GVQ UK FOCUS FUND 2020 annual review and Fund outlook
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GVQ UK FOCUS FUND
2020 annual review and Fund
outlook
Risk considerations
KEY RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE GVQ UK FOCUS FUND (“Fund”) – The general risk factors set out
under the heading Risk Factors of the Prospectus and the Supplement to the Prospectus apply to the Fund.
In addition, Shareholders should note the following factors:
Objective Risk – There can be no assurance that the Fund will achieve its investment objective. An investor
should consider his personal tolerance for an investment based upon global equity securities before investing
in the Fund.
Management Risk – The ability of the Fund to meet its investment objective is directly related to the
Investment Manager’s investment strategies for the Fund. If the Investment Manager’s investment strategies
do not produce the expected results, the value of your investment could be diminished or even lost entirely and
the Fund could underperform against other funds with similar investment objectives.
Key Personnel – The performance of the Fund will depend on the skill and expertise of the Investment
Manager. The loss of key personnel could affect the performance of the Fund.
Equities Risk – As the Fund will invest primarily in equity securities, the value of the Fund’s underlying
investments may fluctuate in response to activities and results of individual companies, as well as in
connection with general market conditions.
Availability of Suitable Investment Opportunities – The Fund will compete with other potential investors to
acquire assets. Certain of the Fund's competitors may have greater financial and other resources and may
have better access to suitable investment opportunities. There can be no assurance that the Fund will be able
to locate and complete investments which satisfy the Fund's rate of return objectives or that the Fund will be
able to invest fully its committed capital. If no suitable investments can be made then cash will be held by the
Fund and this will reduce returns to Shareholders.
Limited Number of Investments – The Fund anticipates that it will be diversified. However, in the event of a
material demand for redemptions, the Fund could be forced to sell liquid positions resulting in an over-
weighting in a small number of illiquid investments. In such circumstances, the aggregate return of the Fund
may be substantially and adversely affected by the unfavourable performance of a single investment. The
Fund's restriction of redemptions of Shares in excess of ten per cent of the total Net Asset Value of the Fund
on any one Dealing Day will mitigate this risk to an extent should these circumstances arise.
The Fund could take its charges from capital of the Fund if insufficient income is generated to cover the
charges and accordingly there is the potential for capital erosion. Capital erosion may have the effect of
reducing the level of income generated in the future.
These are not all the risks of an investment in the Fund. For a full list of the Fund’s risks, please see the
Prospectus. Investors should take advice from their own independent professional financial advisers before
making an investment decision and are responsible for ascertaining any income tax or other tax consequences
which may affect their acquisition of any investment.
You should remember that the value of investments and the income from them may go down as well as up and
is not guaranteed, and investors may not get back the amount invested. Past performance cannot be relied on
as a guide to future performance.
1Notice to recipients
This document is given to the recipient on condition that the recipient accepts that it is not a client of GVQ
Investment Management Limited (“GVQ Investment Management” or “GVQIM”) and that hence, none of
the client protections applicable to GVQIM’s clients are in fact in force or available, and GVQIM is not
providing any financial or other advice to it.
This document has been issued by GVQIM in the UK solely for the purposes of section 21 of the UK Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000. GVQIM, whose registered office is at 16 Berkeley Street, London, W1J 8DZ,
is registered in England: No 4493500 and is authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority.
This document is confidential, is for informational purposes only, and is intended solely for the person to whom
it is delivered. It may not be reproduced, photocopied or disseminated to any other person without the express
prior written consent of GVQIM. GVQIM acts as the investment manager for the various funds included in this
presentation.
The information in this presentation is subject to change without notice, its accuracy is not guaranteed, and it
may be incomplete and is condensed. This document is not intended to provide, and should not be relied on
for, accounting, legal or tax advice or investment recommendations.
All opinions and estimates included in this document speak as of the date of this document and are subject to
change without notice and reliance should not be placed on the information given herein.
Although GVQIM has taken all reasonable care that the information contained in this document is accurate at
the time of publication, no representation or warranty (including liability towards third-parties), expressed or
implied, is made (or accepted) as to its accuracy or completeness or fitness for any purpose by GVQIM. Under
no circumstances will GVQIM be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, special or consequential loss or
damages caused by reliance on this information or for the risks inherent in the financial markets.
