentiate between Israel proper and
to international loans. Israeli settlements in occupied or annexed
Morocco was incentivised by US recogni- territories. Emirati companies have even
tion of Moroccan sovereignty over Western concluded agreements with companies
Sahara and the promise that negotiations active in Israeli settlements. While Morocco
on a settlement of the conflict there would criticises Israel’s actions, including those
take place on the basis of Morocco’s autono- that endanger the status quo on the Temple
my plan. As a result, not only the US, but Mount/Haram al-Sharif, it is unlikely to
also the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan opened use its political capital to actively counter
consulates in Western Sahara. In addition, Israel’s occupation and annexation policies.
the US promised to supply Morocco with The Trump administration’s stance,
drones and other precision weapons, as the Israeli-Moroccan agreement and the
well as extensive aid and investment. growing recognition of Moroccan sovereign-
ty over Western Sahara have also led to
Problematic Side Effects both a hardening of Morocco’s position on
the Western Sahara issue and to increasing
As a result of the agreement between Israel tensions between Morocco and Algeria.
and the UAE, a large number of cooperative Algiers feels threatened by the (potential)
ventures have since been agreed upon, not expansion of Israeli-Moroccan cooperation
only at the state level, but also between and sees itself as even more isolated in the
private and civil society actors. Thus, for region, especially due to its support for the
the first time, a “warm peace” is emerging; Polisario.
already, Israel’s relations with the UAE Beyond these direct effects, three factors
have clearly outpaced those with Egypt and in particular are likely to exacerbate con-
Jordan. Israel’s existence is not only being flict in the region. First, the Trump admin-
recognised as a reality, the country is also istration undermined principles of inter-
increasingly accepted as a partner and a national law – above all the prohibition of
part of the region. the acquisition of territory by force – and
However, this shift should not be con- this is made abundantly clear in its prom-
fused with progress towards a settlement of ises to Israel and Morocco. The second fac-
the conflicts between Israel and its neigh- tor is the intensification of Tehran’s threat
bours. In the context of the agreements, perception as it fears “strategic encircle-
Israel did commit to the Gulf States and the ment”. The US’s commitments to deliver
US not to carry out the formal annexation arms could thus trigger a new arms race in
of parts of the West Bank that it had an- the region and prompt Iran to work to
nounced in May 2020. However, the secure its strategic depth by expanding its
Abraham Accords make reference to the network of (violent) non-state actors. Third,
Trump plan, thus legitimising the Israeli Israel’s intelligence and IT cooperation with
right’s claim to parts of the West Bank as authoritarian states in the region threatens
well as permanent, overarching Israeli to further restrict the scope of action of
control over Israel and the occupied Pales- opposition and civil society actors in these
tinian territories. They make no mention states rather than promoting more inclusive
of a Palestinian state or concrete steps to political systems. As recent reports about
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. the Israeli NSO Group’s spyware “Pegasus”
SWP Comment 45
July 2021
3confirm, the UAE’s leadership features as Authoritarian Consolidation
one of the malware’s clients, employing it
for the surveillance of journalists, human Nothing has changed with regard to the
rights activists, and even members of the reasoning behind Syria’s original exclusion
Emirates’ royal families. from the Arab League, namely its massive
human rights violations and alleged war
crimes. Nonetheless, Arab states now assess
Rapprochement of Arab States the situation differently in light of various
with Syria developments, including the military defeat
of the Syrian opposition, the increased in-
Since the end of 2018, several Arab states fluence of non-Arab powers in Syria, and
have gradually been normalising their the devastating regional destabilisation
relations with Damascus. In the beginning emanating from the Syrian conflict and the
of the Syrian civil war in 2011, a majority Covid-19 pandemic. This shifting percep-
of Arab leaders condemned Assad’s actions tion was also contributed to by the realisa-
against his own population and suspended tion that, at least since Russia’s interven-
Syria’s membership in the Arab League. tion in 2015, the US and the EU, despite
Some Arab Gulf States (above all Qatar and their initial mobilisation against the Assad
Saudi Arabia) supported the Syrian oppo- regime, were no longer seeking regime
sition and rebel groups. Yet at no point change in Damascus. As a result, the Arab
during the civil war was Syria wholly iso- Gulf States in particular favoured a rever-
lated in the region. Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, sion to authoritarian consolidation across
Jordan, Lebanon and Oman never complete- the region, including in Syria.
