Humanitarian Strategy, 2020-2021 - Palestine Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo - AECID
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Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo Humanitarian Strategy, 2020-2021 Palestine —
INDEX HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY, 2020-2021 PALESTINE _3 1. CONTEXT _4 2. VULNERABLE POPULATIONS _7 3. PRINCIPAL HUMANITARIAN NEEDS _8 4. STRATEGIC POSITIONING _10 4.1. Strategic Objectives 10 4.2. Sectors for Action 11 4.3. Main Partners In The Action 11 5. ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX _12
Humanitarian Strategy, 2020-2021
Palestine
—
The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), attached to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation (MAUC), is the principal management body for Spanish
Cooperation. Humanitarian action is a major priority for this body in its efforts to combat poverty and
promote sustainable human development.
AECID’s Humanitarian Action Office (HAO), created in 2007, is responsible for managing and implementing
Spain’s official humanitarian action, based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and
independence. The HAO works within the framework of the guidelines set out in Spanish Cooperation’s
Fifth Master Plan (2018-2021), and of the Humanitarian Action Strategy (HAS) for 2019-2026. The HAS is the
cornerstone of Spain’s humanitarian action and follows an approach based on rights; gender, age and diversity;
disaster risk prevention, reduction and reporting; resilience, do-no-harm and conflict sensitivity; and concern
for the environment.
Furthermore, AECID has undertaken different commitments on the quality of assistance, following the
World Humanitarian Summit of 2016 and the adoption of the Grand Bargain, in the same year.
To enhance the effectiveness of AECID’s response to major crises, humanitarian strategies have been
established for priority geographical contexts in line with the humanitarian response plans of the UN and
the EU. These strategies will be complementary to any applicable Country Partnership Framework.
The HAS, which draws on the lessons learned from planning AECID’s humanitarian responses in 2018 and
2019, addresses the main needs identified in this context by targeting specific sectors.
The gender, age and diversity-based approach adopted in the HAS must be mainstreamed into AECID’s
actions. For this reason, the Agency will strive to ensure that in the projects it supports, the assistance,
resources and services provided reach the entire target population, according to their specific needs, roles
and capacities, paying special attention to women and children. Another priority will be that of preventing
and responding to gender-based violence during humanitarian crises.
AECID will thus support projects that incorporate the gender markers of the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (Codes 3 and 41) and of the EU Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
Operations (DG ECHO) (Mark 2)2.
1 IASC Gender Marker Overview: Available at:
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/Marcador%20de%20G%C3%A9nero%20FAQs.pdf
2 ECHO Gender-Age Marker. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/gender_age_marker_toolkit.pdf
3As regards the other horizontal priorities and
approaches adopted by Spanish Cooperation,
priority will be given to actions having an inclusive
approach and results-based management,
together with the effective mainstreaming of
environmental sustainability, cultural diversity
and human rights.
The provision of cash assistance and vouchers
will be incorporated into humanitarian action as
a key element of the response, and unmarked aid
and support for local actors will be promoted as
far as possible.
Lastly, it is important to take into account that
the response to the Covid-19 pandemic and to its impact on humanitarian contexts could represent a
significant proportion of the contributions channelled through international organizations and NGOs. This
will affect the activities that are funded in the different sectors, and it is likely that considerable attention will
need to be paid to actions that contribute to the fight against infection with the virus and its consequences.
These questions will be addressed in line with Spanish Cooperation’s Joint Response Strategy for the
Covid-19 crisis, which is based on the following priorities: save lives and strengthen health systems; protect
and recover rights and livelihoods and reinforce the capacities of vulnerable people; preserve and transform
socioeconomic systems, rebuild production industry, and reinforce democratic governance, placing people
at the centre of our action.
1. CONTEXT
The chronic protection crisis in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories persisted in 2019 and
no substantial change is expected in the short
term. The main cause is the Israeli occupation
since 1967, together with the political division
between Gaza and the West Bank and the
violations of International Law. It is a protection
crisis with humanitarian consequences caused
by restricted access to basic services and
by the recurring violations of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International
Human Rights Law (IHRL)3.
