Nord Stream 2 and the Energy Security Dilemma
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NO. 46 JULY 2021 Introduction Nord Stream 2 and the Energy Security Dilemma Opportunities, Options and Obstacles for a Grand Bargain Maria Shagina and Kirsten Westphal Washington and Berlin have settled their differences over the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. For the time being, this has halted the spiralling energy security dilemma. While Washington is sending a clear signal that constructive relations with Berlin are important, the German government is now called upon to implement a variety of measures. Still, the project remains a political issue. Kyiv and Warsaw have already signalled their opposition. A grand bargain that is not only bilaterally agreed upon but also involves Ukraine and commits Russia has not yet been achieved. Politically, the Biden administration and The bilateral agreement now revives US German government have reached a joint relations with Germany, while extraterrito- agreement. It will enable the completion of rial sanctions against Europeans remain an the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipe- option of last resort. The declaration makes line. Construction of the pipeline is to be clear that Washington and Berlin will work finished by the end of August. The first together constructively. Both begin by string is already complete, and less than assuring that they are prepared to impose 40 kilometres still need to be laid on new sanctions “should Russia attempt to the second string. The construction and use energy as a weapon or commit further welding work will be followed by pressure aggressive acts against Ukraine.” In such a tests on both strings, which will take an- case, Germany would lobby the EU accord- other two to three months. This means ingly. Both emphasise the energy security that, technically speaking, gas could flow of Ukraine and Central Europe, as well as through the pipeline as early as the end of the principles of EU regulation. Berlin also this year. The last open questions concern commits to the implementation of these the application of the amended EU gas principles with regard to Nord Stream 2. directive, the approval of an operating Furthermore, Germany pledges to apply all regime and technical certification. In the available leverage to extend gas transit eyes of many observers, the final decision- through Ukraine for up to ten years. Ger- making phase in the conflict over Nord many will contribute at least $175 million Stream 2 has now begun. to a Green Fund to support Ukraine’s
energy transformation and security. This long-term strategy of maintaining a
sum is expected to grow to at least $1 bil- 30 percent market share in the EU while
lion when including private sector capital. also backing the ‘Northern route’ from
Germany will provide additional funds of Bovanenkovo through the Baltic Sea into
$70 million for, among other things, the North-West Europe. This is the shortest
coal phase-out. In addition, as part of the route, with favourable and foreseeable
Climate and Energy Partnership, Germany transport conditions (at least along large
and the US will support energy transfor- parts of its non-regulated sections). It also
mation, infrastructure development and cuts less into Russia’s own rents and
resilience in Ukraine and Central and East- revenue streams than other routes.
ern Europe, including through the Three However, a negative downward spiral of
Seas Initiative. The agreement also men- self-fulfilling prophecies seemed to unfold
tions technological know-how, assistance in the summer of 2021. Nord Stream 2 has
with market regulation and Ukraine’s been drawn into a classic energy security
integration into the European power grid, dilemma, with all sides pursuing their secu-
for which EU funds will also be provided. rity interests and preparing for the worst.
Germany has faced a difficult predicament
(see SWP Comment 32/2021). A clash be-
Germany and EU Gas Market tween Russia and the US over the German
Developments gas market seemed inevitable.
The endgame saw more twists play into
The compartmentalisation of gas relations the hands of Russia’s Gazprom. Over the
with Russia has been a long-standing course of the first half of 2021, security of
paradigm in Germany that is backed by a supply within the EU gas market increas-
market-based approach and the wish to ingly caused headaches as it turned from an
‘de-politicise’ the pipeline. The German over-supplied gas market into a tight mar-
government has viewed the project through ket. Ten years of relatively low gas prices
economic and regulatory lenses since it and the Covid-19-induced price slump in
started in 2015, as it shared the assessment 2020 led to a buyers’ market that was ex-
that Nord Stream 2 would improve flexi- pected to last beyond 2025. This favoured
bility and liquidity on the gas market. EU market competition and regulatory
In security and foreign policy circles, in- strength. But recently this has changed, as
cluding those of the coalition parties, there the market tightens and the pendulum of
are major reservations about the project. market power swings toward suppliers.
