FORECAST SERIES: Putin's Likely Course of Action in Ukraine - PUTIN'S MILITARY OPTIONS
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DECEMBER 2021 FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS FREDERICK W. KAGAN, NATALIYA BUGAYOVA, GEORGE BARROS, KATERYNA STEPANENKO, AND MASON CLARK
Frederick W. Kagan, Nataliya Bugayova, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine Putin’s Military Options
Cover: Peaceful Mission 2021 joint counterterrorism exercise by SCO member states ORENBURG REGION, RUSSIA SEPTEMBER 23, 2021: T-72B3M tanks are seen during the Peaceful Mission 2021 joint counterterror- ism command post exercise by SCO member states at the Donguz military training ground. Gavriil Grigorov/TASS (Photo by Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images) All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing or from the publisher. ©2021 by the Institute for the Study of War. ©2021 by the Critical Threats Project. Published in 2021 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 | Washington, DC 20036 1789 Massachusetts Avenue NW | Washington, DC 20036 understandingwar.org criticalthreats.org
ABOUT THE AUTHORS Frederick W. Kagan is a senior fellow and the director of the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). In 2009, he served in Kabul, Afghanistan, as part of General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team, and he returned to Afghanistan in 2010, 2011, and 2012 to conduct research for Generals David Petraeus and John Allen. In July 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen awarded him the Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor the Chairman can present to civilians who do not work for the Department of Defense, for his volunteer service in Afghanistan. He is coauthor of the report Defining Success in Afghanistan and author of the series of reports Choosing Victory (AEI), which recommended and monitored the US military surge in Iraq. His most recent book is Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields. Previously an associate professor of military history at West Point, Dr. Kagan was a contributing editor at the Weekly Standard and has written for Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and other periodicals. Nataliya Bugayova is a non-resident National Security Research Fellow at ISW. She led the Institute for the Study of War’s (ISW) Russia and Ukraine research team from 2019-2020 and has been ISW’s Russia Research Fellow since 2018. Her work focuses on the Kremlin’s foreign policy decision-making, information operations, and ongoing global campaigns - including in the former Soviet Union and Africa. Nataliya currently serves as Director of Intelligence at Tecsonomy, a new tech-enabled intelligence firm specializing in supply chain analysis. She holds a Master’s in Public Policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where she was a student fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. George Barros is a Researcher on the Russia and Ukraine portfolio at the Institute for the Study of War. His work focuses on Russian information operations, the Kremlin’s campaigns in Ukraine and Belarus, and Ukrainian politics. George received his B.A. in International Relations and Global Studies with a concentration in Russian and Post-Soviet Studies from the College of William & Mary. Prior to joining ISW, he worked in the U.S. House of Representatives as an advisor on Ukraine and Russia for a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Kateryna Stepanenko: Kateryna Stepanenko is a Russia Researcher on the Russia and Ukraine portfolio at the Institute for the Study of War. Natively from Kyiv, she focused her academic and professional career on investigating the implications of Russian hybrid and disinformation warfare on Ukraine and conflict resolution in Eurasia. Kateryna received a B.A. in International Affairs from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs where she concentrated in Europe and Eurasian affairs. Mason Clark is the Lead Russia Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. His research focuses on Russian military capabilities and learning, Kremlin integration efforts in the former Soviet Union and Russian strategic calculus. Mason has been quoted in The Wall Street Journal, New York Times, New Yorker, BBC, Voice of America, Task & Purpose, Defense One, the Kyiv Post, and others. He regularly briefs senior military and civilian decision makers on Russian military capabilities and the Kremlin’s global campaigns. Mason received a B.A. with Honors in International Studies with a focus on US Foreign Policy and Russian from American University’s School of International Service. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the incredible team at ISW and the Critical Threats Project (CTP), without whom this report would not have been possible. As always, enormous thanks to ISW President Kim Kagan. ISW Chief of Staff Jennifer Cafarella provided invaluable reviews. Tech Intern John Chladon supported with geospatial analysis. Research by Russia team interns Celine Alon, Julia Belov, Grace Mappes, Naveen Rajan, and Nicholas Velazquez supported this report. Thank you to the ISW editing and production team, including Lisa Suchy and Jacob Taylor. ABOUT THE INSTITUTE ISW is a non-partisan and non-profit public policy research organization. It advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. It is committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the US around the globe. The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute equips policymakers, opinion leaders, and the military and intelligence communities with detailed and objective open-source analysis of America’s current and emerging national security challenges. Through daily monitoring, in-depth studies, graphic presentations, private briefings, and public events, the project is a unique resource for those who need to fully understand the nuance and scale of threats to America’s security to effectively develop and execute policy.
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PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS
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investigative focus and dive deeply into the most relevant connections.Table of Contents
8 Executive Summary
10 Introduction
10 Full-Scale Invasion
10 The Russian Plan
13 Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion
13 Likely Situation Following Initial Invasion
15 How Would Putin Rule a Conquered Ukraine?
18 Courses of Action Subordinate to COA 1: A Full Invasion of Ukraine
18 Sub-COA 1a: Deploy Forces to Belarus
21 Sub-COA 1b: Overt Deployment in Donbas
22 Sub-COA 1c: Create a Land Bridge from Rostov to Crimea
24 Sub-COA 1d: Odesa
26 Sub-COA 1e: Kharkiv
28 Evaluation of COA 1 and Sub-COAs 1c through 1e
30 EndnotesPutin’s Military Options
Executive Summary
Russian President Vladimir Putin is amassing a large force near the Ukrainian border and
reportedly has a military plan to invade and conquer most of unoccupied Ukraine. Western
leaders are rightly taking the threat of such an invasion very seriously, and we cannot dismiss
the possibility that Putin will order his military to execute it. However, the close look at what
such an invasion would entail presented in this report and the risks and costs Putin would have
to accept in ordering it leads us to forecast that he is very unlikely to launch an invasion of
unoccupied Ukraine this winter. Putin is much more likely to send Russian forces into Belarus
and possibly overtly into Russian-occupied Donbas. He might launch a limited incursion into
unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion.
