Re-Inventing Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision
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Re-Inventing Europe:
A Cosmopolitan Vision
Ulrich Beck. Professor of Sociology at the Ludwig-Maximilian Universität in Munich
and Lecturer at the London School of Economics
Europe can become neither a state nor a nation social science is becoming historically fallacious,
– and it won’t. Hence, it cannot be thought of because it filters out Europe’s complex realities
in terms of the nation-state. In fact, advanced and space for interaction. In a nutshell, it is blind
research on Europe has scarcely dared venture to Europe and blinds us to Europe.
beyond the conventional basic pattern of na- A similar thought pattern stems from the
tion-state thinking. The EU is considered in statement that there is no European Demos,
terms of territoriality, sovereignty, jurisdic- or populace. What populace is meant – that of
tions, and demarcation. Even at higher levels of the ancient Greek city-states, the Swiss cantons,
complexity, when speaking of “governance” or or the nation-states? What about the present-
a “multilevel system”, the legal and academic day societies of our intertwined countries? Do
parlance of research on Europe remains biased the nation-states themselves still even have a
toward organizational and regulatory systems homogeneous populace or citizenry?
designed to conceive of and cast the EU in the The nation-state is everywhere as the tacit
image of the nation-state. conceptual measuring stick that makes the
Sociology’s failure with regard to Europe is realities of Europeanization appear deficient:
particularly conspicuous. The discipline devel- no populace, no people, no state, no democracy,
oped its instruments in the waning nineteenth no public. In addition to disinterest and sheer
century from the analysis of national societies. lack of understanding for the debates of other
Because those instruments are ill-suited to ana- member states, there is a steadily increasing
lyzing European society, the conclusion in sociol- number of transnational communication
ogy is that, obviously, there exists no European processes about common challenges, such as
society at all worth mentioning. This opinion the recent responses to the war in Iraq, to the
has many causes, but one in particular deserves democratic revolt in Ukraine, and to European
criticism: the concept of society is the crystal- anti-Semitism. Instead of making stereotyped
lization point of sociology’s methodological na- assertions that there is no European public,
tionalism. In sociological analysis, Europe must people should expand the concept of “public”
therefore be understood as a plural – as socie- beyond its fixation on the nation-state and
ties; it must be understood in additive or, at best, open it up to a cosmopolitan understanding
comparative terms. In other words, the society that realistically accommodates the dynamics
of Europe overlaps Europe’s national societies. from which the transboundary forms of the
This methodological nationalism practised by European public sphere are developing.
IEmed 10.indd 109 16/05/2008, 8:53110 Re-Inventing Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision
What is “European” in this sense are cona- tion-state lies in turning attention inwards
tional forms of identity, ways of life, means of to the exclusion of all else, thereby banishing
production, and types of interaction that pass transnational and global inequalities from the
right through the walls of states. It is about field of vision.
forms and movements of ceaseless border- The history of inequality presupposes the
crossing. Horizontal Europeanization is giving history of equality, that is, the institutionali-
rise to new shadow realities that are lived in zation of norms of equality: without equality
the blind spots of the aliens’ registration of- there can be no comparability and therefore no
fice: multilingualism, multinational networks, politically relevant inequality. The distinction
binational marriages, multiple residences edu- between global and national inequalities is
cational mobility, transnational careers, and based on the fact that within different national
linkages between science and the economy. arenas there are powerful norms of inequality
Both science and economy are globalized and at work – relating, for example, to civil, politi-
Europeanized at the same time and it will be cal and social rights, and pre-political national
not easy to distinguish between those two as- identities. It is these norms of inequality that
pects. These spots are spreading and are being establish both the comparability of inequalities
taken for granted by the upcoming generation. within the national arena as well as the incom-
Contemplating these developments, I see five parability of inequalities between them.
lines of thought.
