The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities in Transnational Spaces - Brill
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
review of religion and chinese society
5 (2018) 156-182
brill.com/rrcs
The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities
in Transnational Spaces
Yuting Wang
American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
ywang@aus.edu
Abstract
Since the beginning of the reform and opening up in China nearly four decades ago,
China’s Muslim minorities have restored connections with the global Muslim ummah
(community) through religious pilgrimages, business activities, and educational and
cultural exchanges. Whether attracted by better economic prospects or for religious
purposes, an increasing number of Chinese Muslims have found ways out of China,
taking sojourns or eventually settling down in diverse locations across the globe. Draw-
ing on the author’s field research in China, the United States, and the United Arab
Emirates, combined with a review of key studies on Chinese Muslims in Southeast
Asia, this paper traces the shape of Chinese Muslim transnational networks and ex-
amines the construction of “Chinese Muslim” identity in the diaspora. By locating the
study of contemporary Chinese Muslims within the broader scholarship on transna-
tional religion, this paper deepens our understanding of the impact of globalization on
ethnoreligious minorities.
Keywords
Chinese Muslims – transnational migration – diasporic identity – transnational Islam –
globalization
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/22143955-00502003
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 157
跨国空间里的华人穆斯林身份建构
摘要
改革开放近四十年以来，中国的穆斯林少数民族通过宗教朝觐，商业活
动，以及教育文化交流与世界各地的穆斯林社区恢复了联络。不论是基于
经济考虑或宗教目的，越来越多的中国穆斯林离开中国到海外各地暂居或
者定居。使用作者在中国，美国，阿联酋的田野资料，并结合其他学者对
东南亚华人穆斯林的研究，本文勾勒出华人穆斯林跨国网络的轮廓，并考
察移民社区中“华人穆斯林”身份的构建。将当代华人穆斯林置于跨国宗
教的研究领域之中，本文将加深我们对全球化进程中少数宗教族群的认
知。
关键词
华人穆斯林，跨国移民，流散身份，跨国伊斯兰，全球化
Introduction
Chinese Muslims, or more precisely, Chinese-speaking Muslims, have in many
ways become a transnational phenomenon in recent decades. More than sim-
ply the result of cross-border population movement, the growing visibility of
Chinese Muslim communities in Western academia1 and public discourses2 is
also the byproduct of the escalating conflict between Islam and the West and
the deeply rooted sectarian tensions within the Muslim ummah (community).
The legitimacy of the very existence of Chinese Muslims is, on the one hand,
threatened by the the invasion of modern and postmodern cultural influences
1 A rich and growing body of literature on Chinese Muslims and Islam in China has developed
since the topic was first introduced to Western academia through the work of Jesuit mission-
aries in the early twentieth century. James Frankel (2011) provided a review of key publica-
tions in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Recent conferences and workshops held
in the uk (International Conference on Ethnographies of Islam in China, held at the soas,
University of London, in March 2017), the uae (Workshop on Islam in China and Chinese
Muslims, held at the American University of Sharjah in January 2018), and Hong Kong (Inter-
national Conference on Islam in the China Seas, held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong
in March 2018) suggest that the field remains relevant in different areas of academic research.
2 Major media outlets in the West, for example Foreign Affairs and the New York Times, fre-
quently report on the affairs of Muslim minorities in China.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access158 Wang
that confront those desiring to preserve an ancient tradition, and on the other
hand celebrated as a sign of the universality of Islam and of the possibility
of cross-cultural dialogues and cooperation. Therefore, the vitality of Chinese
Muslims in transnational spaces presents a fascinating case study for both
theologians (e.g., Abd-Allah 2004, 2006) and academics.
Recently, there has been a renewed scholarly interest in the growing ties
between Chinese Muslims in mainland China and the diasporic communities
in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and beyond (Ho 2010, 2013; Wang 2016; Cieciura 2018 [in
this issue]). A complex Chinese Muslim transnational network, as shown in
these studies, links closely knit communities in remote corners of Northwest
China to individuals scattered in large metropolises from the Middle East to
North America, and is sustained by powerful social media. The historical ties
between China and Southeast Asia and the prevailing Islamic culture in the re-
gion make it attractive to potential Chinese Muslim migrants. The Middle East
and North Africa is another desirable destination, for both religious and eco-
nomic reasons. A constant flow of Chinese Muslims has traveled to countries
like Tunisia, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, either through official
channels or by private means, in order to study in some of the most reputable
religious universities or madrasas in the Islamic world. Some of these students,
who initially aspired to become imams after completing their studies, took ad-
vantage of the growing appetite for Chinese products in the region to build
their own trading companies. The rapid economic growth in the Arabian Gulf
countries over the last two decades has also drawn a large number of Chinese
Muslims, especially from the less developed region of Northwest China. The
global North remains an ideal destination for Chinese migrants, including a
stream of Chinese Muslims with strong academic credentials and rich pro-
fessional experience. Nevertheless, the implications of the increasing cross-
border mobility of Chinese Muslims and of the expanding Chinese Muslim
transnational networks, both tangible and virtual, on the identities of Chinese
Muslims have not been adequately addressed in the existing scholarship. Stud-
ies of Chinese Muslim migrants remain outside the mainstream scholarship
on Muslim immigrants and on the Chinese diaspora. This paper seeks to bridge
these fields by examining the divergent approaches to being and becoming
“Chinese Muslims” within a multilayered and expansive Chinese Muslim
transnational network.