A full-scale Russian invasion of unoccupied Ukraine Crimea with Russian territory near Rostov along
would be by far the largest, boldest, and riskiest military the northern Sea of Azov littoral, as well as
operation Moscow has launched since the 1979 inva- seizing the Kherson region north of Crimea and
sion of Afghanistan. It would be far more complex than securing the Dnepr-Crimea canal;
the US wars against Iraq in 1991 or 2003. It would be a
marked departure from the approaches Putin has relied
• Conducting airborne and amphibious opera-
tions to seize Odesa and the western Ukrainian
on since 2015, and a major step-change in his willing- Black Sea coast; and
ness to use Russian conventional military power overtly.
It would cost Russia enormous sums of money and likely • Launching a mechanized drive to seize the stra-
many thousands of casualties and destroyed vehicles and tegic city of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine.
aircraft. Even in victory, such an invasion would impose Putin will very likely deploy Russian troops into Belarus
on Russian President Vladimir Putin the requirement to this winter. He has set all the necessary informational
reconstruct Ukraine and then establish a new government and military conditions to do so and is likely simply
and security forces there more suitable for his objectives. waiting for what he judges to be the right moment. Such
a move could dramatically increase the challenge NATO
We continue to assess for all these reasons that Putin
faces defending the Baltic States from future Russian
does not, in fact, intend to invade unoccupied Ukraine
attack because it would put Russian mechanized units
this winter despite the continued build-up of Russian
on both sides of the narrow Suwalki Corridor through
forces in preparation to do so.
which NATO supplies and reinforcements to the Baltic
A full-scale Russian invasion would consist of numer- States must run. It would also set conditions for future
ous discrete operations, almost every one of which threats to invade Ukraine along an axis that would enable
could also be conducted independently of the others Russian troops to envelop Kyiv from the west. And
to achieve more limited objectives at lesser cost and it would put additional Russian troops on the Polish
risk. The most salient of those operations include, in border, increasing the threat to NATO’s eastern flank.
order from most- to least-likely:
Putin and Russian officials are actively setting informa-
• Deploying Russian airborne and/or mechanized tional conditions to move Russian troops overtly into
units to one or more locations in Belarus that occupied Donbas. Russian forces are already covertly
would support a planned attack on Ukraine as well there, to be sure. An overt deployment would let Putin
as pose other threats to NATO member states; bring in much more combat power that would pose
• Deploying Russian mechanized, tank, artillery, a more immediate and serious threat to unoccupied
Ukraine. Military conditions are likely already set both
and support units overtly into occupied Donbas;
in occupied Donbas and among the troops that would
• Breaking out from occupied Donbas to estab- deploy there. Putin need not fear unrest in occupied
lish a land bridge connecting Russian-occupied Donbas because of its pro-Russian sentiments and
8 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORGDECEMBER 2021
the firm control he has established over it through his The other two possible courses of action are much
proxies and agents. The overt deployment of Russian more dangerous and much less susceptible to early
forces there would put great domestic pressure on termination. With regard to the seizure of Odesa,
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from two amphibious and airborne attacks are inherently risky,
directions. Anti-Russian Ukrainians and the Ukrainian no matter how well-rehearsed and prepared. The drive
military would demand a response and serious prepara- on Kharkiv minimizes those risks but imposes the very
tions to defend against a possible Russian attack. Western real challenge of seizing and holding a city of more than
leaders would likely press Zelensky not to respond so as 1.5 million people. We assess that Putin is unlikely to
to avoid “escalating” the conflict or disrupting diplo- conduct either of these courses of action independently
matic efforts underway to de-escalate it. These pressures of a full-scale invasion.
could set conditions for what we assess to be Putin’s pre-
Putin will surely continue to build up the capabilities
ferred course of action, which focuses on undermining
he would need to conduct the full-scale invasion of
Zelensky and the current Ukrainian political envi-
Ukraine over the course of this winter. He gains tre-
ronment in advance of Ukrainian parliamentary and
mendous leverage with the West in doing so and allows
presidential elections in 2023 and 2024 respectively.
his military time to set conditions for a much more rapid
We will explore this preferred course of action in the
build-up and attack against Ukraine or NATO states in
next report in this series. Such efforts would also make
the future, since we forecast he will likely leave elements
a future Russian invasion of unoccupied Ukraine some-
of his mobilized forces in place at the end of this crisis.
what easier than it is at present.
The continued military deployments themselves are
All other Russian military options involve attacking
not, therefore, the indicators we should be watch-
one or more areas of unoccupied Ukraine and would
ing to determine Putin’s intent. We should instead be
therefore constitute renewed overt Russian aggression
watching the information conditions he is setting in
not seen since 2014-2015. These military operations
Ukraine, Russia, and the West, as discussed in Part I
would create tremendous pressure on Zelensky and the
of this series. If Putin is serious about seizing all or
Ukrainian military, confront NATO and the United
most of unoccupied Ukraine, he will be setting condi-
States with very unpleasant and difficult choices, and
tions for the post-war governance of that area as well.
set conditions for future Russian military operations
Western and Ukrainian intelligence should focus on
against Ukraine. They would also pose serious risks to
indicators that he is doing so, many of which will be
Putin, however. They would certainly generate Russian
hard to observe in the open source.
casualties and cause losses of expensive equipment that
Russia can ill-afford to replace. Putin might neverthe- The art of deterring Putin lies in adding sufficient risk
less accept these risks and costs in individual limited to his undertakings while offering the most limited pos-
attacks, particularly those that offer him reliable ways to sible negotiated concessions. Western negotiators and
stop his advances and declare victory early on if things policymakers must internalize the extreme risks and
appear likely to go poorly for him. costs to Russia that are inherent in a full-scale invasion
of Ukraine to avoid conceding to or threatening Russia
The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov
more than is needed to deter an attack Putin probably
to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this
does not intend to launch.
respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him
control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly Putin is trying to panic the West into surrendering
needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do important principles and accepting Russian actions
fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupt- that would damage Western interests and security
ing key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to severely but would seem less dangerous when com-
the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an pared to the massive threat Putin is presenting to
important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area Ukraine. Western leaders must avoid becoming mes-
around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol merized by the threat of a Russian invasion while
just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas. cajoling Putin to de-escalate the crisis he has created.
