National Threat Assessment for 2022 - PST
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
DESIGN: KNOWIT
National Threat
Assessment for 2022
The Norwegian Police Security Service
pst.no1
Introduction
The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) is Norway’s domestic In the National Threat Assessment for 2022, the Norwegian
intelligence and security service and is subordinate to the Ministry Police Security Service (PST) presents an unclassified review
of Justice and Public Security. PST’s main task is to prevent and of the threats that Norwegian society will face this year. The
investigate serious crimes that threaten national security. This includes assessment devotes special attention to the tradecraft used by
the identification and assessment of threats related to intelligence,
Russian and Chinese intelligence, operations against Norwegian
sabotage, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism
computer networks, the proliferation of military technology,
and extremism. The assessments provide a foundation for policy-
strategic acquisitions and influence operations, as well as to
making and inform political decision-making processes. PST’s national
threat assessment is part of the service’s duty to inform the public the emergence of extremist communities with anti-
and presents an analysis of expected developments within its areas government and conspiratorial attitudes. In addition, NTA
of responsibility. describes the projected development of the terrorist threat
picture, as well as the threat picture facing Norwegian
The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) is Norway’s foreign intelli- dignitaries.
gence service. Although it reports to the Chief of Defence, the service’s
areas of responsibility include civilian as well as military matters. NIS’s The National Threat Assessment for 2022 addresses a broad,
main tasks are to supply information on external threats to Norway and widely diverse target group. On the one hand, the report
high-priority Norwegian interests, to support the Norwegian Armed is intended for members of the general public who require
Forces and the defence alliances to which Norway belongs, and to
comprehensive information on the status of and expected
assist in political decision-making processes by providing information
trend in the threat picture. On the other, the National Threat
on matters relating to Norwegian foreign, security and defence policy.
Assessment addresses individuals and enterprises that require
NIS’s annual assessment, FOKUS, is an analysis of the current situation
and expected developments in geographic and thematic areas that are information for their own security efforts, but do not have
particularly relevant to Norwegian security and national interests. access to classified assessments for a variety of reasons.
Accordingly, it is important that all those who read this report
The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) is the competent consider its content and make their own assessments of its
authority for preventive security services in Norway. It provides advice relevance to and consequences for their own undertakings
and oversees security of information, information systems, objects and in the light of the assets they manage. The first page of this
infrastructure of national importance. NSM also bears national respon- assessment sets out in greater detail how the information can
sibility for cybersecurity, including the detection, notification and be used for this purpose.
coordination of responses to serious cyber attacks. In its annual report
“Risiko” (Risk), published in the first quarter of the year, NSM assesses
A threat assessment from PST will invariably take a threat-
the risk of Norwegian society being subjected to intentional acts that
oriented perspective, focusing attention on actors and issues in
may directly or indirectly harm critical national interests.
the light of their bearing on the threat picture in Norway. For
that reason, the National Threat Assessment must also be read
as an adjunct to the efforts to find good threat and risk mitiga-
tion measures to inform political and economic policy choices.2 3
The use of degrees of PST’s terrorism Use of the national threat assessment
probability threat scale
The following is a list of the degrees of PST’s terrorism threat scale is intended to The national threat assessment is an • A good assessment of assets provides
probability used in this assessment. These give an overall impression of the terrorism analysis of expected developments in grounds for identifying relevant threats
are emphasised in boldface. The aim is threat situation. While the degrees of PST’s areas of responsibility in the coming to a particular undertaking. Further,
to minimise the risk that our evaluations probability represent PST’s assessment of year. It is intended to create awareness of an assessment of assets will highlight
are unclear or could be misunderstood. the likelihood that there will be an attempt the most serious threats facing Norway ways in which hostile actors can
The terms and the descriptions of their to carry out an act of terrorism, this scale and to provide decision-making support impact the undertaking’s assets. In this
importance have been compiled jointly by expresses the likely degree of severity of in connection with important preventive context, it is also important to examine
the police, PST and the Norwegian Armed the situation. security measures that undertakings need dependencies, including those outside
Forces. to take. The threat assessment should be the undertaking itself. This will provide
viewed in the context of other threats that a basis for assessing vulnerabilities,
could also affect the assets of a particular which describe the extent to which the
5 Extraordinary threat situation undertaking, such as other types of crimes undertaking’s assets are vulnerable to
Highly likely or undesirable incidents. identified threats, which, in turn, form
Very good reason to expect 4 High threat of terrorism the basis for establishing preventive and
More than 90% probability Use of the national threat assessment in mitigation measures.
3 Moderate threat of terrorism connection with a risk assessment:
• Based on this, a risk assessment must
Likely • Risk can be defined in several ways. be carried out to determine whether an
2 Low threat of terrorism
Good reason to expect In this context, risk is discussed as a undertaking maintains an appropriate
60–90% probability combination of assets, threats and level of security.
1 No known threat of terrorism vulnerability, and the national threat
assessment is intended to be used as
Even chance a resource to inform decisions about
Equally likely and unlikely In its work to establish a threat level, PST potential threats.
