Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings- The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan
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F E B RUA RY 1 , 2 0 1 5
Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice
Reuters
Breaking the Hourglass:
Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—
The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan
Kimberly Howe, Elizabeth Stites, and Danya Chudacoff
Cover image: Many civilians left their homes in rebel-held areas of Aleppo out of fear of the bombs [Reuters]
©2015 Feinstein International Center. All Rights Reserved.
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2 Feinstein International CenterAcknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) of the US Department of State for their generous support for this research project. We would also like to thank all of the dedicated members of governments, UN bodies, and international and local NGOs for sharing with us their time and insights over the course of this study. The organizations that agreed to participate in our study sample were extremely open, collaborative, and interested in the process: we would have no report without your support and enthusiastic input. We are particularly grateful to the Syrian organizations that participated, as individuals from these organizations—often working long hours on a volunteer basis and under life-threatening circumstances—always somehow made time to speak with the research team. In addition, we want to acknowledge all the individuals and organizations that participated in the workshop in Gaziantep, Turkey in September 2014. We thank the FIC administrative and finance team and the Tufts legal office for their support and efforts. The final report was strengthened by the insights of Rebecca Thompson, Program Coordinator at Mercy Corps, as well as Wendy Guyot, Razan Abd El Haque, and Courtney Brown. Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 3
Contents
Executive Summary 5
I. Introduction 11
II. Literature Review 14
III. Findings 23
A. Remote Management in Practice 23
B. Partnership 25
C. Identifying Potential Local Partners 30
D. Capacity 31
E. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 34
F. Donor Requirements 37
G. Donor Withdrawal 39
H. The Importance of Trust 41
IV. Conclusions 45
V. References 48
4 Feinstein International CenterEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overview Methods
This study set out to examine partnerships This study used qualitative methods to gather
between international and local organizations longitudinal data over nine months on
engaging in humanitarian action in remote partnerships between international and local
management and insecure settings. The study organizations providing cross-border
was motivated by the lack of systematic research humanitarian action from Turkey into northern
in areas where international organizations have Syria. We used selective sampling to identify five
limited access due to insecurity or lack of Syrian organizations and their international
permission from host governments. While most partners who were willing to participate in
large international organizations have developed monthly interviews. We also interviewed 27
guidelines around partnerships, these partnership additional international and local organizations
approaches tend to be designed for development responding to the Syrian conflict in order to
contexts or when humanitarian space is gather a range of perspectives. In Iraqi Kurdistan,
accessible to outsiders. we collected data from key informants and
representatives of current or defunct
We used the case of northern Syria, specifically organizations that had provided assistance in the
focusing on cross-border assistance from Turkey, early 1990s. The data from Kurdistan were
and complemented this study with a historical particularly important to understanding the
review of Iraqi Kurdistan during and after the process and repercussions of donor withdrawal.
US-led Operation Provide Comfort in the early
1990s. The objective of this research was to We transcribed, coded, and analyzed a total of
improve the evidence base on how international 123 interviews. In late September 2014, we
organizations could most effectively partner with presented the preliminary findings from this
local organizations in remote management analysis to a group of more than 60
settings. We pursued four specific areas of representatives from Syrian, Turkish, and
inquiry in order to fulfill this objective: i) How international organizations in Gaziantep, Turkey.
do international organizations identify local This facilitated workshop allowed for “ground-
partners? ii) How do international organizations truthing” of the initial findings and provided an
assess and build the capacity of these partners? iii) opportunity for study participants and broader
How are monitoring, evaluation, accountability, stakeholders to comment, correct, and contribute
and learning (MEAL) conducted in these to the findings. The data from this workshop are
settings? iv) How do local partners prepare for incorporated into the final report.
eventual donor withdrawal? The findings from
this research aim to inform and improve the A literature review on operations in remote
ways in which international and local management and humanitarian and development
organizations work together in settings of remote partnerships complemented the field work. In
management or insecurity, with lessons for addition, we benefitted from analysis by
country donors, United Nations agencies, colleagues from the Feinstein International Center
international organizations, and local partners. at Tufts University who provided insight on
This work was funded by the US Department of remote management in insecure settings, with
State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and specific examples from Afghanistan and Somalia.
Migration (PRM).
Our methods adhered to principles of
confidentiality, and thus no information was
shared between partner organizations working
on Syria. We also do not identify any of the
organizations or individuals who participated in
this study.
Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 5Findings access by armed groups is a form of power.
