China and the "Singapore Model": Perspectives from Mid-level Cadres and Implications for Transnational Knowledge Transfer - Cambridge University Press
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988
China and the “Singapore Model”:
Perspectives from Mid-level Cadres and
Implications for Transnational Knowledge
Transfer
Hong Liu* and Ting-Yan Wang†
Abstract
Over the past three decades, China has shown tremendous interest in the
“Singapore model” through its sending of tens of thousands of cadres to
Singapore for executive training and graduate education. Although this phe-
nomenon has been studied, no attention has been drawn to the perspectives
of those mid-level cadres who took part in the training and what those per-
spectives might imply. Utilizing a unique dataset of over 1,350 mid-level
cadres graduating from the “Mayors’ Class” in Singapore from 1995 to
2016 and follow-up surveys and interviews, this article intends to fill this
gap. We found that the most appealing characteristics of the “Singapore
model” for these mid-level officials lay in practical governance lessons and
their potential transferability rather than in ideologies. This finding chal-
lenges conventional wisdom that the most plausible rationale of China’s
learning from Singapore is political. We also examine Xi Jinping’s view of
Singapore and its relevance to China’s latest national agendas in building
a “learning nation” and strengthening the CCP’s resilience through anti-
corruption and intra-party regeneration. The conclusion places the China–
Singapore case within the context of the changing trend of transnational
knowledge transfer in the non-Western world.
Keywords: China; Singapore model; mid-level cadres; learning nation;
transnational knowledge transfer
Singapore, as a small city-state, has attracted a disproportionate amount of
interest from China since the latter started its process of economic reform and
opening up. Following Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Singapore in late 1978, hundreds
* School of Social Sciences and the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore. Email: liuhong@ntu.edu.sg.
† Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Email:
tywang@ntu.edu.sg (corresponding author).
© SOAS University of London, 2018. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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use, available provided the original work is properly cited. doi:10.1017/S0305741018000462
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. First published online 28 May 2018
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741018000462
China and the “Singapore Model” 989
of high-ranking delegations were dispatched to visit it. The “Singapore fever” was
intensified by Deng’s Southern Tour in 1992, during which he made the widely
cited statement that “Singapore’s social order is rather good. Its leaders exercise
strict management. We should learn from their experience, and we should do a
better job than they do.”1 Since then, over 50,000 cadres have been sent to
Singapore on almost a monthly basis to study every aspect of the so-called
“Singapore model.”2 It has been suggested that Singapore constitutes only the
second role model for China after the Soviet Union, and has been the only coun-
try called on by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders to learn from since
the late 1970s.3 In a recent Asia Barometer survey, the top two learning models in
Chinese ordinary people’s eyes are the US and Singapore.4
China’s needs have met proactive response from the supply side. Local insti-
tutes in Singapore exemplified by Nanyang Technological University (NTU),
National University of Singapore, and the Civil Service College have been exten-
sively involved in this knowledge transfer process by providing customized edu-
cation programmes for CCP cadres, covering subjects ranging from economic
development, public administration, housing and grassroots politics to urban
planning and anti-corruption. As the then Vice President Xi Jinping highlighted
in 2011, “Tens of thousands of Chinese officials at various ranks have been to
Singapore for visiting and studying,” and “this has played an important role in
promoting bilateral relations and China’s construction for modernization.”5
Li Yuanchao, the then Minister of the Department of Organization of the
CCP Central Committee which is in charge of nurturing cadres among the 80
million CCP members, spoke favourably about Singapore in April 2010: “Out
of all the destinations where we send our leading officials to receive training,
Singapore is our top choice because Singapore is the most sincere in helping
China develop, due to our longstanding warm relationship.”6
Among various education programmes, the so-called Chinese “Mayors’ Class”
administered by NTU attracted the most media and academic attention for the
following reasons: 1) its long history, which could be traced back to 1992, the
first such programme in Singapore (and beyond); 2) its large quantity of
1 Vogel 2012, 589.
2 The number (50,000) is drawn from Singapore Deputy Minister Teo Chee Hian: Teo Chee Hean. 2015.
“Forging consensus with our people, building national unity.” Opening speech at the 15th China-
Singapore Forum on Leadership, 10 April 2015, http://www.psd.gov.sg/press-room/speeches/opening-
address-by-deputy-prime-minister-teo-chee-hean-at-the-fifth-singapore-china-forum-on-leadership. Accessed
29 March 2016.
3 Lim and Horesh 2016; Zhao, Lingmin. 2015. “Xinjiapo shi weiyi bei zhongguo lingdaoren dianming
xuexi de guojia, ping shenme?” (Why did Singapore constitute the only country explicitly called on
by Chinese leaders to learn from?), Xinjiapo yan, 8 September, http://toutiao.com/i6191
993370699055617/. Accessed 8 September 2015.
4 Chu, Huang and Lu 2015.
5 China Embassy. 2011. “Xijinping huijian xinjiapo qian zongli liguangyao” (Xi Jinping met with the for-
mer Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew), 23 May, http://www.chinaembassy.org.sg/chn/xwdt/
t824712.htm. Accessed 12 April 2016.
6 Cited in Koh, Tommy. 2017. “Singapore’s friendship with China,” The Straits Times, 2 May. Koh is
ambassador-at large of the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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990 The China Quarterly, 236, December 2018, pp. 988–1011
graduates, with about 1,350 alumni by 2016; and 3) its widespread influences.
