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The Next Steps for EU Counterterrorism Policy - Evolving ...
NO. 20 MARCH 2021             Introduction

The Next Steps for
EU Counterterrorism Policy
Evolving Threats of Jihadism, Right-wing Extremism, and Transatlantic Cooperation
Raphael Bossong

In the wake of the Corona pandemic and the storming of the Capitol, threat percep-
tions with regard to right-wing extremists and conspiracy theories have increased
markedly. The attacks in France and Austria last November showed that the threat
from jihadist terrorism also remains acute. Against this background, the counter-
terrorism agenda of the European Union (EU) was updated at the end of 2020 and
covers a broad range of topics. However, it also testifies to the heterogeneity of the
Union’s competences and the different interests of EU member states. On the one
hand, the EU’s role remains limited when it comes to the rehabilitation of imprisoned
terrorists and to the broad societal prevention of extremism. On the other hand, the
EU is pushing forward with a set of regulations to remove illegal online content. This
common legislative agenda is also part of a renewed transatlantic partnership. How-
ever, proactive measures against right-wing terrorism will, for the time being, be
advanced in flexible coalitions.

The dismantling of the territory of the          An intelligence failure led to the Vienna
“Islamic State” (IS) in 2019 and intensive    attack in November 2020, which was per-
efforts by intelligence and law enforcement   petrated with a Kalashnikov. By contrast,
agencies to pursue terrorists mean that       those who attacked the Paris editorial
serious attacks, which occurred repeatedly    offices of Charlie Hebdo in 2015 used assault
in Europe between 2014 and 2017, have         rifles that could be legally acquired as
become less likely. Neither the so-called     dummies in Slovakia and made functional
migration crisis of 2015 nor the return of    again all too easily. In recent years, the EU
foreign fighters from IS has resulted in an   states have closed this and other regulatory
uncontrollable threat to Europe so far,       loopholes that could be exploited by terror-
although irregular immigrants and rejected    ists, for example in the area of financing.
asylum seekers have repeatedly carried out    Nevertheless, the Union is facing new risks
or attempted attacks. These acts have also    that are calling its relative successes in the
shown that access to weapons and high-        fight against terrorism into question.
value targets has become more difficult.
The Continuing Threat from                         offenses, including material support (e.g.,
                 Jihadist-motivated Terror                          attempts to leave the country to join IS).
                                                                    Even a comparatively low recidivism rate of
                 The Islamic State (IS, alternatively ISIL, ISIS,   less than 5 percent – the estimate for
                 or Daesh) may regroup in Syria and Iraq.           European jihadists these days – represents
                 Major suicide bombings in Baghdad this             a considerable threat potential in view of
                 January are signs of such a development. It        the more than 1,400 persons currently in
                 is likely that IS continues to have access to      prison. Over the past two years, this threat
                 substantial financial resources. Detained          has materialized in terror attacks in Vien-
                 fighters could benefit from regional unrest        na, Dresden, and London. In the aftermath,
                 and targeted operations to liberate them           decision-makers have been under intense
                 from prisons. EU states are still acting too       pressure to explain why former criminals
                 hesitantly and incoherently when it comes          were able to strike again. However, terrorist
                 to readmitting nationals who had joined IS.        convicts cannot generally be locked up for-
                 Orderly procedures for repatriation are            ever without breaching fundamental prin-
                 preferable, both for normative reasons and         ciples of the rule of law.
                 in light of the security risks that arise from
                 a permanent denial of responsibility and
                 lack of effective jurisdiction.                    Different Assessments of Trans-
                     The Biden administration can help stabi-       national Right-wing Extremism
                 lize the situation on the ground, as it is
                 seeking to renew its partnership with Kurd-        The Corona crisis, meanwhile, has created a
                 ish allies and apparently intends to keep          huge resonance chamber for conspiracy
                 US forces in the region. The appointment of        theories. Violent actions by radical vaccina-
                 Brett McGurk, the former Special Presiden-         tion critics are conceivable. Already long
                 tial Envoy for the Global Coalition to Coun-       before the pandemic, right-wing extremist
                 ter ISIL, as the National Security Council’s       terrorism was markedly on the rise. When
                 coordinator for the Middle East and Africa         different forms of right-wing extremist hate
                 is another indication of the continued             crimes are included, one can discern a de-
                 intensity and regional dimension of the            crease in violent acts over the past 30 years
                 threat. For example, groups and actors             in Europe. Nevertheless, there is a qualita-
                 affiliated with IS have been able to gain a        tively new threat of interrelated terrorist
                 foothold on the African continent – appar-         attacks.
                 ently leading to growing tensions with sup-           The Christchurch 2019 attacker, by his
                 porters of al-Qaeda there. European states         own admission, was inspired by Anders
                 must therefore continue to help stabilize          Breivik’s deeds eight years earlier. Since
                 fragile countries in its wider neighborhood,       then, several copycats have appeared on the
                 despite many setbacks. This applies first          scene in the United States and Germany.
                 and foremost to France, which faces a wide         These perpetrators usually spread right-
                 range of problems in the Sahel (SWP Com-           wing extremist ideas that can be connected
                 ment 5/2021).                                      across different national and ideological
                     At home the EU has to deal with indi-          contexts. In particular, the belief in a “Great
                 vidual jihadists and small cells that, with-       Replacement,” according to which the
                 out clear links to organized structures,           white population is to be deliberately de-
                 often act haphazardly, making them all the         stroyed by immigration, serves as a unify-
                 more unpredictable. In addition, new ideo-         ing element. Online image boards, open
                 logical developments must be kept in mind,         and closed social media channels, and parts
                 such as a violent Takfirism.                       of the gamer scene support a culture of
                     A particular challenge is the growing          glorification of violence. However, an inten-
                 number of individuals who have been con-           sified cross-border networking of right-wing
                 victed in recent years for various terrorist       extremist parties, organizations, and indi-

