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NO. 16 APRIL 2020 Introduction The Refugee Drama in Syria, Turkey, and Greece Why a Comprehensive Approach Is Needed Sinem Adar, Steffen Angenendt, Muriel Asseburg, Raphael Bossong, and David Kipp The plight of refugees in the Syrian province of Idlib, on the Greek islands, and on the EU’s external borders has worsened dramatically over the last few months. Once more, the European Union (EU) is split on questions of asylum and migration, and it portrays limited capacity to act in issues of foreign and security policy. What options does the EU have to address the deteriorating situation? This question has become even more pressing due to the spread of Covid-19. The EU-Turkey statement of 2016 has strengthened cooperation with Ankara on humanitarian aid and border controls, but it also has major weaknesses. A comprehensive approach is needed. The EU should prioritise providing new financial resources for Turkey that should be com- plemented by scaling-up assistance to Greece as well as to Syria’s neighbours. In addition, the Europeans should support the creation of a safe zone in northern Idlib. As in 2015, the worsening of the refugee paign with the support of its allies – situation in Greece and Turkey today stems Russia, Iran, and Iranian-led militias. from an escalation in the (civil) war in Syria. In order to counter the advances of the Since April 2019, the regime in Damascus Syrian army, Ankara increasingly supported has launched a number of military offen- Syrian rebels and brought its own troops sives aimed at reconquering the province and heavy equipment to the frontlines of Idlib in the country’s north-west, with starting in February 2020. Turkey wants the overall goal of reclaiming the whole to prevent a renewed rush of refugees to its of Syria’s territory. An agreement between borders, to underpin its demand for a safe Russia and Turkey (the September 2018 zone or buffer zone in the border region, Sochi Agreement) had previously averted and to shore up its negotiating position the offensive, but it was ultimately unable with regard to three areas on Syrian terri- to prevent it. Even the Turkish observation tory that it currently occupies. After a dra- posts along the agreed ceasefire line did not matic escalation between Turkey and Syr- change this. In December 2019 the Syrian ian rebels on the one hand, and the Syrian regime launched its latest military cam- army, Russia, Iran, and Iranian-led militias
on the other, Moscow and Ankara agreed current crisis, 2.8 million people in north-
upon another ceasefire on 5 March 2020. west Syria were dependent on humanitarian
The ceasefire applies to a narrow six-kilo- aid. Harsh weather conditions have added
metre strip on both sides of the M4 motor- to the worsening situation of refugees:
way connecting the Syrian provincial capi- There is a lack of (heated) shelters, water,
tals Latakia and Aleppo. Even if the cease- sanitary facilities, food, and protection
fire has since resulted in a cessation of air against attacks.
strikes, the arrangement is not intended to Further forced displacement from Syria
be permanent and does not settle the con- towards Turkey is foreseeable once the
flicting interests of the actors involved. Its fighting in the province of Idlib intensifies
implementation has also proven to be again or if Damascus takes control of the
difficult. north-west of the country. Yet, Turkey is
not ready to accept more refugees and is
therefore likely to keep the border closed.
Dramatic Situation of Even in the mid to long term, Syrian refu-
Internally Displaced Persons gees are unlikely to return to Syria in
in Northern Syria significant numbers. Rather, more Syrians
are likely to leave, or want to leave, the
Against this background, the predicament country in order to escape repression and
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in persecution or – in view of the economic
Syria has further worsened. According to and currency crisis – to make a living else-
the United Nations (UN), from the begin- where.
ning of December 2019 to mid-March 2020,
almost one million Syrians – approximately
60 per cent of which are children and 20 Situation of Refugees in Turkey
per cent women – fled from the fighting
and the advancing Syrian Arab Army. Turkey hosts the largest refugee population
Today, around a quarter of the people in worldwide. Syrians, with around 3.6 mil-
the affected areas of the provinces of Idlib lion people, constitute the largest group. In
and Aleppo are on the run. The way to addition, there are 400,000 to 500,000 non-
Turkey, however, is blocked – all border Syrian refugees, mainly from Afghanistan,
crossings into Turkey have, in principle, Iraq, and Iran. Syrian refugees enjoy tem-
been kept closed since March 2015. Turkey porary protection in Turkey, and only about
also completed a border wall in 2018 and 2 per cent of them live in refugee camps.
