INQUIRY INTO AND REPORT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE 2016 FEDERAL ELECTION AND MATTERS RELATED THERETO
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Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
Supplementary Submission 1
to the Federal
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
INQUIRY INTO AND REPORT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE
CONDUCT OF THE 2016 FEDERAL ELECTION AND
MATTERS RELATED THERETO
Ian Brightwell:
Date: 12th November 2016Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
INQUIRY INTO AND REPORT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE
CONDUCT OF THE 2016 FEDERAL ELECTION AND
MATTERS RELATED THERETO
Table of Contents
Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 1
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 2
2 Roll Divergence ............................................................................................................................... 2
3 Enrolment Voting ............................................................................................................................ 4
4 Delayed Election Night Results ....................................................................................................... 4
5 Counting Senate Papers on Election Night ..................................................................................... 5
6 Senate Count Costing ...................................................................................................................... 5
7 System Renewal Options ................................................................................................................ 6
Author: Ian Brightwell
i Submission - Fed 2016 IWB - Supp 1 v1.docxInquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
Recommendations
The author commends the following recommendations for the Committee’s consideration in
additional to recommendations in the original submission.
Recommendation 1
The committee should recommend to government that COAG consider the establishment of a
Electoral Process Council1 to deal with the harmonisation of electoral legislation related to
roll management, election funding disclosures and management of electoral process and,
also the potential for sharing electoral technical and human resources across jurisdictions.
Recommendation 2
The committee should recommend to government legislation be amended to allow
enrolment voting to be undertaken at the next general election.
Recommendation 3
The committee should recommend to government legislation be amended to allow for
electronic voting to be used with paper docket verification in pre-poll venues at the next
general election to increase the number of votes counted and returned on election night.
Recommendation 4
The committee should reiterate to government the importance of retaining the counting of
senate votes in polling places and pre-polls on election night to first preference by group.
Recommendation 5
The committee should request the AEC provide a report on the senate preference capture
process used at the 2016 election. The report should in addition to assessing the
effectiveness and efficiency of the process provide costings and assess alternative methods of
capturing senate preferences.
Recommendation 6
The committee should recommend to government that the Digital Transformation Agency
(DTA) be made the lead agency for the redevelopment of election systems with a view to the
developed systems being adopted by all election bodies in Australia. The DTA should in the
first instance prepare a strategy and feasibility study determining the viability of a national
election technology service organisation providing election technology services to all
Australian jurisdictions.
1
COAG Councils provide a forum for intergovernmental collaboration and decision-making
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag councils
1Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
1 Introduction
This supplementary submission focuses on issues arising from the AEC’s submission to the inquiry.
This submission addresses the following areas of the AEC’s submission:
Role divergence – page 16
Enrolment Voting
Election Night – page 37
Counting Senate Papers on Election Night
Senate count costing
System Renewal Options – page 4
2 Roll Divergence
My personal experience in managing polling places in NSW is that roll divergence is a significant
issue for electors. Any further increase roll divergence would undermine the public’s confidence in
the enrolment process. Page 16 of the AEC submission touched on the topic of roll divergence. The
submission identified that divergence is still a significant issue with no real prospect of a solution to
the problem.
A previous submission by the AEC to JSCEM on 20 February 2015 entitled “Electoral Roll Divergence”
not only identified the level of roll divergence at that time but also identified the source of
divergence between NSW and Victorian rolls. It said in part:
As of 11 November 2014, there were 525,839 divergent enrolments (see Table 4.1). Of these,
19 309 were divergent due to entitlement differences (that is, single enrolments where the
individual was not eligible for enrolment at both levels of government), and 506,530 were
divergent for other reasons, such as direct enrolment programs. The detailed divergence
figures by federal Division are listed in Appendix A. – page 4
One of the explanations for the large amount of divergence where the state enrolment is
more recent is the focus of the Victorian and NSW SDE programs on enrolling 18 year olds
onto their state rolls. Both Victoria and NSW use data from school assessment authorities
(see Table 4.2) to enrol new electors in this cohort. The FDEU program has no equivalent
data source specifically targeting 18 year olds, although young people will be captured in the
FDEU process when they engage with a driver's licence issuing authority or Centrelink. – page
6
Without wishing to make comment on the decisions of other commissions, the
(Commonwealth) Electoral Commissioner, as the responsible officer, formed the view that
automatically applying state direct enrolment (SDE) and update transactions as federal
enrolment transactions presented a potential risk to the integrity of the Commonwealth
2Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
electoral roll. In any case, much of the data that meets the AEC’s standards is already
captured through the mail review program. – page 10
The statement above from the federal commissioner related to his unwillingness to use school
assessment authority data is perplexing as this is very high quality data that has been vetted by the
state’s education authorities for year 12 examination purposes. The AEC’s only possible complaint
about quality is that the address data provided is not always accurate post end of year because
young electors are by their nature relatively itinerate and not easily managed by the current
relatively arcane roll management practices of the AEC.
