Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 9 Fall 2014 ISSN: 2241-438X
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Issue 9
Fall 2014
NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONAL ISSN: 2241-438X
Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal
TRAINING CENTER
1
NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational CONTENTS
Training Center
COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL rediscovering the SUA Convention", by Matteo
Del Chicca, World Maritime University
4 Editorial by Ioannis Pavlopoulos
Commodore GRC (N) 31 Building a Maritime law Enforcement
Mentality, by Nikolaos Ariatzis, Lt
MARITIME INTERDICTION
OPERATIONS
Commander, GRC (N) JOURNAL
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
6th Annual
TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES
6 Implementing Maritime Security Director
Measures, by Philip Holihead,
Head of Djibouti Code of Conduct
Implementation, IMO
33 The role of new Technologies &
Policies concerning EU Maritime
Commodore I. Pavlopoulos GRC (N)
Commandant NMIOTC
Security & Borders Surveillance,
Conference
By Dr Pierluigi Massimo Giansanti,
Manager, FINMECCANICA Group
MARITIME SECURITY
Executive Director
7 Global Maritime Security the
"Thousand-Ship Navy" concept, by
38 The Role of Non-Lethal Weapons in
Maritime Operations, by Massimo
Commander C. Campana ITA N
Director of Training Support
Annati, Rear Admiral (retd) ITN,
Corrado Campana, Commander Chairman European Working
ITA N Group on Non-Lethal Wapons
Editor
10 Introducing the Privatisation of
Maritime Security: Casual Factors,
Implications and Trends, by
OPERATIONAL ISSUES
Lt Commander N. Ariatzis GRC (N)
Transformation Staff Officer
42
Ioannis Chapsos, Research Fellow
in Maritime Security, CTPSR/ NATO ongoing Naval Operations,
CURRENT AND
Coventry University Maritime Security & Law Enforce Layout Production Manager
ment, by Eugene Diaz del Rio, Rear
Admiral (OF-6) ESP N Evi Sakellaridou
ACADEMIC ISSUES MWR Office
FUTURE 14 Dartmouth Centre for Seapower
& Strategy (DCSS), University of
44 Maritime Close Combat, by Kostas
Dervenis, Engineer
CHALLANGES Plymouth, by Prof Graeme Herd,
Dartmouth Centre & Dr Fotios
Moustakis, Associate Professor &
head of External Affairs of Darmouth
NMIOTIC 5TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
TO
Centre
51 Building a Law Enforcement Culture
at Sea for a more Secure Maritime
Environment
LEGAL ISSUES
ENERGY SECURITY 17 The Military-Law Enforcement
Alliance to Combat, Transnational
HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS
IN THE 56
Organized Crime at Sea, by Pierre
St. Hilaire, Director, Counter- VIP visitors to NMIOTC
Terrorism, Public Safety & Maritime
Security, ICPO-INTERPOL The views expressed in this issue
MARITIME ENVIRONMENT 21 Building a Law Enforcement Culture
at Sea, by José Nieves, Captain,
NMIOTC TRAINING
reflect the opinions of the authors,
and do not necessarily represent
NMIOTC or NATO’s official posi-
USCG
62 Photos from NMIOTC Training
Activities
tions.
24 Distinguishing Law Enforcement
from Armed Conflict Paradigm in
All content is subject to Greek
Copyright Legislation.
02-04 JUNE 2015
International Law, by Panagiotis Pictures used from the web are not
Sergis, Lt Cdr, GRC (N) MWR ACTIVITIES
subject to copyright restrictions.
You may send your comments to:
27 "Towards a more wide accepted
definition of the Terrorism Crime:
75 Trips and Excursions ariatzisn@nmiotc.grc.nato.int
2 3
Starting from the second semester of 2013 the initiatives NMIOTC took in support of 2014 as a “Legal Year” are as follows:
1. Establishing and delivering for the first time the Pilot Course 9000 “Legal Issues in MIO”, dealing with a variety of issues that arise
during the planning and execution phase of Maritime Security and Maritime Interdiction Operations.
2. Establishing continuous and productive cooperation with key international players in law enforcement such as INTERPOL, EU-
ROPOL, US European Command (EUCOM), US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the US Naval Criminal Investiga-
tive Service (NCIS). We are including their valuable experience in our training products, with a focus on illicit trafficking at sea.
3. The establishment of continuous cooperation with outstanding academic institutions in the field of law, such as the University of
South Africa, The Pantion University of Athens, and the University of Trace, which supported NMIOTC with the development of
our Legal course.
4. With the assistance of the US EUCOM and the Hellenic Police SMEs we developed the module of “Evidence Collection”, which
ensures that boarding teams effectively collect evidence from an crime scene in order to effectively prosecute suspects in court.
5. We established the training module “Collection of Biometrics in the Maritime Environment” (which also deals with proper dissem-
ination), in order to ensure that Identity Operations are executed in accordance with Alliance Concepts and International Law.
6. Developing the new course illicit trafficking at Sea with the assistance of US EUCOM with focus on effective countering of illicit
trafficking of drugs, people, weapons etc.
7. We are moving towards the concept of exploiting Non Lethal Weapons in order to neutralize adversaries. We are looking for
ways to incorporate to our tactics and procedures this capability which even thought is used for a long time from law enforcement
agencies it is something new for most armed forces.
8. We established a direct cooperation with Legal Authorities such as the Legal Prosecutor Office of Piraeus for piracy Issues and
we included their valuable experience in our training products.
9. Not to forget also the key pillar of transformation which deals with the objective of achieving a law enforcement culture for mari-
time forces contributing to the experimentation and development of solutions and equipment such as C3PO CEBOSS and video
streaming of real time High Definition Video from boarding teams to motherships and to the Headquarters ashore for the timely
assessment of findings and biometric data aimed to the evaluations of evidences and to the possible prosecution of the suspect-
ed criminals.
