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Political values in
Europe-China relations
Edited by: Tim Nicholas Rühlig, Björn Jerdén, Frans-Paul van der
Putten, John Seaman, Miguel Otero-Iglesias and Alice Ekman
A report by the European
Think-tank Network on
China (ETNC)
December 2018
I ! I " E # R
Political values in
Europe-China relations
ETNC Report
December 2018
Edited by:
Tim Nicholas Rühlig
Björn Jerdén
Frans-Paul van der Putten
John Seaman
Miguel Otero-Iglesias
Alice Ekman
1December 2018 All rights reserved © The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Elcano Royal Institute ISBN: 978-91-7507-429-0 Cover photo: © Shutterstock.com Layout: Tim Nicholas Rühlig (UI) Language editing: Andrew Mash Disclaimer: Although the authors of this report have used their best efforts in its preparation, they assume no responsibility for any errors or omissions, nor any liability for damages resulting from the use of or reliance on information contained herein. 2
Contents
Foreword 5
List of institutions contributing to ETNC 7
Executive Summary of the introduction 9
The role of political values in Europe-China relations 11
Introduction
Tim Nicholas Rühlig, Björn Jerdén, John Seaman, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Miguel
Otero-Iglesias and Alice Ekman
Belgium’s multilayered China policy: A case of principled pragmatism? 23
Belgium
Bruno Hellendorff
The Czech Republic’s values-based policy towards China reconsidered 27
Czech Republic
Rudolf Fürst
Discreet diplomacy: Denmark’s pragmatic stance towards China 31
Denmark Andreas Bøje Forsby
Political values in France-China relations, 2018: The start of a policy shift 35
France
under Emmanuel Macron
Alice Ekman
Germany’s promotion of liberal values vis-à-vis China: Adapting to 39
Germany
new realities in political relations
Lucrezia Poggetti and Kristin Shi-Kupfer
Sino-Greek relations: Marked by values or opportunism? 43
Greece
Plamen Tonchev
Absent political values in a pragmatic Hungarian China policy 47
Hungary
Tamas Matura
Political values in Italy’s China policy: A “constructive approach” 51
Italy
Nicola Casarini, Lorenzo Mariani, and Fabio Angiolillo
Latvia: A pragmatic approach without making significant 55
Latvia
Concessions to China
Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova and Māris Andžāns,
Human rights promotion and the changing role of political values in 59
Netherlands Netherlands-China relations
Frans-Paul van der Putten
Political values in Norway’s relations with China: Standing ground or
Norway 63
giving in?
Hans Jørgen Gåsemyr
3Poland’s modest approach to a values-based China policy 67
Poland
Justyna Szczudlik
Portugal-China relations: Political values play second fiddle 71
Portugal
Carlos Rodrigues
Political values: A sensitive issue almost absent from Romania’s relations 75
Romania
with China
Iulia Monica Oehler-Şincai
Political values in Spain-China relations: Empathy, discretion and patience 79
Spain
Mario Esteban and Miguel Otero-Iglesias
The prudent proponent Sweden’s normative China policy 83
Sweden
Viking Bohman and Anna Michalski
UK-China: Broadening the values agenda 87
United Kingdom
Tim Summers
Political values in EU-China relations: Towards a “principled” or a 91
European Union “pragmatic” approach?
Tim Nicholas Rühlig
4Foreword
The European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) is a gathering of China
experts from a selection of European research institutes. It is devoted to the
policy-oriented study of Chinese foreign policy and relations between China and
European countries as well as the European Union (EU). The network facilitates
regular exchanges among participating researchers with a view to deepening the
understanding of how Europe, as a complex set of actors, relates with China and
how China’s development and evolving global role is likely to impact the future
of Europe. The network’s discussions, analyses and recommendations take a
decidedly “bottom–up” approach, examining the various aspects of bilateral
relations between European countries and China in order to generate a more
complex perspective on the broader EU-China relationship.
The network was first launched on the initiative of the Elcano Royal Institute and
the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) in Brussels on 6 November
2014. This meeting brought together experts from eleven EU member states, as
well as observers from EU institutions. The ETNC members decided to meet in
a different capital every six months and the Mercator Institute of China Studies
(MERICS) joined Elcano and Ifri in their efforts to move the project forward.
The ETNC’s goals are:
• To facilitate regular exchanges among European researchers on key
issues related to China and Chinese foreign policy, particularly on
how they relate to the EU, individual EU member states, and other
European countries.
• To generate discussions among European policy experts on
bilateral relationships between EU member states and China, and
subsequently on the EU–China relationship more broadly.
• To contribute to the analysis of China’s emerging grand strategy by
focusing on European perspectives, with an eye on how this crucial
relationship impacts the broader global economic and political
order.
• To provide recommendations for the conduct of Europe–China
relations based on in-depth discussions and research conducted by
experts within the network.
• To create a European pool of expertise and contact networks in
and on China that can be activated and utilized whenever one of the
participating members requires it.
Ultimately, the ETNC’s main aim is to enhance European expertise, knowledge
and networking capacity on China’s foreign policy and its foreign relations with
the EU member states and the EU itself, by focusing on all the different levels
of interaction. These range from the local to the supranational, but the ETNC
considers the national sphere to be the analytical point of departure.
This report is the fourth in an on-going effort to dissect and reassemble Europe-
China relations from a European country-level perspective. The first roundtable
5discussions on the report were graciously hosted by the University of Aveiro in
Portugal in May 2018, and its conclusions further refined in discussions organized
at the China Studies Centre of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and
the New Silk Road Programme at the Rîga Straňdinđ University in October 2018.