has used force to repel new refugees from They can obtain work permits, but this
Syria, as reported by human rights organi- ultimately depends on the goodwill of their
sations. Some 550,000 Syrians have thus employers. Compared with neighbouring
sought refuge in the border region in north- countries, refugees in Turkey have a high
western Idlib, and more than 400,000 have rate of school enrolment and a large pro-
moved to Turkish-controlled areas further portion work in the (mainly) informal sec-
east, mainly in the enclaves of al-Bab and tor. Nevertheless, it remains a major chal-
Afrin. lenge for Turkey to integrate Syrian refu-
For many, it is not their first displace- gees into its society and economy (see SWP
ment. Since 2017, some 1.5 million Syrians Comments 1/2020 and 5/2020). Moreover,
have been evacuated to Idlib from other popular attitudes towards refugees have
parts of the country in the course of so- become increasingly hostile as the economic
called reconciliation agreements, which crisis in the country deepens. As a result,
served the regime in Damascus to recon- the government has ramped up restrictive
quer breakaway territories, or have fled measures. Syrian refugees are no longer
there. This has doubled the population allowed to stay in Istanbul, but only in the
in the province of Idlib. Even before the districts where they were originally regis-
SWP Comment 16
April 2020
2tered. It also appears that some refugees suspended the right to apply for asylum
have been pressured to sign up for “volun- for one month. According to press reports,
tary” return. In practice they are threatened a secret camp on the Greek mainland has
with deportation in inhumane conditions. been used to detain newly arrived migrants
According to the United Nations High Com- and refugees in order to return them directly
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approxi- to Turkey, bypassing the rule of law. Numer-
mately 87,000 refugees returned to Syria ous EU representatives, including Commis-
from Turkey between 2016 and January sion President Ursula von der Leyen and
2020. It is fair to assume that a sizeable the Council of Interior Ministers, expressed
portion of them did not do so voluntarily. clear support for Greece in these endeav-
The repatriation of refugees also plays ours. Frontex, the EU’s border and coast
a growing role in Ankara’s military offen- guard, was tasked with launching two rapid
sives against its southern neighbour. When interventions to reinforce Greek land and
“Operation Olive Branch” began in January sea borders with Turkey and to intensify
2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan em- repatriation operations. For these and other
phasised in a speech that the goal was measures – such as offering financial in-
“to return Afrin to its true owners ... and to centive programmes for voluntary returns,
return three and a half million Syrians to increasing reception capacities in the Evros
their homeland”. In September 2019 – one region of Greece, and strengthening locally-
month before the latest military invasion – needed infrastructure for health and safety
Erdoğan presented a plan to the UN General screening – the EU Commission provided
Assembly that foresaw reconstruction proj- €350 million in emergency aid. It announced
ects to settle about one million refugees in that this amount would be doubled through
a safe zone in north-eastern Syria. a reallocation of budgetary resources. Only
after some delay did the EU Commissioner
for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, voice
Escalation at the cautious criticisms of Greece’s clear viola-
Turkish-Greek Border tions of international and European refugee
law. Therefore, with the growing opera-
At the end of February 2020, the Turkish tional involvement of EU agencies in north-
government announced that it would open ern Greece, there is a risk of sharing respon-
its border to Europe. In doing so, it drew sibility for the violations of human rights
refugees and migrants to the crossings with and refugee law.
Greece, provoking a local humanitarian By mid-March the immediate crisis at the
emergency. Four objectives informed An- EU’s external border in Greece had eased.
kara’s decision: 1) to obtain more EU finan- Since then, Turkey has transported several
cial support for hosting refugees; 2) to com- thousand irregular migrants and refugees
mit Europe to providing stronger financial that remained in the Evros border region
and diplomatic support in the face of the back to Turkish cities. What has often been
humanitarian emergency in Idlib, which described from a European perspective as
would help to overcome the crisis on the attempted blackmail by Ankara appears
ground and prevent new refugee move- to have come to an end for the time being.
ments into Turkey; 3) to shore up political/ The Turkish coast guard has also resumed
military backing for Turkey’s agenda in its regular border surveillance. However,
northern Syria; and 4) to receive financial this is unlikely to stop crossings to the
support for its reconstruction efforts there, Greek Aegean islands completely, especially
including the creation of residential devel- when milder weather conditions return in
opment projects for repatriated refugees. the spring.