To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law and regulatory requirements, GVQIM specifically
disclaims any liability for errors, inaccuracies or omissions in this document and for any loss or damage
resulting from its use, whether caused by negligence or otherwise.
Guernsey: The shares that are the subject of this presentation may only be made from within the Bailiwick of
Guernsey either: (i) by persons licenced to do so under the Protection of Investors (Bailiwick of Guernsey)
Law, 1987 (as amended) (the “POI Law”); or (ii) to persons licenced under the POI law or the Insurance
Business of (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 2002 (as amended), or the Banking Supervision (Bailiwick of
Guernsey) Law, 1994 (as amended), or the Regulation of Fiduciaries, Administration Businesses and
Company Directors, etc. (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 2000 (as amended)
Switzerland: The Prospectus and the Supplements of the Funds, the Key Investor Information Documents
(“KIIDs”), the Memorandum and Articles of Association as well as the Annual and Interim Reports of the
Company are available only to Qualified Investors free of charge from the Swiss Representative. In respect of
the Shares distributed in Switzerland to Qualified Investors, place of performance and jurisdiction is at the
registered office of the Representative. Swiss Representative: 1741 Fund Solutions AG, Burggraben 16, 9000
St. Gallen. Swiss Paying Agent: Tellco Ltd, Bahnhofstrasse 4, 6430 Schwyz, Switzerland
The Prospectus and key information document (KIID’s) for the GVQ UK Focus Fund [sub fund or GVQ
Investment Funds (Dublin) Plc] are available in English on GVQIM’s website www.gvqim.com. Please see
offering documents for full term and conditions.
22020 annual review and Fund outlook Manager’s review1,2 2020 was an extraordinary year for the world, dominated by the first global pandemic since the Spanish flu in 1918, ravaging societies and economies. The UK economy, by way of example, saw its sharpest quarterly contraction in over 300 years of history in Q2; a pattern largely repeated the world over as countries grappled with national lockdowns and protecting healthcare systems under acute stress. Record stimulus packages were swiftly put in place in an attempt to try to counterbalance economies, and spur recovery. Evidence at the half year point suggested that both the economic measures taken, in conjunction with national lockdowns, were starting to take effect, providing some cause for tentative optimism as we moved into the second half of the year. Indeed Q3 in the UK saw a record GDP print of +15.5%. However, despite mounting evidence of economic recovery through Q3, markets continued to favour ‘growth’ companies, over their ‘value’ counterparts, a trend in place for a number of years now, but accentuated by COVID, creating what an increasing number of market participants believe to be, ourselves included, a historic bubble, with the styles of ‘growth’ and ‘momentum’ converging. As the broker Citigroup surmised at the time: ‘Investors appear to be plugged into all manner of momentum trades across a range of assets classes, whether they realise it or not …this in turn has meant that the entire equity market has now become a monstrous anti-value trade.’ On a similar note, another broker, Liberum, in response to events wrote: ‘Normally, periods of extended outperformance by high momentum stocks makes markets vulnerable to “momentum crashes” or sudden reversals of price momentum. If this momentum rally does revert, it could lead to one of the biggest momentum crashes ever’. We do not do ‘momentum’. The MSCI UK Growth index outperformed its Value counterpart by a further 11.7% during Q3, providing a year-to-date headwind to Fund performance of nearly 29% as we entered Q4. While not an outright ‘Value’ Fund, we are, and will always be, valuation sensitive. People sell shares for many reasons; they buy them for one, to make money. We therefore highlighted at the end of Q3 that we thought it was interesting, and we believed instructive (given depressed valuations of many Portfolio companies at the time) that we had seen material share purchases across a wide range of Portfolio companies since COVID began. In September alone significant purchases included: WPP’s CEO and CFO buying £482k and £441k respectively; Babcock’s CEO bought a further £100k (following a purchase of £318k in July) and the CFO designate, also £100k; Jupiter’s CEO bought another £53k (following a purchase of £493k in August); Micro Focus’ Chairman (and connected persons) bought a further £243k (having purchased £875k in H1). This list was by no means exhaustive, but we believed, served to underpin the view of how severely dislocated some share prices had become from company fundamentals. We used Fund holding, Tyman, to help illustrate this. In response to Tyman’s H1 results, broker Liberum said: ‘Strong first half results lead us to upgrade 2020 forecasts, by 19% at the