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 9Putin’s Military Options
Introduction
The Russian military is clearly creating the option to Russian plan leaked in Western media.1 It considers
invade Ukraine along multiple axes simultaneously the challenges that Putin and the Russian military
and reportedly has a plan to do so later this winter. would likely face in executing such a plan during the
We assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin will military operations themselves and following the
not execute that plan, is highly unlikely to conduct end of major combat operations.
a full-scale invasion of unoccupied Ukraine, and
Those challenges are daunting, and Putin and
may not use Russian military force beyond occupied
Russian military planners are very likely aware of
Donbas and Belarus at all. We assess that he would
them; they should profoundly shape Western policy
not have executed the leaked plan and that a full-
during this crisis. The art of deterring aggression
scale invasion of unoccupied Ukraine was highly
lies in tipping the balance of expected risk, cost, and
unlikely even before the summit with US President
reward so that the aggressor decides that the under-
Joe Biden. We assess that Putin is far more likely
taking is not worth the cost or is too risky. Western
to use the threat of massive invasion that Russian
leaders must understand the risks and costs inher-
deployments, mobilization, and reported plans
ent in a military undertaking of this scale in order to
have created to advance ongoing Russian lines of
determine how much they must add to tip the scale—
effort in Ukraine while extracting concessions from
and thereby avoid conceding or threatening more
the West furthering those efforts and other Russian
than is necessary.
objectives. The presidential summit and the ensuing
diplomatic process thus further advance Putin’s This report also considers in detail various sub-
original objectives, reinforcing his preferred course components of the overall invasion plan to evaluate
of action rather than preventing an invasion. the likelihood that Putin might execute one or more
of those components without committing to a full
This part of our report examines the manner in
invasion. All these sub-components could set con-
which a full-scale invasion might proceed based
ditions for a full-scale invasion in the future, but
on observed and projected Russian military move-
each also achieves important Russian objectives in
ments; our assessments of Putin’s objectives and the
its own right.
situations in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the West
as considered in Part I; and reports of the intercepted
Full-Scale Invasion
The Russian Plan report in German media suggests that the Russians
intend to cut off power and other essential services
Numerous media stories have presented summaries, to those surrounded cities to force their capitula-
sometimes detailed, of the plan for the invasion tion within a few weeks.3 Most reports of the plan
that US intelligence reportedly obtained clandes- depict Russian forces stopping largely along the
tinely.2 The plan is straightforward as presented: line of the Dnepr River, with two notable excep-
Russian forces based in Crimea and Donbas begin tions—the Russians apparently plan also to seize
attacks on southern Ukraine, likely with the inten- Odesa and the entire western Ukrainian coastline,
tion of drawing Ukrainian forces there. Russian and they reportedly aim to encircle Kyiv from the
mechanized forces then strike toward and encircle west and seize it as well.4 Reports of this plan along
key cities such as Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Kyiv. One
10 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORGDECEMBER 2021
with commentary by Russian analysts (who are not southeast of the city and the river remains wide
necessarily well placed to have good insight into the and difficult to bridge, especially if the crossing is
plan, however) suggest that Putin might not attempt opposed, for most of that distance.
to conquer western Ukraine—where anti-Russian
The most attractive military option for pursuing this
sentiment is highest and a large-scale insurgency is
undertaking would therefore have Russian forces
most likely to result from an invasion.5
coming from southeastern Belarus along the right
The bulk of the invading force would be Russian bank of the Dnepr with logistics lines running back
forces already stationed at permanent garrisons to Belarus and thence back to Russia. The Russian
in Crimea; forces around Rostov and in Donbas; plan apparently suggests such an approach.
forces from bases in Boguchar, Valuiky, and Klintsy
A mechanized drive from southeastern Belarus
along the northern Ukrainian border; and airborne
toward Kyiv faces two noteworthy obstacles—
troops that can rapidly deploy from many bases in
the southern reaches of the Pripet Marshes and
Russia at short notice.6 Many of these units are likely
Chernobyl. The marshes can be difficult, in some
not fully manned in peacetime, as the Russian mili-
places likely impossible, for mechanized forces
tary still relies on conscription to fill out its ranks.7
to traverse when wet, but they also freeze solid in
The US intelligence community reportedly assesses
winter.9 That freezing may partly explain the reports
that Putin has ordered a call-up of 100,000 reserv-
that the plan is set for execution in late January or
ists, presumably to fill out these and possibly other
early February. Chernobyl is also a manageable
units that would be needed for the invasion.8
obstacle for Russian troops. Russian forces, like
The seizure of Kyiv poses the most significant most modern militaries, are equipped and trained to
military challenge in this plan. Most of the city, operate in environments contaminated by nuclear,
including the presidential palace and Parliament, is radiological, chemical, and biological weapons. The
on the right bank (the west side) of the Dnepr River Russians have emphasized such training in their
and west of Russia’s border with Belarus. Encircling exercises for years. 10 They can reasonably expect to
it would require getting large numbers of mecha- move through the Chernobyl region without serious
nized forces across the river and supplying them risk or loss.