The Greek government used tear gas
and rubber bullets to prevent refugees and
migrants from entering Greece, and it
SWP Comment 16
April 2020
3Perpetual Crisis on the hand, Greek courts would have to consider
Greek Islands Turkey as a safe third country. Related legal
challenges have already been raised against
Living conditions for migrants and refugees summary deportations of irregular migrants
on the Greek islands remain catastrophic. during the current crisis. One the other
The facilities (so-called hotspots), which hand, Ankara would need to offer construc-
were set up with EU support starting at the tive cooperation, which has been funda-
end of 2015, were meant to accommodate mentally called into question by the recent
just over 6,000 people, but they currently crisis at the common land border.
house more than 41,000 people. The over-
crowding is an – unplanned – conse-
quence of the EU-Turkey statement of 2016, Background of the
which stipulates, among other things, that EU-Turkey Statement
asylum seekers may not, as a rule, be trans-
ferred to mainland Greece. At the same Cooperation between the EU and Turkey is
time, asylum procedures on the islands urgently needed, both for refugee protec-
have been extremely slow, and repatriations tion and for border security. Over the past
to Turkey that were originally intended have weeks, both sides have emphasised that
hardly been implemented. Non-govern- the existing EU-Turkey statement of March
mental organisations (NGOs), UNHCR, and 2016 – often referred to as the refugee
various EU institutions have long criticised or migration “pact” or “deal” – continues
the living conditions in the hotspots. In to serve as a common point of reference.
addition to overcrowding, a lack of security, Following a meeting with Erdoğan in Brus-
dismal sanitary conditions, and insufficient sels on 9 March 2020, EU Council President
access to medical care and psycho-social Charles Michel announced that EU High
support add to the humanitarian crisis. Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
Accidents and fires occur repeatedly, as do rity Policy Josep Borrell and Turkish Foreign
violent riots, which have already claimed Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu should jointly
several lives. The first Covid-19 infections review how the 2016 statement could be
among migrants and refugees in a reception better put into practice.
centre on the Greek mainland illustrate the By 2014 the escalation of the civil war in
even more serious threat to the health and Syria had led to a massive regional crisis of
lives of those detained in camps on the forced displacement, all while the UNHCR
islands. was facing severe shortages of humanitarian
For months already, the Greek govern- aid. Brussels’ first response was to launch
ment has been considering the evacuation the “EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to
of refugees to the mainland. In the medium the Syrian Crisis” (“Madad Fund”). The trust
to long term, Athens wants to house new fund provided initial financial support for
asylum seekers arriving on the islands in several of Syria’s neighbouring countries in
closed facilities. However, local protests 2014, but it was far from sufficient. In view
have so far largely prevented their construc- of rapidly rising refugee numbers, Brussels
tion. With the asylum law that came into pursued more comprehensive stabilisation
force in January 2020, Greece has further measures in autumn 2015 with the “EU-
restricted the rights that allow asylum Turkey Joint Action Plan”. The first part of
seekers to stay in the country; the use of the the plan aimed at improving the humani-
police and the military is intended to speed tarian situation of refugees in Turkey. This
up the asylum procedures. Whether the was to be achieved both through European
Greek government will succeed in return- financial aid and through legal and institu-
ing rejected asylum seekers to Turkey in tional reforms in Turkey. The latter were
larger numbers than in the past depends on particularly decisive for providing Syrians
two questionable assumptions. On the one with medium-term prospects. For example,
SWP Comment 16
April 2020
4the Turkish labour market was opened good €1.5 billion has also been earmarked
up and Syrian children were able to go to directly for state agencies in Turkey, above
school. The second part of the Action Plan all the Ministry of Education. In an audit at
focussed on border management and infor- the end of 2018, the EU Court of Auditors
mation campaigns against irregular migra- emphasised the need to shift from short-
tion. This was in the interest of Europe as term, limited humanitarian aid to the crea-
well as Turkey. After all, Turkey wanted tion of sustainable support structures for
to avoid serving as a corridor for irregular refugees.