The report has been coordinated by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
(UI) with the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Ifri,
and Elcano Royal Institute contributing to the editorial process and with the
active participation of all ETNC institutions.
6List of institutions
contributing to ETNC
Coordinating Institutions
• French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), France
• Elcano Royal Institute, Spain
• Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Germany
Participating Institutions
• Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Belgium
• Institute of International Relations (IIR), Czech Republic
• Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark
• Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA), Finland
• Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER), Greece
• Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
• Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy
• Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), Latvia
• The Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”,
The Netherlands
• Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway
• Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Poland
• University of Aveiro, Portugal
• Institute for World Economy, Romanian Academy, Romania
• University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovakia
• The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), Sweden
• Chatham House, United Kingdom
Important Disclaimer
The views presented in ETNC reports are the sole responsibility of the signed
authors and do not in any way represent the views of all members of ETNC,
its participating institutions, nor the institutions with which the authors are
affiliated.
78
Executive Summary
• Through case studies of 17 countries and the European Union (EU) as
an actor, this report analyses the role political values play in Europe’s
China policy and whether China has any influence on the understanding
of political values in the EU member states and Norway.
• The findings of the report are the result of a bottom-up research process
that has engaged with researchers in the European Think-tank Network
on China (ETNC).
• Political values may be perceived differently across Europe. For the
purposes of this report, we start from the EU definition, which makes
democracy, human rights and the rule of law core political values.
• While these three political values are deeply rooted in most European
states, the ways in which states address these issues in their relations
with China differ significantly. Based on the analysis of bilateral and
multilateral practice, it is possible to distinguish four different patterns
of behaviour among the various states: vocal and active; active and
discreet; passive; and passive and potentially counteractive.
• Our findings suggest that three factors are of particular importance to
the variety in European approaches: historical legacy, economic relations
with China and Chinese pressure:
- While there has been a general downgrading of the importance
of political values in the approaches to China of most European
states, younger democracies have been more affected by this
trend.
- Although there are exceptions, states with a higher per capita
gross domestic product tend to be more active in the field of
political values in their relations with China. Close trade relations
with China also correlate with a higher level of activity in this
field. Meanwhile, the share of Chinese investment does not
make a major difference. Instead, investment in strategic sectors
of the economy or the hope of attracting Chinese money to fill
an investment gap are more decisive factors.
- Chinese pressure has led some European states to reconsider
their level of activity in promoting democracy, human rights
and the rule of law. Even so, they have not taken political values
entirely off the agenda.
• The EU as a supranational institution is one of the most vocal advocates
of the importance of political values in relations with China. Most
prominently, concerns over political values are addressed in the EU-
China Human Rights Dialogue and EU-China Legal Affairs Dialogue
Executive Summary 9but also in many resolutions in the European Parliament. At the same
time, engagement at the EU level serves as an excuse for inactivity in this
field in many member states.
• Europe’s recent impact on China’s political values has been rather
limited. However, it is likely that it has had some impact in individual
human rights cases as well as with regard to legal reform in areas with
direct economic implications.
• Despite China’s increased efforts to promote its image abroad, in all the
countries analysed the general public and large sections of the political
elite and media hold largely negative views of China’s political system.
For instance, negative views were found in the reporting in Europe on
the removal of presidential term limits at the National People’s Congress
in 2018.
• Despite this generally negative image, China has occasionally gained
influence over decision making in some sensitive fields and is increasingly
seeking to align Europe with China’s own interests and values.
• Those political elites with an affinity for or acceptance of China’s
political system are for the most part Eurosceptic. Nonetheless, not all
Eurosceptics have a favourable view of China.
• Finally, this report highlights the diverging views and approaches within
Europe on the defence of political values in relations with China. This
leaves a number of questions still open for debate: Should Europe’s
political values extend beyond the scope of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law, for instance, to include concepts of economic liberalism?
How far should Europe go in defending its political values beyond its
borders? What ultimately is the most effective way to approach China on
these issues?
10 Executive SummaryIntroduction: Political values in
Europe-China relations
Tim Nicholas Rühlig, Björn Jerdén, John Seaman, Frans-Paul van der
Putten, Miguel Otero-Iglesias and Alice Ekman
Questions of democracy, human rights and the rule of law have long been a
source of tension in Europe’s relations with China, both in exchanges with China
and among Europeans themselves. The European Union was in part built on a
foundation of common political values,1 but member states are often at odds
over the extent to which these values should constitute a central element of their
respective relations with China. In the inaugural 2015 report of the European
Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), Europe’s lack of unity on this question
was striking.2 This remains true today, if not more so. Under the leadership of
Xi Jinping, China has become increasingly critical of Western political values and
sought to position itself as a role model for other countries.3 In this context, the
question of how to treat political values in relations with China only grows more
relevant for Europe, as does the question of how China will seek to promote its
own understanding of political values in Europe.
