What I Learned Since I Stopped Worrying and Studied the Movie: A Teaching Guide to Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove
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What I Learned Since I Stopped Worrying and
Studied the Movie: A Teaching Guide to Stanley
Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove
Dan Lindley, University of Notre Dame
Introduction tack may set off a doomsday device that pabilities and resolve, but also on the
will kill all life on the surface of earth.2 adversary’s values and emotional state
John Pike, former director of space The doomsday weapon is unrealistic. (hence, mind). Deterrence rests not only
policy at the Federation of American However, if one views it as analogous to on having missiles, bombers, and the
Scientists, once said to me: “Everything mutually assured destruction (the near willingness to use them, but also on
there is to know about nuclear strategy total destruction of the U.S. and Soviet knowing where to target them so that
can be learned from Dr. Strangelove.” Union inevitable in a real nuclear war), the enemy will fear the retaliatory at-
“Everything” is only a mild overstate- then almost everything that happens in tack. Deterrence is impossible if the en-
ment. I show Dr. Strangelove annually to the movie could have actually happened. emy fears nothing and does not mind
Notre Dame audiences to teach about The most important theme of the film is being dead and destroyed.
nuclear war, and I will continue to do so that it makes fun of the sad, perverse,
until nuclear weapons and war itself are and absurd reality that the U.S. and the
no longer problems. The film offers les- Soviet Union could destroy each other The Necessity of Communication for
sons about war, politics, and history and within 30 minutes. Unlikely and improb- Effective Deterrence
can serve as a teaching aid for classes in able, yes. Possible, yes. Deterrence only works if the threats
introductory international relations, for- Dr. Strangelove also highlights the intended to cause fear are communi-
eign policy, defense policy, causes of range of procedures and strategies in- cated to the adversary. No threats made,
war, organizational politics, and Cold volved in maintaining the nuclear stand- no fear created. This point is made by
War history.1 off. Why did the U.S. have bombers con- Dr. Strangelove when he says: “Yes, but
In this teaching guide I cover three stantly in the air, already well on their the . . . whole point of the doomsday ma-
tasks, all of which highlight concepts and way to their targets? Why might individ- chine . . . is lost . . . if you keep it a se-
themes in Dr. Strangelove. First, I use ual base commanders have had the au- cret! Why didn’t you tell the world, eh?”
the film as a springboard to discuss de- thority to use nuclear weapons at their (56:29).
terrence, mutually assured destruction, own discretion? Why were our forces on
preemption, the security dilemma, arms hair-trigger alert? Why might a dooms-
races, relative versus absolute gains con- day device seem to be a logical step? The Logic and Illogic of Nuclear
cerns, Cold War misperceptions and The single, simple answer to these ques- Deterrence
paranoia, and civil–military relations (in tions is the U.S.’s (and Soviet Union’s)
this order). Second, I put these concepts When mutually assured destruction
quest to make nuclear deterrence credi- (MAD) is achieved, it becomes illogical
into their historical contexts to teach ble. Think about deterrence and the
about Cold War history. Third, I show to use nuclear weapons, no matter the
need for credibility as you read this and scenario. If anyone attacks, all will get
how closely Dr. Strangelove parallels ac- watch the film.
tual events and policies. I conclude with clobbered. If one receives a first strike,
Finally, remember that the U.S. and there is little or nothing to gain from
the story of how an article by Thomas Russians can still easily destroy each
Schelling led to the making of the film. retaliation. Deterrence will have failed
other and that several other countries and retaliation risks further strikes and
have nuclear weapons. The Cold War is more fallout. Ironically, MAD makes
over, but nuclear danger is not. When nuclear weapons so illogical that deter-
Dr. Strangelove, Nuclear Stanley Kubrick made Dr. Strangelove in
Strategy, and the Cold War rence may actually suffer unless the
1963, there were 34,000 nuclear weapons credibility of suicide (or further damage)
Dr. Strangelove is a black comedy on earth. Today, there are 31,500.3 The can be restored. Two ways of making
about a renegade U.S. Air Force Gen- doomsday device is alive and well. retaliation credible involve automating
eral, Jack D. Ripper, who orders his retaliation and introducing illogic and
B-52 bombers to drop their nuclear uncertainty.