What is apparent from the above statements and the recent AEC submission is that the AEC does
not have a viable solution to the divergence problem. Additionally, it should be noted that the NSW
Electoral Commission (NSWEC) is in the later stages of implementing a new Roll Management
System (RMS). The business case for the new system is based entirely on removing the need for AEC
roll data from the NSW roll preparation process and using “free” source data. This is supported by
the statement below.
The NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) has indicated its desire to reduce its current
financial contribution under the JRA and then cease contributions in 2015- 16, as it will have
developed its own capability to maintain a roll and deliver roll related processes in NSW for
state and local government events. – page 3
Further the NSWEC annual report for FY 14-15 said:
The Agreement with the Commonwealth, running at $4.8 million per annum, for provision of
elector enrolment information will be phased out in just over a year’s time. The Commission
is investing in its own Roll Management System leveraging off the investment previously
made in the ‘SmartRoll’ product that utilises NSW databases, such as the register of drivers’
licences, to update elector enrolment details. The software development programme for the
Roll Management System has a capital investment of $5.7 million and will be completed by
the end of 2016. – page 11
It should also be noted that state election bodies resent paying the Commonwealth for a roll which
in is part built from data the states have provided via their motor and birth, death and marriages
registries. The business case for the NSW Roll Management System project was built on the concept
of removing the need for NSW to pay the AEC for a federal roll which comprised substantially NSW
agency sourced data.
Given the new RMS system may be operational early next year, it is my view, that NSW roll
divergence may significantly increase should the NSWEC no longer use the federal roll as its
foundation. Conversely, should in NSW continue to pay for the federal roll then the business case for
RMS would be completely undermined.
I see the only way to properly address this issue is for it to be raised at COAG and the issue be
treated as a national issue rather than leaving it to the Commissions to resolve by agreement. It is
my observation that each Commission’s management is too parochial in their outlook to be able to
effectively address the roll diversion issue. It is my view that until these issues are addressed roll
divergence will continue for Australia’s two largest states.
3Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
Further I would suggest that the only viable solution to this issue is for a national enrolment body to
be formed which can deal with all Commissions roll requirements equitably and reliably. It is
possible that much of the current roll management resources available within the AEC could be used
by a national body to manage a national roll. However, it is important that the management and
governance of these resources are separated from the AEC and reflect the needs of all jurisdictions.
The establishment of such a body could also be considered by COAG in parallel with other electoral
issues which could also benefit from a national approach.
See recommendation 1.
3 Enrolment Voting
The use of enrolment votes is now common for most states at their general elections. NSW at the
last state general election accepted into the count some 15,000 new electors during voting and
corrected the addresses for some 32,000 incorrectly enrolled electors.
I would recommend the AEC adopt enrolment voting using similar procedures to NSW. This would
result in the AEC potentially accepting into the count an extra 50,000 votes and correcting the
enrolment details (and in many cases their division) of about 100,000 electors at the next general
election.
However, to implement enrolment voting the AEC will also need to update their systems, voting
procedures and training. Plus, the AEC will need to provide electronic roll lookup devices in all voting
venues. Enrolment voting requires a reliable means by which an elector’s correct enrolment details
can be found quickly by election officials.
See recommendation 2.
4 Delayed Election Night Results
Although the below statements by the AEC are correct they omit stating that only 87% of prepoll and
polling place TCP votes were counted by the end of election night.
117. By approximately 3am (AEST) on 3 July, 96.7 per cent of all ordinary House of
Representatives votes (11 422 070 ordinary House of Representatives ballot papers) and
73.9 per cent of all ordinary Senate votes (8 732 945 Senate ballot papers) were counted
and results published on the AEC Tally Room (TR).
118. The election night count involved a count of House of Representatives first preferences,
the Two‑Candidate‑Preferred (TCP) count and Senate first preferences. The Senate votes
that were not counted on election night were primarily those taken at PPVCs.
The figures in the AEC report shown above relate only to first preference votes. It should be noted
that the HOR TCP vote is the most critical vote count required on election night hence its timely
availability is important to determining the HOR election outcome.
4Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
Most of the missing TCP results on election night are for pre-poll venues and as such the use of
electronic voting with paper docket in pre-polls would add over 250,000 TCP votes to the election
night count before 9pm. Similarly, because no pre-poll senate ballots were counted on election night
the use of electronic voting in pre-polls would add more than 850,000 senate votes to the election
night count before 9pm.
