THE TWO CANALS AND NATO'S WILD CARDS IN THE PONTO-BALTIC ISTHMUS
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THE TWO CANALS
AND NATO’S WILD CARDS
IN THE PONTO-BALTIC ISTHMUS
Adrian-Vasile POPA
PhD candidate, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest
The Russian Federation’s recent buildup of A2/AD forces in Crimea and
Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and
Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries.
Facing this challenging geostrategic context, two major infrastructure
developments ‒ Kanal Istanbul in case of the Black Sea, respectively Vistula
Spit canal in case of the Baltic Sea ‒ may represent a game changer for the
security environment in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus in the near future. This paper
discusses the Central and Eastern Europe countries driving narrative behind the
expected operationalisation of these two canals and outlines their potential
contribution to NATO’s enforcement of credible security guarantees in the
Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
Keywords: Baltic Sea, Kanal Istanbul, NATO, the Russian Federation, Vistula
Spit Canal.
No. 1/2020 64The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus is the hotspot where the
Russian Federation’s strategic Rimland clashes with NATO’s Eastern
flank. Indeed, this is in general terms the space whose domination is
the first key step for the ultimate world domination as referred to it
by both the British strategist Halford Mackinder – who initially called
it the geographical pivot of history1 and later Heartland2 – and the
American strategist Nicholas Spykman – who identified it as one of the The loss of
most important parts of his Rimland theory . 3 hegemonic
influence
The Great Power status cannot be fully-claimed by the Russian on Central
Federation unless it ensures its full-access to open seas. The loss of and Eastern
European
hegemonic influence on Central and Eastern European countries countries once
once they joined NATO was assumed by the Russian Federation as a they joined NATO
never-again compromise inherent in the process of transition from the was assumed
by the Russian
USSR. Further shrinking of its shores in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus could Federation as a
not be any more tolerated by the Russian Federation. Indeed, depicting never-again
compromise
the outcome of the Cold War as a victory for the Atlantists amid an inherent in
alleged betrayal of Mikhail Gorbachev that lead to the self-destruction the process of
of the tellurocratic power4, Aleksandr Dugin appraises Boris Eltsin’s transition from
the USSR.
decision of August 1999 to appoint Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister
of the Russian Federation5. Indeed, it was during Vladimir Putin’s
leadership when the Russian Federation strongly denied through
hardcore military interventions Ukraine and Georgia’s aspirations for
NATO membership.
1
Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographic Journal XXIII, no. 4
(1904), pp. 421-437.
2
Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1919,
pp. 92-95.
3
Nicholas John Spykman, “Frontiers, Security and International Organization”, Geographical
Review 32, no. 3, 1942, pp. 441-442.
4
Aleksandr Dugin, Last War of the World-Island, London: Arktos Media Ltd., 2015, pp. 38-40.
5
Ibid, p. 70.
65 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYAdrian-Vasile POPA
The following lines are going to discuss both the Russian Federation’s
re-emergence as a potential threat in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus and
the Central and Eastern European countries driving narrative behind
the expected operationalisation of two major infrastructure
developments – Kanal Istanbul in the case of the Black Sea, respectively
Vistula Spit canal in the case of the Baltic Sea – that may ultimately
represent NATO’s wild cards for enforcing credible security guarantees
in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S RE-EMERGENCE
AS A POTENTIAL THREAT IN THE PONTO-BALTIC ISTHMUS
Over the
The Russian Federation’s re-emergence as a potential threat is
centuries
to date, the coupled nowadays with an increasing confronting rhetoric comprising
geostrategic allegations of airspace violations6 and even incidents limiting the
importance
of the Black freedom of navigation7 in the Black and Baltic Seas. This might not
Sea has been be a surprise though for those who have thoroughly followed the
based on the
role that this
geostrategic evolutions in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
region played On the one hand, the role of the Black Sea as the Southern
simultaneously part of both the Russian Federation’s strategic Rimland and NATO’s
as a ‘connecting
bridge’ and Eastern flank is modeled by the interests pursued in this regional
‘border’ security complex by the Great Powers. Over the centuries to date, the
between former
powers and geostrategic importance of the Black Sea has been based on the role
empires and as that this region played simultaneously as a ‘connecting bridge’ and
a ‘buffer’ and
‘border’ between former powers and empires and as a ‘buffer’ and
‘transit’ zone
between Europe ‘transit’ zone between Europe and Asia8.
and Asia.