NMIOTC Commandant’s Editorial As everybody knows, theory that is not implemented is meaningless. After identifying the need to fill the gap on law enforcement
culture, our response was immediate. Following our aim to develop a diverse and highly effective Maritime Security Operations
workforce and to enhance integrations and improvement of interoperability on the High Seas, while forging at the same time a law
enforcement culture, NMIOTC developed a wide range of actions to serve this goal and is making a strong and continuous effort to
NMIOTC COMMANTDANT’S FOREWORD FOR ANNUAL CONFERENCE deliver the best and most effective training to NATO Forces and to support the International Maritime Community.
The 3000-year long experience of Greeks at sea has shown that one on the few stable things at sea is the evolving a nature of mari-
time threats. Maritime Cyber Security, for example, which is a primary concern today, was not even discussed twenty years ago. On Ioannis Pavlopoulos
the contrary, Piracy at Sea, once a permanent menace for seafarers, almost disappeared during the twentieth century and reemerged Commodore GRC (N)
in recent years in a totally new way. NMIOTC Commadant
By examining some established trends, however, it is reasonable to take actions in order to prepare for the future. Taking into
account that maritime trade consists of more than 80 percent of the worlds circulated goods and that it will continue to be the most
cost-effective means to feed our national economies with goods and energy resources, it is safe to conclude that maritime security
will continue to directly affect the world economy in the future. Thus the Sea is a valuable source of growth and prosperity and the
global economy depends on open, protected and secure seas and oceans for economic development, free trade, transport, energy
security, tourism and good status of the environment.
Along the same lines, we can identify that: first, the global economy will increase its dependency on maritime trade; second, that the
migration –both legal and illegal– will continue as result of globalization; and third, that together with increased global trade we will
face the challenge of increased field of action for Maritime Criminal Activities including Transnational Organized Crime.
Obviously maritime security today remains a focal point since it should be secured against a plethora of risks and treats in the global
maritime domain. The required shielding can only be achieve in a cross-sectoral, and cost efficient way where all partners from
civilian and military authorities and actors (such as law enforcement, border control, customs and environmental authorities, maritime
administrations, navies, coast guards, intelligence services) as well as agencies and industry (shipping, security, communication and
capability support) will cooperate with mutual benefit always in conformity with existing laws, treaties and the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)..
Keeping that in mind, it is necessary to maintain a balance. On one hand we have the necessity of uploading freedom of navigation
and overseas trade. On the other hand we have an ethical and legal obligation to uphold International Law, International Maritime
Law, Treaties, Conventions, and UN Security Council Resolutions when conducting Maritime Security Operations.
Having identified, through delivered training to a variety of NATO member states and other partner navies a constant and growing
need for proper legal training of all personnel involved in the planning and conduct of Maritime Interdiction Operations, we decided to
dedicate the year 2014 to the study of legal issues arising during Maritime Security Operations (including the interaction with civilian
seafarers and the need for proper evidence collection and crime scene preservation aboard vessels) and to the development of
proper legal training to address these concerns.
4 5
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS MARITIME SECURITY
i mplementing m aritime s ecurity m easures
by Philip Holihead
Global Maritime
Head of Djibouti Code of Conduct Implementation, IMO
Security
F
or the shipping industry maritime itime security, and thus to implement learned so far. Liaison between navies
security perhaps means the ability
for merchant ships to “pass on the
seas upon their lawful occasions”. But the
full maritime security requires complete
buy-in by coastal States, and to achieve
that requires capacity building efforts to
and merchant shipping should be contin-
ued at the strategic level as a matter of
course, so that emerging threats to securi-
the “Thousand-Ship
days when the naval balance ensured the
status quo are gone; navies are no longer
deployed in sufficient numbers to ensure
occur. Experience from the western Indi-
an Ocean and Gulf of Aden area is that
it is not just navies that require capacity
ty can be identified by those who regularly
transit the oceans’ choke points and trou-
ble spots, to those who might be required
Navy” concept
that sea lines of communication remain uplift, but in fact the whole mechanism of to police them. Navies and coastguards
unthreatened unless specifically tasked to government and legislation so that States in coastal States should be encouraged to by Corrado Campana
do so. Thus there is greater reliance upon fully understand why they need to be in- patrol their TTWs and EEZs within robust Commander ITA N
local navies to be able to combat threats volved in securing the maritime space and regional frameworks in order to suppress
to maritime security. the resources therein, and have the law local threats to maritime security. Estab-
I
The key to effective maritime security is to act upon it. This whole of government lished navies should be used as diplomat-
clear legislation and multi-organizational approach basing security decisions on the ic tools to influence in these matters and n the autumn of 2005, Admiral Mi- War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, purposes and precluding its use for others
cooperation. This has been the key to value of maritime resources is required to to assist with local and regional capacity chael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief Admiral Mullen openly admitted to the that threaten national, regional, or global
the effective suppression of piracy off the draw the small navies and coastguards building e.g. the mechanisms by which of Naval Operations, challenged the assembled chiefs of navy and their rep- security”. He had already expressed the
coast of Somalia where a cooperative ef- out of their ports and create a presence NATO warships are able to meet at sea world’s maritime nations to raise what he resentatives from seventy-five countries idea a month earlier in an address to the
fort by navies and merchant shipping has in areas such as fishing grounds, port ap- and both communicate and exercise to- called a “thousand-ship navy” to provide that “the United States Navy cannot, by students of the College, but he now elab-
resulted in no successful piracy attacks proaches, tourism areas, offshore mineral gether against mutually held SOPs could for the security of the maritime domain on itself, preserve the freedom and security orated the concept:
for over 2 years. Given the types of geo- and gas extraction areas etc. When they if exported be a significant enabler for es- a global scale in the twenty-first century. of the entire maritime domain. It must “Because today’s challenges are global
graphical area in which piracy occurs and are all doing this, then their presence will tablishing regional coordinated maritime Speaking at the Seventeenth Internation- count on assistance from like-minded na- in nature, we must be collective in our
the ability of regional forces to operate go a long way to suppressing criminal acts law enforcement capability. Politicians al Seapower Symposium at the Naval tions interested in using the sea for lawful response. We are bound together in our
outside their TTWs, there will always be a such as smuggling, IUUF etc. from which should be encouraged to look upon such dependence on the seas and in our need
case for a coordinated naval presence to piracy can develop. work as ‘conflict prevention’ rather than for security of this vast commons. This is
suppress this threat when it arises. To implement maritime security in the aid, and invest accordingly. a requisite for national security, global sta-
But piracy is not the only threat to mar- future we should build on the lessons bility, and economic prosperity.