Through an analysis of 16 EU member states, Norway and the EU as an
institution, this report sets out to examine how political values enter into Europe-
China relations.4 It looks at how European actors treat political values in relations
with China, and how China, directly or indirectly, shapes the debate on political
values in Europe. From the outset, Europe’s political values are defined as those
identified by EU convention – the so-called triad of democracy, human rights 1
European Union, Consoli-
and the rule of law that forms its constitutive political values. As evidenced by dated Version of the Treaty on
some of the contributors to this report, however, political values can sometimes European Union, 2012, Brussels,
EU, § 21.
take on broader dimensions to include issues related to political economy and
2
Mikko Huotari et al., Map-
the rules-based international order. Such a broad definition, which is seen for ping Europe-China Relations:
example in Italy and the UK, links liberal political and economic values and treats A bottom-up approach, 2015,
Berlin, European Think-
them as mutually constitutive. While this approach takes a more comprehensive
tank Network on China,
view of Europe-China relations, it has proved far less consensual at the EU https://www.ifri.org/en/
level. Moreover, under this broad definition the boundaries of political values are publications/ouvrages-de-
lifri/mapping-europe-china
blurred, which runs the risk of confusing policies driven by economic interests -relations.
with concerns over what EU member states have jointly defined as their core 3
China Copyright and Media,
political values. Communiqué on the Current
State of the Ideological Sphere
This report does not take a stand for or against any particular definition of (Document No. 9). Report con-
political values. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law serve as the minimal cerning the Present Situation in
the Ideological Area, 2013, https:
core definition that all chapters draw on while allowing for an analysis of further //chinacopyrightandmedia.
aspects, including the economic dimension. In the introduction that follows, we wordpress.com/2013/04/
22/communique-on-the-
compare the results of all the chapters using this base definition of political current-state-of-the-ideological
values, and are careful not to establish any hierarchies between member states. -sphere-document-no-9.
4
Countries were selected
Mapping European approaches to political values and China based on the participation
of institutes in the ETNC.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, all EU member states have committed themselves to 5
The only non-member state
the external promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.5 Two reviewed in this report, Nor-
questions arise from this basic position. First, in what way and by which means do way, endorses identical values.
Introduction 11EU member states promote these values in their relations with China? Without
a doubt, strategies differ among the states, but so do their respective degrees of
leverage in relation to China. Second, what importance do EU member states
place on political values when they conflict with other interests, such as those in
the economic field? Promoting political values and protecting economic interests
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but trade-offs between different objectives
often arise. Hence, only the relative differences among European states are
discussed.
With regard to the first question, we identified particular approaches in bilateral
and multilateral contexts. At the bilateral level, we assessed EU member states’
actions against three options for promoting democracy, human rights and the
rule of law: (a) “megaphone diplomacy”, or government representatives making
public statements on sensitive human rights issues; (b) discreet diplomacy, such
as demanding the release of dissidents in non-public settings; and (c) cooperative
projects, such as assisting China’s judiciary in developing the rule of law. At
the multilateral level, EU member states have the option to actively initiate
6
United States, Item 2. Joint EU policies that prioritise the promotion of democracy, human rights and the
Statement - Human Rights rule of law. A further approach is to remain passive but be supportive of such
Situation in China. Delivered
by US Ambassador to the HRC initiatives within the EU framework. This is often closely related to a policy of
Keith Harper, 10 March 2016, “outsourcing”, whereby member states argue that only the EU as a whole has the
https://geneva.usmission.
strength to promote political values in relation to China. Some states may also
gov/2016/03/10/item-
2-joint-statement-human- raise objections to joint attempts by the EU to promote such values. Outside the
rights-situation-in-china. EU framework, states may form like-minded coalitions and formulate common
7
Simon Denyer and Emily statements and policies. Two recent examples date from 2016, when a group
Rauhala, “Eleven countries
signed a letter slamming of states submitted a statement to the United Nations Human Rights Council
China for torturing lawyers. (UNHRC) raising concerns about China’s treatment of human rights defenders,6
The U.S. did not”, Washington
Post, 22 March 2017, www.
and from 2017, when another group of states signed a letter highlighting the
washingtonpost.com/news situation of human rights lawyers in China.7
/worldviews/wp/2017/03/
22/eleven-countries-signed Patterns of action and inaction
-a-letter-slamming-china-
for-torturing-lawyers-the- When dealing with China on issues of democracy, human rights and the rule of
u-s-did-not/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.0813240a law, the study found that European countries differ to a large degree in the scope
e3cf. of their political action. Based on their behaviour in bilateral and multilateral
8
Information on some of contexts,8 they follow four relatively distinct patterns: (a) active and vocal; (b)
these aspects is based on
publicly available data; others
active and discreet; (c) passive; and (d) passive and potentially counteractive.
were assessed according to
the analysis in the chapters be-
low and the knowledge and
judgement of their authors,
although the responsibility
for qualifying patterns of
behaviour lies with the authors
of this introductory chapter.
Moreover, while the edito-
rial deadlines of this report
did not allow for an analysis
of how various European
countries have voiced their
concerns about human rights
in Xinjiang, debates within
the EU and views expressed
at the UNHRC could be
used to further elaborate
on these observed patterns
in the future.
9
Norway and Denmark
supported the 2016 UNHRC
statement, and France and
12 IntroductionCountry Strategy relative Cooperative Discreet Megaphone Ad hoc Characterisation
to EU policy projects diplomacy diplomacy multilateral of policy action
action activism (signing towards China
the 2016
and 2017
statements)
Belgium Proactive and X 2017 Active and
supportive discreet
Czech Passive and 2017 Passive
Republic supportive
Denmark Passive and X X 2016 Active and
supportive discreet
France Proactive and X 2017 Active and
supportive discreet
Germany Proactive and X X X Both Active and
supportive vocal
Greece Passively Passive and
supportive, potentially
occassional counteractive
opposition
Hungary Passively Passive and
supportive, potentially
occassional counteractive
opposition
Italy Passively Passive and
supportive, potentially
occassional counteractive
opposition
Latvia Passive and X Passive
supportive
Netherlands Proactive and X Both Active and
supportive discreet
Norway Not member X X 2016 Active and
discreet
Poland Passive and (X) X Passive
supportive
Portugal Passive and Passive
supportive
Romania Passive and (X) Passive
supportive
Spain Passive and X Passive
supportive
Sweden Proactive and X X X Both Active and
supportive vocal
United (Brexit) X X X Both Active and
Kingdom vocal
The active and vocal states, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK),
currently employ the broadest scope of policies. All frequently voice criticism
of China publicly as well as in discreet diplomatic channels. They also carry out
cooperative projects to strengthen the rule of law and human rights in China.
