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Politics and Governance Open Access Journal | ISSN: 2183-2463 Volume 8, Issue 3 (2020) Politics and (Self-)Organisation of Electricity System Transitions in a Global North–South Perspective Editors Eberhard Rothfuß and Festus Boamah
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3 Politics and (Self-)Organisation of Electricity System Transitions in a Global North–South Perspective Published by Cogitatio Press Rua Fialho de Almeida 14, 2º Esq., 1070-129 Lisbon Portugal Academic Editors Eberhard Rothfuß (University of Bayreuth, Germany) Festus Boamah (University of Bayreuth, Germany) Available online at: www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance This issue is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY). Articles may be reproduced provided that credit is given to the original and Politics and Governance is acknowledged as the original venue of publication.
Table of Contents Politics and (Self)-Organisation of Electricity System Transitions in a Global North–South Perspective Eberhard Rothfuß and Festus Boamah 162–172 Centrally Decentralising? Analysing Key Policies and Pathways in Norway’s Electricity Transitions Tor Håkon Jackson Inderberg 173–184 Prioritizing the Chicken or Egg? Electric Vehicle Purchase and Charging Infrastructure Subsidies in Germany Roland Zink, Javier Valdes and Jane Wuth 185–198 Geostrategic Renewable Energy Transition in Turkey: Organizational Strategies Towards an Energy Autonomous Future Özge Dolunay 199–210 Cross-Scale Linkages of Centralized Electricity Generation: Geothermal Development and Investor–Community Relations in Kenya Britta Klagge, Clemens Greiner, David Greven and Chigozie Nweke-Eze 211–222
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i3.3636
Editorial
Politics and (Self)-Organisation of Electricity System Transitions in a
Global North–South Perspective
Eberhard Rothfuß and Festus Boamah *
Chair of Social and Population Geography, University of Bayreuth, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany;
E-Mails: eberhard.rothfuss@uni-bayreuth.de (E.R.), festus.boamah@uni-bayreuth.de (F.B.)
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 7 September 2020 | Published: 11 September 2020
Abstract
Dominant electricity systems are inevitably transitioning into new forms in terms of power generation mix, mode of en-
ergy system governance and vested interests, the extent of state and consumer/citizen participation in the energy system,
and energy justice expectations in different geographies in the Global North and Global South. In this editorial to the the-
matic issue entitled Politics and (Self-)Organisation of Electricity System Transitions in a Global North–South Perspective,
we discuss politics and (self)-organisation of (just) energy transitions to expose how messy, convoluted, and fluid future
electricity system transitions can be in both the Global North and Global South.
Keywords
decarbonisation; energy transition; global north; global south; Paris climate agreement; solar photovoltaic systems
Issue
This editorial is part of the issue “Politics and (Self-)Organisation of Electricity System Transitions in a Global North–South
Perspective” edited by Eberhard Rothfuß (University of Bayreuth, Germany) and Festus Boamah (University of Bayreuth,
Germany).
© 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Global Decarbonisation and the Role of the vided a timely inspiration and execution plan for future
Electricity Sector decarbonisation. Yet there clearly exist inconsistencies
between the carbon emission trajectories, planned emis-
The destructive consequence of fossil fuel consumption sion reductions, and required emission reduction targets
is now self-evident. Causal mechanisms and scientific re- of all countries, not excluding the so-called “climate pro-
medial measures are well known and yet the proposed gressive” nations (see Anderson, Broderick, & Stoddard,
decarbonisation initiatives seem either far-fetched or 2020). The energy industry alone contributes over 40%
run the risk of adventuring into an arena of obscurities, of global carbon emissions (International Energy Agency,
uncertainties, and ambivalences. In cases where decar- 2020), and so the claim that the Paris-compliant global
bonisation initiatives are fairly straightforward and per- carbon budget requires complete decarbonisation by
haps seamless, debates about the choice of pathways 2030–2045 (Anderson et al., 2020) suggests a radical
that would produce just outcomes raise more questions transformation of the society, the economy and gov-
than answers. Carbon lock-ins are indisputable in critical ernance of energy systems across the world in less
sectors such as the electricity and transport sector, heavy than three decades. The backtracking of wealthy na-
industries, as well as the aviation and shipping industries. tions from the Paris Climate Agreement (e.g., USA under
The consensus to keep the global average annual tem- President D. Trump), display of carbon lock-in syndromes,
perature rise to well below 2°C and even aspire to re- and/or structural contradictions in decarbonisation dec-
duce it further down to 1.5°C—as stipulated in the Paris larations among champions of sustainable energy tran-
Climate Agreement reached in 2015—may have pro- sitions (Germany, UK, Sweden, and Norway) and obvi-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 162ous reluctance of coal-dependent European countries plement fossil fuel-dependent, centralised electricity sys-
(Germany, Czech Republic, and Poland) to honour coal tems which are currently losing their appeal in favour of
phase-out pledges (Europe Beyond Coal, 2019; Osička decentralised electricity options in both the Global North
et al., 2020) speak louder than the popular adage. In and Global South (Boamah, 2020b; Bouffard & Kirschen,
other words, it is easier said than done. These wealthy 2008; Taylor, Turner, Willette, & Uawithya, 2015). Two is-
western countries may have failed to exhibit exemplary sues are noteworthy in the discussion of the choice of
behaviours in the transition to decarbonised energy sys- electricity transition pathways from among the count-
tems due to structural and circumstantial constraints less available options. The first crucial issue is the direc-
over which they have limited or no control. What ap- tion and nature of the transition process, which would
pears intriguing, however, is the continuous promotion be more appealing in both the short- and the long-term.
