Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India's Strategic Engagements - Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Uneasy Contradictions
Continue in India’s
Strategic Engagements
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
VOL 9 INDO-PACIFIC ANALYSIS BRIEFS 2020INDO-PACIFIC ANALYSIS
BRIEFS 2020
The Perth USAsia Centre’s Indo-
Pacific Analysis Briefs seek to provide
perceptive and contemporary insights
from across the region. The series
features leading analysts from Asia,
Australia and the US to deliver up-to-
the-minute assessments on issues of
national and regional importance. This
series will shine a light on the issues
that remain critically important to
Australia and the Indo-Pacific at a time
when global events may otherwise
dominate the news cycle.
AUTHOR Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Distinguished Fellow, Head, Nuclear and Space Policy; Observer
Research Foundation
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Distinguished Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy
Initiative at Observer Research Foundation. She is also a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat.
Dr. Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-
2007), where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate
Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan in 2012.KEY POINTS
→ Recent Chinese behaviour including its aggression along the Line of Actual Control
has made it difficult for India to continue carving out a middle way in its strategic policy to
balance its interests between the US and China. 3
→ Tensions between China and India are heightened by the recent clash, India’s
wariness over China’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic, and India’s term as the Chair of the
Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India’s Strategic Engagements
World Health Organisation’s Executive Board.
→ India has amended its foreign direct investment policy in response to Chinese
opportunistic economic activity during COVID-19, to which China has reacted negatively.
→ In this context, participation in minilateral clubs with like-minded partners is an
effective strategy for India. The Quad, and the emerging ‘Quad Plus’ extension, will play an
important regional role post-COVID-19.
→ India must also reassess its engagement in other multilateral forums including RIC,
BRICS and the Non-Aligned Movement.
India has been attempting to find new ways to continue pursuing the middle path1 in its
strategic engagements. On the one hand, there is a greater recognition of the challenge
from China and hence, a greater willingness to partner with other like-minded countries.
Recent developments in the India-China relationship, particularly confrontation on the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) only push India further in this direction.
On the other hand, New Delhi has also been seeking more options to find a middle
ground to balance its engagement between China and others. Such efforts have caused
a greater emphasis than before on multilateral groupings such as Russia-India-China
(RIC), Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and especially, the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM).
Finding the middle ground has become difficult for a few different reasons. Firstly and
most importantly, tensions between India and China have heightened as a result of the
current Sino-Indian clash at the Galwan River valley and the confrontation across much
of the Line of Actual Control (LAC)2 that divides Indian and Chinese territory and forces.
Not only has there been enormous anger about the death of Indian soldiers3 in the clash,
but there also appears to be a significant change in the attitude of Indian political elite
towards China. Where there was previously some consideration of a pragmatic effort to
maintain a stable working relationship with China, its recent aggressive behaviour4 has
made it more apparent5 that this might not be possible.
The second is the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. While India has not formally blamed
China for the world-wide crisis, New Delhi has become more wary about China and its
role in the viral outbreak.
Though India has managed to avoid the worst effects of the health emergency by
locking down the entire country6, the secondary effects on the Indian economy and
society are likely to be dramatic. The massive migrant crisis is only one facet of the
enormous dislocation that Indian society is going through, and the situation is only
likely to become more dire7. Consequently, popular Indian distrust of China, even beforethe current confrontation at the LAC, had ballooned. New Delhi cannot overlook the
consequences of COVID-19 on Indian society and the economy.
The third is the international dimension. India has been under some pressure to join
others in holding China and the World Health Organisation (WHO) – which has been
seen as unusually deferential to China – accountable for the crisis. India has joined the
broad coalition of close to 120 nations8 in carrying out an independent inquiry into the
4 origin of the pandemic, a cause that Australia championed which in itself has caused
huge friction between Canberra and Beijing9.
But India is also taking over as the Chair of the WHO Executive Board, which was decided
Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India’s Strategic Engagements
last year, well before the current crisis. This is likely to put India in an uncomfortable
position between its partners such as the US and Australia, who want a credible
investigation into the origins of the pandemic, and China, who is likely to seek to stymie
such efforts.