migration from various parts of the Middle From a European perspective, the great-
East and Asia to Europe over the long term. est achievement of the EU-Turkey statement
However, a broader political agreement is that the number of irregular border cross-
became necessary in order to get the co- ings into the EU has been greatly reduced.
operation between Europe and Turkey off For many proponents of the pact, the most
the ground and operational. This was done important argument for its continuation is
in March 2016 with the EU-Turkey state- the deterrent effect on sea crossings and the
ment, in which the Europeans committed subsequently lower number of drownings.
to mobilise up to €6 billion until the end The one-to-one mechanism has often been
of 2018. In return, no more asylum appli- described as the reason for this develop-
cations were to be accepted from Syrians ment, as Syrians received the political sig-
who landed irregularly on the Greek nal that they would be deported from Greek
islands. Instead, they were to be returned islands back to Turkey. However, in prac-
to Turkey as swiftly as possible – which tice, the implementation of this aspect of
would be defined as a safe third country the EU-Turkey statement has been very
for this purpose. Conversely, the EU would limited. By the end of January 2020, only
accept vulnerable persons from Turkey about 2,000 people had been transferred
through resettlement, ideally in corre- from Greece to Turkey since 2016 – a frac-
sponding numbers to the Syrians returned tion of the overall number of asylum seek-
from the Greek islands (“one-to-one mecha- ers on the Greek islands over the same
nism”). In the case that irregular crossings period. The largest group of returnees was
over the Aegean were by-and-large stopped, comprised of Pakistanis, who have no pros-
Europe offered the prospect of further re- pect of protection, either in the EU or in
settlements from Turkey. The EU also com- Turkey. At the same time, the EU received
mitted to revitalising accession talks with more than 25,000 Syrians from Turkey
Ankara to continue work on deepening who were particularly in need of protec-
the customs union and accelerating nego- tion. Despite the larger number of people,
tiations on visa liberalisation for Turkish this was less than half of the quota origi-
citizens. nally planned. In light of this, one can
question whether the one-to-one mecha-
nism of the EU-Turkey statement made
Implementation of the Statement a significant and lasting impact on the
number of irregular landings on the Greek
To date, most of the pledged €6 billion in islands. Weather conditions, the improved
European financial support has been spent humanitarian situation in Turkey, and
on education, health, and humanitarian increased border controls on the so-called
aid. According to the EU Commission, con- Western Balkan route could also be respon-
tracts for services worth €4.7 billion have sible for the rapid and steep reduction in
been signed, of which €3.2 billion has sea crossings, which was already apparent
already been paid out. Financial resources in the winter of 2015/2016. More recently,
have been approved, mainly for projects the inhumane reception and living con-
implemented by UN agencies, international ditions on the Greek islands acted as a
financial organisations, and some NGOs. A standalone deterrent factor.
SWP Comment 16
April 2020
5Other elements of the EU-Turkey state- riations to Turkey as well as of refugees
ment, such as accelerated visa liberalisa- who are directly resettled from Turkey by
tion, could not – and cannot – be im- EU member states. In conclusion, the pact
plemented due to the domestic political as a whole is not working.
situation in Turkey since the attempted Based on this assessment, one may rec-
coup of July 2016. Only the deepening of ommend smaller or fundamental reforms
the customs union still seems feasible from to the cooperation format with Turkey over
a technical point of view. However, eco- migration control and border security. Very
nomic conditions have changed consider- far-reaching proposals are coming from the
ably in the meantime, adding to general European Stability Initiative (ESI), which sees
problems with regard to the rule of law itself as the initiator of the EU-Turkey state-
in Turkey. ment. The ESI advocates a structural over-
Of the nine points contained in the state- haul and renewal, an “EU-Turkey statement
ment, only the European pledge of finan- 2.0” with short- and medium-term measures.
