How the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Dialogue Can and Must Make Progress
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Deep Cuts Statement
How the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability December 2021
Dialogue Can and Must Make Progress
How the U.S.-Russian Strategic
Stability Dialogue Can and Must
Make Progress
Statement by the Deep Cuts Commission
For decades, the United States and Soviet the West remain as fraught and tense as
Union (later Russia) have co-existed in a they were during the Cold War, with multi-
dangerous state of mutual nuclear vulnera- ple points of friction and spheres of poten-
bility that requires effective dialogue, mili- tial military confrontation – from the Baltic
tary restraint, and bold action to achieve Sea to the Black Sea, in and around Ukraine,
deep cuts in their massive nuclear stock- in outer space, and in cyberspace.
piles. This is why the United States and the
Soviet Union formally agreed in 1973 that an In this context, it is in the interest of both
objective of their policies must be “to re- sides that the Strategic Stability Dialogue
move the danger of nuclear war and of the (SSD) is effective and productive.2 As Presi-
use of nuclear weapons” and that they must dents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin stated at
both “act in such a manner as to prevent the their June 16, 2021, Geneva summit, even in
development of situations capable of “periods of tension” Washington and Mos-
causing a dangerous exacerbation of their cow have demonstrated that they “are able
relations, as to avoid military confronta- to make progress on our shared goals of en-
tions, and as to exclude the outbreak of nu- suring predictability in the strategic sphere,
clear war […].”1 reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the
threat of nuclear war.”3
Despite substantial past progress in capping
and reducing their massive Cold War-era ar- In order to seize opportunities to reduce nu-
senals through a series of bilateral arms con- clear dangers, both sides need to move
trol and reduction treaties, the two nations swiftly and decisively. A top priority has to
still possess thousands of nuclear weapons be the search for a follow-on agreement or
on a range of delivery systems capable of in- agreements to the 2010 New START Treaty,
flicting catastrophic destruction within the last remaining bilateral treaty capping
minutes of a launch order from either side’s the world’s two largest arsenals, before it ex-
leader. Today, relations between Russia and pires in early 2026. U.S. and Russian leaders
www.deepcuts.org 1Deep Cuts Statement
How the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability December 2021
Dialogue Can and Must Make Progress
should also explore other measures to re- START. A new agreement should aim to fur-
duce nuclear dangers, prevent new arms ther reduce the total number of deployed
races, and prepare the ground for inclusion strategic nuclear warheads and delivery sys-
of additional nuclear powers in the arms re- tems and adopt stricter counting rules for
duction effort. Europeans can facilitate pro- nuclear weapons attributed to strategic
gress by encouraging the United States and bombers. An up to one-third reduction in
Russia to be bold, while taking European se- deployed strategic forces would still leave
curity concerns into account. each side with an overwhelming nuclear re-
taliatory force that is more than sufficient to
Following the June summit, the two sides deter a nuclear attack by any adversary. New
agreed to discuss strategic stability in “an in- mutual, verifiable limits on strategic nuclear
tegrated, deliberate, and robust process,” weapons will need to factor in new systems
and they established two working groups: being developed by both sides, including
the Working Group on Principles and Ob- hypersonic weapons.
jectives for Future Arms Control, and the
Working Group on Capabilities and Actions Extending arms control to include “tac-
with Strategic Effects.4 Two rounds of the tical” nuclear weapons. In parallel with
dialogue have been held, but the next round New START follow-on negotiations, U.S.
will not convene until 2022. and Russian negotiators should also address
non-strategic nuclear weapons, beginning
with a transparency agreement requiring
Next Steps detailed declarations of tactical nuclear
stockpiles, including warheads in storage.
The extension of New START was critically More ambitious agreements to reduce nu-
important to retain limits and verification clear risks could include understandings not
on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. But the to locate nuclear warheads at or near bases
treaty will expire on February 5, 2026, with dual-capable non-strategic delivery
leaving little time for the two sides to nego- systems. U.S. and Russian non-strategic nu-
tiate and conclude complex new arms con- clear warheads could be stored in locations
trol arrangements. further from NATO bases in Europe and
Russia’s western border. Making progress
With leadership from the top and support on non-strategic nuclear arms control is im-
from key U.S. allies in Europe, the two sides portant; however, it should not become a
can and must move quickly to find effective prerequisite for lower ceilings on the two
new solutions before New START expires. sides’ strategic nuclear arsenals.