As navies, we have successfully learned
how to leverage the advantages of the
Philip Holihead
sea... advantages such as mobility, ac-
With 35 year’s service as a Warfare Officer in the Royal Navy, and vast experience of multi-national operations including cess, and sovereignty.... We must now
as an Executive Assistant to a NATO Commander, command of UN maritime forces in Cambodia, and diplomatic postings leverage these same advantages of our
as the UK Defence Attaché in Egypt and Yemen, Phil Holihead has a wealth of international, operational and planning profession to close seams, reduce vulner-
experience.
abilities, and ensure the security of the do-
On leaving the Royal Navy in 2009 he worked temporarily for the European Union as an expert conducting needs anal-
ysis for the Critical Maritime Routes programme. In April 2010 he was approached by the IMO to lead the newly-formed main, we collectively, are responsible for.
Counter-Piracy, Project Implementation Unit. As we combine our advantages, I envision
His job at IMO is to deliver capacity to counter piracy and other maritime security threats in the Gulf of Aden and Western a 1,000-ship Navy –a fleet-in-being, if you
Indian Ocean in accordance with the Djibouti Code of Conduct, manage the IMO multi-donor trust fund, and run the will, made up of the best capabilities of all
Counter-Piracy Project Implementation Unit.
He is a regular speaker at international conferences on countering-piracy, and has both hands-on and strategic experi-
freedom-loving navies of the world”.
ence of delivering maritime capacity on a regional basis. The rationale for the thousand-ship navy
Phil is married with 4 grown-up children and 3 grandchildren. (TSN), more generally referred to also as
6 7
Partnership a part of its current maritime
strategy, and the lack of such official
support for this concept has likely been
interpreted by nations reluctant to partic-
MARITIME SECURITY
ipate as a sign of weakness in American
commitment to the TSN/GMP; thus, this
daring idea runs the risk of becoming the
maritime equivalent of Woodrow Wilson’s
League of Nations –the international orga-
For many poor The maritime security strategy needs
therefore to target and put pressure on the
nization created after the First World War people, the outcomes organizers of maritime crime and to build
to provide a forum for resolving interna- from illicit activities viable economic alternatives to coastal
tional disputes, which was first proposed
by US President Woodrow Wilson as part
are so high, and the communities, who could help end mar-
itime crime simply by refusing to protect
of his Fourteen Points plan for an equi- licit alternatives so criminal interests.
table peace in Europe, but of which US unrewarding, that To this aim, it is necessary to build more
was never a member– that is, it will die, inclusive maritime security communities.
and not because it was a bad idea but be-
interdiction and Cooperation, interaction, common pro-
cause the country that proposed it was not prison will not deter tocols and practices in the field of mari-
committed to it. them from trying their time security will facilitate international
We know that it is possible for the inter- or regional communities to take effective
national Community to focus on a difficult luck again. The action in the long term, and the idea of
and asymmetric security threat and mo- maritime security the Thousand-Ship Navy/Global Maritime
bilize sufficient resources to specifically
deal with it, as shown by the success-
strategy needs there- Partnership seemed to aim to the right di-
rection.
ful reduction of Somali piracy in the last fore to target and put
years. However, the increase of other pressure on the
illicit activities such as the ‘irregular arriv-
als’ from Somalia to Yemen and a num-
organizers of maritime
the “Global Maritime Network” (GMN) or make clear that participation would be • Nations or navies having the capacity ber of recent heroin seizures in the Indian crime and to build
“Partnership” (GMP), emanated from the strictly on a voluntary basis and that the would be expected to help less capable Ocean illustrate that we are dealing with viable economic
a “moving target”: criminals are opportun-
increased international maritime traffic goal was simply to meet the “compelling ones increase their ability to provide
ists and move between different areas of
alternatives to
due to globalization and from the concept need” that emerged “for a global maritime maritime security in their own ports,
that promoting and maintaining the secu- security network, a Navy of Navies, to pro- harbors, territorial waters, and ap- illicit business depending on enforcement coastal communities,
rity of the global maritime commons is a tect the maritime domain and to ensure proaches. and profitability. For many poor people, who could help end
the outcomes from illicit activities are so
key element, because the freedom of the that the lifeblood of globalization –trade– • Nations or navies that need assis-
high, and the licit alternatives so unre- maritime crime simply
seas is critical to any nation’s long-term flows freely and unencumbered”. tance would have to ask for it.
economic well-being. Indeed, policing These public writings and statements • Each geographic region would devel- warding, that interdiction and prison will by refusing to protect
and protecting the maritime commons established the guiding principles for the op regional maritime networks. not deter them from trying their luck again.
criminal interests.
