UNREST DURING THE INAUGURATION SEASON - EXAMINING THE JANUARY 6TH, 2021 - Allied Universal
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EXAMINING THE JANUARY 6TH, 2021 UNREST DURING THE INAUGURATION SEASON Intelligence Report 2021 © Allied Universal Prepared January 11, 2021
SUMMARY This report examines the events of January 6, 2021, in Washington D.C., in which a large demonstration in support of the outgoing presidential administration became a violent riot, culminating with the storming of the U.S. Capitol building and the deaths of five individuals. The demonstration on January 6 was not the first such demonstration to breach the Capitol’s security; however, it was one of the more violent instances in recent memory. In 1971, an anti- war group detonated a bomb near the Senate facilities inside the Capitol, causing thousands of dollars' worth of damages without casualties. In a similar incident in 1983, a bomb was detonated outside the Senate chambers, causing internal damage without casualties. In 1998, a gunman stormed past security, killing two law enforcement officers before being subdued, following an exchange of gunfire. There have also been breaches without violence, such as the 2018 Women’s March in which thousands of activists marched on the Capitol in a show of civil disobedience; the protest resulted in the arrests of nearly 600 participants, including prominent celebrities and politicians, after demonstrators pushed past security and conducted a "sit-in" inside the Senate chambers. While security points were breached at each of these events, none featured the level of violence and force experienced in the storming of the Capitol on January 6. The breach of security by thousands of demonstrators marked the first such event since 1958 when a group of protestors forced their way into the Capitol with violent intent. Intelligence Report Page |2 © 2021 Allied Universal
KEY FINDINGS OF THE JANUARY 6 CAPITOL RIOT On January 6, 2021, thousands of demonstrators gathered in Washington D.C. to voice their support for the outgoing presidential administration and to protest the November 2020 presidential election results. Significant chatter forecasting the demonstration appeared in social media in the days leading up to the demonstration. On Wednesday, January 6, the Senate and the House of Representatives would convene to debate objections to the count of Electoral College votes. Shortly after arriving at the Capitol, demonstrators became more aggressive toward Capitol Police posted outside as Senate and House procedures were underway. At approximately 2:15 PM EST, Capitol Police notified members of Congress that no entry or exit from the building was allowed due to an "external security threat," as demonstration participants had broken through physical security barriers. Roughly fifteen minutes later, legislators inside and their staffs were forced to take refuge in secure locations as demonstrators rushed through the House chambers and police reportedly deployed tear gas in the Capitol Rotunda. The incident was declared an unlawful assembly and a riot, and demonstrators remained inside until National Guard, FBI Tactical Teams, and Capitol Police could secure the building at approximately 5:40 PM EST. Congress reconvened that evening to continue with deliberations. The incident resulted in the deaths of five individuals, including a Capitol Police officer (1). In response to the incident, Washington, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser imposed a 6:00 PM EST curfew which was echoed by Virginia Governor Ralph Northam for Arlington and Alexandria counties, resulting in a heightened police presence and the early closure of local businesses. (2) Even as they had staged outside of the Capitol building in preparation for the day's demonstrations, law enforcement officers ultimately appeared to be underprepared and underequipped. Demonstrators became aggressive, and law enforcement officers appeared overwhelmed as police barricades were overcome at multiple points around the building and as protesters scaled walls and scaffolding emplaced for Inauguration Day (3). By all accounts, U.S. Capitol police were underequipped and under-resourced to prevent thousands of demonstrators from breaching the building. Despite the urgency, reportedly three hours passed before reinforcements arrived, well after demonstrators had overrun the Capitol’s security barriers. Approximately three additional hours were needed to clear the building and secure the chambers to allow Congress to resume deliberations. Suspicious packages were discovered on Capitol grounds, and pipe bombs were found at the headquarters of the Republican and Democratic National Committees. All of the devices were safely detonated and neutralized by law enforcement (4). The national capital was not the only city that experienced demonstrations related to the certification of Electoral College votes in Congress. Protests were held in Georgia, Hawaii, Oklahoma, Arizona, Washington, Utah, California, Ohio, Kansas, Nevada, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, New Mexico, Texas, South Carolina, Nebraska, and Arkansas (5). While rallies at several state capitals were relatively peaceful, protests in several other cities became violent. Demonstrators and counter-demonstrators clashed in Oregon, Ohio, and California, and Intelligence Report Page |3 © 2021 Allied Universal
participants were subject to riot control measures
like tear gas and pepper spray. In New Mexico and
Georgia, the state capitols were evacuated. Armed
demonstrators appeared outside the statehouses in
Georgia, Oregon, Washington, Oklahoma, Arizona,
and Colorado, but no gun violence was experienced
at any of these locations (6).
