Venezuela, the Region and the World
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NO. 19 APRIL 2019 Introduction Venezuela, the Region and the World Steps for a Possible Way Out of the Crisis Claudia Zilla Since Nicolás Maduro took over as Venezuela’s president in 2013, the country’s gross domestic product and oil production have fallen by more than 50 percent. Political institutions, on the other hand, have doubled: there are two legislative bodies, two Supreme Courts and, since Juan Guaidó’s self-appointment in early 2019, two com- peting presidents. The international community is divided – many states stand behind the regime, many others behind the opposition. Groups of states are address- ing the Venezuela issue in various initiatives, without the participation of the parties in the conflict. The EU and its member states should refrain from any action that could increase the risk of military intervention and bloodshed. Instead, they should exert diplomatic pressure to protect the population from repression, hunger and disease, and to strengthen the opposition. Furthermore, they should support a con- flict resolution process that is upheld by national actors and embedded in Latin America, and which has democracy as a long-term goal. At the beginning of 2019, a new dynamic known, charismatic young politician of the developed in the Venezuelan conflict over Voluntad Popular party, which belongs to the the change of government. After President Socialist International. He is also backed Nicolás Maduro was re-elected in May 2018 by numerous states that officially recognise in an early vote that was neither free nor him in his transitional role, that offer fair, he took up his second mandate on humanitarian aid and demand presidential 10 January 2019, for the period up to 2025. elections. Challenged by these develop- However, the opposition National Assembly ments, the Maduro government has en- (NA) withdrew his mandate. As a result, trenched its repression and its discourse. many actors in the international community also refused to recognise Maduro as Presi- dent of Venezuela. Moreover, the NA elected Increased Repression Juan Guaidó as its chairman. On 23 Janu- ary, at a major rally in Caracas, he appointed Ever since Juan Guaidó declared himself himself interim president of the country. interim president and the populace has Opposition parties and the population repeatedly demonstrated en masse, the gathered behind the hitherto largely un- Maduro government has been particularly
repressive towards its citizens. According Parallel Institutions
to a report by the Venezuelan human rights
organisation Foro Penal, 988 people were The power struggle between Maduro and
arbitrarily arrested in Venezuela between Guaidó, which was triggered by the latter’s
21 and 31 January 2019. During the same self-declared interim presidency, had already
period, 35 people were killed by firearms been preceded by the doubling of the legis-
and at least eight extrajudicial executions lative (2016) and judicial branches (2017).
are thought to have been carried out. It is Venezuelan democracy was in fact laid
notable that this time the victims come pre- to rest shortly after the parliamentary elec-
dominantly from poorer social strata and tions of December 2015, when freedom of
that some of them are minors. Many took choice was already restricted and the oppo-
part in protests for the first time, some sition achieved a landslide victory. As a
were merely nearby. Most arrests (77 per- result, the executive and judiciary, which
cent) took place on 23 January itself, not were loyal to the regime, systematically and
during the demonstrations but after them, drastically curtailed the competences and
when citizens were on their way home or resources of the legislative branch. In 2016,
already back at home. By 20 January 2019 Maduro ensured that a constituent assem-
there were 273 political prisoners in Ven- bly was elected under unfair and un-free
ezuela; by 31 January this figure had risen conditions. However, the assembly did not
dramatically to 942. Among them are 58 draft a constitution, but was busy legislat-
military personnel and 11 minors. ing. Since then, there have been two par-
These victims of the state apparatus are liaments that do not recognise each other.
abused during their arrest and then tor- That same year, the government refused to
tured in prison (including sexually). They hold a referendum on Maduro’s dismissal,
are denied legal assistance, medical care despite the fact that the opposition had col-
and often access to food and water. Similar lected the necessary signatures. Many civil
practices were already documented in the servants who had signed were dismissed.
2018 report of the United Nations High In 2016 the showdown between the
Commissioner for Human Rights. government and the NA over the appoint-
In addition to militias, units of the ment of judges ended with a co-opting of
armed forces and the police are responsible the judiciary by the government. Independ-
for these human rights violations. The Ven- ent and opposition lawyers were arrested
ezuelan security apparatus can count on or fled the country. This did not prevent the
support from Cuba, the so-called G2 (Grupo opposition-dominated NA from appointing
Dos), for reconnaissance and counterespio- 33 judges in July 2017, who now try to hold
nage. Military courts have also been crucial, office in exile, mainly in Chile, Colombia,
particularly since 2014 – not only in trials Panama and the USA. The so-called Supreme
against members of the armed forces, but Court in Exile or Supreme Court Abroad
also against civilians accused of rebellion or works virtually: members of the various
treason, as the International Commission specialist chambers communicate weekly
of Jurists revealed in a report in 2018. by conference call via the internet and pro-
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court in Ven- cess complaints received via e-mail and
ezuela, which is loyal to the regime, has their own website. A Twitter and Instagram
responded to a request by the Attorney Gen- account also serve their public relations.