ASSET
40–60% probability examines the current threat assessment,
along with an evaluation of (i) the degree
of severity/damage potential of any ter-
Unlikely rorist act, (ii) the uncertainty and scope of
Little reason to expect gaps in the intelligence related to potential For planning preventive security
10–40% probability hostile actors, and (iii) our/the authorities’ measures, more information is
ability to implement countermeasures available on the following websites:
n
Ex
in advance of the execution of possible
o
Highly unlikely
cti
po
threats. pst.no
tra
su
Very little reason to expect politiet.no
re
At
Less than 10% probability nsm.no
RISK
THREAT VULNERABILITY
Exploitation4 5
Summary State intelligence Politically motivated violence The threat to
activities – extremism dignitaries
Pages 6–13 Pages 14–25 Pages 26–28
Several countries’ intelligence services Individuals with extreme 1) right-wing or It is unlikely that Norwegian dignitaries
operate on Norwegian territory. In 2022, as extreme Islamist convictions will pose will be subjected to serious acts of
in previous years, the Russian and Chinese the most serious threat of terror against violence in 2022. There is, however, a
services are deemed to pose the greatest Norway in 2022. PST finds there to be an growing danger that individual dignitaries
threats to Norway. even chance that right-wing extremists or might experience spontaneous physical
extreme Islamists will attempt to carry out confrontations.
The threats will manifest in different ways: terrorist acts in Norway.
• New computer network operations will
impact Norwegian targets in the coming Potential terrorists are being radicalised 2)
year. Undertakings involved in defence, both through in-person contact with other
emergency preparedness, policy making extremists and via digital arenas. Any
or technology activities, i.e., areas in mobilisation and terror planning this year
which Norway is highly advanced, will will primarily take place through contact
be in particularly exposed positions. on online networks.
• Russian intelligence officers will persist
in trying to recruit sources and contacts Any terrorist act will probably be carried
with access to the information they seek. out by an individual using weapons that
• Norwegian business and industry are easily available to him or her to attack
and Norwegian specialist groups will targets that fit the perpetrator’s stereo-
experience covert attempts to make type of the enemy.
procurements on the part of actors 1)
According to PST, the term ‘extreme’
involved in military modernisation and Over the past year, PST has registered implies acceptance of the use of vio-
armament. Actors affiliated with Russia, growing activity among individuals who lence to achieve political, religious or
China, Iran and Pakistan will pose special advocate anti-government ideas. This is ideological goals. While extremists
challenges. especially true in relation to conspiracy accept the use of violence, they do not
• During the year ahead, several state theories involving the Covid-19 pandemic. necessarily engage in violence them-
actors will identify and monitor individu- It is unlikely that these people will try to selves.
als who reside in Norway. Their objective commit terrorist acts, but there is a chance
is to prevent or clamp down on political that certain individuals will be radicalised. 2)
The term ‘radicalisation’ refers to the
resistance. process whereby an individual devel-
PST considers it highly unlikely that ops an attitude of acceptance for or a
PST has found few cases of coordinated, left-wing extremists or activists associated willingness to actively support or take
targeted influence operations in Norway with the climate, the environment or part in violent acts to achieve political,
to date, but we must assume that foreign nature conservation will try to carry out religious or ideological goals.
intelligence services could attempt to terrorist acts in Norway in 2022.
influence public opinion in Norway in
2022.6 7
State intelligence activities
In the past year, we have seen a pronounced increase in the
number of computer network operations. The threat posed by
state computer network operations is serious and will continue
to persist in 2022.
State Further, foreign intelligence services will try to recruit individu-
als in Norway as sources. Foreign states will adopt increasingly
more complex corporate structures and demonstrate great
intelligence creativity in order to procure sensitive technology from
Norwegian enterprises. Other countries will monitor dissidents
and minorities.
activities Computer network operations will continue to
constitute a serious threat against Norway
Computer network operations have become an integral part of
the activities of foreign intelligence services. The cyber attacks
on the Storting (Norwegian Parliament) in 2020 and 2021 are
examples of extremely serious incidents. In recent years, the
Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) has observed
Several countries’ intelligence services a tripling of serious cyber incidents aimed at public- and
operate on Norwegian territory. Among them, private-sector undertakings in Norway. Some of these incidents
were carried out by hostile actors operating on behalf of
the Russian and Chinese services pose the foreign states. In 2021, such actors succeeded in infiltrating
greatest threat. They employ a number of networks belonging to the Norwegian authorities and private
enterprises. China and Russia are generally behind these opera
different methods to achieve their goals. Their tions. PST expects that these countries will continue to carry
activities can have grave consequences for out computer network operations against Norway in 2022.
Norway. They could affect Norway’s freedom Several countries are interested in information about Norwe-
of action and undermine our ability to deal gian decision-making processes. In particular, undertakings
that work with Norwegian foreign affairs, defence and security
with crises. Moreover, they could impair the policy will be targeted for computer network operations. The
competitiveness of business and industry and same applies to companies and research groups in the fields of
defence, health and maritime technology. The petroleum sector
make individuals feel they are no longer safe and the space sector should also be prepared for unauthorized
in our country. parties to try to steal data from their computer networks.