All three countries also joined multilateral initiatives in 2016 and 2017 by signing
statements denouncing the human rights situation in China. In addition, they
have been proactive and supportive of EU efforts, although more recently the
implications of “Brexit” means that the UK has largely neglected this channel.
Introduction 13It is noteworthy that the UK and Sweden have explicitly broadened their human
rights agenda with regard to China to include issues such as human trafficking,
and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual/Transgender and Intersexual (LGBTI)
and women’s rights.
Other countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and
Norway, are active in voicing their concerns about human rights and the rule of
law in China, but currently less vocal in their approaches. They work through
discreet diplomacy and avoid bilateral “megaphone diplomacy”. All have spoken
out as part of multilateral coalitions, and they all endorsed one of the two
statements in 2016 and 2017 condemning human rights violations in China (the
Netherlands signed both).9 Some, such as Denmark, have parliaments that are
vocal regarding human rights violations in China. Norway and Denmark carry
out projects in China to enhance the above-mentioned triad of political values.
France, the Netherlands and Belgium proactively support a unitary EU approach
to strengthening democracy, human rights and the rule of law in China, while
Denmark is more passive within the EU.
The group of more passive countries currently comprises the Czech Republic,
Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain. While these countries tend to be
less active in promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law in their
relations with China, this does not mean that they do not support these values.
They avoid public criticism but raise concerns in discreet diplomatic meetings,
while not making them a priority. Within the EU, they vote in favour of policies
that promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law but do not actively
initiate or push for these policies. With the exception of the Czech Republic,
which supported the 2017 letter, they have not signed the above-mentioned joint
statements.10 None of these states carries out significant cooperation projects in
China.
Meanwhile, other countries have not only remained passive with regard to the
EU’s direct promotion of political values in China, but also shown signs of
attempting to counteract these attempts. Perhaps the best known example is
Greece’s veto of a unified European stance on China’s human rights violations
in the UNHRC in 2017. This marked the first time in the EU’s history that a
consensus could not be reached on the subject. While other countries have not
been so disruptive on the three political values, Hungary joined Greece (and
Croatia) in drastically tempering the EU’s joint statement on the International
Court of Arbitration’s ruling with regard to the South China Sea – a ruling that
has China adamantly refused to recognise. In Italy, meanwhile, changes are also
under way. Previous Italian governments remained fairly passive on issues of
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in China, but their insistence on
issues such as not granting Market Economy Status to China and developing an
EU-wide investment screening mechanism are considered by some to have been
at least partly motivated by such concerns. There are early indications, however,
that the new government, made up of the Five Star Movement and the Lega, is
Belgium signed the letter in likely to change tack and become more conciliatory towards China.
2017.
10
President Zeman has crit- The above categorisations are limited to the approaches of European states to
icised the decision to sign democracy, human rights and the rule of law by means of megaphone diplomacy,
but did not have the consti-
discreet diplomacy, cooperative projects, EU initiatives and ad hoc multilateral
tutional power to withdraw
the Czech Republic’s support statements. If economic and other policies had been included, some results might
for the statement. have turned out differently. This analysis is not an exhaustive comparison of how
11
Katrin Kinzelbach, The “tough” countries are towards China in their overall policies, but a benchmark of
EU’s Human Rights Dialogue
their policy preferences in directly dealing with questions of democracy, human
14 Introductionrights and the rule of law in China. It is also important to note that a country’s
policy actions can and do change over time, sometimes dramatically, depending
on national elections. Some countries, such as the Czech Republic or Hungary,
have in recent decades gone from vocal and active to passive or even potentially
disruptive, while others, such as Germany, have become more vocal and proactive
in recent years. This classification therefore represents a snapshot in time.
The role of historical legacy, economic ties and Chinese pressure
Our findings suggest three factors to be of particular importance in the varied
European approaches: historical legacy, economic relations and Chinese
pressure.
Historical legacy: While existing research and commentary tend to focus on
economic factors, our cross-country survey indicates that a variety of historical
legacies continue to shape China policy. We found that the year of democratisation
tends to correlate with approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of
law in relations with China. While most of the states analysed in this report
attributed more importance to democracy, human rights and the rule of law in
their relations with China in the 1990s, several, particularly former communist
countries, have since downgraded the importance of these three values more
than others. This suggests that older democratic institutions tend to resist such
downgrading more than those in younger democracies. That said, correlation
does not mean causality.
A closer examination of individual countries adds further nuance to the role of
history. Historical references appear throughout Europe in discourses on the role
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. While this may be a discursive
strategy to some extent, all politics start with words. Hence, such discourses
should not be ignored.