Over 60 per cent of the students were (vice) mayors or cadres of equivalent or
higher ranks,7 which was why the programme obtained its reputation as
the “Mayors’ Class.” It comprises two master-degree programmes: Master of
Science in Managerial Economics (MME) and Master of Public
Administration (MPA). It emerged initially as a cooperative education project
between the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee and
Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the “Agreement on Delegating
Senior Chinese Cadres to Study and Exchange in Singapore” signed by the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries in 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2014.8
In recent years, and especially since the 18th CCP Congress in 2012 when Xi
became the CCP Secretary-General, China’s modelling of Singapore has gained
growing attention, many making reference to the “Mayors’ Class.” Some studies
employed the “Mayors’ Class” case as vital evidence of China’s obsession with
the “Singapore model,” arguing an ideological alliance between China and
Singapore based upon “soft-authoritarianism,”9 or attributing the close learning
relationship to Singapore’s effective ruling style exemplified by Lee Kuan Yew.10
While useful, the existing studies relied on secondary aggregate data, published
reports or commentaries, paying no attention to the structure of the education
programmes and perspectives of those cadres trained in Singapore, thus weaken-
ing (and sometimes invalidating) their arguments.
This article explores China’s knowledge of the “Singapore model” from the
perceptions of mid-level cadres educated in the “Mayors’ Class,” placing particu-
lar focus on the most attractive elements – through the participants’ eyes – of the
“Singapore model” and its transferability to China. We take issue with Kean Fan
Lim and Niv Horesh, who conclude that the most plausible rationale of Chinese
policymakers in proclaiming the importance of learning from Singapore is polit-
ical.11 We argue that the motivations behind the CCP’s continuous interest in
Singapore are multifaceted; from the perspectives of those mid-level cadres, the
most appealing characteristics of the “Singapore model” lie in practical govern-
ance lessons including meritocracy, clean and efficient governance, and rule of
law, rather than in ideologies such as authoritarianism and one-party dominance.
This article employs a mixed methodology utilizing quantitative and qualita-
tive data. We collected hitherto untapped graduate data from the “Mayors’
Class,” including the students’ biographical information submitted upon their
entrance to the programme and their profiles, updated in 2016. We also con-
ducted an online questionnaire survey and face-to-face interviews pertaining to
7 See the third section of this article for details.
8 Sun and Lancaster 2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. 2015. “Zhongguo tong xinjiapo de
guanxi” (Sino-Singapore relations), July, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_
676205/1206_677076/sbgx_677080/. Accessed 13 August 2016.
9 Ortmann and Thompson 2014.
10 Ho 2015.
11 Lim and Horesh 2016.
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graduates’ current working status, their perceptions of the “Singapore model”
and its applicability and effectiveness in China, in addition to other open-
ended questions. The survey was carried out from September to December
2015 through emails, yielding 193 respondents out of 1,160 graduates surveyed
(response rate: 17 per cent).12 With a view to understanding the larger frame-
works within which the “Singapore model” is situated, we examined writings
by the “Mayors’ Class” graduates and Xi’s comments on Singapore. Although
the “Mayor’s Class” was established prior to Xi’s assuming of power, his stand-
point on this issue is of importance in determining whether the experience learnt
by the mid-level cadres would remain relevant, especially at a time when Xi is
completing his first term and observers are convinced that Singapore will con-
tinue to inspire China under his leadership.13 Other data include official party
publications and social media platforms such as the Study Times (Xuexi shibao
学习时报), an organ of the Central Party School (CPS) of which Xi was
President from 2007 to 2012, and the Xuexi Group (xuexi xiaozu 学习小组),14
a social media platform formally associated with the People’s Daily.
This article is organized in three sections. After reviewing the “Singapore
model” and China’s interest in it, we examine in detail the findings on the
“Mayors’ Class” in order to reveal the most appealing aspects of the
“Singapore model” and its transferability. The third section analyses Xi’s views
of Singapore in the context of a transforming China. The article concludes
with the implications of the case of the “Mayors’ Class” for the intra-Asia trans-
national knowledge transfer.
The “Singapore Model” and Its Attraction to China
Within a relatively short span of 52 years following independence in 1965,
Singapore has elevated itself to the status of a developed economy enjoying pol-
itical and social stability, with GDP per capita jumping from US$500 in 1965 to
US$56,000 in 2014.15 Singapore’s success has often been attributed to the
“Singapore model,” a term first coined in the 1990s.16 Although widely applied,
it is a controversial concept. Two main camps held opposite views about its vir-
tues and vices: for those admirers of Singapore’s economic miracle and stability,
the “Singapore model” was characterized in terms of growth, meritocracy,
morally upright government, high standard of livelihood, and social harmony
12 Comparing the survey dataset with the graduate dataset based on key variables including age, gender,
provinces, administrative ranks, working sectors, etc., the former was found to be representative of the
latter.
13 Horesh and Paris 2017.
14 Translated by the authors as there is no official translation for this group. Xuexi could also mean to
“study Xi” in Chinese.
15 “World Bank national accounts data”, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=
2015&locations=SG&start=1968&year_high_desc=true. Accessed 3 November 2016.
16 Ortmann and Thompson 2014.
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and order.17 The critics, in contrast, pointed out the “dark side” of the “Singapore
model” in terms of its authoritarianism and elitism.18 We argue that the
“Singapore model” has three key dimensions: 1) a strong state (under the long-
standing one-party dominance), facilitating efficient governance; 2) dynamic
economic development strategies; and 3) effective policy implementation.
