Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
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Mapping Security Cooperation in
the Pacific Islands
Joanne Wallis, Henrietta McNeill, Research Report | 2021
James Batley and Anna Powles
Introduction Security cooperation frequently involves the
In the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security, weaving together of state, bilateral and multilateral
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders recognised that initiatives. Multilateral cooperation includes formal
the Pacific Islands region is facing ‘an increasingly institutions and other processes, meetings and
complex regional security environment driven by mul- dialogues at which state officials primarily discuss
tifaceted security challenges’. This raises the question security concerns. Some of the latter may be ongoing,
of how Pacific Island states and territories1 will respond while others may be formed in response to a specific
to these wide-ranging, but frequently interconnected, crisis or event. It should be noted that no formal, region-
challenges, including what role regional security wide collective security agreement exists in the Pacific.
cooperation can play. As in other regions, Pacific Rather, security cooperation in the Pacific Islands is a
Island states have recognised through multiple security patchwork of agreements, arrangements and activities
declarations that security cooperation can help them between Pacific Island states and territories and their
address the increasingly transnational and globalised security partners3 that reflects differing priorities and
nature of threats — such as pandemic diseases, climate geopolitical dynamics. In this regard, the resource
change and transnational crime — that are difficult for constraints that most Pacific Island states experience
states to respond to individually. These declarations mean that partners are active participants in security
reflect a broadening understanding of ‘security’ that cooperation. The roles and focuses of these partners
has occurred globally, particularly in the past decade, vary tremendously, as do their policy commitments,
with security challenges no longer narrowly defined as and the impact and effectiveness thereof.
primarily military matters, but now cover a wide range We have adopted a definition of security coopera-
of multidimensional and transnational issues. tion as ‘common action between two or more states to
The purpose of this paper is to identify and advance a common security goal’ (Bisley 2012:23). We
map the various cooperative security agreements, focus on state interactions for analytical simplicity and
arrangements and institutions between and among due to the confines of space; this should not be read as
states and territories in the Pacific Islands region, implying that the many intrastate local and community
and their partners. This will aid our ongoing analysis of security initiatives and mechanisms practiced in the
overlaps and gaps and inform our subsequent proposals region are unimportant.
on how security cooperation could be best orientated to This paper begins by identifying the major regional
address current and future regional security challenges.2 organisations and partners involved in security
Regional entities in the Pacific are themselves cooperation in the Pacific Islands. It is then structured
diverse, ranging from the comparably populous Papua around what our mapping has identified as the major
New Guinea (PNG), with 8.7 million people, to Niue, security challenges that are dealt with cooperatively:
with 1400 people, and spanning large islands and
maritime security, environmental and resource security,
small archipelagos. They also have differing political
humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR), transnational
systems and levels of economic development. Pacific
crime and cybersecurity. These challenges are mirrored
Island states and territories also span a range of
in the Boe Declaration. We conclude by identifying the
different statuses, from sovereign states through to
questions our mapping has raised to be addressed in
colonial entities, as well as differing constitutional
our ongoing research.
relationships with metropolitan states and diverse
international relationships.
Department of Pacific Affairs 1
Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
Abbreviations SIDS – Small Island Developing States
AFP – Australian Federal Police SIDS SAMOA – SIDS Accelerated Modalities of
APG – Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering Action Pathway
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team SPC – Pacific Community
CNMI – Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands SPREP – Secretariat of the Pacific Regional
Environment Programme
CROP – Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific
TCU – Transnational Crime Unit
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
UK – United Kingdom
EU – European Union
UNDP – United Nations Development Pro-
FAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture gramme
Organisation
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention
FFA – Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Association on Climate Change
FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit US – United States
FLNKS - Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et
Socialiste
FOC – Pacific Islands Forum Officials Committee Regional security actors
FSM – Federated States of Micronesia Pacific Islands Forum
FSRS – Pacific Islands Forum Subcommittee on The most significant regional organisation focused on
Regional Security
politics and security is the PIF. The PIF was established
GCF – Green Climate Fund
in 1971 and now has 18 members4 (although this may
HADR – Humanitarian and disaster relief
change if the PIF’s five Micronesian members proceed
IUU – Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing with their expressed intent to withdraw), plus Tokelau
ITU – International Telecommunications Union as an associate member. The majority of funding for
MSG – Melanesian Spearhead Group the PIF Secretariat and its activities has traditionally
NDC - Nationally Determined Contributions to come from Australia and New Zealand, which are
reduce carbon emissions members, but a 2018 agreement to realign the funding
NZDF – New Zealand Defence Force model means that from 2021, 51 per cent of funding will
OCO – Oceania Customs Organisation come from island member states in order to dilute the
PaSCON – Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network influence Australia and New Zealand were perceived to
PASO – Pacific Aviation Safety Office gain over the Secretariat from their funding.
PICP – Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police In 2019, the PIF established a Forum Officials
PIDC – Pacific Immigration Development Community Subcommittee on Regional Security (FSRS), which
PIDF – Pacific Islands Development Forum was a reinvention of the Forum Regional Security Com-
mittee that operated until 2015. As the name implies, the
PIF - Pacific Islands Forum
FSRS is subordinate to the region’s premier officials-level
PILON – Pacific Islands Law Officers’ Network
coordinating mechanism, the Forum Officials Committee
PLG – Polynesian Leaders Group
(FOC). It consists of officials and practitioners and is
PMSP – Pacific Maritime Security Program mandated to ‘develop a Pacific Security Dialogue
PNA – Parties to the Nauru Agreement through the FSRS in order to provide a more inclusive
PNG – Papua New Guinea space for regional security discussions’ (PIF 2019a:5).
PSIDS – Pacific Small Island Developing States The FSRS is intended to meet regularly to discuss the
PTCCC - Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination security issues facing the region; coordinate and mon-
Centre itor the implementation of all PIF security declarations
PTCN – Pacific Transnational Crime Network and commitments; prioritise regional security issues
RAMSI – Regional Assistance Mission to the and formulate actions to manage the regional security
Solomon Islands environment; and keep the FOC apprised of regional
RMI – Republic of the Marshall Islands security issues and initiatives (PIF 2019b).