of low-carbon energy solutions in Global South countries Put differently, this is whether to maintain the status
where the technology is neither cost-effective nor eas- quo or switch between decentralised, fully, or partly cen-
ily compatible with their politics, energy system, socio- tralised systems, on the one hand; and the political and
economic conditions, and the energy visions of different socio-economic impacts of the transition pathway cho-
social groups (Boamah, 2020b). This double-standard or sen, on the other hand. The next and related crucial issue
perverse approach to sustainable energy transition has is whether the decarbonisation process should be self-
been described as “energy bullying” (Monyei, Jenkins, driven, state-driven, and/or context-driven. The ambiva-
Serestina, & Adewumi, 2018; see also Boamah, 2020b). lence over the potential of (un)just energy transition cuts
The greater contribution of ‘climate progressive coun- across both of these issues. In other words, which elec-
tries’ to global carbon emissions—compared to devel- tricity system transition should be chosen, with regards
oping countries—places non-negotiable moral and politi- to where, when, for whom, with what consequences for
cal responsibilities on them in global decarbonisation ini- the economy and fossil fuel consumption, and in order
tiatives. In fact, many developing countries do not feel to escape which kind of entanglements?
morally obliged to implement renewable energy tech-
nologies unless they are cost-effective and fit seamlessly 2. Highlights from the Four Articles and Our Argument
into their overarching socio-economic development mas-
ter plans (Boamah, 2020b). The term ‘energy bullying’ The four articles in this thematic issue sought to en-
could perhaps be an apt description to foreground jus- gage with the aforementioned issues, and the conclu-
tice considerations in the transition to low-carbon en- sions reached in all articles suggest electricity system
ergy technologies. However, although least-developed transition pathways are rather less predictable, nested,
countries are the primary victims of climate change im- and in a state of constant flux. As shown in the arti-
pacts, a number of them (e.g., Indonesia, Philippines) are cles, the socio-economic and ecological impacts of the
equally guilty of heavy carbon emissions, and thus, can- direction of electricity system transition would depend
not shun their contribution to global climate change mit- on local circumstances and a complex set of conditions,
igation efforts solely on claims of ‘energy bullying’ by the e.g., in Kenya and Turkey. And even in cases of obvious
Global North. transition towards decentralised electricity systems, the
The pathways to decarbonisation remain convoluted co-existence of both systems is still inevitable and de-
and debatable in both the Global North and Global South. sirable. Furthermore, transitioning to energy efficiency
Climate scientists may have their say while politics and technologies like electric vehicles (EVs) does not auto-
modes of energy governance drive decarbonisation ini- matically guarantee desirable decarbonisation pathways
tiatives in opposite directions, especially in the shipping, (e.g., in Germany) and decentralised electricity transition
aviation, and heavy industry sectors where further de- is not always driven by defossilisation considerations, es-
carbonisation options are either limited or too expen- pecially in Norway where the electricity sector is already
sive. Of course, there is no single ‘silver bullet’ solution fully decarbonised. The issue of just energy transition
to this quandary of the Anthropocene and so the de- becomes even more complicated when entitlement no-
bate should rather be focused on identifying the most tions, development priorities, and aspirations of differ-
promising entry point for the discussion of trade-offs in ent countries are compared and put in context. We dis-
decarbonisation pathways—of the menu of available op- cuss in this editorial politics and (self)-organisation of
tions. Electricity reaches approximately 4.3 billion peo- (just) energy transitions to expose how messy, convo-
ple, and the sector constitutes the single largest source luted, and fluid future electricity system transitions can
of aggregate greenhouse gas emissions in most coun- be in both the Global North and Global South.
tries, predictably the fastest growing energy sector of
the future. Moreover, the emergence of electric cars 3. Centralised–Decentralised Electricity System
makes the sector a promising decarbonisation pathway Dichotomy, Self-Organisation, and Just Energy
(Sovacool & Walter, 2019). The electricity sector cer- Transition
tainly has important roles to play in decarbonisation ini-
tiatives, especially given recent advancements in low- Centralised electricity systems, which have dominated
carbon energy technologies and their capacity to com- the electricity regime in most countries for decades,
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 163depend on fossil fuel-powered generation plants. The Global North (e.g., Germany, UK, Switzerland, Australia,
governance mode of these systems limits the capacity Norway, Spain, and some areas in the USA), primarily
of consumers to produce energy and proactively miti- to encourage the transition to low-carbon energy solu-
gate power supply shortfalls and unreliable power sup- tions (Bach, Hopkins, & Stephenson, 2020; Dharshing,
ply. The mainstream discourse of the Anthropocene and 2017; Inderberg, Tews, & Turner, 2018; Passey, Watt,
characteristic features of a centralised electricity sys- Bruce, & MacGill, 2018; Schmid, Pechan, Mehnert, &
tem are rendering this dominant power supply paradigm Eisenack, 2017). Particularly prominent is the emerging
less desirable mainly due to the fast depletion of fos- phenomenon of electricity users simultaneously becom-
sil fuels and attendant negative climate change impacts. ing consumers and producers of electricity—often re-
Furthermore, the desire of investors to minimise risks ferred to as ‘prosumers’—using small-scale solar PV sys-
through the deployment of smaller-scale, modular gener- tems as well as offset electricity tariffs usually with cen-
ation and transmission systems, as well as public reserva- tralised grid connection. The deployment of these sys-
tions about system corruption, gross inefficiencies, and tems facilitates effective involvement of users in electric-
other uncertainties play a role in this tendency (Boamah, ity provision by sharing excess power—produced from