SWP Comment 20
March 2021

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viduals can also be observed offline, espe-     latest joint EU Security Union Strategy,
cially at sports and music events.              published in summer 2020, addresses many
   Since 2019 at the latest, German politi-     aspects of the fight against terrorism, espe-
cians and security authorities have been        cially in the area of early detection or “anti-
stressing jointly that right-wing extremism     cipation” – a new term in the EU’s dis-
poses as serious a threat as militant jihad-    course. However, according to this strategy,
ism. The events on Capitol Hill in early        the most important priorities for the future
January further demonstrated the growing        are “hybrid threats,” cybersecurity, the pro-
scale and radical nature of conspiracy-         tection of critical infrastructures, and deal-
theory movements to a global public. None-      ing with the impact of, as well as harness-
theless, Western states do not share a full     ing, new technologies for security authori-
or comprehensive threat perception toward       ties (especially artificial intelligence and
this challenge. Right-wing populist forces      encryption). Meanwhile, the Schengen zone
have not marched from victory to victory in     and the freedom of movement must be
many democratic elections since 2017, as        preserved as much as possible during the
previously feared. In addition to the United    ongoing pandemic.
States and Germany, explicit right-wing ter-       In view of these structural challenges
rorism has so far mainly been concentrated      and urgent crises, the EU’s recent commu-
in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the United          nications and declarations on the fight
Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Greece – and         against terrorism adopted by the Interior
taken various forms in each case. Various       Ministers, the Commission, and the Euro-
Eastern European states have strong right-      pean Council in November and December
wing extremist organizations but have not       2020 are unlikely to provide a significant
yet experienced attacks.                        impetus. Arguably, they served primarily as
   Overall, there is no uniform recording of    a political signal in response to the attacks
politically motivated acts of violence in the   in France and Vienna that occurred shortly
EU, despite Europol’s regular reports, which    before, as well as the fifth anniversary of
are supposed to include all types of terror-    the Paris attacks (Bataclan). It should be
ism. Hence, there is a discrepancy between      noted, however, that the Council of EU
the presumed threat potential from trans-       Ministers of Interior explicitly welcomed a
national right-wing terrorism and the ac-       temporary expansion of internal border
tual shared security priorities of many EU      controls and wanted to intensify the ex-
states.                                         change of information on potentially vio-
                                                lent extremists (German “Gefährder”). This
                                                may influence the strategic debate on the
The Recent EU Agenda                            future of the Schengen regime, which is to
                                                be held from autumn onwards, at the latest.
The particularly serious attacks in Paris in    Meanwhile, the intelligence exchange on
November 2015 marked a turning point in         dangerous extremists is to take place within
European counterterrorism policy. Police        the framework of a new “European police
and intelligence cooperation has been sig-      partnership.” This is probably the most im-
nificantly intensified since then. In addi-     portant initiative of the past German Coun-
tion, the EU decided to strengthen controls     cil Presidency in the area of internal secu-
at its external borders and passed an ambi-     rity. However, this partnership cannot be
tious reform package on biometric data-         understood as focusing primarily on the
bases that can, among other things, help        fight against terrorism because it covers a
identify suspected terrorists. Many of these    much broader field of police work, includ-
measures have yet to be implemented on          ing local cooperation in border regions.
a technical level.
   In the current EU legislative period, how-
ever, the political focus has shifted. The