6
See The Moscow Times, Russia Says It Intercepted U.S., Swedish Spy Jets Over Baltic Sea,
11 June 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/06/11/russia-says-it-intercepted-
us-swedish-spy-jets-over-baltic-sea-a65956, retrieved on 20 June 2019; Radio Free Europe,
Estonia Says Russian Plane Again Violates Airspace, 21 June 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/
estonia-russian-plane-violates-airspace/29310815.html, retrieved on 22 June 2019.
7
See BBC, Russia-Ukraine Tensions Rise after Kerch Strait Ship Capture, 26 November 2018,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46340283, retrieved on 18 June 2019; David B.
Larter, Russian military ‘harassed’ US-flagged merchant ship in the Baltic ahead of exercises,
Defence News, 27 June 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/06/27/russian-
military-harassed-us-flagged-merchant-ship-in-the-baltic-ahead-of-exercises/, retrieved on
18 June 2019.
8
George Cristian Maior, Noul aliat. Regândirea politicii de apărare a României la începutul
secolului XXI, 2nd edition, Editura RAO, București, 2013, p. 73.
No. 1/2020 66The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
In the twentieth century, the Euro-Atlantic thalassocratic powers
referred to the Black Sea as almost a ‘Russian lake’, being a genuine
power projection platform for the Soviet naval forces into the
ROMANIAN
Mediterranean Sea9. However, the disintegration of the USSR has MILITARY
altered the Black Sea power relations as emerging states have THINKING
diminished the shore area of the newly-formed Russian Federation
and further oriented their foreign policy towards better relations with
the West.
The Wider Black Sea Region evolved into a key-component of the
Euro-Atlantic strategic defence. In this sense, while NATO formed and
strengthened the Southern part of its Eastern flank, the United States
multiplied its military bases in the Wider Black Sea Region by using the
infrastructure of the riparian allies and partners ‒ for example, since
Having been
the Cold War in Turkey ‒ Incirlik Air Base and Izmir Air Station; but also signed in 1936,
nowadays in Romania ‒ Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, Babadag training the Montreux
Convention sets
base, Smârdan training area, Cincu training area and the AEGIS Ashore
the navigation
missile defence facility in Deveselu; Bulgaria – Aytos Logistics Center, rules through
Novo Selo Range, Bezmer Air Base and Graf Ignatievo Air Base; Ukraine the Straits for
both merchant
- Ochakov Naval Base; and Georgia ‒ a potential joint development of vessels and
Vaziani military aerodrome. warships in time
of peace and in
Overall, probably the most important position in terms of security
time of war.
for the Wider Black Sea Region remains the Bosphorus-Dardanelles
system, which facilitates sea-going navigation to the Planetary Ocean.
Having been signed in 1936, the Montreux Convention sets the
navigation rules through the Straits for both merchant vessels
and warships in time of peace and in time of war10. The Montreux
Convention has established the Turkish control over the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles Straits and has limited in terms of tonnage and
stationing the naval presence of non-riparian states at the Black Sea.
However, the Russian Federation’s destabilising actions in the region,
culminating with the annexation of Crimea, transformed the Black
Sea into a two-hegemon regional security complex. Recent increase
9
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Marea tablă de șah, Editura Universul Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p. 48.
10
For full details regarding the provisions of the Montreux Convention, see League of Nations,
“Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, with Annexes and Protocol. Signed at
Montreux, July 20th, 1936”, Treaty Series CLXXHI, No. 4001-4032, pp. 213-241 (1936).
67 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYAdrian-Vasile POPA
in the US focus on the Wider Black Sea Region suggests its desire to
alter the current status quo by contesting the anachronic provisions
of the Montreux Convention, especially in terms of the access and
stationing in the Black Sea of warships belonging to the non-riparian states.
This potential development would fully-ensure the security guarantees
offered to its allies and partners in the region. The operationalisation of
Kanal Istanbul, the man-made canal sought to be completed by Ankara
in 2023 as a celebration of the centenary of the Turkish republic,
might be a chance for the alteration of the mare sui generis status
of the Black Sea as it would probably require the renegotiation of the
current provisions of the Montreux Convention.