ly severed ties with Damascus. The UAE The UAE justified its rapprochement with
maintained both economic and diplomatic Damascus in December 2018 by highlight-
channels with Damascus and harboured ing the necessity to push back the influence
several members of the Assad family. of Iran and Turkey in Syria and to strength-
The UAE and Bahrain set Syria’s rehabili- en the Sunni Arab presence there. Both Iran
tation into motion by reopening their em- and Turkey militarily intervened indirectly
bassies in Damascus in December 2018. In and directly on different sides in the con-
the run-up to the Arab League meeting in flict early on. Initiated by Russia in 2017,
March 2019, other Arab states, including the Astana Process saw Tehran and Ankara
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Tunisia, assume official roles in the management of
(unsuccessfully) lobbied for Syria’s readmis- the Syrian conflict. Since then, their pres-
sion to the organisation. At that point, only ence, or that of the militias they support,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia explicitly rejected has been consolidated in various parts of
Syria’s return. US and EU pressure was most the country. Indeed, Turkey has even
likely the main impediment to Syria’s re- administratively incorporated enclaves in
admission. northern Syria. For Abu Dhabi, the prospect
In October 2020, Oman reinstated its of profiting from investment opportunities
ambassador to Damascus. In December in the reconstruction of the war-torn coun-
2020, high-ranking representatives of the try also plays a role. Before 2011, the UAE
Syrian regime met with Israeli security was the second largest Arab investor in
officials at the Russian military base Syria after Saudi Arabia, primarily in the
Hmeimim. Finally, in early May 2021, a real estate and transportation sectors.
Saudi delegation led by intelligence chief Since 2018, Abu Dhabi has been showing
General Khaled Humaidan visited Damas- increased interest in investing in luxury
cus. Both meetings are said to have projects such as Marota City.
discussed the conditions for a regional For Syria’s neighbours, it is above all
rehabilitation of the Assad regime. economic interests that compel them to
open up to Damascus. Jordan and Lebanon,
SWP Comment 45
July 2021
4which have been severely impacted and to reduce Iran’s footprint in Syria, this
destabilised by the civil war in Syria, seek to would probably lead to a renewed flare-up
revive cross-border trade and profit by way of armed conflict in areas controlled by the
of Syrian reconstruction. The Jordanian regime, thus making the stabilisation of
leadership also fears the transnational Syria even more difficult.
mobilisation of jihadist groups and is there- Arab normalisation of relations with
fore interested in stabilising Syria and deep- Damascus goes hand in hand with a de
ening its security cooperation with Damas- facto recognition of Russia as the new
cus. Further, the interest in a swift repatria- dominant foreign power in the Middle East,
tion of the more than 1.5 million Syrian which means a further weakening of West-
refugees hosted by Jordan and Lebanon ern influence. Last but not least, the reha-
plays a central role in their respective rap- bilitation of Assad fits into the pattern of
prochements with the country. authoritarian restoration that can be ob-
The decisive obstacles for the Arab served in many other parts of the region.
leaders’ reengagement with Damascus are Assad’s staying power and the regime’s self-
therefore political pressure from Washing- presentation as a secular bulwark against
ton and Brussels, and US sanctions. Besides religious extremism are not only seen as
the punitive measures levied against Presi- constitutive of a model to be emulated by
dent Assad and his extended entourage, some rulers in the region, but they have
the US sanction regime includes sectoral also increasingly made an impression
sanctions that may also be applied to third internationally.
country nationals who cooperate with Syria’s return to the Arab League could
Syria’s financial institutions, oil and natu- thus also serve as a springboard for the
ral gas industries, and construction com- country’s leadership to reintegrate into the
panies. world community without any changes
in behaviour or reform. In any case, the
Assad’s Rehabilitation international rehabilitation of the Assad
regime is incrementally progressing. This
By gradually normalising their relations dynamic undermines the UN-led Geneva
with Syria, Arab countries confer renewed process, in which the parties to the conflict
regional legitimacy on the Assad regime. are negotiating a political settlement. Yet,
Behavioural changes in terms of respect for that route is largely deadlocked anyway,
human rights, rule of law, inclusion and and offers little prospect of success in view
good governance, let alone a political tran- of the military balance of power and the
sition and a power-sharing arrangement as Astana Process.
envisaged in UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 2254 of 2015, are no longer part of the
discussion when it comes to Syria’s return End of the Qatar Blockade
to the Arab League. As a result, the Syrian
population will continue to suffer massive In January 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
repression. The majority of displaced Syr- Bahrain and Egypt ended their boycott of
ians residing in neighbouring countries Qatar after nearly four years. In June 2017,
will likely be forced to return home in the this so-called quartet had suspended diplo-
medium-term, even if neither their safety matic relations with Doha and imposed an
nor livelihoods are guaranteed. air, land and sea blockade on the country.