A related issue is Beijing’s efforts to control and manipulate multilateral agencies such
as the WHO and the United Nations (UN). It is important for India that such agencies
are not hijacked by any one power. Encouraging and upholding neutrality, accountability
and transparency in multilateral agencies could very well become agenda items for
India and other like-minded Indo-Pacific powers.
India has also just been elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council,
which will again complicate India’s ability to balance its engagement with China – a
permanent member of the Security Council – while also exemplifying leadership in
upholding these values.
Furthermore, the kind of COVID-19 pandemic assistance that China engaged in with
the supply of faulty personal protective equipment (PPE) and test kits10 has squandered
away a lot of sympathy that may have existed in India. In comparison, despite not being
a member of the WHO, Taiwan has come out as an exemplary partner and its pandemic
assistance has gained a lot of support for Taipei across the globe. Beijing’s behaviour
has raised Indian concerns, adding to earlier disgruntlement with its behaviour in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group11.
The fourth is China’s efforts to leverage the economic devastation caused by the
pandemic. In April, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) raised its stakes12 in one of India’s
largest mortgage providers, the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC),
from 0.8 percent to 1.01 percent. Worried at the consequences of any opportunistic
corporate takeovers and acquisitions, the Indian government revised its foreign direct
investment (FDI) policy that would restrict China from acquiring significant stakes in
the Indian economy.
China reacted negatively13 to India’s amended FDI policy14, which unambiguously
states that “an entity of a country, which shares a land border with India or where the
beneficial owner of an investment into India is situated in or is a citizen of any such
country, can invest only under the Government route.” The policy was revised within
days after China raised its stakes in the HDFC and was immediately seen as targeting
China15, who labelled it as discriminatory.
As many countries, including the US and Japan, seek to diversity their markets away
from China, India is looking to take advantage of this emerging situation by providing
an alternative market. However, it is unclear whether India has created the necessary
infrastructure or a business-friendly bureaucracy and political culture to cash in on
this opportunity.The Indian government is acutely aware of its lack of capacity to facilitate countries
turning to India and has asked state governments to come up with measures that
incentivise significant economic and technological investment in the country. But India’s
challenges16 are far too many including land acquisition, tax and labour laws, quality of
infrastructure, and governance issues that may not be addressed fast enough to attract
anyone trying to shift out of China. In fact, many businesses are finding Vietnam as a
much more attractive alternative than India. 5
All of the above factors increasing tensions in the Sino-Indian relationship have pushed
India towards greater engagement with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific. The
Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India’s Strategic Engagements
fact that the Quad came back17 in a second iteration is a testament to the growing
perception of the challenge that China poses in the region. More recently, in the wake
of the pandemic, this cooperation has extended to a Quad-Plus engagement18 involving
three other Indo-Pacific powers – New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam. There is
little doubt that the clash at Galwan will force India further along this path.
There is a strong case for these like-minded countries to continue working together in
the post-pandemic scenario on other issues raised by China’s rise in the region. Just as
the original Quad took shape in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, this group
has the potential to emerge as a strategic entity after the COVID-19 pandemic is over
because each of the new partners has had to confront aggressive Chinese behaviour.
Whether a Quad-plus arrangement becomes a reality or not, there is a strong likelihood
that such minilaterals will take shape in the Indo-Pacific in a post-COVID world due
to the widely prevalent apprehension towards China. But this is not going to be as
straightforward for countries like India which are still seeking strategic involvement in
other regional and multilateral institutions as a way of buying some bargaining space.
India’s Foreign Minister Dr. S Jaishankar in a November 2019 speech said19 as much:
“[For India to] maximise options and expand space naturally
requires engaging multiple players…Hedging is a delicate
exercise, whether it is the non-alignment and strategic autonomy
of earlier periods, or multiple engagements of the future. But
there is no getting away from it in a multipolar world.”
India’s then Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale referred to this saying that India is no more
non-aligned but that it has an issue-based alignment20 approach.
India’s recent approach to RIC, BRICS and the NAM may be a consequence of such
thinking. After skipping the NAM Summits in 2016 and 2019, Modi in 2020 decided to
join the virtual NAM Summit.21 Whether this represents a significant shift in India’s
approach towards the NAM is unclear, but it is more likely that New Delhi sees this as
one more group which will hopefully provide at least another layer of protection – even
if a flimsy one – from China’s threats.