Due to Norway’s membership of the UN Security Council, the
intelligence threat against Norway’s foreign service has been
heightened. This refers to the digital arena in particular. This
threat picture will continue in 2022. The threat will mainly come
from China and Russia. Meanwhile, we know that actors associ-
ated with other countries have also engaged in computer net-
work operations against Norway. The goal of such operations
has not necessarily been to undermine Norway, but to improve
their own freedom of action in or in relation to the Security Council.
Since the normalisation of bilateral relations between Norway
and China, PST has noted that Chinese computer network
operations are increasingly focusing on political issues in8
State intelligence activities 9
State intelligence activities
Norway. This marks a change from in installing a back door in a software
Norwegian undertakings earlier when operations were more Characteristic challenges update made by the IT company Solar-
can take simple measures to geared towards technology companies. related to Chinese Winds. This enabled the hostile actor to
mitigate vulnerabilities It is likely that hostile Chinese cyber intelligence activity compromise the undertakings that used
Hostile actors are continuously actors have been tasked with identifying Chinese intelligence activity is the software, including US government
looking for vulnerabilities that Norwegian politicians and others who characterised by several singular agencies.
might allow them access to their criticise China. The increased focus on features that distinguish them from
targets. One similarity shared by Norwegian decision-making processes other state actors’ intelligence oper- Third: When hostile actors look for
many successful computer network may be a result of China’s growing for- ations. Although China’s intelligence vulnerabilities, they try to hide among
operations is that the hostile actor eign and trade policy interests in Europe. services are sophisticated and the multitude of actors on the Internet.
has exploited vulnerabilities which, technically advanced, they often They rely on this method to perform
in retrospect, would have been easy In other countries, we have seen that make use of civilians with access to digital espionage in Norway. One trend
to eliminate. This includes, e.g., the state actors are capable of performing information. These people exploit observed by PST lately is that hostile
re-use of weak passwords, the lack sabotage by means of computer network their positions voluntarily or under actors are becoming increasingly likely
of two-factor authentication and operations. The steep increase in ran- duress. to use digital infrastructure in Norwegian
outdated software. somware in recent years illustrates the homes to hide. In such cases, the hostile
potential damage that can be wreaked According to Chinese law, any actor gains access through home elec-
by digital sabotage. In other countries, Chinese citizen or business can tronics connected to the Internet, e.g.,
health services, the police, fuel supplies be ordered to cooperate with the PCs, routers, and smart TVs, to access
and the food supply have been targeted. Ransomware is gene country’s intelligence apparatus. the undertaking that is the real target
rally something we associate with crime for profit. Yet there are This means that actors whose inten- of the digital espionage.
several examples of cases where there have been links between tions are initially legitimate can be
the ransomware and foreign intelligence services. In the light ordered to obtain information on Efforts will be made to recruit
of the global trend, the ultimate consequence of this could be behalf of the party-state. individuals in Norway
3)
The term ‘basic that basic national functions 3) in Norway could be impacted by Although computer network exploitation
national functions’ this type of digital operations, resulting in delays and interrup- China is characterised by its lack of has been an integral part of the activities
(BNF) refers to tions in the provision of services. distinction between the private sec- of foreign intelligence services, we see
functions of such a tor, the state and the party. In China, that some services are devoting con-
nature that a total Computer network operations usually start with the hostile there is significant and growing siderable resources to recruiting human
or partial loss of actor performing reconnaissance of the undertakings, identi state control of private enterprises. sources in Norway. Russia is especially
that function will fying assets, employees and technical vulnerabilities. The actor The Chinese authorities are also prone to give priority to recruitment in
threaten the gov- then has several feasible options: running a strategic campaign to get Norway. This is done, for example, with
ernment’s ability to high-tech commercial enterprises the help of intelligence officers who work
protect Norway’s First of all: The simplest method is still to dupe an employee involved in military modernisation. under cover at the Russian Embassy in
sovereignty, terri- of an enterprise to click on links from seemingly trustworthy The upshot is that it is exceptionally Oslo. They conduct intelligence opera
torial integrity and sources. Another method is to direct the operations at Internet- challenging to distinguish between tions in Norway under the protection
democratic form of exposed services, e.g., emails. In this context, the hostile actor purely commercial actors and actors of diplomatic privilege and immunity.
government. exploits vulnerabilities like weak passwords, outdated software being exploited for intelligence Norwegians who travel in Russia may
and the lack of two-factor authentication to gain unlawful purposes. Similarly, it is hard to tell also encounter attempts at recruitment.
access to computer systems. whether an enterprise supports Russian intelligence services have broad
China’s violations of human rights authority to engage in surveillance and
Second: Even though the target of digital computer network or military rearmament. exercise pressure domestically, and they
exploitation may be well protected, computer network take advantage of that to find opportuni-
operations against vendors and subcontractors may be easier ties to exploit individuals in Norway.