Here, calls have become more pronounced Gas supplies are constrained as a number
to enact a moratorium on the project to of factors converge. Cold temperatures from
achieve a consensus in the EU and to assess February through May 2021 prolonged the
the project’s impacts on the security situa- heating season in Germany and elsewhere.
tion and transatlantic relations. None- Yet, LNG was redirected to Asia as its price
theless, the legal and economic conditions was 80 percent higher than in the EU, or
have already been set. it did not even reach Europe as US LNG
The market regime has favoured EU exports plunged by two-thirds in February
consumers over the past decade, but it has 2021. This emptied European gas storage
not changed the fact that three large pipe- facilities. The demand for LNG surged in
line suppliers – Russia, Norway and Asia, and heat waves in North America re-
Algeria – dominate the market or that sulted in greater energy demand. European
Europe is the market of last resort for liqui- gas production has continuously decreased
fied natural gas (LNG). In today’s tight over the past few years, and Norway’s
market, Russia’s Gazprom is exploring its deliveries were lessened due to mainte-
market position, not only in order to profit nance that had been postponed during the
from high prices, but also to pursue its pandemic. The spot market prices and
SWP Comment 46
July 2021
2prices for forward contracts for next winter nivka interconnection points. It is unclear
surged to more than €30/MWh by the end why the additional firm volumes have been
of June 2021, or $11 per mmbtu, compared limited to that amount since 2020 and the
to $2 per mmbtu in June 2020, with day- interruptible capacities are not offered at
ahead prices jumping to €37.75/MWh in a discounted rate like they usually are. A
early July in Germany. Prices surpassed shame and blame game between Moscow
levels unseen since 2008. All in all, the and Kyiv has commenced. In any case,
second quarter of 2021 raised concerns for 2 bcm less gas arrived from Russia in July
the upcoming winter. 2021 due to maintenance work on Yamal
Thus, close attention has been paid to from 6 to 10 July and on Nord Stream 1
Gazprom’s supplies. While observers report from 13 to 23 July.
that the company has delivered almost 20 Besides, Gazprom has not booked annual
percent less than in 2019 (pre-Covid), the capacities through Poland’s Yamal, sug-
company itself reports record sales to gesting that it aims to have Nord Stream 2
Europe. In this respect, the market reacted go online soon. Moreover, Germany’s gas
nervously this summer to Gazprom’s ab- storage facilities are only at 50 percent com-
stention to book additional interruptive pared to previous years. The large storage
transport capacity. facilities operated by Gazprom’s subsidiary
Part of the December 30, 2019 trilateral Astora in Rehden and Jemgum in Germany
political agreement between Russia, and in Haidach in Austria, are very empty
Ukraine and the EU, which prevented a gas compared to previous years. Besides, stored
conflict at the last minute, is also an agree- gas in these facilities has obviously been
ment between Gazprom and Naftogaz on used to fulfil delivery obligations over the
the organisation of gas transit. Accordingly, summer. The fact that storage levels are
for a $7.2 billion payment from Gazprom, particularly low in the south will be an
Naftogaz books annual transport capacity early test for the new German market area,
for Russian gas at 65 billion cubic metres which will begin on 1 October 2021.