eral’s Office and frozen Guaidó’s accounts The decisions of the Supreme Court Abroad
and forbidden him to leave the country. On are neither recognised nor adhered to by
2 April 2019, the Constitutional Assembly the Maduro government, such as a ruling
followed the request of the Supreme Court on 29 October 2018 that sentenced Maduro
and lifted Guidó’s parliamentary immunity to imprisonment and declared him deposed.
paving the way for his prosecution. To reunite these parallel worlds and
overcome the recurring crises, two nego-
SWP Comment 19
April 2019
2tiation attempts between the government or mental incapacity, dismissal by referen-
and the opposition were launched in 2016 dum and neglect of office. As one might
and 2017/18, and were accompanied by expect, they do not include the current con-
internationally respected public figures stitutional conflict. Since there is no consti-
from other states. However, the negotia- tutional provision regulating the current
tions broke off unsuccessfully after a few situation, the NA refers to an analogous
months. case in which Article 233 could be applied.
If the head of state is absent before taking
office, under Article 233 presidential elec-
Constitutional Acrobatics tions shall be held within 30 days. During
this period, the NA chairman shall take
Repression, the enforced conformity of the over the affairs of government. Guaidó took
organs of government, and the duplication on this role with the NA’s support via his
of institutions prove that the 1999 consti- very public swearing-in ceremony in Janu-
tution, drafted under the government of ary 2019. According to the NA’s decision,
Hugo Chávez, is no longer the basis for gov- he now has the threefold task of ending the
ernment action. Unlike the Latin American usurpation of the presidency by Maduro,
military dictatorships of the 1960s to 1980s, forming a transitional government, and
Maduro has tried to underpin his policies, organising free and transparent elections.
repressive measures and manoeuvres with On 5 February, the NA adopted the
state institutions, by invoking the constitu- statute governing the democratic transition
tion and elections. This democratic façade and the restoration of the Constitution.
is likely to be a typical feature of modern Among other things, it makes the 30-day
authoritarian regimes. It does not necessarily deadline of Article 233 of the Constitution
make them more harmless, but it does more flexible: this now refers to the period
render them tolerable for longer, both for beginning with the (unspecified) end of
the local population and the international usurpation and ending with the formation
community. of a transitional government. Elections
Guaidó is also making legalistic efforts to should be held as soon as possible and at
legitimise his self-appointment as interim the latest within one year.
president. When the NA did not recognise On 15 January, shortly before the tran-
the presidential elections of May 2018 as sition statute was adopted, the NA enacted
democratic nor Maduro’s assumption of the so-called amnesty law. The opposition
office in January 2019 as legitimate, it passed thus altered its strategy vis-à-vis prosecuting
a legislative act on 15 January declaring the Chavists and Madurists. The law offers the
country’s presidency vacant and Maduro a prospect of impunity to those civilians and
usurper. This situation enabled it to apply military loyal to the regime who are willing
three constitutional articles. Article 333 to change sides and contribute to the demo-
entitles citizens (with or without office or cratic transition. After Guaidó had been
mandate) to enforce the Constitution if it sworn in, the text of the law was distributed
has been violated or disregarded. Article to police and military services in front of
350 grants the people the right to rebel the international media. Guaidó did not
against regimes, laws and authorities that even exclude Maduro from the group of po-
undermine democratic values and prin- tential beneficiaries. The USA supports the
ciples, and violate human rights. opposition’s offer, which is as generous as
While these two articles refer to viola- it is vague, while human rights organisa-
tions of the Constitution and the resulting tions, such as Human Rights Watch, criti-
right to resist, Article 233 regulates the cise the fact that it does not specify either
absence of any president. Several cases the crimes to be considered or the imple-
are described, namely death, resignation, mentation process. They argue that due to
deposition by the Supreme Court, physical this ambiguity, the amnesty law contradicts
SWP Comment 19
April 2019
3the constitution and the international obli- a violation of the ban on intervention and
gations of the Venezuelan state. The num- can exacerbate conflicts. This is particularly
ber of deserters in question has so far been true of present-day Venezuela, since Guaidó,
limited to about 700 – in a state with some as the president recognised by several
2,000 generals alone and numerous mili- states, could now ask foreign countries for
tary leaders heading ministries, state com- military assistance. Although Guaidó’s in-
panies, and regional executive branches. ternational backing reinforces his political
There are also a number of diplomats from weight, the diplomatic step of officially
Venezuela’s embassies who have spoken recognising his interim presidency further
out in favour of Guaidó. foments the conflict. By their explicit par-
tiality, the recognising states unnecessarily
restrict their room for manoeuvre, e.g. for
Excessive International Zeal mediation.
