Islam, Models and the Middle East: The New Balance of Power following the Arab Spring1
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Islam, Models and the Middle East: The New
Balance of Power following the Arab Spring1
Burhanettin DURAN* and Nuh YILMAZ**
Abstract Key Words
The Arab Spring has created a fertile Model, Islam, balance of power, Middle
ground for the competition of different models East, theo-political, New Sunnism, Arab
(Turkish, Iranian and Saudi) and for a new Spring, Salafi, Shia, Wahhabi.
balance of power in the Middle East and
North Africa. These three models, based on
three distinct styles of politics, go hand in hand Introduction
with competing particular politics of Islam.
Their search for a new order in the region The aim of this article is to discuss the
synthesises covert and overt claims for regional changing balance of power in the Middle
leadership, national interests and foreign policy
priorities. This article argues that the new
East and North Africa (MENA) region
emerging regional order will be established on following the Arab Spring by focusing
either a theo-political understanding, in other on the foreign policies of the four leading
words on securitisation and alliances based states- Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and
on sectarian polarisation which will lead to
Egypt- and their political and religious
more interference from non-regional actors,
or on a gradual reform process of economic models. The main emphasis will be the
integration and diplomatic compromise. In way in which how these four countries
the first case, biases and negative perceptions use their models as vehicles to compete
will be deepened in reference to history and for supremacy in a new regional order.
to differences in religious interpretation, and
will result in conflict, animosity and outside
Therefore, the problem will not be
interference. In the second case, there will be a dealing with what model people should/
chance to establish a cooperative regional, non- would follow but how these models have
sectarian perspective accompanied by a critical, been used and enhanced through various
but not radical, attitude towards the West.
soft and hard power instruments. We
discuss the three models in relation to
each other through their relationship
* Professor of political science at İstanbul Şehir to US (the global other) and Israel (the
University. regional other) in shaping the potential
** George Mason University. fourth model of the emerging Egypt.
139
PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 4, pp. 139-170.Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
In reality, these three models are based quo through solutions coming from
on three distinct styles of politics. These compromise. Instead of a theo-political
three models go hand in hand with three stance that emphasises polarisation and
different peculiar politics of religion. The sectarianism, this model introduces a
Iranian model legitimises itself as against political theology based on pluralism.
the US, Israel, imperialism and the West
through an “axis of resistance”. It aims
for a radical change in the regional status
In the search for regional
quo that was established, yet pursues hegemony there is need for
pragmatic politics when necessary. transnational institutions,
As a tool for legitimacy, Iran follows a religious rhetoric and
polarising and sectarian (Shi’ism) theo- practices that can reach non-
political2 policy. In contrast, Saudi governmental actors outside of
Arabia legitimises its own regional vision national borders.
by formulating itself as Custodian of
the Two Holy Mosques, Sunnism and These three models have been
Islam, opposing reforms and envisions attempting to influence a potential
an authoritarian model in favour of fourth model, the Egyptian model. It
the status quo. This model follows a is still unclear what the Egyptian model
polarising and sectarian (Sunni) theo- will look like; however, this model will
political policy. While Saudi Arabia is be deeply influential in building a new
facing a more radical Salafist (right- regional order. From the Tahrir effect4
wing) opposition, the Iranian regime is on other countries to Morsi’s election to
up against a more moderate and liberal presidency and the coup d’état against
(left-wing) opposition.3 Thus, these him on 3 July 2013, whatever happens
two theo-political models increase the in Egypt will affect other countries in
potential for conflict in the region by the region.5 Fred Dallmayr sees the
inviting foreign powers to intervene in Egyptian Tahrir revolution as Islam’s
regional politics.
response to Western modernity and
The third model, the Turkish model, that it is a democratic alternative to the
aims for economic integration and is secular Kemalist revolution and Iranian
based on Turkey’s increasing popularity Islamic reform.6 Saudi Arabia’s reaction
due to its economic success and foreign and Israel’s securitised response to the
policy performance. This model prefers Egyptian model, the US’s democracy
the gradual transformation of the status promotion agenda and its will to protect
140Islam, Models and the Middle East
its authoritarian allies in the region, will transnational institutions, religious
affect the future of this transformation. rhetoric and practices that can reach non-
governmental actors outside of national
Discussion of the Models borders. The countries who aspire to be
models must have the determination to
and Regional Powers in
mobilise their resources to encourage
the Search for Order in the their non-governmental organisations
Middle East to be active outside of their national
borders. Despite this, these countries do
The Arab Spring forced all the regional not push their “model” on others to be
powers in the Middle East to manage this readily imitated by others. Except for
revolution and to try to find a new Middle Iran shortly after the 1979 Revolution,
Eastern order. Even if Turkey’s claim of it none of them have claimed to provide
forging a new order is more commonly a universal model to the region or the
known, both Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s Islamic world.
search for a new order goes farther back
In the model debate, different
than Turkey’s claim. Their search for a
interpretations of Islam and its
new order synthesises covert and overt
mobilisation are vital. The regional
claims to regional leadership, national
countries mobilise their own versions of
interests and foreign policy priorities. The
Islam to strengthen their soft power and
parameters that define this competition
for legitimacy purposes.7 Saudi Arabia
to influence the new emerging order are
and Iran are both mobilising the ulama
not merely the strategic; rather there are
for this cause, and are openly making
competing ideologies and visions for the
theo-political claims. The greatest
future of the region. In other words, the
advantage for these two countries is the
“model discussion” is a power projection
consensus on the strategic vision among
opportunity related to differing regional
political and state elites. Having the
demands and visions of the various
Muslim Brotherhood excluded from
countries on how the new emerging
the political life, Egypt seems to lose the
regional order should be.
significance of its theo-political claims.