Access relates closely to risk, and the ways in
The findings from this study are meant to be which different actors view access correlates to
broadly applicable to settings of remote their tolerance for risk. For example, those local
management or extreme insecurity. organizations with the best access to populations
in need are those that also represent the greatest
The first finding points to important tensions risk to international actors, as access requires
inherent within situations of remote moving through highly insecure areas and
management. Remote management is defined interfacing with armed groups. For the most
by the United Nations Office for the part, the international organizations we
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) interviewed were aware of these trade-offs and
as the withdrawal for security reasons of the underlying tensions, and were willing to take
international staff and the transfer of program the associated risks in order to provide assistance
responsibilities to local staff or partner to beneficiaries. There is less evidence that the
organizations. The increase in remote donors who fund the international organizations
management contexts is a result of several trends share this approach and are willing or able to
in Western aid practice: i) involvement in areas take on this same level of risk.
that were previously off-limits due to insecurity,
sovereignty, or lack of national interest; ii) a Our findings on partnerships in remote
growth of partnership approaches in the management settings illustrate some of the
humanitarian sector; and iii) increased reluctance unique challenges and considerations for
on the part of international organizations or their international organizations seeking to operate in
donors to take security risks. these environments. Options for local partners
are generally more limited, and many candidates
While remote management has been used on a may be unregistered in their home or host
temporary basis for humanitarian operations in a country, be extremely new, and have little
number of contexts, including Sudan, Iraq, organizational or operational experience.
Afghanistan, and Somalia, the case of Syria is Diaspora organizations may also exist as potential
unique in that remote management has been the partners; these organizations are more likely to
predominant form of operation since early in the have a proven track record and characteristics
crisis and is likely to continue for the duration of appealing to international organizations (such as
the conflict. financial systems, language skills, and personnel
systems). On the other hand, diaspora
Our study demonstrates that remote organizations are likely to have significantly less
management involves a series of trade-offs and credibility with or access to the affected
compromises, both for local and international communities.
organizations and between the international
organizations and their donors. These trade-offs Partnership models between international and
and compromises result in tensions in the local organizations vary in motivation, contract
partners’ relationship and affect the ability of the type, type of assistance, the value of the contract,
partnership to provide assistance. These tensions as well as which organization drives the agenda.
occur primarily around issues of access and In addition to these dimensions, this study
include questions of security, risk, and reporting identified a set of additional variables that held
requirements, including monitoring and strong influence over partnerships in the Syrian
evaluation. context. These include: how the international
organization defines its end goals, the
The Syria case study brings into stark clarity the international organization’s capacity to partner
contentiousness and complexity around access. with local organizations, the stability of the
The study found that access (like beneficiary international organization within the local
needs) is constantly shifting. Access is highly context, and the country donor’s level of comfort
relational and depends on local networks and with risk.
reputations. Access is arbitrary, and control of
6 Feinstein International CenterThis study found that remote management misunderstandings, misalignment in priorities
contexts require a partnership strategy in which for capacity building, and poorly targeted
international organizations consider that: resources.
partnerships take time; there is no checklist for
finding a good partner; and partnerships are Techniques for capacity building identified in
enhanced when the operational environment is this study include trainings, workshops,
collaborative and trusting, and there is an partnership focal points, staff secondments, and
understanding that the context is constantly pilot projects. Trainings are the most common
changing. mode of capacity development, and are largely
driven by the priorities and needs of the
There are a number of ways to identify international organizations. Local organizations
potential partners in remote management often object to this top-down approach and
settings. The most common methods in the case complain that the trainings are time-consuming
study were through contacts with other and not always relevant to their needs. From the
international organizations, participation in perspective of local organizations in the Syria
coordination meetings that included local case study, having a dedicated partnership focus
organizations, and contact initiated by the local point person within the international partner
organizations. These methods are relatively organization was by far the most effective means
passive and prioritize those local organizations of building capacity. These individuals served as
with the skills and connections that enable them resources for the partner organization and helped
to make contact with international actors. More them to navigate the complex terrain of
active methods for partner identification reduce international funding and requirements.
bias and may improve results. These methods
include stakeholder mapping, use of pre-conflict The study demonstrated how monitoring and
connections, networking through existing evaluation (M&E) takes on heightened and
contacts or social media, participating in regional perhaps disproportionate importance in remote
and local events, and interviewing local actors. management settings. This is due both to the
All of these methods require time, outreach, and logistical difficulties of conducting M&E in a
the existence of specific skills or experience conflict zone, and to the awareness by all parties
within the international organization. Collective that the continuation of the partner relationship
means of partner identification on the part of the depends heavily on the quality of more general
international organizations could offset some of reporting, including M&E. A range of
the required resources and also decrease innovative M&E approaches has been developed
counterproductive competition among agencies. around the world for settings in which access is
limited or simply irregular. These include
Our study examined the question of capacity in INGO-based methods such as call centers, GPS
depth and found discrepancies regarding the shipment tracking, and regular debriefing
meaning of capacity, the elements of capacity meetings with local partners. Community-based
considered to be the most important, and the methods include crowd sourcing, broadcasts,
best approaches for building capacity. The case complaints boxes, and consulting local
studies for this research highlighted two types of communities. Local partner methods include
capacity that were most prevalent and important: photos and videos of distributions, web-based
organizational capacity and operational capacity. remote project monitoring, daily verbal reports,
Organizational capacity refers to management, and peer observations. Over the course of the
governance, and decision-making structures. study, third- party monitoring was increasingly
Operational capacity refers to delivery of viewed as the gold standard for remote
programs and projects. International monitoring and evaluation. Each of these
organizations were found to be much stronger in approaches has its benefits and drawbacks, and
organizational capacity, while the strength of none can fully address the difficulty of
local organizations was in operational capacity. monitoring operations in a contested and rapidly
This difference at times leads to changing conflict environment.
Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 7The challenges of MEAL were clear in the Syria outcomes depended on a number of factors,
case study, and our recommendations arise from including the extent of core funding held by
these. Local organizations felt that the MEAL an organization prior to withdrawal. Many
agenda was pushed by their international organizations in Iraqi Kurdistan coped with
partners, with little attention to the quality of the cessation of donor funds by scaling back
the assistance being delivered. There is a their operations or costs, including laying off
perceived asymmetry in the emphasis of staff or shifting to a volunteer model. Others
accountability to the donors versus became dormant but did not close altogether;
accountability to the local beneficiaries. Different some of these have reemerged in response to
donors have different reporting requirements the influx of Syrian refugees and Iraqi
that must be juggled. These demands create internally displaced persons (IDPs) in recent
heavy time burdens on local partners with little months.
organizational capacity, volunteers as staff, and
dangerous working environments. In addition, Donors can mitigate the negative impacts of
third-party monitors were at times insensitive to eventual withdrawal by prioritizing the longer-
the culture or the conflict dynamic. However, term sustainability of their local partners. This
this study found that local organizations can be done through attention to both
increasingly streamlined MEAL into their own organizational and operational capacity building,
programming, as the merits of MEAL were a focus on the capacity of the institution as
appreciated in their own right, apart from donor opposed to simply that of individuals within the
requirements. organization, support to longer-term projects,
provision of core funds, and efforts to support
Aside from requirements specific to MEAL, alliances among local groups to contribute to a
donor requirements were found to strain local robust civil society.
organizations where they have the least amount
of capacity, specifically, in organizational One of the most important lessons from the
capacity. As well, international organizations Syria case study has to do with the role of trust
often do not factor security into their in partnerships. The study showed that trust
requirements. Often local organizations said that was an absolutely essential element of the
they are faced with the dilemma of receiving partnering relationship, but trust served
international support or putting their staff, different functions for international and local
vendors, and beneficiaries at security risks to organizations. In addition, international actors
comply with donor requirements. At the same often placed less emphasis on trust than did
time, this study highlighted that international their national counterparts. International
organizations—including country donors—are organizations have multiple levels of safeguards
receptive to receiving feedback from local and systems in place to ensure minimal losses
organizations about the problems they encounter and smooth operations. In contrast, for local
with requirements. Communication and trust organizations, trust is the primary and most
between partners was highlighted as a important system for maintaining both
cornerstone to effective partnerships. organizational and operational success. While
trust is helpful to international organizations, it
The study examined donor withdrawal is ultimately replaceable, because they are more
primarily through the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. invested in and reliant upon a system of checks
Organizations employed a variety of coping and balances. This difference in perspectives
mechanisms in response to the sudden or means that the international organization does
gradual withdrawal of their major donors. not fully appreciate the extent to which trust
These approaches ranged from complete and trust-building matter to the local
closure to diversification of funding sources to organization.
the adaptation of the organization’s mission
and goals. The likelihood of any one of these
8 Feinstein International CenterConclusions • Design their requirements to prioritize
security for both national and international
The true equity of partnerships between local actors over other reporting considerations,
and international actors can be questioned when by emphasizing that security is the top
one side has all the money and holds most of the priority for all actors, having clear
decision-making power. This dynamic is more contingency plans in place to take into
nuanced in a remote management setting account the shifting security conditions,
because while the international players continue ensuring that security costs at the local level
to hold all the money, the local players hold all of (including guards, adequate offices, trainings,
the access. The international actors have no insurance, etc.) are included in project grants
choice except to partner if they wish to be for local organizations, and encouraging
involved in humanitarian response. open feedback about emerging conditions.
• Solicit information from both international
By its very nature, remote management places and local fund recipients in order to fully
into stark contrast the roles and priorities of the understand the potential difficulties with
international and local actors. The primary role meeting reporting requirements.
of international organizations in remote • Be clear about the conditions under which
management settings is to manage their local they would consider withdrawing funding,
partners. The primary role of local partners is to in order to build trust and open channels of
deliver goods and provide services to people. It is communication along the partnership chain.
personal for local actors because the conflict is • Work with international partners to
affecting their friends, families, neighbors, and streamline and simplify requirements to the
countrymen. They are concerned with saving extent possible in order to reduce the burden
lives, securing livelihoods, and preparing for a on local partners.
better future. With these tensions and differences
in mind, the study concludes with International organizations should:
recommendations on creating and maintaining • A ssess their motivations for choosing to be
successful partnerships in remote management present and active in response to a given
settings. emergency. Involvement should be based on
having a comparative advantage such as an
Specific Recommendations established presence or history in the region,
strong regional networks, staff with advanced
Bilateral and multi-lateral donors should: language skills, or expertise and
• Recognize that partnerships in remote demonstrated success in remote management
management contexts are fundamentally settings.
different from other settings. Donors should • A ssess their motivations for partnering and
take this uniqueness into account before their capacity to partner before initiating the
supporting international organizations that partnership processes.