Regional technical bodies working on security
2
Research Report 2021
issues are also allowed to attend the FSRS, includ- of regional organisations. The CROP consists of
ing many Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific Community (SPC), Forum Fisheries
the Pacific (CROP) agencies and the regional law Agency (FFA), University of the South Pacific, Pacific
enforcement bodies, such as the Pacific Islands Islands Development Program, Secretariat of the
Chiefs of Police (PICP), Oceania Customs Organ- Pacific Regional Environment Programme
isation (OCO), Pacific Immigration Development (SPREP), South Pacific Tourism Organisation, Pacific
Community (PIDC), Pacific Islands Law Officers’ Power Association and the Pacific Aviation Safety
Network (PILON) and relevant international agencies Office (PASO).
as required. The CROP, which is chaired by the PIF Annual PIF leaders’ meetings have also addressed
Secretary General, provides high-level policy advice security concerns and led to a number of declarations
to, and coordinates action between, the executives relating to security in the region, as outlined in Table 1.
Table 1. Pacific Islands Forum declarations relating to security
Declaration Security issues addressed
Honiara Declaration (1992) Transnational crime
Law enforcement cooperation
Aitutaki Declaration (1997) Enhanced security cooperation
Widened regional security agenda to include threats from natural disasters, environ-
mental damage, economic, social and environmental policies and external threats to
state sovereignty
Biketawa Declaration (2000) ‘Good governance’ and the rule of law
Acknowledged the principle of ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs of another
member state’
Asserted that in a ‘time of crisis or in response to members’ request for assistance, for
action to be taken on the basis of all members of the forum being part of the Pacific
Islands extended family’
Nasonini Declaration (2002) International counterterrorism measures
Auckland Declaration (2004) Greater regional cooperation on security issues
Niue Declaration (2008) ‘Growing threat posed by climate change to the economic, social, cultural and environ-
mental well-being and security of Pacific Island countries’
Waiheke Declaration (2011) Sustainable economic development and enhanced regional cooperation and integration
Rarotonga Declaration (2012) Gender equality
Majuro Declaration (2013) Committed forum members to ‘demonstrate climate leadership’
Palau Declaration (2014) Ocean sustainability
Port Moresby Declaration (2015) The threat ‘posed by climate change to the economic, social, environmental and cultural
well-being and security’ of the region
Boe Declaration (2018) ‘Expanded concept of security inclusive of human security, humanitarian assistance,
prioritising environmental security, and regional cooperation in building resilience to
disasters and climate change, including through regional cooperation and support’
Under the Boe Declaration Action Plan, PIF member states are encouraged to develop
national security strategies that are expected to create an ‘overarching framework that
outlines the nation’s strategic context, identifies security challenges and opportunities,
articulates the nation’s vision and agenda, sets priorities for coming years, and sets
in motion reforms to strengthen the national security community’ (George 2021:12).
Samoa, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands have launched national security strategies in the
past two years.5 More are due in 2021 from Tonga and the Cook Islands, which are
expected to shape further the regional security agenda through national prioritisation
(Keen 2021).
Kainaki II Declaration (2019) Urgent climate change action
Source: compiled by the authors.
Department of Pacific Affairs 3Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
Since 2000, the Biketawa Declaration has provided and Tuvalu. It has also hosted Māori delegations from
the framework for regional crisis management and New Zealand, as the organisation is open to Polynesian
has been endorsed by all members of the PIF. Most societies rather than nations. Unlike the MSG, the PLG
significantly, it was invoked to support the Regional maintains a working relationship with the PIF and holds
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands its meetings on the margins of PIF fora.
(RAMSI) (2003–13) that responded to escalating insta- The Micronesian President’s Summit was
bility in Solomon Islands in 2003. RAMSI was made up established in 2001 and involves leaders of Palau,
of police personnel from the Cook Islands, Federated Kiribati, Nauru, RMI and FSM meeting annually to
States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of discuss issues of ‘Micronesian solidarity’. A similar
the Marshall Islands (RMI), Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Micronesian Chief Executives Summit was initiated
Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Australia and New in 2003 and includes the presidents of Palau, FSM and
Zealand, military personnel from Australia, New RMI, as well as governors from the US territories of the
Zealand PNG, Fiji and Tonga, and civilian personnel Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI),
from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and PNG. Guam and the FSM states of Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei
The Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru initi- and Yap.
ative (2005–10) that responded to a deterioration in Of all the established subregional political organ-
governance in Nauru was also authorised under the isations, the MSG has demonstrated the broadest
Biketawa Declaration. ambition to develop a role in the area of security
Pacific Community cooperation, although to date this ambition has yet to
be realised in a significant way.
The Pacific Community (SPC) is the principal scientific
and technical institution in the region. It plays a key role Major regional partners
in the management of, and promoting cooperation in, Partners have many reasons for engaging with the
the fields of human and resource security in the Pacific Pacific region, ranging from colonial legacy to geo-
Islands. It has a wider membership than the PIF,6 as graphical proximity and geopolitical interests. However,
seen in our interactive map of regional organisation it is notable that interest in the Pacific Islands has
membership. increased over the past decade.