Therefore, any claim to be a “model” However, it would continue to become
combines strategic goals, national theo-politically influential in its search
interests, security concerns and for influence in the regional power
ideological visions. In the search for struggle since it had theo-political claims
regional hegemony there is need for even during the Mubarak era as a result
141Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
of al Azhar University.8 While in the representative of Shi’ism, Wahhabism,
Egyptian case, both the recent coup d’état which is just another version of Sunnism,
and the influence of external powers will will not remain unchallenged. The “new
limit these claims, in the Turkish case, Sunni” arguments and positions that
political culture, intra-elite problems may spring from normalisation of Egypt
and internal power balance will limit and transformation of Turkey’s religion-
theo-political claims. In spite of these politics experience will be potential
limitations, the JDP’s foreign policy challenges to Wahhabism and Shi’ism.
within the limits of secular nation-state
seems to protect the Islamic interests The limits of regional models and
of regional peoples, and strengthens new nationalism
the Religious Affairs Directorate. Still,
after the Arab Spring, the alternative It is clear that none of the competing
religion-politics relationship models and countries can solidify values that could
theo-political policies may force Turkey create consent throughout the region.
to recalibrate the role of religion in her The exclusionary nature of Shi’ism and
policies. If Egypt comes out successful Wahhabism does not allow them to forge
from its current turmoil, a pluralistic and an inclusive consensus that is based on
democratic “new Sunnism” might arise
political participation of minority groups
as a response to Shi’ism and Wahhabism
and women’s rights for the entire region.
in the long run. That said, however they
In discussing the idea of “model”, it is
became integral part of state policies,
not true to assume that a model should
Shi’ism, Sunnism or Wahhabism cannot
be absolute and flawless but rather it
be seen as all-inclusive (monolithic)
should be taken as experience sharing.
religious movements. Each represents a
particular Islamic understanding, and Following the Arab Spring, a new
all are pluralist and historically and pragmatic nationalism that blends Islam
politically founded positions. Therefore, with Arabism is rising.9 These new
the new struggle for an emerging versions of nationalism are intertwined
regional order will not be between with the claims that there is need for a
the Islamic ummah and Western new order established through regional
colonists or Israel, but whether Islam leadership. In the different regional
will be interpreted in a theo-political leadership models, Iran, Turkey and
or political theological position. While even Egypt claim that they are trying to
Iran is an unchallenged theo-political find regional solutions to the problems
142Islam, Models and the Middle East
of the region while rejecting external The Iranian Model: Shia
interference.10 While Iran formulates Politics between Radical
regional solution that would lead to
Change and the Status Quo
less influence from the US and other
Western actors, Turkey attempts to The 1979 Iranian Revolution not only
balance the influence of Iran’s soft inspired Islamist movements against
and hard power policies to ease the the West and the US, but it also played
disturbances felt by Saudi Arabia and the a major role in spreading the idea of
other Gulf countries. Iran’s influence and revolution and its critique of Israel.
its vocal support for Palestinians were Even though Iran was unsuccessful in
balanced by Turkey after the 2009 Davos exporting the Islamic state model, it
incident. It is quite likely that Egypt influenced other Islamist movements
would have changed its policy towards who came to see Sharia as the main
Israel and would be more critical due source of the state.11
to its democratic responsiveness to the Whether it is right or wrong, the
demands of its people if President Morsi term “Shia Crescent” has signified a
had not been toppled by the Egyptian growing concern about Iran’s policies
military. in the region. To be more precise, after
the US invasion of Iraq, Iran’s increasing
power projection in the region has
While Iran formulates regional increased its area of influence through
solution that would lead to less its support for the pro-Iranian Shia in
influence from the US and other Iraq, the Shi’ite opposition in Bahrain
Western actors, Turkey attempts and the increased activity of the Shi’ite
to balance the influence of Iran’s population in western Saudi Arabia,12
soft and hard power policies to through the mobilisation of the Zaydis
ease the disturbances felt by of Yemen13 against the Saudi-backed
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Yemeni government, and the conversion
countries. of Alawites to Shi’ism in Syria.
With Iranian support for the Shi’ite
Hazara people in Afghanistan, and of
Of the regional powers in the position course Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas
of model countries, the first and in Palestine, the picture has become even
undoubtedly the most radical one is Iran. clearer.
143Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
Shia politics as a theo-political leaders and that their loyalty is to Qom
instrument in Iran. King Abdullah II of Jordan and
former President Mubarak of Egypt
The idea of a Shia awakening after expressed this impression by stating that
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 links three the Shia are untrustworthy citizens.14
phenomena: the Shia majority taking The “Shia Crescent” theory is based on
power in Iraq, Iran’s rise as a regional the Shia taking power in Iraq, and Iran’s
power, and Shia groups gaining power growing influence on Shia population in
in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.15 We argue that
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates the idea of a Shia Crescent is the result of
(UAE) and Pakistan. With the Shia polarising sectarian rhetoric in the region.
awakening, the various Shia groups in That being said, Iran’s manipulation of
the Middle East have become braver Shia Islam and of its ability to mobilise
about taking power and the religious the Shi’ite populations for its national
and cultural interaction among them interests creates the basis for Iran’s soft
is increasing. Two dimensions of the power and its vision of Shi’ism as a theo-
foundation of this reawakening can be political instrument.
determined: Iran’s regional policies based It should be noted that Shi’ism has
on Shi’ism, and the partially integrated been successfully used by Iran in two
and partially competing status of Shia ways. Historically, Shi’ism provided a
politics in Iraq. Even though Shi’ism strong foundation for Iran to transcend
may seem at a disadvantage because of its specific national interests and concerns.