despite likely Ukrainian attempts to destroy neces-
The Russian military could also mitigate these prob-
sary bridges and otherwise disrupt
lems by moving its base of attack
Russian logistics. The river itself is
in Belarus further west, circum-
wide and flows in several channels
venting both Chernobyl and the
through the city. A large hydro- Western leaders must marshes at the expense of a longer
electric dam roughly four miles understand the risks line of advance through a popu-
north of the city has created a large
and costs inherent in a lation likely to be hostile. The
lake and wide marshy area that
leaked plan apparently considers
runs all the way to the Belarusian military undertaking this option, describing a drive to a
border. Attacking forces coming
only from Russian territory would
of this scale in order to “line Korosten-Uman” that would
determine how much envelop Kyiv from the west and
likely have to either seize and then
prompt its surrender.11 Korosten
defend the bridges within Kyiv they must add to tip is about 90 miles northwest of
itself or conduct opposed river
crossings using their own bridging
the scale—and thereby Kyiv while Uman is 115 miles south
of the capital, making this a very
equipment in an urban environ- avoid conceding or wide envelopment.
ment. They could instead attempt threatening more than
to cross downstream of Kyiv and Russian analysts also focus heavily
then drive north to encircle it, but is necessary. on the use of Russian airpower in
the next bridge is roughly 60 miles this campaign without specifying
CRITICALTHREATS.ORG 11Putin’s Military Options
how it would be used.12 Western descriptions of the played out during the 1940 German invasion
plan do not describe an independent air compo- of France. Initial German plans called for
nent.13 The Russian military would surely seek to invading through Belgium exactly as the French
ground and destroy the Ukrainian air force and, expected they would, and therefore into the
particularly, the Turkish TB-2 drones that wrought teeth of the prepared French army. Those
such havoc on Armenian armored formations in plans leaked, persuading the German military
the hands of Azerbaijanis during the Nagorno- to draw up new plans for an invasion along a
Karabakh crisis in the fall of 2020.14 The Russian different route—one that caught the French
air force could attempt decapitation strikes to kill completely by surprise.
Zelensky, members of the Rada, key military offi-
cials, and others, although Russian infiltrators are at 3. Putin could also proceed in phases more
least equally likely to attempt assassinations. Russian widely separated from one another. He could
air power could destroy power plants and other key begin by moving forces first into Belarus and
infrastructure nodes as well to disrupt Ukrainian then openly into Donbas, for example, and
command, control, communications, and ability to then push messaging suggesting that he was
coordinate defenses, as well as to compel the capitu- done with military activities for the winter.
lation of cities.15 Russian aircraft would surely target Subsequent limited attack phases could include
concentrations of Ukrainian troops and vehicles, the drive along the north Azov Sea coast, an
especially those known to be equipped with Javelin attack on Odesa, a drive on Kharkiv, or other
and other anti-tank systems.16 operations—each presenting itself as a com-
plete operation and allowing Ukrainian forces
Reports of the Russian plan suggest that it aimed time to settle into defending new front lines in
in part to achieve a degree of surprise by begin- each area. That sequence of phases could cul-
ning in the south and shifting north only after minate with a drive on Kyiv, or it could press
Ukrainian forces had moved in response. If so, it directly toward accomplishing Putin’s political
will not achieve that effect anymore. The scale of objectives. We will consider these more limited
the Russian mobilization and the energy the United scenarios in more detail below but simply note
States has put into notifying allies and the world here that they could also be sub-components of
of this plan may deprive it of the element of sur- this larger invasion obfuscated as limited and
prise if Putin orders its execution in late January or independent efforts of their own.
early February of 2022. The Russians could work to
achieve surprise nevertheless in several ways. The Russian plan as described in detail in the
German media is highly problematic, contains
1. If Putin does not execute the plan this winter numerous unreasonably optimistic assumptions,
but instead repeats this mobilization process in and involves a degree of hand-waving that would
the future, he could seek to achieve the kind of be stunning to see from a professional military
surprise Anwar Sadat secured against Israel in staff, let alone an officer as competent as Russian
the 1973 war.17 Repeated Egyptian mobilizations Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff Valerii
before that war in support of exercises simulat- Gerasimov.18
ing invasion numbed the Israeli Defense Force
to those exercises and contributed to their total This objection is susceptible to various responses.