Pacific Islands Development Forum Australia — ‘Pacific Step-Up’
The Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) was Australia is the largest donor to the Pacific Islands
formed in 2013 after Fiji was suspended from the PIF region (Lowy Institute 2020). Its most recent policy,
in 2009. The PIDF sits adjacent to the existing regional a ‘Pacific Step-Up’, was announced in 2017 and is
CROP architecture. Membership includes Fiji, FSM, coordinated by a specially created inter-agency Office
Kiribati, Nauru, RMI, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, of the Pacific (within the Department of Foreign Affairs
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste. Although Fiji and Trade). The step-up includes increased opportu-
has since resumed active membership of the PIF, the nities for labour mobility and infrastructure investment,
PIDF has continued. and a commitment to have a diplomatic presence in
all PIF member states. The step-up has also included
Subregional groupings
the creation of the Pacific Fusion Centre, to be
Pacific Island states have also developed subregional located in Port Vila, Vanuatu, to provide strategic
groupings. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), assessments and analysis of open-source material
which includes Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu to Pacific Islands senior leadership, policymakers and
and Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste senior security officials on Boe Declaration themes,
(FLNKS),7 is the most established, having been formed and the Australia Pacific Security College, an
in 1988 and with a secretariat located in Vanuatu, the educational institution intended to strengthen regional
construction of which was funded by China. security through collaborative learning and enhanced
The Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) was estab- people-to-people links.
lished in 2011 and includes Samoa, Tonga, French Pol- The step-up provided that a specific Pacific unit
ynesia, American Samoa, Cook Islands, Tokelau, Niue of the Australian Defence Mobile Training Team
4Research Report 2021
would be created to help facilitate capacity building in New Zealand — ‘Pacific Reset’
the region. Australia already has a network of defence Launched in 2018, New Zealand’s ‘Pacific Reset’ seeks to
attachés located in Vanuatu (working with the Vanuatu re-orient New Zealand as a Pacific nation and deepen its
Mobile Force, a paramilitary branch of the police), Tonga, regional involvement across diplomatic spheres, defence
Solomon Islands, PNG, Fiji and Hawai‘i, as well as its engagement, policing and economic development. In
longstanding Defence Cooperation Program, which addition to diaspora and people-to-people links, the
has projects and personnel in many Pacific Island states. initiative also builds on New Zealand’s long-standing
Australia has a bilateral security treaty with Solomon labour mobility program with the region. The reset also
Islands that enables the rapid deployment of troops and includes 10 new diplomatic positions in the region and
assistance (including by third states), one with Vanuatu four to promote Pacific policy globally.
that enables additional support for the Vanuatu police, Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau are part of the
and a memorandum of understanding on security coop- Realm of New Zealand. New Zealand has a Treaty of
eration with Nauru. In addition, the Fiji–Australia Vuvale Friendship (1962) with Samoa, including a 2019 State-
Partnership8 is intended to encourage cooperation in ment of Partnership on security cooperation. The New
a range of areas, including security. In 2020, Australia Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) Mutual Assistance
agreed to a Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Programme includes eight technical advisors in Pacific
Partnership with PNG. This built on the 1987 Joint Dec- states, including Tonga, Fiji and PNG, and a civilian focus
laration of Principles, under which the two governments on leadership and professional development. The NZDF
undertook to ‘consult, at the request of either, about is seeking to enhance its cooperation in the region
matters affecting their common security interests’. under its Vaka Tahi Pacific Partnership Model.
Australia is a full member of the PIF. New Zealand is a full member of the PIF.
Figure 1. Pacific constitutional relationships
Source: designed in partnership with Karina Pelling, CartoGIS ANU.
Department of Pacific Affairs 5Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
United States (US) — ‘Pacific Pledge’ China
The US’ 2019 Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy China has diplomatic relations with 10 Pacific states
included a ‘Pacific Pledge’ to increase its involvement in (Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, PNG, Samoa, Solomon
the region, particularly through development assistance. Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). China has exten-
The US has territories in the region (Guam, CNMI and sive development assistance and lending programs in
American Samoa), and the independent states of FSM, the region, including through its Belt and Road Initiative,
RMI and Palau maintain Compacts of Free Association and Chinese state-owned enterprises are engaged in
with the US (granting access to live and work in the US the commercial sector. Chinese military and security
and aid support in return for American oversight of their cooperation in the Pacific has concentrated on the PNG,
security and defence interests). The funding elements Tongan and Fijian militaries (the only Pacific states with
of the compact agreements are due to expire for FSM military capabilities), as well as Vanuatu’s mobile police
and RMI in 2023 and Palau in 2024. The US also has force, including through renovating infrastructure, port
military bases in the region, including Anderson Air visits, training, grants and officer exchanges. China
Force Base on Guam and the Ronald Reagan Ballistic also funds the annual China–Pacific Island Countries
Missile Defence test site on Kwajalein Atoll. The US Economic Development and Cooperation Forum; the
Indo–Pacific Command is located in Hawai‘i and most recent was held in Samoa in 2019.
provides strategic and operational direction to the US China is a dialogue partner of the PIF.
Pacific Fleet, US Pacific Air Forces, US Army Pacific
Taiwan
and US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (approximately
375,000 personnel). Taiwan has diplomatic relations with Tuvalu, Nauru, RMI
The US is a dialogue partner of the PIF. and Palau. Taiwan provides development assistance,
technical assistance and support for small-scale
France — ‘Une stratégie Indo-Pacifique’ infrastructure projects.
France sees the Pacific Islands as key to its ‘Une stratégie Taiwan is a dialogue partner of the PIF. The PIF
Indo-Pacifique’, under which it seeks to create ‘a secu- Post-Forum Dialogue Partners’ Meeting is one of the
rity continuum which extends from Djibouti to French very few international fora that both Taiwan and China
Polynesia’ (Guitton 2019). France has three territories attend, although Taiwan meets with its partners at
in the region, New Caledonia, French Polynesia and separate venues.