The simultaneous debates about the so-called “China model” provide clues
behind China’s fascination with Singapore. Discussion about the “China model”
gained popularity after 2004, when Joshua Cooper Ramo first coined the term
the “Beijing Consensus” which aroused the first wave of “China model” debate.19
Some featured China as a developmental state20 similar to other East Asian coun-
tries including Singapore, while other proponents of the “China model,” such as
Pan Wei, Wang Hui, Martin Jacques and Daniel Bell, highlighted the unique-
ness, appropriateness, legitimacy and advantages of the “China model,” in con-
trast to the Western model of liberal democracy.21 Bell, for example, argues that
the “China model” is a “Chinese-style vertical democratic meritocracy” that
includes “democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritoc-
racy at the top.”22
Almost all of these arguments rest upon an assumption that China is historic-
ally and culturally divergent from the West, which is remarkably similar to Lee
Kuan Yew’s defence of Singapore in his discrediting of Western-style liberal dem-
ocracy. Meritocracy, deemed an essential element of the “China model,”23 is also
at the heart of the “Singapore model.” Scholars such as Xiao Gongqin described
the “China model” as “new authoritarianism,” another significant resemblance
to the “Singapore model.”24 Singapore has been first labelled by Francis
Fukuyama in 1992 as a “soft authoritarian” country, characterized by a combin-
ation of market-oriented liberal economy and paternalistic authoritarian polity.25
Based on this concept, Danny Roy found a rhetorical alliance between Singapore
and China, driving the latter to seek development lessons from the former. He
contended that soft authoritarianism is influenced by Confucian values (some-
times expressed as “Asian values’), emphasizing education, industriousness,
order, filial piety, and selflessness.26 In a similar vein, Stephan Ortmann and
Mark Thompson argued that soft authoritarianism is the major reason behind
China’s obsession with Singapore.”27
17 Quah 1998; Sonoda 2014; Ho 2015.
18 Barr 2014; Rajah 2012.
19 Ramo 2004; Zhao 2017.
20 Tang 2016.
21 See, Wang 2011; Pan 2010; Jacques 2010; Bell 2015.
22 Bell 2015, 180.
23 Pan 2010; Bell 2015.
24 Xiao 2014.
25 Fukuyama 1992; Roy 1994.
26 Roy 1994.
27 Ortmann 2012; Ortmann and Thompson 2014.
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The existing literature attributes three dimensions behind Singapore’s attrac-
tion to China. First, both countries share a similar ideological stance in resisting
Western-style liberal democracy, and Singapore is one of the few countries in
the world that has successfully combined stable one-party dominance and sus-
tained economic growth, which is of particular appeal to the CCP.28 Second,
Singapore’s efficient, effective and incorruptible governance attracted global
attention, and China could draw practical lessons from this to strengthen its gov-
ernance capacity and legitimacy. Third, the majority (74 per cent) of Singapore’s
population are ethnic Chinese who share the Confucian cultural roots.
Since the early 1990s, Chinese intellectuals started examining the secrets and
transferability of the “Singapore miracle,”29 exemplified by growing numbers
of publications. A 2006 survey based on the China National Knowledge
Infrastructure (CNKI) showed that from 1994 to 2004, 740 articles on
Singapore were published in China’s Southeast Asian studies journals, far
outnumbering those on other (bigger) countries in the region such as Malaysia
(n = 198) and Indonesia (n = 174). The survey attributed the disproportional
amount of attention to the Chinese elite’s aspiration to model itself on
Singapore.30
As CNKI is a comprehensive database archiving all formally published articles
and graduate theses in China since 1915, we extended the above survey on the
same platform but refined the search in a more rigorous manner by excluding
irrelevant subjects and extending the timeframe to the end of 2016. Keyword
searches on Singapore, Lion City, PAP, and Lee Kuan Yew generated over
45,300 academic articles between 1993 and 2016. The sheer volume of writings
is extraordinarily large considering the city-state’s tiny size. A more focused
search on the “Singapore model” yielded 200 academic publications, with an
average of 8.3 pieces per year. Figure 1 portrays an overall rising trend of pub-
lications on the “Singapore model” over the past 24 years, signalling a wide-
spread interest in the “Singapore model.”
Chinese perceptions of Singapore have been shaped by diplomacy. The decline
of writings on Singapore in 2016 (11 in comparison with 36 in 2015, still higher
than the average 8.3) might be partly due to diplomatic tensions between the two
countries over the South China Sea issue and Singapore’s military ties with
Taiwan, which aroused a wave of hostility in China (especially netizens) towards
Singapore. Nevertheless, the tensions only generated short-term and limited
negative impact on China–Singapore relations. Singapore’s merchandise exports
28 To be sure, Singapore is not the only country under one-party dominance in Asia which has successfully
overcome the middle-income trap; Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is comparable to the PAP in
this aspect, given that since 1955 the former only briefly lost its dominance in parliament from 2009 to
2012. Both countries were credited with economic success and political stability. However, China would
not publicly advocate Japan as a learning model because of the painful memory of Japanese invasion
during World War II.