EPS level. Revenues have recovered faster than expected, with July ahead of the prior year. Self-improvement measures are gaining momentum. US sentiment is very strong, with Tyman’s shares left behind. It has increased financial headroom through covenant relaxation and a £100m CCFF facility. The shares look cheap given its market leading positions on 12% FCF yield’. This corroborated our analysis. Ultimately, Tyman went on more than a round trip in 2020, starting the year at 271.5p, before falling to a low of 134p (24/3) and subsequently rallying to close out the year at 350.5p (a total positive annual return of 29.1%). Illustrative, we believe, of the challenges of 2020, but also the potential pitfalls and dangers of taking a very short term view. Its share price journey sets, we believe, precedent. Source: 1. GVQIM 2. Bloomberg 3. Northern Trust Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and the value of investments can go down as well as up 3
2020 annual review and Fund outlook Just over a decade ago, most market participants grossly underestimated the rapid snap back in both earnings and cash flows from the trough coming out of the Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”). The opportunity today, however, to which we think this is most pertinent, is a relatively small subset of the UK market. Not ‘Value’ per se, but a selection of companies which based on our rigorous due diligence and quality assessment process, offer both strong future growth and cash flow potential, yet are also temporarily trading on value ratings, so additionally offer huge re-rating potential. As a point of reference, over the subsequent five years following the GFC, the Strategy delivered the following returns: 2009 +52.2%; 2010 +30.5%; 2011 (5.0)%; 2012 +19.6%; 2013 +44.2%; a cumulative total return of c.225%. We believe conditions today are similar; arguably better. We produce detailed forecasts in our models at the point of analyst research on a stock and these drive our real target price and Internal Rate of Return (“IRR”) for each investment. However to keep tabs on the valuation element of the portfolio on a month-to-month basis (i.e. in between our detailed research) we monitor what consensus estimates imply. So, that IRR is based upon the weighted forecast return for each stock from its current GVQ cash yield to its target GVQ cash yield (concluded by the research committee) using consensus profit/cash forecasts. Hence it is our way of looking at the world for the portfolio (through the 4 drivers) but based on current consensus estimates. To be clear, this methodology is not used to set target prices or to make investment decisions – but we use it as a steer to see what is going on with the portfolio and what consensus is currently assuming with our quality work layered on top via the rating. The implied IRR of the Fund on this basis going into the final quarter was c.45% per annum (based on 3YR forecasts). To note, not only is the number high in absolute terms (i.e. strong expected returns) but also evenly balanced across growth, de-gearing and re-rating potential, with no one dominant driver. The last time we witnessed a similar phenomenon was indeed coming out of the GFC. Three major positive catalysts fell into place over the final quarter of the year, starting (and most importantly) on 9th November with the news the world had been hoping for, that Pfizer had found a COVID vaccine, turning global markets on their heads. By way of example, European price momentum witnessed its largest one day drawdown ever. (The second largest historical drop, for reference, was March 2000; the end of the dotcom bubble). This followed through and was further catalysed by the election of Joe Biden as US President (and confirmation post period end that the Democrats had also taken control of the Senate) and a much anticipated Brexit deal announced pre-Christmas. We view all three outcomes as highly positive for the backdrop to the Fund, and ‘value’ more generally: Pfizer’s vaccine (and others like it) help pave the way for a route back to normal life; Joe Biden’s election and Democratic control of the Senate are seen to both reduce the political risk premium and raise the prospect of higher inflation; and a (albeit light) Brexit deal at the eleventh hour, provides a framework for the UK to move forward. The change of sentiment is clear to see in the Fund’s numbers; since the last business day before the Pfizer news was announced, through to the end of the final quarter, the Fund delivered a total return of 25.3%, outperforming the index by 14.4%. COVID news flow will undoubtedly continue to dominate headlines for the foreseeable future and share prices will, we expect, remain volatile, however we believe the building blocks for a change of market leadership, are now firmly in place. Performance review1,3 Since the Interims were reported at the half year, NAV per share increased to £24.20 for the I class shares, delivering a total positive return of 