The stagnation since 2001 of the political
negotiations (what is known as the Middle
East Peace Process, which was launched by the
1991 Madrid Peace Conference and formalized
by the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords between
the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization) has generated fait accompli
policies which, on the one hand, consolidate the occupation of Palestinian territory by the State of Israel
and, on the other, have led to sporadic episodes of violence, including terrorist actions, by Palestinian
resistance movements in response to such policies. In practice, restrictions on the movement of people
3 Humanitarian Implementation Plan HIP Palestine 2019,Version 01 – 17/10/2018. ECHO.
4and goods, limited access to land and natural resources, demolitions, forced displacements and evictions,
and the violations of fundamental rights are part of everyday life in Palestine.
The Palestinian context is also characterized by its geographical fragmentation and the inequalities between
the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.
Of the 4.95 million Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, over 2.4 million need
humanitarian assistance. The Palestinian population of the West Bank suffers extreme restrictions on
mobility, access to water, the use of land and the management of rural and building land, with devastating
consequences on basic rights such as health and education. In Gaza, the impact of armed conflicts in 2008-
2009, 2012 and 2014, the blockade and closure of borders imposed on the Gaza Strip since 2006 and the
bitter political conflict between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have led to the gradual worsening of
living conditions. The humanitarian situation sharply deteriorated in 2018 and 2019, because the energy
crisis that began in 2017, which particularly affected the sectors of water, sanitation and hygiene, and
health, was compounded with the escalation of violence generated as a result of what is known as the
Great March of Return, which led to hundreds of deaths and thousands of people injured or mutilated.
The humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip reached unprecedented levels in 2019, directly affecting sources
of revenue and access to essential services by its two million residents.
In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, restrictions on the movement of goods and people, limited access
to land and natural resources, denial of basic services, the expansion of settlements, violence inflicted by
settlers4 and the rising number of demolitions (some of infrastructure financed with European funds), have
all created a coercive5 environment with complex needs, both humanitarian and for development. The
reduction in the space available to the Palestinian population to carry out its normal activities is the result
of the settlements, the demolition of properties and the destruction of urban areas, the limitation on
residential areas and territorial fragmentation. Since the end of the Oslo Accords period (1993-2000) the
“islands” over which the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank have had control consist of 227 enclaves
(88% of which are under 2 km2) all divided or surrounded by areas under Israeli jurisdiction or by physical
barriers to access (checkpoints)6.
Approximately 320,000 Palestinians live in East Jerusalem. They continue to face difficulties in accessing
housing, due to the lack of building land and the lengthy and expensive permit application process.
Due to all these factors, which are made worse by the lack of internal reforms to foster transparency and
improve public management, the Palestinian economy, despite its potential, is in a phase of widespread
divestment, unable to generate jobs and revenues that would allow them to improve living standards. The
productive base has deteriorated due to restrictions on trade and on access to resources and by the
blockade in Gaza. Over the past 25 years industry has shrunk by half in terms of GDP, and agriculture by
one third. As a result of the occupation, Palestine’s economy is dependent on imports (with a trade deficit
of 40%, one of the highest in the world), trade is completely concentrated in Israel and it relies heavily on
international humanitarian assistance. In the context of the fiscal crisis, since 2019 Israel has been applying
a law that enables it to deduct from the transfer of indirect taxes and import duties collected on behalf of
the Palestinian government, the amount equivalent to what it considers the Palestinian government spends
on supporting Palestinian prisoners, and their families, for offences linked to security or “terrorism”. The
Palestinian government rejected this partial payment and demands payment in full. It has, thus, lost 65%
of its tax revenues (equivalent to 15% of GDP), in a context of decreased foreign aid and the suspension
of US assistance. The fiscal crisis has paralyzed the provision of basic essential services and has forced
4 In 2019 the upswing in violent incidents inflicted by Israeli settlers and affecting Palestinians confirmed a trend that started
in 2017. (OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin June 2019) https://www.ochaopt.org/poc/17-june-1-july-2019
5 HIP ECHO 2019. HNO OCHA 2019.
6 Sara Roy, “Decline and Disfigurement:The Palestinian Economy after Oslo,” in The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid,
ed. Roane Carey (New York:Verso, 2001), 94
5additional cuts in social services7. The crisis was not resolved in 2019 and it has affected power supply to
the central areas of the Ramallah and Jerusalem districts, with cuts planned by the Israeli supplier to force
the Palestinian electric distribution company to pay the amounts in arrears.