Although in Venezuela lawfulness has long
been a mere political veneer, and Article The Politicisation of
233 of the Constitution is the weakest pillar Humanitarian Aid
of Guaidó’s empowerment, many govern-
ments around the world have emphatically The international-law principles of state
followed the legalistic argument derived sovereignty and non-interference are in
from it. They were ready, either immediate- tension with the humanitarian principle
ly or after an eight-day ultimatum during of human protection, which has been en-
which free elections were supposed to be hanced by the concept of Responsibility to
announced, to officially recognise Guaidó’s Protect since 2005. This legitimises, under
interim presidency and demand that presi- strict conditions, military measures for
dential elections be held. Furthermore, the the purpose of humanitarian intervention.
USA and other Latin American countries The political struggle for humanitarian
welcomed the ambassadors sent by Guaidó. aid in Venezuela and its connection to
Guaidó also visited Colombia, Brazil, Para- regime change is currently caught in this
guay, Argentina and Ecuador in late Feb- tense relationship. While the president
ruary and early March 2019. systematically violates human rights, the
By extending their political commitment interim president is not in a position to
from the legitimacy of Guaidó’s interim protect citizens from these practices. While
government to its official recognition, these Maduro denies the existence of a humani-
states effectively gave Venezuelan constitu- tarian crisis, rejects support from abroad
tional law precedence over international and closes the borders, Guaidó leads the Aid
law. On the one hand, it is part of the inter- and Freedom Coalition for Venezuela. This
national legal tradition and the recognition recruits aid workers from among Venezue-
procedure of most states not to recognise la’s population and non-governmental orga-
persons or governments, but rather states. nisations, and gathers aid supplies from ab-
On the other hand, according to inter- road (especially from the USA) in neighbour-
national law, recognition is based on the ing regions across the Venezuelan border.
actual exercise of power in a state, meaning On 23 February, the test of strength be-
effective control over its armed forces, tween government and opposition surround-
administration and territory. The recogni- ing humanitarian aid reached a headline-
tion of a government under international grabbing peak when Guaidó took the lead
law goes hand in hand with a number of in a convoy of lorries carrying relief sup-
privileges and obligations, whose use and plies that started in Cúcuta, Colombia. Fur-
fulfilment presupposes government effec- ther aid transports were organised from
tiveness. The premature recognition of a Roraima in Brazil. What had begun with an
revolutionary government can be seen as international aid concert and speeches by
SWP Comment 19
April 2019
4Guaidó and the presidents of Chile, Colom- passed a resolution that did not recognise
bia, Paraguay and the Secretary-General of the result of the presidential elections and
the Organisation of American States (OAS) noted a breach of the constitutional order
in Cúcuta ended a few kilometres beyond the in Venezuela. The process of withdrawal
border crossing in a clash between the con- from the OAS, which Venezuela initiated
voy and Venezuelan military and police. Ac- with its application in 2017, has now been
cording to Foro Penal, about 60 people were interrupted, after many OAS member states
injured and at least two killed. Guaidó recognised Guaidó as the legitimate presi-
stopped the “humanitarian avalanche”. Via dent and after he sent a special representa-
Twitter, he officially informed the interna- tive to the OAS. The meeting of 14 Latin
tional community that, since Maduro had American countries held in August 2017 in
prevented the import of aid, all options the Peruvian capital gave rise to the Lima
should now be kept open to liberate Ven- Group, which is working to find a peaceful
ezuela. solution to the Venezuela crisis. In the
Unlike the USA, Latin American and course of its summit meetings, the group
European countries, which are on Guaidó’s has intensified its demands on the Maduro
side, unequivocally rule out a military government. In its February 2019 statement
option. However, they call on the Maduro in Bogotá, it declared that Maduro’s hold on
government to allow humanitarian aid and power was a threat to peace and security
to organise new elections or else resign. in the region, and it called on actors in Ven-
Given their two-pronged approach, Maduro ezuela and abroad to officially recognise
views foreign humanitarian aid as a Trojan the Guaidó government. In September
horse intended to change the balance of 2018, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
power, i.e. as an instrument for regime Paraguay and Peru demanded that the
change. Against this backdrop, the United International Criminal Court investigate
Nations, the International Committee of the crimes against humanity they claim
the Red Cross and the national Red Cross have been committed in Venezuela since
societies associated with it have refused to February 2014.