against a wide spectrum of threats is a “Navy of Navies”: • To be effective and efficient, the Glob-
high priority for all nations interested in • National sovereignty would always be al Maritime Partnership would have to
the economic prosperity and security that respected. share information widely; classified mar-
derives from a free and safe maritime do- • Nations, navies, and maritime forces itime intelligence would be kept to a
main. would participate where and when minimum. Commander Corrado Campana
The U.S. Navy used a series of maga- they have common interests. • This would be a long-term effort, Commander Corrado Campana attended the Italian Naval Academy from 1987 until 1991, when
zine articles and speeches by various • The focus would be solely on security aimed at the security of the maritime he was commissioned as Ensign. He has achieved the qualification in Naval Artillery and Missile
senior officers, including Admiral Mullen, in the maritime domain: ports, harbors, domain. Systems and the specialization in Naval Weapons Direction. He served onboard several Italian
Navy ships such as the frigates Libeccio and Maestrale and the destroyers Ardito and Luigi Durand
to explain and build support for the thou- territorial waters, maritime approach- Years after the bold proposal for a mul-
de la Penne, and was appointed as Commanding Officer of the auxiliary ship Ponza and of the
sand-ship navy. The TSN/GMP was envi- es, the high seas, and international tinational maritime force, little progress frigate Granatiere. He served in international staffs such as the Force HQ of the Multinational
sioned as an international maritime force, straits, as well as the numerous ex- seems to have been made in constituting Force and Observers (M.F.O.) in El-Gorah (Sinai, Egypt) as Naval Advisor, and the EU Naval Force
an aggregation of maritime entities, not ploitable seams between them. this “navy-in-being”, mostly because of OHQ in Northwood (UK) as ACOS CJ3 Operations within the anti-piracy Operation ATALANTA. He
just of the world’s navies. It would also in- • While no nation can do everything, all the reduced resources –financial, opera- served in national staffs such as the Command in Chief of the Italian Fleet as Head of the Artillery
clude the world’s coast guards, seaborne nations could contribute something of va tional and even intellectual– invested to and Missile Systems Section, the Command of Italian Maritime Forces in Taranto as ACOS N3
shipping enterprises (shipping lines, port lue. achieve the goal and because not all na- Operations and at the Italian Joint Operations HQ in Rome, as Head of Maritime Operations Section
facilities, and other maritime-related enti- • The TSN/GMP would be a network of vies appear to fully appreciate the nature (J3). He attended the Italian Joint War College and the Course in International Humanitarian Law at the Centre for Defence High Studies in
ties), and various governmental agencies international navies, coast guards, and the size of the challenges they face in Rome and also served as Tutor for the attendees. Commander Campana has achieved the Degree in Maritime and Naval Science at the
and nongovernmental bodies. maritime forces, port operators, com- the global maritime domain. University of Pisa, the Degree in Political Science at the University of Trieste, and the Master in International and Military-strategic Studies
at the L.U.I.S.S. University “Guido Carli” in Rome. Since the 1st August 2013 he is appointed at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational
In an effort to head off concerns about mercial shippers, and local law en- The U.S. Navy itself has not made the
Training Centre in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece as Director of the Training Support and Transformation Directorate.
sovereignty, the U.S. Navy attempted to forcement, all working together. Thousand-Ship Navy/Global Maritime
8 9
deployment of PMSCs on board merchant
vessels, given the numerous ethical, op-
erational and legal concerns stemming
from their applied practices. However, the
MARITIME SECURITY
shipping companies are treating their use
as the sole security provision through high
risk areas and as the main guarantee for
the security of both the seafarers and their state’s defence budget entailed in employ- Private Maritime Security Companies
cargo. ing VPDs compared to the deployment There is evidence to support the notion
of naval assets on the other side of the that states are still reluctant to intervene
Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) globe clearly provide a convincing justifi- and pose restraints on the rapidly grow-
The blurred distinction between state and cation for adopting these tactics. The de- ing, already booming and highly profitable
private maritime security becomes even bate that emerged regarding this practice maritime security industry. On the con-
murkier as a consequence of several was that states were desperately trying trary, they are also integrating PMSCs
states’ common practice of deploying the not to completely abolish and outsource in their security provision structure; they
so-called Vessel Protection Detachments their monopoly in security provision, while are expanding the privatisation trend in
(VPDs). Through this, what was hitherto more business oriented analysts suggest the maritime domain and also gradually
perceived as the state’s obligation has be- that states are just trying to take their outsourcing monopolies to them. Even
come a private endeavour as well since share from the security provision pie, with- in states such as the Netherlands, which
states are privately hiring armed military in the contemporary anti-piracy business are still reserved on this issue and ban
Introducing the Privatisation of teams to shipping companies for protec- model (Chapsos2013). the use of PMSCs on board vessels fly-
tion of commercial vessels. On the one Yet, the reality is slightly different and ing their flag, there are 13 Dutch PMSCs
hand, the private sector’s high demand for this has been demonstrated in the cru- registered in their homeland1 (as of No-
Maritime Security:
armed escorts at competitive prices and, ellest way possible. That is, through the vember 2013), which offer their services
on the other, the guaranteed high level incident involving the two Italian marines in vessels flying foreign flags (although
training of military personnel, as well as deployed on board ‘Enrica Lexie’ (Baner- they may be managed by Dutch owners).
ji and Jose 2013). The death of the two
Casual Factors, Implications and Trends
the reduction of states’ armed forces bud- An indicative study was released in Febru-
get, offers great potential for both parties Indian fishermen, who were shot by the ary 2013, analysing the status of VPDs in
to do business. The service is available marines after being mistaken for pirates, Europe and addressing the critical ques-
highlighted the complexity of maritime
by Ioannis Chapsos* to ships registered and flying the flag of
the respective state, or even to compa- security issues and the murky framework
tion: should state or private protection be
used against maritime piracy (Van Ginkel
Research Fellow in Maritime Security, CTPSR/Coventry University nies controlled by the state’s nationals. of its provision. This can partly explain et al. 2013). The report clearly reflects
Given also the flexibility and legal status states’ reluctance to keep the monopo- the EU states’ preference in contracting
of military personnel in terms of carrying ly of security provision, both ashore and PMSCs for the vessels flying their flag,
weapons through transit ports and their offshore, since its expeditionary forces instead of deploying VPDs.