2020b; Bouffard & Kirschen, 2008). Small-scale decen- renewable sources—with the grid and other electricity
tralised systems are emerging as suitable alternatives or users, supports peak load demand management, energy
complements to centralised systems. They are mostly system efficiency and plays a vital role in ensuring reliable
based on renewable energy technologies or on high- and sustainable electricity supply in the future (Inderberg
efficiency fossil fuel-based technologies such as com- et al., 2018; Razzaq, Zafar, Khan, Butt, & Mahmood, 2016;
bined heat and power or have the capacity to use di- Zafar et al., 2018). While the potential contributions of
verse sources of energy simultaneously, thereby miti- decentralised, self-organised electrification systems to
gating many power generation and supply uncertainties decarbonisation and the empowerment of consumers
(Bouffard & Kirschen, 2008). The flexibility and oppor- are pretty clear, the expectation that particular transi-
tunity to integrate renewable technologies to drive de- tion pathways would ipso facto produce just outcomes
carbonisation initiatives add vitality to calls for a radical for all groups, communities, and sectors of the economy
transition towards decentralised electricity systems par- in different geographies is still debatable. The ‘just en-
ticularly in Global North countries generating high car- ergy transition’ approach entails a critical discussion of
bon emissions and urgently seeking to mitigate their high the social, economic, and political repercussions of de-
carbon footprints out of ‘ecological guilt’—primarily per carbonised energy transition or decarbonisation strate-
moral considerations. gies to avoid potential re-production of exploitation in
Meanwhile in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, over the quest to eschew carbon lock-in (Healy & Barry, 2017;
800 million people live without electricity access (World Unruh, 2002; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Studies show
Bank, 2019). In these geographies, a single focus on state- that decentralised systems grant consumers some auton-
led centralised electrical grid extension to territorially re- omy, provide increases in the uptake of low-carbon en-
mote and lower-income locations is either unfeasible or ergy technologies, alter the political power wielded by
costly. The transition to flexible, commercially viable, and energy companies, and still have the tendency to create
scalable decentralised electricity systems seems to be the social inequalities in favour of more affluent groups who
obvious option to move toward in the near future (Banal- can afford and undermine the operation of conventional
Estañol, Calzada, & Jordana, 2017; Bisaga & Parikh, 2018; energy players who may lose customers (Brisbois, 2019;
Taylor et al., 2015). Another important avenue for decar- de Wildt, Chappin, van de Kaa, Herder, & van de Poel,
bonisation is the energy efficiency measures and/or prac- 2020; Sovacool, Lipson, & Chard, 2019). The transition
tices that result in reduction of energy demand as well to prosuming will reconfigure the electric utility sector
as the transition to EVs or heat pumps (Geels, Sovacool, towards low-carbon solutions with many unpredictable
& Sorell, 2018). It is worth clarifying that the term self- risks, and so policymakers and planners are advised to
organised, decentralised system used here denotes a proactively consider effective and efficient measures for
system of energy generation and distribution primar- their entry into competitive electricity markets (Parag &
ily initiated, owned and/or predominantly financed by Sovacool, 2016). As promising as this sounds, the implica-
users themselves rather than the state, parastatals or pri- tions for just outcomes remain open to question. Another
vate companies and where electrical power is generated conundrum is that most Global South countries are tran-
from (local) sources other than conventional centralised sitioning towards a decentralised paradigm primarily to
grid systems. Self-organisation of energy therefore en- complement centralised power supply systems and mit-
compasses embedded generation or net metering, pri- igate the accompanying spatial inequalities. Accordingly,
vate sector-driven mini-grid electrification, and complete decarbonisation is the least important consideration for
stand-alone solar photovoltaic (PV) systems where even the transition. Whereas the wealthy carbon-dependent
regulatory frameworks and incentives are driven by the Global North countries are compelled decarbonised their
state, parastatals, or by private companies. energy systems out of moral and political obligations.
The transition to self-organised decentralised elec- The most crucial motivating factors behind the tran-
tricity provision has gained much prominence in the sition processes, entitlement notions, and other contex-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 164tual conditions in specific geographies deserve attention try and an increasing share of private vehicles, is also ex-
here since different transition pathways are possible. In amined. The authors conclude that neither an increasing
Norway, for example, where electricity prices are rela- electrical charging infrastructure nor EV subsidy policies
tively low, and centralised electricity generation is sig- are sufficient in accelerating EVs transition per se. And
nificantly based on renewables, the transition to self- even if the two conditions did facilitate the transition,
organised grid-connected solar PV systems may be less they still do not warrant successful decarbonisation since
inspiring (in the future). At least out of ecological sus- Germany generates approximately 30% of its electricity
tainability and financial concerns since the electricity sec- from coal. The overall effect of the EV transition must be
tor is already cost-effectively “de-carbonised” compared set in relation to the nature of the country’s power gen-
to that of Germany, and UK, for example (see Inderberg eration mix and the fraction that may be constituted by
et al., 2018). This does not suggest a seamless transition renewable energy sources in the future. Also, it should be
in Norway, as shown by Inderberg (2020) in this volume. pointed out that the total carbon dioxide balance of EV
The grid companies and their interest organisations cer- production (e.g., the battery system) can cast doubts on
tainly still hold key positions but their interests have be- the proposed climate neutrality associated with the tran-
come increasingly less unified since 2011. Higher frag- sition from fossil fuel-powered cars to the electric types.