smaller population, it actually has a more This sectarian identity, which was
advantageous position than Sunnism even manifested in the Shah’s era, has
when it comes to having a transnational continued after the Iranian Revolution
network. Unlike Sunnis, the fact that to support Iranian policies, and has
Shia Muslims must form their religious provided an ideological legitimacy
beliefs by imitating a clergyman beyond national borders. Made up of
(marja’al-taqlid) naturally creates a Islamist and nationalist elements, this
transnational religious network. In the Shia identity criticises Arab nationalisms
Sunni world, there is the impression that or Pan-Arabism. The decline in the
the vilayat al-faqih doctrine created by legitimacy of the secular Baath regimes
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini directs was deepened with the downfall of
all Shia to follow the Iranian religious the Saddam regime and has been
leadership over their own religious completed with the Arab Spring. In
144Islam, Models and the Middle East
this respect, Khamenei was able to technology that includes enriching
find an accommodating political scene uranium. Iran sees its nuclear programme
after 2003 and 2011, which Khomeini as a critical element to increase internal
was not able to find after the Iranian national solidarity, as well as to bolster its
Revolution. claim that it is setting up a new order in
The Shia reawakening in a different the region.19
way made Iranians uncomfortable as
some in Iran started following Ayatollah The Arab Spring and the limits
Sistani and paying alms to Sistani’s of the Iranian model
representative in Qom, which indicates
that there will be competition for In the earlier stages of the Arab Spring,
religious leadership within Shi’ism.16 Iran supported the protest movements.
In other words, it is inaccurate to say For Iran, the protests were the reaction
that the Iranian religious leadership is of Muslim peoples against “the Western-
uncontested in gaining the loyalty of supported secular dictators”. In
the Shia population. This all started addition, the 1979 Iranian Revolution,
after Najaf once again being a religious like the Arab revolutions, was realised
centre for the Arab Shia after the 2003 through non-violent protests, boycotts
Iraqi invasion. This may lead to a and civil unrest. As a result, the Iranian
competition between Ayatollah Sistani’s administration argued that these
vilayet al ummah theory17 and Ayatollah revolutions were influenced by the
Khomeini’s vilayat al-faqih theory. Iranian Revolution and that the “great
However, because of the Syrian crisis, it awakening” promised by Khomeini was
is difficult to see whether this would lead taking place.20 Thus, it was thought that
to a differentiation. the increasing influence of the Muslim
Iran has built its regional alliances by Brotherhood in Egypt and similar Islamic
promoting itself as an axis of resistance. movements could support the Islamic
To transcend the sectarian limits, Iran politics represented by Iran. Pro-reform
has emphasised the Palestinian problem. Iranian authors also believe that the
This has also allowed it to establish a regional reform movements first began
transnational policy. In this sense, Israel’s with Khatami’s election to presidency
continuing aggressive and offensive in 1997 and that if this process had
policies helps Iran to continue its regional not been interrupted, Iran would have
alliance.18 The second component of been in a more influential position than
Iran’s foreign policy is having nuclear Turkey.21
145Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
On the other hand, Iran’s interpretation contextual. Iran, too, now gives emphasis
of the regional revolutions as “anti- to the difference between the interests of
Western” was aimed towards its internal its allies and the others, and has almost
politics. The fact that a youth movement completely given up an approach based
that emphasises freedom, democracy and on principles.
income distribution overlaps with the
Iranian opposition is seen as a handicap
for Iran. It should be remembered that As the Libyan, Syrian, Yemeni,
demonstrations by the opposition to and Bahraini examples show us,
express solidarity with the Tunisian it will not be easy to eliminate
people in February 2011 were harshly the authoritarian regimes in
put down. This shows the limits of the the region despite the Arab
Iranian model. Spring and even they can
reproduce themselves under the
To overcome sectarian limitations,
cloak of “democratic” military
Iran’s field of hegemonic rhetoric in the
Middle East has always been constructed
intervention as in the Egyptian
around the notion of “anti-imperialism”.
case.
Contrary to many analyses, the strategic
alliance between Syria and Iran has been The weakest side of the Iranian
in fact around this notion and not on model is its counterproductive and
sectarian bonds.22 Using anti-imperialist reactionary political language and its
rhetoric, Iran, which has been able to political practice, which is founded on
form alliances with both the Alawites sectarian polarisation. In addition, when
and the Sunni revisionist powers, has the daily secular choices and freedoms
attempted to define itself as the leader of this model are examined, the loss
of the resistance bloc, and has somewhat of legitimacy among its own people is
been successful. However, one of the
thought provoking.
results of the Arab Spring is that it has
revealed that Iran’s “anti-imperialism” Syria has also created a serious
rhetoric is unable to go beyond sectarian legitimacy issue for Iran. Despite its
limitations as Iran changed this attitude Islamic foreign policy agenda, Iran’s
when faced with the risk of losing its support for Arab nationalist and secular
most important ally, Syria.23 Thus, Baath regimes against the Islamists has
Iran’s initial excitement is now less out turned almost all of the regional Islamist
of principle and more fragmented and movements against it. This could possibly
146Islam, Models and the Middle East
erode Iran’s potential to be a regional The Saudi Arabian Model:
power and result in the decrease of its
A Monarchy Favouring the
area of political influence.24 For political
Status Quo and Wahhabism
movements who found their rhetoric
on democratisation, participation and
Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region
income distribution, the Iranian model
has often been overlooked. With its
is not appealing. support for various Salafist movements,
The Iranian model is hard-power its close alliance with the US and its
centred and has been influential on Shia leadership in the Gulf, and especially
populations and anti-US/Israel groups to its formation of a “Sunni bloc”25 against
secure material resources. The soft power Iran, Saudi Arabia is one of the most
element of this model is unable to go important countries in the region. The
beyond the Shia and some non-Sunni fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq and
groups of the region. the demise of the Mubarak regime in
Egypt have decreased these countries’
The most appealing side of the Iranian
influence on the Arab world. The Saudi
model is undoubtedly its view of the
model represents a conservative Wahhabi
US as an external global power who
authoritarian regime26 as it cannot
constantly and cruelly interferes in the
even accept the idea of a constitutional
region, and its exclusion of Israel as an monarchy. In this respect, even though
actor that was implanted in the region it is a pro-status quo model, it has a
by Western powers. Iran’s anti-US and critical role in shaping the structure of
Israel discourse delegitimises the pro- the new order.27 By providing asylum to
American countries in the region and the fallen leader of Tunisia, supporting
Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian model. Iran Mubarak and the coup d’état in Egypt
now looks as if it has abandoned the idea and sending Gulf Cooperation Council
of a regional model based in the region (GCC) troops to Bahrain, this model
itself in favour of its sectarian interests, has shown that it is a supporter of the
and this has considerably limited its regional status quo. However, when the
opportunity to be a distinctive model new Arab revolts appeared in favour of
that begun with the revolution. Saudi Saudi Arabia in Libya, Syria, and partially
Arabia, who represents a different style in Yemen, even though they threatened
of politics and emphasises security, is the status quo, this model supported the
situated directly opposite to this model. forces of the Arab Spring. In another
147Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
way, Saudi Arabia represents a model to the leaders of rentier regimes even if it
that will act as a barrier to stop the waves is not so favourable for the people.