participate in relief operations organised The USA, the main buyer of Venezuelan
by Guaidó. Their justification is that the oil, has been imposing increasingly harsh
principles of international humanitarian sanctions against Venezuela since 2015.
law – impartiality, neutrality and inde- These include visa restrictions, the freezing
pendence (from political objectives, for of property and assets, and a ban on U.S.
instance) – are not being observed. More citizens and institutions from conducting
and more non-governmental organisations transactions with persons listed on the Spe-
are raising their voices against the politici- cially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons
sation of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, List. Canada followed the US measures
for which they hold the government and against Venezuela in September 2017, as
the opposition equally responsible. well as their tightening in May 2018.
On 28 January 2019, the US Department
of State and the US Department of Finance
International Sanctions Policy cancelled the oil deliveries by Venezuela’s
largest oil company PDVSA. They also trans-
Yet many Latin American states, the USA ferred control of its Texas-based subsidiary
and the EU have been steadily increasing CITGO, and of Venezuelan government
the pressure on the Maduro regime since accounts on US territory, to Guaidó’s interim
2017. In August of that year, Argentina, government.
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay excluded The EU has had an arms embargo in
Venezuela from Mercosur, the common place against Venezuela since November
market of the South, by applying the 2017. In addition, the assets of persons con-
democracy clause. In June 2018, the OAS sidered to be key actors in the repressive
SWP Comment 19
April 2019
5regime have been frozen. These people have Members of the Venezuelan opposition
also been banned from entering EU coun- also fuel the domino theory. Julio Borges,
tries. These measures were extended and member of the NA, confirmed during a
prolonged in March 2018. European coun- press conference in the USA that the cur-
tries such as Switzerland and Norway joined rent struggle is not only about Venezuela,
the EU sanctions with similar measures. but also about Cuba and Nicaragua, and
freedom in the whole region. He also used
the metaphor of a Berlin Wall that had not
The Domino Theory yet fallen in Latin America, implicitly
referring to a new Cold War.
For years, Latin America regarded the dis- Domino theories and Cold War analogies,
mantling of democracy and the rule of law, however, have a devastating effect on con-
and the aggravation of the humanitarian flict resolution because they broaden the
situation in Venezuela as a purely national circle of parties in the conflict and promote
matter. Only as a result of several changes the hardening of positions and thus con-
of power in the region, the drying up of frontation. It is true that other foreign
Venezuelan money that flowed into friendly actors besides the USA are also involved
states, and the exodus of around four mil- in the Venezuela conflict, above all Cuba,
lion Venezuelans have Latin America’s China and Russia. However, their role is
countries become willing to regard the likely to remain limited due to narrowly
“Venezuela problem” as regional. defined priorities. Havana is likely to with-
In the meantime, however, the Venezuela draw its security experts from Venezuelan
crisis has become more complex not only institutions as soon as “21st century social-
at home but also abroad. Some actors inside ism” is no longer Venezuela’s state ideol-
and outside Latin America suspect that the ogy. China is Venezuela’s main creditor,
USA’s engagement in Venezuela hides a and its key concern is contractual security,
more comprehensive regime change strat- meaning the repayment of its loans. Mos-
egy which, in the longer term, will also cow, on the other hand, has a strong inter-
encompass Cuba and Nicaragua. est in keeping US interference in Venezuela
This so-called domino theory is lent to a minimum.
credence not only by statements from the
US President, his Vice President Mike Pence
and his national security advisor John Bol- Dialogue instead of Violence
ton. In January 2019, the Republican Elliott
Abrams, who had already held foreign The international engagement in the Ven-
policy positions under Ronald Reagan and ezuelan conflict should give priority to
George W. Bush, was appointed US envoy humanitarian protection, contribute to de-
for Venezuela. Abrams is a highly contro- escalation, focus on the Venezuelan actors,
versial figure in inter-American relations. and ensure that any dialogue process is em-
Serious accusations are associated with his bedded in Latin America. Europe would
name, such as the concealment of human have a role to play in supporting the regional
rights violations and the arming of groups framework.