Limiting Iran’s influence in Syria and They demanded, among other things, that
expelling Tehran-backed militias has now Qatar restrict its relations with Iran, close
become the Arab Gulf States’ most pressing the Turkish military base that was recently
priority. Yet, President Assad depends on established in Doha and stop supporting
these militias to maintain his claim to the Muslim Brotherhood.
power. Should the Arab states in fact try
SWP Comment 45
July 2021
5Already in 2014, Qatar’s divergent for- Iran in the four capitals combined with the
eign and security policy priorities had led to realisation that Doha was (inevitably) co-
a serious rift with Saudi Arabia, the UAE operating more closely with Ankara and
and Bahrain. Doha saw the Arab uprisings Tehran due to the boycott, contributed to
that began in 2011 as an opportunity to the quartet’s willingness to overlook Doha’s
strengthen both its regional position as well deviating foreign policy in favour of closing
as groups that it favoured. To this end, it the ranks.
supported, among others, the Muslim Third, although less significant, the
Brotherhood and its local offshoots. The lifting of the boycott offered the prospect of
leaderships in Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Manama economic recovery. March 2020’s drop in
and Riyadh, on the other hand, soon re- oil prices on the international market as
garded the uprisings, and especially the well as the decline in global demand for oil
Muslim Brotherhood’s role therein, as an due to the Covid-19 pandemic, resulted in
existential threat, and reverted to authori- significant losses for the Gulf States. The
tarian restoration. Although the dispute end of the embargo allowed for the revital-
ended in November 2014 with the signing isation of cross-border trade, mutual invest-
of the “Riyadh Document”, divergence ment and open air travel. The fact that the
remained. Again, in January 2021, the four boycott forced Qatar to diversify its econo-
countries lifted the embargo on Qatar even my has ironically made it a more attractive
though Doha had not met any of their business partner for the other Gulf States.
thirteen demands. This also provides an opportunity for the
deeper integration of their economies.
Motives for Closing Ranks
Limited Reconciliation
There were three main reasons for this dé-
tente. First, the lifting of the boycott, which Still, the persistence of ideological diver-
was primarily initiated by Saudi Arabia, gences and conflicts of interest is likely to
represented a concession to the new US continue to cause tension among the GCC
administration. The Saudi royal family states as well as between Qatar and Egypt.
sought to improve its reputation and bilat- Despite reconciliation, the GCC is still far
eral relations vis-à-vis the US in this way. from being an effective regional organisa-
During his presidential campaign, Joe Biden tion, let alone a defensive alliance.
had already announced that he would with-
draw all support for Saudi Arabia’s war in
Yemen and fundamentally reassess rela- Conflict-prone New Order
tions with the Gulf monarchy. This also
came against the backdrop of the killing of The described normalisation processes and
journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, rapprochements reflect the power shifts of
which was presumably ordered by Saudi the last decade. They can be explained by
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. countries’ changing assessments of the
Second, by lifting the embargo, the quar- regional security situation, shared threat
tet intended to integrate Qatar more strong- perceptions and converging interests –
ly into its “Sunni-Arab alliance” and thus especially, but not exclusively, of the Arab
pull it away from the sphere of Iranian and Gulf States and Israel.
Turkish influence. As the Biden administra- The power shifts are primarily character-
tion sought to return to the 2015 Joint ised by the rise of the small Gulf States, first
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or to and foremost the UAE, as the engines of
negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran, the regional development. They emerged invig-
quartet feared a strengthening of Tehran orated from the geostrategic disruptions
which (in their eyes) necessitated defensive caused by the Arab Spring, while traditional
action. The heightened threat perception of regional powers (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi
SWP Comment 45
July 2021
6Arabia and Syria) lost stability and impor- espousing political Islam. They see this
tance. At the same time, the partial with- support as a challenge to the governance
drawal of the US as the formerly dominant models of the Gulf monarchies and Egypt
foreign power in the region widened the alike.
room for manoeuvre of emerging regional Israel, Egypt and the Gulf States share
powers and non-state actors. It also offered the security-motivated interest in tying the
Russia the opportunity to significantly US to the region in the long-term. They are
expand its military presence in the Middle also eager to promote economic recovery
East and Mediterranean region. Russia was after Covid-19. The Arab Gulf States, in
therefore able to establish itself as an un- turn, seek to (further) diversify their econ-
avoidable actor with limited power to shape omies.
but great power to prevent.