work with local partners. • Encourage cooperative approaches with
• Evaluate their tolerance for risk (including other international actors in order to
the potential that organizations will interface decrease the time and energy required to
with armed groups and also that flexibility manage partnerships with local
may be needed regarding standardized organizations. These approaches could
requirements) before supporting partnership include identification of local actors, joint
initiatives or operating in remote capacity assessments, and opportunities for
management settings.1 shared learning. In addition, cooperative
1
or assistance on evaluating risk, see OECD, 2011, “Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of
F
Success?” http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/48634348.pdf; and M. Jacquand and S. Ranii, 2014, “UN Development
System Risk Management in Fragile States,” Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York, cic.
nyu.edu/sites/default/files/un_dev_risk_mgmnt_rannii_jacquand_1.pdf.
Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 9efforts could focus on harmonizing reporting organizations should ensure that outside
formats, MEAL systems, and financial actors (such as third-party monitors) are
management systems. sensitive to the local context.
• Hire dedicated partnership staff as focal point • Provide core funds to local partners in order
persons who can serve as mentors to local to promote longer-term sustainability. Local
organizations. partners should gradually be encouraged to
• Use active methods to identify local partners, procure goods locally, support projects with
including mapping, research through social longer-term horizons, build civil society
media outlets, reliance on local experts, alliances, and develop their own contingency
interviews with community members, and plans.
contact with pre-conflict networks. • Provide fora for local partners to learn from
Collective approaches across international one another. These discussions and
organizations can greatly improve this exchanges—on what works, what does not,
process. Avoid passive methods for partner and how challenges can be overcome on the
identification that can lead to bias and less ground—will often be more useful than the
effective partnerships. trainings organized by international actors.
• A ssess and build both the organizational and • Recognize that cultural differences—
operational capacity of local partners. This including in modes of communication,
holistic approach will help local working, and conditions that build or erode
organizations prepare for eventual donor trust—may lead to divergent understandings
withdrawal. of the same situation.
• Design their requirements to prioritize • Recognize that in contexts such as Syria
security for local organizations over other many local organizations are newly formed
reporting considerations. This can be done and may need additional support to
by emphasizing that security is the top understand the language, processes, and
priority for all actors, having clear architecture of international partners and the
contingency plans in place to take into broader humanitarian system.
account the shifting security conditions,
ensuring that security costs at the local level Local organizations should:
(including guards, adequate offices, trainings, • Be willing to learn and accept feedback from
insurance, etc.) are included in project grants their international partners and donors.
for local organizations, and encouraging • Be honest with their international partners
open feedback about emerging conditions. about security concerns, difficulty meeting
• Recognize that trust is a central component donor requirements, and other challenges.
to successful partnerships and that trust can • Recognize the importance of core costs and
serve different functions. International salaries and communicate these needs to
organizations should engage in active their partners and potential partners.
measures to build trust with the their local • Familiarize themselves with humanitarian
partners, such as holding regular in-person principles and the ethos behind these
meetings to exchange information and ideas, principles.
ensuring transparency in decision-making,
and establishing robust feedback mechanisms
specifically about the partnership process.
• Devote attention to both accountability to
beneficiaries and accountability to donors.
Monitoring and evaluation in remote
management settings is a complicated
process, and one that should focus on the
quality of outcomes as well as the processes
of humanitarian action. Field staff from local
organizations should be included in M&E
protocols and processes, and international
10 Feinstein International CenterI. INTRODUCTION
Overview where humanitarian space is accessible to
outsiders. Furthermore, existing best practices
This study set out to examine partnerships and recommendations for partnerships are rarely
between international and local organizations informed by systematic or evidence-based
delivering humanitarian assistance in remote research.
management and insecure settings. Motivation
for this study emerged from informal We conceptualized the concerns of humanitarian
conversations with humanitarian actors along the actors in remote management contexts as akin to
Turkish-Syrian border in the spring of 2013. an hourglass, with the top sphere representing
Members of international organizations the magnitude of international resources
expressed concern, confusion, and frustration earmarked for the crisis, and the bottom
with the lack of tools, expertise, and guidance representing the volume of need on the ground.
available to them as they attempted to provide In between these two spheres is a bottleneck that
humanitarian assistance from Turkey into Syria. limits the flow of resources from the
Organizations were increasingly required to international community to war-affected
consider remote partnership models as security in civilians. While efficient resource flow is a
opposition-controlled areas deteriorated and challenge in any humanitarian situation, a
access became progressively restricted. While preliminary scoping study allowed us to theorize
many international organizations have developed that this pinch point in the center of the
internal partnership guidelines, most approaches hourglass was a function of both the operating
are not designed for emergency situations, but environment as well as the partnership process.
rather, for longer-term development contexts or
Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 11The study set out to answer the following and representatives of donor countries concerned
research question: with Syrian civil society development and
humanitarian assistance. In total, the study
What are the best and most effective ways for comprised of 123 interviews that were conducted
international and local organizations to partner in in English or Arabic between November 2013
remote management settings? and September 2014.