in the Central American conflicts during Humanitarian protection. The international
the 1980s. In addition, Senator Marco community should work towards the Maduro
Rubio, the son of Cuban emigrants and regime refraining from repressive measures,
a proponent of a tough policy towards releasing political prisoners, and allowing
Havana, acts as an informal foreign policy humanitarian aid by neutral actors. For his
advisor (and sometimes government spokes- part, Guaidó should refrain from politicis-
man) on Latin American issues. Rubio rep- ing it. Simultaneously, his physical integ-
resents the state of Florida, which has a rity and freedom must be strictly protected.
large Latin American electorate. The path to holding democratic new elec-
SWP Comment 19
April 2019
6tions would then have to be smoothed question of whether Guaidó should be
in talks between government and opposi- recognised. Mexico and Uruguay are pur-
tion – a presidential election is essential, suing a middle course with the proposed
but parliament or regional executives could “Montevideo mechanism”, which is also
be elected at the same time. This would supported by Caribbean states and Bolivia.
mean moving away from political maxi- This mechanism is a four-phase process to
mum goals in favour of immediate humani- overcome the crisis – comprising dialogue,
tarian protection for the population. negotiation, commitments and implemen-
De-escalation. International pressure on tation – whereby new elections are not a
authoritarian regimes can certainly con- prerequisite for talks, but a possible out-
tribute to their erosion and give the oppo- come. The emphasis on building trust and
sition some protection. However, a policy an openness to results was one of the
of regime change from outside only leads strengths of the concept; it did not, how-
to sustainable democracies in exceptional ever, develop any momentum. Neither the
cases, even if the call for help came from two main countries nor the three personali-
inside the country. It is therefore impera- ties who were supposed to promote rap-
tive to avoid a situation where US engage- prochement between the conflict parties
ment on the Venezuela issue supplants were able to develop the necessary diplo-
the role of Venezuelan society and Latin matic traction.
America, giving the whole process the EU support for a Latin American group of
character of an externally imposed regime states. While the EU is divided on the ques-
change. If the conflict escalates, US support tion of recognising Guaidó’s interim presi-
for Guaidó must also be prevented from dency, it has nonetheless been able to form
leading to military intervention. The risk an international contact group, which joined
of violent chaos with an impenetrable net- in a meeting with other Latin American
work of numerous state, para-state, social countries in Uruguay on 7 February. The
and criminal actors would be extremely governments of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecu-
great. ador, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
National focus. In early 2019, the Venezue- lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
la conflict became highly internationalised. United Kingdom were represented.
A constructive approach to tackling the The divergent positions could provide a
crisis requires a focus on national actors. resource for forming a politically balanced
Guaidó’s fresh and dynamic charisma was small group of Latin American states,
decisive in upgrading the NA and convinc- whose involvement is acceptable to both
ingly representing it in public as well as sides and which opens a first channel of
remobilising the population. For the initial communication between the government
phase of dialogue with the regime, it is im- and opposition. The expectations and con-
portant to keep the circle of participants ditions to be established in this way should
small. During the transition process, how- not cover regime change, but the launch
ever, other national actors (such as trade of a dialogue process between the conflict
unions, associations, churches, the student parties. Such an initiative would not be the
movement, representatives of a critical first, but the context would have changed.
Chavism) should also be involved so as to This time the talks could be more confiden-
lay eventual foundations for the social tial and involve Cuba as a guarantor. The
anchoring of democracy and reconstruction group should present itself to the Maduro
in good time. government and the armed forces support-
Latin American embedding. Latin America ing it as a “peaceful alternative” to the
is today divided between those governments menacing option of a US intervention. The
that stand behind the Maduro regime and negotiations would have to specify con-
those that are pushing for change. In the cessions to the regime, which would cer-
latter group, there is no agreement on the tainly include more than a vague promise
SWP Comment 19
April 2019
7of amnesty. It should be clarified which
countries will accept the amnestied actors.
The EU should intensively facilitate such a
dialogue process, and provide advisory and
technical assistance to the Latin American
group.
Finally, those actors within the Venezue-
lan opposition and the international com-
munity who reject both military interven-
tion and negotiations should be reminded
© Stiftung Wissenschaft of a simple principle: anyone who is for
und Politik, 2019 change and does not want to fire a weapon
All rights reserved must speak out. This is the only real alter-
native to civil war.
This Comment reflects
the author’s views.
The online version of
this publication contains
functioning links to other
SWP texts and other relevant
sources.
SWP Comments are subject
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing.
For further information on
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/
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SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute for
International and
Security Affairs
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
Fax +49 30 880 07-100
www.swp-berlin.org
swp@swp-berlin.org
ISSN 1861-1761
doi: 10.18449/2019C19
Translation by Tom Genrich
(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 14/2019)
Dr Claudia Zilla is Head of The Americas Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 19
April 2019
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