Drawing on my field research in China, the United States, and the United
Arab Emirates, combined with a review of key studies on Chinese Muslims
in Southeast Asia, this paper traces the shape of the Chinese Muslim trans-
national network and the construction of a “Chinese Muslim” identity in
varied c ontexts. To deepen our understanding of the impact of globalization
on ethnoreligious minorities and align the study of Chinese Muslims more
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 159
closely with the agenda of mainstream scholarship, this paper begins by locat-
ing the study of contemporary Chinese Muslims within the broad scholarship
on transnational religion, specifically transnational Islam.3 It proposes that
Chinese Islam, although a local development, is increasingly a transnational
religious phenomenon. The identity of contemporary Chinese Muslims is a
product of transnational migration and exchanges. It is neither static nor uni-
form, but arises from individually conceived ideas responding to a sense of
homelessness and anomie that combine to form a strategy to aid the search
for a “third space” (Fischer 2004) and a new home in a fragmented world. The
role of Islam in this process is important, but not always essential; indeed, the
very concept of “Chinese Muslims” reveals the complex relationship between
culture and religion.
Chinese Islam: The Dialectic between Local and Global
Spanning some fourteen hundred years, the history of Islam in China has been
greatly shaped by continuous negotiations over spatial boundaries between
Muslim minorities and non-Muslim majorities, and by the relationship be-
tween local context and global forces. Islam, a monotheistic faith that arose
in the Arabian Peninsula, is widely believed to have first arrived in China dur-
ing the second half of the seventh century with Arab and Persian caravaneers
and voyagers. Some of these pioneers settled down in coastal cities such as
Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Changzhou, while others put down roots in the
capital city of Chang’an (former name of Xi’an). By the eighth century, Muslim
communities had been established in major urban areas (Israeli 2002:291–294).
The Chinese imperial court welcomed the arrival of the “foreign guests” (fanke
蕃 客 ), granting extraterritorial privileges within their residential areas, which
were known as fanfang 蕃 坊 (foreigners’ corners). The emperors ordered the
building of mosques for their Muslim guests, some of which still stand today in
Guangzhou and Xi’an.4
In the following millennia, these “foreign guests” weathered a turbulent his-
tory in the Middle Kingdom and eventually put down roots in a largely Confu-
cian society despite their distinctive beliefs and lifestyles. Islam evidently went
through a process of Sinicization as it struggled to survive in the midst of an
3 For discussions of transnational Islam and global Islam, see Bowen 2004; Roy 2004; Cesari
2009; Leonard 2009.
4 The Huaisheng Mosque (怀 圣 寺 ) in Guangzhou is believed to be one of the oldest mosques
ever built in China. The grand mosque in Xi’an was built in the fourteenth century.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access160 Wang
overwhelmingly polytheistic majority. Throughout a long period c haracterized
by interwoven intervals of peaceful coexistence and violent confrontations,
a unique Chinese Islamic culture centered on the concept of qingzhen 清 真
emerged.5 Not only have Chinese Muslims developed distinctive rituals of
their own, Chinese Muslim intellectuals have also made important progress
in reconciling two seemingly incompatible civilizations—Confucianism and
Islam—by linking Chinese mythology to the theology of Islam and reinterpret-
ing Islamic concepts using Confucian vocabulary (Murata and Chittick 2000;
Murata, Chittick, and Tu 2009; Petersen 2017).
The development of a distinctively Chinese Islam can be understood as the
result of the cyclical processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.
Originated in the social and cultural context of the Arabian Peninsula, Islam’s
cultural forms became separated from its birthplace as it reached the Far East
through the settlement of Muslim traders, merchants, soldiers, and intellec-
tuals in imperial China—a process of deterritorialization (Inda and Rosaldo
2002:11). To cope with the separation and the loss of natural habitat, itinerant
Islamic cultural forms from Arabia and Central Asia cling to selected elements
in the local culture to reconstitute and eventually recreate context-based time-
space meanings (Inda and Rosaldo 2002:12)—the reterritorialization of Islam
in China. The unique architectural forms of Chinese mosques; the creolization
of Chinese, Arabic, and Farsi that forms a distinctive colloquial language, jing-
tangyu 经 堂 语 ; and various vernacular religious rituals are all strong evidence
suggesting that the process of reterritorialization has clearly taken place. Thus,
Chinese Islam is the very product of transnational flows that began during the
archaic stage of globalization.
The peculiar social, cultural, and political dynamics in Chinese society
that are reflected in the complex identity matrix of Chinese Muslims and that
constitute the “Chinese Muslim” identity are sensitive to the contexts within
which individuals operate. Concerned with the growing influence of overseas
religious organizations on domestic religious activities, the Chinese govern-
ment has tightened its control over religious affairs in recent years.6 Steps
have been taken to promote patriotism and nationalism among religious mi-
norities through educational and religious organizations. The militarization in
5 Translated as “pure and true,” the term qingzhen symbolizes two important aspects of Mus-
lim identity in Chinese society. Qing, meaning “pure” or “clean,” represents the significance
of “ritual cleanliness and moral conduct” in Islam; zhen, interpreted as “true” or “authentic,”
points to the very question of the legitimacy and authenticity of Islam as a way of life in a
predominantly Confucian society (Gladney [1991] 1996:13).
6 For a discussion of China’s recent tightening of control over religion, see Yang 2018:1–4.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 161
injiang to curb the looming threat of terrorism and separatism has drawn
X
criticism from the global Muslim ummah and human rights activists (Chung
2018). Further, the prevalent Islamophobia in Chinese society (Luwei and
Yang 2018) and China’s foreign policies in the Middle East (Ehteshami and
Horesh 2018) lead many to question the implications of China’s rise for
the Muslim world. The identity of Chinese Muslims is thus susceptible to these
ongoing events both inside and outside their localities. Although the Chinese-
speaking Hui people are largely portrayed as China’s “good” Muslims (Wang
2013a), it has become increasingly challenging for individuals to claim both
identities at the same time.
The dilemma facing Chinese Muslims is not unique. Scholars from a wide
range of fields have carefully examined the impact of globalization on religion
and the phenomenon of transnational religion (e.g., Levitt 2001; Ebaugh and
Chafetz 2002; Csordas 2009). The meeting of a projected hegemonic form of
global religion and locally rooted variations frequently results in tension and
conflict in individual identities. This is especially true for religious minorities
living on the periphery. Although their hybrid cultural repertoires have en-
abled them to survive between multiple worlds, such hybridity can also ren-
der them homeless. As these individuals negotiate with multiple forces that
simultaneously push them down and pull them up in the ebb and flow of glo-
balization, they develop different ways to address the demands of living in an
interdependent and interconnected global space where diverse cultures and
worldviews frequently clash.