The first is the issue of the dynamic of The EU is an arena where formal
inequality affecting Europe as a whole: what sovereignty can be exchanged for real
impact does the dismantling of national bor- power, national cultures nurtured and
ders in Europe have on the European dynamic economic success improved
of inequality? For one thing, the nation-based
limits to people’s perceptions of social inequal- This is the prerequisite for the political le-
ity begin to dissolve as Europeanization moves gitimation of socio-political activities within
forward. In response to the question of what the nation-state and passivity towards others
legitimizes social inequality, there are at least “outside” it. If inequality itself were the
two possible answers: the merit principle and key political criterion, it would be extremely
the nation-state principle. The first answer is difficult to justify why prosperous European
a familiar, well-rehearsed one and has already societies make such huge efforts to organize
been the subject of critique. It is a perfectly financial transfer systems within their own na-
logical consequence of the national perspective tion-states on the basis of national criteria of
and relates to domestic inequalities internal poverty and neediness, while a large proportion
to the state. The second answer provides an of the world’s population is threatened daily
explanation for the “legitimation” of global with starvation.
inequalities and makes it possible to identify The methodological nationalism that
the major blind spots and sources of error to underpins the sociology of inequality unre-
which methodological nationalism exposes the flexively makes nation-state bounded equality
sociology of inequality. Perceptions of inequal- both a presupposition and a constant. This in
ity that are based on the national outlook are turn obscures the fact that it is the nation-state
subject to a fundamental asymmetry, as far as principle itself that generates the increasingly
both society and social science are concerned. scarce resource of legitimation through incom-
The “legitimatory achievement” of the na- parability – scarce on account of the dramatic
IEmed 10.indd 110 16/05/2008, 8:53Quaderns de la Mediterrània 111
union struggle for equality has come up against
a “natural” boundary, namely that of the na-
tion-state. As natural as it is within Germany
to struggle to maintain national agreements
on pay and conditions and to fight for wage
parity between East and West Germany after
German unification, for a long time it was
just as natural to ignore wage differentials in
comparison with other European countries.
Looked at through national spectacles, differ-
ences in wage levels between Bavaria and East
Berlin are considered illegitimate, while the
same differences between Bavaria and Bel-
gium are seen as legitimate. But what happens
when these same differences are viewed and
judged through European spectacles? Aren’t
differences in wage levels between European
countries illegitimate in that context? Shouldn’t
European trade unions be demanding “equal
pay for equal work” for every European worker?
Or must this principle be discarded?
These are far from being merely academic
questions, something that became abundantly
Serigraph by Farid Belkhaia, “Andalusian Series”, clear in January 2004 when a great deal of heat-
Éditions Marsam. ed polemical debate was conducted in different
national public arenas over the move initiated
by some members of the European parliament
growth and growing consciousness of global to strengthen the institution’s identity by stand-
inequalities. To put it another way, the na- ardising members’ parliamentary allowances.
tion-state principle institutionalizes the act of Huge inequalities exist here with regard to lev-
looking the other way. els of payment for the same work. An Italian
What does this mean when applied to member of parliament receives 11,000 euros
Europeanization? As the barriers of interstate before tax, his German party colleague is paid
incomparability between inequalities fall away about 7,000 euros, their Spanish neighbour has
(for example, through a growing European self- to make do with 3,000 euros, while their new
awareness or through the institutionalization of colleagues from the Central European countries
equality and self-observation), the European get no more than 1,000 euros. No immediate
Union can be expected to enter a period of plans exist to reduce these extreme inequali-
turbulence – even given constant relations of ties, as the EU foreign ministers succumbed to
inequality. public pressure and quashed the initiative.
The issue can be illustrated with the help Neoliberalism has appropriated the old
of a simple example. The slogan “equal pay motto of the workers’ movement in a new form:
for equal work” was and still is a key demand equal pay for equal work – as long as it is equal
of the workers’ movement. However, the trade low pay! The unions seem to be faced with two
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equally unacceptable options as a result of this. necessary reforms are thwarted by the organ-
One is to resist this move and demand equal ized resistance of the groups affected. To escape
pay for equal work – as long as it is equal high this trap, the connection between the decline
pay! This was the route taken after German in population growth, the aging of societies,
unification, although it is generally agreed to necessary reforms of social security systems,
be economically fatal and politically utopian. selective migration policy, the export of jobs,
The second option is no less appealing, where and the taxation of corporate profits could be
the unions find themselves in the perverse posi- defined and cooperatively worked on as a Eu-
tion of taking up the slogan of their enemies ropean problem. This approach can and would
and demanding different wages for the same benefit all governments currently contenting
work – in other words: defending existing wage themselves with sham solutions in the dead-
differentials between European countries. This end of the nation-state.
forces the unions into a neo-national position.