29 Sun 2002.
30 Tang and Zhang 2006.
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Figure 1: Publications on the “Singapore model” in China from 1993 to 2016
Source:
Computed by the authors based on data from CNKI.
to China have sustained a steady increase since the dispute31 and Singapore
remained the top investing country in China in 2016.32 Even at the height of
heated debates over the South China Sea, the People’s Daily still considered
Singapore as a “Master Teacher ( jiaoshi ye 教师爷)” for domestic socio-
economic developments in China, which should still “humbly take heed of
suggestions and criticisms from outside including Singapore.” Moreover, the
“all-weather friendship” between China and Singapore resurfaced in the official
discourse of both countries. At the 13th Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation
(JCBC) held in Beijing in February 2017, leaders of both governments high-
lighted that Sino-Singapore ties have grown from strength to strength. Deputy
Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean pledged Singapore’s strong support for the
Belt and Road Initiative, which is Xi’s signature foreign policy. Prime Minister
Lee Hsien Loong praised Xi Jinping’s endeavour in advocating globalization
and free trade, welcoming China’s growing engagement with the region as
Singapore has a very broad and substantial relationship with China.33
China’s passion in learning from Singapore (and a few selective countries) is
partially rooted in the CCP’s championing of building a “learning nation.”
After 1949, the CCP adopted the “Leaning toward One Side” foreign policy
and reconfigured almost every sector of the new country along the Soviet
31 Department of Statistics, Singapore. http://www.tablebuilder.singstat.gov.sg/publicfacing/createData
Table.action?refId=4715. Accessed 28 August 2017.
32 Ministry of Commerce, PRC. http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjiziliao/v/201702/20170202509836.
shtml. Accessed 28 August 2017.
33 “Dialogue with PM Lee Hsien Loong at the EDB Society’s Pioneering the Future Series Forum.” 20
February 2017, http://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/excerpts-dialogue-pm-lee-hsien-loong-edb-societys-
pioneering-future-series-forum. Accessed 16 March 2017.
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model. As Mao Zedong put it, “[W]e need to launch a nationwide upsurge of
learning from the Soviet Union on how to build our country.”34 Jiang Zeming
advocated constructing a “learning party” and considered learning as a vital
way to survive in an open and changing world, to combat corruption, and for
modernization to materialize.35 Hu Jintao institutionalized this notion by creat-
ing a “learning system,” extending from collective study by the Politburo mem-
bers down to study sessions at every level of the Party.36 The national network
of Party Schools serves as the key institution in nurturing mid-career Party
cadres, military officers and selected businessmen.37 There are presently 2,753
Party schools at central, provincial and local levels in China,38 and the CCP’s sys-
temic training of political elites has been considered a major reason in explaining
its resilience and capacity to withstand economic reform and social transform-
ation.39 After the 1990s, to confront huge challenges of economic reform,
socio-political pressures and globalization, China embarked on new and substan-
tial rounds of learning from developed countries. It is against this background
that Singapore has emerged as one of the key learning reference points. The
CCP leaders, however, do not intend to “become” another country through
learning, and firmly believe that learning should be based on China’s own cir-
cumstances and serve China’s practical needs. As Xi emphasized in 2015: “We
must learn from the fine achievements of other countries in the development of
the rule of law. However, learning from others does not amount to simply copy-
ing them. Under no circumstance can we engage in ‘all-out Westernization’,
‘complete transplant’ of the systems of others, or copy, from other countries
indiscriminately.”40
The “Mayors’ Class” and Mid-level Cadres’ Perspectives of the
“Singapore Model”
Having established the macro-political environments within which Singapore was
situated in post-reform China, we now turn to the meso level, namely, those offi-
cials who had personal and extensive experience of Singapore. The “Mayors’
Class” is a one-year, full-time residential programme conducted in Chinese,
requiring the completion of at least ten courses (three core courses and seven elec-
tives41) and requiring a thesis in order to obtain a master’s degree. Some
34 “Guanche Mao zhuxi de weida haozhao” (To carry out the great call of Chairman Mao), People’s
Daily, 10 February 1953.
35 Jiang 2006, Volume I, 99, Volume III, 185.
36 Tsai and Dean 2013.
37 Wibowo and Lye 2006; Shambaugh 2008.
38 Lee 2015.
39 Wibowo and Lye 2006; Shambaugh 2008; Lee 2015.
40 Xi 2015.
41 The core courses of the MPA programme include “Introduction to Public Administration, Market and
Market Failure, and Public Strategic Administration,” and for the MME programme are “Managerial
Economics: Theory and Applications, Macro Economics” and “Human Resources Management and
Labour Economics.”
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graduates wrote monographs based on their study experience in Singapore, and
recalled that completing the degree courses was no easy task for middle-aged
cadre students, in particular having to face the possibility of exam failure and
therefore not being awarded the degree.42
The origin of the “Mayors’ Class” can be traced back to 1992, soon after the
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Singapore in 1990 and
Deng’s Southern Tour in Spring 1992. At first, there were only one or two short-
term programmes a year, hosted by the Nanyang Business School at NTU; later
in 1994, the demand escalated to almost one training programme every month.43
In 1998, NTU launched a master-degree programme (MME) specifically for
Chinese cadres, followed in 2005 by the launch of the MPA.44
A key feature of the “Mayors’ Class” is extensive incorporation of the
Singaporean experience in its curriculum. There are Singapore-specific courses
such as Singapore Public Administration, Singapore’s Green Policies, The Social
Management System of Singapore, Rule of Law and the Legal System in
Singapore, etc. Former ministers, parliament members, and senior civil servants
served as adjunct professors lecturing on a regular basis. They include Yeo Ning
Hong (former Minister for Communications and Information), Yeo Cheow Tong
(former Minister for Health, Trade and Industry), and Mah Bow Tan (former
Minister for Communications, Environment, and National Development), to
name just a few. With rich experience in the governance of Singapore as well
as knowledge of China, they were able to structurally link the Singaporean les-
sons with China’s circumstances. For example, Chan Soo Sen, former Minister
of State for the Prime Minister’s Office, Education, and for Trade and
Industry, served as the first CEO of the China–Singapore Suzhou Industrial
Park Development Co. between 1994 and 1996. During and after the lectures,
the cadre-students had heated discussions with the Singaporean politicians and
exchanged ideas on governance issues. Besides the structured lectures, the pro-
gramme also organized site visits to various government departments, statutory
boards, parliament members’ meet-the-constituents sessions, the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau, Science Park, community-level grassroots organi-
zations etc., thus enabling the students to gain first-hand knowledge of the oper-
ation of the Singapore government.