As one of the three monotheistic Abrahamic traditions, Islam is seen as in-
trinsically universal. Since its inception, Islam has called for people to turn
away from local deities to worship an omnipresent God—a genuinely uni-
versal vision that is evident both in the Qur’an and in religious practices, par-
ticularly through the ritual pilgrimage of the Hajj, where people of all colors
and shapes pray together as equals. Although Islam has inevitably developed
distinctive territorial characteristics, throughout the millennia waves of re-
gional and transnational migrations have helped to diffuse Islam to the far-
thest corners of the world, triggering an unceasing process of localization and
hybridization. The confluence of population movement, transnational reli-
gious movements, the institutionalization of Islamic organizations, and “the
diasporic forms of consciousness, identity, and culture creation” produces the
diverse transnational forms of Islam (Bowen 2004). Consequently, identity
construction among Muslim minorities in the diaspora is strongly shaped by
these transnational dimensions.
Given the reemerging importance of place in the discourses of globaliza-
tion today (Tilley 2006; Christopherson, Garretsen, and Martin 2008), the study
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access162 Wang
of Chinese Muslims thus requires more place-based analyses embedded in a
study of multidirectional flows in transnational spaces driven by highly mobile
Chinese Muslim individuals from diverse backgrounds, global Islamic move-
ments, and Muslim social networks (e.g., conferences, research institutions,
and Islamic organizations). In the following pages, I will consider both local
contexts and global forces while engaging with the experiences of diasporic
Chinese Muslims in multiple locations to show that the identities of contem-
porary Chinese Muslims are not merely inherited, but produced and consoli-
dated through individual encounters in transnational spaces. The conversion
of Han and other ethnic minority Chinese to Islam,7 especially in the diaspora,8
broadens the scope of “Chinese Muslims” to include those who do not neces-
sarily consider themselves Hui.
Encountering Chinese Muslims in Transnational Spaces
I began my research on Chinese Muslims at the end of 2006 as part of a project
investigating the relationship between faith and trust in China’s emerging mar-
ket economy.9 On my first research trip to China, I visited Beijing, Zhengzhou,
and Guangzhou and conducted more than sixty in-depth interviews with Chi-
nese Muslim businesspeople in different trades, seeking to understand how
ethnoreligious minorities reconcile the conflicting demands of religion and
business in China’s emerging market economy (Wang and Yang 2010, 2011).
In subsequent years I continued my research on Chinese Muslims in Yiwu
to find out the opportunities and challenges of living in the world’s largest
small-commodity wholesale market (Wang 2015). My current project involves
a five-year ethnography on Chinese expatriates in Dubai from 2011 to 2016.
I observed the rapid growth of Chinese Muslim business networks, religious
organizations, educational initiatives, cultural events, and social networks in
the city and beyond. I was particularly interested in the new role Chinese Mus-
lims play as middlemen in cultural exchanges between China and the United
7 There has been a growing interest in the diffusion of Islam among ethnic minority groups
that are not traditionally associated with Islam, such as the Tibetan 藏 , Dai 傣 , and Mongo-
lian 蒙 peoples. For a discussion of Tibetan Muslims, see Wang and Yang 2015. For a discus-
sion of Dai Muslims, see Ma 2013.
8 For a discussion of early Chinese conversion to Islam in Indonesia, see Taylor 2005.
9 Publications from this project include Gao and Yang 2010; Wang and Yang 2011; Tong and Yang
2016.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 163
Arab Emirates. Between September 2016 and May 2017, I had an opportunity to
study Chinese Muslim immigrants in North America, particularly those who
live in the San Francisco Bay area (Yu 2017) and Southern California. I con-
ducted twenty interviews with first- and second-generation Chinese Muslim
immigrants to examine the connotations of “Chinese Muslim” and how this
identity shapes the day-to-day lives of immigrants.
Migration is central in the history of Islam and Muslims. The movement
of people over the millennia across the vast terrain stretching from West Asia
to the Middle Kingdom defines the ethos of Chinese Muslims, who are the
products of the cross-fertilization of diverse cultures. Chinese Islam grew out
of the encounters between the monotheistic faith brought by immigrants and
the highly eclectic traditions in the host society. To Chinese Muslim minori-
ties, migration is not simply a choice; it is often a survival strategy. The process
of moving and resettling transcends boundaries and enriches spiritual experi-
ences. The territoriality of China’s Muslim minorities became increasingly dis-
cernible toward the end of the Qing dynasty. By the early twentieth century, a
substantial number of Hui people, concentrated in the northwestern provinces
of Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, and Yunnan, had produced a distinctive Chinese
Muslim cultural landscape. Urban Muslim enclaves were clearly identifiable in
cities like Beijing, Huhehot, Xi’an, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Nanjing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou. The Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang Party and the
Communists produced the first major wave of Chinese Muslim emigrants in
the twentieth century. Anticipating the defeat of the Kuomintang and unsure
about the attitudes of the Communist Party toward religious minorities, tens
of thousands of Muslims fled the mainland. Many went to Taiwan, while oth-
ers sought refuge in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. Among this wave
of migrants were many Hui elites, including affluent businesspeople, entre-
preneurs, Islamic scholars, and officials in the Kuomintang government. They
brought Islam to their new homes, built mosques, and formed Hui commu-
nities in the diaspora. Some actively participated in local politics and had a
long-lasting impact through their writings and social activism (Cieciura 2018
[in this issue]). The prominent Hui warlords of Northwest China were also
forced into exile. Ma Hongkui and his close family members eventually settled
down in Southern California, following a fallout with Chiang Kai-Shek shortly
after arriving in Taiwan. Ma Bufang and his associates made a pilgrimage to the
kingdom of Saudi Arabia before taking up temporary residence in Cairo. They
eventually returned to Saudi Arabia after Egypt established a diplomatic rela-
tionship with the People’s Republic of China in 1957. Ma Bufang was appointed
by Chiang Kai-Shek as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia and served in that role
until his death in 1975. Ma Hongkui, however, died as an insignificant Chinese
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access164 Wang
immigrant in Los Angeles.10 Communications between the diasporic Chinese
Muslims and those left in the mainland remained scarce until the period of
reform and opening up began in the early 1980s.