of the Arab Spring from hitting the oil-
rich Gulf monarchies. The regional order and the
Paradoxically, even though the Saudi transforming function of the US
model is the opposite of the Iranian and the GCC
model, its theo-political power works in
a similar way in its sectarian direction The GCC, central in shaping the
and polarising nature. The Saudi Arabian regional order, exceeded its initial
monarchy, feeling surrounded and economic integration role and recently
threatened by Iran, is trying to overcome gained military functions. The new
the demands for democratisation and twofold mission of the GCC is to
participation through social aid policies. maintain internal security and protect
While the US is trying to manage the regional status quo. For this purpose,
the regional transformation with an and led by Saudi Arabia, the GCC aims
“orderly transition” approach, the Saudi to protect the regional monarchies from
model’s refusal to reform itself solidifies radical movements and endeavours to
its authoritarian side in the short run. guarantee stability in order to maintain
However, this approach will lead to loss the new economic structure in the Gulf,
of its legitimacy in the longer term.28 where the Gulf countries have recently
Despite this, the Saudi model, by been trying to plan their post-oil and
utilising the “Iranian threat” to gain the natural gas economy and are increasingly
“Sunni leadership”, is following sectarian becoming a geo-economic centre of
and polarising policies. The strength of finance.29 The GCC initially regarded
the Saudi model is visible in the Gulf Saudi Arabia’s basic role as the protector
countries’ policies of securitisation and of the Gulf monarchies against the
authoritarianism. As the Libyan, Syrian, influence coming from Iran and Iraq.30
Yemeni, and Bahraini examples show Saudi Arabia, by refusing the US’s call to
us, it will not be easy to eliminate the meet with Bahraini opposition, instead
authoritarian regimes in the region opting to interfere militarily via the
despite the Arab Spring and even they GCC, proves that Saudi Arabia is the
can reproduce themselves under the cloak guardian of the status quo, and it will even
of “democratic” military intervention as oppose the US’s demands to fulfil this
in the Egyptian case. In this respect, the role.31 Saudi aspiration to include Jordan
Saudi model seems appealing- especially and Morocco in the GCC indicates that
148Islam, Models and the Middle East
it intends to form an opposing balance the Two Holy Mosques (moral politics:
against the Arab Spring. This strategy soft power) and large income from oil
is legitimised through an anti-Iran (realpolitik: hard power) not only makes
discourse.32 it easier to apply a transnational policy,
but also allows Saudi Arabia to challenge
Within this environment of rising
Iran, Hezbollah and al Qaeda in
sectarian polarisation in the region after
competition for the “authentic” version
the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia maintains
of Islam.35
its critical position in US strategy. In the
GCC, the US is trying to balance the
situation by not losing Saudi Arabia33 Saudi Arabia has not become
yet keeping the Arab Spring alive. This a target country for democracy
formula will not only ease the Saudi promotion as the current system
family and save face, but will also stop ensures that oil will smoothly be
Iran. The US, who wants to already start transferred to the international
shaping the new order in the Middle markets, and also due to its
East, would be agreeable to the GCC distinguished role in protecting
turning into a NATO-like security the status quo in the region will
alliance against the rising Iranian threat. be preserved.
Wahhabism and expansionist Despite opposing Wahhabi comments,
theo-politics the official Wahhabi community’s
support for Saudi foreign policy is
The strongest aspects of Saudi Arabia’s critically vital for the survival of the
model are Wahhabism’s transnational regime. This support has allowed the
connections, its sectarian legitimacy, Saudis to maintain its relations with US
financial strength and Western political on the basis of mutual strategic/national
and military support. The Saudi claim interests.36 The Osama bin Laden and al
that they are pursuing a religious policy Qaeda example, on the other hand, has
and are serving Islam has made it shown the extent to which the limits of
convenient to use the “true representation Wahhabism can go. Despite all this, Saudi
of Islam” rhetoric to present their Arabia has not become a target country
political/strategic interests and goals, for democracy promotion as the current
and to defend them in the media.34 The system ensures that oil will smoothly be
Saudi claim of being the Custodian of transferred to the international markets,
149Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
and also due to its distinguished role in Arabia, will make the competition
protecting the status quo in the region harder for Saudi model.38 All the
will be preserved. predictions that the Salafis will remain
loyal to the Saudis do not necessarily
The limits of the Saudi model reflect the reality as the Salafi movement
and the regional balance of is not uniform and homogeneous and
is instead socially heterogeneous and
power
politically diverse. The Saudi model will
continue to represent the pro-US, Sunni
The weakest side of this model is the
authoritarian political position in the
impossibility of the reproduction of its
region.
strongest aspects i.e., realpolitik and
moral politics. Due to its conservative
and authoritarian limits, it is difficult Saudi support for Sunni groups
for the Saudi model to be an alternative first during the Afghan War in
for the masses. The anti-participatory the 1980s against the Soviet
conservative attitude that manifests itself Union and especially later in
in the daily segregation against women for Iraq against Iran has turned it
example does not have a perspective that into a regional power.
can be maintained in the long run even
if the high oil revenues are distributed
On another level, Saudi support for
like bribes. The participatory character
Sunni groups first during the Afghan
of the Turkish model, and any eventual
War in the 1980s against the Soviet
democratisation of Egypt, will challenge
Union and especially later in Iraq against
the Saudi model in the long term. Iran has turned it into a regional power.