9.8%, and NAV per share increased to £23.57 for the A class shares, delivering a total positive return of 9.6%. Perhaps more illuminating is the return from the market low on 23rd March 2020, through to the end of the year. Over this period, the I class shares delivered a total positive return of 39.0%; the A class shares 38.5%; versus an equivalent total return from the FTSE All Share index (the “index”) of 37.8%, lending further support to our view, we believe, of the recovery potential. This, however, only went part way to mitigating the COVID impact, felt principally in Q1 of the year. Over the full year, the I class shares delivered a negative total return of 25.5%; the A class shares a negative total return of 25.9%. Source: 1. GVQIM 2. Bloomberg 3. Northern Trust Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and the value of investments can go down as well as up 4
2020 annual review and Fund outlook The Fund declared a final dividend on the 31st December 2020 of £0.16 (I class shares) and £0.11 (A class shares), representing a total full year dividend yield of 1.13% and 0.64% respectively. While down materially on the previous year, as companies took stock of the impact of COVID and acted prudently to preserve cash flow (pending outcome) it was encouraging to see over H2 the likes of BAE Systems announce at its H1 results that it would be fully restoring its dividend. Its final dividend relating to the previous financial year (which had been proposed but then deferred due to COVID uncertainty) was paid in September, and an interim dividend (for this financial year) of 9.4p (flat on 2019’s interim payment) paid in November. Perhaps more notable given it has often historically been seen as a global bellwether, WPP, along with announcing its half year results in August that materially beat revised consensus expectations and pointed towards signs of positive momentum in H2 to date, re-introduced an interim dividend payment of 10p. While lower than the equivalent period last year (23p), it was a welcome move and another sign of the COVID fog, more generally, starting to lift. At the December 2020 Capital Markets Day, WPP went further and announced they would return to paying an ongoing full year dividend. Key to maximising the recovery potential in the Fund is the ability for companies to avoid large expensive and dilutive rights issues, of which none of the Fund’s investments under its ownership had had to do during the COVID crisis. (This is highly unusual compared to other Fund peers and in contrast to performance). Alongside this, we identified and discussed in previous Factsheets, Cineworld, the only company in the Fund on our analysis to have short term liquidity issues as a result of enforced closure for much of the period. Pleasingly the company announced during November that they had secured significant additional liquidity and headroom: through the issue of $450m of new debt, covenant waivers on all debt facilities until June 2022; additional maturity on the RCF to 2024; the bringing forward of a $200m tax refund into early 2021; and the issue of equity warrants. The warrants were issued to the new lenders and with full exercise into ordinary shares, the lenders would hold 9.99% of the enlarged share count. This is consistent with previous management messaging that they did not expect any material equity dilution as part of any raise, and the additional liquidity now provides the company with significant headroom to manage through. Clearly a good result; the shares were up c.100% in November alone. Over time, on a fully recovered basis, we believe the shares could still increase 5x, significantly more than offsetting 2020’s loses; it was the biggest detractor over the year delivering negative 723 basis points (“bps”). Another company to feel a material impact from COVID was Babcock, as confirmed post period end, by their Q3 trading update. The business performance was ahead of expectations and showed run-rate improvement over H1 with 9 month revenues off just over 3% and therefore holding up well through COVID as we would expect during a downturn given the nature of Babcock’s long term contracts. However the unique nature of this downturn, i.e. social distancing and closures, has meant that profitability (-c.30% over the same period) has been hit much harder that would “normally” be the case, and this continues to date. We expect this to bounce back as measures are unwound with the main catalyst being the mass vaccinations programme, particularly with Babcock continuing to show a strong order book which will continue to support the ongoing business. The shares delivered a negative total return of 576bps over the full year. We note the further purchase of, in aggregate, c.£180k of shares by Directors after the Q3 update (taking the total since the new CEO was appointed to just under £1m) lending strong support to the medium to long term potential of the company. The new CEO will outline his new strategy at the full year results in May 2021. Source: 1. GVQIM 2. Bloomberg 3. Northern Trust Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and the value of investments can go down as well as up 5