yearly (bcm/y) for 2020 and 40 bcm/y for the The missing piece of the puzzle relates to
periods of 2021-2024. Capacity was reduced gas prices in Europe, which are at a 13-year
in the contract from 2021 onwards because high. Future gas prices for the winter are
it was assumed that Nord Stream 2 would either at the same level or slightly lower
be completed by 2020. However, this was than spot and summer prices (backwarda-
prevented by US sanctions. The ship-or-pay tion) at major trading hubs. The low stor-
agreement does not provide seasonal flexi- ages are a function of the non-existent
bility as it is calculated on a daily basis of summer-winter spread, as traders that are
178 million cubic metres per day (mcm/d) only eyeing optimisation of revenues (after
in 2020 and 110 mcm/d for 2021-2024. In a year of loss in 2020) may have little in-
addition, the Ukrainian Gas Transmission centive to prepare for security of supply out
System Operator (GTSOU) has offered 15 of their own pockets.
mcm/d of firm capacity since February 2021 There are no signs that Gazprom is not
for monthly bookings, which Gazprom has fulfilling its contractual obligations under
consistently booked since then. Yet, the long-term delivery contracts, but it seems
additional 63.7 mcm/d of interruptible unwilling to provide swing supplies. Given
capacity that has been offered by GTSOU the high prices, Gazprom stands to increase
since May 2021 has come into focus. its profits by 43 percent in 2021 compared
Although it was expected that Gazprom to 2020, all without increasing its volumes.
would book the latter in view of price Security of supply will become, as it
increases, this has not been the case. looks as of mid-July 2021, an issue this
According to GTSOU, the volumes are in autumn and winter. For the EU, LNG sup-
line with the interconnection agreement plies help to diversify, but they come with
with Gazprom for the Sudzha and Sokhra- a significant price tag and time lag. Strong
SWP Comment 46
July 2021
3demand for LNG in Asia is expected to last within a period of three months. According
into the next year. Extreme price spikes in to Energy Industry Act §4a, the BNetzA has
the winter could be a consequence, as Euro- four months, until 11 October 2021, to
pean storages usually have an important draft a decision and to send it to the Euro-
function in balancing the global market. pean Commission (EC) for an opinion. The
Asia does not have significant storage EC, in turn, has two months to draft an
facilities. In sum, many traders seem to be opinion with recommendations. The BNetzA
betting on Nord Stream 2 coming into then has another two months to publish its
operation by the end of the year. For them, decision and all related opinions and docu-
the pipeline will put Northwest Europe into ments. Given these timeframes for the regu-
a more comfortable supply position and latory process, it could take until February
will have a price dampening effect. 2022 for a first decision. Prior to this, the
In the end, the market has begun to Energy Supervisory Authority of the Federal
favour Russia. Russia already cut supplies State of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
during the 2014-15 winter season to pre- needs to approve commissioning. Moreover,
vent gas from flowing back to Ukraine, and the technical certification of the construct-
it could well be that Moscow will play its ed pipelines still needs to be completed.
trump card against Western Europe in the Originally, the Norwegian firm DNV GL was
conflict over the pipeline this autumn. responsible for this certification, but with-
Voices calling for a moratorium have been drew when facing the risk of US sanctions
continuously raised in Germany, too. The in January 2021. It is unclear which compa-
country is facing elections on 26 September ny will complete the certification according
2021. The election programmes of the to international standards as well as those
liberal democrats (FDP) and the Greens call of the German Association for Gas and
for a moratorium and end to the project, Water (DVGW).