failure to recognize the moment when Sadat First, we have only media reporting of the plan and
was truly ready to attack. intelligence community officials’ comments on it;
that reporting may be oversimplified to the point of
2. The Russian military could adjust the initia- inaccuracy. Second, the plan obtained by US intel-
tion point of the offensive as well as its initial ligence could be a strawman or templated laydown
and subsequent targets, relying on the condi- of a generic operation written to give the Russian
tioning of this leaked plan to shape erroneous military a concrete basis for identifying where to
Ukrainian reactions. This scenario famously concentrate forces and a timeline within which to
12 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORGDECEMBER 2021
do so. Third, our judgement of Gerasimov and the of course, but that is not the major problem these ad
Russian General Staff could be wrong—he could be hoc groups would face. Previous Russian invasions
satisfied with a plan based on so conditioned them to fight, but also
many optimistic assumptions. conditioned them to a certain kind
The appearance of of fight. Ukrainian militia for-
The reported plan is nevertheless
mations generally fought against
a good place to begin our evalu- enemy mechanized Russian proxies and were able
ation of the challenges a Russian
invasion of unoccupied Ukraine columns driving into to do so on relatively even terms
because Putin withheld the full
would face regardless of the valid- one’s country tends to weight of Russian military power
ity of the objection or responses concentrate thought from the fight. When Russian
to it. The reported plan raises
many of those key challenges and and galvanize initial conventional forces actually did
engage directly, as at the Battle of
alludes to others. We will consider resistance. Debaltseve, the Ukrainians were
the solutions to those challenges
crushed.21
apparently included in the plan
itself as well as other possible solutions. This evalu- The Ukrainian military has greatly increased its
ation can then inform our assessment of the likely effectiveness, equipment, training, and cohe-
risks and costs inherent in Russia’s execution of this sion since that time, but the Russian military has
or even a more sophisticated and sounder plan that improved to an even greater degree.22 Russian forces
can, in turn, in form Western leaders deterrence fighting at Debaltseve and elsewhere during the
calculus. 2014-2015 war, moreover, were not generally fight-
ing as regular units with their normal structures and
full complements of troops and equipment.23 Many
Likely Ukrainian Initial of the volunteers who supported the Ukrainian
Responses to Full-Scale military in 2014 and 2015, on the other hand,
Invasion have been disbanded and have not been training or
exercising (some of those units were instead incor-
The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight porated into the Ukrainian military).24 There is
against such an invasion, for which it is now pre- little ground for optimism that they would present a
paring.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military formidable general obstacle to Russian mechanized
personnel might have about their leaders or their pros- and airborne units fighting in their normal comple-
pects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns ments as the Russians have repeatedly trained to do
driving into one’s country tends to concentrate since 2015.25 Ukrainian forces and irregular troops
thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses could, however, create significant delays in particu-
complexities and creates binary choices. Military offi- lar areas if they establish positions at key bottlenecks
cers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight with weapons capable of disabling or destroying
in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. Russian mechanized vehicles. Such delays could
There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will matter if the Russian advance depended on precise
perform differently in this case. timing and the close coordination of attacking
Ukrainian civil society is also conditioned to fight columns advancing independently of one another—
Russian invasions by the 2014 attacks and repeated something the Russian plan appears to require.
fears of subsequent aggressions. Tens of thousands
of Ukrainians demobilized from the ad hoc militia
units that formed in 2015 would likely take up arms
Likely Situation Following
again in the face of Russian tank columns driving Initial Invasion
toward Kyiv and other key cities.20 One can easily Russian forces attacking on the scale and along the
overstate the determination of Ukrainians to fight, axes of advance laid out in the reported plan would
CRITICALTHREATS.ORG 13Putin’s Military Options
nevertheless likely achieve their military objectives troops identified as being prepared for the invasion
of destroying the Ukrainian military’s ability to con- is 175,000.30 It is unlikely that Russian forces will
tinue fighting and encircling major Ukrainian cities be able to prevent the transition of Ukrainian resis-
(if that is what Putin plans to do). Unless the United tance into a low-level insurgency if the Ukrainian
States and some NATO states actively participate in people choose to attempt it. There is good reason
the fighting, the major variables are the time it takes to think they will do so, at least for a time, based on
the Russian military to achieve these aims and the their responses to post-2014 crises.
cost it will have to pay in blood and equipment. The
The question of western Ukraine also becomes
outcome of the initial fighting itself is not in doubt.
prominent in this phase. The plans suggest that
Reports of the plan and most discussions of the Putin does not intend to invade or occupy the most
invasion stop at this point. But decisions and heavily anti-Russian areas of western Ukraine but
actions beyond this point will determine the success would rather leave them as some sort of rump state-
or failure of the entire undertaking. Even assum- let, at least for a time.31 Doing so would likely make
ing that Ukraine’s surrounded cities surrender as those areas a magnet to which Ukrainians who wished
planned and Putin finds himself in control of much to continue fighting Russia would withdraw, possi-
of Ukraine, he then has to do something with this bly establishing a government-in-exile and means
conquered territory to achieve his actual objectives. for supporting continued resistance and poten-
What he can and will do depends heavily on the sit- tially insurgency within Russian-occupied Ukraine.
uation in Ukraine when the major fighting stops. Putin would surely threaten them with devastating
That situation is likely to be chaotic and ugly. violence—and threaten NATO with war if it moved
forces into western Ukraine or supported it in any
The Russian invasion outlined in the leaked plan
way—but would risk over-extension if he followed
and above is a scaled-up version of the “thunder run”
through on threats to attack the enclave, especially
of US forces into Iraq in 2003.26 It leaves Russian
if he did so while many of his forces were tied down
forces in control of major population centers but
securing their gains in eastern and central Ukraine.
not the countryside. Even in the major population
For purposes of this discussion, we assume that he
centers, Russian forces will be challenged to secure
would allow this enclave or statelet to remain free
themselves and stamp out resistance. Kyiv is a city
for a time even if it fueled resistance to his consoli-
of three-to-four million people; Kharkiv over one
dation in the rest of the country.
and a half million.27 Odesa and
Dnipro each have roughly one Putin might benefit from a brief
million inhabitants.28 Russia does period of relative calm after the
not adhere to American counter- Even assuming that invasion despite all these con-
insurgency doctrine, to be sure, Ukraine’s surrounded siderations. The shock of being
but the counter-insurgency ratio invaded and overwhelmed would
identified in that doctrine was cities surrender as be substantial and could stun even
derived from the study of many planned and Putin those Ukrainians determined to
insurgencies, not just those in continue the fight enough to delay
which America was engaged.29
finds himself in control and disrupt their efforts. Russia
That ratio—of one counter-insur- of much of Ukraine, might well have a window of some
gent per 20 inhabitants—would he then has to do weeks or even months in which
suggest a counter-insurgency to try to organize a new political
force requirement on the order of something with this order, hunt down would-be resis-
325,000 personnel just for those conquered territory tance leaders, establish Ukrainian
cities. Russia might well accept a to achieve his actual forces loyal to itself, and disrupt
much lower ratio and would surely efforts to develop an insurgency.