The implementation of the hukou policy11 following the founding of the
People’s Republic effectively strengthened government controls over popula-
tion movement. Although the Chinese constitution guarantees religious free-
dom, the penetration of Party branch committees in large work units (danwei
单 位 ) and residential neighborhoods shook the social structure of urban Mus-
lim enclaves. The unwavering political campaigns in the first three decades af-
ter the founding of the prc, up to the end of the Cultural Revolution, severely
curtailed the rights of religious minorities. As a result, the second wave of Chi-
nese Muslim migration did not occur until the advent of economic reform,
the loosening up of the hukou policy, and the rehabilitation of places of wor-
ship. It began with rural Muslim residents moving to nearby cities or provincial
capitals. Then a stream of brave migrants headed to the booming manufacture
centers on the southeast coast. Unlike the Han migrants, Muslim minorities
found working at large factories less appealing due to dietary restrictions and,
for some, religious obligations. Instead, Hui and Uyghur people started small
businesses. They set up Northwest-style food stands or restaurants catering to
the growing appetite for diverse foods in the metropolises. Uyghur street ven-
dors and kebab sellers became a familiar sight in urban centers across eastern
China. The mushrooming halal restaurants in the Pearl River Delta suggest
that the expansion of the Chinese Islamic cultural landscape is the result of
domestic migration. Chain migration was a pronounced feature in this wave
of migration. For example, following the opening of one Qinghai restaurant by
a Salar family on the outskirts of Beijing, countless Qinghai restaurants were
founded, all of which were operated by Salar Muslims from Xunhua Autono-
mous County in Qinghai Province.12 The traditional Hui urban enclaves also
served as the entrepôt for new immigrants. These halal restaurants and eth-
nic businesses became transmitters of information and points of gathering on
Fridays, on the occasion of religious festivals, and during the holy month of
Ramadan. These business networks would later grow into important platforms
that allowed Islamic scholars and Chinese Muslim intellectuals and artists to
10 For a detailed account of the Ma family warlords of Gansu, see Lipman 1984. See also
Allès, Cherif-Chebbi, and Halfon 2001.
11 Hukou 户 口 is a household registration system in mainland China.
12 This information derives from interviews with Salar businesspeople in Beijing and
Guangzhou in 2006.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 165
disseminate knowledge and provide much-needed cultural activities for mi-
grants coping with the disorienting urban life.
The third wave of migration began after 2000 and continues today. This
phase of movement is marked by its transnational and multidirectional char-
acteristics. Instead of settling down in one place, more and more individuals
began to travel frequently between two or more locations often situated in
more than one country. These flows of population are driven by the central
government’s agenda to deepen economic reforms, to revive trade along the
ancient Silk Road, to develop the vast Northwest region, and most recently to
deepen China’s connectivity with the rest of the world through the Belt and
Road Initiative. More importantly, in the last two decades, the movement of
people no longer follows the southeastward path of the second wave of mi-
gration. Ningxia Autonomous Region made a timely decision to bank on its
unique Muslim cultural capital in order to attract collaborators, investors, con-
sumers, and tourists from the rest of China and the growing markets in Muslim
countries (Ho 2013). The first China-Arab Trade and Commerce Summit took
place in 2009 in Yinchuan, the capital of Ningxia Autonomous Region. The
event was so successful that the Yinchuan government renamed it the China-
Arab Expo and built a permanent site where the convention is held every two
years to promote economic, social, and cultural exchanges between China and
the Arab countries, and to facilitate the flow of capital and people.
These contacts have encouraged Muslim minorities to seek opportunities
in the Middle East and North Africa. There is now a significant presence of
Chinese Muslims—Hui, Uyghur, Han converts, and others—among the Chi-
nese expatriates in oil-rich Gulf cities, especially in Dubai, a prominent global
city in the region (Wang 2016). Moreover, in the last two decades, a growing
number of Chinese Muslim businesspeople have expanded their businesses
to Eurasia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative has
further enabled greater participation of Chinese Muslim businesspeople, pro-
fessionals, students, artists, and intellectuals in various exchange activities in
transnational spaces.
During the same period, students and professionals from Muslim back-
grounds trickled into Western countries in search of further education and
better employment opportunities. These individuals are widely dispersed, yet
they are often connected through relatives, friends, alumni networks, and pro-
vincial associations of all sorts. These existing social networks, strengthened
by social media, provide convenient platforms for exchanges of information,
which in turn cultivate a sense of belonging and strengthen group solidarity.
Friendships and romantic relationships formed in virtual space often extend
into real life, connecting distant Chinese Muslim communities on different
continents.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access166 Wang
The increasing flow of China’s Muslim minorities into Southeast Asia, the
Middle East, and North Africa, as well as other popular destinations in North
America, have significantly expanded the migratory networks and introduced
the phenomenon of Chinese Islam to people who have little knowledge about
China, let alone Chinese Muslims. Although the Turkic-speaking Uyghurs gen-
erally exist outside this network, the boundaries are not all that clear and are
contingent on the background of each person. Individuals of different minzu
民 族 (ethnicities or nationalities), varied socioeconomic backgrounds, profes-
sions, and religiosity connected via the migratory networks represent “Chinese
Islam” in different ways. Their interpretations of Chineseness and Muslimness
are also divergent. Contacts with non-Chinese Muslims and exposure to differ-
ent Islamic schools of thought as the result of migration both pose challenges
and provide opportunities for China’s Muslim minorities to rethink their heri-
tage and identity as they navigate transnational spaces.
