ZUMA RE-ELECTED TO LEAD SOUTH AFRICA FOR A SECOND TERM

ZUMA RE-ELECTED TO LEAD SOUTH
   AFRICA FOR A SECOND TERM

                                 Cape Town, 29th December 2012

                                   Arnold Wehmhoerner
                           FEPS Correspondent for Southern Africa

For further information please contact Ernst STETTER, FEPS Secretary General at ernst.stetter@feps-
        europe.eu or David KITCHING, FEPS Policy Advisor at david.kitching@feps-europe.eu

              FEPS Rue Montoyer 40 B-1000 Brussels +32 2 234 69 00 | www.feps-europe.eu

At its 53rd congress in the year of its 100th anniversary on 18th December 2012 in Mangaung
(Bloemfontein) the ANC delegates re-elected Jacob Zuma as party president. This means he will most
probably lead the ANC into the next presidential and parliamentary elections to be held around April
2014.

The ANC is again placing the fate of the country into the hands of a man who escaped prosecution on
serious fraud and corruption charges after improper manipulation of the National Prosecution
Authority. The ANC voted for a man whose financial adviser supported him with over 4 million Rand
before he was sent to jail for corrupt dealings and the ANC wants to be led by a man who used 250
million Rand of state money to build his private luxurious village. Already in 2009, when he became
president of South Africa for the first time, a leading columnist wrote “that he would go naked into
the world as the leader of our country”1.

This choice happens at a time when columnists write about “the moral decline under Zuma” 2 or
about “the dismal signs of a failing state”3. At a time when The Economist runs a front page report on
South Africa headed “Cry the beloved country: South Africa’s sad decline”; and the World Bank
reports that the country could do better. During his term in office, corruption, fraud and
“tenderpreneurship” became entrenched in the public service, the educational system declined and
internal security crumbled. While he has been in charge the government has tried to undermine the
independence of the courts, police, press, and prosecution authorities.

What went wrong? Can the blame be put on a single person, Jacob Zuma? Or was the decline of the
once admired ANC of Nelson Mandela from a liberation movement to an organisation of vested
interests to be expected?

Jacob Zuma is a child of the ANC. He spent his entire life with this organisation and the delegates
knew very well who they elected in 2007 to replace Thabo Mbeki. After the harsh rule of Mbeki they
expected a leader more in touch with the party and the man in the street, someone who is more
“African” by leading as a moderator. However, during his term it became obvious that to be popular
with the party ranks is not enough to lead an emerging country in the tough conditions of a global
economy. Decisions, even unpopular ones, were required instead of dragging issues through various
committees and cabinet meetings.

1 Allister Sparks: Is President Jacob Zuma competent? In Cape Times 21.11.2012
2 Adriaan Basson: Zuma exposed, review in Cape Times 30.11.2012
3 Alex Borraine in Cape Times 26.11.2012

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From August 2012 onwards, during the wave of strikes in the mining sector which extended to
informal strikes in the agricultural sector, the state president remained mostly silent and indecisive.
The ANC alliance partner COSATU called for a “Lula” factor hoping that, like in Brazil, their leader
would turn the tide. But Zuma is not Lula. During his first term he has not given the country the
necessary policy direction; and that a state president who escaped conviction of corruption just on
formal grounds would not be the ideal person to fight corruption in the public sector is obvious.

In the months before the congress, during which branches had to discuss their preferences, media
reports made the public believe that there would be a repetition of a leadership change like at the
congress in Polokwane 2007 when President Thabo Mbeki was replaced by Zuma and even forced to
step down as state president for the remainder of his term. Kgalema Motlanthe, Deputy President,
was the candidate of the opposition in Mangaung and he declared his willingness to replace Zuma.
But he refused Zuma’s offer to run as his deputy knowing well that he would lose everything if
defeated. Weeks before the congress it became clear that Zuma through his “interlocking system of
patronage”4 ruled the party. Only three out of nine provinces were in favour of Motlanthe. None of
Motlanthe’s supporters were elected to one of the six leading positions in the party; Zuma is in full
control.

Cyril Ramaphosa, former secretary general of the Mine Workers Union who became a business
billionaire decided in the last minute to run as Zuma’s deputy. But his election left a huge question
mark. Is he really willing to give up his business interests as he is required to do by the constitution if
he becomes a member of the government in the position of deputy state president? Observers
believe that this decision is to be made not in 2014 after the parliamentary elections but much
earlier because it is expected that Motlanthe is going to resign as deputy state president in early
2013 because it has become difficult for him to continue to work together with Zuma in government.