the programmes of the social democrats Nord Stream 2 AG is still litigating three
(SPD) and the conservatives (CDU/CSU) make cases against the amendment of the EU’s
no mention of the pipeline. In any case, gas directive before the courts. Warsaw and
Germany’s future federal government may Kyiv, for their part, may also take legal
take a different position than the current action against the decision, as shown by ex-
one, which, however, will provisionally ample of OPAL, a Nord Stream 1 connecting
remain in office until the – possibly pro- pipeline. After the ruling of the European
tracted – coalition negotiations have been Court of Justice on 15 July 2021, the transit
concluded. Still, the administrative proce- flows through OPAL remain restricted
dures of the project are already underway. to 50 percent, limiting gas transit flows to
The amendment of the EU’s gas directive 12 bcm/y. Thus, legal disputes around the
in February 2019, was a move to ‘de-politi- pipeline will continue for some time, also
cise’ and have the issue dealt with by the depending on the EU’s stance and the EC’s
German administration. Yet, this sets into issued opinion. The most important ques-
motion a trajectory with no obvious room tion here is related to the actual physical
for a backstop, let alone a moratorium. On gas flows of Nord Stream 2 through Ger-
11 June 2021, Nord Stream 2 AG – the many’s coastal waters, to which the
project developer – applied to the German amended gas directive must be applied. It
Regulatory Authority (BNetzA) for a certi- remains unclear whether, when and how
fication as an independent transmission much gas will flow, and under which (pre-
system operator. This was done under liminary) conditions. Tight market condi-
German Energy Act §4b. The German Fed- tions may come into play favouring Nord
eral Ministry for Economics and Energy Stream 2’s speedy technical certification
must submit its assessment as to whether and (preliminary) operation.
granting the certification would jeopardise Given the promotion of “molecules of
the energy security of Germany or the EU freedom” under the Trump administration,
SWP Comment 46
July 2021
4the Kremlin might gladly be willing to clear that the Biden administration was
show that “energy security can only be reluctant to use extraterritorial sanctions
achieved in close partnership with Russia”. against its allies as it prioritised the revival
Berlin is in a difficult position as it can of the transatlantic relationship with
neither rely on Moscow’s cooperative Germany. As part of the PEESA sanctions
approach in gas matters nor assume that package, the US targeted Russian pipe-
it will be easy to accommodate Ukraine’s laying vessels but spared European entities
interests to the largest extent possible, a involved in the project. It was later revealed
precondition set by the US. that the US consulted with Ukraine on this
decision and did not face any objections.
The Ukrainian officials were certain that US
Ukraine’s Position on a sanctions would suffice to block the pipe-
Grand Bargain line, prompting Kyiv to postpone any
serious elaboration to contingency plans.
From the very beginning, Ukraine was an Ukraine’s reading of the situation
opponent of the controversial Nord Stream changed from overly optimistic to disap-
2 pipeline. Launched in 2015, the project pointed when the Biden administration de-
raised legitimate concerns with respect to cided to waive sanctions on Nord Stream 2
its compatibility with EU sanctions intro- AG and its CEO Matthias Warnig. This deci-
duced after Russia’s annexation of Crimea sion caught Ukraine by surprise, not least
in 2014. But it was only in 2019 when due to the fact that, unlike before, Kyiv was
Kyiv began to actively lobby against Nord not consulted. In an interview on the affair,
Stream 2 in Washington and Brussels. De- President Zelensky expressed resentment
spite the topsy-turvy US-Ukrainian relation- and disillusionment: “Unfortunately, [the
ship under the Trump presidency and the decision] is definitely not aimed at sup-
lack of coordination within Ukraine, Kyiv porting Ukraine. […] I truly thought that
managed to lobby for the introduction of when it came to Nord Stream 2, the United
US sanctions under the Protecting Europe’s States remained the last standing outpost,
Energy Security Act (PEESA) in December so to say.” Zelensky claimed that Biden
2019. Ukrainian officials celebrated the offered him “direct signals” that the pipe-
interim victory, as construction on the pipe- line would be blocked. Despite the US’s
line was suspended for a year and a half. bitter move, Kyiv still counts on Washing-
US sanctions were also instrumental in ton – this time on strong bipartisan sup-
Naftogaz’s signing of the gas transit agree- port in Congress – to halt the construction
ment with Gazprom for the 2020-2024 and operation of the pipeline.