Another element of the new reality is
that Russia, Iran, the UAE and Turkey de- Policy Recommendations for
ploy mercenaries and support militias as a Germany and the EU
way of exerting their influence. In doing so,
they undermine state structures and spon- A new, conflict-prone regional order is
sor a pool of fighters with different ideo- taking shape in the Middle East. The rap-
logical orientations; a situation that is likely prochements are first and foremost advan-
to destabilise the region in the long-term, tageous for those states and leaders directly
even beyond the current conflict arenas. involved. Only the normalisation of rela-
The leaders’ assessments of regional security tions between Israel and the UAE brings
dynamics have changed in that authoritarian forth tangible effects for the respective
restoration following the Arab uprisings populations in the sense of a “warm peace”.
can now be considered successful in much Still, the rapprochements do not offer any
of the region, whereas regime change in entry points for the settlement of long-
Syria is no longer considered realistic. Inter- lasting inter- or intra-state conflicts or for
nationally, too, this authoritarian restora- dealing with the socio-political causes of
tion is now increasingly accepted as with- the Arab uprisings and their destabilising
out alternative. What is more, the Pales- effects, for instance on Lebanon. On the
tinian question has lost further relevance contrary, in third countries (such as Algeria
for the Arab states, not least because their and Iran) they even intensify prevalent
threat perceptions have changed and their threat perceptions.
interests have converged with those of The potential for Germany and its part-
Israel. ners in the EU to actively shape the trajec-
The prevailing threat perception in Israel tories of developments in their southern
and the Arab Gulf States, shared by leaders neighbourhood is quite limited in view of
in Egypt and Morocco, is that Iran is ex- the dynamics analysed. Moreover, the more
panding its influence in the Middle East the policies and priorities of EU member
and the Mediterranean. Iranian attacks on states diverge, the less influence they can
oil tankers in spring 2019, and drone and exert. It is therefore crucial that Europeans
missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities exe- come together on issues of principle. Euro-
cuted by Tehran-backed Yemeni Huthi peans should avoid being dragged into
rebels in September, painfully revealed regional rivalries and refrain from engaging
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s vulnerability. in one-sided partisanship with conflicting
Additionally, the Huthis in Yemen scored parties in the region. Further, Germany, the
military successes. The aforementioned EU and its member states should not fuel
leaders also feel threatened by Turkey’s armed conflicts by, for example, supplying
geostrategic claims in the region, Ankara’s weapons to conflicting parties such as Saudi
increasingly interventionist policy in the Arabia or the UAE.
Mediterranean and its support for groups
SWP Comment 45
July 2021
7The EU and its member states will only
be able to play a mediating role if they take
into account the interests and threat per-
ceptions of all relevant actors. This is all the
more important when establishing or sup-
porting new formats for cooperation. The
East Mediterranean Gas Forum, for exam-
ple, which brings together Egypt, France,
Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority and Cyprus (with the EU and US
© Stiftung Wissenschaft as observers), is perceived by Turkey as
und Politik, 2021 an exclusive club. Consequently, since its
All rights reserved inception in 2019, it has increased, not
decreased, tensions in the Mediterranean.
This Comment reflects
In this context, it is paramount to support
the authors’ views.
the current approaches to resuming dia-
The online version of logue between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia,
this publication contains as well as between Ankara and Cairo
functioning links to other through mediation.
SWP texts and other relevant
While exchanging with the states of the
sources.
Gulf Cooperation Council, the EU should
SWP Comments are subject adequately consider the increased influence
to internal peer review, fact- of the Arab Gulf States. This would mean,
checking and copy-editing. among other things, not limiting itself to
For further information on trade relations, but expanding the exchange
our quality control pro-
to issues of regional order and security. This
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- should also include a dialogue that accom-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ panies the negotiations on a new nuclear
quality-management-for- agreement with Iran with the aim of pro-
swp-publications/ moting regional understanding and re-
ducing perceived threats. A starting point
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
for addressing the Saudi-Iranian hegemonic
Politik conflict could be the track-two talks which
German Institute for the two states have been holding for some
International and time. Another important topic should be
Security Affairs Syria. Here, the EU and its member states
should focus their efforts primarily on
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin improving the humanitarian situation and
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 the enduring stabilisation of Syria instead
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 of concentrating on preventing Arab states’
www.swp-berlin.org rehabilitation of the country. Last but not
swp@swp-berlin.org
least, the EU and its member states should
ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
discuss with the states of the GCC how the
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 normalisation agreements with Israel can
doi: 10.18449/2021C45 be conducive to constructively dealing with
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 50/2021)
Dr. Muriel Asseburg is a Senior Fellow in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.
Sarah Charlotte Henkel is a Programme Manager at the SWP’s Brussels Office.
SWP Comment 45
July 2021
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