Cyril Ramaphosa was Nelson Mandela’s favourite as his successor but the party pushed for Thabo
Mbeki. Does his re-emergence in top politics after nearly 20 years mean that he is aiming to become
Zuma’s successor as president of the party in 2019 and then state president after the following
presidential elections? To have Ramaphosa on his side is of tremendous importance for Zuma.
Zuma’s approval ratings in urban areas declined to 49% (Motlanthe in comparison: 67%)5 and the
urbanized provinces Gauteng and Western Cape voted against Zuma. Ramaphosa could keep the
urban and professional electorates in the ANC which fear that Zuma is moving the party “founded by

4 Allister Sparks: Decoding the Ramaphosa game plan in Cape Times, 19.12.2012
5 Nic Dawes: Cyril the key to urban voters in Mail and Guardian, 21.12.2012 – 3.1.2013, page 3

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an educated, anti-tribalist African elite towards ethnic, regional and traditional politics.”6 Gwede
Mantashe, the re-elected secretary general of the ANC, thinks that Ramaphosa could be “a de facto
prime minister”7 (like Thabo Mbeki under Nelson Mandela). In such a position Ramaphosa could
implement the National Development Plan and give the Zuma administration the badly needed
economic competence and authority for economic reforms. But can the authoritarian traditionalist
Zuma and the constitutionalist businessperson Ramaphosa work together in one government? Zuma
is an opportunist who has no difficulty to go along with Ramaphosa’s ideas as long as this keeps him
in power and enables him to win the next elections in 2014 with a substantial margin. But can
Ramaphosa avoid being drawn into the Zuma patronage system?8

The ANC congress resolved that nationalisation is not an aim in itself and that state ownership should
only be increased in strategic sectors where it is deemed appropriate. The party prefers to raise
money from companies through the tax system instead of nationalisation. This principle gives the
government the necessary flexibility and may pacify the left wingers in the party and the youth
league. The party calls for integrity and the fight against graft. In this context, the party intends to
intensify cadre and leadership training. There have been many declarations on the fight against
corruption in the past and it remains to be seen if action will follow. A commission will be set up to
examine the role of the provinces and to investigate if their number can be reduced; the same
applies for municipalities with low revenue bases. Zuma’s election is also a defeat for the removed
president of the ANC youth league, Malema, who had called for the election of Motlanthe. It seems
there is no return to politics possible for him in the near future.

Would Motlanthe and his team have provided better leadership to the country? During his short
term as state president Motlanthe proved to be a loyal soldier to the ANC stepping down for Zuma as
requested. As state president and deputy president under Zuma he showed solid administrative skills
without making any far reaching political or economic decisions. During the recent wave of strikes in
the mining and agricultural sectors he did not make any particular efforts for its solution despite
having previously been the secretary general of the Mine Workers Union and therewith possessing
the necessary experience and skills for handling labour conflicts. To stand up to Zuma and to refuse
to be drawn into Zuma’s slate as deputy shows his moral integrity. He also refused to be a candidate
for the NEC (National Executive Committee), and is now without any party mandate.

6 Nic Dawes, 2012
7 The South African constitution does not provide for a prime minister, the president has an executive function.
8 Nic Dawes, 2012

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During the electoral conferences in the provinces the ANC showed a good degree of open discussion
and democratic procedures, although some conferences became violent and court cases on the
legitimacy of delegates are still pending. For outsiders it is still incomprehensive why Zuma, who is
seen by many less suitable for the office of president than Mbeki or Motlanthe, was able to twice
defeat his opponents. What has happened to the party which so overwhelmingly (75%) voted for
him?

Corruption did not start with Zuma. The arms deal saga began already during President Mbeki’s term
and continues to haunt the party up to today. It seems that this fall opened the watergates of
corruption at all levels of government. From then on, for many in the party status, income and
opportunities for nepotism became more important than the former ideals of the liberation
movement. The moral decline was facilitated by the deployment of many inexperienced cadres into
high government positions also as a result of affirmative action. These cadres then worked on
patronage networks instead of exerting the necessary administrative skills and controls.

To become a member of the ANC during apartheid when the party was banned involved considerable
personal risk. This was a natural positive filter for the caliber and convictions of party members.
Today many join the party in order to have access to jobs in public institutions. Since the Polokwane
congress in 2007 the membership of the party grew from slightly more than 620,000 to more than
1.2 million this year. Especially in Zuma’s province, KwaZulu-Natal, membership trebled to 330,000
because the ANC made tremendous strides in the Inkatha Freedom Party areas. Members from
other provinces “were taken aback by KwaZulu-Natal delegation’s lack of political intellectualism.”
Long standing ANC members complain that the former Inkatha members “have introduced a culture
of political intolerance and violence.”9 According to ANC’s own internal investigation 38 party
members have been killed since January last year.

Nowadays, factions in the ANC are not led by different ideological positions or convictions. They are
coalitions of interest groups fighting for government positions. In 2007 the Zuma faction, in opposing
Mbeki, made the public and probably many ANC delegates believe that they - if victorious - would
pursue a more leftist policy in contrast to Mbeki’s “capitalist” approach. After Zuma attained power,
however, South Africa’s economic policy remained unchanged. This time, during the discussions for
or against Zuma in the party branches members did not even pretend to argue over labels of right or
left.

9
    Niren Tolsi: Mantashe doesn’t walk the talk in Mail and Guardian, 21.12.2012 – 3.1.2013

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The moral decline of the ANC during the process from a liberation movement to a party in power was
to be expected. But the extent to which this decline has happened so far was certainly unexpected
for many. And this must be blamed on the leadership which failed to provide positive role models for
the public and party, which did not properly educate the new emerging elite or exert the necessary
administrative controls, and which left corrupt and inefficient ANC cadres unpunished. With the re-
election of Zuma this trend will not be reversed but unfortunately one has to fear that this process
will accelerate.

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