As news of the unfolding events at the U.S. Capitol
broke, a few demonstrations turned volatile. In
Salem, Oregon, elements reportedly associated with
The Proud Boys became aggressive and clashed
with both police and counter-demonstrators, causing
injuries. Additionally, armed activists stormed the
Washington State Governor's Mansion grounds after
breaching exterior fencing (7) before being escorted
from the grounds by Washington State Troopers.
Between December 23rd and January 7th, several
non-governmental sources published nearly two-
dozen articles warning of the impending unrest.
These organizations followed the individuals
involved in the planning as they openly discussed
storming Congress and encouraged participants to
carry zip-ties to seize politicians whom they may
encounter.
SECURITY RESPONSE
In response to the potential for violent unrest at the
U.S. Capitol and at state capitol buildings across the
country, several states have activated their National
Guard units to help secure state and federal
facilities. On Monday, January 11, the chief of the
National Guard Bureau, General Hokanson,
announced approximately 10,000 National
Guardsmen would be activated and deployed to
Washington D.C. in preparation for the Presidential
Inauguration. Guardsmen from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New York will join D.C.
guardsmen and law enforcement officers to augment security in the nation's capital (8). Nearly
6,000 guardsmen arrived in D.C. during the weekend, and another 4,000 are set to arrive by the
weekend of January 16 and 17. The FBI has released a statement indicating that armed
demonstrations are expected at all 50 state capitols, starting as early as January 16.
Intelligence Report Page |4
© 2021 Allied UniversalIn Olympia, Washington, the Washington State National Guard was mobilized on January 10 in preparation for the reconvening of the Washington State Legislature, and demonstrations were expected at the state capitol building. Demonstrations over the weekend remained peaceful, as guardsmen stood watch outside the state legislature. The governor activated roughly 750 members of the National Guard following the Governor's Mansion's demonstrations and breach on January 6 (9). The Proud Boys and other extremist groups are reportedly planning to conduct armed protests in as many state capitals as possible on Sunday, January 17, according to multiple sources. Although a broad statement, these announced plans should be taken seriously by residents and businesses near state capitol buildings. As seen during the demonstrations in the summer of 2020 in cities like Seattle, Portland, Atlanta, and Washington D.C., local businesses and storefronts are highly susceptible to vandalism (10 | 11). In Utah and Texas, there were gatherings of several hundred supporters of the outgoing administration at each statehouse. There were minor scuffles with law enforcement in both cases that resulted in the use of pepper spray and pepper balls. Since January 6, we have also seen rallies in Cleveland, OH, St. Louis, MO, and Austin, TX. All three of these demonstrations were organized and had a few hundred participants. In Cleveland, there was a protest against the outgoing administration. In St. Louis, the focus was a call for Senator Josh Hawley to resign. In Austin, the rally called for State Attorney General Ken Paxton to resign. (12). At least nine protests under the banner "TRUMP/PENCE OUT NOW!" were planned through refusefacism.org and occurred on January 9th and 10th (13). Thus far, some of the refusefascism.org demonstrations have seen counter-demonstrations in response. A demonstration in San Diego, CA clashed with counter-protestors and resulted in the arrests of three individuals (14). Antifa held a demonstration in Portland, OR on January 6 that quickly turned destructive. Participants attempted to burn down a police precinct building and damaged the exteriors of local businesses that they deemed had ties to fascist local politicians or policies (15). Antifa has been consistently promoting almost daily rallies in Portland for nearly a year. The threat of damage to local businesses and government structures in Portland is elevated. Intelligence Report Page |5 © 2021 Allied Universal
SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS Open-source chatter has frequently preceded large-scale demonstrations, as it did before the January 6 riots. Many posts discuss planned activities for not only Inauguration Day but also the weekend prior. Social media discussions on open sites such as Facebook and Twitter have been more frequent, especially regarding potential unrest on the weekend of January 16 and 17 (16). As a result, Washington, D.C., Mayor Muriel Bowser has requested assistance from the Department of Homeland Security to increase security presence in the Capitol area and the cancellation of all requests for demonstration permits (17). Business owners and D.C. residents have begun posting the hashtag "#DontRentDC" to deter property managers from granting short-term rentals unwittingly to individuals traveling from out of town with an intent to participate in civil unrest. Of particular concern is the so-called "Million Militia March." Vows by extremist groups to return to the Capitol on Election Day are posted on multiple social media forums and call for armed marches and violence. T-shirts and posters for the event have been made and published on numerous social media platforms. Other locations mentioned in social media posts include Salt Lake City, Utah, state buildings in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Columbus, Ohio (18). Given the many posts calling for action on various social media and blog sites, the likelihood is high that demonstrations will turn violent. The recent removal of Parler - an application that advertises a strict adherence to the right to free speech - from Apple and Google app stores and Amazon Web Servers may increase the likelihood of demonstrations at the sites of these companies’ offices in the coming days. News of these companies' decisions was followed by posts on various social media and blogging platforms inciting violence against tech company employees. However, the likelihood of crowd sizes similar to those seen in D.C. on January 6 for any potential anti-tech demonstrations is low (19). Intelligence Report Page |6 © 2021 Allied Universal
CONSIDERATIONS
It is recommended that businesses in the vicinity of government buildings track demonstration
activity in and around their locations and opt for early closures over the next ten days.
Additionally, it is recommended that employees living in the immediate areas of planned
demonstrations limit movement.
Businesses should consider risk-ranking locations based upon proximity and likelihood of unrest
nearby. Specifically, businesses and assets near state capitol buildings, government facilities,
and law enforcement agencies should observe the following considerations.
In addition to minimizing personnel working on-site, companies whose essential workers must
attend sites near demonstrations should develop and implement contingency plans in case
evacuation becomes necessary. Ensure your business continuity plan is reviewed and up to
date.
Utilizing professional intelligence monitoring and reporting resources will provide businesses
with the most up-to-date information and allow management to make informed decisions to help
ensure the safety of staff and facilities and the integrity of their brand. Intelligence monitoring
services and threat intelligence analysis identify specific threats that may be announced online
before incidents take place. The storming of the U.S. Capitol was discussed extensively online
for several weeks before January 6. Professional intelligence services that monitor social media
sites, forums, and blogs can allow for early warning and increased reaction times to mitigate
potential threats.
Employing physical security professionals is another protective measure to ensure the safety of
personnel and facilities. Private security serves as a deterrent to opportunistic criminal activity
and acts as emergency response. With law enforcement departments focused primarily on the
epicenters of unrest, opportunistic criminal activity may go unchecked. Businesses should
consider the employment of protective teams with at least one individual with emergency
medical training, given potential delays in response times from law enforcement and emergency
medical services.
COMMERCIAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Have a robust intelligence capability in place. Intelligence support during a time of unrest will
allow local operations or security managers to have a near-real-time overview of the local
climate and operating environment should tensions rapidly escalate.
2. Minimize presenting facilities as a soft target for opportunistic criminal activity. Having a
proactive plan in place to deter criminal activity will aid in protecting employees and assets.
These measures include:
Intelligence Report Page |7
© 2021 Allied Universal→ Early identifying and procuring security services.
→ Conducting security system tests to confirm that all CCTV, communication, barrier, fire
suppression, and alarm systems are fully operational or otherwise make any necessary
repairs.