period. Since then, Ukraine’s current strategy
With the election of the Biden adminis- regarding Nord Stream 2 remains largely
tration, Ukraine had high hopes that the unchanged: opposing the pipeline and
US would apply all sanctions powers at its lobbying for more US sanctions while
disposal to halt the construction of the working on a contingency plan in the back-
pipeline. There was an expectation that, ground. Svitlana Zalishchuk, the newly
unlike Trump, Biden would be consistent appointed international affairs advisor to
in his pushback against Russia and its Naftogaz, reaffirmed that Ukraine’s last
diversification pipeline. Kyiv read the US’ hope to stop the pipeline lies in Washing-
statements about Nord Stream 2 being “a ton and not in Berlin. Kyiv hopes that US
bad deal for Europe” as a confirmation of Congress will increase pressure on the
its beliefs that Washington would not allow Biden administration to impose more effec-
the project to move forward. Kyiv was slow tive sanctions, including those that work to
to come to the realisation that Biden fa- hinder the certification of the pipeline and
voured diplomacy over economic coercion repeal the waivers. In addition, Kyiv sees a
on the matter. By February 2021, it was new opportunity in fighting Nord Stream 2
SWP Comment 46
July 2021
5with the Global Magnitsky Act. The US ready to take legal action against Gazprom
Senate Foreign Relations Committee un- by way of international arbitration, at-
animously supported a bill to assess corrup- tempting to challenge Russia’s monopoly-
tion with regard to the Nord Stream 2 proj- like selling behaviour with regard to the
ect. The bill, still subject to full approval sale of Central Asian gas. Ensuring that
by Congress, envisages the introduction of Nord Stream 2 is complying with the EU’s
sanctions on entities involved in corrupt Third Energy Package is another part of
activities throughout the project. Naftogaz Ukraine’s strategy to utilise market instru-
CEO Yuriy Vitrenko alluded that the sanc- ments to limit the impact of the Russian
tions could target Russian oligarchs such pipeline. The second option, which is
as Arkadiy Rotenberg and Gennadiy Tim- gaining traction in Kyiv, is to move gas
chenko, both of whom are the key sub- purchases to the Russian-Ukrainian border
contractors of Nord Stream 2, but already and allow European companies to book
sanctioned by the US. capacities directly via the Ukrainian gas
Ukraine’s strategic miscalculation of the transmission system. In Vitrenko’s view,
Biden administration’s priorities has left it this would be the best assurance for
in a bind. Banking on US sanctions left Ukraine that gas transit through the coun-
Ukraine truly unprepared for the eventuali- try remains guaranteed. Ukraine’s third
ty of a completed Nord Stream 2. Unsurpris- option is to capitalise on its vast gas stores
ingly, Kyiv has been totally opposed to the in times when the EU’s decarbonisation
idea of a grand bargain between Germany policy will require more underground stor-
and the US. For Ukraine, the issue of Nord age facilities. Finally, joining the Three Seas
Stream 2 has become an existential threat. Initiative could help Ukraine to enhance its
Its attention has shifted beyond the $1.5- energy connectivity with Central Europe
3 billion per year loss in gas-transit revenue and diminish the historical reliance on the
as it has now come to focus on security con- “East-West” axis.
cerns. Kyiv fears that once the construction From Ukraine’s point of view, opposing
of the pipeline is completed, Russia will the pipeline should go hand in hand with
be unconstrained in its ability to launch a preparing contingency plans. Both strate-
full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This line of gies are viewed as complementary. By con-
argumentation has not found support tinuing to oppose the project and lobby for
within Germany’s current government, more sanctions, Kyiv hopes to increase pres-
where it is perceived as speculation. sure on Russia, thus creating greater room
As the construction of Nord Stream 2 for manoeuvre with regard to its contin-
reaches its end, Kyiv has belatedly em- gency plans.