2020 annual review and Fund outlook Other material detractors were Equiniti, negative 429bps, and Micro Focus, negative 315bps. Regarding Equiniti, in our opinion the most important news came after Q4 with the announced change in CEO which we believe is key to the company attracting investors and the equity re-rating. We have been working closely with the Board and other investors to encourage a review of the executive team following a number of disappointments. The new CEO starts April 1st and comes well regarded from our referencing of his time at Secure Trust Bank. Micro Focus ended the year strongly, delivering a total positive return of 72.3% in the final quarter. Its latest trading update showed revenue in-line with previous guidance and a clear improvement in H2 that continued into 2021 across all business lines, while EBITDA margin was at the top end of guidance; also named in the period as a partner for Amazon’s mainframe migration technology. Despite its poor share price performance over the entirety of 2020, the company has seen minimal downgrades compared to the rest of the market through the COVID crisis. We view this as anomalous. As the broker Numis wrote in July: ‘we estimate the shares discount a c.6% pa revenue decline in perpetuity. If management can achieve their FY23 financial targets, the share price could multiply by 5. We think the risk- reward is substantially skewered to the upside.’ We agree. One final point of reference as regards the recovery potential of the Fund, it was pleasing to note the strong share price performance of Spire Healthcare +63.6%, Gym Group +59.1% and Informa +40.4%, in Q4; all new additions to the Fund post the onset of COVID. Portfolio review1,2 The Fund was 97.2% invested at period end with holdings in 26 companies; the balance held in cash. The top 10 holdings accounted for 62.2% of the Fund’s NAV. Small and Mid Caps represented 59.9%; the Fund continued to have strong liquidity with the average market capitalisation of the portfolio, £2.4bn at period end. As with H1, and given the ongoing extreme volatility over the period, the majority of transactional activity in the Portfolio related to managing existing investments to maximise the future return profile of the Fund. The Fund made one disposal since reporting its Interims, Ashtead (on achieving its target price) and three new investments: Spire Healthcare; Gym Group; and GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”). Spire Healthcare is the leading independent hospital group in the UK by revenue. The group has 39 hospitals and eight clinics across England, Wales and Scotland, through which they provide diagnostics, inpatient, day case and outpatient care in areas including orthopaedics, gynaecology, cardiology, neurology, oncology and general surgery. The group serves private medical insured (c.50% of revenue), NHS (30%) and self-pay (c.20%) patients. Under former management, exacerbated by COVID, the company suffered a significant de-rating due to a number of issues which we believe are being well addressed by the new management team who we have been impressed by. These include: focus on clinical excellence where the group have already received multiple upgrades by the industry regulator, significant operational improvements such as investing in new IT systems to better manage workflow and the cost base, strong focus on cash generation to degear the balance sheet and a shift to Return on Capital Employed (“RoCE”) focus rather than on “empire building” with poor capital allocation discipline. We believe these changes will significantly improve the quality of the Spire business and enable the group to generate material equity value for shareholders with a re-rating to subsequently follow. We also note that due to COVID restrictions on both NHS and private providers ability to perform procedures during 2020 there are record waitlists (estimated at 10m people at the end of 2020 vs c.4m at the end of 2019) which should provide Spire with a tailwind going forwards. Spire has been selected as one of the private hospital providers to be contracted by the NHS to help work through the backlog of procedures. The recovery in operational procedures at Spire is already ahead of our forecasts. Source: 1. GVQIM 2. Bloomberg 3. Northern Trust Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and the value of investments can go down as well as up 6