Sweden and the Netherlands have a long tradition of promoting human rights
internationally. The legacy of the Nazi period remains a crucial component
of Germany’s self-identification and has a big impact on its policy regarding
democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The Czech Republic’s communist
past for many years made the country one of the most vocal critics of human
rights violations in China. To this day, the Hungarian people remain highly
sceptical of the Communist Party of China (CPC), despite the record of the
government in expressing ideological affinity with China. In Poland, historical
legacy also fuels widespread suspicion of communism, which influences attitudes
to the CPC. The contrasting symbolism of 4 June 1989 in Poland and China is
telling – while China conducted its violent repression of protestors in Tiananmen
Square, Poland was holding its first semi-free elections – and for many years
served as a marked example of the different political values in the two countries.
Only when the Law and Justice Party (PiS) won the most recent elections did
criticism of the semi-free elections of 1989 become more mainstream.
In Portugal, a critical examination of the country’s colonial past has led many to
highlight the need to respect sovereignty and a plurality of political models. In
Latvia, the conviction that political values are solely a domestic matter stems from
the violation of the country’s sovereignty by the Soviet Union. Spain’s gradual
transition to democracy after the death of Franco makes many Spaniards reluctant
to opt for the active promotion of democratic values in foreign countries. Many
people in Greece feel that their country has frequently been manipulated by
larger powers and are thus less inclined to suggest norms of governance to other
nations. In sum, while most Europeans seem to share the belief that democracy,
Introduction 15human rights and the rule of law are universal values, they disagree about the
degree to which these principles should be externally promoted.
The importance of historical legacies notwithstanding, domestic political dynamics
clearly have an impact too. Germany’s former Social Democrat government
under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder paid less attention to promoting democracy,
human rights and the rule of law in China than Angela Merkel’s subsequent
administrations. In France, Emmanuel Macron’s policies seem to indicate a
shift towards increasing the importance of the three values in French-Chinese
relations compared to his predecessors, Francois Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy.
Under President Zeman, meanwhile, the Czech Republic’s government has made
considerable changes to the policies of Václav Havel. Italy’s new government has
shown signs of downgrading the role of democracy, human rights and the rule
of law in its relations with China.
Economic relations: Economic relations with China differ in both quantity
and quality among European states. Countries with a higher GDP per capita
tend to take a stronger position on political values, but there is no correlation
with absolute GDP. In other words, richer countries – but not necessarily big
economies – adopt a more active stance on the promotion of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law in China. Of course, in many cases richer countries
are also older democracies, which makes it difficult to distinguish between the
relative effects of historical legacy and economic performance.
Contrary to the common belief that extensive economic cooperation with China
makes European states more reluctant to promote political values, our findings
demonstrate the opposite. The higher China’s share in a country’s overall trade,
the more active and vocal that state tends to be in promoting democracy, human
rights and the rule of law in its relations with China. Moreover, the correlation
is stronger with China’s share of a country’s exports than its share of imports.
In other words, China’s status as an important target market does not appear to
reflect a greater reluctance to promote the triad of political values.
The results with regard to Chinese direct investments in Europe are less clear-cut.
There is no strong correlation between absolute or relative amounts of incoming
Chinese investment and the active promotion of political values by European
states. Nonetheless, individual cases demonstrate that Chinese investments, or
the expectation of such investments, may have a significant impact in some
countries. Portugal has received substantial Chinese investment in strategic
sectors and keeps a low profile on democracy, human rights and the rule of
law in its China policy. The engagement of the Chinese firm COSCO in the
Greek port of Piraeus has created high hopes of further Chinese investment.
Chinese money does not just fill the apparent investment gap in Greece – it also
offers a potential alternative to the EU. The chapter on Greece demonstrates
that this has affected the country’s approach to promoting democracy, human
rights and the rule of law in China. The Czech Republic has also received some
investment in recent years, which has contributed to the downscaling of political
values on the government’s agenda. Romania and Hungary have not received
Chinese investment on a similar scale to that of Western European countries, but
have high hopes of inflows in the future. The UK, which had been fairly active
in calling for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the past, is seeking
new economic cooperation as it prepares to leave the EU in 2019. This seems
to have prompted a rethink of the trade-offs between economic interests and
political values in its relations with China.
16 IntroductionFinally, comparing the results with the 2017 ETNC report on Chinese investments
in Europe, even though the countries that are more critical of investments tend
to place greater importance on the promotion of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law, there are numerous exceptions to this trend. The Netherlands and
the UK, for example, are openly critical of China’s political values but welcome
investment projects. Previous Italian governments, in turn, have been much more
vocal on the economic dimension of China’s growing influence in Europe than
on issues related to democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Chinese pressure: The findings indicate that Chinese pressure has led some
European states to reconsider their level of active promotion of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law in China, although none of them have given up
their normative aspirations altogether. Hence, while Chinese pressure has induced
some change, it has not taken political values entirely off the agenda. The most
prominent example is Norway, which suffered from a freeze in political relations
and some degree of economic retaliation, such as restrictions imposed on the
import of Norwegian salmon, after the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded
Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010. After six years of not apologising
for the Nobel Committee’s decision, Norway opted for a pragmatic approach
in order to resume relations with China in late 2016. The fact that support for
Norway from other European countries was rather low-key sent a signal that the
issue was not a priority for the rest of Europe.
Denmark and the Netherlands had similar but less serious experiences after
sponsoring a China-critical resolution in the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights (UNCHR) in 1997. At first, the Netherlands as the holder of the
rotating presidency of the EU drafted a China-critical resolution in the UNCHR.