In the long run, in spite of the While empowering the sectarian political
detrimental effects of the recent military groups among the Sunnis in Lebanon,
intervention, the Tahrir revolution will Saudi Arabia suffered a serious blow
put Egypt back at the centre of the with the assassination of Rafiq Hariri.
Arab world. A potential Saudi-Egyptian Bringing military possibilities to the
competition over the regional order may table as well for the regional competition
also be a competition over who will win for power after Hariri’s assassination,
Egyptian Salafis, and this may sour the Saudi Arabia supported the Islamist and
relations between the two countries.37 Sunni section of the opposition in Syria
In addition, the Brotherhood’s extensive and aims to block Iran’s growing clout in
network in the Gulf, including Saudi the region.
150Islam, Models and the Middle East
After the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia President George W. Bush’s “freedom
felt isolated as a result of the US’s lack agenda” presented Turkey as a symbol of
of support for Mubarak and Saleh, and moderate Islam and a potential model
attempted to diversify its relations with of democracy for the Middle East.40 In
countries that may counter-balance the a more recent example President Barack
US, such as Pakistan and China. Saudi Obama pointed to Turkey as a model for
relations with China have been extended the Islamists in moving to a democracy
to the areas of the economy, energy from the previous authoritarian Middle
and petro-chemicals.39 However, with East regimes in after the Arab Spring.
Pakistan, it has a military partnership,
common sectarian policies and a strategic There has been a “Turkish
balancing act against Iran. Saudi policy model”, which has spanned the
proved counter-productive in Egypt 20th Century. that has aimed at
where the absence of sectarian tension portraying Turkey as a “new”
alienated mainstream Sunni groups from modern and secular country or
its model. as a “source of inspiration” for
modernising countries.
The Turkish Model:
Increasing Self-confidence Had the model debate remained ideas
and the New Balance for only US presidents, Turkey would
between the West and Islam not have been the object to such a
debate. However, the Islamist political
There has been a “Turkish model”, leaders of the transitioning countries
which has spanned the 20th Century. in the Middle East, such as Rashid
that has aimed at portraying Turkey as Ghannushi’s Ennahda Movement in
a “new” modern and secular country Tunisia or the Muslim Brotherhood of
or as a “source of inspiration” for Egypt, have also openly expressed their
modernising countries. However, the intention to benefit from the Turkish
real focus behind the recent discussions experience to disassociate themselves
has been the last 10 years when the JPD from the likes of Iran and the Taliban.41
has governed the country. The following On the other hand, seeing Turkey as a
two examples show how the notion of country that bridges democracy and
“Turkey as a model country” has been Islam, under the JDP government the
played out. In the post- 9/11 era, US Turkish model appeals to diverse groups
151Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
in the region.42 Thus, the reason Turkey enough to live in a democratic system.
is seen as a model is simultaneously Therefore, until this maturation, military
both Kemalism and the JDP experience. elites should oversee the transition.43
With the new balance it has established These are the people who have attempted
between security, democratisation and to contain the effects of the Arab Spring
economic development, and its new with a “counter-revolutionary” agenda.44
definition of national interests, the JDP
represents an interesting experience. With the new balance it has
Another reason why Turkey is seen as
established between security,
a model is the gradual move towards
democratisation and economic
civilian control over the military. In
development, and its new
other words, now that the political elite
definition of national interests,
decide on national security issues, it has
the JDP represents an interesting
become a very appealing example for
experience.
countries like Tunisia and Egypt in their
recent transitional period.
The second group, predominantly
The Turkish model’s appeal and Islamists, see Turkey as a model because of
paradox the transformations that have happened
in Turkey in the last decade under the
The striking point about Turkey’s JDP rule. The real issue is that the JDP,
model is its appeal to diverse political a democratically elected government,
positions and agendas because there are has brought Islam and democracy
multiple “Turkish models” for different together, integrated Islamists in politics,
actors. The first group, the overwhelming established the rule of law and civilian
majority of the authoritarian secular supremacy over military elites and
elites, reads the Turkish model as a brought about economic development.45
controlled modernisation through the What is more, Turkey’s ability to criticise
supervision of a military bureaucracy to Israel46 makes the Turkish model more
moderate and integrate Islamist actors appealing for Islamist movements.