cial aid was ultimately kept – though with The most urgent task would be to end the
considerable delays. The EU can point out humanitarian emergency on the Greek
that the vast majority of the financial re- islands by immediately emptying the camps
sources have been allocated, and funds that while also preventing a new humanitarian
have not yet been disbursed will eventually catastrophe on the Greek mainland.
all be paid out in the context of longer-term To achieve such a transformation of the
projects. Nevertheless, Turkey can legiti- current status quo, Greek authorities would
mately call for more resources and speedy have to prioritise two measures. First, new
disbursements to avoid shortfalls, as the and sufficient reception centres and shelters
first projects providing direct support for would have to replace the existing camps,
Syrian families will come to an end in which need to be closed. Second, the Greek
autumn 2020. The EU has not yet been asylum system should undergo deep reform
able to agree internally on new funds for to enable asylum procedures to be com-
Turkey, not least because the negotiations pleted within two months, including the
on the next EU multiannual financial frame- appealing of any decisions. Greece would
work (2021–2027) have proven to be very need the support of other EU countries in
difficult so far. The Corona crisis is likely planning and implementing such a system.
to exacerbate the situation and push inter- According to the proposals of the ESI, newly
national humanitarian aid to the back- arrived Syrians to Greece would be sent
burner, as EU member states are now ur- back to Turkey without an individual asy-
gently adopting comprehensive emergency lum procedure. This would have to be
and supplementary budgets to contain the accompanied by a review mechanism with
economic damage at home. Ankara to ensure that they are treated in
Turkey in accordance with international
standards. It is argued that a “statement
Reform Proposals for the 2.0” could stabilise the situation in the
EU-Turkey Statement Aegean and reduce the number of irregular
entries into Greece. In return, the EU states
The starting point for any reform is to should keep their promise to resettle more
evaluate the deficits of the existing frame- refugees directly from Turkey. This would
work for cooperation under the EU-Turkey have to be on a larger scale than in the
statement. The criticisms range from the past, for example 50,000 people within the
lack of monitoring mechanisms, the miser- first year. Moreover, an additional €6 bil-
able reception conditions on the Greek lion should be provided to Turkey for its
islands, the insufficient quality and exces- continuing efforts to host and integrate
sively long duration of asylum procedures Syrian refugees, whose numbers are likely
in Greece, to insufficient numbers of repat- to rise further over the coming years.
SWP Comment 16
April 2020
6Some of these reform proposals are in- minors, which still has to be put into prac-
deed essential. Especially in light of the tice. Public health risks will be even less
Covid-19 crisis, it has become truly urgent manageable if the situation in the camps
to empty the camps on the islands. It would remains unaddressed. For rejected asylum
also be beneficial to support Greece in pro- seekers, EU-funded programmes for volun-
cessing asylum applications, to undertake tary return are conceivable, as far as the
more resettlements from mainland Greece situation in the country of origin permits it.
to other EU states, and to make further Effective support for Greece will also be a
financial contributions to Turkey. Yet, it precondition for the fundamental reform
makes little sense to continue the one-to- of the Common European Asylum System,
one mechanism of repatriation and resettle- which will be proposed by the EU Commis-
ment. Even if the ESI acknowledges prob- sion in the “Pact on Migration and Asylum”
lems with this provision of the EU-Turkey later this spring. This structural endeavour
statement, its reform proposal still assumes is more important than ever. The increas-
that any irregular migrant who arrives in ingly widespread suspension of the right to
Greece after the entry into force of a new asylum and the full closure of international
edition of the statement could be returned borders during the Corona crisis must not
to Turkey. However, experience to date be accepted as the new normal.
shows that the preconditions for consider- Second, it is in Europe’s interest to be-
ably increasing the number of returns come more involved in Syria’s neighbour-
to Turkey are too high. This component ing states. The material and social costs that
should therefore be dispensed within any the main host countries for Syrian refugees
future cooperation framework between (Turkey: 3.6 million; Lebanon: 900,000;
the EU and Turkey. Jordan: 650,000; Iraq: 250,000) have accrued
need to be compensated more systematically.