weapons on the Soviet Union. This at- The Definition of Deterrence
Automation ensures retaliation by tak-
The eccentric nuclear strategist Dr. ing humans out of the loop. A dooms-
Strangelove4 defines deterrence when he day machine fits the bill. Ruling out “hu-
Dan Lindley is assistant professor in interna-
says: “Deterrence is the art of producing man meddling” is crucial because one
tional relations and security studies at the Uni- in the mind of the enemy . . . the fear to must make credible the incredible threat
versity of Notre Dame. Lindley worked for sev- attack” (55:09).5 of suicide. Dr. Strangelove explains this
eral arms control and research organizations Because deterrence requires the cre- logic:
in Washington, D.C. before receiving a Ph.D. ation of fear, deterrence is arguably
from MIT. Lindley has published and spoken on more an art than a science. The enemy President Merkin Muffley: “But, how is
U.N. peacekeeping, internal conflict, the Cyprus it possible for this thing to be triggered
problem and Greco-Turkish relations, collective
must fear that the costs of attack will automatically, and at the same time
security, the U.S. intervention in Panama, the outweigh the benefits. Whether one can impossible to untrigger?” (54:42)
role of ideas in international politics, and SDI produce enough fear to prevent an at- Strangelove: Mr. President, it is not
contracting. tack depends not just on one’s own ca- only possible, it is essential. That is the
PSOnline www.apsanet.org 663whole idea of this machine, you know. credibility. The idea was for plan R to visors to President Kennedy wanted to
Deterrence is the art of producing in the be a sort of retaliatory safeguard.” strike Cuba during the Missile Crisis, an
mind of the enemy . . . the fear to attack. President Muffley: “A safeguard?” action which could have easily escalated.
And so, because of the automated and Turgidson: “I admit the human ele-
irrevocable decision making process which ment seems to have failed us here. But Had the U.S. engaged the Soviet Union
rules out human meddling, the doomsday the idea was to discourage the Russkies in nuclear combat, we would have gotten
machine is terrifying. It’s simple to under- from any hope that they could knock out more than our hair mussed. This is one
stand. And completely credible, and con- Washington, and yourself, sir, as part of a reason why it is dangerous to build first-
vincing. general sneak attack, and escape retalia- strike weapons (or defenses whose effec-
tion because of lack of proper command tiveness is uncertain). They lend cre-
Although it may not be fair to con- and control.”
demn the automated-response doomsday dence to semiplausible theories of
device on the basis of a single slip-up, victory that may persuade the president
Ripper’s attack order to his bomber
the film invalidates the wisdom of that to attack during a crisis.8
wing exemplifies the main tradeoff with
machine by highlighting its dangers. devolution of authority: one cannot de-
Would any state cede control of its volve authority and retain central control
weapons to computers and sensors?6 So at the same time. Loss of control is ex- Advocacy for Preemption
the problem remains: how to make the acerbated by the CRM-114 coded com- Although many believe that the U.S.
incredible credible. A fallback strategy is munications device which makes it would never consider preemption, or
to introduce illogic and uncertainty into nearly impossible to communicate with make it an official strategy, the U.S. has
nuclear strategy and nuclear command and recall the planes while in the air. never been willing to make a “no-first-
and control. Akin to throwing the steer- Only Ripper knows the code. Individu- use” pledge. Scott Sagan notes that one
ing wheel out the car window when en- ally, devolution and prevention of false of the U.S. government’s most important
gaged in a game of chicken, delegating communication seem like good ideas. early Cold War strategy documents,
to base commanders the authority to But when combined as part of one plan, NSC-68, embraces preemption. He ex-
issue strikes decentralizes military con- they render Ripper’s orders almost irre- cerpts: the U.S. should strike with its
trol and makes retaliation more likely. versible.7 “full weight . . . if possible before the
Deterrence is enhanced if nuclear Note too the influence of domestic Soviet blow is actually delivered” (1989,
bombs might explode whenever a situa- politics (Senator Buford). In the U.S., it 20).
tion becomes precarious. If the enemy is politically difficult to be seen as “soft Compare the language of Turgidson
does not know who controls the bombs on defense.” This makes it easier with that of General Curtis LeMay, a
and under what circumstances authoriza- (though not always easy) for military key Air Force strategist during the early
tion for their use “devolves” to lower hawks to corner opponents, win debates, Cold War:
levels of command, perhaps they would and influence policy.
not initiate combat in the first place.