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The Controversial Scope of                       Court again formulated strict conditions
                 EU Counterterrorism Policy                       for the proportionality of mandatory data
                                                                  retention.
                 Ascribing various security policy initiatives
                 to the field of counterterrorism has both
                 advantages and disadvantages. On the one         Structural Gaps and Limits of
                 hand, such a move may accelerate and             EU Prevention Policy
                 facilitate political decision-making. On the
                 other hand, comprehensive counterterror-         The central task of a revitalized EU counter-
                 ism packages create coordination and im-         terrorism policy is to contain the aforemen-
                 plementation problems. Above all, one            tioned structural threat potentials posed by
                 needs to avoid distorted assessments about       jihadist and right-wing extremists. In the
                 the necessity and proportionality of new         field of terrorism prevention, the EU has
                 security laws in the aftermath of atrocities.    been trying to take on a coordinating role
                    In the early 2000s, for example, the intro-   since the mid-2000s. In particular, the
                 duction of the European Arrest Warrant           Commission launched the Radicalisation
                 and many more measures in the Area of            Awareness Network (RAN), which now has
                 Freedom, Security and Justice were justified     more than 3,200 members from academia,
                 on the grounds of combating terrorism.           government, and civil society. The net-
                 However, rapid progress in integration sub-      work’s mission is to promote pilot projects
                 sequently entailed numerous legal chal-          and best practices across borders and to
                 lenges and repeated amendments.                  disseminate new research findings. In 2019,
                    The EU’s recent counterterrorism agenda       an additional steering board was set up to
                 appears comparatively more mature. For           advise member states on their prevention
                 example, the European Commission has             policies.
                 taken up issues that a special committee of         The concrete effects are unclear. This is
                 the European Parliament highlighted in a         exemplified by the correctional system. EU
                 comprehensive evaluation of EU counter-          member states have inconsistent and un-
                 terrorism policy during the last legislative     coordinated approaches when it comes to
                 period. Among other things, victims of           dealing with terrorist convicts. Lacking
                 terrorism are to be entitled to more rights      prison chaplaincy and underfunded reha-
                 and compensation, while the protection of        bilitation programs still often characterize
                 public spaces should be improved. In con-        practices on the ground. The EU supports a
                 trast, the European Council’s renewed call       professional association of correctional
                 for mandatory data retention must be seen        authorities that provides data on prison
                 as a rather problematic priority for the next    conditions, among other things. A recent
                 stage of the EU’s fight against terrorism.       RAN manual on the rehabilitation of ter-
                 This also applies to the comprehensive           rorist offenders could serve as a reference
                 reform of Europol’s mandate currently            work. However, typical European gover-
                 under negotiation, which aims to boost the       nance instruments, such as mutual periodic
                 technical capacities of European police          evaluations, have not been introduced to
                 authorities and to forge closer cooperation      date. A recommendation by the EU Council
                 with the private sector. Some aspects of         of Ministers in 2019 has not yet resulted in
                 these legislative proposals are suitable for     any noticeable consequences.
                 aiding the prevention and prosecution of            Regardless of this, the member states
                 serious crimes. However, if the emphasis in      each bear responsibility for a prevention
                 the political debate is placed on combating      and integration policy for society as a
                 terrorism, there is a renewed risk of dis-       whole. Actions in this field require a strong
                 torted legal provisions, which could lead to     civil society and democratic legitimacy. This
                 further actions for annulment before the         has been demonstrated once again in recent
                 European Court of Justice. Recently, the         months in the debates on “political Islam”