The privatisation of security model income for the companies, and also for PMCs and PSCs are mainly contracted consequent better protection in case of have to operate in complex and hostile Still, regulation issues remain unclear; the
The private security model has been the state in terms of taxation. by states, the main driver for PMSCs to prosecutions, many companies are in fa- environments. On the other hand, private IMO outsourced the regulation of PMSCs
broadly applied, both ashore and at sea The dividing line between state and pri- mushroom largely comes from the ship- vour of contracting them (Brown 2012:9). security providers enable governments to to the flag states (IMO 2011a). In this
and a mutually beneficial relationship be- vate security is even murkier in the mar- ping and offshore energy industry. Perhaps the practice of deploying VPDs avoid supervision, external (and internal) framework, and given states’ selective en-
tween the state and the private sector can itime domain than it is ashore. The Inter- The private maritime security sector takes is the strongest evidence of the contem- legislative requirements, parliamentary in- gagement with PMSCs’ regulatory issues
be identified in this. Through instituting national Maritime Organisation (IMO) in advantage of the unemployed, retired porary perception of security, which com- quiries or political cost when using force in terms of hard law, one could argue that
this model, the state, on the one hand, its Circular 1405 (IMO 2011b:1), defines and well-trained military (or naval) per- pletely aligns national military power and and conducting controversial operations states are in favour of the soft law ap-
reduces the defence expenditure budget PMSCs as “[p]rivate contractors em- sonnel to develop the already booming force projection with private commercial abroad. Thus, especially in the maritime proach to regulate the private maritime se-
for providing security in the globalised ployed to provide security personnel, both and well-established business model, in interests. Hence, it could be interpreted domain, the responsibility is transferred curity industry; yet, this approach remains
environment. On the other, it simultane- armed and unarmed, on board for protec- the same way as on land. At the same as an attempt to integrate the neo-liber- to the shipping companies and vessel broadly questioned, in terms of its appli-
ously minimises the political cost from tion against piracy” and their armed em- time, the state gains a dual reward for the al model of security privatisation (Avant masters, both for the choice and contract cability, efficiency and effectiveness in the
potential human casualties of its armed ployees as “Privately Contracted Armed defence budget expenditures that were 2008, Ortiz 2010, Abrahamsen and Wil- of the private security provider, as well maritime domain. Thus, regulation and
forces caused by their deployment in de- Security Personnel” (PCASP). The land invested in their training: The allocation liams 2011), into the state-centric tradi- as for covering the cost of their own se- certification is clearly another major issue.
stabilised countries, or even engagement base practice shows that governments of funding required for the deployment tional mechanisms of security provision, curity. The state retains only the right of The principles of the free market dominate
in ambiguous operations in the territories primarily choose to utilise Private Mili- of naval assets on the other side of the as interpreted through the realist ap- regulation and control of the private secu- the private security industry, where non-
of foreign sovereign states. The private tary (PMCs)/Private Security Companies globe is minimised whilst income is gener- proach. rity providers; however, practice indicates state actors are responsible for undertak-
sector offers jobs to former well trained (PSCs) for political ends, regardless of ated in terms of taxation from the private However, deploying a VPD on board a that even these are following free market ing the essential issues of regulation and
military personnel, and the profitable con- the financial motivations of the companies sector activities. Public opinion (at a glob- merchant vessel is incomparably cheaper principles and the states’ engagement re- certification. More important, since there
tracts provide an attractive generation of (Mandel 2002:23). However, although al level) may be in favour or against the than deploying a frigate to patrol the In- mains rhetoric (Chapsos 2013). are no legal binding relationships between
dian Ocean; the limited demands on the
* Ioannis Chapsos is a Research Fellow in Maritime Security at the Centre for Trust, Peace & Social Relations (CTPSR) – Coventry University. He is a Cap-
tain (ret) of the Hellenic Navy, who introduced Maritime Security as a new thematic area to Coventry University, after lecturing for five years at the Hellenic
Supreme Joint War College. His research is focused on the global trend of privatisation of maritime security and the potential implications in international 1. This is the number of Dutch PMSCs registered in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. See ICoC, available from http://www.
security with specific emphasis in modern piracy, IUU fishing, and trafficking related crimes via sea. icoc-psp.org/[accessed 15 June 2014].
10 11
stead of interrupting the business model tax revenues should be allocated to de-
with a more robust intervention in the ployed assets in faraway seas rather than
MARITIME SECURITY global market. meeting social demands at home.
All the issues raised above, highlight ma-
MARITIME SECURITY
The trends jor concerns that have to be addressed
The need for merchant vessels to em- at international level in order to enhance
ploy PMSCs or VPDs in order to provide maritime security so as to make the vast
an additional layer of ship protection is oceans safer, as well as the concomitant different flag states’ legislations which –in domain. Down at the state level, individu-
internationally accepted. In respect of promise of reward. They could also trig- several cases–i complicate even more the al countries could improve their regulation
this, although international organisations, ger the international community in iden- already complex maritime security envi- and supervision of PMSCs. This, in turn,
such as the IMO, recognise this reality, tifying an international organisation with ronment. This entity will also have toapply may enable them to use these services in
they still need to provide a firm lead on the global jurisdiction to regulate, vet and different requirements and standards be- enhancing homeland maritime security in
related issues such as regulation, training, certify private security providers. This tween land based and maritime operators, the near future and also address maritime
and rules for the use of force. The regu- will perhaps overcome the plethora of due to the distinctiveness of the maritime threats other than piracy accordingly.
lations of armed security providers do not
include elements that provide minimum
standards with respect to these services
(regardless of their status as militaryor pri-
vate). Moreover, there are no supporting
globally recognised regulations in place to
List of References
ensure that all providers of these services ♦ Abrahamsen, R. and Williams, M. C. (2011), Security beyond the state: private security in international politics, Cambridge, UK; New York:Cambridge University
are subject to comparable controls at in- Press.
ternational level. Without such regulation, ♦ Avant, D. (2008), Private Security in Williams, P., ed. Security Studies: an introduction, New York: Routledge 438-452
and the concomitant checks and controls, ♦ Banerji, A. and Jose, D. (2013), Murder trial of Italian marines in India navigates murky waters, Reuters, [online] available from: http://in.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2013/06/10/india-italy-marines-idINDEE95900B20130610 [accessed 10 June 2013].
the risk of sub-standard service raises ♦ Brown, J. (2012), Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean's Private Security Boom, September 2012, Sydney: LOWY Institute for International
debates and breeds mistrust, as well as Policy.
the likelihood of the inappropriate use of ♦ Chapsos, I. (2013), VPDs: States' Maritime Security Failures, Maritime Executive, 11(71)
the regulating/certifying bodies and the many reasons. This provides the oppor- force, including lethal force. ♦ IMO (2011a), Revised Interim recommendations for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel in the High Risk Area, MSC1/
Circ.1406, London: IMO.
companies, the whole process is based tunity to manage its own security, provide Whilst PMSCs already provide security
♦ IMO (2011b), Revised Interim guidance to Ship owners, ship operators, and Ship masters on the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in
on two factors. the required short term solutions and services to the offshore oil industry, con- the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405, London: IMO.