Turgidson (34:52): “One, our hopes
This principle was particularly relevant
for recalling the 843rd bomb wing are
in Cold War-era central Europe, where The Precariousness of MAD During the quickly being reduced to a very low
there were thousands of tactical nuclear Late 1950s and Early 1960s order of probability. Two, in less than
weapons (tactical for the U.S., strategic fifteen minutes from now the Russkies
Consider the speech in which General
for the Europeans; most of these weap- will be making radar contact with the
Turgidson says: “We would therefore planes. Three, when the do, they are
ons were larger than the Hiroshima and
prevail, and suffer only modest and ac- going to go absolutely ape, and they’re
Nagasaki bombs). How would the Sovi-
ceptable civilian casualties from their gonna strike back with everything
ets know who controlled these weapons? they’ve got. Four, if prior to this time,
remaining force which would be badly
Would not the Soviets suspect that we have done nothing further to sup-
damaged and uncoordinated” (36:02).
lower-level commanders might gain con- press their retaliatory capabilities, we
He continues, defining “modest and ac- will suffer virtual annihilation. Now,
trol of nuclear weapons and be highly
ceptable”: “Mr. President, I’m not saying five, if on the other hand, we were to
motivated to use them if they risked be-
we wouldn’t get our hair mussed. But I immediately launch an all out and co-
ing overrun? How could a full-scale nu-
do say . . . no more than 10 to 20 million ordinated attack on all their airfields
clear war be stopped if nuclear weapons and missile bases we’d stand a damn
killed, tops. Uh . . . depending on the
in Europe started going off? (Remember good chance of catching them with
breaks” (36:56).
that many of our nuclear delivery sys- their pants down. Hell, we got a five to
If it is possible to imagine fighting a one missile superiority as it is. We
tems—including tactical bombers, cruise
nuclear war with acceptable casualties, could easily assign three missiles to
missiles, and Pershing missiles— could
then it is possible to imagine victory in a every target, and still have a very ef-
reach well into Russia, even all the way
nuclear war. And if victory is possible, fective reserve force for any other con-
to Moscow.) These uncertainties may tingency. Now, six, an unofficial study
then MAD does not exist and deter-
have been designed to create enough which we undertook of this eventuality,
rence is much weaker. Dr. Strangelove
fear to prevent an attack in the first indicated that we would destroy ninety
would say, there is not enough fear to percent of their nuclear capabilities.
place.
attack. While the definition of accept- We would therefore prevail, and suffer
This exchange (29:00) explains devolu-
able may be subjective, the danger is only modest and acceptable civilian
tion of authority:
highest when MAD exists, but advisors casualties from their remaining force
General “Buck” Turgidson: “Plan R is and politicians still think victory is possi- which would be badly damaged and
an emergency war plan in which a ble. As Geoffrey Blainey notes, “Most uncoordinated.”
lower echelon commander may order wars were likely to end in the defeat of ⴱ ⴱ ⴱ
nuclear retaliation after a sneak attack at least one nation which had expected
if the normal chain of command is dis- President Muffley: “General, it is
rupted. You approved it, sir. You must
victory” (1988, 144 – 45). the avowed policy of our country never to
remember. Surely you must recall, sir, In Dr. Strangelove, Turgidson advised strike first with nuclear weapons.”
