ELECTRICITY GRID Opportunities Exist for DOE to Better Support Utilities in Improving Resilience to Hurricanes - Report to Congressional Addressees
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United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Addressees
ELECTRICITY GRID
March 2021
Opportunities Exist for
DOE to Better
Support Utilities in
Improving Resilience
to Hurricanes
GAO-21-274
March 2021
ELECTRICITY GRID
Opportunities Exist for DOE to Better Support Utilities
in Improving Resilience to Hurricanes
Highlights of GAO-21-274, a report to
congressional addressees
Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
Hurricanes pose significant threats to Since 2012, utilities have taken steps to improve grid resilience to severe
the electricity grid in some U.S. coastal hurricanes, such as (1) implementing storm hardening measures to enable the
areas and territories and are a leading grid to better withstand the effects of hurricanes; (2) adopting technologies to
cause of major power outages. In enhance operational capacity and help quickly restore service following
recent years, hurricanes have disruptions; and (3) participating in mutual aid programs with other utilities and
impacted millions of customers in training and planning exercises. For example, utilities have implemented storm
these areas. Adoption of technologies hardening measures that include elevating facilities and constructing flood walls
and other measures could improve the to protect against storm surges. Utilities have also adopted technologies that
resilience of the grid so that it is better
enhance communication capabilities and monitor systems to detect, locate, and
able to withstand and rapidly recover
repair sources of disruptions. However, these utilities reported challenges
from severe weather; this could help
mitigate the effects of hurricanes.
justifying grid resilience investments to obtain regulatory approval, and some
utilities have limited resources to pursue such enhancements.
This report examines (1) measures
utilities in selected states have adopted Example of Hurricane Resilience Improvement: Elevated Substation
to enhance grid resilience following
major hurricanes since 2012 and any
challenges utilities face funding such
measures; and (2) federal efforts to
support the adoption of measures to
enhance grid resilience to hurricanes
and any opportunities that exist to
improve these efforts. For this report,
GAO assessed agency and industry
actions; reviewed relevant reports,
policies, and documents; and
interviewed federal, industry, and local
officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE (1)
establish a plan to guide its efforts to
develop tools for resilience planning, Various federal agencies can provide funding for efforts to enhance grid
and (2) develop a mechanism to better resilience to hurricanes, including the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
inform utilities about grid resilience Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, eligibility for most
efforts at the National Laboratories. federal funding for grid resilience, including some USDA and FEMA funding, is
DOE agreed in principle with these
limited to publicly owned utilities and state, tribal, and local governments. The
recommendations, but its proposed
Department of Energy (DOE) does not provide direct funding for grid resilience
actions do not fully address GAO's
improvements, but it has efforts under way, including through its National
concerns.
Laboratories, to provide technical assistance and promote research and
collaboration with utilities. DOE has also initiated preliminary efforts to develop
tools for resilience planning, including resilience metrics and other tools such as
a framework for planning, but DOE does not have a plan to guide these efforts.
Without a plan to guide DOE efforts to develop tools for resilience planning,
utilities may continue to face challenges justifying resilience investments. In
addition, DOE lacks a formal mechanism to inform utilities about the efforts of its
View GAO-21-274. For more information,
contact Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or
National Laboratories. Such a mechanism would help utilities leverage existing
ruscof@gao.gov. resources for improving grid resilience to hurricanes.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Background 4
Utilities Have Adopted Measures to Enhance Grid Resilience, but
Face Challenges Undertaking These Efforts 7
Various Federal Programs Can Be Used to Support Efforts to
Enhance Resilience to Hurricanes, but Opportunities Exist to
Improve Federal Support 17
Conclusions 27
Recommendations for Executive Action 28
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28
Appendix I Comments from the Department of Energy 34
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 37
Related GAO Products 38
Tables
Table 1. Storm Hardening Measures Utilities Have Adopted since
2012 8
Table 2. Automated Technologies Utilities in Selected States Have
Adopted since 2012 13
Table 3: Federal Support That Can Be Used for Grid Resilience
Efforts 18
Figures
Figure 1: Elevated Substation in New York to Protect from
Flooding 10
Figure 2. Wooden Utility Pole Replaced with a Concrete Pole 12
Page i GAO-21-274 Electricity Grid
Abbreviations
AMI Advanced metering infrastructure
BRIC Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities
CDBG-DR Community Development Block Grant Disaster
Recovery
Con Edison Consolidated Edison Company of New York
DOE Department of Energy
EEI Edison Electric Institute
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLISR Fault Location, Isolation, and Service Restoration
GMLC Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium
HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
ICE Interruption Cost Estimate
LBNL Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
MISO Midcontinent Independent System Operator
NAERM North American Energy Resilience Model
NRECA National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
NYSERDA New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority
PA Public Assistance Program
PREPA Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
PSE&G Public Service Electric and Gas Company
RUS Rural Utilities Service
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
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Page ii GAO-21-274 Electricity GridLetter
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
March 5, 2021
Congressional Addressees
Hurricanes pose significant threats to the electricity grid in U.S. coastal
areas and territories and are a leading cause of major power outages. In
2012, Hurricane Sandy interrupted electricity service to about 8.5 million
customers in 24 states across the northeastern and mid-Atlantic U.S. for
several months. In 2017, Hurricane Irma struck, causing power outages
for 6.7 million customers in Florida—64 percent of all customers in the
state—about 100,000 of whom remained without power for over a week.