Wallis and Futuna. France has hosted periodic Oceania
Indonesia — ‘Pacific Elevation’
Summit meetings;9 the most recent in 2020 focused on
the legacy of French nuclear weapons testing. Indonesia presents itself as part of the region by virtue
France is a dialogue partner of the PIF, but its of five provinces it characterises as Melanesian (Papua,
engagement was boosted in 2016 when New Caledonia West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku and East Nusa
and French Polynesia became full members. Tenggara) (see May 2020:12). In 2019, it convened
an Indonesia South Pacific Forum in Jakarta and
Japan — ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ subsequently announced a ‘Pacific Elevation’ strat-
Japan sees the region as part of its ‘Free and Open egy intended to enhance economic engagement,
Indo-Pacific’ strategy, although its interests are more promote greater cooperation on common concerns
squarely focused on the South China Sea and Southeast such as climate change and respond to the changing
Asia. Japan has a significant and long-standing devel- geostrategic environment.
opment assistance program to the region, although it Indonesia is a dialogue partner of the PIF.
is not seen as a significant security partner. Japan has
United Kingdom (UK) — ‘Pacific Uplift’
hosted the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting every three
years since 1997. Since 2018 the UK has been engaged in a ‘Pacific
Japan is a dialogue partner of the PIF. Uplift’ strategy, which has included re-establishing
diplomatic missions in Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu that
were closed down earlier in the century and doubling
the size of its diplomatic presence in Fiji. The UK retains
6Research Report 2021
Pitcairn Island as a territory in the Pacific. police forces) to environmental and resource security
The UK is a dialogue partner of the PIF. (for example, disaster response and fisheries) to human
security (health and biosecurity) and everything in
India — ‘Act East’
between. As one Pacific Islands scholar has observed,
India adopted an ‘Act East’ policy in 2014 that has the ‘development and the security agendas are the
included a greater strategic focus on the Pacific flip sides of the same coin, and the outcome of one
Islands, although there have been few tangible out- is reliant on the other’ (Koro 2021). It is estimated that
comes to date. India established the Forum for India– from 2010 to 2018, bilateral donors and multilateral
Pacific Islands Cooperation, which met in 2014 in Fiji institutions spent US$20.44bn in aid in the region (Lowy
and in 2015 in India. Institute 2020).10
India is a dialogue partner of the PIF.
Maritime security
Other PIF dialogue partners
Fisheries are the most important maritime security
Canada, Cuba, the European Union (EU), Germany,
issue for the Pacific Islands, as they provide a significant
Italy, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain,
source of government revenue, employment, nutrition
Thailand and Turkey are also PIF dialogue partners. and economic development. The Pacific Ocean is the
Development assistance largest tuna fishery in the world, and tuna from the
western and central Pacific Ocean has a market value of
Bilateral and multilateral development assistance pro-
US$6.01bn (Williams and Reid 2019). For many Pacific
grams play a major role in addressing the full spectrum
Island states, fisheries revenue contributes over 50
of security challenges in the Pacific. These range — as
per cent of their gross domestic product (Connell and
much of the following discussion will illustrate — from
Lowitt 2019). It should not come as a surprise, therefore,
‘hard’ security programs (building the capacity of
that there is a long history of regional cooperation in this
Figure 2. State-based donor aid to the Pacific 2010–18
Source: compiled by the authors from figures in Lowy Institute 2020.
Figure 3. International organisation donor aid to the Pacific 2010-2018
Source: compiled by the authors from figures in Lowy Institute 2020.
Department of Pacific Affairs 7Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
sector, and relations between Pacific Island countries for up to 365 days per year (DoD 2018). The NZDF
and security partners are deep and well-established. complements the work of patrol boats in Fiji through
Seventeen Pacific states11 are members of the Operation Wasawasa. The Australian Defence Force
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), based in Solomon also complements the PMSP with efforts such as
Islands. The FFA provides policy and regulatory Operation Solania, which deploys ships and aircraft for
support for fisheries management in the region and regional fisheries surveillance efforts (DoD 2021). Simi-
coordinates an Australian-funded aerial and satellite larly, the Royal New Zealand Navy monitors EEZs for
surveillance centre to monitor fisheries compliance IUU fishing alongside compliance officers from Pacific
and detect illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) Island states under Operation Calypso (MPI 2013). The
fishing. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries U.S. Coast Guard also has a presence in the region,
Commission12 has responsibility for managing migra- supporting US territories such as CNMI and American
tory fish stocks (such as tuna) and is based in FSM. The Samoa. The US helps Pacific Island states manage
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management fisheries compliance through Shiprider Agreements
Organisation13 is responsible for the management that allow law enforcement officers from participating
of non-migratory fish species (such as orange roughy Pacific Island states16 to embark on U.S. Coast Guard
and jack mackerel). It only includes two Pacific states and U.S. Navy vessels to observe, board and search
(Vanuatu and Cook Islands), but is headquartered in vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations
New Zealand. within their EEZs or on the high seas. Partner states
The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)14 is also support annual FFA exercises (FFA 2008).
the only legally binding regional agreement regarding Australia, New Zealand, France and the US also
fisheries management in the Pacific. The parties (and cooperate as the Quadrilateral Defence Coordi-
Tokelau) follow the Vessel Day Scheme, which limits nation Group to conduct regional surveillance oper-
the number of days each party can have active fishing ations on IUU fishing, support the work of the FFA and
boats. The alternative Te Vaka Moana Group15 advo- combat transnational crime maritime interdictions, as
cates limits on the quantity of fish caught (rather than will be discussed shortly.
days fishing). It is said to have developed to ‘cushion
Environmental and resource security
the growing influence of the [PNA]’, but, alongside the
MSG Fisheries Committee, has limited influence Beyond fisheries, Pacific Island states face a number of
(Aqorau 2015:225, 2020). environmental and resource security challenges, most
Pacific Island states’ efforts to improve maritime notably from climate-related change and relating to the
security receive considerable support from partners. sustainability of natural resources.
Most significantly, under its Pacific Maritime Security At the regional level, a number of relevant bodies are
Program (PMSP), Australia is providing (and sustaining) focused on scientific and policy support. The PIF hosts
Guardian-class patrol boats to PNG, Fiji, FSM, Tonga, the Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner,
Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, Kiribati, RMI, Palau, which advocates on behalf of the region on ocean
Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu to help them police their issues in collaboration with CROP agencies. SPC
extensive exclusive economic zones (EEZs), primarily for manages the Centre for Pacific Crops and Trees,
IUU fishing. These boats are replacing those provided the Pacific Community Centre of Ocean Science
under the program’s precursor, the Pacific Patrol Boat (funded by New Zealand) and a fisheries laboratory,
Program. The PMSP is the largest single component of providing scientific expertise to strengthen policy and
Australia’s defence cooperation program in the Pacific advocacy measures.