During the past two decades, the Palestinian economy has been driven by large inflows of transfers, as
other sources of growth have been hindered by the pervasive Israeli restrictions on the movement of
people and goods. Under a baseline scenario which assumes a continuation of the Israeli restrictions,
the political divide between the West Bank and Gaza, and the decline in foreign aid levels, the Palestinian
economy is expected to slip into a recession in 2020 and 2021, even if one-off transfers are made from the
tax revenues retained from the Palestinian government by Israel. Palestine’s borrowing capacity is almost
non-existent and the fall in revenues will bring about cuts in social spending, which in turn will reduce
consumption and investment. The decline in growth immediately entails a decrease in real per capita
income and a rise in poverty. These restrictions on trade and movement have resulted in a high risk of
destabilization of projects and of trade flows and in keeping investment levels low, favouring non-tradable
sectors that have a lower impact on productivity increase8. The role of foreign aid is essential to creating
an alternative vision that fosters growth and job creation.
The humanitarian space has been reduced and the harassment of non-governmental organizations,
international agencies and humanitarian personnel continues to increase, both by the Government of Israel
and by the Palestinian government and the de facto authorities in Gaza. This restriction of humanitarian
space manifests itself in police reports and arrests for diversion of funds, confiscation of material and
equipment based on alleged violations of Israeli regulations, denial of work and access permits; or sporadic
audits with undue demands (disclosure of protected confidential information), which clearly reduce the
operational capacity of organizations.
One of the challenges to be met in this humanitarian context is the need for greater coordination of
humanitarian and development needs (the nexus) to address the main, root causes of vulnerability, fragility
and conflict, while taking care of humanitarian needs and strengthening resilience9. In order to do so, it is
essential to work with a more participative approach that includes community work, taking into account
specific characteristics of gender, age and diversity..
7 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), Report to the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee, Brussels, 30 April 2019
8 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/publication/economic-monitoring-report-to-the-ad-hoc-liaison-
committee-september-2019
9 HIP ECHO 2019.
6TABLE 1. PALESTINE: GENERAL AND HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION10
5.2 million (1.9 million in Gaza, 2.9 million in the West Bank and 0.3 million in East
Population under occupation Jerusalem)
(38.9% is under 15 years of age)
46% of the population
1.5 million in Gaza; 0.9 million in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Area C: 0.3; East
2.4 million need Jerusalem: 0.3; Areas A and B: 0.3)
humanitarian assistance 8,500 internally displaced persons
Refugee population (including direct family) that needs assistance: 1.4 million, living in
the affected areas11
Human Development Index 2017 0.686 (ranking 119)
INFORM Vulnerability Index12 6.5 (INFORM 4 Global Index)
Crisis Index13 3 out of 3
2. VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
Gaza Strip:
• Displaced population whose homes and/or means of livelihood were destroyed or affected by the
2014 Operation Protective Edge and the subsequent retaliatory military operations. In 2019, the number
of displaced persons amounted to 8,500, of whom 300 were displaced during the November 2019
escalation of violence.
• Population of the zones delimited by Israel and adjacent to the border and with restricted access,
supposedly for security reasons, which depends on agriculture and fishing for subsistence and must carry
out this agricultural and fishing activity in these high-risk areas.
• Victims of the repression of the Great March of Return demonstrations (since March 2018):There has
been a sizable increase in Palestinian victims in Gaza in the context of the demonstrations and other protest
activities along the perimeter of the border with Israel. In 2019, 33 Palestinians died as a result of actions by
the Israeli security forces during the protest, and 11,523 Palestinians were injured. In total, 212 Palestinians
died and 36,134 were injured between the beginning of the protests until 31 December 201914.