barked on its elaboration of a plan B. Public Having faced a bitter misunderstanding
discussions on the topic have revealed divi- with Berlin’s current government, Ukraine
sions between Ukrainian diplomats, policy- is putting its hopes in Germany’s federal
makers and experts: some argue that it is elections in September 2021. According to
in Ukraine’s best interest to take an active opinion polls, the Green Party is likely to
stance in the negotiations to secure better supersede the SPD, a strong supporter of
terms; others adamantly oppose a grand the pipeline, in a new government coali-
bargain, arguing that agreeing on a com- tion. The Greens have adamantly opposed
pensation package would be perceived as a Nord Stream 2 on environmental grounds
concession to Russia. and due to its negative security effects on
The discussed options for the plan B are Ukraine. This potential change in Germa-
wide-ranging and include market, legal ny’s political landscape makes Kyiv reluc-
and geo-economic instruments. Firstly, by tant to negotiate a compromise with the
leveraging EU energy market rules, Ukraine current government in Berlin. Kyiv is keen
seeks to challenge Russia’s monopolisation to postpone negotiations, hoping that the
of gas flows from Central Asia. Naftogaz is
SWP Comment 46
July 2021
6Greens, as a part of the new government, already objected the deal, citing insufficient
will stop the pipeline. security guarantees to limit the threats of
The announcement of the US-Germany Nord Stream 2. Albeit to no avail, Kyiv has
agreement confirmed Ukrainian fears that been seeking to shift the discussion to hard
the fate of the pipeline would be decided security issues such as Russian de-occupa-
without taking Ukraine’s interests to heart. tion of Ukrainian territories, discussion
As the deal was signed without Ukraine’s of energy in the Normandy format and
consent, Kyiv fears it is losing its voice in weapons deliveries. Agreeing to financial
the Nord Stream 2 debate. compensation is seen by Ukraine as un-
acceptable, as this could be conceived of as
a concession to Russia. Instead, Kyiv has
What’s Next? embarked on a strategy to directly engage
with the European Commission, effectively
While the US-Germany deal has been side-lining talks with Berlin. Ukraine has
signed, it is still far from a grand bargain. invoked Article 274 of the Ukraine-EU Asso-
A consensus in the EU has not yet been ciation Agreement, which stipulates that
achieved, and Brussels’s role goes well the parties shall consult or coordinate with
beyond issuing an opinion on the applica- each other over infrastructure develop-
tion of the Gas Directive. The EU has to join ments.
forces to integrate Ukraine into the Green The compromise around Nord Stream 2
Deal, as envisaged in the US-German agree- is not an end in itself, but a means to avoid
ment. Domestic political pressure in Wash- further escalation. Extending the current
ington, Berlin and Kyiv will make agreeing gas-transit agreement beyond 2024 seems to
on the ultimate deal a challenging task. It be something that Washington, Kyiv, Berlin
will require a great degree of flexibility for and Brussels can agree on, but it would
all sides, forcing concessions on important require Moscow’s cooperation. Chancellor
and sensitive issues and compelling the Merkel has already called President Putin,
parties to engage with Russia. This grand but Foreign Minister Lavrov has already
bargain also presupposes a conciliatory criticised Berlin’s commitments.
approach on the part of Russia. The devil lies in the details of quantities,
The agreement between the US and post-2024 tariffs and durations, but also
Germany has outlined a broad range of direct gas imports. From Germany’s per-
important long-term measures to offset the spective, more transparency is needed
negative impacts of Nord Stream 2. Kyiv, around the Ukrainian-Russian interconnec-
however, is focusing on short-term and tion agreement. Ukraine also needs to
concrete security guarantees. Seeing itself prove and establish itself as an attractive
trapped in a traditional energy security transport corridor, and storage and trading
dilemma makes it unlikely to accept the hub. From the Ukrainian point of view, the
long-term prospect of energy transforma- acceptable option would be to extend gas
tion, especially as security concerns and transit for the next 15 years at a capacity of
energy interests interact. In the short-term, 45-50 bcm/y with financial guarantees from
the effectiveness and credibility of the joint (non-Russian) European banks and com-
declaration will be tested. From Ukraine’s panies without resuming gas imports from
point of view, despite the promised sanc- Russia. A lower capacity would make it
tions in the case of Kremlin aggression, the technically difficult and expensive to use
concrete “shut-down” mechanism is miss- the gas transmission system and large stor-
ing. This, of course, is and remains legally age facilities, as well as to realise reverse
and economically almost impossible to flows and backhaul from Europe. However,
implement. if existing long-term contracts with South-
For Ukraine, accepting the deal as it Eastern Europe are still taken as a basis,
stands proves to be problematic. Ukraine the transport volumes are much lower, at
SWP Comment 46
July 2021
720 bcm/y. The creation of an international waivers and could potentially include new
consortium with the involvement of Euro- ones to resolve the remaining certification
pean and American companies in manag- issue.