Hurricanes Irma and Maria hit the island of Puerto Rico within two weeks
of each other and damaged the island’s electricity grid, resulting in the
longest blackout in U.S. history. In response, federal agencies, including
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), provided about
$3.9 billion beginning in 2017 to help restore electricity service in Puerto
Rico; this effort included temporary or partial repairs. 1
According to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Quadrennial Energy
Review, extreme weather—including hurricanes, blizzards, heat waves,
and thunderstorms—is the leading cause of power outages in the United
States. 2 Moreover, the growing severity of extreme weather events in
recent years has been a principal contributor to an increase in the
frequency and duration of U.S. power outages. According to the
Congressional Budget Office, extreme weather events are projected to
worsen in the future due to climate change. 3 Adoption of technologies and
1GAO, Puerto Rico Electricity Grid Recovery: Better Information and Enhanced
Coordination Is Needed to Address Challenges, GAO-20-141 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8,
2019).
2Department of Energy, Quadrennial Energy Review (QER) Task Force, Transforming the
Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of the QER (Washington, D.C.:
January 2017).
3Congressional Budget Office, Potential Increases in Hurricane Damage in the United
States: Implications for the Federal Budget (June 2016).
Page 1 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridother measures could improve the resilience of the electricity grid so that it can better withstand and rapidly recover from severe weather. 4 Electric utilities, industry regulators, and other stakeholders play various roles in the deployment of technologies that could enhance grid resilience. The federal government also plays a significant role in supporting grid resilience through various funding, research and development, and information-sharing initiatives. In particular, DOE leads federal grid resilience efforts in coordination with the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Agriculture (USDA). DOE also conducts research and development and provides analytical support for efforts that aim to ensure the resilience of the electricity grid. GAO was asked to review the federal government’s preparedness, response, and recovery efforts for disasters that occurred in 2017. This report is part of a larger body of work we are conducting on various disaster response and recovery issues, and it follows up on our previous reports that examined the restoration of Puerto Rico’s electricity grid after the 2017 hurricane season. 5 Specifically, this report examines (1) measures that utilities in selected states have adopted to enhance grid resilience following major hurricanes since 2012 and any challenges these utilities face in funding such measures; and (2) federal efforts to support the adoption of measures to enhance grid resilience to hurricanes and any opportunities that exist to improve these efforts. To address both of these objectives, we identified 20 states that have experienced hurricanes and received federal support related to grid 4For the purposes of this report, grid resilience refers to preparing for, withstanding, and rapidly recovering from significant service disruptions caused by extreme events, such as hurricanes. Presidential Policy Directive 21 states that the term "resilience" means the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents. See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2013). 5GAO-20-141; GAO, Puerto Rico Electricity: FEMA and HUD Have Not Approved Long- Term Projects and Need to Implement Recommendations to Address Uncertainties and Enhance Resilience, GAO-21-54 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2020). Page 2 GAO-21-274 Electricity Grid
resilience in 2012 through 2020. 6 We analyzed reports and federal agency data for descriptions and funding levels of grid resilience projects. We analyzed federal policy, planning, and guidance documents from DOE, FEMA, HUD, and USDA, as well as documents, reports, and studies to summarize information and views from utilities and state, federal, and electric utility industry stakeholders. 7 In addition, we reviewed reports that we identified as relevant to grid resilience plans and efforts from selected state commission dockets, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, DOE, the National Laboratories, and nongovernmental organizations such as nonprofits and research institutes. Further, we reviewed prior GAO reports describing the federal role in enhancing grid resilience and funding sources, and our prior recommendations to address challenges hindering grid recovery. We interviewed representatives of federal and state government agencies involved in utilities’ grid resilience efforts, public utility commission officials responsible for evaluating the financing of resilience enhancements, and other stakeholders that play various roles in the development and deployment of technologies that could enhance grid resilience. These included officials from the National Laboratories, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and 16 utilities in the states we reviewed. We interviewed officials from investor-owned, cooperative, and publicly owned utilities of varying customer base size and geographic location. 8 To gain a more comprehensive view of industry perspectives, we also interviewed officials at three organizations that represent these types of utilities: the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, and the American Public Power Association. We identified these stakeholders by reviewing documents and obtaining recommendations during our interviews about others knowledgeable about grid resilience efforts. We also interviewed officials from federal 6The states we selected were Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. 7We did not include the Department of Defense in our analysis of federal efforts to support the adoption of measures to enhance grid resilience to hurricanes although the department has a significant role in grid resilience on military bases. 8To characterize utility officials’ views throughout this report, we defined modifiers to quantify the views of the 16 utilities we interviewed as follows: “nearly all” represents officials from 14 or 15 utilities; “most” represents officials from 11 to 13 utilities; “many” represents officials from eight to 10 utilities; “several” represents officials from five to seven utilities; and “some” represents officials from two to four utilities. Page 3 GAO-21-274 Electricity Grid
agencies, including DOE, FEMA, HUD, and USDA’s Rural Utilities
Service (RUS).
We conducted this performance audit from May 2020 to March 2021, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
The Electricity Grid and The electricity grid involves three distinct functions: generation, electricity
the Impact of Hurricanes transmission, and electricity distribution. Electricity is generated at power
plants by burning fossil fuels; through nuclear fission; or by harnessing
renewable sources such as wind, solar, geothermal, or hydropower. Once
electricity is generated, it is sent through the electricity grid, which
consists of high-voltage, high-capacity transmission systems, to areas
where it is transformed to a lower voltage and sent through the local
distribution system for use by residential and other customers.
Throughout this process, a grid operator or utility must constantly balance
the generation and consumption of electricity. To do so, grid operators
monitor electricity consumption from a centralized location using
information systems and send minute-by-minute signals to power plants
to adjust their output to match changes in demand.