The four primary objectives of the study were to The study began with a global literature review
document the most effective methods and on partnerships in insecure settings. Next,
processes for: interviews with a range of INGOs at the
• Identifying potential local partners headquarters level were conducted about
• A ssessing and building capacity of local organizational partnership practices. We then
organizations conducted interviews with a large sample of
• Engaging in remote Monitoring, Evaluation, government donors, government implementers
Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) (private contractors), UN bodies, INGOs, and
• Preparing local organizations for donor local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs)
withdrawal concerned with humanitarian action or civil
society development. These organizations were
Each of these objectives has been focused on remote all involved in elements of cross-border
management settings, which are commonly defined as operations from Turkey into Syria.
complex humanitarian crises where international
organizations, or international staff, have limited To examine trends and organizational
access due to a lack of permission from the host experiences more deeply, we invited five Syrian
government and/or extreme insecurity. organizations and their international partners to
participate in a paired longitudinal case study.
Design This approach allowed us to regularly interview
various members of each local organization and
To answer the research question and meet the their international partners over a period of nine
objectives of the study, two country cases were months. Interviews were open-ended and
explored: Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Syria semi-structured, and questions were similar in
case focused on contemporary cross-border theme across meetings. Syrian organizations
humanitarian operations running from Turkey interviewed included: two grassroots
into Syria. The Iraqi Kurdistan case examined organizations, two diaspora organizations, and
the development of civil society in the years three arms of a provincial council.2 International
following Operation Provide Comfort in 1993, organizations interviewed included: one country
and thereby represents a historical analysis for the donor, two government contractors, two
purpose of this study. INGOs, and one organization that received
funding from Gulf donors.3 All interviews and
Methods were qualitative and consisted of an conversations were held under the condition of
extensive review of secondary sources and strict confidentiality, including between partners.
qualitative interviews conducted with While each side of the local-international pair
representatives of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish was aware of its counterpart’s participation in the
grassroots organizations, Syrian diaspora study, we did not share information between the
organizations, Syrian local councils, international members of the dyad. The identity of any
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), individuals or organizations that participated in
representatives of various United Nations bodies, this study has not, and will not, be shared.
2
or this study, we define grassroots organizations as local non-governmental organizations that are not registered in Syria.
F
Diaspora organizations are those run by Syrians but registered outside Syria. A more detailed and nuanced explanation is in
Section III B.
3
As local organizations rely on more than one source of funding, our paired case study approach included more than five
international organizations.
12 Feinstein International CenterIn total, we interviewed representatives from 46 border from Turkey to Syria, and was attended
different organizations throughout the course of by more than 60 organizations. Participants
this study. By no means did we interview all included representatives of Turkish
organizations currently operating cross-border organizations, donor countries, government
from Turkey into Syria or all organizations that implementers, INGOs, Syrian local councils,
exist in Iraqi Kurdistan. It should be noted that diaspora organizations, and grassroots
Turkish organizations were not actively sought organizations. The purpose of this workshop was
out for inclusion in this study. The scoping study two-fold. First, we aimed to present our main
revealed that partnerships between host country results and to “ground-truth” these findings
NGOs and local organizations are fundamentally with national and international actors, including
different from those between international and study participants. Second, we facilitated a
local organizations. With a wish to reduce feedback session about the study’s core findings.
variance and increase generalizability of our Feedback garnered from the workshop has been
findings to other remote management settings, integrated into the results presented in this
the study focused particularly on Syrian report.
grassroots and diaspora organizations and
international actors. The sample size is not The next section, Section II, provides a detailed
representative in a strict sense. Rather, we literature review on remote management and
engaged in continuous snowball sampling, and partnership practices in a variety of settings.
sought to interview all organizations willing to Findings from the research are presented in
speak with us. Given the length of the study, Section III and are organized around the main
some organizations that were initially reluctant objectives of the study. Section IV provides a set
to be interviewed later sought us out for of recommendations for local and international
inclusion in the study. For the paired case study organizations, as well as donor countries. Given
sample, we purposively included a range of that the voices of local organizations are rarely
organizations that represented cross-border heard in these fora, we have intentionally
operations both on the local side (grassroots, highlighted their perspective in this report.
diaspora, local councils) as well as the
international (government donor, implementer,
INGO). Furthermore, we strove to interview
several members of each case study organization
in order to triangulate perceptions and
information.
The choice to study cross-border operations
from Turkey into Syria, rather than from Jordan,
Iraq, or Lebanon into Syria was motivated by
three factors. First, the majority of cross-border
assistance into northern Syria is procured from
Turkey. Second, international and Syrian
organizations are higher in number and greater
in visibility in Turkey than in Jordan, Iraq, and
Lebanon. Third, the remote management focus
of the research necessitated examining assistance
to opposition-controlled areas of Syria, and
Turkey shares the longest border with non-
regime-controlled areas.