and highly effective avenues of approach for infiltrating an
enterprise or organisation. Such attacks are known as ‘supply The first contact between an intelligence officer and a potential
chain attacks’ because an actor attacks a weaker, more source often takes place in a professional setting. We have
peripheral link in an enterprise’s supply chain. The SolarWinds numerous examples of this happening at seminars, conferences
operation exposed in December 2020 is a prime example of a and trade fairs. People need not have access to classified infor-
supply chain attack. In this operation, a hostile actor succeeded mation to be relevant. Intelligence officers will often seek out10
State intelligence activities 11
State intelligence activities
individuals who do not have such access today, but who may Actors involved in covert procurement
eventually gain greater access. They also seek out people who Indications of illegal attempts in Norway will employ a wide
have access to sensitive information through their networks. procurements: variety of means, some of which are
Such individuals may be easier to dupe into cooperating, and typically legal, e.g., acquisitions and
they can receive information from colleagues or acquaintances • You are given limited information investments. Other means are illegal, e.g.,
without raising any suspicions. about the buyer cyber hacking or circumventing export
• You are given limited informa- control regulations. Many activities are
There are many people who could potentially help intelligence tion about the end user, or the in a grey zone.
officers by responding to their need for information. A useful customer is reluctant to provide
source can provide information about people, decision-making this type of information State actors regularly employ means
processes and future events that is not available online. • The order is unusual in terms such as false documentation, intricate
Sources can provide information to of shipping and payment corporate structures, shell and front
which they have access through their • The goods are to be sent to a companies, and supply chains. They
positions. They may also actively obtain warehouse, forwarding agent also use third party states, including
Examples of fields of new information on behalf of foreign or duty-free zone other Western countries, in their cam-
technology that may be intelligence services. • An established customer asks paigns against Norwegian undertakings.
targets for clandestine for products that you do not We expect such methods to continue
and covert procurement Building a trusting relationship between normally sell to be used in the years ahead.
activities: a source and an intelligence officer is • The buyer has a simple website
often a lengthy process. On several that has not been updated and Technology developed for civilian purposes
• Sensor and detection technology occasions, we have seen that a year or includes little contact informa- may also be pivotal for the development
• Marine and subsea technology more may pass before sources share tion and production of weapons of mass
• Oil and gas technology information that they consider sensitive. • The order is unusual with a view destruction, along with their delivery
• Semi-conductor technology Meanwhile, sources have grown accus- to number or volume systems, as well as conventional weapons
• Space and satellite technology tomed to increasing secrecy. They may • You receive comparable or simi- and surveillance systems. A great deal of
• Drone technology even have ended up in a relationship that lar orders from several different today’s civilian technology can also be
• Laboratory and production offers no easy way out. A source may be actors used for military purposes. This makes
technology convinced that the person in question is it hard to know whether a technology
• Communication technology in control of the situation, while actually can be used in ways that run counter to
having no idea how he or she is being the regulations. Foreign countries are
manipulated by the intelligence officer. not only interested in the most advanced technology; used
equipment is often a target. In addition, there is extensive resale
Norwegian enterprises will be of technology to countries of concern. Norwegian goods can
Research fields of particular exposed to covert attempts at end up in completely unexpected places, such as North Korea
interest to foreign states: procurement or Syria.
One important aspect of great-power
• Metallurgy rivalry today involves trying to out- The acquisition of and investments in Norwegian enterprises
• Nanotechnology compete rivals when it comes to tech- could allow foreign states access to information and influence
• Cyber security nology. Consequently, new technology that it is not in Norway’s interest for them to obtain. This was
• Cryptography is sought after by state actors to ensure decisive in 2021, when the Norwegian government stopped
• Robotics and autonomics military capability, political influence the sale of Bergen Engines to a Russian company. The fact that
• Molecular biology and economic growth. Many states are Norwegian enterprises offer goods, services, technology and
• Chemistry willing to go to great lengths and do not expertise that are important for other states’ military develop-
• Micro-electro-mechanical rule out using unlawful means to obtain ment may motivate foreign acquisitions and investments once
systems (MEMS) technology and knowledge. Norwegian again in 2022.
• Acoustics enterprises will also be affected by this.
• Nuclear physics Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan are Norwegian research and educational institutions maintain a
among the states PST expects to con- high calibre by international standards. They often have good
tinue to engage in illegal procurement funding schemes and access to advanced laboratory facilities
activities in Norway in 2022. as well as other research infrastructure. Foreign states have12
State intelligence activities 13
State intelligence activities
a strong interest in exploiting the advantages offered by The sum total of the negative influences on individuals who live
Norwegian research communities. Their intention may be to in Norway and are politically active constitutes a problem for
use Norwegian technology and knowledge in ways that run democracy and international affairs. In a digitised global world,
counter to Norway’s export control regulations. Any contact however, it is challenging both to identify and to counteract
with the Norwegian enterprise keeps the real end user of a such oppression.
product or its real purpose in research collaboration secret.
Funding for research projects or offers of lucrative financial Several countries’ intelligence services can influence
deals to researchers who possess cutting edge expertise are Norwegian decisions
also among the incentives that PST knows are employed. Such Thus far, PST has uncovered few cases of coordinated, targeted
incentives can lead to sensitive information, knowledge and influence operations in Norway. Nevertheless, several of the
technology falling into the hands of the foreign actor. intelligence services that operate in our country are tasked with
influencing political decisions, and we remain cognisant of the
Dissidents and minorities in Norway will continue possibility that foreign intelligence may try to influence public
to be monitored by other countries opinion in Norway in 2022.