mentation is likely to yield reduced political influence. Socio-economic conditions and political systems in
On the other hand, the grid companies have endorsed Turkey make the co-existence of centralised and decen-
the idea of nationally determined regulations. Although tralised systems more desirable, as shown in Dolunay’s
depending on the details, the policies analysed either article (2020). Instead of approaching centralised or de-
favour or discourage further developments toward de- centralised transitions as two separate paths, in which
centralised electricity systems, Inderberg (2020) sug- an entire energy system and/or institutional structure
gests that the centralisation–decentralisation dichotomy need to be revised accordingly, partially managed mod-
obscures many nuances involved on three accounts. First, els could provide faster transitions to renewable energy
decentralising initiatives in the energy system can go and enable practical solutions for people. Indeed, from
hand in hand with centralised political steering. It is a technical perspective, a centralised grid-connected en-
pretty clear that nationally mandated initiatives have de- ergy system is a combination of many decentralised en-
veloped digitalisation and prosuming provisions that may ergy systems into a grid. Depending on the particular
lead to increased decentralisation. Second, this complex- sources of social power in a country, region, or govern-
ity underlines the fact that a rough categorisation of ac- ment as discussed in this article, a different model of re-
tors into incumbents and new entrants is not sufficiently newable transition with different layers of liberalisation,
fine-tuned: Analysis of decentralisation requires signifi- privatisation, or self-organisation is also possible. This
cantly more refined categorisation and contextualisation could in some cases facilitate a faster renewable tran-
to enable more precise predictions. Thirdly, transitioning sition than purely centralised or decentralised options.
includes several development paths, which may lead to The organisation of the (de)centralised electricity transi-
diverging interpretations. Even though Norwegian elec- tions are dependent on the history, geography, and the
tricity sector is fully decarbonised, there are still several overlapping relations of these sources of social power.
different transitions underway. This indicates that even Nevertheless, the answer to the question of who is pre-
in countries where much of the policy drive is mandated pared to take responsibility within a given country will
by a decarbonisation goal, subtler causal agents are likely determine how social power will play out in renewable
to exist. It is, therefore, necessary to contextualise and energy transitions.
make a nuanced analysis to clarify factors influencing on- In the foregoing, analysis of geographies of self-
going energy transitions, paying a keen attention to path- organisation and just energy transition notions are nec-
way directionality complexities as well as the energy jus- essary to expose the nature and cause of conundrums
tice implications of the ongoing changes. and conflicting perspectives surrounding electricity sys-
Developments in Germany are not straightforward ei- tem transition in different geographies. Self-organisation
ther. Carbon emissions from the road transport sector is seen as a way of institutionalising new social rela-
are still significant and so the transition from fossil fuel tionships deriving from (or establishing) a variety of lo-
vehicles to EVs has been featured an as important de- cal networks, which potentially offer new pathways for
carbonisation initiative. Since early 2010, the German the emergence of ‘alternative forms of governance.’ It
government implemented a series of measures to pro- is achieved through encounters—perhaps of a serendip-
mote the use of EVs, including purchase subsidies and itous nature—that lead to the identification of mu-
the development of charging infrastructures. The article tual interests, positions, and relations based on shared
by Zink, Valdes, and With (2020) discusses the impact of space, knowledge, values, and norms (Atkinson, Dörfler,
an increasing share of EVs on the electricity grid and suit- & Rothfuß, 2018, p. 2). Fundamentally, self-organisation
able locations for charging stations with examples from is a way of representing processes that institutionalise
a case study in Lower Bavaria. The impact of purchase the social relationships deriving from a variety of local
subsidies on EV purchases in Germany, a high-income networks. These interactions initially generate trust de-
country characterised by an important automotive indus- rived from individual relationships which, over time and
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 165through further interactions, become transformed into projects by citizens and communities in local energy ini-
collective forms of trust and create practice(s) with ‘col- tiatives to the resultant ‘transformative outcomes’ in the
lective intentionality’ (Hasanov & Beaumont, 2016). This transition to new energy systems and how these cre-
does not imply that they operate in an ‘anarchical’ man- ate promising avenues to facilitate energy transition to-
ner as they have to institutionalise some of their proce- wards a low-carbon future (Hasanov & Zuidema, 2018).
dures, although they always try to uphold a certain ‘flu- Self-organisation of distributed generation in the Global
idity’ and openness of social processes and internal in- North, for example, ensures reliable energy supply and
novation. However, self-organisation can take on many sustainable energy practices, grants some autonomy to
different forms as it develops within local and regional energy users (Bulkeley, Powells, & Bell, 2016; Strengers,
contexts in response to locally experienced and defined 2013; Strengers, Pink, & Nicholls, 2019; Zafar et al., 2018),
‘problems.’ Given this, in attempting to identify a some- not excluding availability of financial incentives, rele-
what general ‘definition’ of self-organisation, we need vant technical information, as well as the existence of
to exercise caution. There are multiple ways of concep- clear regulatory frameworks (Boamah, 2020b).The driv-
tualising self-organisation that are not necessarily mutu- ing forces behind self-organisation of energy and their
ally exclusive. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this consequent effects in the Global South vary markedly
(see Atkinson et al., 2018, p. 170). Nederhand, Bekkers, not only from experiences in the Global North but also
and Voorberg (2016, p. 2) define self-organisation as a even within and between countries. Major drivers of
“collective process of communication, choice, and mu- the transition include unjust billing systems, inefficien-
tual adjustment of behaviour resulting in the emergence cies in state-driven centralised electricity provision, and
of ordered structures”; while for Boonstra and Boelens unreliable and unavailable grid power supply particu-
(2011) it is the absence of government involvement, and larly in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa,
thus, of external control (see also Boonstra, 2015). We do and many other African countries. Self-organisation of
not see these two approaches as necessarily contradic- electricity towards decentralised electrification systems
tory. However, we should also acknowledge that some seems like a promising approach to addressing energy
forms of self-organising may consciously choose not to injustices, and thus, economic challenges in the Global
engage with established forms of governance, indeed South. In Africa in particular, self-organised electrifica-
they may seek to demonstrate that there are alterna- tion initiatives are expressions of despondency, aspira-
tive ways of organising society. Meerkerk, van Boonstra, tion for autonomy in energy generation and consump-
& Edelenbos (2013) point out that self-organised initia- tion, and thus, remediation responses to energy injus-
tives represent a challenge to existing governance struc- tices considered realisable through limited or no depen-
tures yet evolve together within existing institutional set- dency on state institutions (Boamah, 2020a, 2020b).