Hurricanes can produce dangerous conditions—such as high winds,
storm surge, and flooding—that cause significant damage to the
electricity grid. These conditions are estimated to result in increased
recovery costs in several hurricane-prone U.S. locations. Storm surge is
an abnormal rise of waters (generated by a storm’s winds) that can reach
heights well over 20 feet, span hundreds of miles of coastline, and travel
several miles inland, causing significant damage, particularly along
coastal areas. Flooding is the major threat from storms for people living
inland. There are two general types of flooding: flash and long term. Flash
flooding, defined as a rapid rise in water levels, can occur quickly due to
intense rainfall. Long-term flooding caused by rising waters in rivers and
streams can persist for several days after a storm. Hurricane‐force winds
(i.e., 74 miles per hour or more) can stay above hurricane strength well
inland, where debris such as signs, roofing material, siding, and other
items may become flying hazards.
Page 4 GAO-21-274 Electricity GridPower lines and transformers used to provide electricity to customers are
particularly susceptible to damage from severe weather. 9 For example, in
2017, Hurricanes Maria and Irma combined to produce storm surges,
flooding, and high winds that knocked down 80 percent of Puerto Rico’s
utility poles and all transmission lines, resulting in the loss of power to
essentially all of the island’s 3.4 million residents, according to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. As of November 2020,
FEMA obligated approximately $10 billion in funding and HUD awarded
about $1.9 billion in grants to rebuild the grid in Puerto Rico. 10 In 2016,
the Congressional Budget Office identified the 10 U.S. states most likely
to incur damage from hurricanes—Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Texas—and concluded that, over time, the costs
associated with hurricane damage will increase more rapidly than the
economy will grow. 11
Key Stakeholders in the Providing safe and reliable electricity to consumers involves several key
Electric Utility Industry stakeholders, including utilities, state commissions and energy offices,
and federal agencies.
There are three types of electric utilities:
• Investor-owned utilities. 12 Investor-owned utilities are large, private,
electric utilities that issue stock owned by shareholders. Almost three-
quarters of utility customers get their electricity from investor-owned
utilities, which are most prevalent in heavily populated areas on the
East and West coasts of the United States. In 2017, 168 investor-
owned electric utilities served an average of 654,600 customers. 13
9Congressional Research Service, Hurricanes and Electricity Infrastructure Hardening
(Sept. 20, 2017).
10GAO-21-54.
11Specifically, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the expected annual
damage amounted to 0.16 percent of GDP (or about $28 billion); by 2075, however, that
figure is expected to reach 0.22 percent (equivalent to about $39 billion in today’s
economy). Congressional Budget Office, Potential Increases in Hurricane Damage.
12The Edison Electric Institute is a trade association that represents investor-owned
utilities. According to EEI, its member utilities provide electricity to about 220 million
Americans and operate in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
13U.S. Energy Information Administration, Investor-owned Utilities Served 72% of U.S.
Electricity Customers in 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2019).
Page 5 GAO-21-274 Electricity Grid• Publicly owned utilities. Publicly owned utilities include federal-,
state-, and municipal-run utilities. 14 The U.S. has 1,958 publicly
owned electric utilities with an average of 12,100 customers each.
The largest U.S. publicly owned utility is the Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority (PREPA), which serves 1.47 million customers. 15
• Electric cooperatives. 16 Electric cooperatives are not-for-profit,
member-owned utilities and are located in 47 states. Cooperatives are
most prevalent in the Midwest and Southeast. There are 812 electric
cooperatives in the U.S., serving an average of 24,500 customers
each. According to DOE, electric cooperatives tend to serve
customers in rural areas that were not historically served by other
utilities. 17 Electric cooperatives’ members vote for representatives to
the Board of Directors who oversee operations and return any
revenue in excess of costs to their respective members.
Responsibility for regulating the electricity industry is divided between the
states and the federal government. Most electricity customers are served
by electric utilities that are regulated by the states, generally through state
public utility commissions or equivalent organizations. State public utility
commissions regulate utility management, operations, electricity rate
structures, and acquisitions. 18 State public utility commissions have a
variety of responsibilities, such as approving utility investments in
generation and distribution infrastructure, rates retail customers pay, and
how those rates are set. In addition, other state entities, such as energy
offices, can play a role in establishing policies and programs that support
14Municipal utilities are owned by cities and counties and are generally regulated by a
local government rather than by the states or federal government. The American Public
Power Association (APPA) represents municipal utilities.
15U.S. Energy Information Administration, Investor-owned Utilities.
16The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) is the national service
organization that represents the United States’ electric cooperatives.
17Additionally, more than 250 distribution cooperatives and NRECA-member public power
districts serve an estimated 4.2 million people in these counties, with poverty rates ranging
from 20 percent to over 60 percent.
18State regulators approve utility investments either in advance of construction or
afterwards when the utility seeks to recover costs in the rates it charges customers. Some
states have integrated resource planning processes to determine what facilities should be
built. The purpose of integrated resource planning is to meet future power demand by
identifying the need for generating capacity and determining the best mix of resources to
meet the need on a least-cost, system-wide basis. The integrated approach considers a
broad range of feasible supply-side and demand-side options and assesses them with
respect to financial, economic, and environmental impacts.