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in Austria and France. It would not make            this crisis protocol is coordinated by Euro-
sense to decide at the EU level to what ex-         pol.
tent the work of religious associations may             In view of the dynamic growth of extrem-
be monitored or in how far their political          ist online content and the large number of
participation could be deemed appropriate.          platforms that do not yet participate in
The idea – raised briefly by President of           such partnerships, the EU Commission and
the European Council Charles Michel – of            Council have been pursuing a legislative
establishing an EU training center for              initiative for the mandatory deletion of
imams is equally unrealistic, as long as            terrorist online content since 2018. In con-
education policy remains predominantly a            trast, the European Parliament and repre-
national or subnational competence. In this         sentatives of industry and civil society most-
respect, it is logical that the European            ly warned against disproportionate censor-
Council at the end of 2020 condemned                ship and the structural disadvantage of
attacks on freedom of expression and                smaller online platforms that do not have
religion only in very general terms and             the resources to review content and regu-
urged harmony between religious educa-              larly cooperate with security authorities.
tion and fundamental European values.               In the wake of the murder of the teacher
                                                    Samuel Paty in France, which could clearly
                                                    be traced back to incitement on social
Mandatory Deletion of Terrorist                     media, a political compromise could now
Content Online                                      be found: In the upcoming EU regulation,
                                                    the strict deadline for deleting marked
In turn, the EU is focusing its efforts on          terrorist content within one hour is to be
controlling the online space, where it can          maintained, although certain exceptions
exercise strong regulatory powers based on          apply for small providers. Similarly, the
the Single Market. So far, only a few Euro-         rule that deletions can be ordered across
pean countries, including Germany, have             borders is maintained within the Single
adopted new legal regulations for the rapid         Market, with only a few ex-post review pos-
deletion of extremist or (popularly) inflam-        sibilities for the state in which the online
matory online content. In recent years,             service concerned is located. On the other
security authorities have entered into              hand, the obligation to take “active mea-
voluntary partnerships with operators of            sures,” i.e., to check online content before
major online platforms (including social            it is uploaded, has been deleted. The use of
media), with Europol taking a leading role          possible terrorist content for research and
with its Internet Referral Unit and the EU Inter-   educational purposes is also to remain per-
net Forum, which includes representatives of        mitted.
key companies (YouTube/Google, Facebook,                Critics nevertheless see the danger of
Microsoft, Twitter). In coordination with           illegitimate and unbalanced content con-
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism,     trols, as different standards could be applied
which links the same private-sector actors          to cross-border deletion requests, depending
and the EU with 29 other states and the             on the national political and legal system.
United Nations, jihadist propaganda has             In addition, extremist users could migrate
been reduced significantly. The main tool is        to communication channels and providers
a hashtag database that captures identified         outside of Europe that are difficult to con-
terrorist material and enables cross-plat-          trol, such as Telegram.
form blocking. In October 2019, after the               Experience to date in Germany with the
terrorist attack in Christchurch, state and         Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) suggests
private actors added a so-called crisis proto-      that at least the risks of unjustified deletion
col, which should ensure the swift –and, if         of legal content or the ineffective transfer
possible, worldwide – blocking of filmed            of illegal content to unregulated platforms
terrorist acts. In the EU, the application of       are relatively low. The disadvantage of the