On the other hand, representing the Northern part of both the
Russian Federation’s strategic Rimland and NATO’s Eastern flank,
The Baltic Sea, the Baltic Sea is also highly-important in terms of geostrategy.
as a potential As Michael Peck put it, in the Baltic region, “geography is not on NATO’s
area of Russian
influence, is side. The Baltic States are on Russia’s western border, near Russian
indissolubly bases, supplies and reinforcements, while NATO forces are mostly in
linked to the
Kaliningrad Western Europe and the United States (…) which means that NATO
enclave ‒ cannot count on relieving the Baltic nations before Russia had time to
located on its
entrench”11. In addition, the shallow waters and narrow straits of the
shores between
Poland and Baltic make it easy for the Russian Federation to lay mines and hard
Lithuania. for NATO to maneuver warships (…) making it impossible to support
the tiny Baltic states in case of a war12. Not ultimately, as Robbin Laird
argued, “the Russians with the advantage of having significant Russian
minorities in the Baltics (as a result of the dissolution of the USSR) can
play a probing game similar to Ukraine if they deem this necessary or
useful”13.
11
Michael Peck, Want to Stop Russia from Invading the Baltic States? Turn Poland Into a Military
Powerhouse, The National Interest, March 23, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/
want-stop-russia-invading-baltic-states-turn-poland-military-powerhouse-48692, retrieved
on 24 June 2019.
12
Sabine Siebold, Germany strengthens Baltic naval alliance to counter Russian buildup, Reuters,
October 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-baltic-military/germany-
strengthens-baltic-naval-alliance-to-counter-russian-buildup-idUSKCN1N0287, retrieved on
23 June 2019).
13
Robbin Laird, European Direct Defense: The Case of the Baltics, Second Line of Defence,
January 25, 2019, https://sldinfo.com/2019/01/european-direct-defense-the-case-of-the-
baltics/, retrieved on 23 June 2019.
No. 1/2020 68The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
The Baltic Sea, as a potential area of Russian influence, is indissolubly
linked to the Kaliningrad enclave ‒ located on its shores between
Poland and Lithuania. Over time, Kaliningrad was a strategically
ROMANIAN
important area, with the Russian fleet stationing in this area from MILITARY
where an offensive against the West could be launched anytime14. THINKING
The Kaliningrad enclave holds currently the Russian Federation’s only
uncontested European maritime port that does not freeze in winter
– except for the Port of Sevastopol whose annexation by the Russian
Federation is highly-disputed – allowing it to keep its borders secured.
After the United States announced that elements of its missile defence
shield will be installed near Kaliningrad, the Russian Federation
Poland ‒ NATO’s
has endowed its Baltic fleet with high-tech capabilities15. Indeed, the main defence
mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might be questioned by the pillar in the
Northern part
Russian Federation in the near future. In this sense, there is no surprise of the Eastern
that this year’s Baltic Operations naval drill headed by the US reborn flank – proved
2nd Fleet, with some exercises being staged off the coast of Kalinigrad16, that is ready to
complement the
was counter-maneuvered by the Russian Federation through a similar Alliance’s efforts
training operation in the area17. by conducting
national security
As a consequence, only through a strengthened presence at the projects aimed
Baltic Sea could NATO at least balance potential Russian aggressions at strengthening
its position in
while fully-ensuring the security guarantees offered to its members. relation with
Indeed, the 2016 Warsaw summit represented a turning point the Russian
Federation.
in the perception of NATO vis-à-vis the defence of its members
at the Baltic Sea. As Iulia Joja and Octavian Manea remarked,
“though in the aftermath of the Crimea annexation the Alliance
promised to increase readiness in Europe and consolidate defense on
the Eastern flank, the 2016 Warsaw focused only on the Baltic Sea.
14
Alexander Diener and Joshua Hagen, “Geopolitics of the Kaliningrad Exclave and Enclave.
Russian and EU Perspective”, Eurasian Geography and Economics 52, no. 4 (July 2011), p. 574.
15
BBC, Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers NATO, 22 November 2016, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38070201, retrieved on 22 June 2019.
16
Carlos Munoz, U.S. Navy Sends Message to Russia with 2nd Fleet’s Baltic Operations,
The Washington Times, 22 May 2019,https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/
may/22/navy-2nd-fleet-sends-message-russia-baltops-drill/, retrieved on 24 June 2019.
17
Alexander Prokopenko and Roman Goncharenko, NATO and Russia: Maneuvers and
Countermaneuvers in the Baltic Sea, Deutsche Welle, 14 June 2019 https://www.dw.com/en/
nato-and-russia-maneuvers-and-countermaneuvers-in-the-baltic-sea/a-49188875, retrieved
on 24 June 2019.