try to field local forces quickly. objectives. Moscow has the advantage of
But the total number of Russian having agents throughout Ukraine
14 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORGDECEMBER 2021
who likely already have lengthy target lists to support
such efforts, as well as potential proxies identi-
How Would Putin Rule a
fied and possibly partially prepared to play roles in Conquered Ukraine?
securing the country and undermining resistance.32 Putin’s purpose in invading Ukraine would be, in
The psychological effects of an invasion and their large part, to establish a new government and new
duration are hard to predict and likely depend on political order amenable to Russia and his aims.33
many factors. If Putin can achieve meaningful sur- The fact that such would be his objective raises the
prise, then the shock and subsequent disruption burden on him to think through a post-conflict
of efforts to counter him will likely be severe. The political order beyond the “you-break-it-you-own-
current Ukrainian information space, as discussed it” principle. This dangerous military undertaking
in Part 1 of this report, suggests that he might achieve will almost certainly be a failure if it does not result
some level of psychological surprise if he invaded in a relatively stable political order oriented on
within the next few weeks, but that he is unlikely to Moscow.
achieve surprise if he waits until the plan’s reported The political transformation Putin seeks goes
initiation date in late January or early February. beyond replacing Zelensky with someone more
If the Russian deployments in preparation for suitable. Putin will surely also insist on changes to
this attack continue over the coming months and Ukraine’s constitution, particularly removing the
Russian conditions-setting in the information commitment to join NATO and likely replacing it
space expands Ukrainians are likely to begin taking with a ban on joining the Western alliance.34 He will
the risk of attack more seriously. Some will likely set likely seek binding commitments for deeper inte-
conditions for resistance and, if necessary, insur- gration of the Ukrainian and Russian economies,
gency and will have some time to do so. for the permanent expulsion of Western military
The net effects of the shock value of an invasion and advisors and equipment, for joining and fully par-
Russia’s inherent advantages in moving quickly to ticipating in Russia-led institutions such as the
take advantage of the shock period are thus likely to CSTO, and possibly other concessions.
be reduced if Putin carries through with the attack Putin has been steadily driving both Ukraine and
as reportedly planned this winter. Putin would the West toward these conditions without invading.
likely seek to increase those effects through coordi- He has suffered setbacks and encountered obstacles,
nated cyber and information campaigns, sabotage some resulting from or strengthened by his own
and other infiltrator activities, and possibly other errors, as outlined in Part 1 of this report, but he
non-military or irregular warfare adjuncts that are has been adapting his approach as well. If he decides
either not in the intercepted plan or not included to invade Ukraine now, the likeliest explanation
in media reports of it. for this about-face in Russian strategy would be a
Putin may thus need to establish new conditions determination to cement his legacy, of which he has
of government and a new political climate in Kyiv openly identified the reintegration of Ukraine as a
against the backdrop of at least limited continuing central part. If legacy drives him to such a dangerous
resistance and proto-insurgency, against which his endeavor, then he is unlikely to be satisfied with an
military forces and intelligence services would be outcome that can be readily put at risk in the future.
focusing their efforts. He has no reason to be con- He surely would not want to leave Ukraine in a state
fident that he would face a more stable situation, that might require some successor to re-invade it,
although it is certainly possible that he could. Much with Putin taking the blame for not having done it
depends on the path he chooses to take in govern- right to begin with.
ing a conquered Ukraine and the relative time-space But Putin cannot adopt the most straightforward
relationships between Russia’s efforts to establish a approach to reintegrating a lost Soviet land by
new mode of governance and the efforts of Ukrainian force—crushing it militarily and keeping large armed
oppositionists to build an effective resistance. forces in it to crush its people into obedience over
CRITICALTHREATS.ORG 15Putin’s Military Options
decades—if the Ukrainians establish a viable resis- responsibility for them is clearly intended in part
tance or proto-insurgency. That Soviet approach to get Kyiv to pay for them.37 In annexing the vast
ultimately failed, for one thing, areas of Ukraine occupied after
although Putin blames Mikhail an invasion of this type, Putin
Gorbachev’s weak stomach would inherit the same problem
for the failure, and it would This dangerous military on a scale orders of magnitude
ruin Russia. The expense of undertaking will almost larger. The Ukrainian economy,
maintaining a large occupa- properly rebuilt and integrated,
tion force, whether military or certainly be a failure if could eventually become an
paramilitary, would drain the it does not result in a engine for Russian economic
Russian treasury faster than relatively stable political growth, to be sure. But the up-
Putin could hope to refill it. front costs of reconstructing it
order oriented on Moscow. after the damages of an invasion
We have no public discussions
and then reorienting it to orbit
of Putin’s thinking on this
Moscow would likely be stagger-
matter, but the entire tenor
ing. Putin simply does not have the cash to afford
of Russian military and state security doctrine
this and does not likely desire the responsibility.
argues that he would calculate this way. The Russian
approach to conflict is explicitly designed to offset Putin might hope, in fact, for a much more opti-
the terrible economic disadvantages Russia faces mistic (for him) outcome—a new Ukrainian state
against the West. Putin constantly makes clear
35
that is independent of Russia but permanently
that he is acutely aware of Russia’s economic limi- politically, economically, and socially aligned with
tations. It would be completely inconsistent with Moscow. He would not have to maintain a large mil-
a two-decade-old pattern for him to accept such a itary or security garrison in such a state, nor would
devastating economic price that could put at risk he have to support it economically. He might hope
not merely his or his successors’ hold on Ukraine, to achieve this outcome by one of at least two pos-
but even their hold on power in Moscow. He is sible routes. He might facilitate the formation of a
extremely unlikely, therefore, to set up some sort new Ukrainian political order himself in a fashion
of “Ukrainian Democratic Republic” modeled on similar to the one the US used to build new Afghan
the German Democratic Republic of the Cold War and Iraqi governments after the military operations
days and kept in line by a vicious domestic dictator- of 2001 and 2003.38 Alternatively, he might court
ship backed up by tens or hundreds of thousands of a sort of Vichy Ukraine, whereby some pro-Russian
Russian troops. leader emerges from the wreck of the invasion, sur-
renders on behalf of Ukraine, and undertakes to
Putin is equally unlikely to adopt another straight-
accept Putin’s dictates and run the country (or as
forward approach—annexing Ukraine directly to
much as Putin chooses to leave to that person) in
Russia as a collection of separate provinces. He
Putin’s interests.