when Senator Buford made that big striking first in the movie. In an ominous LeMay: “If I see that the Russians
hassle about our deterrent lacking parallel, several military and civilian ad- are amassing their planes for an
664 PS September 2001attack . . . I’m going to knock the shit out security dilemmas and preoccupied by and shows how they exacerbate relative
of them before they take off the ground.” relative gains concerns is just like the gains concerns. Examples of Jervisian
Robert Sprague, cochair of the U.S. or the Soviet Union as depicted in misperception include: thinking the en-
Gaither Committee: “But General LeMay,
that’s not national policy.” Dr. Strangelove— especially in these spe- emy is more evil than it really is; not
LeMay: “I don’t care, it’s my pol- cific instances: realizing one’s own faults; and not un-
icy. That’s what I’m going to do” (Kaplan derstanding how one is perceived by the
1. Ambassador De Sadeski explains
1983, 134). other side. Ripper’s fluoridation commie
why the Soviets built the doomsday
conspiracy (58:45) is the film’s prime
Not quite the same scenario, and device: “There are those of us who
example of exaggeration of evil;10 other
there are times when preemption might fought against it, but in the end we
examples include Turgidson’s analysis of
be wise— but the commander in chief is could not keep up with the expense
inferior Soviet technological capabilities
supposed to participate in launching a involved in the arms race, the space
and his view of Soviet perceptions of the
full-scale nuclear war. race, and the peace race. And at
U.S. He is not aware that his own gov-
Both scenarios illustrate the dangers the same time our people grumbled
ernment shares some of the blame for
of crises more generally. It is scary to for more nylons and washing ma-
the Cold War and its security spirals.
think of LeMay’s contemplated actions chines. Our doomsday scheme cost
and how likely it would be for the Sovi- us just a small fraction of what
ets to respond by alerting and preparing we’d been spending on defense in a Cold War Paranoia
their airborne/strategic forces in a crisis.9 single year. But the deciding factor
The ratcheting up of military prepara- was when we learned that your Many students (and others) who
tions is even scarier in light of the wide- country was working along similar watch Dr. Strangelove today did not live
spread disrespect for civilian authority lines, and we were afraid of a through the Cold War and thus may not
by top Air Force generals during the doomsday gap” (53:14). understand how closely the film reflects
Cuban Missile Crisis (see the proceeding Cold War-era attitudes and policies. In
2. General Buck Turgidson says: its portrayals of Turgidson’s paranoia
section on civil–military relations). The
“Gee, I wish we had one of them and the military’s strategies and tactics,
situation would be even graver if there
doomsday machines” (55:25). Dr. Strangelove barely exaggerates. The
were any LeMay counterparts on the
Soviet side. Each side might increase its 3. General Buck Turgidson says: “I American populace was paranoid and
alert levels to protect its forces, but the mean, we must be . . . increasingly the U.S. military maintained a hair-trig-
other side would see it as preparation on the alert to prevent them from ger nuclear defense posture for a num-
for war and be increasingly tempted to taking over other mineshaft space, ber of years. Senator Joseph McCarthy
launch a preemptive strike. Incentives in order to breed more prodi- conducted witch-trialesque hearings to
for such first strikes can increase drasti- giously than we do, thus, knocking denounce supposedly un-American com-
cally in a crisis, and such situations us out in superior numbers when munist infiltrators in American govern-
worsen when the leadership is not fully we emerge! Mr. President, we must ment, in Hollywood, and elsewhere. The
in control of its own state’s crisis-man- not allow . . . a mineshaft gap!” (95: House Un-American Activities Commit-
agement strategies, tactics, and assets. 10). tee (HUAC) pursued, denounced, and
ruined the lives of suspected but often-
Doomsday envy is an extreme but il- unproved traitors. On the other hand,
The Security Dilemma (and how it drives lustrative case. Turgidson wants one, the Soviet Union was more malevolent
arms races) even though having two is redundant than even its opponents dreamed (killing
and even having one is illogical. But its own citizens, degrading its environ-
The security dilemma exists because arms races are, in the language of game
what Country A does to improve its se- ment, conducting a huge biological war-
theory, mutual defection. They are not a fare program, etc).
curity usually diminishes the security of realization of common interest.
Country B. As Country A buys weapons, Most Americans remember the 1950s
the relative strength of Country B de- in terms of Pax Americana and white
creases. This security dilemma underlies picket fences, and they forget that it was
Relative Gains and Zero-Sum Games also a time when schoolchildren hid un-
the spiral model of arms races in which
each country builds up its arms strength Relative gains concerns and the zero- der their desks as they practiced re-
responding to the adversary’s buildup. A sum nature of the Cold War hindered sponding to a nuclear attack.
security dilemma is a zero-sum situation arms control and other forms of cooper-
in which any nation’s gain is another’s ation between the U.S. and the Soviets.