Between 1989 and 1996, the EU had sponsored such a resolution annually. In
1997, however, several EU member states declared that they would no longer
support such a resolution, which led Denmark to take the initiative and draft it
without EU support. China retaliated against Denmark for the resolution and the
Netherlands for making a China-critical speech at the UNCHR and trying to draft
the EU-wide resolution. In 2008, France faced strong political and economic
reaction from the Chinese government after a short, half-hour meeting between
the Dalai Lama and Nicolas Sarkozy; the same happened to Denmark in 2009.
More recently, the UK encountered a freeze in high-level political ties with China
after the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, met the Dalai Lama in 2012.
The role of the EU: Asset or obstacle in pursuing political values?
The EU aims to coordinate and carry out a joint foreign policy that is partly
based on its political values. At the same time, the EU mirrors the diversity of
perspectives and interests of its member states. This holds particularly true in
the area of foreign and security policy, which remains an intergovernmental
competence, that is, an area that all member states decide on unanimously in the
European Council. The EU’s bureaucracy, however, has a significant impact on
foreign policymaking even though it lacks formal decision-making power. The
agency of the EU strengthens a China policy that aims to promote democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, and all member states to varying degrees share a
belief in these political values. For the EU, however, these values are constitutive
of its historical emergence and development, and thus at the heart of the self-
identification of the European institutions.
This multilayered structure results in two ambivalences that are crucial to the
EU’s China policy. First, while the EU bureaucracy tends to highlight democracy,
Introduction 17human rights and the rule of law, the EU remains vulnerable to disunity due
to the different national interests of its member states. At the same time, the
EU provides a framework for constant coordination which – at least to some
extent – tends to harmonise European foreign policy. Hence, the EU is both a
mechanism for unifying the continent and somewhat vulnerable to disunity.
Second, if united and with the full support of all the member states, the EU has
the potential to exercise more leverage than individual member states vis-à-vis
China with regard to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, this
potential leverage serves as a good excuse for member states to take contentious
issues off their bilateral agendas with China and outsource these to the EU. In
short, the argument that the EU has more leverage and is thus better equipped
to address concerns over political values in China might be valid, but also clears
the way for inaction at the member state level.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to find any other actor in world affairs today that places
more importance on democracy, human rights and the rule of law in relations
with China than the EU. The EU makes use of the full range of instruments, such
as megaphone diplomacy, discreet diplomacy and specific cooperative projects.
Without doubt, the supranational bodies of the EU promote its constitutive
political values in relations with China. Critics argue, however, that the EU applies
double standards when it comes to the promotion of political values.
The effectiveness of European policy
In one sense, the recent European impact on China’s treatment of political values
has been limited. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law are suffering
a severe backlash in China. In the absence of any breakthroughs, NGOs and
social scientists have called for the termination of the EU-China Human Rights
Dialogue.11 Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons to believe that European
efforts have made at least some difference.
Improvements in civil liberties or civil rights are restricted to individual cases.
There is some indication that when the EU raises the fate of imprisoned
individual human rights lawyers and activists, for example, in the context of the
EU-China or other bilateral human rights dialogues, their conditions of detention
often improve.12 In other cases, Chinese leaders have agreed that dissidents under
house arrest can leave the country. The most recent example was the permission
given for Liu Xia, the widow of the late Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo,
to leave China in July 2018.
When it is in the self-interest of the Chinese government to reform, the EU is likely
to have a more significant impact. The development of China’s judicial system
might well facilitate economic development, foreign investment and international
trade. Hence, Chinese leaders have a keen interest in the development of legal
affairs compared to issues of civil liberties and the civil rights components of the
rule of law – albeit that there is still clear resistance to the idea of making the CPC
with China. Quiet Diplomacy itself subject to an independent judiciary. Other examples of Chinese self-interest
and Its Limits, 2015, New are the fight against pollution or attempts to improve economic development
York, Routledge.
12
– issues that come under the category of social and economic human rights that
Author interviews in several
cities in China, 2016 and the CPC advocates. European assistance in these fields is mostly welcomed by
2017. China. Another possible success is the significant reduction in the number of
13
See e.g. Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, executions carried out in China. Some argue that the EU’s continuous lobbying
Europe, China, and the Limits
combined with its own track record may have facilitated this development.13
of Normative Power. Forth-
coming 2019, Cheltenham, Finally, European China policy may have had more general effects. The EU’s
Edward Elgar.
treatment of political values in its relations with China helps to shape Europe’s
18 Introductionself-identification. It also signals to the rest of the world what Europe stands for
and that China’s attempts to redefine concepts such as democracy and human
rights do not go uncontested. Hence, the role of political values in Europe-
China relations should be seen in the broader context of shaping the normative
framework of the international order.
Does China shape the concept of political values in Europe?
China’s growing outreach to Europe corresponds with decades-long European
attempts to encourage China to adopt a more open and democratic system, but
what do Europeans think of China’s political system? What are the effects of
Chinese attempts to shape European policy and public opinion? Throughout
the 17 countries analysed, the public remains largely negative about China’s
political values. The findings in the chapters correspond with similar results from
Eurobarometer opinion polls.
Although these polls do not explicitly measure European support for China’s
political values, they do indicate largely negative general views on China. These
sceptical perceptions are notable in the light of the intensified Chinese foreign
propaganda push in the past decade. China launched a broad public diplomacy
initiative in France, for example, among other EU member states. In other
countries, China aims for influence by means of financial investments.14
This demonstrates that not all Chinese attempts to affect European public
opinion amount to actual influence. “Influence” refers to the capacity to affect
the actions or feelings of others. This means that influence only exists within
relationships – and is never the property of an actor. To analyse influence is
thus to study the effects of actions, not merely the intentions behind the actions.