Page 6 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridstate goals, such as promoting the use of cleaner and more efficient
energy through the use of renewable energy sources. 19
Since 2012, utilities in selected states have taken steps and adopted
Utilities Have Adopted various measures to enhance grid resilience to hurricanes and other
Measures to Enhance severe weather. These utilities have also adopted various technologies to
enhance operational capacity and help quickly restore electricity service
Grid Resilience, but after disruptions caused by severe weather. Further, utilities in selected
Face Challenges states have taken steps to enhance grid resilience by collaborating in
mutual aid programs as well as training and planning exercises, among
Undertaking These other efforts. However, utilities we interviewed identified challenges to
Efforts funding grid resilience measures primarily related to (1) justifying
resilience investments and obtaining regulatory approval, and (2) having
limited resources to pursue resilience measures, including conducting
research and development of grid resilience technologies.
Utilities in Selected States Utilities have adopted storm hardening measures to enable the grid to
Have Adopted Storm better withstand the impacts of severe weather events, such as
hurricanes. Storm hardening measures include physical changes to grid
Hardening Measures to
infrastructure such as constructing flood walls, installing network
Improve Grid Resilience protectors, elevating facilities, undergrounding electrical equipment, and
and Minimize Damage utility pole management. Table 1 includes information about such
from Flooding, Storm measures.
Surges, and High Winds
19For example, the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
asserts that, among other things, it is charged with making cheaper, cleaner and more
reliable energy available for state residents. Similarly, the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) seeks to lower energy bills, reduce
emissions, create economic development, and improve energy system reliability.
Page 7 GAO-21-274 Electricity GridTable 1. Storm Hardening Measures Utilities Have Adopted since 2012
Storm hardening measure Resilience characteristics States with utilities that adopted measure
Flood protection and controls: Withstand flooding from storm surges. New York, Texas
constructing flood walls
Flood protection and controls: Provide protection against flooding and insulate New York
installing network protectors electrical equipment, which enables effective
functioning when submerged.
Elevating electrical facilities Decreases the likelihood that water from flooding Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, New York,
will inundate electrical facilities. North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia
Undergrounding equipment Make power lines less susceptible to damage Florida, Georgia, New York, North Carolina,
and reduce storm-related outages. Texas, Virginia
Pole management Inspect, repair, and replace utility poles that may Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, New Jersey, New
be susceptible to damage from high winds. York, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia
Source: GAO analysis of electric utility information. | GAO-21-274
Flood Protection and Controls DOE has identified flooding from storm surges as the most prevalent
cause of damage to substations in coastal regions. In response, some
utilities in selected states have taken various flood protection measures to
prevent damage from flooding and storm surge during severe weather
events such as hurricanes. Flood protection measures include the
following:
• Constructing floodwalls. Floodwalls are often made of concrete or
steel and are designed specifically to prevent flooding of electrical
equipment and facilities. Most floodwalls were built decades ago,
according to DOE. Some utilities, however, have constructed
floodwalls since 2012. For example, in New York, Consolidated
Edison Company of New York (Con Edison) has constructed more
than 3.3 miles of floodwalls—some 6 feet high—around critical
equipment (e.g., substations) since Hurricane Sandy in 2012. 20 Con
20According to Con Edison documents, it spent $847 million on a broad upgrade project.
In addition to floodwalls, these measures included installation of over 800 submersible
transformers and network protectors, more than 3,500 waterproofing seals in conduits,
and 270 watertight flood doors in electric substations and steam generating stations.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Con Edison Close To Completing $1
Billion In Post-Sandy Storm Protections (October 2016).
Page 8 GAO-21-274 Electricity GridEdison officials stated that these floodwalls allow normal access to the
substation while protecting it in the event of flooding. 21
• Installing network protectors. Network protectors are designed to
detect when there is an abnormal power flow from a utility to an end
user. Network protectors also insulate electrical facility equipment
from flooding, thereby enabling the equipment to function when
submerged in water. In such a circumstance, the network protector
can physically disconnect and isolate the fault, which enables grid
operators to take remedial action and reduce the risks of damage to
an electrical facility and equipment.
Elevating Facilities Electrical equipment and facilities may be elevated above flood levels, as
another form of storm hardening. 22 For example, in 2013, FEMA
recommended that local communities require certain structures to be
elevated in accordance with specified risk categories. 23 To that end,
critical equipment in commercial buildings serviced by Con Edison in New
York was relocated to higher elevations. Also, a New Jersey-based
electric utility, the Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G),
raised seven substations above flood level, which protects 96,323
customers from service disruptions that could occur because of flooding
at these substations. Officials we interviewed from PSE&G told us that
this was part of a 5-year, $1.2 billion project to elevate 18 substations that
flooded during Hurricane Irene and Sandy. Additionally, CenterPoint, a
Texas-based utility, rebuilt and elevated its Galveston substation after the
21Substations provide crucial links for electricity generation and serve as key nodes for
linking transmission and distribution networks to end-use customers. Additionally, a
substation generally contains transformers, protective equipment (e.g., relays and circuit
breakers), switches for controlling high-voltage connections, electronic instrumentation to
monitor system performance and record data, and fire-fighting equipment in the event of
an emergency. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy
Reliability, United States Electricity Industry Primer, DOE/OE-0017 (July 2015).
22The National Flood Insurance Program restricts the placement of electrical equipment
and wiring in buildings in Special Flood Hazard Areas (i.e., land areas subject to a 1
percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year). Such equipment and wiring must
generally be above the elevation of flooding having a 1 percent chance of being equaled
or exceeded in any given year. Local utilities may also have additional requirements that
dictate the location of electrical service components. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Flood Protection and Elevation of Building Utilities, RA4 (April 2017).