Reclaiming Chinese Identity in Southeast Asia
Countries around the South China Sea have a long and complex history with
China through tribute and trade. As a result, Southeast Asia now hosts about
80 percent of the entire Chinese diaspora. Ethnic Chinese, numbering some-
where between 40 and 50 million, have made important contributions to the
economic, social, and political development of the region and have played in-
dispensable roles in cultivating and maintaining ties with China (Dongen and
Liu 2017). Despite the concentration of about 240 million Muslims in South-
east Asia, mainly Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei, Chinese Muslims have not
received much attention in studies of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia
until recently.
The presence of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia today is mostly due to reli-
gious conversion, rather than the emigration of Hui people from China. The
ethnic Chinese Muslims number between 30,000–50,000, less than 2 percent
of the Chinese in Indonesia and a tiny minority in the nation’s Muslim popula-
tion. Until the end of the 1990s, or the end of the New Order era (1966–1998),
it was widely believed that ethnic Chinese who converted to Islam would lose
their “Chineseness” (Hew 2014a). The radical reorganization of day-to-day rou-
tines and the practice of intermarriage—two conspicuous results of religious
conversion—would lead to the assimilation of ethnic Chinese into various lo-
cal ethnic majorities that comprise the ethnically and culturally diverse Indo-
nesian society.
These assumptions, however, have been challenged in the post–New Or-
der period: a growing number of Chinese Muslims have been engaging in the
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 167
public display of their “Chineseness” as Indonesia continues to show greater
political openness to Chinese culture. In his carefully executed ethnography of
Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, Hew Wai Weng (2017) documented the various
dimensions of “Chineseness” as exhibited by ethnic Chinese Muslims in Indo-
nesia. China’s prospering economy and growing influence in the region after
the end of the Cold War, the changing political atmosphere within Indonesia,
and the internal restructuring of Indonesian Islam are among the most im-
portant factors that made the coexistence of “Chineseness” and “Muslimness”
possible among Chinese Muslims in Indonesia.
Hew (2014b) provided a detailed account of the Cheng Hoo Mosque estab-
lished in Surabaya in 2002. Incorporating the contours of the ancient Ox Street
Mosque located in the heart of Beijing with an interior design featuring Indo-
nesian representations of Islam, the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque “declare[s]
that Islam and Chineseness can coexist harmoniously in the country” (Hew
2014b:630). Hew went on to argue that the construction of a Chinese-style
mosque reflects “a process both of consumption and self-production” and “the
interplay of transnational imagining and local negotiation” (2014b:630). Cheng
Hoo Mosque is a statement made by ethnic Chinese Muslims in Indonesia to
legitimize their existence. Backed by the fourteen-hundred-year history of Is-
lam in China and the resilience of the Hui people, Chinese Muslims in Indone-
sia can now introduce themselves as followers of an authentic tradition that is
even older than Indonesian Islam.
Compared to the small Chinese population in Indonesia (less than 1.2
percent of the total population), the Chinese community in Malaysia is the na-
tion’s second largest ethnic group, making up 23.4 percent of the total popula-
tion.13 Like their counterparts in Indonesia, the experiences of Chinese Muslims
in Malaysia are similarly influenced by the fluctuating relationships between
China and Malaysia, China’s growing influence in the South China Sea, and
global Islamic movements. Due to the close association between Malay ethnic-
ity and Islam, Chinese converts are also expected to erase their Chinese ethnic-
ity in order to claim Muslim identity (Ma 2011). In addition, studies have found
that Chinese Muslim migrants—the Hui people—from mainland China are
pushed by social and political forces to assimilate into either the non-Muslim
Chinese community or the non-Chinese Muslim community (Ma 2010). With
the rise of China and the shifting attitudes toward cultural diversity within
Muslim communities, however, there is a growing desire among ethnic Chi-
nese Muslims to preserve their Chinese identity alongside their Muslim iden-
tity. This is especially true among recent Chinese Muslim immigrants from
13 Source: Department of Statistics of Malaysia, 2016.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access168 Wang
mainland China (Chow and Ma 2016). The practice of adopting Arabic sur-
names and first names upon embracing Islam now meets mounting resistance
(Malay Mail 2015). Chinese Muslims also display and reproduce their ethnic
identity by celebrating Chinese festivals, such as the Chinese New Year, the
Moon Cake festival, and the Dragon Boat festival.
The experiences of Chinese Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia as docu-
mented in these studies show that claiming Chinese identity helps to weaken
the strong linkage between local majority groups—various ethnic groups in
Indonesia and the Malay in Malaysia—and Islam. The public discourse on the
issue of cultural diversity in Islam, informed by the ongoing debate among
Islamic scholars and theologians on the concepts of pluralism and multicul-
turalism in Islam (Said and Sharify-Funk 2003), have clearly shaped the per-
ception of Chinese cultural practices among Chinese Muslims in the diaspora.
Through building Chinese-style mosques, resisting the assimilative force, and
engaging in global exchanges of religious knowledge, Islam in Southeast Asia
has transcended its ethnic and local boundaries to become universal and glob-
al, lending legitimacy to a diasporic Chinese Muslim identity.