69 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYAdrian-Vasile POPA
The differentiation between the Northern (Baltic Sea) and the Southern
part (Black Sea) of the Eastern flank was conceptualised as ‘enhanced’
versus ‘tailored’ forward presence and translated into four battalions
of Western combat troops on the ground and the continuous rotational
presence in the North, while only training and staff units, no Western
framework nations and intermittent rotational presence in the South”18.
In addition, Poland ‒ NATO’s main defence pillar in the Northern part
of the Eastern flank – proved that is ready to complement the Alliance’s
efforts by conducting national security projects aimed at strengthening
its position in relation with the Russian Federation. Indeed, after
the 2015 inauguration of the liquefied natural gas plant in Swinoujscie19,
four more major projects are expected to be operationalised on the
NATO’s Eastern
flank countries
Polish territory in this respect in the near future – i.e. the Baltic Pipe
cannot wait infrastructure project20, Vistula Spit canal21, the Central Transport Hub22
for the ‘great
and the American military base known as Fort Trump23.
game’ between
the West and Overall, facing the aforementioned prospective challenging
the Russian
geostrategic context in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, NATO’s Eastern flank
Federation
to reach an countries cannot wait for the ‘great game’ between the West and the
outcome, but
Russian Federation to reach an outcome, but they rather are meant
they rather are
meant to act pro-actively in order to ensure their security and prosperity.
to act pro-
actively in order
to ensure their
security and
prosperity. 18
Iulia Joja and Octavian Manea, 2018 NATO Summit: Finally a Focus on the Black Sea?, Real Clear
Defense, 11 July 2018, https://www. realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/11/2018_nato_
summit_finally_a_focus_on_the_ black_sea_113596.html, retrieved on 25 June 2019.
19
See Radio Poland, Świnoujście gas terminal officially opened, 12 October 2015, http://www.
thenews.pl/1/12/Artykul/224582,Swinoujscie-gas-terminal-officially-opened, retrieved on
25 June 2019.
20
See Natalia Konarzewska, “Baltic Pipe to Cut Poland’s Gas Dependence on Russia”, Eurasia
Daily Monitor 16, no. 69 (May 2019).
21
See The Telegraph, “Poland to build canal in order to avoid ships passing through Russian
waters”, 13 October 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/13/poland-to-build-
canal-in-order-to-avoid-ships-passing-through-ru/, retrieved on 25 June 2019.
22
See Poland In, Central Transport Hub to include 1,600km of new railway lines, 25 March 2019,
https://polandin.com/41899932/central-transport-hub-to-include-1600km-of-new-railway-
lines, retrieved on 25 June 2019.
23
See William J. Hennigan, Fort Trump? The Pentagon Takes a Step Toward Establishing Base in
Poland, Time, 14 March 2019, https://time.com/5551061/poland-military-base-fort-trump/,
retrieved on 25 June 2019).
No. 1/2020 70The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
KANAL ISTANBUL AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION
TO NATO
The official argument for the construction of this canal of about 50
ROMANIAN
km in length running parallel to the Bosphorus is to divert the critical MILITARY
THINKING
volume of the maritime traffic from the Straits that have become some
of the world’s busiest choke points. Apart from being an initiative
directed to ensure the safety of navigation – the Straits are notorious
for maritime accidents as over 140 occurred since 200624 –, Kanal
Istabul would allow the Turkish authorities to charge the shippers
a transit fee for crossing it, a limited provision in this sense being
available nowadays to Turkey when managing the Bosphorus and the First, the Turkish
authorities
Dardanelles Straits. might not
Turkey has not adopted yet an official position regarding the introduce Kanal
Istanbul under
inclusion of Kanal Istanbul under the provisions of the Montreux the provisions
Convention. As a consequence, two options can be considered in of the Montreux
the case of Kanal Istanbul when taking into account its potential for Convention.
As a
the emergence of a NATO wild card for enforcing credible security consequence,
guarantees at the Black Sea. in this case the
deployment of
First, the Turkish authorities might not introduce Kanal Istanbul naval assets
under the provisions of the Montreux Convention. In this sense, Binali in the Black
Sea by NATO
Yıldırım, the last holder of the position of Turkish Prime Minister until
non-riparian
the recent government system changes in Turkey from parliamentary states would
to executive presidency, declared in January 2018 that Kanal Istanbul be committed
only to the
would not be subject to the Montreux Convention25. As a consequence, jurisdiction
in this case the deployment of naval assets in the Black Sea by NATO imposed by
Turkey.
non-riparian states would be committed only to the jurisdiction
imposed by Turkey and not to a binding international agreement
as of now. Not ultimately, this strategic option would allow NATO’s
enforcement of credible security guarantees at the Black Sea through
a permanent fleet. However, the crystallisation of this option is limited
24
Mehmet Ogutcu, Revising the Montreux Convention, Hurriyet Daily News, 12 April 2018,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/mehmet-ogutcu/revising-the-montreux-
convention-130148, retrieved on 20 June 2019.