adopted this approach with Crimea in 2014 but
has steadfastly refused to do it with Donbas or even The challenges of overseeing the formation of a new
the territories he seized from Georgia in 2008. government under the barrels of Russian tanks are
His reluctance to absorb the DNR and LNR likely daunting. Putin observed and no doubt learned
results first and foremost from the fact that he lessons from the US experiences in Iraq and
benefits from the leverage their continued formal Afghanistan, but the truth is that such an undertak-
existence within the independent Ukrainian state ing is inherently fraught. He could well have to form
provides.36 But he is also likely deterred by the cost that new government in the context of continued
that rebuilding them would impose on the Russian resistance, possibly moving toward proto-insur-
state if he annexed them. His continued pressure on gency, as described above, and against the backdrop
Kyiv to “normalize” the areas he occupies and take of a wrecked economy. He should remember the
16 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORGDECEMBER 2021
difficulty of accomplishing such a task from his under direct Russian control and likely integrated
own experience in Ukraine’s east. Russian efforts to into the Russian chain of command as are the mili-
establish effective control of the DNR and LNR via tary forces of the DNR and LNR.40 This approach
local proxies faltered for years and required constant would allow him to maintain the fiction of an inde-
intervention—even in regions with high degrees of pendent Ukrainian state—including giving him a
sympathy toward Russia and effectively no internal series of potential scapegoats in the proxy political
resistance to Russian rule. Those regions continue leaders who could be jettisoned whenever public
to drain the Russian economy. Replicating even that pressure or embarrassment required—while leaving
level of success would be much more challenging in him fully in charge of the internal security appara-
a post-invasion Kyiv. tus, technically behind the scenes.
A Vichy Ukraine scenario is somewhat more plau- Attractive as Putin might find this approach,
sible. Putin has no lack of candidates for the mantle however, he will likely find it very difficult to imple-
of a Ukrainian Pétain, and he would surely put his ment rapidly. Some of the years it took Russia to
security services to work quickly building the infra- create such structures in the DNR and LNR were
structure one would need to try to govern. But spent exploring alternative options and looking for
Putin would likely recall two good reasons to doubt acceptable leaders, but some reflected the reality
the long-term efficacy of such a solution. First, the that it just takes time to get it right. Putin could take
Vichy government itself lasted barely two years— the time he needed in Donbas because, annoying as
Hitler invaded and occupied Vichy France in 1942 the expense of keeping Russian control of the area
after the allied landings in North Africa, partly in the interim no doubt was, it was small enough for
because he mistrusted it as the war continued and him to absorb it.
partly because it was ineffective against the Free
Putin will not risk losing control of Ukraine if he has
French resistance.39 Second, Putin also has expe-
to wage war to gain it. He would be unlikely, there-
rience with something like this scenario. Former
fore, to withdraw his military forces completely or
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich was a largely
reduce his security service deployments substantially
reliable Russian agent governing Ukraine mainly in
until he is confident that his proxy structure will
Putin’s interest. But he was an ineffective ruler of
hold. It should take him many months to gain much
Ukraine trying to guide the country in a direction
confidence at all and some years to gain it fully. He
many Ukrainians opposed—and doing it badly. His
would have to be ready to keep a large contingent of
overthrow in the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution was
Russian troops and security service elements com-
the event that triggered Putin’s intervention in the
mitted to suppressing unrest and building proxy
first place. Putin might decide to try again with a
forces in Ukraine for two to three years in any
new person and a more rigorous and possibly brutal
event, at least if he were at all serious. The actual
approach to setting conditions and supporting that
expense of such an undertaking would be large.
person but doing so would risk leaving his successor
The opportunity cost of focusing so many limited
a mess rather than a clean legacy.
assets on this task would be even larger. Putin would
Putin is most likely, therefore, to have to accept the likelihood of a
attempt a larger-scale version of steady drip of Russian casualties
the system he ultimately settled at the hands of any resistance or
on in Donbas—a formal politi-
Putin is most likely, proto-insurgency—a drip that
cal leader who is a vetted Russian therefore, to attempt a cost his predecessors in office
proxy and ostensibly controls larger-scale version of the dearly.
the government, backed up
by a parallel security structure system he ultimately settled Putin certainly could find
ways to govern a conquered
manned partly by Russians and on in Donbas. Ukraine, and he might well
partly by Ukrainians but entirely
CRITICALTHREATS.ORG 17Putin’s Military Options
decide to pay the prices and take the risks con- benefits. People change, of course, especially toward
sidered above in return for completing this vital the ends of their lives. But we should look for solid
part of his legacy. But such decisions would be evidence that Putin’s thought process and calcula-
fundamental deviations from the patterns of tions really have changed so fundamentally that he
thought, behavior, and action he has pursued for would either overlook these problems or accept
two decades. They would be, in many respects, irra- these costs before accepting at face value the inva-
tional, driven by an ideological need and psychic sion plan he is ostensibly pursuing.