The second is that Europeanization is ini- Who is guilty and who is innocent, who
tiating a historically new positive-sum game: will get ahead and who will fall behind
Joint solutions serve the national interest. Eu- the military or human rights, the logic of
rope’s crisis is a mental one. National govern- war or the logic of treaties?
ments are struggling with seemingly national
problems in a national setting and are trying Looking at everything from the national
to solve them by going their own national ways perspective jeopardizes national prosperity
– and are failing. The export of jobs is an exam- and democratic freedom. Ensuring the health
ple, as is the attempt to control the taxation of of the nation and the economy, effectively
corporate profits. Mobile business organizations coping with unemployment, and promoting a
operating within global networks are able to lively democracy all require the cosmopolitan
play individual states against each other and viewpoint. Transcending national and post-
thereby weaken them. The more the national national sympathies, cosmopolitan Europe
perspective predominates in the thinking and does not threaten the nation-state but rather
action of people and governments, the more prepares, facilitates, modernizes, changes, and
these businesses succeed at expanding their opens it for the global age.
own power. That is the paradox that must be The third line of thought is that Europe-
understood. The national frame of reference anization requires a memory culture that spans
violates national interests. The EU is an arena borders. In the words Thomas Mann wrote in
where formal sovereignty can be exchanged anguish about World War I: “Alas, Europe,” by
for real power, national cultures nurtured and which he meant the calamity of the Western
economic success improved. The EU is better world. Two and a half thousand years shred-
placed to solve national problems than na- ded by war and bled to death. At the centre of
tions could possibly do acting alone.1No mat- every village in Europe stands a large monu-
ter where one looks in Europe, it is the same ment engraved with the names of those killed
situation. The ratio of old people to the total in action – 1915, 1917. On the wall of a nearby
population is rising to uncomfortable levels, church one then finds three more names from
pension systems no longer function, but the the same family on a stone tablet listing the
1. U. Beck, Power in the Global Age, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005.
IEmed 10.indd 112 16/05/2008, 8:53Quaderns de la Mediterrània 113
Ignacio Caballero.
casualties of World War II – killed in action, monopoly on power into a taboo on violence.
1942; killed in action, 1944; missing in action, The threat of violence as a political option,
1945. That was Europe. whether between member states or against
How long has it been? Not very. Until supranational institutions, has been banished
the late 1980s the peoples of this belligerent once and for all from the horizon of the pos-
Europe faced off in a nuclear stalemate. The sible in Europe.
policy of drawing East and West closer together That change became possible because Eu-
seemed possible only through recognition of rope has experienced the advent of something
the seemingly eternal division of Europe. And qualitatively new – national horror about the
today? A European miracle has taken place. En- murder of European Jews. The national wars
emies have become neighbours! That wonder is and expulsions are no longer remembered
historically unique, actually even inconceivable. only within a national compass; the national
At precisely the most wanton moment in the space for commemoration is bound to broaden
history of states, a political invention comes to a European scope. A Europeanization of
along that makes possible what is almost un- perspectives is occurring (at least the first
imaginable – states themselves transform their signs of it).