In September 2014, after analyzing all interview
material, we held a workshop in Gaziantep,
Turkey. This workshop was open to all local and
international organizations operating cross-
Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 13II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview local governments and organizations—
partnerships and partnering arrangements have
A common point of consensus across much of taken on greater importance in the operational
the literature on contemporary humanitarian strategies and programming plans of aid
aid intervention is that conflicts are becoming interventions across the board.
more frequent, intense, and complex. The
greater instability—and growing sense of While there has been growing enthusiasm for
insecurity—is seen as a consequence of the partnering and localization across the donor,
global trends and imbalances that followed the international, and local stakeholder spectrum,
end of the Cold War and the rise in the rollout of these practices has varied across
globalization. In that window of time, the organizations, contexts, and field locations. At
humanitarian aid community has witnessed a the headquarters level, Western international
dramatic shift, not only in the types of conflicts organizations (particularly INGOs) are paying
and emergencies to which it must respond, but more attention to their partnership strategies by
also in the ways in which it can and is expected commissioning reviews, research, and best
to intervene in order to protect and assist the practice guidelines to help instruct field offices
world’s vulnerable populations. on working with local partners. However, in
the field, standard operating procedures for
Two separate but complementary trends have engaging local partners can be vague,
helped define this shift. The first, a direct disjointed, or missing entirely. As with
response to rising insecurity, has been remote operating procedures and practices in multiple
management, wherein intervening aid sectors, this is especially true in contexts of
organizations have responded to heightened risk emergency response, active conflict, and rapid
by withdrawing key senior international staff response.
and upper national management from the
conflict zone, and instead relying on local staff Evaluations of humanitarian aid operations in
or partners to continue programming at Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan, and Somalia
reduced levels. The second is an industry trend demonstrate that the mechanisms for sustaining
towards the localization or local ownership of operations through remote management in the
programs. The latter implies a greater role for context of war are largely ad-hoc, often taken at
local stakeholders, including governments, civil the field level, and without a standardized
society organizations, the private sector, and industry or between-country approach for
beneficiaries in the agenda setting, engaging local actors. The more recent case of
implementation, financial management, and Syria presents many of these problems and is in
overall “ownership” of development efforts in many ways more extreme.
their respective countries as a means for
guaranteeing sustainability. Unlike the above-mentioned interventions,
where international organizations’ emergency
The transition implies a new role for the major response efforts shifted to remote management
international organizations that have throughout the conflict, the need to operate
traditionally been the primary implementing remotely was the case with Syria almost from
bodies in complex emergencies. These (mainly the outset. The Syrian government’s strict
Western) international organizations have regulation of entry into the country, as well as
operated through their own strategic visions as its long-standing policies of obstructing civil
the purse holders, technical experts, and drivers society in general, meant that not only could
of change. But as the impetus to carve out a international organizations, particularly
greater role for local stakeholders has grown— INGOs, not easily enter Syria at the onset of
in part due to increased demand on the part of the crisis, but also that those that were present
14 Feinstein International Centerprior to the crisis were heavily regulated and In the context of humanitarian aid interventions,
had few local partners to work with, even as the remote management is different from
scale of violence and suffering increased.4 “decentralized programming,” which generally
refers to vesting more decision-making power at
Today, the majority of international aid going the local level, either through local staff or
into Syria is happening cross-border from partners, for a variety of operational needs.10
Turkey.5 The implication for international Remote management, however, implies a more
organizations is that they must contend not only serious shift in operational approach, usually due
with cross-border programming, operations, and to insecurity. Authors Donini and Maxwell
logistics, but also issues of operating cross-line provide a broad definition of remote
between armed opposition groups and the management as: “the withdrawal of senior
regime. Local partnerships have been key to international or national humanitarian staff from
these operations, providing access for many the location of the provision of assistance or
international organizations to areas they could other humanitarian action—as an adaptation to
not otherwise reach due to security or political insecurity, and a deviation from ‘normal’
concerns.6 For their part, local organizations— programming practice.”11 The Humanitarian
many of which were only established in response Practice Network (HPN) of the Overseas
to the conflict—have been able to engage with a Development Institute (ODI) defines remote
wide network of international donor bodies and management as “a type of operation carried out
humanitarian agencies for the first time. Many of from a distance” whose nature is a “reactive,
these local organizations have developed their unplanned position due to deteriorating security
capacity while working with or alongside conditions.”12 In both cases, however, the
international organizations.7 implication is that remote management is a
“temporary” adaptation and usually an ad-hoc
Remote Management in the Literature measure rather than an intended approach.13
While operating remotely has been a tactic in a Remote management is largely viewed as “less
range of humanitarian aid interventions in the than desirable” due to its reactive nature and the
past, discussion regarding “long-term” remote physical and logistical distance between upper
management began only in the past decade.8 The management and field operations and staff. It is
complex crises in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq assumed that international organizations concede
pushed consideration of remote management as a at least a degree of quality and impact in favor of
recurring programmatic theme to the fore, as sustaining some level of operation.14 In insecure
international organizations found themselves and limited-access contexts, “remote
increasingly entrenched in remote management management programming has the important
practices.9 benefit of allowing some aid programming to
4
. Slim and L. Trombetta, 2014, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis. Co-ordinated Accountability and Lessons
H
Learning (CALL) Initiative,” IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group, New York, p. 45.
5
Ibid., p. 21.