First, the prestige of a company is in- identify new business opportunities with sultancies to governmental bodies and ♦ Mandel, R. (2002), Armies Without States: the Privatisation of Security, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
creased when it is certified from as many the states’ tolerance and encouragement. commercial companies, what we can ex- ♦ McMahon, L. (2013), UK gives go ahead for floating armouries, Lloyd's List, [online] available from: http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/regulation/article427433.
pect to see is a rapid increase in the ex- ece#! [accessed 20 Sep. 2013].
bodies as possible. This offers to the po- It can help to reduce unemployment rates
♦ Ortiz, C. (2010), Private armed forces and global security: a guide to the issues,Contemporary military, strategic, and security issues, Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger.
tential clients the sense that its reputation with the creation of new security provision tent of their engagement in maritime secu- ♦ Van Ginkel, B., Van der Putten, F.-P. and Molenaar, W. (2013), State or Private Protection against Maritime Piracy? A Dutch Perspective, Hague: Netherlands Insti-
is genuine, since it is certified by diverse companies (training, vetting, logistics, rity challenges other than modern piracy, tute of International Relations - Clingendael
institutions, associations, standards or etc.) which support the main core of secu- such as IUU fishing and trafficking related
even other private companies. rity operations, following the paradigm of crimes at sea. And given the current in-
Second, as long as the relationship with equivalent companies ashore. What re- ternational economic restraints, it will be
the regulators cannot possibly have le- mains to be realised is the extent to which perceived as more cost effective for states
gal implications, being based solely on a the state will achieve the goal of managing and regional organisations (such as e.g.
membership or paid assessment/vetting, and regulating this network, and whether the UN,NATO, EU) to contribute and
should any wrong-doings become publicly it will retain the jurisdiction and control share the financial burden of contracting
known this will only impact on the compa- over security and force projection. PMSCs to do the job, with a local or re-
ny’s reputation in the market. Definitely, in So far, states have demonstrated a se- gional mandate/contract. This practice
this competitive environment this is quite lective approach towards regulating the will alleviate the demand to allocate funds
important, since it is the primary criteri- private maritime security industry. An from the already tight defence budget to
on by which a client chooses among the indicative example is the stance of the deploy naval assets on the other side of
hundreds of available companies offering UK government towards the controver- the globe in order to enhance maritime Ioannis Chapsos
the same services. However, they are not sial issue of floating armouries; although security on behalf of fragile states. Even Retired Captain of the Hellenic Navy, researches the global trend of privatisation of international se-
sufficient for regulating the companies in there is a major issue and debate around further, this rapidly increasing strategy will curity in general and maritime security in particular; he investigates the extent of the states’ actual
terms analogous to those that used to be their deployment, acceptable/legitimate also provide the internal and external le- regulation and control over the maritime security industry -given the flag states’ responsibility and ju-
imposed by states. A simple change in standards and use, the UK Department of gitimisation to fragile states to outsource risdiction- using the case study of PMSCs in anti-piracy operations off Somalia since 2005. Due to the
sovereign rights to private security provid- globalised nature of the maritime domain, his research identifies the gaps and the risks stemming from
the company’s name for example, could Business Innovation and Skills has issued
the industry’s self-regulation and posed in international security in governance, strategy, policy, social
overcome the effects of any potential re- 50 licences for such vessels, operating in ers to perform the tasks that they are in-
and commercial terms.
corded trespasses. the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden (Mc- capable of executing. Consequently, de- Ioannis Chapsos introduced Maritime Security to Coventry University, and subsequently, the online MA
The private sector has established a pe- Mahon 2013). Hence, the state prefers a veloped states will not have to go through in Maritime Security course was launched by the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS)
ripheral commercial network around the tolerant approach, choosing to legitimise the internal struggle of persuading public research unit in January 2013.
node of the state, which is booming for issues which are still under research in- opinion in this present financial crisis that
12 13
pertise in maritime affairs, strategic
and defence studies as well as profes-
•
sional military education.
Third, through teaching, research and
ACADEMIC ISSUES
dialogue activities the DCSS will pro-
vide ‘through life learning’ to develop
thought leadership abilities of profes-
sional staff officers and practitioners and success at delivering educational op- There will also be strong linkages with the
to enable them more efficiently and portunities to naval officer and NCO pro- School of Marine Science & Engineering
effectively navigate an increasingly fessional training at the BRNC Dartmouth. (MSE) through CENORE, the Centre of
complex and ambiguous strategic This development offered a number of Excellence in Naval Oceanographic Re-
context. DCSS educational opportu- synergies for both institutions of which the search and Education, and its links to
nities will be of high quality, accessible Department is one. The SSMW is capa- degree programmes in Oceanography
and represent value for money. ble of offering tailored packages of educa- and Hydrography as well as its £3.9M
tion to both students at Plymouth Univer- UAE Ocean project (which is for the De-
Defense and Strategic Studies at Dart- sity and members of the UK armed forces. velopment of the Naval Ocean Monitor-
mouth and Plymouth Today, the Department (Mark Grove, Phil ing and Forecasting Centre in the United
The ten staff of the Dartmouth Centre for Grove, Dr Fotios Moustakis, Dr Simon Arab Emirates), in partnership with the
Seapower and Strategy (DCSS) are facul- Murden, Dr Jane Harrold) in Dartmouth UAE Naval Advanced Solutions (NAS),
Dartmouth Centre
ty members at the University of Plymouth under the leadership of Professor Alan CENORE, UoPEL, and Met Office.
and are located either on the Plymouth Myers (Director of Military Education) pro- Alongside this the Hydrographic Academy
campus or at the Britannia Royal Na- vides initial officer education for all Royal is developing structured on-line learning
val College (BRNC), Dartmouth. These Navy and Royal Marines officers as well to degree level in hydrography, in collab-
for members help deliver our teaching, dia-
logue, and research activities.