To make progress, they will need to tackle
four difficult but resolvable sets of issues re- Averting a race in intermediate-range
lating to strategic nuclear weapons control missiles. In the absence of the Intermedi-
and reduction: ate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the
risk of a new INF missile race in Europe will
Further reducing strategic arsenals. A grow. President Biden, in coordination with
key objective of the next round of talks NATO, should respond constructively to
should be to maintain verifiable limits on Russia’s 2020 proposal for a verifiable mora-
U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads torium on the deployment in Europe of mis-
and delivery systems, including new kinds siles formerly banned by the 1987 INF
of strategic systems not included in New Treaty, and also include the 9M729 (SSC-8)
cruise missile. The Russian proposal5 is a
www.deepcuts.org 2Deep Cuts Statement
How the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability December 2021
Dialogue Can and Must Make Progress
starting point for mutual discussions. stockpiles, would also help fulfill the United
Another option would be to verifiably ban States’ and Russia’s obligation under Article
nuclear-armed ground-launched and sea- VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
launched cruise and ballistic missiles of in- Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to "pursue negoti-
termediate range. ations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
From a European point of view, a new agree- race at an early date and to nuclear disarma-
ment that addresses non-strategic weapons, ment, and on a treaty on general and com-
including restrictions on intermediate- plete disarmament under strict and effective
range missiles formerly prohibited by the international control."
INF Treaty, could facilitate agreement
among NATO allies on a more sustainable
defense and deterrence posture and im- Europe’s Role in Reducing Nuclear Dan-
prove European security. gers
Limiting strategic missile interceptors. The Biden administration has been
Further progress toward deeper reductions informing allies about progress in the Rus-
in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are un- sia-U.S. talks and has stated its intention to
likely to gain traction unless Washington consult with them during possible negotia-
and Moscow agree to constraints on their tions. This willingness to coordinate within
long-range missile defense capabilities, NATO increases opportunities for and re-
and/or at least agree to outline their plans sponsibilities of Europeans to move arms
for development, testing, and deployment control forward.
of such systems in the future. It is our assess-
ment that the United States, and Russia, can NATO is pursuing a double track approach
field sufficient numbers and types of missile of increasing defense and deterrence capa-
interceptors to mitigate the threat of a bilities while allies at the same time see arms
limited ballistic attack from North Korea or, control as “an essential contribution to
possibly in the future, Iran, and at the same achieving the Alliance’s security objectives
time agree to parameters on the quantity, and for ensuring strategic stability and our
location, and capability of missile defense collective security.”6
systems that do not undermine strategic
stability. European allies should support the bilateral
dialogue on nuclear dangers by making con-
Given that Russia and the United States are structive proposals on the way ahead on nu-
currently taking decisions on the expensive clear arms control. After the demise of the
modernization programs of their nuclear INF Treaty, this is particularly important be-
forces, reaching new bilateral agreements cause there are no arms control treaties left
on these and possibly other weapons sys- in Europe.
tems is essential to maintain strategic
stability and avert unconstrained, costly, The United States and its NATO allies
and dangerous nuclear weapons competi- should revive something like the Special
tion. Consultative Group that accompanied the
INF talks in the 1980s.7 Or allies could use
Serious progress toward the negotiation on the “Special Advisory and Consultative
a New START follow-on agreement, and Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Pro-
other restraints on U.S. and Russian nuclear
www.deepcuts.org 3Deep Cuts Statement
How the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability December 2021
Dialogue Can and Must Make Progress
liferation Committee” set up in 2013 to facili- stockpiles, is a necessary precondition for
tate the transatlantic dialogue on arms con- their own involvement in the nuclear arms
trol.8 control process. London has recently an-
nounced that it will increase the cap on its
European allies could help to increase a po- nuclear capabilities and reduce transparen-
litical space for arms control talks by post- cy on its nuclear posture.10
poning decisions on beefing up the nuclear
deterrence posture until it has become clear All five states, which are members of the
whether the United States and Russia will be NPT, should reaffirm their commitment to
able to conclude arms control talks success- further progress toward the goal of a world
fully. free of nuclear weapons at the upcoming
10th NPT Review Conference, Jan. 4-28, in
New York. The nuclear five should support
Involving Additional Nuclear-armed a final NPT Review Conference statement
States that calls for:
Both Russia and the United States want to energetic efforts by the United States
broaden, in the long run, participation in and Russia to reduce nuclear risks and
the nuclear arms control process. This goal maintain strategic stability, and to con-
is in line with NPT commitments. NPT clude talks on a New START follow-on
members have called “on all nuclear- agreement or agreements that achieve
weapon States to undertake concrete dis- further, lower limits on strategic nuclear
armament efforts and affirm […] that all warheads and delivery systems and
States need to make special efforts to estab- limits on non-strategic and non-de-
lish the necessary framework to achieve and ployed nuclear weapons no later than
maintain a world without nuclear 2025, and
weapons.”9
deeper engagement between the five nu-
The United States and NATO want to en- clear-armed states on nuclear disarma-
gage China, which is in the process of ex- ment pathways and on nuclear risk re-
panding its nuclear capabilities, in nuclear duction, either bilaterally and/or
risk reduction and, eventually, the nuclear through a new multilateral format.