10 HNO OCHA 2019. As in other contexts, in the HNO general data is not disaggregated by gender https://
www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/2018/12/humanitarian_needs_
overview_2019-%281%29.pdf
11 OCHA defines affected population as those people subjected to constant violations of IHL and to all forms of human
rights violations: threats to n life, freedom and safety; population subjected to forced displacement; livelihood erosion;
impossibility of purchasing basic goods and services, etc.
12 INFORM Report 2019:
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Inform%202019%20WEB%20spreads.pdf
13 ECHO Crisis Assessment Index Rank 2019
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/annex_3_inform-ci_2019_new.pdf
14 https://www.ochaopt.org/poc/24-december-2019-6-january-2020
7The West Bank:
• The Palestinian population in Area C: This area, which represents 63% of the West Bank, is under the
control of the Israeli Government, which has applied a restrictive planning scheme that makes it impossible
for the Palestinian population to obtain building permits, thus preventing them from developing adequate
housing infrastructure and from making a living. Over 10,000 people live in 63 communities that are under
a high risk of forced transfer in the West Banks’s Area C, 62% of whom are refugees.
• East Jerusalem (and the periphery of Jerusalem) are inhabited by 320,000 Palestinians, and 200,000
Israeli settlers. The threat of the unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem and the periphery of Jerusalem
contravenes International Law and increases the vulnerability of the resident Palestinian population.
• In Hebron H2, 20% of the area remains under Israeli control, and an estimated 40,000 Palestinians
present a special protection risk in the face of settler violence.
3. PRINCIPAL HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
The United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 202015 (HRP)
identified, as the priority goals of humanitarian assistance, three lines of action: defending and respecting
the rights of the Palestinian population living under occupation; providing basic, quality services to those in
situations of acute vulnerability; and capacity-building for vulnerable groups to deal with the protracted crisis
and its effects, included environmental effects.
The Response Plan amounts to USD 348 million—USD 264 million in Gaza and USD 85 million in the West
Bank—to address the needs of 1.5 million people in Gaza and the West Bank, despite having identified 2.4
million people in need.
The principal humanitarian needs are described by sector as follows:
• Protection.The root causes of the protection crisis in Palestine lie in the occupation and other violations
of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) that affect the lives
and safety of the Palestinian population, and, consequently, limit their access to health, water, and education
services, and to means of livelihood. Nearly 2 million Palestinians are affected by protection risk.
There were a few calm years after the 2014 war, but in 2018 and 2019 tension and violence intensified. In
Gaza there have been repeated cycles of rockets and incendiary balloons launched from Gaza and reprisals
with air strikes on Gaza, always on the brink of leading to another return to generalized hostilities. The
number of victims of the repression of the Great March of Return protests is very high, in relative terms,
for a “low-intensity” conflict. In the West Bank, the coercive environment contributes to increasing the
risk of forced displacement of many Palestinians in Area C, East Jerusalem and the Israeli-controlled area
of Hebron (H2), with the demolition of homes and agricultural or community infrastructure, forced
evictions, discriminatory urban planning, restricted access and movement, expansion of settlements and
violent attacks on persons and properties by Israeli settlers; all in a context in which duty-bearers are not
held accountable for violations of IHL and human rights.
There has been an upswing in gender-based violence, sexual abuse and forced marriage in the communities
affected by different types of violence, fragmentation and displacement, with limited availability of
multisector services (i.e. health, legal assistance and psycho-social support)16.
• Food and nutrition security.The factors contributing to the situation of food insecurity in Palestine are
insufficient economic access to food caused by restrictions on movement, trade, and investment, and by
15 OCHA, 2019: “Humanitarian Response Plan, 2020”: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-response-plan-2020
16 UNFPA: GBV Mapping (2016); UN Women: Navigating Through Shattered Paths: NGO Service Providers and Women
Survivors of Gender-based Violence. An Assessment of GBV Services in Gaza. 2017.
8the high levels of unemployment. Although food is available, prices are too high for those families with
least resources, who spend approximately 50% of their income on food.