                                                                                                      SWP Comment 20
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partial migration “into the dark” is likely     the DSA, two particular challenges arise:
                 outweighed by the more limited reach of         First, many actors from the online milieu
                 those alternative communication channels.       of the “new right” use coded language that
                 The following points are more problematic:      hides extremist content in innuendo and
                 the ability of users to find and effectively    is difficult to detect using automated pro-
                 use mechanisms to flag illegal content, the     cedures. Second, right-wing extremist
                 legal verifiability of deletion requests, and   speech is assessed differently across EU
                 the tracking of offenders, since the police     member states. In 2008, the Union adopted
                 and judiciary have too few qualified person-    a framework decision on combating racism
                 nel. A corresponding reform of the NetzDG,      and xenophobia, according to which mem-
                 which also should massively increase the        ber states should penalize such statements.
                 role of the German Federal Criminal Police      This weakly binding legal act from before
                 Office in the prosecution of online hate        the Lisbon Treaty has had little effect.
                 crimes, is nearing completion – but it faces       Consideration is therefore being given
                 several legal and practical hurdles. In light   within the Commission to extending the
                 of this example, the upcoming EU regula-        areas of crime identified in Article 83 (1)
                 tion on deleting terrorist content will not     TFEU – for which the EU can perform a
                 be easily implemented effectively and in a      harmonization function – to include hate
                 proportionate manner in other member            crimes and hate speech. However, such a
                 states either.                                  decision would have to be unanimous in
                                                                 the Council. This is not likely, at least as
                                                                 long as tensions continue between member
                 Further EU Regulation in the Area               states over issues of the rule of law and the
                 of Digital Policy                               interpretation of the Union’s fundamental
                                                                 liberal values. The decision by Twitter and
                 The debate on the regulation of the Internet    Facebook to ban US President Donald
                 or Internet-based business models is devel-     Trump from their platforms, for example,
                 oping rapidly. The EU Digital Services Act      has prompted a reaction from the Polish
                 (DSA), presented at the end of 2020, devel-     government to plan a national law prohib-
                 ops a comprehensive concept of responsi-        iting such “censorship” within its sphere of
                 bility and accountability of large online       influence.
                 platforms and social media. Among other            Unilateral action by the major online
                 things, uniform mechanisms for reporting        platforms, taking advantage of their quasi-
                 suspected illegal content are to be estab-      monopoly positions, can be critically ques-
                 lished. The dissemination of extremist or       tioned with good reason. However, individ-
                 deliberately misleading content is to be        ual member states are making it more dif-
                 countered by regulating recommendation          ficult to arrive at a pan-European approach
                 algorithms. Larger platforms would have to      through new legal acts on the limits of ex-
                 provide significant transparency of their       pression on the Internet. This is also true
                 content control and moderation systems.         for France, which plans to finalize the DSA
                 The DSA, however, is not intended to create     in 2022 as part of its next EU presidency,
                 new rules to criminalize specific forms of      but it is already pushing national laws in
                 content.                                        this area.
                    In the area of jihadist terrorism, as men-
                 tioned, some voluntary mechanisms and
                 the forthcoming EU regulation on deleting       Transatlantic Dimension
                 designated terrorist online content should
                 already provide a reasonably effective set of   The events at the Capitol have triggered a
                 tools. However, in the area of right-wing       change of heart among many Democrats
                 extremism and so-called hate speech, which      and also some Republicans when it comes
                 could also fall under the regulatory scope of   to the traditionally very high value placed

