Blurry Counterterrorism - A Chance for Russia, A Risk for Europe - German Council on Foreign Relations
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German Council on Foreign Relations
No. 7
March 2021
COMMENTARY
Blurry
Counterterrorism
A Chance for Russia,
A Risk for Europe
The European Union should actively rorism in the European Union (EU) and
address the problematic use of coun- its member states. The Russian regime
terterrorism by non-European states uses counterterrorism (CT) measures
– especially Russia – and make it a and operations to increase repressive
permanent aspect in developing coun- policies at home and enhance its inter-
terterrorism strategies and agendas. national influence abroad. This misuse
Miriam Heß
Project Officer Failing to address the misuse of coun- should motivate actors in the EU’s CT
Security and Defense Program terterrorism sends the wrong signal not sector to address ways of dealing with
only to those with reason to fear geo- Russia in light of its problematic con-
political interference by their countries ception and execution of CT.
of origin, but also to states that pursue
“anti-terrorist-operations” in the form RUSSIA’S
of abductions and executions abroad. CONTROVERSIAL
CONCEPTION OF
The terrorist attacks in Paris, Dres- COUNTERTERRORISM
den, Nice, and Vienna in autumn 2020
served as dramatic reminders of the Russia’s problematic conception and
enduring threat that Islamist terrorism execution of CT and Putin’s geostra-
poses to Europe. In a timely response, tegic interests in international CT co-
the European Commission published operation are both widely acknowl-
its new counterterrorism agenda in edged and discussed. In March 2020,
early December 2020. Jakob Hedenskog, deputy and research
director of the Swedish Defence Re-
More specifically, however, the murder search Agency (FOI), presented a com-
of French teacher Samuel Paty near parative analysis that mapped Russia’s
Paris on October 16 also highlight- international CT engagement and re-
ed two pressing issues that are often porting on problematic interests in co-
overlooked: first, the Chechen origin operation with Russia.
of the attacker and, second, Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s subsequent A vivid example of a domestic “an-
offer to support the fight against ter- ti-terrorist-operation” in Russia is theNo. 7 | March 2021 2
COMMENTARY Blurry Counterterrorism
EXEMPLARY
NUMBERS
OF FOREIGN RUSSIA
FIGHTERS
FROM EUROPE
AND RUSSIA
That the majority of
North Caucasian
Islamists departed from EUROPE
Europe is often overlooked
100
175
600 SYRIA
600
1,200
From Germany 2,400 IRAQ
From France 1,200
From the Chechen
diaspora in Europe COMBAT From Kabardino-Balkaria
ZONE OF ISIS
From Ingushetia
From Chechnya
Source: Neil Hauer, “Chechen and North Caucasian Militants in Syria,” Atlantic Council, January 18, 2008: https://www.atlanticcouncil. From Dagestan
org/blogs/syriasource/chechen-and-north-caucasian-militants-in-syria; Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now
exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR, January 26, 2015: https://icsr.info/2015/01/26/foreign-fighter-to-
tal-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s
Second Chechen War (1999–2009) de- ly hold leadership positions with- THE EU’S DEAD
clared by Putin after a series of bomb- in the UN’s CT architecture. Vladimir ANGLE: THE CHECHEN
ings in Moscow for which he held Voronkov serving as Under-Secretary DIASPORA IN EUROPE
Chechen terrorists responsible. An in- General of the United Nations Office
ternational example for a military en- of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) is just For Europe, international concerns
gagement termed an “anti-terror- one prominent example. about Russia’s CT strategy also have a
ist-operation” is Russia’s intervention strong internal component that needs
in the Syrian civil war. Given the prov- That Russia understands the fight to be given more attention: the impor-
en fact that Russia allowed many do- against extremism and terrorism tance of people from the North Cauca-
mestic extremists – especially from the mainly in the context of its own in- sus for CT efforts and deradicalization
North Caucasus – to travel to the Syri- ternational engagement – both mil- work in Europe. This became appar-
an battlefield, observers doubt its stat- itary and diplomatic – but certain- ent as the Second Chechen War caused
ed motive for engaging in that war. ly not in the context of strengthening many people from the North Caucasus
civil society, deradicalization, and dis- to flee to Europe and in the context of
Russia’s international CT agenda also engagement work is, at the very least, the so called Islamic State in Iraq and
has diplomatic dimensions. Through problematic. The Commission on Se- Syria (ISIS). Russian-speaking fighters
its engagement in the Shanghai Coop- curity and Cooperation in Europe, also constitute one of the largest groups of
eration Organisation and as a perma- known as the US Helsinki Commission, foreign supporters in ISIS. This is not
nent member of United Nations Se- addressed these concerns in an expert only due to people leaving Russia itself;
curity Council, the Russian regime is hearing in June 2019 under the illustra- according to Europol and information
continually pushing to play a leading tive heading “Russia’s Counterproduc- from the International Crisis Group,
role in the international fight against tive Counterterrorism.” some 2,400 members of the Chechen
terrorism. Russian officials current- diaspora in Europe traveled to Syria.No. 7 | March 2021 3
COMMENTARY Blurry Counterterrorism
The threat posed to Europe by net- Furthermore, other incidents point to- gument to suppress domestic political
works of returning foreign terror- ward operations and attacks that pur- opposition. This fact shapes the con-
ist fighters was demonstrated when sue nationally-driven agendas against text of efforts associated with coun-
a Chechen was arrested in Italy in “domestic terrorists” abroad. These tering terrorism and creates a relevant
2017 for terrorist recruitment after he include the murder of a Georgian of difference in how people in Europe
fought in Syria between 2014 and 2015. Chechen origin in Berlin in August and Russia perceive CT.