For example, the fact that a Chinese ambassador writes an opinion piece in a
widely read European newspaper extolling the virtues of China’s political system
does not equal influence. To gauge its possible influence we need to study the
reception given to the article. For example, if its content appals readers it could
even have negative effects on Chinese influence.
When it comes to political elites, Chinese political values mostly meet opposition.
China’s growing footprint does however serve the interests of some political
elites. In particular, favourable views of China’s political system seem to be
correlated with negative views of the EU. Political actors that are critical of the 14
Francois Godement and
EU tend to use China as leverage vis-à-vis the EU institutions and other EU Abigaël Vasselier, China at
member states. The Greek government, for example, does not praise Chinese the Gates: A New Power Audit
of EU-China Relations, Lon-
don, ECFR, 2017 p. 76.
Introduction 19authoritarianism, but it does side with China occasionally to demonstrate that it
possesses an alternative to the EU.
The Hungarian government is alone in expressing ideological interest in China’s
political values. Viktor Orbán contrasts what he describes as China’s efficient,
labour-oriented society with the lengthy processes of the EU. In the Czech
Republic, the public and most political parties are critical of China with the
exception of the Eurosceptic and pro-Chinese supporters of President Zeman.
In Romania, most of the China enthusiast voices emanate from among the
Eurosceptic. While all the China-friendly political elites are Eurosceptic, the
opposite is not true. In fact, a number of Eurosceptic political parties are openly
critical of Chinese authoritarianism, including the major right wing populist
parties in Denmark and Poland.
Furthermore, there have been instances where Chinese attempts at influence
have backfired. In Denmark, opinion formers and opposition politicians have
reacted strongly to revelations that in 2017 the Chinese Embassy had pressured
a theatre not to host a show featuring a dance company associated with Falun
Gong. Another example is the closure of all but one of the Confucius Institutes
attached to Swedish universities. In Belgium, reports that the country’s security
services were investigating the Confucius Institute of the Free University of
Brussels sparked controversy.
However, even in the absence of outright admiration, tacit acceptance of China’s
political system as a legitimate alternative can still make a big difference. In a way,
this would resemble China’s own official position: Europe should not change
to become more like China, but the leaders in every country should be free to
decide its political system without intervention from the outside world. (Whether
China has always adhered to this principle is another matter.)
Factors in the attractiveness of China’s political model
Two factors appear to facilitate China’s outreach: the hope of receiving Chinese
investment and irritation towards the EU for meddling too much in the domestic
affairs of member states. The economic incentives largely resonate with business
communities throughout the continent. However, some academic institutions
and think tanks also hope and compete for funds. Most intensive are Chinese
investments in Brussels-based think tanks and invitations to China addressed to
individual European scholars focused on China or international relations more
widely. China’s largest government-sponsored think tank, the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences, opened its first European subsidiary, the China-Central and
Eastern European Institute, in Hungary in 2017.15
Overall, European media coverage of China’s political system tends to be
negative, a trend that the case studies indicate has strengthened further since Xi
Jinping’s authoritarian turn. A recent example is the negative European coverage
of the Chinese National People’s Congress in 2018, which abolished presidential
term limits and thus centralised power in the hands of Xi Jinping.
While often easy to detect, it is more difficult to assess the effectiveness of
China’s attempts at influence. Even though our findings indicate that European
perceptions of China’s political values are becoming increasingly unfavourable,
we should perhaps be cautious about drawing conclusions too quickly. One
15
possibility might be that European perceptions of China would have been even
The Hungarian government,
however, did not allow the more negative without these attempts. A second possibility is that the effects are
institute to register as a think difficult to measure. China’s influence on European perceptions partly works
tank, but only as a company.
through mechanisms such as self-censorship and self-denial, which are not
20 Introductioneasy to detect using conventional research methods. A third possibility is that
China expects its influence operations to produce their main returns in the long
run. Activities such as funding think tanks, university programmes and visits by
European researchers, moulding key individuals and organisations, and investing
in a media presence might improve underlying perceptions of China in Europe,
but will take time.
More crucially, China has gained in influence in particularly sensitive fields
of decision making. Prominent cases include the watering down of the EU’s
position on adherence to international law in the South China Sea dispute in
2016 and the Greek veto of the EU’s condemnation of China’s human rights
violations in the UNHRC in 2017. China has undoubtedly attempted to influence
Europe’s political decisions on accommodating China in a wide range of fields,
including political values.
Questions for the way forward
There are diverse approaches to China across Europe. Governments have
different priorities, follow different strategies and have different perspectives
on the role of China in Europe. European states possess limited leverage over
China to achieve their goals. If Europe wants to remain relevant it needs to find
higher levels of convergence in at least five fields that are currently subject to
contentious debate.
Definition: Most fundamentally, Europeans already disagree on the very
definition of political values beyond the Lisbon Treaty. Should political values
be restricted to the three core values of the EU, or should the definition be
broadened to include other aspects, such as those related to the role of the state
in the economy?
Goals: Regardless of how Europe defines the political values it aims to follow in
its relations with China, the role of pursuing these values needs to be clarified.
What are the priorities of Europe’s China policy and where do political values
fit? Does the EU aim to actively promote its political values in its relations with
China (offensive interpretation) or to restrict their validity to Europe (defensive
interpretation)? Are some political values, even within the core three, being
prioritised over others when dealing with China?