tings. We want to argue that the most fruitful way of Decentralised, self-organised models of electricity
doing this and of understanding self-organising is a dis- production have thus been perceived as an opportunity
cursive approach that identifies particular ‘local issues,’ for countries in the Global South to leapfrog directly
‘frames of orientations,’ and which develops associated into the future of electricity. That said, in the Global
narratives, visions and practices and then seeks to con- South where decentralised electricity systems appear as
struct particular courses of action—appropriate to local the better alternative, outcomes of the mode of gover-
contexts. Here self-organising is a dynamic process that nance present yet additional dilemmas. Despite interest
emerges in response to the development of shared local in self-organised decentralised electrification, states are
understandings and ways of addressing these (Rothfuß still ambivalent due to potentially negative effects on
& Korff, 2015). Moreover, as the experience and knowl- their monopolistic practices. States have strong vested
edge of such groups evolve, they themselves are likely to interests in power generation and aspire to retain sub-
change and, perhaps, expand their horizons beyond local stantial control in centralised electricity provision in or-
contexts, making connections with wider national and der to directly drive their socio-economic development
global causal processes. Self-organisation as a means of agenda throughout the country. This is particularly strik-
action ‘from below’ emphasises interaction and discus- ing where centralised electricity distribution is struc-
sion between participants leading to the identification of tured around state monopoly primarily for ‘developmen-
relevant local issues and the formation of an accompany- tal state’ visions in order to secure revenue flows and/or
ing ‘discourse/narrative’ of problem definition that may in response to a history of unsuccessful private sector-
challenge and subvert existing governance forms or en- led development approaches (Boamah, 2020a, 2020b;
hance them. It provides alternative ways of doing things, Van der Merwe, 2017). Central governmental structures
it potentially offers new ways of ‘governing from be- and parastatals strategically organise decentralised elec-
low’ that reflect local contexts, understandings of prob- tricity provisions in a way that keeps citizens perpetu-
lems, and solves them through innovative practices (see ally within the bounds of patronising state-driven elec-
Joas, 1996). tricity services. Even in South Africa, a country that sup-
In the energy transition literature, self-organisation ports embedded electricity generation or net metering
encompasses a variety of topics ranging from active through state-driven initiatives—such as tax incentives
participation of the population and local ownership of and cost reductions to reduce its huge carbon foot-prints
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 166(Didiza et al., 2016; Van der Merwe, 2017)—regulations governance in geothermal energy development in Kenya
on permissible power exports by net-metered customers include institutional interplay, co-management, and the
are designed to prioritise the financial sustainability of Geothermal Development Corporation as a bridging or-
state electricity distribution against the interests of cus- ganization. Their study shows that centralised electricity
tomers who want to mitigate impacts of unjust electricity generation can, as with decentralised electricity systems,
provision in ‘self-fulfilling’ ways (Boamah, 2020b). have strong local impacts, with local communities play-
Similar ambivalence occurs in Ghana and Kenya ing an active part. The Baringo community in Kenya, for
where the centralised electricity sector also serves as instance, is not a passive recipient of benefits but rather
the state’s cash-cow and any aberration from this tra- an active participant in negotiations as well as acts of
dition spells financial doom for the state electricity dis- resistance and sabotage when important demands are
tributors and the implementation of collectively bind- not met or if Geothermal Development Corporation ac-
ing decisions by the state (Boamah, 2020b, in press). tivities are regarded as unfair. Community action and re-
Kenya Power has reservations against self-organised, de- sponses, therefore, have the potential to disrupt project
centralised electrification systems due to its cyclical fi- advancement. The conclusion reached by the authors is
nancial challenges and financial obligations to numer- that cross-scale links need to be considered to under-
ous power producers, sometimes with contracts extend- stand how power relations impact the implementation
ing beyond 20 years (Boamah, 2020a). Unless decen- and governance of large-scale electricity generation.
tralised electrification systems are organised within the There are certain distinct motivating factors and fric-
state apparatus and tailored to specific rural electrifi- tions in electricity system transitions which are exclu-
cation visions of the state, decarbonisation considera- sive to particular countries in the Global South. Ghana
tions through self-organised mechanisms do not present is a classic case in point. The strategic handling of tar-
any practically compelling motivation for the promotion iffs and the quality of electricity supply present govern-
of self-organised, decentralised initiatives of the popu- ments with the opportunity to shape the public’s impres-
lation. This is especially the case given that renewables sion of the ruling government. Ghana experienced acute
constitute approximately 85% of power generation mix power outages caused by power generation shortfalls,
(43.50% geothermal, 27.61% hydro, and 15.12% wind) grand energy sector corruption, and controversial tariff
as of May 2019 (Boamah, 2020b) and given the exis- increases between 2012 and 2016. Rampant power out-
tence of 3.2 million off-grid solar PV installations as of ages were satirically represented in the Ghanaian media
December 2017—which are mostly private sector-driven. as Dumsor whereas ‘hyper-speed’ recording of electric-
Furthermore, neither decentralised nor centralised sys- ity units by alleged ‘faulty meters’ were termed ‘Usain-
tems provide precise instructions for socio-economic Bolt Meters’ due to public perceptions of unfair billing
transformation especially for territorially remote areas. systems (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2018; Pyman & Boamah,
The spatial concentration of centralised electrical 2019). Dumsor is a word in the Ghanaian Twi language
grids in urban and higher-income locations of Kenya af- which refers to frequent and unexpected power out-
fects the development of micro-business enterprises in ages within a short period of time. The satirical term
remote areas (Boamah, 2020a). Well-to-do households was invented by the frustrated Ghanaians to ridicule the
who invest in more efficient solar PV systems to serve government’s poor management of energy crises, espe-
as power back-up systems are able to satisfy energy cially prior to the general elections in December 2016.