23FEMA recommends that utility systems within Special Flood Hazard Areas must be
located at or above elevation of flooding (having a 1 percent chance of being equaled or
exceeded in any given year) per National Flood Insurance Program criteria. Moreover,
FEMA recommends that all utility systems be elevated as high as practicable for existing,
non-Substantially Damaged and non-Substantially Improved construction (see FEMA P-
348, Edition 2-Table 4-1). FEMA, Flood Protection and Elevation of Building Utilities.
Page 9 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridstorm surge during Hurricane Ike destroyed it in 2008; the utility repeated
the same actions for a substation farther inland after Hurricane Harvey in
2017. 24 Figure 1 shows an elevated substation.
Figure 1: Elevated Substation in New York to Protect from Flooding
Undergrounding Facilities and Power outages from hurricanes are often the result of damage to power
Equipment lines caused by high winds. To reduce the risk of damage from high
winds, some utilities in selected states have placed certain facilities and
equipment underground. Placing infrastructure, such as power lines and
electrical equipment, in underground trenches and enclosures may
require special insulation, such as encasement in conduits or steel pipes.
However, undergrounding facilities and equipment carries substantial
costs that may preclude some utilities from adopting such measures.
According to the Congressional Research Service, the cost of
24One utility in Florida has initiated a pilot program to underground power lines in some
neighborhoods. Additionally, a utility in North Carolina has undertaken efforts to raise
some substations. Utilities in Georgia and North Carolina also elevated at-risk substations
to protect against flooding or storm surge.
Page 10 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridundergrounding power lines can be 5 to 10 times (or more) the cost of an
overhead line. Additionally, the University of Florida and some Florida
electric utilities conducted a study concluding that undergrounding
overhead electric distribution systems is costly and that the costs exceed
quantifiable benefits except in rare cases. 25 The study also concluded that
the hurricane reliability of underground systems is not perfect due to the
potential for storm surge damage. Additionally, officials from one utility we
spoke with indicated that undergrounding could hamper grid reliability
because underground facilities can be less visible and more difficult for
service crews to reach. Also, several industry stakeholders agreed that
undergrounding may be counterproductive in areas prone to flooding.
Utility Pole Management Pole management includes the inspection, repair, and replacement of
utility poles and is another form of storm hardening that can improve grid
resilience. Nearly all the utilities that we reviewed in selected states have
pole management policies that require periodic inspection of their utility
poles to determine whether to repair or replace them. Utilities vary in their
pole inspection procedures. For example, some utilities inspect all poles
annually, while others inspect a percentage of their poles at specific
intervals over a prescribed period of time. Utilities then decide on the
appropriate remedy—such as repair or replacement—required to address
any defective poles. For example, some utilities repair poles by using
composite material or replace wooden poles with stronger, more durable
material such as metal or concrete (see fig. 2). These practices can
improve grid resilience because the poles are better able to withstand
high winds during hurricanes and other extreme weather events.
25This study also pointed out that no prior relevant study had recommended broad-based
undergrounding, but several did recommend targeted undergrounding to achieve specific
community goals. Utilities in Georgia, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia have
adopted targeted undergrounding. Additionally, in New York, Con Edison adopted an
innovative-targeted undergrounding strategy to realize the benefits of undergrounding
while avoiding its significant costs. The utility has a large underground workforce that
manages these undergrounded facilities, which is unique from utilities in other locations,
according to Con Edison officials. InfraSource Technology, Undergrounding Assessment
Phase 1 Final Report: Literature Review and Analysis of Electric Distribution Overhead to
Underground Conversion (February 2007).
Page 11 GAO-21-274 Electricity GridFigure 2. Wooden Utility Pole Replaced with a Concrete Pole
Utilities in Selected States Utilities have adopted automated technologies that enhance operational
Have Adopted capacity and that can help provide quick restoration of electric service.
For example, some automated technologies provide enhanced
Technologies to Enhance
communication capabilities; monitor electrical systems to detect, locate,
Operational Capacity and and repair sources of service disruptions; and continue service through
Can Help Restore Power part of the grid when the central grid experiences a service disruption.
Quickly after Service See table 2 for examples of automated technologies utilities have
Disruptions adopted that can enhance resilience.
Page 12 GAO-21-274 Electricity GridTable 2. Automated Technologies Utilities in Selected States Have Adopted since 2012
State with utilities that adopted
Automated technology Resilience characteristics automated technology
Advanced metering infrastructure Enables two-way communication between utilities and Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New York,
customers through an integrated system of smart North Carolina, Texas
meters, communications networks, and data
management systems.
Equipment monitoring technology Monitors and controls electrical equipment by reading Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, New Jersey,
meters and checking the status of sensors in regular New York, Texas, Virginia
intervals.
Microgrids Enable parts of the grid to independently maintain Hawaii, New York, North Carolina, South
power during a larger service disruption. Carolina
Self-healing grid technology Minimizes service disruptions by automatically Georgia, North Carolina, Texas
isolating damaged areas, rerouting to adjacent circuits,
and notifying work crews.
Source: GAO analysis of electric utility information. | GAO-21-274
Advanced Metering AMI is an integrated system of smart meters, communications networks,
Infrastructure (AMI) and data management systems that enables two-way communication
between utilities and customers. AMI can enhance grid resilience
because it can improve a utility’s ability to identify and isolate outages,
automatically and remotely measure electricity use, connect and
disconnect service, detect tampering, and monitor power quality.
Combined with customer technologies, such as in-home displays and
programmable communicating thermostats, AMI also enables utilities to
offer programs and incentives that help customers manage energy
consumption and costs.