Islands region. Under the auspices of the PMSP, The Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Envi-
Australia is also redeveloping the Lombrum Naval ronment Programme (SPREP), a CROP agency,
Base on Manus Island in PNG. It was announced is the most inclusive of all regional organisations.17
this would occur in cooperation with the US; however, SPREP is based in Samoa and provides scientific
this does not appear to have occurred. The PMSP is and policy support for protecting and managing the
an AU$2bn commitment over 30 years and includes environment and natural resources within the Pacific.
aerial surveillance of EEZs coordinated by the FFA SPREP is the secretariat for the Noumea Convention
8Research Report 2021
(1986), which aims to protect, manage and develop the climate-related projects and expertise to build local
marine and coastal environments of the Pacific Islands. capacity. The Commonwealth Blue Charter supports
Its projects are wide-ranging, from waste management states to take action on climate change and ocean
to biodiversity losses in terrestrial and marine flora and pollution; Fiji and Vanuatu have taken leadership roles.
fauna to coral bleaching and erosion. SPREP is also Pacific Island states are also taking a leadership role in
responsible for climate change policy and information the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to
and funding distribution for projects related to climate develop international law in response to the challenges
change mitigation and adaptation. SPC manages the posed by climate change.
Regional Pacific Nationally Determined Con- Further, Pacific Island states are advocating to take
tribution (NDC) Hub, which helps members deter- action to address climate change as part of international
mine their Paris Agreement climate targets — RMI, coalitions, including the Alliance of Small Island
Fiji, PNG and Tonga have all submitted their NDCs to States,18 the Cartagena Dialogue,19 the G77,20 the
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Vulnerable Forum,21 the REEEP22 and
Climate Change (UNFCCC). MRV International Partnership.23 The Interna-
Regional groupings have evolved to negotiate climate tional Union for Conservation of Nature and the
issues on the global stage. The most prominent is the Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change are
Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), also important voices in the climate change and envi-
which was established after the 1992 United Nations ronmental negotiations in which Pacific Island states
Conference on Environment and Development. Since participate (Carter 2015).
2010, the PSIDS have been active in global climate Key bilateral partners in supporting climate change
negotiations. The PIF highlighted PSIDS’ role in 2013 adaptation and environmental preservation in the
with the Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership. Pacific Islands are Australia, New Zealand, the EU and
Individual Pacific Island states have also taken France, followed by Japan and the US. India and China
leadership roles on climate issues in the global arena. have so far made only modest efforts in this field.
Samoa hosted the UN’s Third International Con-
ference on Small Island Developing States Humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR)
(SIDS) in 2014, which promoted global partnerships The Pacific Islands are vulnerable to natural disasters
for sustainable development, including on the issue and there is evidence that such events may increase
of climate change through the SIDS Accelerated with climate change. Yet despite an escalating number
Modalities of Action (S.A.M.O.A.) Pathway. This of natural disasters, the Pacific has no regional HADR
pathway influences how international organisations function. In 2013, the MSG established the Human-
prioritise their work; for example, the Food and Agri- itarian and Emergency Response Coordination
culture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Centre within the Department of Peacekeeping
has undertaken programming based on the Samoa Operations at the MSG Secretariat in Vanuatu,
Pathway (FAO 2018). The World Bank has mobilised focused on coordinating responses to disasters in the
US$140m towards climate change mitigation and region (MSG 2013). It appears this centre has never
adaptation initiatives in the Pacific region, which range functioned. Instead, HADR tends to be conducted pri-
from coastal infrastructure in Samoa to climate-resilient marily by partners in cooperation with affected states,
agricultural development in Vanuatu (World Bank 2013). as illustrated in Annex 1. Indeed, alongside Australia’s
The UNFCCC undertakes specific climate-related pro- PMSP, HADR is one of the most visible ways military
jects in the Pacific, as does the Green Climate Fund forces from partner countries engage with Pacific
(GCF), to which many partners contribute (although not Island countries.
Australia or the US). In 2020, 14 Pacific Island states France, Australia and New Zealand have coordinated
had projects funded by the GCF, to which SPREP is their HADR responses in the Pacific Islands under the
an accredited entity; it develops and implements cli- FRANZ Arrangement since 1992. Partners also conduct
mate projects on behalf of the GCF (SPREP 2020). joint humanitarian exercises in the region regularly, includ-
The Commonwealth Finance Access Hub helps ing the annual US-led Pacific Partnership mission,
states within the Commonwealth access funding for which also includes NGOs and humanitarian agencies.
Department of Pacific Affairs 9Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
The lack of a regional HADR function is partly expli- to and are embedded in sustainable development’. It is
cable by the fact that there are only three Pacific military expected that a HADR concept paper will be presented
forces: the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, His Majesty’s at the 2021 South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meet-
Armed Forces of Tonga and the PNG Defence Force. ing. In addition, the FSRS is tasked with developing a
In addition, the Vanuatu Mobile Force is a paramilitary regional mechanism for HADR response (PIF 2020).
force that supports the police. To date, none of these The US has committed US$10m towards disaster
organisations has had the resources (whether financial resilience initiatives and hosts the Pacific Tsunami
or personnel) to undertake significant HADR cooperation Warning Center in Hawai‘i that alerts Pacific states to
beyond their national borders without external support. threats. Australia assists the Pacific Tsunami Warning
That is not to say, however, that the aspiration for mutual Center and hosts the Australian Tsunami Warning
cooperation does not exist: in 2013, for instance, PNG System, which provides an early warning system to
and Fiji agreed to engage in closer military collabora- Australia and facilitates tsunami warnings for the Pacific
tion under a defence cooperation agreement, initially Islands (BoM 2016). Japan has developed a tsunami
involving Fijian personnel providing training assistance early warning system for Tonga.
to the PNG Defence Force (ABC 9/5/2013; Belden Transnational crime and border management
5/7/2013). Fijian forces are trained at Blackrock
The most common transnational crimes in the region are
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and
drug trafficking, human trafficking, small arms trafficking,
Disaster Relief Camp, which Australia is upgrading
money laundering and environmental crimes, such as
with a view to transform it into a regional hub for police
the illegal trade in endangered species, IUU fishing and
and peacekeeping training and pre-deployment prepa-
logging. Regional cooperation is well developed in this
ration (DoD 2019). In 2015, with the assistance of New
field.