needs for social and business activities even in areas These developments made the incumbent government
noted for unreliable grid supply. Poorer households, on unpopular in the run-up to the 2016 general elections.
the other hand, have to restrict dominant social and The Ghanaian government introduced off-grid solar PV
economic practices according to the energy services of subsidy program primarily to mitigate the energy crisis.
inefficient solar PV systems, which eventually hinders Net metering policy which had been in existence was
the development of home-based and other rural busi- given a more serious attention by the government be-
ness enterprises. The emergence of precautionary en- fore the general elections. The net metering sub-code
ergy practices contributes to unintentional production of was published by the Energy Commission in 2015 and
low-carbon landscapes in the periphery but reveals in- on the 30 September 2016 the Public Utilities Regulatory
herent injustices associated with complete dependence Commission of Ghana published the net metering rate
on decentralised systems too. This also exposes gover- to guide the policy implementation. The Ghanaian gov-
nance challenges since decentralised systems are usu- ernment and energy sector agencies, however, continue
ally organised with little or no adherence to state regu- to express ambivalence on net metering system policy
lations and the desperate customers are often exploited implementation due to cyclical financial indebtedness
by unscrupulous solar energy service providers (Boamah, of its main electricity distributor, Electricity Company of
2020a). The governance mode of either centralised or Ghana (ECG), and the state’s obsession with monopo-
decentralised electricity systems can play an important lising the means of electricity generation and distribu-
mediating role in terms of impacts on rural livelihoods. tion. The ECG has refused to offset monthly electric-
The article by Klagge, Greiner, Greven, and Nweke-Eze ity bills of net-metered customers for over 5 years con-
(2020) sheds light on this issue. The types of multilevel trary to tariff regulations published by the public reg-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 167ulatory commission of Ghana (Afful, in press; Boamah, clear case of frustration born out of relative deprivation;
2020b). Beside financial considerations, the obstinacy of the disenchanted off-grid residents issued subtle threats
the ECG has been attributed to the fact that power gen- to vote against the ruling government during 2020 elec-
eration shortfalls between 2012 and 2016 and related tion upon failure to provide electrical grids (Boamah &
power supply instabilities—which reinforced the idea— Rothfuß, 2020). Self-organisation and the politics of elec-
have been reversed with excess power generation capac- tricity system transitions in contemporary Ghana shows
ity of approximately 2400 megawatts after 2017; hence, a situation where the quality of electricity supply and
the policy has outlived its usefulness, at least in the spatiality of electrical grid access has been a driver and
meantime (Boamah, 2020b). Players in the renewable en- sometimes an outcome of elections. Therefore, the or-
ergy sector and state energy agencies argue that since ganisation of energy infrastructure is intertwined with
the country does not feel morally obliged to promote multiple interests at different geographical scales—from
low-carbon energy solutions and does not have any po- local to national.
litical obligation to do so, decarbonisation of the sector Again, in the Republic of South Africa, the state-
would be largely dependent upon the cost-effectiveness sponsored Free Basic Electricity project increased en-
of the technology (Boamah, 2020b). Reference to excess ergy access for lower-income groups and residents of
power supply—although Ghana currently produces al- off-grid communities, and yet the energy output of de-
most 70% of its power from fossil fuels—and financial centralised solar PV systems was way below energy
considerations, which are largely decisive of the electric- needs of the population relative to the more privileged
ity system transition pathways, suggest that decarboni- groups who had access to more efficient and lower-cost
sation cannot be on the radar of relevant agencies until centralised electrical grids (Masekameni, Kasangana,
it coincides with certain desirable conditions and emer- Makonese, & Mbonane, 2018; Monyei, Jenkins, et al.,
gency situations. 2018; Monyei, Adewumi, & Jenkins, 2018). Both state-
Moreover, in other circumstances, self-organised en- driven centralised electricity systems and decentralised
ergy initiatives imply that there are citizens who are ones do not guarantee just outcomes; and neither do
almost fully fending for themselves via self-financing self-organised decentralised systems offer satisfactory
of power back-up systems, making direct negotiations remedy due to the above-mentioned contested enti-
with private sector energy providers at exorbitant costs, tlement notions. The transition to self-organised, de-
and/or depending on mini-grid electrification systems centralised electrification systems in the Global South
(particularly in remote areas) with tariffs significantly is driven by quite different motivations in rather am-
higher than that of conventional centralised electrical biguous energy policy regulatory frameworks and pub-
grids while the state may have limited control over lic ambivalence.