25
Apud Helene Franchineau, How Istanbul’s man-made canal project could trigger an arms
race in the Black Sea – and why China is watching closely, The South China Morning Post,
3 June 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2149025/how-istanbuls-
man-made-canal-project-could-trigger-arms-race-black, retrieved on 20 June 2019.
71 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYAdrian-Vasile POPA
by the expected vehement opposition of the Russian Federation and
consequently, it ultimately relies on the evolution of the relations
between Turkey and the Russian Federation on one side and between
Turkey and the US on the other side.
Second, Turkey might introduce Kanal Istanbul under the provisions
of the Montreux Convention. In this sense, the operationalisation
of Kanal Istanbul may trigger all the other Black Sea riparian states
to constrain Turkey in order to accept consultations over the legal
system of this infrastructure project because as of now the Straits
are the only maritime routes to the world’s oceans available to them.
As a consequence, in this case the deployment of naval assets in the
Even though Black Sea by NATO non-riparian states would be decided upon the
nowadays
Turkey has negotiation on the new provisions of the Montreux Convention, to
some of its best beconducted most probably by its original signatories26. Not ultimately,
relations with
the Russian this strategic option would probably maintain the current operational
Federation, a limits imposed by the Montreux Convention in case of the vessels of
look into the
recent history non-riparian states. However, the crystallization of this option is limited
can show by the expected US determination to alter the current status quo and
that Turkey’s
national security consequently, it also ultimately relies on the evolution of the relations
can be highly- between Turkey and the Russian Federation on one side and between
affected if found
unprepared in Turkey and the US on the other side.
assuring its own Even though nowadays Turkey has some of its best relations with
security.
the Russian Federation, a look into the recent history can show that
Turkey’s national security can be highly-affected if found unprepared
in assuring its own security. The Turkish Straits crisis is such an episode.
Turkey had attempted to remain neutral during the Second World War,
but it was forced – under the pressure of the Soviet Union’s request to
impose discriminatory transit regulations through the Straits – to call
for US protection and NATO membership after the end of the WWII.
A more recent episode happened on 6 December 2015, amid tensions
between Ankara and Moscow as a result of the 2015 Russian Su-24
shutdown by Turkey, after footage emerged of a serviceman aboard
the Russian Federation’s Caesar Kunikov landing ship apparently
26
Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia (seat inherited by Serbia),
Turkey, UK and USSR (seat inherited by the Russian Federation).
No. 1/2020 72The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
aiming a surface-to-air missile launcher towards Turkey’s largest city
Istanbul while crossing Bosphorus27 .
Coming back to the present, while the impact of the
operationalisation of Kanal Istanbul on the security environment in the ROMANIAN
MILITARY
Wider Black Sea Region is still awaiting its results, Turkey’s cautiousness THINKING
in terms of assuming a legal status for this prospective project might
be a sign that the die has not been cast yet in Istanbul. Indeed, as
Toucas argued, “if it wants to remain a leading stakeholder in the
region, Ankara will have to strengthen ties with Romania and Bulgaria
(…) Only then would Turkey be able to talk to Russia as an equal and Vistula Spit
canal – which
positively use its peculiar relationship with Moscow as an asset to will connect the
stabilize the region”28. Overall, as Asim Suleymanov pointed out, by Baltic Sea to the
Vistula Lagoon
the end of construction of Kanal Istanbul, everything will depend on
bypassing
the leadership of Turkey29 . the Russian
Federation’s
VISTULA SPIT CANAL AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION territorial
waters – is
TO NATO going to allow
Despite the Baltic Sea is arguably the world’s most heavily regulated ships to reach
directly the
sea area30, this situation might change in the near future. In this sense, Polish port of
a potential trigger might be represented by the operationalisation of Elblag without
the compulsory
Poland’s intention to continue the construction of Vistula Spit canal.
as of now access
Authorised by the Polish Parliament in 2017 and announced of the Vistula
officially to be started in February 2019, Vistula Spit canal – which will Lagoon through
the Russian port
connect the Baltic Sea to the Vistula Lagoon bypassing the Russian of Baltiysk ‒ the
Federation’s territorial waters – is going to allow ships to reach main naval base
directly the Polish port of Elblag without the compulsory as of now of the Russian
Federation’s
access of the Vistula Lagoon through the Russian port of Baltiysk ‒ Baltic Fleet ‒
located on the
shores of Pilava
27
Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey not planning to revise Montreux Convention on Bosphorus Strait.
rights, 8 December 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-not-planning-to-revise-
montreux-convention-on-bosphorus-rights-92226, retrieved on 18 June 2019.