Certain countries are willing to go to great lengths to silence
political adversaries living in Norway. In recent years, PST has
seen that China, Iran and other authoritarian states use their Several of the intelligence services that operate in our country
intelligence services to identify and monitor individuals in
Norway. These countries’ authorities want to ensure that their
are tasked with influencing political decisions.
political adversaries do not feel safe enough to speak out in
public. The point is to eliminate political opposition or what
they perceive as undesirable statements. Over the past year, actors working on behalf of Russian and
Chinese authorities have spread disinformation and conspiracy
In 2022, authoritarian regimes will obtain data on dissidents theories about the Covid-19 pandemic. Even though we have not
and minorities in Norway. Among other things, they will do seen such campaigns specifically targeting the general public
reconnaissance on events and associations for groups of exiles. in Norway, Norwegians have most likely been exposed to global
Several countries use their official delegations in Norway as disinformation campaigns run by Russian and Chinese actors.
a platform for espionage against refugees. Some countries
also use religious meeting places for this purpose. In addition, Influence operations under the auspices of foreign intelligence
the Internet is an increasingly important arena for obtaining can undermine the general public’s confidence in the Norwegian
information. Foreign intelligence services do everything from authorities. When foreign intelligence services succeed in
monitoring social media to hacking into electronic devices to influencing or changing a political decision in Norway, they are
monitor individuals or groups. undermining democracy. While such influence is sometimes
legal and other times illegal, it is always unwanted.
Knowing that one might be or is being monitored owing to
one’s political involvement is threatening in itself. In addition, Attempts to exert influence can take various forms. For example,
explicit threats are used against individuals or their family Russia has previously tried to influence democratic processes
members who remain in their country of origin. The threats in several countries. PST has not found any influence operations
often come through the Internet and are often made by under the auspices of state actors in connection with last year’s
representatives of the security authorities in the person’s parliamentary elections (to the Storting and the Sámediggi) in
native country. Norway.
Some states are willing to take significant risks to eliminate Chinese influence activities are well documented in Western
political dissidents in exile. In recent years, we have seen countries. PST is aware that actors working on behalf of Chinese
several examples of dissidents being liquidated or being the intelligence services use both legal and illegal methods to obtain
targets of assassination attempts in Europe. Another method information in Norway. This information can also be used to
is to dupe individuals into travelling to a third-party state exert influence. This year, we can expect such reconnaissance
where the foreign intelligence service has significantly greater activities to target issues and individuals that could affect the
freedom of action to abduct them and take them to their home interests of the Chinese Communist Party.
country.14 15
The threat from right-wing extremists
Politically motivated violence – extremism
There is still an even chance that right-wing extremists will
attempt to carry out terrorist acts in 2022. The threat of terror
Politically moti- comes first and foremost from people who have been radical-
ised by participating in right-wing extremist networks online.
Their stereotype of the enemy includes ethnic and religious
minorities, the Norwegian authorities and politicians, LGBT+,
vated violence as well as traditional media.
The number of right-wing extremist terrorist acts in Europe
has been stable for the past two years, with few attacks carried
– extremism out. However, several attacks have been averted since 2020.
Attention devoted to immigration-related issues and major
right-wing extremist terrorist attacks are especially likely to
inspire terror planning. The threat may change quickly.
Conspiracy theories unify right-wing extremists
Many right-wing extremists will still be unified by conspiracy
The terror threat level in Norway is moderate. theories asserting that the white race is being subjected to
Right-wing extremists and extreme Islamists genocide, and that Western culture will disappear. Such ideas
are ascribed to immigration from non-Western countries and
are expected to continue to pose the greatest low birth rates among whites, among other things. Right-wing
threat of terror against Norway. PST believes extremists portray this as an existential threat.
there is an even chance that right-wing It is primarily accelerationists who are deemed the greatest
extremists as well as extreme Islamist will threat among the right-wing extremists. We still expect cases
in which right-wing extremists in Norway will be radicalised by
attempt to carry out terrorist acts in 2022. accelerationist ideas.
Norwegian authorities and politicians
It is unlikely that individuals with anti-gov- will continue to be accused of treason by
ernment convictions will attempt to carry out Accelerationism ostensibly paving the way for the alleged
Accelerationism is a direction within white genocide, making them key figures
terrorist acts, and highly unlikely that left-wing right-wing extremism. One central in right-wing extremists’ stereotype
extremists and activists engaged in the climate, notion is that a racial war is immi- of the enemy. Conspiracy theories,
nent, and that it is urgent to precip- especially those involving the Labour
the environment or nature conservation will try itate the collapse of society while Party, have circulated among Norwegian
this. It is considered more likely that they will whites are still in the demographic right-wing extremists for many years. It
majority in the West, in order to is expected that the Labour Party will
turn to illegal activities such as vandalism and save the white race. Accelerationists assume a more prominent position in
disturbing the peace than to commit terrorist emphasise terrorism as a valuable the stereotype of the enemy now that
tool for destabilising society and it is the largest party in Norway’s new
acts. igniting a racial war. The perpe- coalition government.
trators of several completed and
averted right-wing extremist terror- Another pervasive opinion among a
ist acts in the West in recent years number of right-wing extremists is that
have been inspired by this mindset. certain perceived negative trends in16
Politically motivated violence – extremism 17
Politically motivated violence – extremism
society are supposedly steps in a larger conspiracy involving easier and faster to acquire expertise and
a secret world-wide Jewish elite. The far right the ability to carry out physical attacks.