Turgidson epitomizes relative gains con- Civil–Military Relations
loss (Jervis 2000).
When nations are deeply suspicious of cerns. For example, he sees no value in Civil–military relations are important
each other, the zero-sum nature of their the transparency provided by Ambassa- because they determine who controls the
competition is even more pernicious. If dor De Sadeski’s presence in the war armed forces and the extent to which
each nation cannot trust the other to room and always calculates things in a the armed forces control the country. In
abide by agreements, then no agree- zero-sum or relative gains perspective. general, Americans are lucky in that
ments may despiral their arms races or Any advantage for the Soviets is bad for they have little to fear from military
tensions. Suspicions and the security di- us, and vice versa. Even after 90 years in coups or other rogue military actions.
lemma lead states to become preoccu- a mineshaft, after billions of people die, However, Dr. Strangelove’s depiction of
pied with their relative positions versus it is still us against them. poor civil–military relations is analogous
others. When concerns over relative po- to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Dr. Strange-
sition are high, chances for cooperation love asks the question: Is the President
Misperception
again decrease because cooperation by in control of the U.S.’s nuclear weap-
definition yields positive-sum results. Dr. Strangelove demonstrates Jervis’s ons? Generals Turgidson and Ripper do
Thus, a suspicious state facing severe “Hypotheses on Misperception” (1999) not respect the President, the President
PSOnline www.apsanet.org 665is not in control of Ripper, and Turgid- dered nuclear forces alerts, which were face the strategic choice of whether to
son borders on insubordinate. Compare sweeping and choreographed (DEFCON exploit the bomber launch by sending in
Ripper’s words to those of an Air Force 3 timed with President Kennedy’s tele- follow-on forces (see Turgidson quote
General describing politicians during the vised address to the nation about the about preemption). With missiles, the
Cuban Missile Crisis (25:55): crisis on October 22, and DEFCON 2 war would start much too quickly, while
on October 24). After the crisis, the one theme of Red Alert is how hard it is
Ripper: “Mandrake, do you recall what President credited these alerts with giv- to start a nuclear war. Schelling noted
Clemenceau once said about war?”
Group Captain (British) Lionel ing the U.S. “relative freedom of action” that this theme got a bit lost in the film.
Mandrake: “No. I don’t think I do sir, (Sagan 1993, 62– 67).12 This is quite an According to Schelling, Kubrick
no.” odd discrepancy with the generals’ ac- wanted to avoid insulting or attacking
Ripper: “He said war was too im- count of the President’s inaction and the U.S. Air Force. This was problem-
portant to be left to the Generals. When lack of strategic thought. Whatever the atic, as he could not start the war with-
he said that, 50 years ago, he might have case, poor civil–military relations are out a psychopathic officer. Kubrick’s so-
been right. But today, war is too impor-
tant to be left to politicians. They have obvious. lution was to exaggerate his characters,
neither the time, the training, nor the in- sometimes to the point of unbelievabil-
clination for strategic thought.” ity. Dr. Strangelove is comedically effec-
The Genesis of the Film tive because it alternates between real-
Air Force Lieutenant General David ism (such as in its military standard
Burchinal (U.S.A.F. Chief of Staff Dr. Strangelove is based on the novel
Red Alert, by Peter George, a former operating procedures and terminology)
LeMay’s deputy for operations), speaks and zaniness. According to Strangelove
about the Cuban Missile Crisis and the RAF major in military intelligence.