ing the Ukrainian gas transmission system In Germany, the federal elections in Sep-
is an attractive option solely for Ukraine tember are likely to lead to a new govern-
that lacked US-German agreement. Ger- ment coalition, with the Green party, a
many does not find this option appealing; fierce opponent of Nord Stream 2, being a
it questions the need to invest excessive strong contender. Still, regardless of the
funds into the Ukrainian gas transportation composition of the next government, Russia
system given the EU’s decarbonisation will remain a challenge. The situation may
© Stiftung Wissenschaft goals. Recent scandals involving Naftogaz’s call for less of an explicit “compartmentali-
und Politik, 2021 corporate governance add to scepticism sation of energy ties” and more for an im-
All rights reserved over Ukraine’s ability to conduct reform plicit “management of confrontation”. In
and modernise its transmission system. doing so, Germany may be able to use
This Comment reflects
For Germany, parts of the compromise energy affairs to ensure that its relations
the authors’ views.
seem evident: Ukraine will be integrated with Russia remain within certain parame-
The online version of into the European energy market, and it ters while balancing cooperation, confron-
this publication contains will become a partner in the energy transi- tation and competition with Russia in the
functioning links to other tion, e.g., for hydrogen. Ukraine would be neighbourhood. This will require a long-
SWP texts and other relevant
a partner in the Green Deal. For Ukraine, term strategy and the careful selection of
sources.
this is not part of the deal. Kyiv is keen on areas in which engagement with Russia
SWP Comments are subject partaking in the EU’s decarbonisation would be in Germany and the EU’s interests
to internal peer review, fact- plans, but it does not see European invest- (see SWP Comment 34/2021). Above all,
checking and copy-editing. ments in Ukraine’s green projects as miti- however, energy relations between Central
For further information on gating the threats emanating from Nord Europe, Eastern Europe and Ukraine must
our quality control pro-
Stream 2. contribute to European cohesion within the
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- As the US-Germany agreement has failed Green Deal. Here, the joint declaration by
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ to properly engage Ukraine, bipartisan Washington and Berlin could well point the
quality-management-for- opposition to the pipeline in US Congress way forward.
swp-publications/ will only rise. Members of US Congress
urged the Biden administration to take
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Ukraine’s security concerns into account
Politik when it came to Nord Stream 2, and im-
German Institute for plored him to reschedule Zelensky’s visit to
International and Washington. Planned for 30 August, the
Security Affairs visit will not allow Zelensky to seek support
in Congress due to a recess. In early June
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin 2021, a House of Representatives panel
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 adopted an amendment which would pre-
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 vent the Biden administration from waiving
www.swp-berlin.org congressionally mandated sanctions. In
swp@swp-berlin.org
parallel, Republican Senator Ted Cruz is
ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
withholding his confirmation of all 13 of
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 Biden’s nominees to key State Department
doi: 10.18449/2021C46 positions until the sanctions waivers are
reversed. The next PEESA sanctions report
(English version of is due on 17 August. The Biden adminis-
SWP-Aktuell 52/2021)
tration is expected to prolong the existing
Dr. Maria Shagina is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Eastern European Studies at the University of Zurich.
Dr. Kirsten Westphal is a Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 46
July 2021
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