Specialized Equipment Utilities use specialized equipment monitoring software, such as
Monitoring Software supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), to enhance grid
resilience. SCADA is a central control system that gathers data from
sensors and instruments throughout the system and relays the data to
grid operators if an outage has occurred, which can reduce the duration
of power outages. Some utilities we reviewed use a SCADA system as
part of their grid resilience efforts.
Microgrids Microgrids are systems that can connect to and disconnect from the grid,
depending on operating conditions, in order to maintain power for a small
area independent of the grid if the grid encounters service disruptions as
a result of an extreme weather event, such as a hurricane. In such
circumstances, the microgrid operates autonomously to provide power to
customers. Microgrids can improve grid resilience by absorbing and
withstanding the effects of extreme weather events and providing power
Page 13 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridto end users, including critical infrastructure such as hospitals. In addition,
microgrids can provide black start services—the provision of the power
necessary to restore a generation plant when power from the grid is
unavailable during a major outage. Our review of selected states
identified some utilities in four states that plan to or have integrated
microgrids into their systems.
Self-Healing Grid Technology Fault Location, Isolation, and Service Restoration (FLISR) technology,
sometimes referred to as self-healing grid or self-optimizing technology,
assesses the grid and automatically responds to problems. This is
possible through the widespread deployment of sensors and other
intelligent devices—such as SCADA—as well as distribution and outage
management systems, grid analytics, models, and data processing tools.
These technologies work in tandem to automate power restoration by
automatically isolating faults and restoring service to remaining
customers. This can reduce the number of customers that experience
service disruptions, as well as the length of those disruptions. For
example, in 2014, DOE reported that FLISR operations showed up to a
45 percent reduction in the number of customers who experienced
service interruptions; up to a 51 percent reduction in customer minutes of
interruption; and about 270,000 fewer customers who experienced
sustained interruptions (greater than 5 minutes) compared to estimated
outcomes without FLISR. Officials from some utilities that have
incorporated FLISR technology into their grid reported that since adopting
the technology, they have experienced fewer and shorter outages, lower
outage costs, and reduced equipment failure.
Utilities Have Collaborated Most utilities in selected states have participated in several efforts with
with Stakeholders on industry stakeholders to improve grid resilience. For example, through
mutual assistance programs, utilities have collaborated with each other
Mutual Aid Programs,
and industry stakeholders to develop plans that establish their respective
Training, and Exercises to roles and responsibilities for restoring power when significant service
Enhance Grid Resilience disruptions occur. Utilities and industry stakeholders have also
to Hurricanes collaborated on training and planning exercises.
Mutual Assistance Programs Mutual assistance programs support the industry’s contingency planning
and power restoration after major storms or other emergencies. Restoring
power quickly after a major storm requires logistical expertise, skilled line
workers, and specialized equipment. Utilities affected by significant
outages often rely on these voluntary partnerships to help speed
restoration efforts. Such mutual assistance programs are generally
formed based on location and type of utility. Through such programs,
utilities share information and resources such as emergency vehicles,
Page 14 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridequipment, and personnel. These utilities also participated in training
exercises to determine roles and responsibilities. All of the utilities that we
reviewed are partners in at least one mutual assistance program.
Training and Planning Training exercises help mutual aid members and others in the industry
Exercises identify roles and responsibilities and share best practices. For example,
with DOE support, the American Public Power Association held a mutual
aid exercise in New York in 2019. 26 This included a tabletop exercise that
involved a Category 5 hurricane impacting the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto
Rico, and the Southeast and Northeast regions of the U.S. The exercise
tested the capabilities of the public power mutual aid network, interagency
coordination, and the tools and technologies used to support mutual aid
coordination. Other stakeholders conduct training exercises that focus on
grid resilience. For example, the Midcontinent Independent System
Operator (MISO)—a regional grid operator that serves 15 states including
Louisiana—coordinated annual drills focused on hurricane preparedness,
and specific issues such as power system restoration. MISO typically
conducts two drills during May that focus on communication and
restoration activities.
Utilities in Selected States Utility officials we interviewed identified two primary challenges to funding
Face Two Primary grid resilience measures: (1) justifying investments and obtaining
regulatory approval, and (2) limited resources at some utilities to pursue
Challenges Adopting
resilience measures, including conducting research and development on
Resilience Measures: grid resilience technologies.
Justifying Investments and
Limited Resources
Justifying Investments and Most utilities recover the cost of resilience measures through rates paid
Obtaining Regulatory Approval by the utilities’ customers. Specifically, to recover costs through rates,
investor-owned utilities we spoke with must obtain approval from the state
public utility commission. 27 According to utility and National Laboratories
officials we interviewed, it can be challenging to justify and obtain
approval for investments in resilience measures because (1) utility
commissions can be hesitant to approve investments that could affect
customer rates; (2) it can be hard to justify large investments to prepare
26There were a total of 50 participants from 32 different public power utilities and joint
action/state associations, federal government partners, and industry partners from EEI.
27Non-utilities, which may include entities such as electric cooperatives, are not subject to
this type of review by a state commission, but officials told us they undergo similar rate
adjustment reviews within their boards.