See recommendation 3.
5 Counting Senate Papers on Election Night
The below statement from the AEC submission suggests counting of votes may have contributed to
the excessive working hours experienced by OICs.
Some staff worked long hours on election day. Contributing factors were the increased
complexity in voting and counting procedures and the prescriptive parcelling and packaging
procedures designed to achieve a high degree of integrity. The balance between integrity
and managing staff working hours is not yet optimal. In some locations, staffing allocations
were not sufficient. – page 54
In my view the unacceptably long working hours for OICs was due almost entirely to the slower
return of materials processes used at this election not the counting of either the senate or HOR
votes. In particular, the counting of senate votes is not a large contributor to the longer working
hours and is an essential process for senate count integrity. The handling and flattening of Senate
votes takes the most time at polling places in the Senate count process and this must be done
regardless of whether senate votes are counted or not.
See recommendation 4.
6 Senate Count Costing
The AEC published costings for the election on page 62 of their report which provided some insight
into the increase in costs associated with the new ballot paper procedures and the senate count.
Although the Senate data capture costs are not broken out specifically it is possible that the
additional cost of scanning and keying senate was in the order of $30M to $40M.
If this is the case I would recommend the AEC consider examining alternative methods of capturing
Senate preference data, such as double keying (not scanning the first round of keying). My rough
calculations would suggest that double data entry could be done for the whole of Australia for about
$30M. I would also suggest that it would be easier to find venues to perform keying and find suitable
operators than it was to source and manage the scanning technology utilised for the senate data
capture which now is potentially a signal source supply arrangement.
See recommendation 5.
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Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
7 System Renewal Options
The AEC’s submission on page 4 flagged that they will be requesting additional funding for new
systems.
While the AEC’s funding has been sufficient for election delivery within the existing model,
there has not been any capacity for significant improvement or replacement of systems. A
comprehensive funding review conducted in 2011 by the Department of Finance found that
the AEC was under‑funded. The additional funding then provided by Government has since
been eroded and the AEC is yet again in a position where it cannot invest in system
renewal, staff capability or redevelopment of the temporary staffing model. As I have
stated at various Parliamentary committee hearings, I believe the temporary staffing model
and the AEC’s election and roll management IT systems are at the end of their useful life.
As a result, much of the delivery of elections and the data for monitoring and reporting on
that delivery, is reliant on human intervention and manual processes. The IT systems, which
have been built over a long period of time, are not able to be easily integrated with
contemporary mobile platforms and in many cases, will not be supported by vendors in
future.
I agree with the Commissioner that the AEC’s systems are well past their end of life and the AEC is
unable to effectively implement business process change without a significant overhaul of their
systems environment.
The current approach in Australia for refresh of electoral systems is for respective governments to
provide individual election bodies funding to develop their own systems in isolation. To give the
committee a sense of the scale of this process, I understand the VEC has recently spent well over
$20M to redevelop some of their systems and the NSWEC has over the past 10 years spend about
$30M to develop is current systems environment.
An ANAO2 report on the last major system development undertaken by the AEC said:
18. The AEC has in place a centralised roll-management system (RMANS) that is used,
amongst other things, to generate the roll that is available for public inspection and the
certified lists of electors used at polling booths on polling day. Another key computer
system is the AEC's Election Management System (ELMS).
19. The staged redevelopment of the AEC's election-management and electoral-roll systems
(ELMS and RMANS) has been underway since mid-2004. However, the project has not
proceeded as planned, with the AEC:
• informing the ANAO that the cost estimate had risen from the original $27
million to ‘somewhere between $56 million and $60 million';
2
The Australian Electoral Commission's Preparation for and Conduct of the 2007 Federal General Election
Wednesday, April 21, 2010, 28 of 2009-2010, ANAO
https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/australian-electoral-commissions-preparation-and-
conduct-2007-federal-general
6Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
• estimating that the redevelopment would be completed by December 2014 if it
was to proceed, 42 months after the originally planned completion date of June
2011; and
• in October 2009, placing on hold any further development of the next stages of
the systems-redevelopment project until it has a more comprehensive
understanding of the implications of the JSCEM report on the 2007 federal
election, the Government's second Green Paper on electoral reform6 and this
ANAO performance audit.
Given the above, it would reasonable to expect that the AEC will need now more than $60M to
replace the current ELMS and RMANS/GENESIS systems and even more to upgrade the election
funding systems to satisfy potential legislation changes. This would be a significant project and one
which the AEC has not in its own right got a good track record implementing.