George conceived the idea to write the screenwriter Terry Southern, George’s
value of strategic superiority: Red Alert helped set the stage for dead-
book in the 1950s when a B-47 roared
“It [value of superiority] was totally over a U.S. airbase in the UK, sending a pan realism in the film:
missed by the Kennedy administra- precariously perched coffee cup crashing
tion . . . They did not understand what Perhaps the best thing about the book
to the floor. Someone quipped, “That’s was the fact that the national security
had been created and handed to them
. . . Fortunately, there was enough
the way World War III will start,” and regulations in England, concerning
panic in Washington when they saw George was off to write Red Alert. what could and could not be pub-
those missiles going in . . . they gave In 1958 someone handed Red Alert to lished, were extremely lax by American
only the broadest indication of what Thomas Schelling during an airplane standards. George had been able to
they wanted in terms of support for flight.13 The novel provided the first reveal details concerning the “fail-safe”
the President. So we were able at the aspect of nuclear deterrence (for ex-
public detailed scenario of how nuclear ample, the so-called black box and the
military level, from the JCS on down
(without involving the politicians) to put
war might start, and Schelling was so CRIM [sic] Discriminator)—revela-
SAC on a one-third airborne alert, to impressed that he purchased and gave tions that, in the spy-crazy U.S.A. of
disperse part of the force to civilian away around four dozen copies. Over the Cold War era, would have been
airfields [and take other alert measur- lunch with a magazine editor, Schelling downright treasonous. Thus the entire
es] . . . These were things that would be discussed writing an article on accidental complicated technology of nuclear de-
visible to the Soviets . . . We could terrence in Dr. Strangelove was based
nuclear war. The editor suggested com- on a bedrock of authenticity that gave
have written our own book at the time,
but our politicians did not understand
mencing the article with a review of the the film what must have been its great-
what happens when you have such a literature on WWIII. Schelling wrote the est strength: credibility.16
degree of superiority as we had, or they article and reviewed Red Alert, On the
simply didn’t know how to use it. They Beach, and Alas Babylon.14 Although the George was concerned that the film
were busily engaged in saving face for magazine rejected the article, the Bulle- would damage his reputation in Amer-
the Soviets and making concessions, tin of the Atomic Scientists soon pub- ica, particularly among his friends.17
giving up the IRBMs, the Thors and
Jupiters deployed overseas — when all
lished it,15 and London’s Observer news- Schelling wrote to reassure him, saying
we had to do was write our own tick- paper reprinted it. Stanley Kubrick that he liked the film and would wel-
et.” (Emphasis added.) happened to read both the newspaper come George as a friend were he to visit
A few moments later in this inter- story and the Bulletin article, which the U.S. Schelling wrote again to say his
view, U.S.A.F. General Leon Johnson prompted him to contact the publishers family would visiting London, but
(Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, of Red Alert in order to get in touch with George’s wife wrote back that George
National Security Council) said about the
political leadership: “They were very good
George. Kubrick, Schelling, and George had committed suicide.
at putting out brave words, but they didn’t then met to discuss how to make the Peter George killed himself in June of
do a bloody thing to back them up except movie. 1966, perhaps in part because he suf-
what, inadvertently, we did. When George wrote Red Alert, inter- fered “fear and pain about the threat of
To which LeMay confirmed: “That continental nuclear missiles did not af- nuclear war.”18 His fears about delega-
was the mood prevalent with the top civil- fect the world’s strategic balance of nu- tion of authority, advocacy for preemp-
ian leadership; you are quite correct”
(Kohn and Harahan 1988, 113–14, 119).11
clear power. However, by the time tion, and other issues were justified.
Kubrick convened the meeting to discuss Though Dr. Strangelove makes us laugh
Obviously, Burchinal, LeMay, and the movie, both ground- and submarine- at these issues, the threat of nuclear war
Johnson had no respect for the Kennedy launched missiles were gaining promi- persists to this day. After much scholar-
administration’s “inclination for strategic nence over bombs dropped from air- ship and history, the dangers of nuclear
thought.” These generals imply that they planes. Kubrick, Schelling, and George war and crises are more easily seen in
gladly ordered alert actions perhaps ear- tried to figure out how to start the war the year 2001. In the late 1950s and
lier and probably over and above those and play out the crisis with missiles. early 1960s, Peter George and Stanley
specified by the political leadership. They could not. Only bombers provided Kubrick were pioneers in helping make
In fact, President Kennedy and Secre- enough time to make all the War Room us aware of these dangers. We should be
tary of Defense Robert McNamara or- scenes possible. The President needed to grateful.