Being a Double Minority in the United States
The passage of the us Immigration Act of 1965 has led to a significant increase
in immigrants from non-European countries. In the subsequent years, the first
wave of Chinese Muslims arrived from Taiwan and many of them settled in
California, given the historical connections between the East Asian Pacific re-
gion and the American West Coast. In the 1970s and 1980s, America’s Muslim
community encountered Chinese Muslims on university campuses through
the networks of the Muslim Student Association. At that time, the small num-
ber of international students of Hui descent almost all hailed from Taiwan and
Southeast Asia, whereas most Chinese Muslim immigrants in America today
arrived from mainland China after 2000. Many of these international students
are in the fields of engineering and computer science. They often find employ-
ment in large it companies, such as Google, Facebook, and Apple, which has
led to the geographic concentration of Chinese Muslims on the West Coast,
especially in the San Francisco Bay area. There are also businesspeople who
obtained green cards or citizenship through investment and individuals who
obtained permanent residence or citizenship through political asylum. De-
spite this diversity, Chinese Muslim immigrants in the United States are gener-
ally voluntary immigrants with strong educational credentials and skills that
are in great demand on the job market. They are widely scattered across the
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 169
continental us and Hawaii (Wang 2013b) and concentrated in California. The
earliest migrant families have now reached the third generation. But most
Chinese Muslim Americans today are first-generation immigrants whose pri-
ority is to put down roots in the United States.
Most of the first-generation immigrants from Taiwan in the 1970s are mem-
bers of well-to-do Hui families who were able to leave mainland China in 1949.
Some of them are descendants of prominent Hui scholars, businesspeople,
and government officials. Fawzia, one of my interlocutors in Phoenix, Arizona,
is widely known within the circle of Chinese Muslims as the daughter-in-law
of the renowned Hui scholar Tong Daozhang, who was jailed during Lee Kuan
Yew’s clampdown on media in Singapore in 1971 (Casady 1975). Fawzia her-
self is a descendant of one of the most affluent Hui households during the
Republican era in Nanjing—the Mai family—which made its fortune in the
shipping business. Born in Taiwan, Fawzia spent her childhood in Europe and
the Middle East with her itinerant diplomat father. She attended schools in
Saudi Arabia, France, Taiwan, Jordan, and the uk and worked as a psychiatrist
and journalist in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. After getting married, she migrated
to Phoenix, where she homeschooled her seven children. A hijabi, a mother, a
well-educated professional, a multilingual educator, a former director of the
Arizona office of cair (Council on American-Islamic Relations), and a teacher
at a Chinese after-school academy, Fawzia possesses a wide range of identities
that make her an extraordinary individual.
The two-hour phone interview was conducted in Mandarin Chinese with
just a few English and Arabic words inserted. Fawzia shared her life story.
My sister and I went to kindergarten in France. I still remember that we
used to be surrounded by other [French] kids who made fun of our eyes
and noses . . .
I went to the University of Jordan to study medicine. . . . It was the only
university in the country at that time. Our professors used to teach in
Arabic. I was the first Chinese who graduated with a degree in medicine
...
I didn’t used to cover my hair, only when [I was] praying. During that
time, in Jordan, only the less educated covered their hair, the more edu-
cated didn’t. When students in the medical school started covering their
hair, I also began wearing longer and longer clothes and started buying
headscarves. After making Hajj, I decided to put on the hijab and I’ve been
wearing it ever since. It came naturally and my daughters are covered
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access170 Wang
too. I didn’t really feel any strong reaction [after I put on the hijab] from
others. I’m used to [being different].
After 9/11 . . . I became director of cair’s office in Arizona. . . . I did many
interviews with the press to talk about Islam and the struggle of American
Muslims. In some ways, I became the face of Muslims in Phoenix.
Although Fawzia was raised in many different places around the world and
mostly outside Chinese society, her identity is strongly defined by her Hui heri-
tage. Her marriage was arranged with the help of family members and relatives
who are well connected to a transnational Hui social network. In fact, Fawzia
told me that since there were so few Hui families overseas, her parents began
making contacts when she was about fifteen or sixteen years old, although she
eventually got married at the age of twenty-six. Both the Arabic language and
Islam are indispensable elements in Fawzia’s identity. Although Fawzia’s father
only started learning about Islam while working in Saudi Arabia, Fawzia was
socialized in Arab Muslim societies from an early age. Her donning of the hi-
jab, an important indicator of her religiosity, was an act in accordance with the
growing conservatism in the Arab world in the 1980s.
The term “Chinese Muslim” in its Chinese translation (华 人 穆 斯 林 ) was
never used during our conversation. Fawzia referred to herself and her family
as Huihui or Hui throughout the entire interview. She used the English term
“Chinese Muslim” only once when talking about her life in the us. Neverthe-
less, in her identity matrix, there is room for Chineseness, which is constructed
through other people’s perceptions of her based on her physical features, her
origin, and her choice of language in her daily interactions with the people
around her. The Chinese heritage she claims is embedded in her extended fam-
ily’s long history in mainland China, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan. Like other
Chinese in the diaspora, she attaches great value to education. The roles she
plays in Islamic organizations and Chinese American educational institutions
suggest that it is possible to be a Chinese and a Muslim simultaneously.
Fawzia’s children, the second-generation immigrants, all learned to speak
Chinese, Arabic, and English. They also received an Islamic education since
childhood. Her daughters wear the hijab and take pride in their religious affili-
ation. One of her daughters is a qualified teacher of Mandarin. Another daugh-
ter is married to a Hui from the mainland and now lives in Nanjing. Two of
her sons ran an online Islamic educational platform for a period of time. As
travel and communication have become easier with technological advance-
ments, Fawzia’s family is now well connected to Chinese Muslim communities
in California, Nanjing, Taiwan, and many other places around the world, which
contributes to the maintenance of their ethnoreligious identity.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 171
Although other interlocutors’ stories are not as legendary, their experi-
ences, just like those of Fawzia, are similarly shaped by the tensions between
mainland China and Taiwan, and the global politics that have aggravated the
conflict between Islam and the West. Chinese Muslims in the San Francisco
Bay area gather frequently. These gatherings are usually held on long week-
ends during public holidays, especially when the dates coincide with Chinese
festivals, such as the Mid-Autumn festival and the Chinese New Year. During
Ramadan and the Eid holiday, on the other hand, many Chinese Muslim fami-
lies celebrate with other immigrant Muslims in the Bay area. Such an arrange-
ment provides space for the reproduction of both religious identity and ethnic
identity, especially for the American-born children.