→ Conducting table-top and operational exercises and training for security and GSOC
operators to ensure that they are fully prepared for potential threats and emergency
situations.
→ To avoid complacency, ensuring security personnel are briefed and remain alert for
potential threats and known risks associated with civil unrest in their local area.
→ Ensuring applicable environment security concerns such as afterhours lighting, lighting
for parking areas, and perimeter fencing are inspected and operational.
→ Evaluating placement of high-value assets to limit ease of access if unrest occurs (i.e.,
nothing of high-value next to the front door or visible through windows) and confirming
the proper security storage of high-value assets.
→ Working with operations and facilities to source vendors to respond in the event
immediate physical repairs for the locations are needed. The client should determine
the most vulnerable locations and proactively secure these repair services before
damage occurs.
→ Working with the business operations team and HR to determine process to secure the
locations in the event immediate evacuation is needed:
o Key control
o Securing locations via alarm activation
o Contact protocols
o Notification process for all employees
o Return to work protocols
3. Ensuring emergency kits are fully stocked, operational, and in an easily accessible location.
4. If possible, having employees return home prior to darkness and avoid coming into office
locations during periods of civil unrest.
EXECUTIVE AND RESIDENTIAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Clients continue to request protective agent resources, including critical incident response
teams at office locations and residences. Protective agents patrolling or conspicuously
standing by a site act as a strong deterrent to opportunistic criminal activity.
2. Consider adding EMT and medical personnel to existing support teams. With decreased
response times from emergency services due to demonstrations or potential riots, having
medically trained personnel on site will decrease reliance on first responders for medical
emergencies.
Intelligence Report Page |8
© 2021 Allied UniversalSome recommendations provided to clients are as follows:
→ If a location is not a priority or if it is near a potential demonstration, shut and board up
the office location on the day prior to the planned demonstration activity.
→ Corporate locations: Provide critical incident response teams prioritized for internal
employee support and evacuation – not to fend off intruders.
→ Residential locations: Provide additional support for executives during a time of high
stress.
→ Ensure emergency kits are fully stocked, operational, and in an easily accessible
location.
SECURITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1. Review current crisis plan. Review current crisis planning documentation including
→ Closing procedures
→ Evacuation procedures
→ Communication protocols
→ Exercises or drills to ensure that all relevant personnel are fully aware of current policies
for emergency preparedness and business continuity, especially as it relates to closing
and evacuation procedures.
2. Establish and maintain communication. Ensure there is an established plan that provides
positive communication processes during critical incidents to facilitate effective emergency
notifications and responses among employees, executives, and clients.
→ A reliable means of information dissemination is critical during times of crisis.
→ Communication should occur at regular intervals to ensure a consistent flow of
information.
→ A formalized plan should include built-in redundancies for primary and alternate
communication methods in the event that digital and cellular systems are disrupted.
3. Social media/local media/open source intelligence monitoring for location and brand
threats. Opportunists, criminals, and influencers have continued to use social media to
communicate, coordinate, and disseminate information. These individuals use simple words
or phrases to create a “trending” topic that allow others the ease of access to current
information ranging from demonstration locations to police responses.
→ Monitoring social media or online forums and acting upon credible threats and trends will
allow security details and site managers to adequately prepare to deter any threats.
→ Subscribe to local, state, and federal governmental outreach programs and intelligence
products such as OSAC, DSAC, and State Intelligence Fusion Centers.
Intelligence Report Page |9
© 2021 Allied Universal→ Meet with local, state, and federal law enforcement personnel for intelligence and
information sharing.
→ Participate in Business Alliance Groups for intelligence and information sharing.
→ Monitoring for the following will provide advanced warning and the time needed to
mitigate the threats and risk to your people, facilities, assets, operations, and reputation:
o Public sentiment
o Brand, company, facility, locations, and personnel mentions
o Known and evolving influencer hashtags
o Protest announcements and updates
→ Trending political, and social justice mentions and hashtags
→ Local news coverage should also be monitored to stay up to date on protests and any
breaking events.
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