Page 15 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridfor events that may occur infrequently, such as hurricanes; and (3) there
are no clear metrics for grid resilience, making it hard to quantify the costs
and benefits associated with investments in resilience measures. For
example, officials from several utilities and some National Laboratories
we interviewed said that the lack of resilience metrics, and the challenges
quantifying the benefits of resilience, have made it challenging for utilities
to justify the costs of some resilience measures to their regulators. 28
Limited Resources Officials at all of the publicly owned utilities and electric cooperatives, as
well as several investor-owned utilities and regulators we interviewed, told
us that they have limited resources to undertake resilience enhancements
or pursue new technologies or tools that could enhance resilience
planning. For example, officials from USDA’s Rural Utilities Service (RUS)
and one industry stakeholder group told us that rural utilities often have
higher costs, due to the ratio of service area size to the number of
customers, as well as more low-income customers, making it more
challenging to recover the cost of investments through electricity rates.
Further, small, rural utilities have limited staff and resources to focus on
grid resilience, according to officials from one industry stakeholder group
that represents small rural utilities. Officials from one small rural utility
said it only has 65 employees and lacks the resources to hire staff that
can dedicate their time to grid resilience. Officials from some utilities said
that applying for federal funding that could be used to enhance grid
resilience and complying with federal program requirements can be
burdensome.
Other Challenges Utility officials also identified a variety of other challenges that can arise
when pursuing grid resilience measures. For example, officials from
several utilities and regulators we spoke with cited vegetation
management as a key challenge, since trees and vegetation are common
contributors to outages and can be challenging to maintain in a way that
minimizes the threat posed to the grid during storms. 29 In addition,
officials from some utilities stated that convincing customers to allow
utility companies to place poles or other structures on their property can
28DOE oversees 17 National Laboratories, which are charged with conducting research
and development on behalf of DOE and can perform such work for other federal agencies
and nonfederal or private entities, including utilities.
29We previously reported that poor vegetation management practices contributed to
increased damage to Puerto Rico’s grid during Hurricane Maria. See GAO, 2017
Hurricane Season: Federal Support for Electricity Grid Restoration in the U.S. Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico, GAO-19-296 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2019).
Page 16 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridbe challenging, even when those structures could enhance grid reliability
or resilience during storms.
Various federal agencies—including FEMA, HUD, and USDA—can
Various Federal provide funding for efforts to enhance grid resilience, but eligibility for
Programs Can Be most federal funding is limited to publicly owned utilities and state, local,
tribal, and territorial governments. DOE and the National Laboratories do
Used to Support not provide direct funding to utilities, but they have efforts under way that
Efforts to Enhance address grid resilience to hurricanes, collaborate with utilities to
operationalize technologies, and support grid resilience through basic
Resilience to research. Furthermore, opportunities exist for DOE and its National
Hurricanes, but Laboratories to better support investments in grid resilience.
Opportunities Exist to
Improve Federal
Support
Federal Programs Can Eligibility for most federal funding for grid resilience is limited to publicly
Provide Funding or owned utilities and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.
Investor-owned utilities—which serve the largest share of customers in
Technical Assistance for
hurricane-prone states—are generally not eligible for federal funding
Some Utilities Investing in under these programs. In addition, officials from some utilities said that
Grid Resilience Measures applying for federal funding and complying with federal program
requirements can be burdensome. 30 Table 3 describes federal funding
from FEMA, HUD, and USDA that can be used to support grid resilience
to hurricanes.
30In our July 2015 report on Hurricane Sandy, we found that different federal disaster
response programs are initiated at different times, making it challenging for state and local
officials to determine how to use federal funds in a comprehensive manner. Specifically,
12 of the 13 states and cities that we surveyed responded that navigating the multiple
funding streams and various regulations was a challenge that affected their ability to
maximize disaster resilience opportunities. GAO, Hurricane Sandy: An Investment
Strategy Could Help the Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future
Disasters, GAO-15-515 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2015). In addition, we previously
reported that Community Development Block Grant for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)
grantees have faced challenges coordinating the use of these funds with other disaster
recovery programs that are initiated at different times and administered by other agencies.
GAO, Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block Grant Funds Is Needed, GAO-19-232
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2019).
Page 17 GAO-21-274 Electricity GridTable 3: Federal Support That Can Be Used for Grid Resilience Efforts
Federal agency Program Description Funding
Federal Emergency Public Assistance Federal disaster grant assistance to state, $4.2 billion in category F funds
Management Agency Program local, tribal, and territorial governments and obligated from 2012 to October
(FEMA) certain types of private nonprofit 2020 in selected statesa
organizations to help them respond to and Approximately $10 billion
recover from major disasters or emergencies. obligated for grid recovery in
Category F covers publicly owned utilities. Puerto Rico in November 2020.
Hazard Mitigation Funding to state, local, tribal, and territorial Approximately $89 million
governments so they can rebuild in a way that obligated for utility-related
reduces, or mitigates, future disaster losses in mitigation in selected states
their communities. since 2012.b
Building Resilient New pre-disaster hazard mitigation program. None. Grant application period
Infrastructure and Grants applied to projects that help reduce opened in fall 2020.
Communities risk to critical systems, such as the grid,
before a disaster and to quickly stabilize a
community after disaster by preventing
cascading impacts.
Department of Housing Community Development Provides funding to address needs not met by $47.3 million awarded in
and Urban Development Block Grant for Disaster other disaster recovery programs after a selected states since 2012.c
(HUD) Recovery (CDBG-DR) disaster, which can include projects to In addition, approximately $2
enhance resilience to hurricanes. HUD billion awarded to Puerto Rico
officials told us that HUD funding has typically and U.S. Virgin Islands in
been invested in water facilities, rather than in 2018.d
electricity grids.