The Chinese Muslim immigrants from mainland China whom I interviewed
said that they rediscovered “Chinese Muslim” identity as the result of migra-
tion. Most of them came to the United States to pursue postgraduate studies.
They had little knowledge about Islam since they were all educated in public
schools in China, where religion is regarded as a primordial relic or as super-
stition. The vibrant religious activities in the United States provide them with
an opportunity to see religion in a different light. The Muslim international
students they meet on campuses and their Muslim colleagues in workplaces
introduce them to local immigrant Muslim communities. Some Chinese Mus-
lim immigrants from mainland China began attending Friday Jummah prayers,
learning how to perform salat, and observing Ramadan. Those who are less
religious are also becoming more interested in Islam and their Muslim identity.
Nevertheless, as Chinese living in the United States, it is inevitable that
Chinese Muslims also share similar concerns as non-Muslim Chinese. They
prioritize job security, financial stability, and their children’s education. Mrs.
Ma, a forty-year-old well-paid professional working in an insurance company,
confessed that although she supported the Democratic Party because it was
more friendly to Muslims, she was frustrated by the increasing taxes levied
on high-income households like hers. She talked about her children’s future
and felt that Asian Americans were punished for their outstanding academic
achievement by the college admission process. She worried that the increasing
competition would reduce her children’s opportunity to go to the best univer-
sities in the United States. The family adheres to Muslim dietary restrictions
carefully and often discusses topics related to Islam at home. However, instead
of finding an Arabic tutor or Islamic teacher, Mrs. Ma enrolled her children in
after-school programs to study Mandarin Chinese, musical instruments, and
martial arts, among other extracurricular activities, just like other non-Muslim
Chinese. Many of my interlocutors echoed these concerns. The prejudice and
discrimination in American society against Asian Americans accentuates the
Chinese identity of these Chinese Muslim immigrants.
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access172 Wang
The formation of Chinese Muslim organizations further strengthens the
identity of Chinese Muslims. Founded in 2005 by a group of international stu-
dents linked by various alumni networks, the Chinese Muslim Youth Associa-
tion in North America (cmyana, 北 美 华 人 穆 斯 林 青 年 联 谊 会 ) provides a
platform for information exchange and mutual help for Chinese Muslims liv-
ing in North America, especially the first-generation immigrants. Members also
frequently engage in discussions of topics related to religious knowledge and
social problems facing Muslim minorities. With the emergence of social me-
dia apps in subsequent years, Facebook and WeChat have gradually replaced
this platform. However, the social network built by cmyana continues to grow,
affirming group solidarity and creating a sense of belonging. It is, therefore,
through their interactions with other Chinese Muslims, non-Chinese Muslim
immigrants from all over the world, and the American mainstream that Chi-
nese American Muslims learn to cope with the challenges of being a double
minority in American society.
The New Middleman Minority in the United Arab Emirates
For centuries, the Arabian Peninsula has been the real or imagined homeland
of Chinese Muslims. The United Arab Emirates (uae), a tiny country located
on the east coast of the peninsula, has become another popular destination for
Chinese Muslim migrants. Many were attracted to the emirate by its booming
economy. The dominant Islamic culture in the region offers another incentive
for Muslim minorities.
Unlike Southeast Asia, where there is a long history of Chinese immigration
and an influential Chinese diasporic community, the uae is home to a highly
diverse population, which is comprised of about 11 percent natives and 89 per-
cent foreigners, mostly from the South Asian subcontinent (uae Government
2018). Unlike the United States, the uae does not offer immigrants a path to
naturalization. Both low-skilled workers and well-trained professionals are is-
sued temporary residence permits under the sponsorship of their employers.
Length of stay is contingent upon employment. Life is transitory in this coun-
try. Although some foreigners have lived in the uae for more than two genera-
tions, there is a strong sense of “permanent impermanence” (Ali 2010).
China and the uae did not establish diplomatic relations until 1984. A small
stream of Chinese businesspeople trickled into Dubai in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The second wave of Chinese entrepreneurs arrived after 2000, sup-
ported by China’s massive manufacturing industry and the need for C hinese
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 173
companies to “go out”14 and engage with the promising Middle Eastern and
African markets. The 2009 economic crisis did not slow down the inflow of
Chinese. In fact, Chinese migration to Dubai accelerated during the years af-
ter the Arab Spring, producing the third wave of Chinese influx. Economic
exchanges between China and the uae have been fruitful as the Chinese gov-
ernment seeks to protect its investment in the region and secure its energy
supplies in the Middle East. China is also keen on promoting deeper mutual
understandings through social and cultural exchanges, which are essential to
China’s long-term strategic goals in the region. As a result, the Chinese popula-
tion in the city has increased by more than a hundredfold since the 1990s from
some 2,000 to more than 270,000.15 China has become the uae’s biggest trade
partner and a significant source of tourists.
As a religious minority living in the midst of non-Muslim majorities, Chi-
nese Muslims have traditionally engaged in ethnic entrepreneurship.16 On the
one hand, they operate ethnic businesses out of ethnoreligious enclaves, sus-
taining an enclave economy. On the other hand, they also play the role of a
middleman minority, enabled by unique skills that give them an advantage in
certain niche markets. As Dubai ascends to become the most promising global
city in the Middle East and the status of Chinese Muslims shifts from religious
minority in China to religious majority in Dubai, a new niche market emerges,
in which the dual identity of Chinese Muslims allows them to become brokers,
mediators, and in a way cultural ambassadors between China and the uae.