The far right is a general term for
Right-wing extremists will continue to use current events, e.g., individuals with right-wing radical Extreme right-wing propaganda, sym-
the Covid-19 pandemic and the climate crisis, to confirm and or extremist ideologies, and it has bolism and materials are also found on
propagate their convictions. Conspiracy theories about the two main characteristics: The first is several image- and video-sharing appli-
Covid-19 pandemic and mass vaccinations will continue to be the idea that the state and the peo- cations that are popular among Nor-
a topic of discussion for many right-wing extremists in 2022. ple should be one. Groups that are wegian young people. The content will
They are of the opinion that the vaccine is a tool to control not considered part of this entity often dehumanise ethnic and religious
or kill off large parts of the population. This feeds into an are considered threats. Second, minorities, who are typically portrayed
already powerful hatred of the authorities among right-wing those on the far right either oppose with a humorous bent to ensure wide
extremists. democracy as a form of govern- dissemination. Algorithms lead users to
ance or challenge the central liberal increasingly more right-wing extremist
Further, certain right-wing extremists emphasise the increased values upon which democracy is content. Participation in online social
risk that climate change will contribute to mass immigration based. What distinguishes right- communities can usher some individuals
as proof of the conspiracy theory centred on the ongoing wing extremists from right-wing into a process of radicalisation. This
genocide against the white race and culture. radicals are their views on democ- process can take place quickly for some.
racy and whether or not they are
willing to accept violence to incite We also expect attempts to radicalise
It is primarily accelerationists who are deemed the greatest political change. Right-wing extrem- individuals in extremists’ own circles of
ists want to destroy democracy and friends, within their families, at school
threat among the right-wing extremists. they accept violence as a means and at work, as well as in other places
to achieve political goals. However, where radicalised individuals recognise
that does not apply to right-wing opportunities to make converts. This
Radicalisation will primarily occur on digital platforms radicals. Still, both right-wing may take place in person, or by the
Digital platforms will still be the most important arenas for rad- extremists and right-wing radicals radicalised person inviting others to join
icalisation to right-wing extremism. The key arenas are digital are often sceptical of the authori- right-wing extremist networks online.
applications through which right-wing extremists can contact ties, viewing them as corrupt.
each other, exchange extreme opinions and share right-wing The right-wing extremist group called
extremist material. the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM)
has a long-term goal of introducing a
Radicalisation will take place in Norwegian, Nordic and trans- National Socialist government in the
national online networks on which there are discussions about Nordic countries. NRM will continue to practice activism,
ideology, stereotypes of the enemy and weapons. Several of both in-person and online, to influence, radicalise and recruit
the transnational networks are more apt to glorify violence new members. Nevertheless, we expect little recruitment of
and contain a great deal of propaganda intended to incite new members to the NRM in Norway. The activism of NRM’s
terrorism. Participation in such right-wing extremist networks members may, however, result in some individuals becoming
can help ensure that individuals develop a desire to commit radicalised.
acts of violence or terrorism.
Further, we see that meetings and gatherings, as well as
Several participants in right-wing extremist online networks websites and online groups for right-wing radicals, can act as
end up there out of curiosity or thrill-seeking, or because they gateways to right-wing extremism. Right-wing radical activity
want to be part of a social community. Opportunities to act is legitimate in a democracy, but it presents a challenge that
without constraints and communicate extremist opinions and some people are radicalised in such arenas.
appeals anonymously lower the threshold for participation.
Online platforms also make it easier to exchange information
about experiences and to find and share manuals and instruc-
tions for making explosives and weapons. This may make it18
Politically motivated violence – extremism 19
Politically motivated violence – extremism
Mass murder or targeted assassinations of individuals The number of terrorist acts committed by extreme Islamists
who fit the stereotype of the enemy are the most likely in Europe declined significantly from 2017 to 2021. At the same
form of attack time, we see that attacks are still being averted in several Euro-
Any potential extreme right-wing terrorist act in Norway will pean countries, including here in Norway, where a 16-year-old
probably be attempted by an individual acting alone. boy was found guilty of planning an act of terrorism in 2021.
Experience indicates that the threat picture can shift quickly
Attacks will probably be in the form of mass damage attacks in response to emergent incidents in Norway and abroad.
or the assassination of a particular individual. The targets will
be groups or individuals who fit the stereotypical image of the Although ISIL and al-Qaeda maintain a local focus,
enemy. This could be people with a non-Western appearance, they remain a threat against the West
Muslims, Jews, dignitaries, LGBT+, or traditional media. The existence and ideological ballast of ISIL and al-Qaeda
that leads them to think that the West is at war with Islam will
Other forms of attack might be vandalism to buildings, continue to incite individuals in several Western countries to
infrastructure or other property belonging to individuals who plan terrorist acts. The threat will primarily come from those
fit the right-wing extremist stereotype of the enemy. The point who participate in extremist online networks that are loosely
of such acts will be to instil fear, not necessarily to take lives. connected to international terrorist organisations. These people
will often also associate with other extremists in person.