IEmed 10.indd 113 16/05/2008, 8:53114 Re-Inventing Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision
Such cosmopolitanism in the opening of society can thus be illuminated in terms of
communication, in the acceptance of inter- the distinction between self-induced threats
dependence through inclusion of the stranger and threats emanating from others. To put it
for the sake of common interests, and in the in highly simplified terms, Europeanization
historical exchange of perspectives between refers to self-induced threats, while the ways
perpetrators and victims in post-war Europe in which modernity threatens to self-destruct
is something other than multiculturalism or in the Third World are perceived primarily as
post-modern non-commitment. Although this a threat emanating from others. Unlike the
cosmopolitanism is intended to rest upon co- theory of dependency or the world system
hesive and reciprocally binding norms that can theory, the theory of reflexive modernisation
help prevent a slide into post-modern particu- highlights the fact that the different regions of
larism, it is not simply universal. For an entity the world are affected unequally not only by the
like Europe, interacting with the range of consequences of failed processes of modernisa-
cultures, traditions, and interests in the weave tion, but also by the consequences of successful
of national societies is a matter of survival. As processes of modernisation.
Hannah Arendt argued, only the infinitely dif-
ficult forgiveness granted and received through Reality is becoming cosmopolitan. The
remembrance creates the necessary trust in the Other whom borders can no longer keep
relationship between states and nations and out is everywhere
empowers them.
The fourth line is the understanding of Eu- The major strands of conflict during the
ropean society as a regional world risk society. Cold War were politically open-ended and ac-
The macrosociology of Europeanization is in quired their explosive character on account of
danger of repeating the same mistakes made by national and international security issues. By
methodological nationalism, only at the Euro- contrast, the geopolitical strands of conflict in
pean level – of getting caught up in what might the world risk society run between the different
be called a “methodological Europeanism”. In cultures of risk. In relation to risk perception,
order to counter this tendency, Europeanization geopolitical conflicts are emerging between
should not be defined and analysed purely in regions that bring highly divergent historical
endogenous terms, but in exogenous terms, in situations, experiences and expectations to the
relation to the frame of reference constituted terrain of the world risk society. An outstand-
by world society. Let me make just a few brief ing example of this is the contrast between the
comments on this point. degree of urgency accorded by Europe to the
The experience of modernity is one of dangers of climate change on the one hand, and
risk, in the sense that, along with its successes, by the USA to international terrorism on the
modernity has also conjured up the possibil- other. Not only are cultural perceptions of glo-
ity of its own self-destruction. However, this bal threats diverging more and more between
insight of reflexive modernisation needs to be Europe and the United States but, because this
opened up to the cosmopolitan point of view is so, Europeans and North Americans are ef-
and thus to the question as to whether the fectively living in different worlds. The way it
threats posed by modernisation are perceived looks to the Americans, Europeans are suffer-
as the side-effects of one’s “own” decisions or ing from a form of hysteria in relation to the
of decisions made by “others”. The dynamic environment, while to many Europeans US
of inequality that characterises the world risk Americans are paralysed by an over-exagger-
IEmed 10.indd 114 16/05/2008, 8:53Quaderns de la Mediterrània 115
ated fear of terrorism. The danger is that as the politan philosopher had anticipated and that
transatlantic cultures of risk drift further apart, no one willed – surreptitiously, unintention-
it will lead to a cultural break between the USA ally, without political decision or design. The
and Europe; to paraphrase Huntington, cultural real process of becoming cosmopolitan in this
differences in perception are generating a clash world is taking place through the back door of
of risk cultures – either you believe in the ex- secondary effects; it is undesired, unseen, and
isting climate disaster or else in the potential usually occurs by default. And what context of
ubiquity of suicide terror attacks. political rule is appropriate for it?
Edgar Grande and I have proposed for it
The choice between risks is not only a redefinition of the term “empire”.2 Spoken
about choosing between risks, it is about in French, that word carries Napoleonic and
choosing between two visions of the world colonial connotations and thus differs from the
term when pronounced in English. The Brit-
Let’s not deceive ourselves: the choice be- ish Empire was something other than impe-
tween risks is not only about choosing between rial America claims to be. The term “European
risks, it is about choosing between two visions Empire” attempts to place Europe on a par with
of the world. The issue is, who is guilty and who the disimilar US Empire. For all the similarities
is innocent, who will get ahead and who will with the complex confederation or empire that
fall behind – the military or human rights, the emerged from the Middle Ages, the European
logic of war or the logic of treaties? empire of the early 21st century is built upon
The fifth, concluding line of thought is a the existing nation-states. To that extent, the
question: how will a European empire of law analogy with the Middle Ages does not hold.