Based on data collected, 1,350 Chinese students had graduated from the
“Mayors’ Class” by 2016. At the time of admission, 72 per cent were working
in the government sector while most of the rest were from state-owned enterprises
or public institutions such as Women’s Federations and universities. Our survey
data show that 86.4 per cent of the cadre-students received recommendations
42 Ma 2004; Wang 2008.
43 Cham 2014.
44 In 2009, NTU founded the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration (NCPA), taking overall charge of
the “Mayors’ Class” and other short-term executive education programmes for officials from China and
other Asian countries. By 2016, more than 15,000 officials have attended these short-term training
programmes.
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from their work units in order to study at NTU, 60.2 per cent were selected
through a competitive process, and the majority, 86.4 per cent, were financially
supported by their work units.
A demographic analysis of the “Mayors’ Class” and its influence in China
Before exploring the graduates’ perspectives of the “Singapore model” and its
transferability, we examine the potential influence of the “Mayors’ Class” grad-
uates in China. The metrics employed are the cadre-students’ geographical distri-
bution, administrative ranks, quality, and career benefits from their education in
Singapore.
In terms of geographical distribution, the “Mayors’ Class” graduates covered
33 province-level administrative regions in the PRC, almost all of the country. As
the pioneer province for sending government leaders to NTU, Hebei tops the list
of the “Mayor’s Class” by having sent 181 cadres. Beijing and Chongqing follow
closely, with 131 and 122 students respectively.
Data show that most of the “Mayors’ Class” graduates are mid-level cadres
and executive leaders in their respective localities.45 Figure 2 compared the
cadre-students’ administrative ranks at the time of their entrance to NTU from
1995 to 2015, updated in 2016. The proportions of Division-Head, Deputy-
Bureau-Director, and Bureau-Director ranks have increased significantly from
23.6, 19.9 and 3 per cent to 28.2, 31.5 and 8.9 per cent respectively, while the pro-
portion of the relatively lower-level Deputy-Division-Head rank has decreased
from 36.3 to 31.5 per cent. A total of 82.8 per cent of the graduates working
in the government sector were holding (vice) mayor-level positions when studying
at NTU; that proportion increased to 92.5 per cent in 2016. In other words,
almost all the “Mayors’ Class” graduates working in the government sector are
now top executive leaders of their local or functional areas. When a cadre is pro-
moted to a leading executive position such as party secretary or mayor, he/she has
the authority in terms of policymaking and policy implementation, which in turn
has a direct impact upon that area.
The “Mayor’s Class” was dubbed the CCP’s “Overseas Party School” by the
Voice of America, referring to its special status in China.46 There are substantial
45 In China, public officials in leadership positions are ranked in a complex hierarchy from the highest
National leader to the lowest Deputy-Section-Head level. In between are Sub-National leader,
Provincial-Ministerial level, Sub-Provincial (Ministerial) level, Bureau-Director level, Deputy-Bureau-
Director level, Division-Head level, Deputy-Division-Head level, and Section-Head level. Mayors are
inclusive of the four levels above the section-head level.
46 Tan 2012. “Nanyang ligong peixun zhongguo guanyuan xiaofang xinjiapo moshi” (NTU training
Chinese cadres to emulate the “Singapore Model”), Voice of America, 13 December. http://www.
voachinese.com/a/singapore-chinese-official-20121213/1563978.html. Accessed 23 March 2015. This
report was reprinted by China’s official media Xinhuanet.com in 2012. “Meimai baodao nanyang
ligong daxue cheng zhonggong haiwai dangxiao” (US media: NTU of Singapore is becoming
China’s Overseas Party School), 17 December, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-12/17/c_
124105286.htm. Accessed 23 March 2015. Fu Jing, “Overseas training boosts China’s development,”
China Daily, 6 July 2016.
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Figure 2: Changing Administrative Ranks of the Cadre-Students of the “Mayors’
Class” (1995–2016)
Source:
Calculated by the authors based on graduate data from NTU.
differences between the two, but a key resemblance between them is the high cali-
bre of their participants. China’s Party Schools at different levels are tasked to
nurture promising cadres who have the potential to be promoted to leadership
positions either in party sector or government, namely the Reserve Cadres. To
be selected, cadres must fulfill the following requirements:47
1) Youth, in line with the party’s principle of Youthful Rejuvenation. To be
included on the list for provincial/ministerial-level reserve cadres, cadres
are normally between 45 and 50 years old; prefectural/bureau-level candi-
dates aged from 40 to 45; and county/divisional-level candidates between
35 and 40;
2) Superior leadership capacity based upon substantial work experience;
3) Good educational background, accordant with party’s principle of
Intellectualization;
4) “Correct” political stand.