I have attached below, for the benefit of the committee, a diagram which identifies the types of
systems required by Australian election bodies to manage elections. It is my observation that the
system requirements for election bodies in Australia are very similar, therefore I believe it would be
possible for these bodies to utilise one configurable centrally managed system to conduct election
functions for all Australian bodies.
By way of example it would be possible and probably advantageous for all jurisdictions to use a
common system for venue management, staffing and training, particularly as state and federal
bodies already share3 common venue and staffing data e.g. about 70% the staff used by the states
are the same people as those used by the AEC for a subsequent election and nearly all venues used
are the same for state and federal elections.
I do not believe that repeating the isolationist approach of the past is the best way forward for the
AEC’s next system redevelopment. Assuming the system needs of the AEC are similar to those of
other electoral Commissions in Australia. It would make sense that any development undertaken by
the AEC should be done in such a way that their as at least a potential for these systems to be used
by election bodies in other Australian jurisdictions. However, history shows that the AEC and state
jurisdictions appear to have a difficulty agreeing how services are to be provided and to what
standard. This is reflected by some states running their own roll system and also the lack of
participation by the AEC in technology sharing initiatives. These issues suggest the AEC may not be
the most suitable organisation to undertake a role of national election technology manager.
At present the Queensland Electoral Commission has about $10M of funding to redevelop its
systems. This project was proposed to be completed by their 2018 election but given the project is
yet to commence is unlikely to meet this timeline. Similarly, the NSWEC is undertaking a
redevelopment of its election funding systems and will potentially need a significant system upgrade
post their 2019 election which would cost in the area of $20M to $30M. Other states (with the
exception of Victoria) typically have limited system infrastructure which is managed with minimal
3
Note privacy issues between agencies can be overcome by staff giving their explicit approval to share data.
The AEC currently provides all states files with venue related survey data outlining venue conditions and
accessibility which each state puts back into their own systems.
7Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
resources. In general, terms the systems environment for most commissions in Australia will require
additional funding to satisfy community expectations with the AEC currently at the top of the
redevelopment list.
There are several management models which could be used to provide a national election
technology infrastructure to all Australian jurisdictions. One is the PSMA4 model, PSMA Australia
Limited is an unlisted public company owned by Australia’s federal, state and territory governments.
Their goal is to facilitate broad and sustainable access to high-quality location data. Another is to use
an existing corporate entity either government or private sector. A suitable government entity
would be AustPost, while there would be a number of corporate entities interested in providing
election technology services.
The following is a list of election processes that could be shared by all Australian jurisdictions on
common technology infrastructure;
Electronic voting – coordinate development of systems and supplying services to support the
delivery of the technology to run internet elections in Australia
Electronic Mark-off in voting centres – supply services and equipment to allow the electronic
mark-off in voting centres, including maintaining an inventory of devices for reuse Australia
wide. Note currently NSW, Victoria and Queensland share 6,500 android tablet devices and
software for static roll lookup. These devices could form the core pool of devices and
technology.
Election Management systems – develop or coordinate the supply of election systems and
associated services to all electoral authorities in Australia. I would expect this could be a
combination of adopting bespoke systems currently in use by States like NSW or Victoria or
licencing best of breed systems from election system suppliers.
National Electoral Roll Management – provide core electoral roll management technology
which can be managed separately by all Australian jurisdictions for their purposes. The
system should use data matching as the principle means by which electors are maintained
on the roll and facilitate online interaction with electors where possible.
Venue and Staffing Management – develop as system which supports the management of
venues, staffing and training for attendance voting. This system should maximise the use of
common data used by both state and federal jurisdictions.
Election Funding and Disclosure – there is a strong demand for the harmonisation of election
funding laws in Australia. Gaps between federal and state legislation and systems has caused
significant decay in elector trust. The use of a funding and disclosure system which ensures
the public can be confident the funding of elections is done in an ethical manner is best
achieved by the states and the Commonwealth using a common system for disclosures.
If the above approach is to be implemented COAG will need to be involved, to ensure the
engagement and commitment of all jurisdictions. This project will be a significant transformation
project which is not only changing the way technology services are delivered but also reducing costs
and improving service delivery (which is the current public expectation). One of the primary aims of
4
https://www.psma.com.au/about
8Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
Submission 76 - Supplementary Submission
such a transformation would be to create a critical mass of systems skills focused on specific election
technologies which would reduce the potential for a ‘census fail” situation occurring.
Given the transformational nature of this project I would recommend that the government direct
the recently formed Digital Transformation Agency to be the lead agency and for them in the first
instance develop a national strategy and funding program which identifies the best utilisation of
election technology across all Australian jurisdictions.
See recommendation 6.
9Inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related thereto
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