On the other hand, given the initial rationale of the RIC as an anti-US counterbalance,
it does not make sense that India is still as invested in this group. New Delhi’s growing
convergence of strategic interests with the US and US allies is a stark contradiction with
that of the RIC agenda, particularly as India-China border tensions increase. However,
even after the latest clashes, India’s foreign minister attended the virtual RIC Foreign
Ministers Meeting22 held on 23rd of June. Notwithstanding, the incongruent strategic
goals23 between India, Russia and China are likely to begin showing up sooner rather
than later.
The same applies to BRICS, another group in which India and China are partners. As with
the NAM, it is likely that India sees membership in these groups as a defensive response
to China’s power, as a way of moderating Beijing rather than one of grand ambition.Nevertheless, a pertinent question is whether India can continue all of these parallel
conversations in a strategically useful manner. In the aftermath of the Galwan clash,
India’s choices just became harder.
6
Endnotes
Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India’s Strategic Engagements
1 Shivshankar Menon (2020), ‘India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy’, Brookings India, May, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/India27s-foreign-affairs-strategy.pdf; Sunil Khilnani et al. (2012), ‘Non-Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic
Policy for India in the Twenty First Century’, Centre for Policy Research, February, https://www.cprindia.org/research/reports/
nonalignment-20-foreign-and-strategic-policy-india-twenty-first-century.
2 Sushant Singh (2020), ‘Line of Actual Control: Where is it located and where India and China differ’, The Indian Express,
18 June, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/line-of-actual-control-where-it-is-located-and-where-india-and-china-
differ-6436436/
3 Dinakar Peri, Suhasini Haidar, Ananth Krishnan (2020), ‘Indian Army says 20 soldiers killed in clash with Chinese troops in
the Galwan area’, The Hindu, 17 June, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-army-says-20-soldiers-killed-in-clash-
with-chinese-troops-in-the-galwan-area/article31845662.ece
4 Rakesh Sood (2020), ‘Writings on the Chinese wall’, Observer Research Foundation, 20 June, https://www.orfonline.org/
expert-speak/writings-on-the-chinese-wall-68209/
5 Ananth Krishnan (2020), ‘For minor tactical gains on the ground, China has strategically lost India, says former Indian
Ambassador to China’, The Hindu, 21 June, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/for-minor-tactical-gains-on-the-
ground-china-has-strategically-lost-india-says-former-indian-ambassador-to-china/article31884054.ece
6 Hugo Seymour (2020), ‘Locking down 1.3 billion people: India’s swift response to COVID-19’, Perth USAsia Centre, 6 April,
https://perthusasia.edu.au/blog/locking-down-1-3-billion-people-india%E2%80%99s-swift-res
7 Jay Ramasubramanyam (2020), ‘India’s treatment of Muslims and migrants puts lives at risk during COVID-19’, The
Conversation, 21 May, https://theconversation.com/indias-treatment-of-muslims-and-migrants-puts-lives-at-risk-during-
covid-19-136940
8 Daniel Hurst (2020), ‘Australia hails global support for independent coronavirus investigation’, The Guardian, 18 May, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/australia-wins-international-support-for-independent-coronavirus-inquiry
9 Jeffrey Wilson (2020), ‘The Australia-China trade war: Vale the ‘grand bargain’?’, The China Story, 18 May, https://
thechinastory.org/the-australia-china-trade-war-vale-the-grand-bargain/
10 Teena Thacker & Anandita Singh Mankoita (2020), ‘Tens of thousands of Chines PPE kits fail India safety test’, The Economic
Times, 16 April, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/tens-of-thousands-of-chinese-ppe-kits-
fail-india-safety-test/articleshow/75171817.cms?from=mdr
11 Economic Times (2019), ‘China rules out India’s entry into NSG without ‘consensus’ on allowing non-NPT countries’, 21
June, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-rules-out-indias-entry-into-nsg-without-consensus-on-
allowing-non-npt-countries/articleshow/69893448.cms?from=mdr
12 The Hindu (2020), ‘People’s Bank of China picks up 1% stake in HDFC’, 12 April, https://www.thehindu.com/business/
Industry/peoples-bank-of-china-picks-up-1-stake-in-hdfc/article31324196.ece
13 Business Standard (2020), ‘India’s new FDI policy is discriminatory and against tree trade: China’, 20 April, https://
www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/china-protests-india-s-new-fdi-norms-calls-them-against-
trade-120042000559_1.html
14 Government of India Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2020), ‘FDI Policy Selection’, 17 April, https://dipp.gov.in/sites/
default/files/pn3_2020.pdf
15 Harsh Pant & Nandini Sarma (2020), ‘India Cracks Down on Chinese Investment as Mood Turns Against Beijing’, Foreign
Policy, 28 April, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/india-china-fdi-restrictions-coronavirus/
16 Bloomberg (2020), ‘India looks to lure more than 1,000 American companies out of China’, The Economic Times, 7 May,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-looks-to-lure-more-than-1000-american-
companies-out-of-china/articleshow/75595400.cms?from=mdr
17 Hong Le Thu (20219), ‘New perspectives for the revived Quad’, 14 February, The Strategist, https://www.aspistrategist.org.