SWP Comment 20
March 2021

6
on freedom of expression. Since then, there      Conclusion and
has been an intense debate in the United         Recommendations
States about the responsibilities of large
online platforms. Given European market          Despite years of effort, the EU has reached
power and the dominance of US companies,         structural limits with regard to broad, all-
it would be highly advisable for Brussels        of-society efforts to curb extremism and
and Washington to agree upon a coordi-           prevent terrorist violence. Within the EU,
nated approach. Broadly speaking, the            member states should not drag each other
following guideline could apply on both          into internal debates about the role of
sides of the Atlantic: The right to freedom      religion and integration in their respective
of expression is to be largely preserved, but    societies. Rather, more targeted efforts can
there should be no “right to amplify.” This      be made at the EU level to create reform
would allow for curbing the dissemination        incentives in specific areas, such as preven-
of certain online content.                       tion and rehabilitation in national correc-
   Joe Biden addressed the danger posed by       tional systems. Even without a competence
right-wing extremism and racism several          for legal harmonization, the EU can do
times in his inaugural speech, not least to      more than promote best practices.
distance himself from the presumed tolera-          At the top of the agenda, however, is
tion or even support of such groups (e.g.,       how to reach a shared understanding on
the Proud Boys) under Donald Trump.              the limits freedom of expression and on the
However, US authorities already banned a         legal responsibilities of online platforms
right-wing extremist organization, the so-       and service providers. EU member states
called Russian Imperial Movement, as a           must continue to work in the long term on
foreign terrorist association for the first      approximating their criminal laws on hate
time in 2020. It is all the more surprising      speech. First, the implementation of the
that there is still no federal legislation to    upcoming regulation on deleting terrorist
prosecute domestic terrorist groups, as          content online must be closely monitored.
such. If this gap were to be closed under the    To avoid a disproportionate use of the ter-
Biden administration, global cooperation         rorism charges in cross-border contexts, it
against right-wing extremist and potential       would be helpful to expand the legal bases
terrorist actors could gain substance.           for combating hate speech and hate crime.
   In view of the different threat situations    In the medium term, the DSA will create
and perceptions of right-wing terrorism in       pressure to act in this direction, as cross-
various European states, however, flexible       border notifications and deletion orders are
bilateral or mini-lateral initiatives are to     likely to increase sharply. The consequences
be expected for the time being, especially       of the DSA will extend far beyond counter-
when it comes to operational cooperation         terrorism and beyond EU borders. There-
between criminal justice authorities and         fore, the converging perception of right-
intelligence agencies. Germany, in partic-       wing extremism being a threat in the United
ular, has an important European leadership       States must be used now as an opportunity
role to play. It is particularly affected by     for a transatlantic regulatory framework.
right-wing extremism and right-wing terror-         Yet all these steps to regulate the online
ism and also has developed special compe-        space can only indirectly impact on differ-
tencies in this area. It should draw on this     ent types of religious and political extrem-
profile to revitalize transatlantic relations.   ism. Most research studies on radicalization
This also applies to the future security rela-   processes and terrorist acts show that on-
tionship with the United Kingdom, which          line communications play an important
already classified domestic right-wing ex-       and growing role, but that personal, social,
tremism as a strategic threat several years      and political factors remain at least as
ago.                                             crucial.

                                                                                                 SWP Comment 20
                                                                                                     March 2021

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Since right-wing terrorism has so far only
                                 been experienced as a priority threat in a
                                 minority of Western states, flexible formats
                                 should be used to move operational coop-
                                 eration forward. This applies, for example,
                                 to intelligence exchanges on right-wing ex-
                                 tremists or to concrete measures that may
                                 have cross-border aspects, such as bans on
                                 associations and investigative procedures. A
                                 comparable pattern of counterterrorism
© Stiftung Wissenschaft          cooperation among “most affected member
und Politik, 2021                states” was already used in the early 2010s
All rights reserved              against the phenomenon of IS foreign
                                 fighters – and could later be transformed
This Comment reflects
                                 into common European approaches. Now
the author’s views.
                                 again, the EU can benefit from committed
The online version of            member states such as Germany and third
this publication contains        countries such as the United Kingdom and
functioning links to other       the United States to advance with tangible
SWP texts and other relevant
                                 counterterrorism measures.
sources.

SWP Comments are subject
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing.
For further information on
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/
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swp-publications/

SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute for
International and
Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
Fax +49 30 880 07-100
www.swp-berlin.org
swp@swp-berlin.org

ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
doi: 10.18449/2021C20

(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 22/2021)

                                 Dr. Raphael Bossong is an Associate in the EU / Europe Research Division.

       SWP Comment 20
       March 2021

       8
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