Strategy: To promote Europe’s priorities effectively, a careful study of China’s
interests is needed as well as a strategic assessment of how it reacts to different
policies. This requires more long-term thinking than is currently being pursued in
Europe. How can the EU link different issues effectively to acquire leverage and
achieve improvements in the fields that are of primary concern to it?
Methodology: What is the most efficient methodology for communicating with
China? Should the EU continue to promote bilateral dialogues? If so, which ones
and under what conditions? Is discreet diplomacy efficient? Should megaphone
diplomacy be used to a greater extent?
Decision making: More efficient policymaking requires that Europe consider
processes of coordinating policy if not decision making. This would require nation
states to compromise and perhaps even give up some of their competences. How
can Europe become more united in its decision making? Are institutional reforms
of the European Council and/or the European Commission needed, such as the
introduction of qualified majority voting in the European Council?
All these issues need to be discussed not only among policymakers but also among
the public, in academia and with think tanks. In fact, the experts in the European
Introduction 21Think-tank Network on China have differences of opinion on all these five fields
too. Hence, we do not seek to formulate answers to these questions but rather
to provide some insights into the issues in the chapters that follow. From our
experience of working on this report, discussions on these controversial issues
are extremely fruitful and we hope to take some of these aspects beyond the
network to contribute to a wider debate on the role of political values in Europe-
China relations.
Tim Nicholas Rühlig, Analyst, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs
(UI), tim.ruhlig@ui.se.
Björn Jerdén, Head of Asia Programme and Research Fellow, The Swedish
Institute of International Affairs (UI), bjorn.jerden@ui.se.
John Seaman, Research Fellow, French Institute of International Relations
(Ifri), seaman@ifri.org.
Frans-Paul van der Putten, Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of
International Affairs ‘Clingendael’, fputten@clingendael.org.
Miguel Otero-Iglesias, Senior Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute, miguel.otero
@rielcano.org.
Alice Ekman, Head of China Research, Center for Asian Studies, French
Institute of International Relations (Ifri), ekman@ifri.org.
22 IntroductionBelgium’s multilayered China policy:
A case of principled pragmatism?
Bruno Hellendorf, Egmont Institute
Abstract
Belgium is a small power and a pragmatic trading nation. It is also host to several multilateral and international institutions and
committed to the defence of liberal values. Its relationship with China reflects both dimensions – Belgium merges an interest-based
foreign policy with a strong emphasis on values. As a federal state with limited resources, it relies on and supports multilateral
institutions in its engagement with China as it does in its other relationships. When it comes to values, Belgium prefers dialogue
over confrontation and avoids acting alone. Recent developments, however, highlight a growing unease with what is perceived as
Chinese intransigence – and sometimes even undue pressure – over values. An important factor in the shaping of the country’s
future China policy will be the differences in perception and priorities among and between Belgium’s regions and communities.
Belgium prides itself on having a foreign policy that is at the same time both
pragmatic and principled. Its diplomacy regularly emphasises its commitment to
“the country’s fundamental values”, such as “democracy, human dignity, human
rights and gender equality”.1 This ambition runs through every international
partnership Belgium enters into, even when, as is the case with China, economic
interests are a clear priority.2
Before examining the specifics of Belgium’s China policy, it is important to keep
the broader picture in mind. Belgium is a staunch sponsor of European unity and
solidarity, and it sees multilateral institutions such as the European Union (EU)
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which it hosts, as well as
the United Nations (UN) system as indispensable pillars of a stable, rules-based
1
These are the first of
international order. It believes in multilateralism not just as a diplomatic tool, but
the Foreign Ministry’s
also as a structuring principle of international life and, in a context marked by a six “fundamental tasks”.
rising tide of populism and mounting protectionist trends, a value to defend. As a Belgium has highlighted a
number of priorities with
trading nation, Belgium is also very much focused on upholding a free, open and regard to its Human Rights
rules-based trading system, and on defending the interests of its companies. agenda: “the abolition of
the death penalty, the protec-
tion of the rights of women,
Belgium’s China policy children and defenders of
human rights, the fight
This overall perspective unambiguously frames the country’s relationship with against all forms of discrim-
China. The federal government aims for both a principled commitment to liberal ination, including discrim-
political values and economic pragmatism. To achieve these, it seeks to make ination based on sexual ori-
entation, and the fight against
the best use of multilateral settings in which to engage with China. However, impunity”. Kingdom of Bel-
the fragmented nature of Belgium’s political and administrative landscape also gium, Foreign Affairs, For-
eign Trade and Development
means that there is no single China policy. Initiatives taken at the federal level Cooperation, Belgium and
are only part of a wider and more complex equation featuring decentralised human rights, https://
diplomatie.belgium.be/en/
authorities. By implication, there is no clear hierarchy of economic interests, policy/policy_areas/human
political engagement and political values. Belgium tends to address issues as _rights.
they arise on a case-by-case basis and to favour dialogue and consultation over 2
Kingdom of Belgium, For-
confrontation. eign Affairs, Foreign Trade
nd Development Coopera-
An interest-based China policy is not peculiar to Belgium. Nor is the country’s tion, Asie et Océanie, https://
diplomatie.belgium.be/fr/
emphasis on the transcendental importance of political values. Rather, Belgium’s politique/regions_mondiales
specificity in regard to its China policy is linked to three separate elements: (a) its /asie_et_oceanie.
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