An extreme right-wing terrorist will probably use firearms,
4)
IED is the acronym improvised explosive devices (IEDs 4)) or vehicles to carry
for Improvised out an attack. In attempts to assassinate a particular target, Supporters of ISIL and al-Qaeda in the West will continue
Explosive Device. an edged weapon or blade will also be a likely weapon. With
The same abbrevia- a view to attempted vandalism, PST finds that arson or the
to produce and disseminate both new and old extremist
tion is used in Nor- use of IEDs will be among the most likely forms of attack. propaganda that incites recipients to carry out terrorist acts
wegian.
in Western countries.
There are several active extreme Islamist networks in Europe.
The threat from extreme Islamists The networks include returned foreign fighters, convicted
terrorists who have been released from prison, and convicted
There is still considered to be an even chance that extreme Isla- terrorists who are still imprisoned. The fact that Norwegian
mists will attempt to carry out terrorist acts in 2022. The threat extremists have contact with people through these networks
of terror will either come from individuals who are inspired has an adverse impact on the threat picture in Norway. This
by the ideology and message of the terrorist organisations is because it brings them into contact with individuals and
ISIL and al-Qaeda, or from individuals mobilised by factors communities that encourage and are able to provide guidance
perceived as provocations, desecrations or oppression of the in respect of attacks.
Islamic religion and of Muslims.
Supporters of ISIL and al-Qaeda in the West will continue
Extreme Islamists’ stereotype of the enemy has many faces. to produce and disseminate both new and old extremist
ISIL supporters belong to the most extreme groups, believing propaganda that incites recipients to carry out terrorist acts
that all who are not followers of their version of faith are infi- in Western countries. This activity will continue to take place
dels. This includes apostates or so-called heretical Muslims and through online platforms. It has proven challenging to prevent
regimes, as well as Western states, groups, organisations and the dissemination of extremist propaganda.
individuals. They claim that the West is conducting a perpetual
war against Islam and Muslims, both in and outside the West. We expect the terrorist organisations ISIL and al-Qaeda to give
In consequence, Western support for intervention in Muslim priority to building up branches and affiliated groups in coun-
countries and for warfare against ISIL and al-Qaeda, as well as tries in which they have gained a footing, rather than carrying
what they experience as oppression and transgressions against out terrorist acts against the West. Norway will continue to be
Muslims in the West, are used as justification for terrorist considered an enemy by the terrorist organisations, but not
attacks. as a high priority target for terrorist attacks, compared with
certain other Western countries.20
Politically motivated violence – extremism 21
Politically motivated violence – extremism
The situation in Afghanistan will have a limited impact the probability that young people will be incited to carry out
on the threat from extreme Islamists acts of violence and terrorism.
The withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan and Syria
has weakened Western military involvement as an incentive Some are also radicalised to extreme Islamism through
for radicalisation and terror planning in the West. Even though in-person contact within their own social circles. We still expect
both ISIL and al-Qaeda now have more freedom of action and to see cases of radicalisation within families, among friends, in
capacity in these countries, this will only have a limited impact prisons, and at reception centres for asylum seekers, as well
on the threat of terror against Norway. The situation in Afghan- as in religious arenas and other locations where radicalised
istan is exceedingly complicated and it is shifting constantly. individuals recognise opportunities to convert others.
Certain extreme Islamists in Norway would like to be foreign In addition, there are certain circles in Norway that help spread
fighters in Afghanistan or in other countries or areas of conflict. the notion that Islam, as a religion, is at odds with Norway’s
However, ISIL and al-Qaeda are expected to give priority to lifestyle and culture. The people in these circles often have an
local and regional recruitment rather than to facilitate recruit- ambiguous relationship to the use of violence, even though
ment of Western foreign fighters in 2022. That being said, even they give the impression that they are non-violent. Experience
a small number of Western foreign fighters could result in more shows that participation in such circles can sometimes serve as
focus on Western countries as targets for terrorist attacks. a gateway to extreme Islamism.
Perceived provocations will continue to contribute to
The absence of any unifying cause with sufficient appeal radicalisation
Situations experienced as insults to and attacks on the religion
means that we do not expect the establishment of organised of Islam and Muslims will contribute to radicalisation and make
extreme Islamist groups in Norway in 2022. it easier to justify terrorist acts. When such incidents take place
in Norway, they add to the likelihood that certain individuals
will start planning terror-related actions. For several decades,
Continued small scale of radicalisation to Islamic incidents of this kind have inspired certain extreme Islamists to
extremism carry out terrorist acts. Most recently in 2020, several terrorist
The absence of any unifying cause with sufficient appeal acts were carried out in Europe in response to perceived
means that we do not expect the establishment of organised transgressions.
extreme Islamist groups in Norway in 2022. Despite the
continuing small scale of radicalisation to extreme Islamism in The probability that this type of events will lead to radicalisa-
Norway, we do, however, expect to see some cases of it. tion and terror planning will increase if it elicits broad coverage
in traditional and social media, supplemented by the dissemi-
Radicalisation will take place through transnational online nation of information via extremist networks online. Experience
networks on encrypted platforms that enable users to act and nonetheless shows that it can take a long time from the time
communicate anonymously. Relationships are built through insults are perceived until retaliatory actions are committed.