Zealand, Fijian soldiers deployed to assist with Cyclone
To address transnational crime and other border
Pam rehabilitation in Vanuatu. Tonga’s armed forces
management challenges, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of
also provided emergency response support to Vanuatu
Police (PICP), the Oceania Customs Organisation
following Cyclone Pam and to Fiji following Cyclone
(OCO) and the Pacific Immigration Development
Winston in 2016.
Community (PIDC) work closely together as part of
There are, however, ongoing discussions under the
a 2018 Declaration of Partnership. That declaration
auspices of the Pacific Islands Emergency Man-
recognises the ‘urgent need for border control agen-
agement Alliance project (supported by Australia
cies to collaborate and meet in regional and national
and New Zealand, with SPC) to develop a Regional
security forums to promote cooperation and general
Strategic Emergency Management Roadmap.
understanding of security issues in the Pacific’ (PIDC
The South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting
2019).
sees defence ministers from Australia, New Zealand,
The Australian-led Joint Heads of Pacific
France, Fiji, PNG, Chile and Tonga meeting annually
Security was established in 2019, bringing together
(biennially until 2020) to discuss defence and secu-
14 nations’ heads of immigration, customs, policing
rity cooperation in the region, ranging from policy to
and defence agencies to discuss shared security
HADR (Reynolds 2020). In 2015, the group agreed
concerns and approaches.24 The Southwest Pacific
to a cooperative exercise framework named POVAI
Heads of Maritime Forces25 have met annually since
ENDEAVOUR that provides a coordinating mechanism
2017 to link security agencies with navies in the spirit of
for HADR-related exercises in the region, as well as
‘friendship and kinship’ (Radio New Zealand 16/8/2019).
maritime security, stabilisation operations and peace-
The agenda is wide-ranging, covering transnational
keeping (Andrews 2015).
crime, safety challenges and climate change.
There has recently been a significant focus on
To facilitate the ability of Pacific Island states to build
disaster resilience. In 2016, the Pacific region adopted
and maintain legislative frameworks to regulate criminal
a Framework for Resilience Development in the Pacific
behaviour, the Pacific Islands Law Officers’ Net-
(SPC 2016:2) that seeks to provide strategic guidance
work (PILON) shares current legislative challenges and
and integrated approaches to ‘enhance resilience to
initiatives across the region. The PIF also has officers
climate change and disasters in ways that contribute
who assist individual members of this network with
10Research Report 2021
drafting appropriate legislation to secure criminal pros- intelligence units (FIUs) around the region that provide
ecutions. Australia and New Zealand have also funded research and analysis on money laundering and other
the Pacific Judicial Development Programme to financial crimes. The FIUs are similarly networked via
support courts and judges to strengthen the judicial the Association of Pacific Island FIUs, within the
systems in Cook Islands, FSM, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering
Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, based in Bangkok. The Egmont Group is an interna-
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Australia and New Zealand tional organisation combatting money laundering with
remain the key providers of law and justice assistance a similar Asia–Pacific grouping of 28 FIUs, including
across the region. Pacific FIUs, and is closely associated with the APG.
To investigate and combat transnational crime, The placement of Australian Federal Police
there are 28 transnational crime units (TCUs) and New Zealand Police advisors in many Pacific
spread across Pacific Island states and territories. The Island states both underpins the regional networks
TCUs share intelligence and investigation information, previously described and supports those countries’
particularly if there is an issue that crosses state borders. extensive bilateral capacity-building programs in the
Some states, such as Kiribati, have multiple TCUs, due region. Australians are located in PNG, Fiji, Solomon
to the geographical (and temporal) distance between Islands and Vanuatu, while New Zealand has advisors in
islands, such as Tarawa and Kiritimati. Australia and Solomon Islands, Pitcairn Island, PNG, Fiji (roaming) and
New Zealand also have newly established TCUs to Tonga. From time to time, Australia and New Zealand
facilitate regional intelligence sharing; New Zealand’s also support the creation of ad hoc groups to address
multiagency TCU has an advisor specifically for capacity specific criminal security challenges. An example is
building Pacific TCUs. the Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime
TCUs are part of the Pacific Transnational Pacific Taskforce, which was launched in 2019 by
Crime Network (PTCN), which is one of the seven Australia, New Zealand, Tonga and Fiji to ‘investigate
networks26 of the PICP27 located in New Zealand. The and disrupt organised crime groups operating in the
PTCN’s physical centre, the Pacific Transnational area, target groups using small craft to move illicit drugs
Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC), is based in through the region, share operational intelligence, and
Samoa. It is headed by a Pacific national and made strengthen cooperation to conduct expanded and
up of Australian and New Zealand policing advisors, as complex investigations’ (AFP 2019).
well as seconded Pacific law enforcement staff (from Organisations such as Interpol, the International
police, customs and immigration agencies). The PTCCC Organization for Migration and the United Nations
collates intelligence from states and international part- Office on Drugs and Crime provide intelligence and
ners to analyse regional trends, create connections regional assessments of transnational crime threats to
between states for joint investigations and provide the region, and often attend regional border security
support if required. The PTCCC has close connections conferences. They also provide training in international
with law enforcement organisations that also have frameworks and complex areas, such as people smug-
intelligence networks for information sharing, including gling. In that space, the Bali Process on People
the PIDC, comprising 20 Pacific heads of immigration Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related
agencies, based in Samoa28 and the OCO, comprising Transnational Crime is an Asia–Pacific regional
23 heads of customs agencies, based in Fiji.29 All three grouping based in Bangkok, of which many Pacific
transnational crime organisations are funded mostly by states are members.31 Several Pacific states are active
Australia and New Zealand, with some state contribu- members, including Fiji, which is the co-chair of the Bali
tions. The Pacific Aviation Safety Organisation (PASO) Process Working Group on the Disruption of People
comprises 10 Pacific states30 that are signatories to the Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Networks along-
Pacific Islands Civil Aviation Safety and Security side New Zealand.