28
Boris Toucas, Turkey Has No Allies in the Black Sea, Only Interests, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 13 February 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-has-no-allies-
black-sea-only-interests, retrieved on 18 June 2019.
29
Asim Suleymanov, Turkey is the Guarantor of Peace in the Black Sea region, Modern Diplomacy,
22 May 2019 https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/05/22/turkey-is-the-guarantor-of-peace-in-
the-black-sea-region/, retrieved on 18 June 2019.
30
Centrum Balticum, Baltic Sea Law, Baltic Area Legal Studies, 2019, http://www.centrumbalticum.
org/en/projects/baltic_area_legal_studies/baltic_sea_law, retrieved on 2 July 2019.
73 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYAdrian-Vasile POPA
the main naval base of the Russian Federation’s Baltic Fleet31 ‒ located
on the shores of Pilava Strait.
Tracing its original plan back to the 16th century, Vistula Spit canal
is intended to finally put an end to the Cold War era dispute originating
in the 1945 Polish-Soviet border agreement that is not fully respected
in the sense of allowing Polish merchant vessels to access freely
the Pilava Strait off the Vistula Lagoon in order to reach the port of
Elblag32. Even nowadays the access of Polish merchant vessels through
the Pilava Strait is allowed only upon paying navigation rights to the
Russian Federation meanwhile the stationing of the latter’s Baltic Fleet
in the nearby port of Baltiysk imposes a series of restrictions, including
Vistula Spit canal limited access for foreign-based vessels.
might represent Therefore, Poland’s decision to start the construction of Vistula
NATO’s wild card
for enforcing Spit canal resides in this country’s ambition to fully-ensure its own
credible security sovereignty. As Jaroslaw Kaczynski revealed, “Vistula Spit canal is
guarantees at
the Baltic Sea important for Poland’s status (…) in the end Poland needs to shed the
as it can offer last traces of being a dependent state. We need to show that times
the Alliance
an unhindered
Russia dictated what we could or not do on our territory are over”33.
access to the Indeed, Vistula Spit canal might serve a military end because Elblag
naval corridor
hosts NATO’s Multinational Division Northeast, which is in charge
linking the Baltic
Sea with Vistula of training the alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroups.
Lagoon. Consequently, Poland’s Former Army Commander General Miroslaw
Rozanski assumed it to be the underlying cause for the canal digging
project34.
Furthermore, Vistula Spit canal might represent NATO’s wild card
for enforcing credible security guarantees at the Baltic Sea as it can
31
Maritime Herald, Poland Began to Build a Canal Through the Baltic Spit, 19 February 2019,
http://www.maritimeherald.com/2019/poland-began-to-build-a-canal-through-the-baltic-
spit/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.
32
Pawel Pawłowski, New Road to the Baltic Sea, Warsaw Institute, 19 March 2019, https://
warsawinstitute.org/new-road-baltic-sea/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.
33
Matthew Day, ‘Days they dictate to us are over’: Poland vows to build Baltic Sea canal to bypass
Russia, The Telegraph, 25 September 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/25/
days-dictate-us-poland-vows-build-baltic-sea-canal-bypass-russia/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.
34
In Pawel Pawłowski, New Road to the Baltic Sea, Warsaw Institute, 19 March 2019, https://
warsawinstitute.org/new-road-baltic-sea/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.
No. 1/2020 74The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
offer the Alliance an unhindered access to the naval corridor linking
the Baltic Sea with Vistula Lagoon. However, the operationalisation
of this infrastructure project, according to its current parameters, offers
ROMANIAN
limited advantage to NATO as the low-water levels in the Vistula lagoon MILITARY
THINKING
maintained by the construction of the canal will definitely constitute
an impediment for the potential deployment of large warships in the
area35.