The results of the Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec) for Palestine at the end of 201817
confirm that food insecurity has deteriorated in Gaza. It affects its entire population in a cross-cutting
manner, but it is most worrying in the case of the non-refugee population, among which it reaches 70%: this
population group represents 40% of the entire population suffering food insecurity and consists of 460,000
people. Responding to these food needs is a pre-requisite in order to be able to give the humanitarian-
response plan in Gaza a multisectoral, equitable and non-discriminatory approach. These are the most
vulnerable groups, whose purchasing power has been reduced by the cuts and the postponement of the
payment of government social benefits and the lack of job opportunities..
• Water, sanitation and hygiene. There are an estimated 1.818 million people with needs in this sector. In
Gaza, the response is hindered by rebuilding delays caused by the limitations imposed by the blockade, and
by the inclusion of 23 water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) materials on the “dual use” list.19 The coastal
aquifer is the only fresh water source in Gaza. Its capacity is practically depleted due to overexploitation
and seawater intrusion.The main effect is that the local population is forced to purchase low-quality water
from private suppliers at a cost of up to 20 times the cost of network water. The impact on the economy
of vulnerable groups is enormous. Households spend one-third of their monthly revenues on bottled water,
while in the Western world it remains under 0.7%. Moreover, poor water quality is causing one-fourth
of the diseases in Gaza and is the leading cause of child mortality. 97% of drinking water does not meet
international quality standards.
In the West Bank, 70% of the population is not connected to a water network; 35,000 people in 52
communities in the southern part of the Hebron district do not have permanent access to safe drinking
water, whether at primary distribution points (homes) or at secondary collection distribution points. In
Area C, in particular, some 270,000 people are subjected to the restricted access scheme imposed by Israel
on water and sanitation infrastructure. The destruction of water and sanitation facilities is also causing
displacement and an increased risk of contracting diseases—an especially serious situation insofar as access
to water, sanitation and hygiene at schools is concerned.
• Gender. The Palestinian crisis has very specific gender dimensions (accentuated by its being a profoundly
patriarchal society), which can be seen in gender-differentiated needs and gender-differentiated access to services
and humanitarian assistance, as well as in the different coping mechanisms of women and men.
A joint gender analysis by OCHA and UN WOMEN in 2017 reports continuous violations as regards the
protection of women and girls (including security incidents, and denial of rights and of access to services
and psychosocial well-being). This analysis makes clear the rise in gender-based violence in the most
vulnerable communities (especially in the case of women with disabilities, whose access to services is
even more restricted), in addition to identifying an increase in the risk of early marriage. Moreover, access
to prevention and response services is limited and needs to be improved.
Likewise, Palestinian women’s high unemployment rate puts them at a disadvantage in terms of generating
income.
Especially troubling is the situation of separated, divorced or repudiated women and of widows—
especially, insofar as their property, ownership, and inheritance rights are concerned, as well as their need
for legal assistance regarding these rights.
Humanitarian clusters have made exhaustive efforts to truly include a gender approach, both in the
identification of humanitarian needs and in the adapted response. However, there is still a need to
improve the quality of sex- and age-disaggregated data, as well as to systematically include gender analysis
in compiling qualitative data.
17 PCBS, SEFSec 2018;
https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/sefsec_2018_-_food_security_analysis_preliminary_results.pdf
18 OCHA, 2019: “Humanitarian Response Plan, 2020”: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-response-plan-2020.
19 Pumps, drills, etc.
9• Health.The massive rise in injured people during 2018 and 2019 has overwhelmed the Gaza health system,
which was already very weak due to movement restrictions on staff and patients, chronic shortages of drugs
and disposables, the energy crisis, and unpaid staff salaries, both in the case of the de-facto government and
the Ramallah government. Generalized violence in daily life has caused mental disorders and psycho-social
problems among the population. An estimated number of at least 50,000 people (50% of whom are legal
minors) need specialized care. In this context, the WHO is leading the efforts to create a coordinated
trauma response system for injured patients who require trauma treatment and rehabilitation services.The
launching of this centralized trauma care system is a good starting point to begin work on improving health
services from the development standpoint, thus realizing the humanitarian-development nexus.