into the political system. This group’s Turkey’s ability to transform civilian-
understanding of Islam and modernity military relations is appealing as these
is contaminated by Eurocentric and actors have been struggling to transform
Orientalist visions. According to them, the “neo-Mamluk”47 administrations in
the people of the region are not mature which the military elites ruled and had
152Islam, Models and the Middle East
economic privileges. It is a natural choice new regional order have made Turkey’s
for the Islamists who have joined politics experience more appealing. As opposed
only after the Baathist movements left to the polarisation and securitisation
the political scene. of the Iranian and the Saudi models,
The third group is the people who this new foreign policy strives to solve
look at Turkey and see democratic current conflicts through economic
transformation, lively economic partnership and integration with a
development, a diverse political life that non-sectarian position. This model sees
advocates for freedom and a pluralistic sectarian polarisation as a danger not
life style.48 This group is interested in only theologically, but also underlines
Turkey for its liberal agenda, yet this its potential to justify non-regional
ironically shows both the appeal and the interference in regional problems. This
limitations of the Turkish experience. It is model is integrated with the West, but
an attractive model to be inspired by, but at the same time defends a regional
if the Turkish model is seen as a model order that is established by regional
to be imposed on Egypt or Tunisia, all actors. Erdoğan’s effective leadership,
these political groups will accept only combined with foreign policy rhetoric
some of what they understand and reject that criticises the Western countries
the rest, and thus the model rhetoric will and Israel when needed, is appealing for
backfire. For example, Turkey’s Kemalist many in the region.51 Erdoğan’s vocal
and secularist political regime will be criticism of Israel during the 2008 Gaza
unacceptable to Islamist groups.49 Even if crisis and in 2009 in Davos has made
one could claim that the transformation him an important leader who is able
of the Islamic movement in Turkey can to have close and constructive relations
be an example to Islamic movements in with the West but also can be critical
the Middle East, Turkish secularism’s and independent of the West at the same
“impoverishing sensitivity”50 towards a time. For people in the region, Turkey
public role of Islam may repel many. is a country that is able to determine its
national interests and stand up to the
The strength of the Turkish West’s influence if necessary, and seems
to display the characteristics that these
model: The new foreign policy
peoples would like to see in their own
governments.
Turkish foreign policy makers’
constant references to regional dynamics Turkey’s “critical engagement” with
and regional actors as carriers of the the West as a member of NATO and
153Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
a membership candidate to the EU, order based on fraternity”. In addition, as
in other words showing that it can a supposedly “central country”, Turkey’s
cooperate when necessary and can be discourse to be the “owner, pioneer,
independent at the same time, challenges servant” of the new Middle East that
the Iranian and Saudi Arabian models. will bring justice to the region will invite
It shows that one does not have to have other regional powers to participate.52
a hostile relationship with the West to
become an independent and dignified Theo-political vs. political
and that being in alliance with the US theology: The need for a new
does not mean one must be obedient to language
all policies.
The most important aspects of the
For people in the region, Turkey Turkish model are its democratic
is a country that is able to tradition, civilian control of the military,
rule of law, independent foreign policy
determine its national interests
and its relation with Islam. Contrary
and stand up to the West’s
to Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey does
influence if necessary, and seems
not constitute its political relationship
to display the characteristics
with Islam on strict theological patterns
that these peoples would like to
or supra-historical senses; rather uses a
see in their own governments.
historico-political language of “justice”
and human rights in formulating its
Turkey defends a regional order which regional vision. Turkey’s advantage, on
is founded by regional actors, respects the one hand, is its ability to turn its
regional social dynamics and is against experience into an applicable form that
any foreign military interference as can be repeated in diverse temporal and
it harms and delays regional stability. spatial contexts. On the other hand, its
Turkey’s claim to manage the “winds of weakness is its relatively poorer level
change” in “pioneering” a new regional of religious discourse as a source of
order centres on democratic vision. legitimacy and intellectual influence on
The “New Middle East”, a term coined region, simply because of the result of
and extensively used by Turkish actors, the years of the securitisation of Islam in
rejects ethnic or sectarian differences as Turkish domestic politics.53 The recent
a source for polarisation, and claims to lift of the ban against the hijab, including
establish this new order as “a peaceful in the parliament, gives the impression
154Islam, Models and the Middle East
that the Turkish model’s secularism is bringing religion into political goals
freeing itself from securitisation. and formulating political goals using a
What is common to the countries in religious vocabulary.
post-Arab Spring transition is that the
Baathist-secular-authoritarian structures What is common to the
have been replaced by semi-democratic countries in post-Arab Spring
ones where Islamists participate in transition is that the Baathist-
the political processes. Elections have secular-authoritarian structures
resulted in either Islamist-dominated have been replaced by semi-
governments or an Islamist opposition. democratic ones where Islamists
The Islamists’ participation in a legal participate in the political
political life through democratic processes.
elections will lead to the competition
of diverse religious interpretations. This
will further strengthen the interaction The Turkish model is met by the theo-
between religion and political legitimacy. political claims of Saudi Arabia and Iran,
In the Iranian and Saudi models, the and challenged by the Islamic rhetoric
theo-political struggle that places religion in countries like Egypt. Erdoğan’s
at the centre of their quest for religious emphasis on a “religious generation”, his
influence is the most serious challenge increasing usage of religious concepts
that Turkey will face. What made “the and his aim to spread religious schools
Turkish model” appealing in post 9/11 (the imam hatip schools) seems to be
period was its unique understanding an attempt to confront these regional
of religion, in other words its “Turkish challenges rather than a search for a
Islam”. Even though the term Turkish domestic agenda. Turkey, challenged by
Islam sounded good to Western ears, it theo-political discourses, has to move
was not positively received in the Middle away from Kemalism’s securitisation of
East. religion on the one hand, and has to
craft a new political language that does
In this respect, it is difficult for
not fall into the trap of theo-politics on
Turkey to compete with Iran and Saudi
the other hand.