and consensus become possible? In the final The cosmopolitan empire of Europe is notable
analysis, understanding the concept of cosmo- for its open and cooperative character at home
politanism in this way is also the key to under- and abroad and therein clearly contrasts with
standing and shaping new forms of political the imperial predominance of the United
authority that have emerged in Europe beyond States. Europe’s undeniably real power is not
the nation-state. But globalization, specifically decipherable in terms of nation-states. It lies in-
the problems with the flows and crises of global stead in its character as a model of how Europe
finance, and the neglected European dimension succeeded at transforming a belligerent past
of current socio-political exigencies show that into a cooperative future, how the European
the opposite is breaking over our heads for now. miracle of enemies becoming neighbours could
A nationally circumscribed labour market no come about. It is this special form of soft world
longer exists. Even if we point the gun barrels power that is developing a special radiance and
at foreigners, well-educated Indians or Chinese attraction that is often as underestimated in the
can offer their services in Germany and the rest nation-state mould of thinking about Europe
of Europe with a click of the mouse. as it is in the projections of power claimed by
Reality is becoming cosmopolitan. The American neoconservatives.
Other whom borders can no longer keep out But what impact does that have on Euro-
is everywhere, but in a way that no cosmo- pean integration? For a long time, that key
2. U. Beck and E. Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004 (English edition: Cosmo-
politan Vision, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006).
IEmed 10.indd 115 16/05/2008, 8:53116 Re-Inventing Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision
concept consisted primarily of the abolition timber and pretty provincial. That aspect of us
of national and local differences. This “har- has endearing sides, too. Individual populations
monization policy” confounded unity with uni- – the British and the French, for example – have
formity or assumed that uniformity is required the reputation of being cosmopolitan, but the
for unity. In this sense uniformity became the attribution applies to them as French or British,
supreme regulatory principle of modern Eu- less so as Europeans. Expansion can either cause
rope, transferring the principles of classical the EU to roll up like a hedgehog or lead it to
constitutional theory to institutions at the Eu- embrace cosmopolitanism and thus enhance the
ropean level. The more successfully EU policy awareness of its responsibility in the world.
operated under this primacy of uniformity, the
more resistance grew and the more clearly the Europe’s further integration must not
counterproductive effects surfaced. be oriented to the traditional notions
By contrast, cosmopolitan integration is of uniformity inherent in a European
based on a paradigm shift in which diversity “federal state”
is not the problem but rather the solution. Eu-
rope’s further integration must not be oriented The national idea is unsuitable for unifying
to the traditional notions of uniformity inher- Europe. A large European superstate frightens
ent in a European “federal state”. Integration people. I do not believe that Europe can issue
must instead take Europe’s irrevocable diversity from the ruins of the nation-states. If there
as its starting point. That is the only way for is an idea capable of uniting Europeans today,
Europeanization to link two demands that at it is that of a cosmopolitan Europe, because it
first glance seem mutually exclusive: the call stills Europeans’ fear of losing identity, makes
for the recognition of difference and the call a constitutional goal out of tolerant interac-
for the integration of divergencies. tion among the many European nations, and
Understood as a historically tested political opens new political spaces and options for ac-
model for a post-imperial empire of consen- tion in a globalized world. The persistence of
sus and law – “the European dream” (Jeremy the nation is the condition of a cosmopolitan
Rifkin) of a soft world power – Europeanization Europe; and, today, for reasons just given,
is fascinating as an alternative to the Ameri- the reverse is true too. The more secure and
can way, and not least to Americans critical confirmed Europeans feel in their national
of America. Ultimately, it is about something dignity, the less they will shut themselves
completely new in human history; namely, off in their nation-states and the more reso-
the forward-looking vision of a state structure lutely they will stand up for European values
firmly based on recognition of the culturally in the world and take up the cause of others
different Other. as their own. I would like to live in this kind
So what is my cosmopolitan vision of Eu- of cosmopolitan Europe, one in which people
rope? We Europeans are, in Kant’s words, crooked have roots and wings.
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