Europe thus should prevent premature
A Comprehensive Approach returns from these countries to Syria, which
remains highly insecure. Early returns
It is clearly not sufficient to only reform the would also completely overload the aid
EU-Turkey statement. Rather, Europe needs organisations working in Syria. Instead,
to pursue a more comprehensive approach Europeans should invest much more deci-
to deal with the challenges. First and fore- sively than they have so far in the human
most, the EU must support Greece more capital of the Syrian population within the
decisively. The perpetual state of emergency diaspora. According to the United Nations
on the islands should be ended as soon as Children’s Fund, about half of all Syrian
possible by means of evacuations to the children in the country itself as well as in
mainland. Greece has currently more than neighbouring countries currently do not
90,000 open asylum procedures. These attend school. Regardless of whether refu-
cases cannot be processed adequately with- gees return to Syria or remain permanently
out more substantial EU assistance. Earlier in the respective host countries, adequate
this year, the European Asylum Support education, training, and services are essen-
Office announced that it intends to double tial to ensure that they do not remain de-
the number of officials seconded to Greece pendent on aid in the long term. With this
to more than 1,000 this year. This promise priority in mind, the EU should also deepen
needs to be fulfilled, despite the unexpected its dialogue with host countries.
constraints of the Corona crisis. In parallel, Third, it is in Europe’s interest to make a
programmes for resettlement to other mem- rapid and substantial contribution towards
ber states are urgently needed for recog- alleviating the plight of refugees in the
nised refugees. This should build on the embattled Idlib province and preventing
first voluntary initiative by seven EU mem- Covid-19 from spreading among the IDP
ber states to accept 1,600 unaccompanied population. That is why the Europeans –
SWP Comment 16
April 2020
7in cooperation with UNHCR, the World
Health Organisation, the World Food Pro-
gramme, international NGOs, and Tur-
key – should immediately provide aid and
emergency shelter for those who are forced
to camp in inhuman conditions near the
Turkish border. At the same time, Russia
must be pressured to ensure that cross-
border access for humanitarian aid is main-
tained after 10 July 2020, when the respec-
© Stiftung Wissenschaft tive Security Council resolution expires.
und Politik, 2020 Europeans should also exert efforts vis-à-vis
All rights reserved Moscow and Ankara to extend and con-
solidate the ceasefire in Idlib so that a
This Comment reflects
political compromise can be negotiated for
the authors’ views.
various points of contention (territorial
The online version of control, protection for the civilian popu-
this publication contains lation, dealing with armed fighters, etc.).
functioning links to other Fourth, in this context, it would make
SWP texts and other relevant
sense if Russia and Turkey committed to
sources.
creating and securing a safe zone for IDPs
SWP Comments are subject in the north of Idlib province. Europeans
to internal peer review, fact- should offer support for the establishment
checking and copy-editing. of such a zone, provided that certain mini-
For further information on mum conditions are guaranteed, for exam-
our quality control pro-
ple: the zone should be reserved for unarmed
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- civilians only; it should not become a base
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ for military operations; nor should it be
quality-management-for- used for the repatriation of refugees from
swp-publications/ Turkey. Military engagement by Europeans
or even NATO, as demanded by Ankara,
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
would be rejected by Moscow (as well as
Politik Damascus) and would not receive a UN
German Institute for Security Council mandate. It would there-
International and fore run the risk of further escalating the
Security Affairs situation instead of helping to stabilise it.
Nor should the Europeans provide diplo-
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin matic, financial, or military support for
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Turkey’s military operations and political
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 ambitions in northern Syria. Although
www.swp-berlin.org Turkey has a legitimate interest in securing
swp@swp-berlin.org
its border with Syria and fending off poten-
ISSN 1861-1761
tial attacks on its territory, its military
doi: 10.18449/2020C16 invasions and occupation of Syrian territory
are in clear breach of international law.
(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 22/2020)
Dr Sinem Adar is a researcher at the Center for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at the SWP. CATS is funded by Stiftung
Mercator and the German Federal Foreign Office. Dr Steffen Angenendt is Head of the Global Issues Division. Dr Muriel
Asseburg is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division. Dr Raphael Bossong is a researcher in the EU / Europe
Division. David Kipp is a researcher in the Global Issues Division and works in the project “Forced Displacement, Migration
and Development Cooperation”, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
SWP Comment 16
April 2020
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