4. STRATEGIC POSITIONING
For AECID and its Humanitarian Action Office,
the Palestinian crisis has been one of the five
priority action contexts (together with Syria, the
Sahel, the Sahrawi people and Latin America and
the Caribbean) since 2013, thus demonstrating
AECID’s commitment to Palestine as a
humanitarian context. The table below shows the
humanitarian funding received by Palestine over
the past few years.
4.1. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
SO1 Contribute to protecting and building the resilience of populations that are suffering or at risk of
IHL violations in Palestine, and carry out advocacy activities urging the Israeli Government to assume its
responsibilities regarding the Palestinian population pursuant to IHL.
SO2 Support access to basic WASH services and food security for the most vulnerable Palestinian
populations and carry out capacity-building for emergency response.
SO3 Contribute to mainstreaming gender, age and diversity approaches into humanitarian actions in
Palestine.
104.2. SECTORS FOR ACTION
Based on the humanitarian needs described, AECID will prioritize its humanitarian actions in the protection
sector. Its contribution to the West Bank Protection Consortium is maintained within the framework of the
ongoing commitment of participant European States to safeguard the fundamental rights of those Palestinian
groups that are especially vulnerable to the expansion of Israeli settlements. Moreover, it will support assistance
actions in the WASH, food security, and nutrition sectors. In order to address sudden emergencies in Palestine,
it will continue to support the coordinated emergency response system (OCHA pooled funds). Furthermore, it
will support projects with a multisector approach, and whose activities are conducted throughout the territory.
In line with the international commitments adopted, AECID will continue to support actions combining new
technologies and methodologies, such as cash transfers. Gender issues will be given priority, cross-cutting
treatment in the different actions.
Taking into account the volatile situation in Palestine, especially in Gaza, and the biennial nature of the strategy,
one possibility to be considered is that of working in other sectors not prioritized in this strategy, based on
needs of particular importance that may arise, such as the medical emergency response in the framework of
the Great March of Return demonstrations.
4.3. MAIN PARTNERS IN THE ACTION
AECID, based on the priority sectors determined for action, and taking into account the nature of this crisis, i.e.
as a protection crisis, will support in this area stakeholders and counterparts with recognized capabilities and
experience in implementing protection projects, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).
Regarding WASH and food security, work will be carried out together with the United Nations Agencies with
mandates for each area, as well as with national and international NGOs.
AECID will continue to support the OCHA-managed occupied Palestinian territory Humanitarian Fund, which
contributes to the joint evaluation of needs and to coordinating the response of the different humanitarian
actors.
This strategy, for its duration, will seek greater localization of assistance, for which collaboration with local
Palestinian organizations of different sectors will be identified or consolidated.
115. ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX
Below is a list of indicators20 that will enable the measurement of the results achieved in Palestine during 2020-2021
INDICATORS
Annual budget disbursed in Palestine
Annual budget disbursed, by principal sector
Annual no. of beneficiaries of the actions
Annual budget disbursed on actions classified with gender marker codes 3 and 4
(IASC) or 2 (ECHO)
GENERAL Net annual budget for the context consisting of cash transfers (cash and vouchers,
disaggregated)
Annual budget disbursed to local organizations directly or indirectly, disaggregated
Percentage of funded projects with a positive score in the DG-ECHO resilience marker
A joint diagnosis between development cooperation and HA actors
Annual budget disbursed for GBV prevention actions
Victims of GBV who have received assistance
PROTECTION Number of children who have received psycho-social assistance
Persons at risk of forced displacement who have received support/assistance
Persons made aware or informed of and/or trained in IHL
SECTORAL FOOD SECURITY Net cash transfers distributed (cash and vouchers, disaggregated)
AND NUTRITION
WATER, Drinking water facilities opened
SANITATION Persons benefiting directly from safe drinking water
AND HYGIENE
20 Data disaggregated by sex will be provided.
12Catálogo General de Publicaciones Oficiales: https://publicacionesoficiales.boe.es © De esta edición: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo Av. Reyes Católicos, 4 Tel. +34 91 583 81 00 NIPO online: 109-20-038-7 28040 Madrid, España www.aecid.es
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