To improve Dubai’s ranking on the global city index,17 Dubai’s ruling elites
are keen on creating an open and tolerant social space, which is key to the
growth of a knowledge-based economy essential for Dubai’s future. In the
last decade, Dubai has constructed world-class infrastructure and simplified
bureaucratic procedures to attract global event organizers. Dubai’s Islamic
roots and cosmopolitan outlook provide the perfect stage for events to pro-
mote cross-cultural dialogues, especially in the post-9/11 era. The Arab Spring
had a mixed impact on Dubai. Its economy boomed as the rest of the Middle
14 For more on China’s “going out” policy, see Salidjanova 2011.
15 This estimate was obtained from the Chinese Consulate General in Dubai. However, given
the high level of population mobility, it is difficult to obtain accurate figures for the city’s
Chinese population.
16 For detailed discussions on ethnic entrepreneurship, see Zhou 2004.
17 Dubai was ranked no. 28 on ATKearney’s Global Cities index in 2016 (https://www
.atkearney.com/documents/20152/436064/Global+Cities+2016.pdf/934b2d25–89fa-00d2
-ee9a-b053b92b5230).
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free access174 Wang
East crumbled into chaos. The influence of extremism also forces Dubai to de-
fend its position as a moderate Muslim society. Although academic research
and public events are closely scrutinized, cultural economy has flourished
with the opening of a number of art galleries, creative spaces, and entertain-
ment venues. There is a growing emphasis on cultural exchanges, drawing the
center of attention away from sensitive issues.
Chinese Muslims in the uae—Hui, Han converts, and Uyghurs—have
played an increasingly important role in promoting mutual understanding
between China and the uae and dialogues between the Islamic and Chinese
civilizations. These individuals come from a wide range of backgrounds. Some
are officially appointed clerics, some are successful entrepreneurs, and others
are artists, teachers, doctors, and intellectuals. Over the years they have spon-
sored, organized, and participated in a wide range of public events to educate
Chinese people about Islamic culture, and to introduce Chinese culture to the
broader Muslim community. With their help, the renowned Chinese Islamic
calligrapher, Mi Guangjiang, held several exhibitions in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and
Sharjah that showcase the perfect union of Chinese and Arab aestheticism. In
June 2016, Zhenghe International Peace Foundation, a us-based non-profit or-
ganization, held its second annual Zhenghe International Peace Conference in
Dubai. Chinese Muslims have also played an active role in interfaith dialogues
sponsored by the uae Ministry of Culture and local Dawah organizations to
promote dialogue between Islam and Confucianism. The organizer of a well-
attended monthly lecture series on topics that are of interest to the Chinese
expatriate community is in fact a Han Muslim convert who received his doc-
torate from a prestigious university in the United States.
These activities have gone beyond the traditional territory of Chinese Mus-
lim businesses, such as halal restaurants and halal food production. As the
volume of trade between China and the uae multiplies, the need for mean-
ingful cultural exchanges between the two countries gains urgency. The dual
identity of Chinese Muslims, broadly defined, is a unique source of cultural
capital in this new field. Through their active involvement in these events,
Chinese Muslims adopt the role of a middleman minority (Blalock 1967:79–
84; Bonaich 1973). In history and at present, middleman minorities—Jewish
Americans, Italian Americans, Chinese Americans, Chinese in southeast Asia,
Korean Americans, and many others—have been able to achieve exceptional
success in their respective niche markets and accumulate considerable wealth;
yet, they continue to face discrimination in the host society, both from the
dominant majority above them and the subordinate minority below (Alba
and Nee 2009). Different from the typical middleman minorities, who gravi-
tate toward certain niche markets and professions due to discrimination and
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessThe Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 175
limited opportunities in mainstream society, the Chinese Muslims in the uae
are simultaneously minority—being Chinese—and majority—being Muslim.
They continue to combat prejudice and stereotypes, both from their Chinese
compatriots and Muslim brothers and sisters, due to their in-between-ness
(Wang 2016). Nevertheless, the growing cultural industry in Dubai, an event
city and an entertainment city, attaches more prestige to the new niche—
cultural exchanges between China and the Islamic world. Activities that fall
into this territory are unlikely to generate much wealth, but they are effective
in improving China-uae relations, which may then translate into tangible busi-
ness deals between the two partners. Dr. Ma, a Hui businessman who served
as the first director of the Confucius Institute in Dubai, contends, “Everything
will become easier, if both sides understand each other and accept each other.
Cultural exchange is the key to open up people’s minds and genuinely accept
each other” (personal interview, 2016).
The new middleman role of Chinese Muslims in strengthening China–uae
relations through their work as policy/legal consultants, business brokers, phi-
lanthropists, and informal cultural ambassadors helps to improve the overall
experiences of the Chinese Muslim community in the uae, which is con-
ditioned by their relationship with the overseas Chinese authorities—the
Chinese Consulate General in Dubai and in turn their relationship with govern-
ment agencies back in China. Being recognized by overseas Chinese authorities
as good citizens is an intangible but valuable asset, especially useful since the
uae does not provide permanent residence or paths to naturalization. Since
Ramadan 2010, it has become a tradition for the Chinese Consulate General to
host an iftar for Chinese Muslim families—Hui, Uyghur, and others—during
the holy month of Islam. The consul general, representatives of major provin-
cial and regional trade associations, and Emirati partners gather together with
Chinese Muslims to celebrate the contributions of Chinese Muslims to the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural exchanges between China and the uae.
Chinese Muslims see the uae as a safe haven where they are not only able
to practice Islam freely, but also have more opportunities to achieve financial
stability and gain social influence. In my research, I found that their accentu-
ated religious identity does not cancel out the presence of Chinese-ness. Even
the second generations are more likely to maintain stronger ties with China.
Under the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative, the uae is also commit-
ted to developing closer and stronger ties with China—an emerging economic
and political power in the ever-changing world system. The shifting economic
currents empower Chinese Muslims to play a bigger role in the future collabo-
rations between the two countries and consequently reinforce their dual iden-
tity as Chinese Muslims (Wang 2016).
review of religion and chinese society 5 (2018) 156-182
Downloaded from Brill.com11/27/2021 12:27:59PM
via free accessYou can also read