The study of strategy and international af-
as courses for more experienced officers
in the Royal Marines. The courses en-
compass the study of international history,
oration with FUGRO World Wide and in
partnership with IMarEst, the international
professional body and learned society for
Seapower & Strategy (DCSS)
fairs at the BRNC, can trace its roots back maritime and land warfare, command and all marine professionals. The full mission
to the vision of the early twentieth century leadership, and contemporary strategic ship bridge simulator operated through the
naval reformer, Admiral Sir Jacky Fisher. issues. The Department also represents Navigation and Maritime Science subject
As a part of Fisher's design for a modern a Ministry of Defence-wide academic area in MSE also offers very significant
University of Plymouth officer education –the so-called Selborne
Scheme– the Department of History and
English was established at the new naval
resource. Members of the Department
undertake policy-related and personal re-
search projects, and disseminate findings
training and joint exercise synergies with
BRNC and their upgraded simulator. This
Academy is in the running to be named
college in Dartmouth in 1905 to inculcate at various levels across UK armed ser- most Outstanding Employer Engagement
by Prof Graeme Herd cadets with a deeper knowledge of their
service as well as of those broader quali-
vices, as well as to foreign military orga-
nizations and universities.
Initiative at the 2014 Times Higher Educa-
tion Awards.
Dartmouth Center ties which had produced the inspired lead- This experience is now complimented The ability to identify and understand link-
& Dr Fotios Moustakis ership of Nelson. by Plymouth University’s newly created ages between science and technology,
A long line of prominent naval historians School of Government (August 1st, 2013). business and trade, defence and strategic
Associate Professor & Head of External Affairs of Darmouth Centre and other academics taught at Dartmouth, Staff in the Politics and International Rela- studies, societal values and norms and
including Michael Lewis, Geoffrey Callen- tions Programmes at Plymouth include ar- environmental and maritime law, for ex-
der, Christopher Lloyd, Edward Hughes, eas specialists that cover the Middle East ample, is entirely relevant in the education
Mandate and Vision 2014 the UK Chief of General Staff not- and so economic prosperity and political Northcote Parkinson, Ruddick Mackay, and North Africa (Dr. Shabnam Holliday of naval officers today.
The launch of the Dartmouth Centre for ed tensions in Ukraine were unforeseen stability. Philip Towle, Geoffrey Till, Eric Grove, and Dr. Chris Emery), Sub-Saharan Africa
Seapower and Strategy (DCSS) is timely. and ‘confound our previous assumptions The Centre has three unique selling and Evan Davies. Many not only distin- (Dr. Karen Treasure and Dr. Rebecca Da- Activities of the Centre
This independent, influential and inclusive about stability across Europe.’ Contem- points. guished themselves as academics, but vies), Europe (Professor Mary Farrell and The DCSS will undertake valuable teach-
Centre meets a clear and growing need to porary strategic challenges –including the • First, Plymouth is Britain’s ‘Ocean also as practitioners, notably in the fields Dr. Patrick Holden) and Russia and Eur- ing and research. It will also help inform
raise knowledge, awareness and under- resilience of global networks enabling en- City’ with a proud maritime and mili- of policy-advice, intelligence, and wartime asia (Professor Graeme Herd), as well as and shape security policy decision-mak-
standing of strategic and defence issues ergy, food and water security, normative tary history and heritage and Dart- operational analysis. In 1982, under the UK foreign and security policy (Dr. Jamie ing by generating education and training
as they relate to maritime affairs and the battles over regulating the use of the glob- mouth hosts the BRNC, the world’s then Head of Department, Louis Wre- Gaskarth). These two groups combined, opportunities, research, dialogue and de-
utility of seapower in the 21st century. al commons, the rise in global maritime most prestigious naval college. ford-Brown, History and English evolved alongside Commodore (Ret) and Hon bate across the maritime domain.
In late 2013 the UK Chief of Defence Staff trade, a shifting military and economic • Second, Centre’s staff consists of BR- into the Department of Strategic Studies Prof Jake Moores of the School of Gov-
argued that the United Kingdom (UK) mil- strategic balance in the High North, and NC’s Dartmouth Strategic and Securi- and Maritime Warfare (SSMW), with its ernment and Dr. Harry Bennett and his Teaching
itary risks having “exquisite weapons sys- the mobilization of Russia’s Black Sea ty Group with an established history of curriculum expanded to take-in contem- maritime-focused colleagues in History, The University of Plymouth has introduced
tems” but a “hollowed out force” not fit for Fleet in Sevastopol in support of territorial excellence and success at delivering porary strategic thought, international bring together expertise in strategic and successfully in the last five years an in-
purpose. In January 2014 a former US annexation of Crimea - highlight the de- educational opportunities to naval of- relations, maritime warfare and regional defence studies as well as experience in novative Masters in Applied Strategy and
Secretary of Defence suggested that the pendence of island nations, such as the ficer and NCO professional training, studies. professional military education in contem- International Security. The programme,
UK was in danger of losing full spectrum UK and Ireland, on seapower to maintain and Plymouth University’s staff in the Since July 1st, 2008, Plymouth Universi- porary and historical, national and interna- which is currently delivered in collabora-
interoperability with the US. By March open lines of communication, connectivity, School of Government who have ex- ty has established a history of excellence tional contexts. tion with the Hellenic National Defence
14 15
an effective way to engage with the pub-
lic. Staff at BRNC (particularly Dr. Jane LEGAL ISSUES
ACADEMIC ISSUES Harrold and Richard Porter) already do
excellent work in this respect. This is a
means to inform the wider public on mar-
itime issues.