2020 annual review and Fund outlook Gym Group is one of the two market leading low cost UK gym operators. Since 2006 there has been a structural change in the gym market with exceptional growth for budget gyms at the expense of mid-market players. Users are typically attracted by very low costs (for example pricing can often be in the low teens per month vs c.£40-£80 for classic mid market players) but whilst still offering substantially the same equipment, with no contract and 24 hour access. We have monitored the stock for a number of years but found the valuation to simply be too rich for our disciplined approach. However, during COVID the shares de-rated substantially and even after the group undertook an equity placing to reduce leverage to only c.1x (with covenant waivers) had not re-rated anywhere close to our view of fair value. With a solid balance sheet (at the start of 2021 the group has runway for 11 months of full gym closures), high growth potential (we believe Gym Group will return to its previous high growth rates with the potential for this to accelerate as people become more health conscious post-COVID and with many cheap opportunities for expansion in sites which traditional retailers once inhabited), high RoCE attributes (c.40% on mature sites) and strong cash generation, we invested shortly after the group’s equity raise. GSK sits within the top 10 of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies. The group has three main business units: pharmaceuticals, vaccines and consumer health. Vaccines is, by revenue, the largest in the world thanks to its two major vaccines for meningitis and shingles and, with a strong pipeline, is expected to continue to drive growth for GSK into the future. The pharmaceuticals division has been an area of doubt for investors after one of its blockbuster drugs faced generic competition in 2019 and with the division having been underinvested by the former management team. However, the relatively new CEO has made material changes to the group and is investing significantly in Research & Development with some exciting prospects in the pipeline. Finally, the groups Consumer Healthcare business is a world leader having combined GSK’s own portfolio with that of Novartis & Pfizer – for reference the division made c.$9bn of revenue in 2019. Amongst other changes the CEO intends to spin off this division next year which we believe should begin to unlock material value as the market re-appraises each of the separate divisions more appropriately. On a reasonable ‘sum of the parts’ valuation (using other listed consumer healthcare groups trading multiples) we believe the core pharmaceutical business to be trading on a lowly c.2x EV/EBITDA vs peers on c.10x. Fund outlook and strategy1,2 The UK, as is well documented, is (and has been for some time) the most underweight region globally by asset allocators. Starved of capital, that which there is, has been overwhelmingly directed to growth funds in the active space and a meteoric rise in passives. Given the record outperformance of growth over value, passives implicitly have a far higher exposure today to the growth style than at any point in their history contributing to ‘growth’ and ‘momentum’ as styles, converging. Similarly, the rapid rise of ESG into the mainstream is increasingly recognised as an accentuating factor to the growth bubble due to the significant overlap in a number of investments. This has created concern in certain quarters, including from within the legal profession that Advisers must make clear ESG investing is not chosen for financial returns. Collectively, however, the inescapable conclusion is that knowingly or not, investors are plugged into all manner of momentum trades. Price action around 9 November was just the tip of the iceberg in our view and a warning shot across the bow. Colour coming back from trading desks suggests the principal driver of Q4’s movement on the back of developments, was hot money (i.e. hedge funds) starting to unwind extreme positioning; in essence long growth / short value. To date this has not obviously manifested itself in any material shift in institutional flow and the aggregate market picture remains largely unchanged (heavily skewed toward growth) but in itself, it was enough to lead to some significant price moves at the stock level over the final quarter. Examples in the Fund included: Micro Focus +72.3%; Spire Healthcare +63.6%; Gym Group +59.1%; ITV +57.5%; Tyman +56.2%; Cineworld +55.2%; Informa +40.4%; with strong breadth across the rest of the Portfolio. Despite these moves, the Fund’s financial characteristics continue to point toward an exceptional absolute and relative investment opportunity. On the latter, it was also interesting to observe some widely held growth darlings, for example Sage and Unilever, sell off over the period, delivering negative total returns of 19.3% and 7.3% respectively. Source: 1. GVQIM 2. Bloomberg 3. Northern Trust Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and the value of investments can go down as well as up 7