Another argument for the relevance of 2019 – the so-called Tiergartenmord,
radicalized North Caucasians for CT, for which strong evidence suggests the It is crucial for affected individuals to
deradicalization, and disengagement involvement of the Russian regime – understand the difference between
work in Europe is the aforementioned and the assassination of a Chechen re- CT efforts and deradicalization work
murder of French teacher Samuel Paty, gime critic in Austria in 2020. and be able to comprehend the con-
which underlines the imminent threat text in which contact persons are en-
stemming from homegrown radical- THE EU RISKS gaging with them. Given that many
ized Chechens in Europe. UNINTENTIONALLY of these individuals are used to see-
PREVENTING AND ing states behave and use their pow-
One of the biggest challenges for ac- IMPEDING ITS er differently, it is already challenging
tors in deradicalization work engag- DERADICALIZATION WORK to build required relationships of trust.
ing with North Caucasian individuals is Addressing CT and deradicalization
their deeply rooted mistrust, particu- Naturally, deradicalization efforts are work together – as in the EU’s new CT
larly against governmental and security not independent from CT efforts. Yet, agenda – only increases confusion and
authorities. This form of mistrust often a key distinction – one especially rel- results in isolating retreats from both
occurs in individuals from authoritarian evant to this context – is that derad- exit and counselling work. Instead, the
countries – for example, Turkey – but is icalization work relies heavily on civ- EU must support its civil society de-
particularly strong in the case of North il society actors. Russia, in particular, radicalization work by building a poli-
Caucasians. Practitioners link this to is more than skeptical about civil soci- cy environment in which aspects of CT
their frequent experiences of violence ety’s participation in CT and, thus, pri- and deradicalization work are likewise
and abuse perpetrated by domestic se- oritizes a state-led and state-centric supported but can also be clearly dis-
curity actors back in Russia. approach. Additionally, authoritarian tinguished from each other in terms of
regimes, like Russia, use CT as an ar- objectives and purposes.
THE FOUR PILLARS OF THE EU’S COUNTERTERRORISM AGENDA
Subordinating prevention and the countering of extremism to counterterrorism
Share information and cooperate across disciplines
Anticipate
EU‘s Counterterrorism Agenda
and levels to better anticipate existing and emerging
threats in Europe
Prevent by addressing and better countering
Prevent radicalization and extremist ideologies before
they take root; prevent attacks from occuring
Protect Europeans by continuing to reduce
Protect vulnerabilities (particularly in public spaces) and
modernize the management of external borders
Rely on the EU’s operational support agencies
Respond (Europol and Eurojust) and an appropriate legal
framework to respond to attacks
Source: European Commission, “A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond,” December 9, 2020: https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/pdf/09122020_communication_commission_european_parliament_the_council_eu_
agenda_counter_terrorism_po-2020-9031_com-2020_795_en.pdfNo. 7 | March 2021 4
COMMENTARY Blurry Counterterrorism
TOWARD MORE search on problematic key interests in
INTEGRATED international CT cooperation and com-
APPROACHES IN EU parative analyses of differing under-
COUNTERTERRORISM standings of terrorism are also already
taking place. These studies, however,
The European Commission should need to be further supported and ex-
clearly address problematic concep- tended so that they inform EU policy-
tions and executions of CT in non-Eu- makers. Monitoring potential strategic
ropean countries. CT depends on interests in CT measures must become
security, political, and judicial cooper- a permanent control mechanism when
ation, as well as on other effective in- developing CT agendas to prevent mis-
formation-sharing networks. Also, the use, increase trust, and prevent the
application of CT measures according unintended impediment of deradical-
to EU standards must be ensured – at ization work.
least on European soil. Failing to con-
sider and address misuse of CT sends
the wrong signal: not only to those
with reason to fear geopolitical inter-
ference by their countries of origin,
but also to states that might consider
pursuing “anti-terrorist-operations” in
the form of abductions and executions
abroad. In order to better integrate its
approaches to counterterrorism, the
EU should take two steps:
1. Investigate and monitor the prob-
lematic conception and execution
of counterterrorism efforts
Addressing the problematic concep-
tions and executions of CT strategies
and geostrategic interests in interna-
tional CT cooperation must not only
take place through research, but also
on a policy level by the European Com-
mission. Monitoring and investigat-
ing other countries’ understanding of
terrorism and the related definition of
terrorists needs to be a permanent as-
pect of developing and formulating CT
efforts. An expert committee can assist
in implementing such policies; includ-
ing central stakeholders from the re-
spective countries can help to maintain
transnational dialogue. This is partic-
ularly urgent in the case of Russia but
certainly also holds true in the context
of other countries, such as Turkey.
2. Support, fund, and initiate critical
studies on counterterrorism
The EU already supports research to
enhance deradicalization efforts on
national, regional, and local levels. Re-No. 7 | March 2021 5
COMMENTARY Blurry Counterterrorism
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Auswärtige Politik e.V.
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