Most cadre-students in our data are well qualified to be grouped among
Reserve Cadres: more than half are 35 to 45 years old, accounting for 67.5 per
47 Hu 2011; Tsai and Kou 2015. Liu, Yanchuan. 2015. “Xunzhao jiebanren: jiemi “houbei ganbu zhidu’”
(Looking for successor: demystify the Reserve Cadre system), CNpolitics.org, 4 June, http://cnpolitics.
org/2015/06/ccp-reserve-cadres. Accessed 1 March 2016.
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cent of the total intake; before entering NTU, 81.8 per cent had a Bachelor’s
degree and 16.5 per cent a Master’s degree; the average length of work experience
when entering the “Mayors’ Class” is 14.4 years, and 52 per cent had accumu-
lated 14 to 21 years of work experience, indicating their potential for taking on
greater responsibilities.
A comparison of data collected at the time of admission in various years and
the updated data in 2016 shows that most cadre-students’ administrative ranks
have been enhanced substantially and the promotion is statistically significant.
We encoded the level of “National leader” as “1,” the “Sub-National leader”
as “2,” and the other lower levels as numbers in ascending order with an interval
of one. A larger value refers to a lower rank while a smaller one to a higher rank.
Figure 2 shows that most cadre-students were concentrated at the levels from
Deputy-Bureau-Director (code = 6) to Deputy-Division-Head (code = 8) when
enrolling in the “Mayors’ Class”; later in 2016 their ranks changed upward,
with more clustered in the categories of the Bureau-Director level (code = 5),
Deputy-Bureau-Director level (code = 6), and Division-Head level (code = 7).
To test whether these changes are statistically meaningful, we conducted a
Paired-Samples T-test to evaluate its significance. The analysis results in
Table 1 show that the average value of students’ initial administrative ranks is
7.75, which has decreased to 6.99 with an absolute change of -0.76 in 2016.
This decline is statistically significant with a p value lower than .001 (T =
10.640; p = 0.000). A straightforward way to interpret this finding is that the
cadres’ average administrative levels were between Division-Head (code = 7)
and Deputy-Division-Head (code = 8) when they were studying in Singapore,
and in 2016 they had been promoted to the levels between Deputy-Bureau-
Director level (code = 6) and Division-Head level (code = 7). Although these
findings alone cannot confirm a causal relationship between “Mayors’ Class”
education and the graduates’ subsequent promotions, they do demonstrate that
these cadres-students are among the most promising middle-level cadres as well
as the relevant significance of their Singapore experience.
Mid-level cadres’ perspectives of the “Singapore model”
The survey (N = 193) found that almost all (96.3 per cent) of the respondents
agree that Singapore’s governance reflects the existence of a “Singapore
model.” The survey provided a series of options on the core elements of the
Singapore model and the respondents were able to select the ones they perceived
to be most crucial and most attractive.48 Figure 3 presents the supporting rates
for the 12 elements of the “Singapore model,” which are: 1) one-party domin-
ance, 2) authoritarianism, 3) periodical democratic election, 4) meritocracy, 5)
48 The selection of these 12 core features was not only based on the authors’ understanding of the
“Singapore model” but also drawn upon comments of experts and practitioners in the field, such as
Goh Nguen Wah and Chew Soon Beng who have been long-term lecturers for the Mayors’ Class.
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Table 1: Comparison of Students’ Administrative Ranks in Admission (Various
Years) and in 2016
M (SD) T-test
In admission In 2016 t (df) p
7.75 (1.340) 6.99 (1.196) 10.640*** (539) 0.000
Notes:
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Calculated by the authors based on data from the NTU Office of Alumni Affairs.
clean and efficient government, 6) rule of law, 7) grassroots social management,
8) racial and religious harmony, 9) economic success, 10) the Temasek model,49
11) public housing, and 12) Central Provident Fund (CPF).50 The 12 elements are
further categorized in analysis into four major dimensions including polity/ideol-
ogy (one-party dominance, authoritarianism, and periodical democratic elec-
tion), governance (meritocracy, clean and efficient government, rule of law,
grassroots social management, and racial and religious harmony), economics
(economic success and the Temasek model), and social services (public housing
and CPF). The supporting rates for each dimension are shown in Figure 4.
Figures 3 and 4 show interesting findings: only 28.6, 45, and 31.7 per cent of
the respondents consider, respectively, “one-party dominance,” “authoritarian-
ism,” and “periodical democratic election” to be key components of the
“Singapore model.” The average supporting rate for the elements listed under
the category of “polity/ideology” is modest (35.1 per cent). These findings are
in a stark contrast to the established conclusion that the most alluring features
of the “Singapore model” to China lie in their ideological resemblance, such as
“soft authoritarianism” and long-term one-party dominance. While there is no
denying that authoritarian politics has been a driving force behind China’s
Singapore fever, our empirical analyses provide an alternative lens by which to
re-examine the reasons underpinning China’s continuous obsession with the
“Singapore model” from the perspectives of mid-level cadres educated in
Singapore, thus challenging the sweeping statement that the most important
motivation for China’s interest in Singapore is the study of ideological politics,
for the purpose of maintaining the CCP’s one-party and authoritarian rule.
The cadre-students gave more weight to practical governance lessons rather
than Singapore’s polity. The rate of support for the “governance” dimension is
75.4 per cent, highest among all the dimensions. The indicators contributing
the largest weight are “meritocracy” (88.9 per cent), “clean and efficient govern-
ance” (87.3 per cent), and “rule of law” (81 per cent). Singapore’s economic
49 The Temasek Holdings is a government-controlled investment vehicle with full operational autonomy
competing in a free market globally. See for details in http://www.temasek.com.sg/.