Not ultimately, the construction of Vistula Spit canal is facing strong
opposition from both the Russian Federation and various groups of
green activists: first, Moscow complains that it had not been consulted
over the canal and that the construction of this waterway threatens In the case of
Kanal Istanbul,
the ecology of the lagoon ; second, green activists organise protests
36
there are various
against the continuation of the aforementioned project, depicting it as actions that
can be taken by
an “illegal environmental hooliganism”37.
NATO members
Overall, despite the European Commission urged Polish authorities and partners in
order to ensure
to put a halt on all plans until a decision is reached at the European the strategic
level38, Warsaw offers assurances that Vistula Spit canal will be advantage
that can be
operationalised as this project is a matter of national security”39. conferred to the
As a consequence, Pawel Pawlowski’s remark on the yet unknown Alliance by the
operationalisation
fate of Vistula Spit canal seems to offer the most-feasible prediction: of the
fortune may perhaps favor the brave40. aforementioned
infrastructure
project.
35
Stratfor, Poland: Warsaw Hopes to Increase Its Autonomy with a New Canal, 27 September 2018,
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/poland-warsaw-hopes-increase-its-autonomy-russia-
new-canal, retrieved on 2 July 2019.
36
Matthew Day, loc. cit.
37
Emily Macintosh, €800M Polish canal is ‘Environmental Hooliganism’, The News Channel of
the European Environmental Bureau, 26 February 2019, https://meta.eeb.org/2019/02/26/
e800m-polish-canal-is-environmental-hooliganism/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.
38
Gabriela Baczynska and Kevin Liffey, EU says Poland cannot build Vistula Spit canal without
approval – official, Reuters, 1 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-poland-
vistulaspit/eu-says-poland-cannot-build-vistula-spit-canal-without-approval-official-
idUSL5N20O5T8, retrieved on 3 July 2019.
39
Karol Witenberg, Poland defies green activists, EU with Baltic canal project, Reuters,
4 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-environment-vistulaspit/poland-
defies-green-activists-eu-with-baltic-canal-project-idUSKCN1QL1AN, retrieved on 3 July 2019.
40
Pawel Pawłowski, New Road to the Baltic Sea, loc. cit.
75 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYAdrian-Vasile POPA
WAYS OF DENOUNCING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S
OPPOSITION TO THE OPERATIONALISATION
OF THE TWO CANALS
The Central and Eastern European countries along with other
interested NATO states have various ways of denouncing the Russian
Federation’s opposition to the operationalisation of the two canals in
favour of the Alliance.
On the one hand, in the case of Kanal Istanbul, there are various
actions that can be taken by NATO members and partners in order to
ensure the strategic advantage that can be conferred to the Alliance by
the operationalisation of the aforementioned infrastructure project.
First, US together with the Black Sea riparian states NATO members
In the case of and partners could promote stronger ties with Turkey in order to make
Vistula Spit
certain that either Kanal Istanbul will be a subject of the Montreux
canal, Poland
supported by its Convention or not, the Turkish authorities are going to lift or at least
allies can take improve the current restrictions on the access and stationing in the Black
various actions
to ensure the
Sea of warships belonging to the non-riparian states. Second, NATO
operationalisation could negotiate with the Russian Federation a non-enhanced naval
of this presence at the Black Sea in exchange with the Russian Federation’s
infrastructure
project in spite restoration of the status quo prior to the annexation of Crimea. Third,
of the Russian NATO could revive and support the operationalisation of the 2016
Federation’s Romanian initiative for an enhanced naval cooperation with the other
vehement
opposition to it. Black Sea riparian states NATO members and partners in order to
create the premises for a de facto permanent NATO Black Sea Fleet in
accordance with the current provisions of the Montreux Convention.
Fourth, the Alliance could reflag some naval assets under the Black
Sea members and partners’ flags in order to boost permanent Allied
naval capabilities in the area. Fifth, NATO could create a chain of Allied
A2/AD bubbles around the Russian A2/AD bubble in Crimea aimed to
restrict the Russian Federation’s freedom of action in the Black Sea and
ultimately to enhance the security guarantees offered to its Black Sea
riparian allies and partners.