disarmament enterprise. Indeed, China’s
nuclear build-up, if unconstrained, could The United States and Russia have a special
negatively affect the readiness of the United responsibility to reduce the threats posed by
States and Russia to further reduce their nu- nuclear weapons and to meet their NPT Ar-
clear arsenals. Moscow would welcome ticle VI disarmament obligations. They
China joining nuclear arms control discus- must be prepared to take meaningful action
sions but would also like to see France and that reduces the role of nuclear weapons, to
the United Kingdom involved in nuclear lower nuclear risks, and to slow and reverse
arms control and the disarmament process. a burgeoning nuclear arms race. Failure is
not an option.
China, France, and the United Kingdom
agree that further cuts in the nuclear arse-
nals of Russia and the United States, which
still account for about 90% of global nuclear
www.deepcuts.org 4Deep Cuts Statement
How the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability December 2021
Dialogue Can and Must Make Progress
1
“Agreement Between The United States of America and Forces Treaty (INF Treaty),” Moscow, October 26, 2020,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64270.
6
of Nuclear War,” Washington, June 22, 1973, NATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5186.htm. Heads of State and Government Participating in the
2
See also “Statement by the Deep Cuts Commission. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June
Turning the Tide: NATO, the United States and Russia 2021,” Brussels, June 14, 2021,
Need to Agree on Ambituous Arms Control Agenda,” June https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
7
7, 2021, Martin A. Smith, “Reviving the Special Consultative Group.
https://deepcuts.org/images/images/News/Statement_b Past Experiences and Future Prospects,” NATOWatch
y_the_Deep_Cuts_Commission_Summits_June_2021.pd (Briefing Paper, 11), July 5, 2010,
f. http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATO_Wa
3
“U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic tch_Briefing_Paper_No.11_0.pdf.
8
Stability,” June 16, 2021, Oliver Meier, “NATO Agrees on New Arms Control Body,”
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements- Arms Control Now, February 2, 2013,
releases/2021/06/16/u-s-russia-presidential-joint- https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2013-02-26/nato-
statement-on-strategic-stability/. agrees-new-arms-control-body.
4 9
“Joint Statement on the Outcomes of the U.S.-Russia “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva on September 30,” the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final
Geneva, September 30, 2021, Document, NPT CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)”, New York, 2010,
https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/- https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I).
10
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4875989?p See also “Statement by the Deep Cuts Commission. The
_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE United Kingdom’s Damaging Decision to Build Up its
_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB. Nuclear Force and How to Respond,” March 31, 2021,
5
President of Russia, “Statement by Vladimir Putin on https://deepcuts.org/files/pdf/Statement_by_the_Deep_
Additional Steps to De-escalate the Situation in Europe Cuts_Commission_on_UK.pdf.
After the Termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Commission members may not fully agree with each and every point included here, though as
a group they are fully aligned in support of the recommendations.
About Deep Cuts Impress
The Deep Cuts Commission provides deci- Institut für Friedensforschung und
sion-makers as well as the interested public Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität
with concrete policy options based on Hamburg (IFSH)
realistic analysis and sound research. Since
it was established in 2013, the Commission is Beim Schlump 83
coordinated in its deliberations by the 20144 Hamburg, Germany
Institute for Peace Research and Security
Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Phone: +49 (0)40 86 60 77 70
the Arms Control Association (ACA), and Fax: +49 (0)40 866 36 15
the Primakov Institute of World Economy
and International Relations, Russian Project Management:
Academy of Sciences (IMEMO, RAN) with Oliver Meier
the active support of the German Federal Maren Vieluf
Foreign Office. Email: info@deepcuts.org
For further information please see:
www.deepcuts.org
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