Treaty. It is the only anti-transnational crime related
organisation that is a CROP member, and is based in
Vanuatu, focusing on training in compliance and safety
for airport officials.
The regional TCU model is emulated by financial
Department of Pacific Affairs 11Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
Regional Law Enforcement Capacity-Building Programs
Australia and New Zealand are engaged in police capacity-building programs in the region. The Australian-led
Pacific Community for Law Enforcement Cooperation coordinates training to ensure there is no overlap,
duplication or gaps (Rakautoga 8/11/2020). Australia conducts a number of bilateral capacity-building programs
with Nauru, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa, and collaborates with New Zealand on the Tonga
Police Development Programme. As part of its Pacific Step-Up, in 2018 Australia announced a Pacific Fac-
ulty of Policing at the Australian Institute of Police Management. New Zealand has a dedicated policing
Pacific Island Prevention Programme that builds on previous programs, such as the Pacific Prevention of
Domestic Violence Programme. New Zealand also has specialist customs and immigration law enforcement
capacity-building programs targeting transnational crime in the region. New Zealand and Japan have worked
together to establish a law enforcement capacity-building program at the University of the South Pacific,
where there are also Pacific policing and border security tertiary qualifications for police and border security
officials (supported by PICP and PIDC). Other states have an interest in transnational crime, including the US,
which has conducted law enforcement training with security agencies throughout the region.
Cybersecurity Other regional organisations have considered
Pacific Island states’ cybersecurity activities have largely cybersecurity issues. For example, PILON 2018’s
been aimed at the protection of the public online, rather conference was themed around cybercrime, and the
than at possible cyberattacks against institutions and network has supported information sharing on cyber
infrastructure (Watson 2021). At present, the prepon- issues between the regional legal community, judiciary
derance of activity in the field of cybersecurity is at the and police (PRIF 2019). One of PICP’s key networks is
national and bilateral levels, rather than the regional level. Cyber Safety Pasifika, a program of 18 nations that
That said, regional cooperation in this area is evolving. uses local police to promote cyber safety messages
At the national level, Pacific Island states are creating within the community, particularly in schools.
computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to Australia is a key partner on cybersecurity in the
protect against, detect and respond to cybersecurity Pacific. Under its Cyber Cooperation Program,
incidents and attacks. Due to the immense cost and Australia has provided support for the development of
effort required to design, install and operate a CERT, state-based CERTs. The potential for attacks during the
many states relied on regional initiatives such as Pac- Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Leader’s Week in
CERT, a regional CERT that worked with internet ser- 2018 provided the impetus for PNG and Australia to
vice providers to manage incidents. PacCERT is now jointly fund the National Cyber Security Centre in
defunct due to lack of sustainability and ongoing support Port Moresby. Australia has also been the executive
(PRIF 2019). The Pacific Cyber Security Operational lead on and biggest donor within PICP to the Cyber
Network (PaSCON) launched in 2018 and is a network Safety Pasifika program. This is part of a targeted
of 14 national CERTs.32 PaSCON is evolving from a approach to cybersecurity through the Australian
mechanism to share incident response tools to provid- Cyber Cooperation Program, established in 2016.
ing an avenue for discussion on broader cybersecurity The program has five aims: compliance with interna-
issues. Cybersecurity is one of the expanded elements tional law; cybercrime prevention, prosecution and
of security within the Boe Declaration and to implement cooperation; cyber incident response; best technology
it, the FSRS has asked CROP agencies for support to for development; and human rights and democracy
‘develop cybersecurity capacity and capability across online (PRIF 2019). The Australia Pacific Security College
the region’ (PIF 2020a). The PIF Secretariat led a cyber in partnership with the Australian National University’s
assessment that recognised that the region has further Cyber Institute have run short courses on cybersecurity
work to do to improve regional cybersecurity (PRIF issues for Pacific government officials. Australia also
2019:9).
12Research Report 2021
funds the Oceania Cyber Security Centre to under- security. That said, to date we have virtually no data
take cyber policy assessments and cybersecurity to determine whether those national security strategies
capacity assessments for Pacific Island states, initially are in fact shaping the allocation of resources by either
focusing on Vanuatu and FSM. The Council of Europe Pacific Island governments themselves or their security
(in addition to Australia) has supported legislative partners. This raises a set of initial questions: how
drafting to develop laws targeting cybercrime (PRIF are the interests of partners and those of Pacific
2019). The US has also hosted cyber capacity-building Island states interacting to shape regional
workshops for Fiji, Kiribati, PNG, Samoa and Tonga, security cooperation? For example, are national
including speciality training from the FBI and US Secret security strategies influencing the allocation of
Service (US Embassy Suva 2019), and incorporated resources by Pacific Island governments and
cybersecurity priorities in wider projects, such as We their security partners, including by promoting
Are Young Pacific Leaders. greater regional cooperation?