Department of Electric Infrastructure Includes financing for construction of electric $2.3 billion loaned in 2019 for
Agriculture, Rural Loan and Loan Guarantee system enhancements in rural areas. rural utilities in selected states;
Utilities Service (RUS) Program Requires adoption of RUS design standards, $3.2 billion in 2020.
which do not specifically address resilience,
but officials said adopting them improved
system components and reliability, resulting
in a more resilient system.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA, HUD, and U.S. Department of Agriculture information. | GAO-21-274
Note: In the past, the Department of Energy (DOE) has provided funding that supported some grid
resilience measures. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided DOE with $4.5
billion for activities to modernize the electric power grid and facilitate recovery from disruptions to the
energy supply, among other things. Under the Smart Grid Investment Grant, DOE and the electricity
industry jointly invested $8 billion in 99 cost-shared projects involving more than 200 participating
electric utilities and other organizations to modernize the electric grid, strengthen cybersecurity,
improve interoperability, and collect data on smart grid operations and benefits.
a
Funding levels are approximate and may not be limited to electricity grid infrastructure.
b
Funding amount excludes some projects that may not connect to the grid, such as funding for
generators.
c
HUD officials highlighted the $47.3 million as grid-specific projects, but noted that states receiving
other CDBG-DR funds could have also used those for grid resilience enhancements, where eligible.
d
We reported in November 2020 (GAO-21-54) that no projects using the grid-specific CDBG-DR
funds had been approved in Puerto Rico.
Page 18 GAO-21-274 Electricity GridFEMA FEMA funding can be used for grid resilience efforts through the following
three programs.
• FEMA Public Assistance (PA) program. FEMA’s PA program
provides federal disaster grant assistance to state, local, tribal, and
territorial governments and certain types of private nonprofit
organizations to help them respond to and recover from major
disasters or emergencies. Through its PA program, FEMA provides
funds to support recovery, including (1) permanent work, which
includes the restoration of and cost-effective hazard mitigation for
disaster-damaged public utilities; and (2) management costs, which
include expenses a recipient or subrecipient incurs in administering
and managing projects, such as to develop and submit projects for
FEMA’s approval. 31
• Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). The HMGP provides
funding to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments so they can
rebuild in a way that reduces, or mitigates, future disaster losses in
their communities. This grant funding is available after a presidentially
declared disaster. HMGP is designed to improve community
resilience—the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from,
and more successfully adapt to disasters—to future disasters during
recovery. Projects funded through this program are to improve the
resilience of either disaster-damaged or undamaged facilities to future
events of any kind. The program funds a wide range of projects such
as purchasing properties in flood-prone areas, adding shutters to
windows to prevent future damage from hurricane winds and rains,
and rebuilding culverts in drainage ditches to prevent future flooding
damage. To be eligible for HMGP funding, a project must conform to
the state and local mitigation plans.
• Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC). BRIC
is a FEMA pre-disaster hazard mitigation program that began in
2020. 32 States, local, tribal, and territorial governments with major
disaster declarations in the past 7 years are eligible for assistance.
According to FEMA documents, BRIC mitigation grants can go toward
projects that help reduce risk to what FEMA calls “lifelines”—critical
31FEMA PA funding is subject to a cost share. Generally, a recipient may be responsible
for a cost share of up to 25 percent of the total eligible amount of grant assistance. FEMA
officials told us that applicants’ inability to provide their portion of FEMA cost-share
initiatives—particularly in the current economic environment impacted by COVID-19—is
the primary challenge that FEMA faces in supporting grid resilience efforts.
32The Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program replaces the Pre-
Disaster Mitigation grant program.
Page 19 GAO-21-274 Electricity Gridsystems such as the electricity grid—before a disaster and quickly
stabilize a community after a disaster by preventing cascading
impacts. The BRIC grant application period opened in fall 2020.
In addition to its funding programs, FEMA has supported industry training
and planning efforts. FEMA conducted a National Level Exercise in 2018
that examined the ability of all levels of government, private industry, and
nongovernmental organizations to protect against, respond to, and
recover from a major hurricane. FEMA published lessons learned from
this exercise, which found that clear communication regarding power
restoration prioritization allowed effective coordination and efficient use of
limited resources, but that more work was needed to define the roles of
utilities at operations centers and staging areas when responding to
disasters. The document also noted several barriers and potential
vulnerabilities to effective communication between electric utilities and
government partners. 33
HUD HUD’s Community Development Block Grant for Disaster Recovery
(CDBG-DR) provides funding to address needs not met by other disaster
recovery programs after a disaster, which can include disaster resilience-
building projects. Communities can use CDBG-DR grants to address a
wide range of unmet recovery needs—losses not met with insurance or
other forms of assistance, including federal disaster assistance—related
to housing, infrastructure, and economic revitalization. 34
HUD officials we interviewed told us that HUD funding typically has been
used to improve the infrastructure of water systems, rather than of
electricity grids. Approximately $2 billion in HUD funding explicitly for
electricity grid enhancements was awarded to Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands after Hurricanes Irma and Maria caused damage to their
electricity grids in 2017. However, HUD officials told us this was a new
use of CDBG-DR funding. 35 States including Florida and Georgia
33FederalEmergency Management Agency, National Level Exercise 2018: After-Action
Report Executive Summary (August 2018).
34When disasters occur, the federal government often appropriates CDBG-DR funding
through supplemental appropriations. These appropriations often provide HUD the
authority to waive or modify many of the statutory and regulatory provisions governing the
CDBG program, thus providing states with greater flexibility and discretion to address
recovery needs.
35The $2 billion included $1.9 billion for Puerto Rico and $68 million for the U.S. Virgin
Islands. As we reported in November 2020, no projects using the $1.9 billion had been
approved in Puerto Rico. GAO-21-54.
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