urge to take real risks and pay real prices for abstract
Courses of Action Subordinate to COA 1:
A Full Invasion of Ukraine
The full invasion of Ukraine consists of several Sub-COA 1a Objectives
major parts. Putin could execute almost every
Deploying Russian ground forces into Belarus
major sub-component of the plan independently of
would accomplish several important objectives for
the others. He might do so, as discussed above, to
Putin. It would establish Russian dominance of
attempt to regain surprise after this plan was leaked,
and control over Belarus clearly and unmistakably,
intending to achieve the same effect of invading
ending the dance Lukashenko has almost inexpli-
and occupying Ukraine as described above but in a
cably led Putin over many years.44 It would likely
phased manner. But he might also execute several of
cement the reality of a Belarusian-Russian Union
these sub-COAs on their own to achieve indepen-
State controlled by Moscow and the integration of
dent objectives without intending to go all the way
the Russian and Belarusian militaries.45
to full-scale invasion. We will consider the major
sub-COAs here ordered by the likelihood we assess This deployment would also establish Russian
for each and laying out the separate objectives each ground forces able to operate from secure bases
might pursue beyond setting conditions for the on the Polish border. Russia already maintains a
full-scale invasion. large concentration of troops, ships, airplanes, and
missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave, which borders
Poland and Lithuania.46 But the exclave is also vul-
Sub-COA 1a: nerable, separated as it is by the Suwalki Corridor
Deploy Forces to Belarus even from Belarus—and many long miles from the
ISW has long been forecasting that Putin would nearest permanent Russian ground forces base.
permanently deploy Russian ground forces into NATO forces could (and should) hold Kaliningrad
Belarus at a moment of his choosing.41 He has fully at risk in a war or potential war with Russia, and
set conditions for doing so in the military and Putin would have to make difficult decisions about
information spaces.42 Russian troops have exercised whether and how to escalate or cut painful losses if
extensively with Belarusian troops, demonstrating NATO did so. Russian ground forces in Belarus face
and improving their abilities to operate in com- no such threat. Their lines of communication back
bined groups and also familiarizing Russian troops to Russia would be solid and secure. They would
with Belarusian terrain and military installations, have operational depth within which to maneuver
doctrine, communications protocols, and habits.43 in Belarus itself and strategic depth if Putin chose
to pull them back into Russia.
18 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORGDECEMBER 2021
Russian forces in Belarus would dramatically The ideal location for Putin to base forces ready-
increase the threat Putin could make against NATO’s ing for an attack on Ukraine would be in Gomel
ability to support its Baltic allies through the Province in southeastern Belarus.49 This area does
Suwalki corridor. The forces in Kaliningrad already not apparently hold the kind of military infrastruc-
threaten that vital chokepoint, to be sure, but their ture the Russian army would prefer to use as a base
vulnerabilities could leave them open to neutraliza- of mechanized operations, however. The largest
tion as already mentioned. Russian ground forces known military area is the Belarusian portion of the
based near Grodno in northwest Belarus would put Chernobyl exclusion zone. Of the various reasons
a pincer on the Suwalki Corridor Putin might eschew that option the
and bring Russian ground rein- main, is that it lacks actual usable
forcements in easy reach of military infrastructure. The prov-
Kaliningrad.47 NATO would have
Russian forces in ince otherwise hosts only a small
to think hard and fast about how Belarus would and basic military airfield and
to secure its ground line of com- dramatically increase a few ammunition depots. The
munication through the Corridor Russian military would therefore
in such a scenario. Putin would the threat Putin could likely have to set up an expedition-
likely seek to use the doubt created make against NATO’s ary base in this region, building
by this situation to undermine ability to support its up stocks of fuel and ammunition,
NATO’s confidence in its ability among other things, to support
to defend the Baltic States and Baltic allies through the the drive on Kyiv. Such an activity
those states’ confidence in NATO’s Suwalki corridor. would be highly visible and would
will to do so, as we have explained take some time. It would also be
elsewhere. 48
so obvious a preparation for the
drive down the Dnepr that it would undermine any
Russian forces in Belarus could also threaten Warsaw
attempt at achieving surprise on that axis even if
itself if concentrated in enough force. They could
the attack followed immediately on the completion
provide leverage for Putin to bring against Poland
of the base. Putin might order forces to move to
and further his efforts to split NATO’s eastern and
Gomel and establish a base there, withholding the
western members from one another, especially if
attack until a later time and seeking to benefit for
the US and western members refused to reinforce
now solely from the panic that would result from
Poland. Putin is highly unlikely to invade Poland,
the danger that he might attack from that area.
to be sure, and nothing in this paper should be
construed to suggest that he would. But states and The next most attractive location for an attack
militaries react to threats as well as actions, and the on Belarus might be the large training area near
appearance of a significant mechanized Russian Baranovichi in central-west Belarus.50 This posi-
force on the western Belarusian border would be an tion has a large base as well as a robust airfield. It
entirely new threat with which Poland and NATO is, however, well inside Belarus and a long way from
would have to cope. Kyiv. Establishing Russian forces here would never-
theless serve several purposes. Those forces could be
A deployment to Belarus is also essential if Putin
used to threaten Ukraine or invade, despite the dis-
wants to be able to attack Ukraine along the right
tance, since it is still one of the closest positions in
bank of the Dnepr River, as discussed above.
Belarus to Kyiv. But Baranovichi would also be a good
base for a mechanized force threatening Poland and
Sub-COA 1a Deployment Options: Lithuania slightly less immediately than a deploy-
If and when Putin does move ground forces into ment on the border itself. Putin could present a
Belarus, the locations to which he sends them and deployment to this Baranovichi as non-escalatory
the types of units he sends could indicate the likeli- and then decry any NATO move of reinforcements
hood that he is preparing to attack Ukraine. toward the Belarusian border. A mechanized force at
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