Arabia on the basis of theo-political
backgrounds while focusing on religious As part of this realisation, Turkey
legitimacy in politics, determining has been transforming governmental
politics based on theological attitudes, institutions and the civil society to craft
155Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
this language and back its claims of geopolitical position, uniting the Levant
regional leadership. Turkey’s increasing with Maghreb (in addition to its role
role in the Organisation for Islamic as a bedrock of ancient civilisation),
Cooperation (OIC), co-chairing the makes this country central to the Arab
Alliance of Civilisation initiative54 and world. This central role feeds two
the leadership role that it has assumed opposite tendencies in interpreting
on international issues such as Somalia Egypt’s geographical location and its
and Rakhine State (Arakan) gives the application to foreign policy: isolationist
impression that the relationship between and activist. While the first tendency
religion and politics is entering an era of claims that the country should not get
transformation. Turkey’s recent emphasis involved in regional issues, the second
on the Ministry of Religious Affairs, tendency sees Egypt as “a link” between
hosting meetings such as the Summit Africa and Eurasia. This second tendency
of African Islamic Leaders, efforts to presupposes that Egypt should follow
carry such projects by using language an active foreign policy in Africa and
that unifies and focuses on education the Arab world and that it should take
to Africa and Asia and attempts to lead on a leadership role.55 In this respect,
in educating clergy is related to this the hope for change fed by the Tahrir
tendency. However, compared to appeal revolution responds to the desire for the
of the polarising and sectarian nature rise of Egypt, and to be a leader or model
of the theo-political language used by country that will have a dignified foreign
Wahhabism and Shi’ism, it does not policy in the Arab world.
seem possible for Turkey to close this gap
in the short term. The appeal and limitations of the
Egyptian model
The Egyptian Model in
With its long historic, religious and
Flux: From an “Islamic cultural past, Egypt has soft power
Democratic Model” to a potential. The al Azhar Mosque’s central
“Liberal” Authoritarianism? role in the Arab world in religious
education supports Egypt’s position.
The new coming experience/model Many people, educated in Egyptian
of Egypt will be a critical component schools and either under the influence
of the new emerging regional order of Arab nationalism or the Islamic
as it is the fourth power centre. Its reawakening, currently work in the
156Islam, Models and the Middle East
educational institutions or ministries in and Saudi Arabia, a difficult journey
the Gulf countries.56 That’s why Egypt’s awaits Egypt. The concern that Egypt
soft power may influence the domestic would create due to its location and
politics of the nation-states of the historical depth can be approached
region: Arabism. Decision makers in the from multiple angles: because of the
Arab countries are being forced to use a Gaza issue, the historic bonds between
pan-Arabist political language in their Hamas and the Brotherhood and the
foreign policy that gives priority to the prominence of the Camp David Accords
sensitivities of the Arab public in order in the regional order, Israel saw the Morsi
to be able to legitimise their domestic administration and any possibility of a
policies. Especially after the Arab Spring, democratic Egypt as a threat. Egypt, as
the language of Arabism has become a an Arab power, may balance Iran in the
common sentiment that represents the Middle East, while all the world powers
Arab public.57 However, even though and regional powers have been involved
Arabism was the language of political in the developments in this country.
and social demands and this shows All these critical issues and the foreign
that this ideology still has a chance in interest in Egypt make observers hopeless
the region, this does not mean that the for the Tahrir revolution. That is why it
Arab Spring had a pan-Arabism agenda is quite likely to see the Tahrir revolution
which has fallen behind the region’s become more like the revolutions of
requirements.58 The defunct President 1848 than those of 1989.60
Morsi’s administration would have
sounded its claim to being a model more
Many people, educated in
loudly if there has been no rupture in the
Egyptian schools and either
process of democratic transition and if
under the influence of Arab
it could transform this social sensitivity
nationalism or the Islamic
into a concrete policy that would appeal
to the Arab world’s problems and ideals.59
reawakening, currently work in
the educational institutions or
Moreover, we can say that there will be ministries in the Gulf countries.
two major problems that will challenge
Egypt: democratisation and economic
development. Stemming from these No matter how much the Tahrir
two issues and the potential threat that process gives priority to political
a rising democratic Egypt will pose to demands, Egypt, as the sixth largest
regional countries, especially to Israel natural gas producer, is faced with serious
157Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
economic problems. The instability will come to power again. The Muslim
reduce foreign investment in the country Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed
and make the economy even more Morsi gained 51% of the votes; however,
fragile. The economic conditions are not former Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq
promising because economic decisions won 49%, a clear indication of the old
are made by the military elite, who are regime’s prowess. Eventually, President
also part of the economy.61 In addition, Morsi’s tenure was ended by the army
the Egyptian army’s inability to fully chief commander Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s
control the Sinai Peninsula, a situation announcement of a coup d’état on 3 July
which led to the constant bombing of 2013 and this was a clear indication of
the Transjordan gas pipeline, disrupting how the democratic transformation
the country’s national gas income. In was vulnerable to political tides in the
addition, a decline in tourism revenue country.
would further worsen the situation. For
this reason, it is not difficult to predict
that Egypt’s economic problems will After the bloody suppression of
directly affect politics. Also, Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood the
this kind of economic pressure will not transformations in the country
easily be able to form its own political and the kinds of political
line and independent foreign policy very language/practice that will be
soon. This will negatively affect Egypt’s created will affect the nature of
role in forming a new regional order. 62 the new regional order.
The major problem with the Egyptian
model is the role of the military in the
process of transition to democracy. The Although the civil resistance of
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces the Muslim Brotherhood against
(SCAF) quietly took control of the the coup d’état is really straining the
administration on 11 February 2011. military, Egyptian politics is on the
Liberals and Islamist forces, which had way to establish a new kind of military
united during the revolution, engaged in guardianship regime, which can also be
a power struggle soon after. It emerged defined as a “liberal” autocracy.63 This
during the presidential election on 30 will also contribute to the reproduction
June 2012 that this struggle would of a new authoritarianism in the Middle
prevent the liquidation of the remnants East. One should be prepared for a
of the old regime and that they could long-term new authoritarianism with
158Islam, Models and the Middle East
the flavouring of democracy. In Egypt, Morsi and viewed the fall of the Muslim
the military tutelage over politics is not Brotherhood as “a golden opportunity to
likely to be removed in the short term. advance their political ambitions”.65
Undoubtedly, after the bloody
The delayed transformation of the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood
Islamic movement in Egypt the transformations in the country
and the kinds of political language/
The transformation of the Muslim practice that will be created will affect
Brotherhood, the leading source of the nature of the new regional order. A
Islamist movements in the Muslim transformation, based on participation,
world, would contribute to Egypt’s soft democratisation, freedom and justice
power. As opposed to the Salafist Nour was possible and it had the potential of
Party’s demand to apply stringent Sharia challenging the sectarian66 and polarising
codes, the Freedom and Justice Party sides of Shi’ism and Wahhabism by
(FJP) founded by the Brotherhood called developing a new and pluralistic and
for a civil and democratic state with an non-sectarian Sunnism. A potential
Islamic reference. The participation of religious alliance between al Azhar and
Egyptian Islamists in politics and their the Muslim Brotherhood, even though
performance was expected to create a new this potential alliance has been severely
synthesis of Islam and democracy, which tainted by the Grand Sheikh of al Azhar
might have brought a revolutionary Ahmed el-Tayeb’s siding with the 3 July
change to the Muslim world. Another coup d’état, has the capacity to bring
critical dimension of the political Egypt to a very important position in
experience of the Egyptian Islamists has the regional theo-political competition.