the matter (Boamah, 2020a, 2020b). Although self- The transition is not any less seamless in the Global
organisation of decentralised electricity systems may North where regulatory mechanisms and clear incen-
mitigate energy injustices and satisfy energy needs of tives exist. There are tensions in Germany as big energy
lower-class social groups in extreme areas of Kenya and companies have been affected by state subsidies sup-
Namibia (Boamah, 2020b), it results in feelings of en- porting small scale self-organised grid-connected solar
trenched energy injustices and misrecognition partic- PV installations. Experiences in Australia are even more
ularly in countries like Ghana where individuals and complex. The transition to net metering and battery en-
groups deem limited or no access to state-driven grid as ergy storage systems in Australia have caused significant
characteristic denial of privileges of national citizenship, reductions in grid electricity consumption (and hence re-
sometimes regardless of socio-economic status, class, duced revenues of utilities) and yet the resultant peak
place of residence, and so on (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2020). load demand reductions can, in certain situations, ad-
Even within Ghana, state-led decentralised solar PV elec- equately offset grid network investment costs (Passey
trification produced conflicting responses regarding the et al., 2018). Depending on the electricity regime, en-
issue of justice: The government-sponsored free dissem- ergy politics and other local conditions, frequent power
ination of 500-Watt solar PV to off-grid communities cre- supply interruptions, poor access to centralised electrical
ated a collective consciousness of misrecognition due grids, and hikes in electricity tariffs present a comingling
to the social preference for centralised grids, whereas a of opportunities and challenges in the transition to self-
50% subsidy of the same program for urban households organised solar PV systems in Global South and Global
generated contrary feelings (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2018, North countries.
2020). The off-grid community had voted for the incum- Self-organised decentralised electricity provision is
bent government in expectation for centralised electri- decidedly reconfiguring the role of civil society organi-
cal grids and the offer of free solar PV systems was per- sations and state actors in electricity regimes of Global
ceived as misrecognition of citizenship rights when com- North and Global South countries. The conflicting view-
pared with fellow Ghanaians living in grid-connected lo- points about what a ‘desirable energy future’ should
cations. This had been the case despite the widespread look like and the governance structures to realise these
outcry of injustices around dependencies on centralised revolve around a choice between self-organised decen-
electricity provision (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2020). This is a tralised systems—inclined towards renewable energy
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 168promotion, energy efficiency, autonomous and ‘demo- 2020, but President Trump flouted the agreement out
cratic’ electricity provision by individuals/local entities— of politics against de-fossilisation. Therefore, decarbon-
traditional centralised systems (Schmid et al., 2017), or isation initiatives and the set timelines in the Global
the co-existence of both systems. North can be nothing more than wishful thinking due
to the obvious negative impacts they may have on the
4. Locked between the Scylla of ‘Energy Bullying’ and economies of these wealthier nations and other vested
Charybdis of Decarbonisation Apathy interests around continuous burning of fossil fuels. Lock-
in syndromes reinforce energy bullying behaviour in even
Concerns about a fair distribution of the benefits and bur- wealthy and ‘ecologically guilty’ countries, as for coun-
dens of the energy system for all in society is certainly tries in the Global South, it reinforces the stance in which
a necessary call within the just energy transition de- they, understandably, do not feel morally obliged to
bate (see Jenkins, Sovacool, Błachowicz, & Lauer, 2020; make strenuous commitments to low-carbon energy so-
Healy & Barry, 2017; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013; Sovacool, lutions. The fact that many least-developed countries in
2014), but they are certainly bundled with some con- vulnerable geographies (e.g., Indonesia, Bangladesh, and
straints too. The justice advocacy in the decarbonisa- Sahelian countries) lack the wherewithal to make effec-
tion debate has placed huge political and moral obliga- tive climate change adaptation—in contrast to wealthy
tions on the major emitters of carbon and this might western countries—reveals the weaknesses of the just
have obscured necessary contributions from least emit- transition framework. The skewed attention to the dis-
ters (predominantly in the Global South) who may suf- tribution obligations of causative agents without analy-
fer from the brunt of climate extremes in the future. sis of primary victims of climate extremes may mislead
According to Anderson et al. (2020), the planned car- some Global South countries to sit aloof and continue
bon emission reductions of “climate progressive nations” with business as usual. In fact, carbon emission statis-
such as the UK and Sweden, will still exceed their fair tics of newly industrialising countries (e.g., Brazil, South
share of a Paris-compliant global carbon budget by at Africa, Indonesia, China, and India) place them in the
least two times, and even in the UK where moderate same league of ‘heavy emitters’ as the wealthy western
progress has been registered, emissions from interna- countries or sometimes even higher (e.g., China). Hence,
tional aviation and shipping are excluded. Norway has Global North’s energy bullying practices cannot justify ig-
fully decarbonised its electricity sector and great strides noring the issue of decarbonisation. Of course, technical,
in the transition to electric cars suggest a big leap for- financial, and other forms of support from the Global
ward, but these gains are still negated by huge carbon North are required to equip climate mitigation efforts,
emissions from its cash-cow (oil and gas sectors, aviation on just grounds, but the obsession with justice consid-
and shipping industries). Calculations by Anderson et al. erations may stall decarbonisation initiatives in the elec-
(2020) show that an immediate 10–15% per year carbon tricity sector. The just energy transition perspective can
emission reduction target is required for Norway to meet thus be not only enabling and but also constraining.