666 PS September 2001Notes
1. Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Wor- newspaper saying that Kahn was never the model. chive chronology of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for
rying and Love the Bomb, screenplay by Stanley Ku- Interview, September 8, 2000. One of Kissinger’s October 22, 1962–2:14P.M. at: ⬍www.gwu.edu/
brick, Peter George, and Terry Southern. Produced main arguments in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign ⬃nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/cmcchron3.html⬎ .
and directed by Stanley Kubrick. Based on the book Policy is that limited nuclear war can be waged and 10. Many in the U.S. did in fact fear that fluorida-
by Peter Bryant (a pseudonym for Peter George), is something for which we should prepare (New tion was a communist conspiracy. The only part of
Red Alert (New York: Ace Books, 1958). The Brit- York: Harper Brothers for Council on Foreign Re- Ripper’s speech that probably could not be cobbled
ish title for Red Alert was Two Hours to Doom. The lations, 1957). Owen Cote, former research assistant together from the New York Times is the bodily flu-
book based on the screenplay is: Peter George, Dr. and driver for Herman Kahn, said that the real role ids reference.
Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and model for Strangelove was a combination of Kahn, 11. JCS is Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. mili-
Love the Bomb (New York: Bantam Books, 1963. Kissinger, and Werner Von Braun, the rocket scien- tary. SAC is Strategic Air Command. IRBMs are
Published January, 1964). The film was scheduled tist. Interview, September 15, 2000. This composite Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, including
for release on December 12, 1963, but was not Strangelove seems most plausible. Thors and Jupiters.
shown until January 1964 due to President 5. All times given are DVD time, i.e., the time 12. DEFCON is short for Defense Condition, and
Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963. Ed. indicated on a DVD player as the movie plays, using describes the alert levels for U.S. forces. Sagan de-
note: when talking about Dr. Strangelove, the film, the Stanley Kubrick Collection from Columbia Pic- scribes the DEFCONs in detail on p. 64 and offers
the title is italicized. The character Dr. Strangelove tures, 1997. At 2:45 DVD time, the U.S.A.F. dis- additional scary tales on civil–military relations (and
is not italicized. A longer version of this guide is claimer starts scrolling up on the screen (the new a host of other accidents and “unintentional” poli-
available via: ⬍www.nd.edu/⬃dlindley/⬎. Special Edition, issued in 2001, scrolls the disclaimer cies) during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as do Allison
2. An extensive discussion of doomsday machines at 0:00 DVD time). All quotes from the movie were and Zelikow in Essence of Decision.
(excerpted almost verbatim in Dr. Strangelove) is taken from or verified using the continuity scripts at 13. Except where noted, this section is based on a
found in Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2 ⬍http://mach.me.queensu.ca/⬃bakhtiar/kubrick/⬎, telephone interview with Thomas Schelling, Septem-
ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, and at ⬍http://flo.mech.eng.usyd.edu.au/⬃norris/ ber 10, 2000. The Special Edition DVD says that it
1961): 144 –53. docs/strangelove.html⬎. An early version of the was Alastair Buchan, British strategist, who gave
3. Of the 31,535 nuclear weapons existent in the script is available at: ⬍www.lontano.org/FMA/arkiv/ Red Alert to Kubrick (and that Kubrick had become
year 2000, 10,500 belonged to the U.S., 20,000 to strangelove_production.html⬎. obsessed with nuclear war, reading some 50 books
Russia, 185 to the United Kingdom, 450 to France, 6. A theme of Kubrick’s, machines murder again on the subject). See liner notes and extra: “Inside
and 400 to China. Several hundred additional weap- in his 2001: A Space Odyssey when the HAL 9000 the Making of Dr. Strangelove.” See also Brian
ons were in the arsenals of Israel, Pakistan, and In- computer kills most of the crew of the Jupiter mis- Siano, “A Commentary on Dr. Strangelove,”
dia. U.S. weapons are in the active, inactive, reserve, sion. See Jerome Agel, ed., The Making of Kubrick’s ⬍www.visual-memory.co.uk/amk/doc/0017.html⬎.