50 CPF is a compulsory comprehensive savings plan for working Singaporeans and permanent residents
primarily to fund their retirement, healthcare and housing needs. Information drawn from CPF website
at https://www.cpf.gov.sg/Members/AboutUs/about-us-info/cpf-overview. Accessed 7 October 2016.
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Figure 3: Respondents’ Supporting Rates of the Proposed Elements
Source:
Calculated by the authors based on the survey data.
Figure 4: Respondents’ Supporting Rates of the Four Dimensions
Source:
Calculated by the authors based on the survey data.
success seems to be less appealing to these mid-level cadres. Items such as “eco-
nomic success” and the “Temasek model” did not receive many votes. “Public
housing” was viewed favourably, with an approval rate of 75.1 per cent. These
findings confirm the shift in the development focus under Xi, namely, less
emphasis on GDP growth but more on better life for all the people under the
framework of the “Chinese Dream.”
Controversy exists as to whether the Singaporean experience could be trans-
planted to China. Many scholars and policymakers are sceptical about the
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transferability of the “Singapore model” to other countries, especially to the
populous and geographically vast China, while others argue that its good prac-
tices could be adapted to the context of China or act as an inspiration to stimulate
contextual policy innovations. Our survey showed that 72.5 per cent of the
respondents believed that the Singaporean experience could be gradually and
selectively applied in China. While fully aware of the significant differences
between the two countries, they remain convinced that Singapore’s operational
practices and principles (e.g., “Homes for All,” and rule of law) could operate
in China as China fosters a modernized civil society. Below is a summary of
the main responses to the open-ended question as to whether the “Singapore
model” is transferable to China:51
• Part of the Singaporean experience could be transferred to China step by step,
after making necessary adjustments according to China’s circumstances;
• Singapore is a very successful model of modern governance and worthwhile
making reference to, especially nowadays when China faces new challenges
of modernizing its governance capability and government system, as pledged
by President Xi;
• The party-building of the PAP and the government’s clean image is worthwhile
studying;
• Rule of law, clean government, and racial harmony policies are transferable to
China;
• The “Mayor’s Class” played an important role in transferring Singaporean
governance lessons to China. Public housing, CPF, anti-corruption policies,
and the “Temasek model” all have been partially or fully transplanted into
China and proved to be successful;
• It is difficult to transfer the “Singapore model” to China because a huge gap
exists between the two countries in terms of national quality, education level,
governance efficiency and capacity, maturity of legislation etc.
There was a widespread expectation that after graduation from the programme
in Singapore, the cadre-students would be able to apply what they had learned
when back in China. One middle-ranking cadre from Shandong who graduated
in 1999 recalled that after reading his graduation report the then Vice Governor
commented that he looked forward to the implementation of some of the mea-
sures.52 A city party secretary shared his view that his studies on managerial eco-
nomics courses had enabled him to lead, confidently and competently, the
discussions and formulations of economic policies.53 Another official (at the
level of Deputy-Director-General) told us that he returned in 2007 to Qinghai
51 Interview with cadre-students through email, 2015–2016.
52 Interview with a cadre-student, Shandong, May 2017.
53 Interview with a cadre-student, Sichuan, September 2015.
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province “with enthusiasms and the intention to apply” what he had learned in
Singapore.54
In short, the perspectives and experiences of the cadre-students differ from the
conventional wisdom, which held that ideological expediency plays a key role in
China’s learning from Singapore. Instead, these students found themselves more
attracted to the practicability and transferability of the “Singapore model” in its
social, economic and political governance.55 Their intensive immersion in courses
(many of which were taught by practitioners and senior civil servants) pertaining
to Singapore’s management of success, as well as field visits to various public
agencies, provided them with a unique perspective from which to understand
developments in Singapore. This has been reinforced by their extensive experi-
ences in China and questions they attempted to address prior to embarking on
their studies.
Xi Jinping’s View of the “Singapore Model”
We have demonstrated that the majority of the cadre-students enrolled in the
“Mayors’ Class” have made significant progress in their political careers through
steady promotion following graduation. Their perceptions of Singapore and the
feasibility of transferring some elements of the “Singapore model” are condi-
tioned by the overall political environments in China, especially Xi Jinping’s
vision for China’s future.
Although Xi Jinping seldom expresses his views on different modes of develop-
ment and is fully confident of China’s own political path, various studies have
revealed his interest in the Singapore experience.56 Like his predecessors, consist-
ent learning and training of party cadres is one focal point of Xi’s views on gov-
ernance. The great significance of the continuous training of CCP’s officials was
highlighted in his speech to the national Organization Department meeting in
2013, entitled “Train and select good officials,” pinpointing “learning is the pro-
cess toward progress.”57 After Xi’s rise to China’s top position, he expressed posi-
tive views about Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore. When Lee’s book Lee Kuan Yew:
The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World was
released in China in 2014, Xi wrote an endorsement for the book, something
that is unprecedented for a top Chinese leader to have done. Disagreeing with
Lee’s comments in 2010 that it might soon be Singapore’s turn to learn from
China, Xi responded by emphasizing that there is still much to learn from
Singapore, especially in the area of institutionalization.58
54 Interview with a cadre-student, Qinghai, January 2016.
55 Gao and Liu (2017) provides examples of some Chinese cities applying the “Singapore model” to their
local governances.