The International Telecommunications Union Another challenge to mapping regional security
(ITU) — a United Nations agency — is active in the cooperation is the need to distinguish between the
region, supporting communications technology policy announcement of an initiative, whether it is implemented
and regulatory cooperation, rural communications and what outcomes it has achieved. Indeed, the quantum
in PNG, RMI, Tonga and Nauru, and cybersecurity of resources directed at responding to a challenge does
readiness assessments in Kiribati, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga not necessarily signal effectiveness. This is a challenge
and Vanuatu. The ITU has been involved in the region to analysing both the contributions of partners and the
for many years, undertaking specialist projects such ambitions of Pacific Island governments themselves.
as the installation of telephone connectivity in Tokelau. Further analysis of the implementation of specific
Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, PNG, Samoa, Solomon programs and announcements is required to assess
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu are all members of Interpol, their practical outcomes. Relatedly, there are questions
which also has an interest in cybercrime. about the ability of Pacific Island states and regional
institutions to absorb the support being provided by
Conclusion and next steps
metropolitan powers and international institutions, with
Our mapping reveals that security cooperation in the a risk that the increased interest from and activity by
Pacific Islands is best described as a patchwork of partners may overwhelm Pacific Island security actors
agreements, arrangements and institutions. This patch- and institutions. This raises another question: how
work seeks to meet a range of security priorities and well coordinated is partners’ assistance to the
ambitions as identified by both the Pacific Islands and region, and what challenges — including to tar-
partners; whether it always achieves this is less clear. geting, overcrowding and absorptive capacity —
The forms that security cooperation takes and does this pose to Pacific Island states?
the targeting of resources devoted to security coop- While a sense of regional solidarity remains strong,
eration are driven by both partners and Pacific Island for the sake of analytical simplicity, we — like others —
governments themselves. The resource constraints frequently refer to ‘the Pacific Islands’; however, there
faced by Pacific Island states mean, of course, that in is a tendency to overuse this collective expression.
many ways they rely on partners’ support. The way Doing so may pay insufficient attention to individual
partners direct their assistance differs across the Pacific Island states’ interests and concerns and may
region, reflecting varying constitutional relationships mask tensions between national, regional and bilat-
and geographic, historical and strategic factors, as eral approaches to managing their security interests.
well as partners’ own priorities and interests. Even Although it was not related to the management of secu-
so, it paints an incomplete picture to depict Pacific rity issues, the pledge by five Micronesian members to
Island governments simply as passive recipients of withdraw from the PIF after their preferred candidate
security assistance. Both the promulgation of regional was not elected as the next secretary general in early
statements such as the Boe Declaration and the 2021 serves as a reminder that different Pacific Island
gradual rollout of national security strategies provide states have different interests, and regionalism may
evidence that Pacific Island governments are giving not always be sufficiently robust to contain such dif-
active consideration to their priorities in the area of
Department of Pacific Affairs 13Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands
ferences. This raises further questions: is there
Endnotes
value in seeking to foster a more coherent and
1. The independent states of the Pacific are Fiji, FSM,
comprehensive regional security architecture in
Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, PNG, RMI, Samoa, Solomon
the region? Whose interests might this serve?
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Territories are
Related to this: might a patchwork of institu-
shown with their key partners in the map in Figure
tions and arrangements that allow a diversity of
2 and include American Samoa, Guam, CNMI,
interests and flexible modes of participation and
Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, French Polynesia,
response to security challenges best suit the
New Caledonia, Wallis and Fatuna, Pitcairn Island
region? If so, what are the gaps and overlaps in
and Rapa Nui.
existing security cooperation?
Security cooperation in the Pacific is occurring in 2. This research has been undertaken thanks to
the context of ‘a dynamic geopolitical environment Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grant 2020-
leading to an increasingly crowded and complex region’ 106-040, awarded to Chief Investigator Professor
(PIF 2018). Our mapping highlights that partners (and Joanne Wallis at the University of Adelaide.
Pacific Island governments themselves) often favour 3. We understand security partners to be neighbouring
bilateral initiatives, and this reflects that, while PIF and metropolitan states with a security interest in the
Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor made a series Pacific region, as well as international organisations,
of public statements regarding regional solidarity, such as United Nations agencies, who undertake
Pacific Island states have not yet created a multilateral joint activities with Pacific states to ensure regional
mechanism akin to the Association of Southeast Asian security.
Nations Regional Forum to engage great powers’
4. Member states of the PIF are Australia, Cook
regional interests and manage relationships with major
Islands, Fiji, FSM, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru,
powers. While this is explicable by the diversity
New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG,
of states and entities in the Pacific, broader
RMI, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and
geopolitical tensions suggest that there may be
Vanuatu. Tokelau is an associate member. Observer
merit in asking: is there value in Pacific Island
states are American Samoa, Guam, CNMI, Timor-
states collectively managing their geopolitical
Leste, Wallis and Futuna. Palau, FSM, RMI, Nauru
interests? What role, if any, could Australia play
and Kiribati have announced their intentions to
in facilitating this?
withdraw from the PIF by 2022.
Finally, as we mentioned in our introduction, it is
beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the many 5. PNG published a national security strategy in 2013,
intrastate local and community initiatives that address the only Pacific Island country to have done so prior
security challenges. The importance of these to the Boe Declaration.
initiatives to the lives of many Pacific Island 6. SPC members are American Samoa, Australia,
people raises our final question: how can secu- Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, France, French Polynesia,
rity cooperation be meaningfully facilitated Guam, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Caledonia, New
between local, national and regional levels? Zealand, Niue, CNMI, Palau, PNG, Pitcairn Islands,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Author notes
the US, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna.
Joanne Wallis is professor of international security in the
7. The FLNKS is a pro-independence movement in
Department of Politics and International Relations at the
New Caledonia.
University of Adelaide, Australia. Henrietta McNeill is a
PhD candidate at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific 8. Vuvale is a Fijian word meaning ‘family’.
Affairs at The Australian National University and a 9. The Oceania Summit was attended by Australia,
research associate at the University of Adelaide. James Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, FSM, Nauru, New
Batley is a distinguished policy fellow in the Department Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Solomon Islands,
of Pacific Affairs at The Australian National University. Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
Anna Powles is a senior lecturer at the Centre for
10. Note the Lowy data — and this section of our
Defence and Security Studies at Massey University,
paper — covers Official Development Assistance
New Zealand.
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