been the competition between Salafism Going beyond this, both the Muslim
and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood and al-Azhar have been
consequence of this competition will challenged by the Salafist movements.
have regional implications that may The sense of this mutual threat might
make for more pragmatic and politically lead to an alliance being formed for
diversified Islamisms to form.64 The a new Sunnism, which would make
recent coup has made this competition way for Egypt to create a new Islamic
much more complex. Although most language. Al Azhar, as the historical
of the Salafi groups and parties have centre of wasatiyya (centrism) in the
taken a pro-Morsi stand, the Nour Party Islamic world, may play this role in the
backed military intervention against region.67
159Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz
One of the most distinctive results of The possibility that the civil war in
the possible democratic Egypt as a model Syria will pave the way for the Muslim
for the region would be the opportunity Brotherhood in Syria to come to
that the two democratic models (Turkey the power fuelled the “Brotherhood
and Egypt) would have to cooperate Crescent” fear. Nevertheless, the Arab
and balance the sectarian and polarising Spring ended when grassroots movement
policies of Saudi Arabia and Iran. in Syria turned into a civil war. Similarly,
However, with the recent military there was a reversal when Egyptian
intervention, Egypt will continue to Commander-in-Chief and Minister of
be a model in flux for the near future Defence Abdel Fattah al Sisi overthrew
President Morsi on 30 June 2013. The
and any transformation of the Muslim
coup, which was supported by Saudi
Brotherhood will be pushed forward to
Arabia and other Gulf countries in
an uncertain date.
order to protect regional status-quo
and non-democratic regimes, enabled
The fall of the Muslim supporters of the old regime in Egypt
Brotherhood and its regional to take control. As a result, a period of
implications instability began for Egypt which was
expected to serve an inspiring example
The Arab Spring paved the way for for the democratisation of the region.
the Islamist parties in the Middle East It would be wrong to interpret Morsi’s
and North Africa and launched a new overthrow only in terms of Egyptian
period called “the Muslim Brotherhood domestic politics. As a matter of fact,
Crescent” by the King Abdullah II of the Muslim Brotherhood experience will
Jordan. The victory of Hamas in the 2006 greatly influence the political balance in
elections marked the start of this period the region in the middle and long term.
which reached a peak with the Tunisian That President Morsi was ousted by a
and the Tahrir revolutions in 2011. coup d’état based on street politics, and
Other successful steps of this process that thousands of Morsi supporters were
included the rise to power of the Justice killed with real bullets in Rabia and other
and Development Party in Morocco, the squares as senior Muslim Brotherhood
critical role of Al-Islah Party in Yemen officials were sent behind bars put
and the increasing power of politicians the movements that are close to the
close to the Muslim Brotherhood in Brotherhood in a difficult position. Even
Libya. though it is still in power, the Justice
160Islam, Models and the Middle East
and Development Party in Morocco was and the Salafist Nour Party’s support for
weakened. The Ennahda movement, the coup created a pseudo-democracy/
which has adopted a reconciliatory revolutionary discourse. This will, in
policy but has been strongly opposed turn, contribute to the birth of new
by the leftist-secular parties and groups forms of authoritarianism in the region.
since the very beginning, is at risk of
being overthrown in Tunisia. Affiliated
The Morsi administration could
movements in these countries, on the
have contributed to creating an
one hand, try to keep their distance from
international public opinion
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They,
which would both convince
on the other hand, seek reconciliatory
political means in order not to experience
the Islamist groups and push
the catastrophe witnessed in Egypt.68
Israel to make concessions in
the resolution of the Palestinian
This new period, called “the fall of the issue.
Muslim Brotherhood”, seems to give
birth to new consequences in the region.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been the Secondly, the democratic
mainstream movement of the Islamist transformation of the Muslim
Brotherhood would have proven to be
movements in the Middle East in the last
the new successful balance between
century. It has influenced and balanced
participation and legitimacy to the
both the Shi’ite and Salafi movements.
people of authoritarian regimes in the
One may anticipate some losses that
Gulf. Accordingly, the second wave of
would occur in the region due to the fall
democratisation would have swept away
of the Muslim Brotherhood.
these countries with the help of either
The first and biggest loss due to the reforms or new revolutions. It is not a
fall of the Muslim Brotherhood is the coincidence that the UAE and Saudi
weakening of the legitimacy granted Arabia, where the largest number of
to the discourse of democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood supporters live,
will of people that was brought about are behind the coup in Egypt. These
by the Arab Spring. The opposition countries were able to preserve the status
ignored the result at the ballot box and quo for now and showed once again that
took to the streets with the help of the they are on Israel’s side in terms of limiting
Egyptian army, removing the discussion the will of the people in the region. It is
of democracy. The Sheikh of al Azhar meaningful that the Gulf countries, just
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