On the other hand, in the case of Vistula Spit canal, Poland supported
by its allies can take various actions to ensure the operationalisation
of this infrastructure project in spite of the Russian Federation’s
vehement opposition to it. First, Poland could offer credible guarantees
No. 1/2020 76The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
that Vistula Spit canal is going to be realized respecting all the norms
of the current international environmental law – in this way Poland
can also offer assurances to the concerned green activists. Second,
the Russian Federation’s environmental narrative when it comes to ROMANIAN
MILITARY
the construction of Vistula Spit canal could be strongly combated by THINKING
the Polish authorities through a similar narrative when it comes to the
construction of Nord Stream 2. Third, Poland might consider putting
a halt to the construction of Vistula Spit canal only after the Russian
Federation agrees to lift the transit fees for all vessels crossing the
Pilava Strait, including those belonging to third-party states. Alternatively,
Alternatively, the Central and Eastern European countries along two transitory
solutions can
with other Euro-Atlantic stakeholders might consider two transitory be taken until
solutions until the construction of the two canals and their legal the construction
of the two
regulation could reach a positive result for them. The first one could
canals and their
be the implementation of the Central and Eastern European countries’ subsequent legal
interconnection projects proposed under the framework of the Three regulations could
reach a positive
Seas Initiative41. The second could be the operationalisation of the result for NATO,
interwar idea of Gdansk-Galati canal that could connect the Black and namely the
Baltic Seas through an infrastructure project led by the consortium implementation
of the
Poland-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova-Romania42. interconnection
projects
CONCLUSIONS proposed under
the framework
The Russian Federation’s re-emergence as a potential threat in of the Three
the Ponto-Baltic Isthmuscalls for the Central and Eastern European Seas Initiative,
respectively the
countries to strengthen their geostrategic position. Within this operationalisation
context, two expected-to-be operationalized infrastructure projects of the Gdansk-
might represent a game-changer for the security environment in the Galați canal.
Ponto-Baltic Isthmus in the near future-Kanal Istanbul, respectively
Vistula Spit canal.
In case of Kanal Istanbul, Turkey has not adopted yet an official
position regarding its inclusion under the provisions of the Montreux
41
For details, see The Three Seas Initiative Summit Bucharest, The Three Seas Initiative –
Priority Interconnection Projects, 17-18 September 2018, http://three-seas.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/list-of-priorityinterconnection-projects-2018.pdf, retrieved on 22 May 2019.
42
For details, see Grigore Gafencu (Foreign Minister of Romania 1939-1940), Telegramă cifrată
către Ambasada României în Varșovia, MAE, No. 15608, March 9, 1939, AMAE, Folder 71/
Polonia/1939, Issue 60: Relații cu România, pp. 94-97.
77 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYAdrian-Vasile POPA
Convention. As a consequence, two options can be considered in its
case when taking into account its potential for the emergence of a
NATO wild card at the Black Sea. On the one hand, if Kanal Istanbul
will not be included under the provisions of the Montreux Convention,
the deployment of naval assets in the Black Sea by NATO non-
riparian states would be committed only to the jurisdiction imposed
by Turkey and not to a binding international agreement as of now.
This strategic option would allow NATO’s enforcement of credible
security guarantees at the Black Sea through a permanent Black Sea
Fleet. On the other hand, if Kanal Istabul will be included under the
Montreux Convetion, the deployment of naval assets in the Black Sea
by NATO non-riparian states would be decided upon the negotiation on
the new provisions of the Montreux Convention. This strategic option
would probably maintain the current operational limits imposed in
case of the vessels belonging to non-riparian states. Overall, both
options ultimately depend on the evolution of the relations between
Turkey and the Russian Federation on one side and between Turkey
and the US on the other side.
In case of Vistula Spit canal, Poland seems to be determined to
operationalise this infrastructure project in spite of the Russian
Federation and green activists’ vehement opposition. This development
is meant to ensure Poland’s sovereignty by allowing national and third
party’s vessels to reach freely the Polish port of Elblag without the
compulsory as of now access of the Vistula Lagoon through the Russian
port of Baltiysk. Ultimately, Vistula Spit canal might represent NATO’s
wild card at the Baltic Sea as it can offer the Alliance an unhindered
access to the naval corridor linking the Baltic Sea with Vistula Lagoon.
The Central and Eastern European countries along with other
interested NATO members have various ways of denouncing the
Russian Federation’s opposition to the operationalisation of the two
canals. Alternatively, two transitory solutions can be taken until the
construction of the two canals and their subsequent legal regulations
could reach a positive result for NATO, namely the implementation
of the interconnection projects proposed under the framework of
the Three Seas Initiative, respectively the operationalisation of the
Gdansk-Galați canal. Finally, probably nothing fits better the context
No. 1/2020 78The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
than historian Marek Chodakiewicz’s remark: “History is alive in the
East. Sorting out the past is the key to the future”43.
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