and hedge categories. Russian weapons are assumed 2001 (New York: Signet Books, 1970). 14. The latter two books are by Nevil Shute (New
to be 50% active and 50% retired/reserve. See 7. The dangers of unplanned interactions of sub- York: William Morrow, 1957) and Pat Frank (Phila-
“Global Nuclear Stockpiles,” Bulletin of the Atomic units or subroutines in complex systems are explored delphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1959), re-
Scientists 56 (March/April 2000). A table in this arti- at length in Sagan, 1993. spectively.
cle shows the yearly nuclear stockpiles of the first 8. Classics on the Cuban Missile Crisis include: 15. The Bulletin article was “Meteors, Mischief,
five nuclear states from 1945–2000. It depicts the Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of De- and War,” 16: 7 (September 1960).
incredible “vigor” of the early atomic arms race. cision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2 ed. 16. ⬍www.terrysouthern.com/texts/
The active portion of the U.S. arsenal in the year (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999); Laurence t_strange.htm⬎.
2000 included 2,000 Intercontinental Ballistic Mis- Chang and Peter Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Cri- 17. Indeed, Dr. Strangelove was widely criticized
siles (ICBMs), 3,456 Submarine Launched Ballistic sis, 1962, A National Security Archive Reader (New when it was released as giving moral support to the
Missiles (SLBMs), 1,750 bomber-delivered/launched York: The Free Press, 1998); Robert F. Kennedy, Soviets. According to Kubrick: “When Dr. Strange-
missiles and bombs, and 1,670 nonstrategic missiles Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis love came out, a New York paper ran a review un-
and bombs. “U.S. Nuclear Forces 2000,” Bulletin of (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Ernest R. May der the head MOSCOW COULD NOT BUY
the Atomic Scientists 56 (May/June 2000). and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: In- MORE HARM TO AMERICA.” Interview by Tim
4. There is considerable debate about who was side the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis Cahill in Rolling Stone magazine, 1987, ⬍http://
the role model for Dr. Strangelove. At some points, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); reynolds.me.queensu.ca/⬃bakhtiar/kubrick/
Dr. Strangelove seems closely modeled after Her- and Sagan, Limits of Safety. stone.html⬎. According to Terry Southern: “Colum-
man Kahn, an early prominent nuclear strategist. 9. Sagan argues against the traditional view that bia was embarrassed by the picture and tried to get
Dr. Strangelove parrots Kahn’s work and worked for the Soviets did not alert their nuclear forces during people to see Carl Foreman’s The Victors instead.
the Bland Corporation, while Kahn worked for the the Cuban Missile Crisis. He acknowledges that the They would steer ticket buyers away from Strange-
Rand Corporation. Thomas Schelling argues that evidence either way remains scanty, but says that love and try to get them to see The Victors. At the
Henry Kissinger may have been the real model for interviews and declassified U.S. documents suggest time we thought we were going to be totally wiped
Dr. Strangelove. He notes that no one who knew that Soviet forces were on partial, if not higher, lev- out. People would call up the box office and be told
Kahn would think of him as the Doctor. Kahn was els of alert. Sagan, Limits of Safety: 142– 45. The So- there were no seats for Strangelove and asked if they
“a great, big, ebullient, roly-poly guy with a great big viets alerted Warsaw Pact Forces. NATO forces, in would like to see The Victors instead. Gradually, the
sense of humor . . . who loved New York delis” and contrast, were purposely not put on very high alert buzz along the rialto built word of mouth in our fa-
who wanted people to think about how to stop a (DEFCON 3) due to allied pressure, presidential vor.” ⬍www.altx.com/interviews/terry.southern.html⬎.
nuclear war in midcourse. Even more convincingly, directive, and fears of the SACEUR, Lauris Nors- 18. Brian Aldiss, “Kubrick—The Writer,” Guard-
Schelling said that Peter George wrote to a London tad, about escalation. See the National Security Ar- ian Unlimited, 14 March 1999.
References
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Essays, Third ed., ed. G. John Ikenberry. New Kohn, Richard H., and Joseph P. Harahan, eds. dents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Prince-
York: Addison-Wesley. 1988. Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with ton University Press.
——. 2000. ”Offense, Defense, and the Security Di- Generals Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W. Johnson,
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