its Paris-based temperature and equity commitments,
and this also requires a completely zero-carbon energy 5. Final Reflections and Unresolved Questions Needing
system in the shipping and aviation industry by 2035. Attention
President Trump blatantly flouted the Paris Agreement,
repealed anti-fossil regulations to revive coal mining in- The thematic issue has sought to explore emerging tech-
dustry in the USA—to honour electioneering promises nological, geographical and political trends in different
in 2016—even in the face of evidence suggesting that regions of the world as our electricity systems are clearly
the coal mining industry and coal jobs decline occurred moving away from the centralized, utility-based, and
three decades earlier and that mining workers have be- state-controlled power generation models. No matter
come accustomed to transitioning to alternative liveli- how hard opponents may try, a paradigm shift in cen-
hoods (Sanya, Evans, & Konisky, 2018). President Trump tralised electricity systems toward self-organised decen-
claims adherence to the Paris Climate Agreement could tralised electricity systems is inevitable be it now or in
endanger the US economy which thrives on massive pro- the future. The shift is a result of a combination of moti-
duction and consumption of fossil fuels, and that he vations and the relevance of the driving forces shaped by
can backtrack this position on the condition that rene- changing circumstances, which are both predictable and
gotiation of the terms of the agreement is deemed fair unpredictable in specific geographies. The consequences
to the American economy and workers. The date of and drivers of electricity transitions are so variable and
formal withdrawal (4 November 2019) is in contraven- mixed that attempts to provide blueprints may give rise
tion of the terms of agreement which prohibits termi- to new lock-ins. Predicting the trajectory of the transi-
nation earlier than three years from the effective start tion pathways and governing it towards desirable out-
date of the agreement by the signatory—which was comes are still complicated given the uniqueness of elec-
4 November 2016 for the USA under the administration tricity regimes within specific countries, the varying lev-
of former President Obama. In other words, the earliest els of national economic development, different state
permissible withdrawal date must be after 4 November priorities, and ever-changing energy visions of electricity
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 169consumers. Even though the direction and governance Anderson, K., Broderick, J. F., & Stoddard, I. (2020). A
mode of electricity transition systems necessary for the factor of two: How the mitigation plans of ‘climate
realisation of decarbonisation targets are not far-fetched, progressive’ nations fall far short of Paris-compliant
the pathways that offer just outcomes make electricity pathways. Climate Policy. Advance online publication.
system transitions amorphous adventures. We cannot https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1728209
pretend to have settled these issues, but our contribu- Atkinson, R., Dörfler, T., & Rothfuß, E. (2018). Self-
tion could perhaps be enhanced by raising some refresh- organisation and the co-production of governance:
ing questions in the hope of informing future research. The challenge of local responses to climate change.
These include, but are not limited to, the following: Politics and Governance, 6(1), 169–179.
Bach, L., Hopkins, D., & Stephenson, J. (2020). Solar elec-
• What are the possibilities for countries of the tricity cultures: Household adoption dynamics and
Global North that have developed excellent cen- energy policy in Switzerland. Energy Research and So-
tralised electricity systems to make a switch to cial Science, 63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.
more flexible and modular energy systems which 101395
are predicted to be the dominant model of Banal-Estañol, A., Calzada, J., & Jordana, J. (2017). How to
the future? achieve full electrification: Lessons from Latin Amer-
• Are Global North countries witnessing a path de- ica. Energy Policy, 108, 55–69.
pendence leading to unforeseen institutional con- Bisaga, I., & Parikh, P. (2018). To climb or not to climb? In-
sequences where countries like the UK—with its vestigating energy use behaviour among solar home
highly centralised electricity system—are now fac- system adopters through energy ladder and social
ing bigger challenges in making the transition to practice lens. Energy Research & Social Science, 44,
more flexible and sustainable energy systems com- 293–303.
pared to countries like Denmark and Germany Boamah, F. (2020a). Emerging low-carbon energy land-
where stronger elements of decentralised electric- scapes and energy innovation dilemmas in the
ity generation have been maintained? Kenyan periphery. Annals of the American Associa-
• Does transition to a decentralised electricity sys- tion of Geographers, 110(1), 145–165.
tem create the necessary preparatory grounds Boamah, F. (2020b). Desirable or debatable? Putting
to mitigate entrenched energy injustices in the Africa’s decentralised solar energy futures in context.
Global South, or does it rather create a dual system Energy Research and Social Science, 62, 1–9.
where commercial and rich consumers could man- Boamah, F. (in press). Self-organisation of solar photo-
age their own energy needs while a less efficient voltaic electrification, social practices, and energy
public electricity system is left to serve the poor? justice in Ghana and Kenya (Unpublished Habilita-
• Should the framing of the electricity system transi- tion Dissertation). University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth,
tion debate be shifted from justice issues to prag- Germany.
matic challenges awaiting residents in vulnerable Boamah, F., & Rothfuß, E. (2018). From technical inno-
geographies? vations towards social practices and socio-technical
• Does self-organisation of energy and unpre- transition? Re-thinking the transition to decen-
dictable outcomes complement or destabilise the tralised solar PV electrification in Africa. Energy Re-
dominant electricity systems and state capacity? search and Social Science, 42, 1–10.
Boamah, F., & Rothfuß, E. (2020). Practical recognition
Acknowledgments as a suitable pathway for researching just energy fu-
tures: Seeing like a modern electricity user in Ghana.
We sincerely appreciate inputs by Prof. Jan Froestad Energy Research and Social Science, 60, 1–12.
(University of Bergen) on an earlier version of this Boonstra, B. (2015). Planning strategies in an age of ac-
proposal. Many thanks also to Editors of Politics and tive citizenship: A post-structuralist agenda for self-
Governance (Raquel Silva and Tiago Cardoso) for their organization in spatial planning. Groningen: Univer-
great support throughout the entire publication process. sity of Groningen.
Boonstra, B., & Boelens, L. (2011). Self-organisation in
Conflict of Interests urban development: Towards a new perspective on
spatial planning. Urban Research and Practice, 4(2),
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Bouffard, F., & Kirschen, D. S. (2008). Centralised and
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