The Military-Law
The first dialogue event consisted of a
College in Athens to senior military officers international security, regional studies, panel entitled ‘Seapower in the Age of
and officials in Greece, encompasses the and contemporary experiences of military Uncertainty’ which opened the ‘Britain
Enforcement
study of strategy and contemporary secu- intervention. It offers students –especially and the Sea 3 Conference: Enriching
rity issues, offering policy-focused cours- those working in the armed services, gov- Britain's Maritime Capabilities’, held at
es and approach which gives students ernment service, aid, community, or me- Mast House 11-12 September 2014. We
Alliance to Combat
an insight into the kinds of issues which dia - the kind of knowledge that may be of were privileged to have as panellists Pro-
challenge Governments, armed services, direct professional use as well as the kind fessor Steve Haines, Professor of Public
and international organizations. of personal and intellectual skills that are and International Law, School of Law,
The programme utilises the expertise valuable to all. Greenwich University, Professor Gwy
available at Dartmouth and Plymouth Uni-
versity, to give students an insight into the
study of strategy, contemporary security
Dialogue and Research
In terms of dialogue and public outreach,
thian Prins, Emeritus Research Professor,
London School of Economics and Mem-
ber of the Strategy Advisory Panel, Chief
Transnational Organized
problems, regional issues, and the pro-
cess of policy-making. The programme
the Centre will create an “Admirals Fo-
rum”, with the view to utilising the exper-
tise, skills and competencies, networks
of the Defence Staff and of the Royal
Marines Advisory Group, and Mr. Mark
Grove, a Lecturer in Maritime Warfare,
Crime at Sea
provides the knowledge and intellectual
skills for employment in any profession, and social capital of retired senior officers Department of Strategic Studies and Mar-
but especially in such fields as military, di- in the region to give guidance, mentoring itime Warfare, University of Plymouth at by Pierre St. Hilaire*
plomacy, journalism, public relations, risk course participants, aid capacity devel- BRNC. A second dialogue event will be Director, Counter-Terrorism, Public Safety &
analysis, security, and lobbying for either opment and act as DCSS Ambassadors. held at BRNC to celebrate the launch of Maritime Security, ICPO-INTERPOL
the commercial or NGO sector. “If only Plymouth knew what Plymouth the DCSS in Dartmouth.
The DCSS has a policy-focused ethos: knows” –we are in the process of auditing In research terms we aim to publish pol-
emphasising contemporary foreign pol- the intellectual and experiential resources icy-relevant opinion pieces (School of
icy and security problems, learning from and willingness of our retired or semi-re- Government Blog) and policy-briefs, as
past experiences, and outlining possible tired population ready and willing to make well as more academic outputs informing
policy solutions and strategies to man- their talent available for DCSS projects. our understanding of our dynamic global “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis –to a greater likelihood of connecting the
age security problems. It encompasses Public lectures on contemporary maritime strategic context. dots– is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information”.
the study of strategy, maritime warfare, affairs as well as history and heritage are The 9/11 Commission Report, at 416.
Professor Graeme P. Herd Introduction ings, firearms, migrant smuggling, illegal the military. In this, it is critical for naval
He is founding Director of the School of Government and Associate Dean in the Faculty of Business, Plymouth
The critical role played by international fishing and dumping, smuggling of illicit assets, as well as private actors travel-
University, which he joined in September 2013. The School of Government has four degree programmes –Poli-
tics, International Relations, Public Services and Sociology– with 443 undergraduate and postgraduate students naval forces in mitigating the threat of goods such as charcoal and ivory, and ing on the high seas, to report criminal
and approximately 32 Faculty. From 2005-2013 Professor Herd was an international faculty member at the maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia other maritime crimes. Accordingly, law activity to the law enforcement communi-
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), where he served as Co-Director of its International Training Course cannot be overstated. The absence of enforcement agencies, by necessity, rely tyvia INTERPOL channels.As this article
in Security Policy and Master of Advanced Studies, accredited by the University of Geneva. Before moving to any regional or international law enforce- on naval forces or other actors operating demonstrates, the experience gained by
the GCSP in 2005, he was appointed Professor of Civil-Military Relations at the George C. Marshall Europe- ment agency on the high seas limits the in that environment to report such criminal naval forces during counterpiracy opera-
an Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (2002-2005) and a non-resident Associate
ability of the law enforcement commu- activities. tions will prove invaluable in countering
Fellow of the International Security Programme, Chatham House (2004-2007). Prior to this he was Lecturer in
International Relations at both the University of Aberdeen (1997-2002), where he was Deputy Director of the nity on land to combat piracy and other To combat transnational organized crime or mitigating other threats in the maritime
Scottish Centre for International Security (formerly Centre for Defence Studies) and Staffordshire University (1994-97) and a Projects Officer, forms of transnational organized crime, at sea will require more robust information domain.
Department of War Studies, King's College London (1993-94). During his doctoral studies on 17th century Russian military and diplomatic including the illicit trafficking in human be- sharing between law enforcement and
history he studied at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (1991-1992) as a British Council Scholar. His
own teaching and research interests have focused on diverse aspects of Russian foreign and security policy and Great Power relations.
During his 21-year academic career he has written or edited nine books, written over 70 academic papers and has given over 100 academic I. Military-Law Enforcement Partnership to Combat Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia
and policy-related presentations in 46 countries.
In the course of combating piracy off the forces operation in the Western Indian NATO2, and CMF3 have forged a strong
Dr Fotios Moustakis coast of Somalia, the three major naval Ocean and Gulf of Aden, EUNAVFOR1, working relationship with INTERPOL and
He was awarded a MA Honours Degree in History and Politics from the University of Aberdeen and a MSc in European Policy, Law and
Management from the Robert Gordon University. In 2000, he received my Doctorate in International Relations from the University of Aberdeen.
He have worked as Research Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen and as Projects Officer
at the Scottish Centre for International Security. He was also Module Convenor/Teaching Fellow at the University of Exeter where he taught * I would like to thank INTERPOL Criminal Intelligence Analyst Anita Gossmann for her valuable edits and comments.
courses on Balkan Security, International Terrorism and International Security. In 2006 he was appointed Senior Associate Member at the 1. The first European Union Naval Force operation, Atalantacomprises up to five vessels and four aircraft and more than 900 personnel. See S.G. Report 623,
Centre for South Eastern European Studies, St Antony’s College, Oxford University. He is also a visiting Professor at the Hellenic National p. 38, U.N. Doc. S/2013/623 (Oct. 21, 2013).
Defence College. He currently work as a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, which is part 2. Operation Ocean Shield is NATO’s counter piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate
of University of Plymouth attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region since 2008. The NATO operation Ocean Shield comprises
16 17
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