2020 annual review and Fund outlook If institutional money follows hot money’s lead (as we expect over time it will) and starts to meaningfully reposition, we believe one of the biggest risks to markets in 2021 will be liquidity, but not obviously, given positioning, where people might expect it. The demise of Woodford in 2019 brought the topic of liquidity front and centre, leading to a focus on small caps and illiquid investments. Today’s issue, however, dwarfs it and extends well beyond these segments of the market in our opinion, given crowding in growth names and consensual trades, presenting arguably systemic risk. Bubbles, by definition, are created when assets to which they pertain, attract an outsized quantum of capital. Warning signs abound; by way of example, Citigroup’s US Strategy ‘Panic Euphoria’ model moved further into ‘Euphoria’ territory at the beginning of 2021, eclipsing levels seen during dotcom, and literally going off the chart. As well known columnist John Authers recently wrote: “If anything, I would argue, aspects of this latest dose of speculation are beginning to look more extreme than their predecessor two decades ago.” We agree and expect 2021 to be anything but calm, but like two decades ago, believe a selective, quality value biased approach to deliver strong returns. With a Brexit deal struck and mass vaccination programmes underway, we also expect 2021 to be characterised by a significant uptick in M&A in the UK, conditions that have historically provided a strong tailwind and benefitted the Fund given its focus on identifying coveted assets. If public equity valuations continue not to look beyond the very short term, we would expect other long term focussed investors to do so as economic conditions improve. Source: 1. GVQIM 2. Bloomberg 3. Northern Trust Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and the value of investments can go down as well as up 8
2020 annual review and Fund outlook
Annualised performance1,3 (%) Key Investment features:
40 39.0 37.8 We aim to combine the best elements of public and private equity
investing as described in the chart below:
30
23.2
Main focus of most Main focus of most
20
12.6 PUBLIC EQUITY INVESTORS PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS
9.8 9.3
10 4.7 3.9 6.7 5.1 6.3 5.6
3.1
0
-0.1
Growth Corporate
-10 Activity
-9.8
-20
-30 -25.5
1M 3M 6M From 23 1YR BREXIT* 5YRS 10YRS
March low
Value De-gearing
UK Focus Fund FTSE All-Share
Annual performance1,2
2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Investment features also include:
Due diligence - thorough 360° appraisals, referencing execs,
% Growth -25.5 33.1 -17.7 8.0 12.7 6.7 6.0 44.2 19.6 non-execs, customers, suppliers. Making use of strategic
relationships with private equity groups.
Quartile 4 1 4 4 2 2 1 1 1
Investment strategy – a focus on catalysts “how will we make
money?” and exit plans - “how will we realise the gain?”
Fund facts
GVQ UK Focus Fund information Use of industry experts – utilising an Advisory Panel of senior
Structure industrialists including Stewart Binnie, Peter Williams, Chris
Dublin listed Open Ended Investment Company (OEIC), UCITS V Rickard and Sir Clive Thompson.
compliant, recognised by the FCA, with reporting status
Incorporation date 5 August 2003
Fund size £179.4m Contact details
No. of holdings 26 For Fund subscriptions and redemptions please visit the
Dividend GVQIM website for an APPLICATION FORM or contact:
Frequency Semi-annual distribution
Northern Trust Fund Servicing Centre
Liquidity Daily pricing and dealing
Tel +353 (0)1 434 5099
Share price I Class A Class Fax +353 (0)1 434 5200
£24.20 £23.57
Min. initial investment £1,000 £1,000 For all other investment queries please contact the
Fund charges
GVQ Investment Management marketing team:
OCF¹ 1.07% p.a. 1.56% p.a.
Email: gvqimmarketing@gvqim.com
Included within the OCF is
AMC² 0.75% p.a. 1.25% p.a. Tel +44 (0)20 3907 4190
Reference codes Fax +44 (0)20 3907 3913
ISIN IE0033377494 IE0033377502 GVQ Investment Management Limited
SEDOL 3337749 3337750
Bloomberg SVIUKFI SVIUKFA 16 Berkeley Street, London, W1J 8DZ
www.gvqim.com
Management team
Fund Manager: Jamie Seaton Deputy Fund Manager: Oliver Bazin
Jamie was appointed CEO of GVQIM in May Oliver is Deputy Fund Manager on both GVQIM’s
2014. He is Fund Manager of both the GVQ UK Unconstrained Funds, the GVQ UK Focus Fund
Focus Fund (since April 2009) and GVQ and the GVQ Opportunities Fund. In addition to
Opportunities Fund (launched October 2015). assisting Jamie, his primary role is performing
Prior to this, Jamie was an equities analyst for analysis and due diligence on existing and
GVQIM, and its first recruit following its formation. potential investee companies. Prior to joining
Previously he was an Investment Manager at GVQIM in 2016 as an Analyst, he worked at
Rothschild Asset Management and worked at Rothschild in their M&A practice. He started his
Goldman Sachs. Jamie holds the CFA and IMC career at KPMG in their audit practice. Oliver holds
qualifications. both the ACA and CFA qualifications.
Source: 1. GVQIM 2. Bloomberg 3. Northern Trust
Notes: * 27th June 2016
1. OCF=Ongoing Charges Figure; OCF is as at November 2020 (latest available) 2. AMC = Annual Management Charge
Past performance is no guarantee of future performance and the value of investments can go down as well as up 9You can also read