6
Ibid., pp. 45–46.
7
Ibid., p. 43.
8
A. Donini and D. Maxwell, 2014, “From Face-to-Face to Face-to-Screen: Remote Management, Effectiveness and
Accountability of Humanitarian Action in Insecure Environments,” International Review of the Red Cross 95, pp. 383–413.
9
A. Stoddard, A. Harmer, and J. S. Renouf, 2010, “Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote Management of
Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas,” Humanitarian Outcomes, New York, p. 14.
10
Donini, p. 3.
11
Ibid., p. 3.
12
A. Harmer, A. Stoddard, and K. Haver, 2010, “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments, Good Practice Review 8 Update,”
Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 83.
13
Ibid., p. 5.
14
Ibid., p. 3.
Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 15continue, but it entails a number of hazards and “Moreover, the dearth of agency guidelines and
disadvantages.”15 Specific challenges may include procedures on the subject seems particularly
difficulty returning to direct programming (a problematic given how widely the practice is
“remote management trap”); potential impacts used in insecure settings.”20
on overall quality of programming; difficulties in
monitoring, reporting, and ensuring beneficiary However, research evaluating the growing
accountability; and added costs.16 complexity of conflicts over the last two decades
demonstrates that remote management is often
One of the greatest concerns of remote protracted and extends far longer than initially
management involves the transfer of security anticipated.21 In his evaluation of the political
risks from international to local staff. Given the and operational implications of providing
increase in attacks against foreign aid workers in humanitarian assistance in Somalia via remote
recent years (up by 60 percent by some management, Bradbury writes, “Some have
estimates17), it is understandable that agencies concluded that remote management is likely to
pull out international staff members. Shifting become more common practice among
implementation to local staff and partners humanitarian agencies in the future … and are
assumes that these individuals face fewer security taking the opportunity to embrace this way of
risks.18 However, studies of remote management working and to learn from the experience.”22
in contexts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and However, even with a growing body of
Somalia point out that while the nature of experience, it is still true that “most
threats to international versus national staff vary, organizations have no formal policy on remote
the local staff often face extreme risks without management; any policy or good practice
the benefit of support or resources often available guidance that exists has been driven by the
to international actors. In addition, “the rising field.”23
attack rates for national [staff ] correlate[s] with
the increased use of remote management Risk Management
operations by international agencies.”19 In other An important conversation happening alongside
words, while nationals were already at risk, the the growing debate on remote management is
shift in modalities further increases local staff’s that of risk management. Spearheaded primarily
exposure to security threats. by a group of UN bodies, a new approach to
security and risk management, known as the
The perception that remote management is a “enabling approach,” is quickly gaining ground
temporary constraint on programming has likely in conversations surrounding humanitarian aid
contributed to the paucity of best-practice in insecure environments. Unlike the prior
literature and policies for operating standards. approach that highlighted risks and respectively
“Across the community of aid agencies, the limited activities, this new method concentrates
general lack of contingency planning and instead on program objectives and aims to
strategic preparation for remote management “identify all possible measures to allow for secure
scenarios greatly exacerbates the challenges delivery against those goals.” In short, it is a
involved,” Harmer et al. write in a recent study. narrative of “how to stay”—and how to continue
15
Stoddard, “Once Removed,” p. 10.
16
Stoddard, “Once Removed,” pp. 8–9.
17
Stoddard, “Once Removed,” p. 10.
18
A. Stoddard, A. Harmer, and K. Haver, 2006, “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations,”
HPG Report 23, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 38.
19
Stoddard, “Once Removed,” p. 28.
20
Harmer et al., 2010, “Operational Security Management in Violent Environments,” Humanitarian Practice Network No. 8,
Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 96.
21
Stoddard, “Providing Aid,” p. 22.
22
Bradbury, M., 2010, “State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia,” Feinstein International
Center, Tufts University, Medford, p. 10.
23
Stoddard, “Once Removed,” 16.
16 Feinstein International Centerto implement at appropriate levels—rather than represents the height of the aid industry’s sense of
“when to leave.”24 The focal shift is based on a insecurity and anxiety.28 “There is little point in
security approach that emphasizes weighing the an aid agency being present in a country if its
benefits and possibilities of sustained delivery staff remain behind compound walls or cloistered
against risks, instead of the previous “automatic” in safe areas and capital cities, unable to work
security triggers that denied such flexibility.25 with the people in need,” Egeland states.29
Effective and well-organized remote
In the 2011 OCHA report, “To Stay and management can, therefore, represent a middle
Deliver,” Jan Egeland writes: “The objective for ground that helps secure an organization’s
humanitarian actors in complex security on-the-ground presence by effectively leveraging
environments, as it is now widely recognised, is local networks while taking into consideration
not to avoid risk, but to manage risk in a way the safety and security of international or
that allows them to remain present and effective similarly threatened staff.