au/new-perspectives-for-the-revived-quad/
18 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (2020), ‘Towards a Quad-Plus Arrangement?’, Perth USAsia Centre, https://perthusasia.edu.
au/getattachment/Our-Work/Towards-a-Quad-Plus-Arrangement/FINAL-2004-Towards-a-Quad-Plus-Arrangement-Perth-
USAsia-Centre.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of India (2019), ‘External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 4th
Ramnath Goenka Lecture 2019’, 14 November, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32038/
External+Affairs+Ministers+speech+at+the+4th+Ramnath+Goenka+Lecture+2019
20 Nayanima Basu (2019), ‘India is no longer ‘non-aligned’, says Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale’, The Print, 10 January,
https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-is-no-longer-non-aligned-says-foreign-secretary-vijay-gokhale/176222/
21 Shubhajit Roy (2020), ‘PM Modi at NAM summit: terrorism, fake news ‘deadly viruses’, Indian Express, 5 May, https://
indianexpress.com/article/india/pm-modi-at-nam-summit-terrorism-fake-news-deadly-viruses-6394202/
22 The Wire India (2020), ‘At Russia-India-China Meet, India Talks of Need to Respect Legitimate Interests of Partners, 23
June, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-russia-china-ric-trilateral-meeting
23 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (2020), ‘Growing Russia-India-China Tensions: Splits in the RIC Strategic Triangle?’, The
Diplomat, 17 March, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/growing-russia-india-china-tensions-splits-in-the-ric-strategic-
triangle/About the Perth USAsia Centre
The Perth USAsia Centre, located at The University of Western Australia, is a nonpartisan, not-
for-profit institution strengthening relationships and strategic thinking between Australia, the
Indo-Pacific and the USA. The Centre is a leading think tank focusing on geopolitical issues,
policy development and building a strategic affairs community across government, business
and academia. Since the Centre’s inception in 2013, the Centre has collaborated with over thirty 7
partners to convene more than four hundred events across sixteen cities in eight countries,
engaging a world-class community of more than 10,000 strategic thinkers and leaders.
Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India’s Strategic Engagements
Disclaimer
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject
matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any
form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication
without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.
© Perth USAsia Centre 2020
This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of
it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or
otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission.
Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.
Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities
and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes
without explicit permission from the Perth USAsia Centre and free of charge.
M265, 3rd Floor, Old Economics Building,
The University of Western Australia,
35 Stirling Highway, Crawley WA 6009, Australia
perthusasiacentre@uwa.edu.au
@PerthUSAsia
PerthUSAsia
linkedin.com/company/perth-usasia-centre
perthusasia.edu.auu a
u.
M
26
ed
5,
a.
3
rd
si
Fl
sa
oo
hu
r,
Ol
rt
d
pe
Ec
on
mo
ic
s
Bu
ild
in
,Tg
he
Un
ive
rs
ty i
of
W
es
te
n r
Au
st
ra
ial
,3
5
St
irl
in
g
Hi
gh
wa
y,
C
ra
w
le
yW
A
60
09
,A
us
tr
al
ia
perthusasiacentre@uwa.edu.au
@PerthUSAsia
PerthUSAsia
linkedin.com/company/perth-usasia-centre
perthusasia.edu.auYou can also read