56 Zhang 2013; Ortmann and Thompson 2014; “Xinren 7 changwei jianjie” (A brief introduction to the
seven newly appointed standing members), Mingbao, 26 November 2012.
57 Xi 2014, 460–471.
58 Lee 2014, 38.
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The Study Times and the Xuexi Group indirectly help to reveal Xi’s views of
Singapore. The former is an influential periodical published triweekly by CPS,
aimed primarily at lecturers and administrators in party schools and other
parts of the CCP’s propaganda system.59 Its main role is to initiate policy-
oriented discussions on crucial issues to guide thinking among Party members.
From 2008 to 2016, the Study Times published about sixty essays detailing the
Singaporean experience, covering a wide variety of areas such as the PAP and
Singapore’s political system, social management, “the Temasek model,” public
housing, and with topics like anti-corruption and party-building receiving the
highest level of attention in terms of occurrence frequency. This is in tandem
with the major tasks that Xi and the CCP leadership have carried out since
2012, with the intention of eradicating rampant corruption and strengthening
the CCP’s governance capability.
Three peak periods of publications on Singapore occurred in 2008 when Xi
took the post of CPS Presidency, in 2012 when Xi assumed the role of the
Secretary-General of the Party Central Committee, and in 2014 and 2015 when
the “deepening reform in an all-round way” was got underway under Xi’s lead-
ership. This is perhaps not a coincidence. Within Xi’s first two months as the CPS
President, the Study Times published five essays on Singapore, leading to the re-
emergence of a mini-“Singapore fever” during the 18th Party Congress, with
eight essays about Singapore being published. Discussions about Singapore
were further intensified in 2014 and 2015, with between ten and thirteen essays
on the “Singapore model” released each year respectively. Table 2 shows num-
bers of essays on Singapore published in the Study Times from 2008 to 2016.
The Xuexi Group is a social media platform with a large number of followers
disseminating news and exclusive information about Xi. Since its first essay titled
“Understanding Xi’s Governance Strategy through 40 Key Words” was released
in February 2014, it has received enormous attention from mass media and pub-
lic officials. Over half of its followers in China are reportedly working in the pub-
lic sector.60 It has become a “must-read” for those interested in Chinese politics
or seeking to survive in Chinese bureaucracy.61
In March 2015, when Lee Kuan Yew was critically ill and then passed away,
the Xuexi Group extensively discussed close connections between Xi, Lee and the
“Singapore model.” Six essays were released between the 18th and 26th March,
focusing on Lee’s life, his personal ties with Xi and their similarities, and Xi’s
thoughts on the “Singapore model.” An essay entitled “Xi, Lee and the
‘Singapore model’” attracted wide attention both domestically and overseas.
Written by Guang Zhao (广昭, a pseudonym meaning “to widely proclaim”),
it claimed that there is sound evidence showing that Xi is inspired by the
59 Pieke 2009, 100.
60 “Naxie ren guanzhu xuexi xiaozu?” (Who are following the Xuexi Group?), http://chuansong.me/n/
989525. Accessed 23 March 2015.
61 Xiao 2015.
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Table 2: Number of Essays on Singapore Published in the Study Times (2008–
2016)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
No. of articles 7 2 4 3 8 3 10 13 8
Source:
Website of the Study Times, http://dzb.studytimes.cn/.
“Singapore model” in his endeavour to find a balance between social progress
and social control.62
Xi’s familiarity with the “Singapore model” might be partially attributed to his
early work experiences. His formative working experience in Fujian (1985–2002),
which is a major ancestral hometown of the Chinese diaspora, might have an
impact upon his policy preferences after 2012. For example, China’s trans-
national model of diaspora governance could be traced back to 1995 when Xi,
as the Party Secretary of Fuzhou (provincial capital city), published an essay
advocating “da qiaowu” (big overseas Chinese work) incorporating both domestic
policies and overseas Chinese policies.63 He had visited Singapore six times prior
to becoming President and had on numerous occasions interacted with
Singaporean officials and businesspeople.
Xi’s view of China as a “learning nation” and his favourable impressions of
Singapore, therefore, provide a political framework that would ensure the con-
tinuing relevance of the Singapore experiences in China and the selective transfer-
ability of the “Singapore model,” which has been reinforced by the fact that
China’s investments in Singapore alone amount to about one-third of its total
investments in “Belt and Road” countries,64 as well as the fact that Singapore
has been the largest foreign direct investor in China. There are a number of
major industrial and innovation parks operating in China, serving as a fertile
ground for transnational knowledge transfer. Indeed, it was Xi who personally
announced the third Sino-Singapore Government-to-Government project
(Chongqing) during his seventh visit to Singapore in November 2015.65
Concluding Remarks
China’s persistent interest in and institutionalized learning from the “Singapore
model” has been extensively studied. However, the perspectives of mid-level
cadres educated in Singapore – who are key stakeholders in the process – and
62 Guang Zhao. 2015. “Xi Jinping, Li Guangyao yu Xinjiapo moshi” (Xi Jinping, Lee Kuan Yew, and the
“Singapore model”), xuexi xiaozu, 23 March, http://chuansong.me/n/1237575. Accessed 24 May 2015.
63 Liu and Van Dongen 2016.
64 Speech by K. Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law, at the Asia Economic
Forum on “The One-Belt One-Road Initiative: Impact and Implications” (August 27, 2017). https://
www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/Pages/Asia-Economic-Forum-on-The-One-Belt-One-Road-Initiative-
Impact-and-Implications.aspx. Accessed November 11, 2017.
65 Kor 2015.
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