in their work. This shift from risk aversion … to
risk management represents the culmination of Types of Remote Management
the past decade’s evolution in thinking and
methodology for programming in insecure While the common feature in remote
conditions.”26 management is an element of distancing between
international staff and the conflict zone with an
The OCHA document indicates that as the increased reliance on local and national staff,
practice of remote management grows, it can there are several mechanisms for engaging as
form part of the narrative of “stay and deliver” in such. Donini and Maxwell identify various
ways that emphasize the appropriate engagement sub-types of remote management in emergency
of local and national actors, even from a distance. humanitarian aid interventions as:
“While [remote management] poses many • Remote programming
challenges for effective and accountable • Remote control
programming, some areas of good practice are • Remote support
emerging. These include investing in highly • Remote monitoring
localized staff structures for field offices, • Remote partnership30
recruiting staff members in consultation with
their communities, and appointing nationals The above represent different ways of adapting
from the diaspora as international staff,” Egeland to insecurity and sustaining programming at a
writes.27 distance, but their common feature is the space
between those making decisions and the
Importantly, standardized approaches to remote intended beneficiaries.31 Furthermore,
management can also provide an alternative to evaluations of remote management practice
“bunkerization,” which is another recent highlight the importance of distinguishing
industry trend that has garnered much criticism. between “deliberate local partnering and
“Bunkerization,” or the retreating of capacity-building … and reactive operational
international aid workers into fortified modifications,” which can both fall under the
compounds of “private international space,” guise of remote management.32
24
J. Egeland, A. Harmer, and A. Stoddard, 2011, “To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security
Environments,” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p. 7.
25
Ibid., p. 8.
26
Ibid., p. 2.
27
Egeland, p. 2.
28
M. Duffield, 2012, “Challenging Environments: Danger, Resilience and the Aid Industry,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 5, p.
475–492 (p. 477).
29
Egeland, p. 2.
30
Donini, p. 22.
31
Ibid., 22.
32
Stoddard, “Providing Aid,” p. 38.
Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 17While it is important to keep in mind the and projects. This includes local involvement in
challenges and consequences inherent in remote design informed by indigenous expertise, and
management, the various modalities for remote ensures viability and sustainability of programs
partnership and the added security they can afford and projects. The conversation around
are likely to remain features of humanitarian aid partnerships has progressed considerably. Today,
response in emergency contexts in the near to partnering strategies are advocated on many
mid-term future. The mechanisms by which fronts: top-down from donors, bottom-up from
these operations are undertaken therefore local organizations and beneficiaries, within
deserve a full review, building upon prior INGOs, from host governments, as well as by
experiences, their impact, and the nascent third-party stakeholders committed to helping
literature that is beginning to grow. promote partnerships across sectors.
Partnerships Policy Shifts
In 2014, USAID announced a new framework in
The diversity of the humanitarian its approach in engaging local actors as part of its
community is an asset if we build on our commitment to sustainable development. By
comparative advantages and complement placing the focus on local capacity and
each other’s contributions. Local capacity is communities, USAID’s Local Systems
one of the main assets to enhance and on Framework “contributes to the ongoing
which to build. Whenever possible, transformation of the way the Agency does
humanitarian organizations should strive to business by defining clear and practical steps
make it an integral part in emergency toward realizing a vision of development that is
response. Principles of Partnership, 200733 locally owned, locally led and locally
sustained.”35 The framework forms part of a new
In 2007, the Global Humanitarian Platform, a reform agenda on behalf of the US development
consortium of UN and non-UN organizations, arm called “USAID Forward,” which sets forth a
endorsed the Principles of Partnership as a new approach for development and aid by
commitment to making a greater and more focusing on dynamic and high-capacity local
equitable space for local partners in the global partnerships, including institutions, civil society,
humanitarian arena. The commitment forms part and the private sector.36
of an important and growing conversation on
partnerships in international relief and The Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network
humanitarian aid over the last decade. Indeed, (MFAN), an important coalition of international
whereas the argument for working with local development and foreign policy practitioners, has
partners has been advocated since the 1980s, it has been instrumental in helping the US government
only been in the last 10 to 15 years that any define this agenda. Building upon industry
meaningful or concrete steps have been taken, knowledge, the coalition advocates in its 2014
particularly at the headquarters level, to make platform, “The Way Forward,” that US aid and
local partners fully engaged actors in operations.34 development efforts should have significantly
more commitment to developing country
The principle aim in advocating in favor of ownership in three areas: ownership of priorities,
partnerships is to aid in the localization and ownership of implementation, and ownership of
community buy-in, or “ownership,” of programs resources.37 This is based on full engagement of
33
lobal Humanitarian Platform, 2007, “Principles of Partnership—A Statement of Commitment.” icvanetwork.org/
G
system/files/versions/Principles of Partnership English.pdf.
34
W. Guyot, 2014, “Strategy Refresh Phase 1 Partners’ Aspirations Report,” International Rescue Committee, p. 7.
35
US Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014, “Local Systems: A Framework for Supporting Sustained
Development,” Washington, DC, p. v.
36
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014, “USAID Forward,” http://www.usaid.gov/usaidforward.
Accessed Sept. 10, 2014.
37
Modernizing Foreign Asistance Network (MFAN), “The Way Forward: A Reform Agenda for 2014 and Beyond,”
Washington, DC, p. 6.
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