these networks, and participants develop the trust needed
to plan and support terrorist activities. Among other things, Simple attacks on densely populated targets or
such networks are used to share extremist propaganda and symbolic targets are the most likely forms of attack
instructions for making home-made explosives. Guidance is Any potential extreme Islamist terrorist act in Norway would
also provided for how to carry out a terrorist attack. probably be committed by a lone individual. It is expected
that the perpetrator would have been in contact with other
We see that ever younger individuals, all the way down to extremists in the run-up to the act.
age 12, are participating in such transnational online networks.
This is not least because a great deal of extremist propaganda The most likely targets are considered to be civilian crowds,
is designed to appeal to a younger audience. Young people institutions or individuals perceived as having insulted the
who are attracted to such networks are often vulnerable, Islamic religion, as well as uniformed police and military
impressionable and generally have less understanding of the personnel in public areas. Churches, synagogues and other reli-
consequences of actions than adults have. That can increase gious meeting places are also deemed likely choices of targets.22
Politically motivated violence – extremism 23
Politically motivated violence – extremism
The perpetrator will probably employ simple means such as to carry out acts of violence and terrorism. Moreover, current
edged weapons or blades, arson or a vehicle. However, attacks events largely determine their focal points. Global disinfor-
that have been averted show that extreme Islamists would still mation campaigns under the auspices of state actors are
prefer to carry out attacks with explosives and firearms. also considered to maintain and, to some extent, strengthen
anti-government ideas among sympathisers in Norway.
In a great many extreme Islamist terrorist attacks, the per-
petrators themselves wanted to be killed by the police while Conspiracy theories about the Covid-19 pandemic will continue
committing the act. Police responders must therefore expect to be a unifying topic. Theories that Covid-19 was created by
to be attacked by the perpetrator. the authorities to control the general public and that vacci-
nations will lead to mass death are among the most common
conspiracy theories. Accordingly, we expect that the handling
of the pandemic will continue to provoke involvement on the
part of anti-government sympathisers.
The threat from individuals with anti-
There is some overlap between anti-government and right-
government convictions wing extremist ideas. Conspiracy theories about the Covid-19
pandemic are also promulgated by multiple right-wing extre
It is considered unlikely that individuals with anti-government mists. Further, the idea that a secret global elite governs the
convictions will try to carry out terrorist acts in Norway. world partially coincides with anti-Semitic right-wing extremist
Generally speaking, the authorities in Norway enjoy a high level notions.
of trust, meaning that anti-government ideas have a limited
potential for expansion compared with the situation in several
other countries. However, in recent years, we have registered Theories that Covid-19 was created by the authorities to con-
more activity among individuals with anti-government convic-
tions in Norway as well.
trol the general public and that vaccinations will lead to mass
death are among the most common conspiracy theories.
In Norway, the threat comes from individuals radicalised
through conspiracy theories and anti-government ideas. Perpe-
trators responsible for several acts of violence and sabotage in Attacks on targets involved in the response to the
Western countries in recent years believe in the same conspir- pandemic are the most likely ones
acy theories promulgated by individuals with anti-government An increase has been registered in the number of acts of
convictions in Norway. violence and sabotage motivated by anti-government ideas
in several Western countries these last years. The targets of
Conspiracy theories about the Covid-19 pandemic will the attacks have primarily been state institutions, along with
be a unifying topic vaccination centres and individuals involved in dealing with
One central idea among individuals with anti-government con- the Covid-19 pandemic.
victions is the notion that the State does not have a legitimate
platform for the exercise of power. The State’s legislation and For the time being, it is unlikely that individuals in Norway with
regulations are perceived as instruments of power used to anti-government convictions would commit a terrorist attack.
violate individual citizens’ freedom and sovereignty. Further, Any potential attack would probably be carried out by one
conspiracy theories claiming that the world is governed by a individual acting alone or a few individuals. Illegal activities
secret global elite with an evil plan have become more promi- such as vandalism and disturbing the peace are, however, con-
nent among anti-government sympathisers. sidered more likely than a terrorist attack. This type of incident
may either be planned or carried out more spontaneously. In
Large volumes of anti-government propaganda and related respect of spontaneous incidents, for example, during a cere-
conspiracy theories are shared on several online fora, Nor- mony, the group dynamic can have a mobilising effect and lead
wegian and transnational alike. The ideas that characterise more people to participate in violent acts on impulse.
the anti-government movements in Norway are impacted by
and commingled with developments abroad. The rhetoric As long as the Covid-19 pandemic continues, likely targets
sometimes includes smears, hate speech, threats and appeals include locations and people associated with the vaccination24 25
The climate, the environment and nature
Politically motivated violence – extremism
Politically motivated violence – extremism
process, as well as key people in the authorities’ handling of the
pandemic. A shift in the focus of anti-government sympathisers
will create new stereotypical images of the enemy and targets
conservation are issues with the potential
for potential attacks. to lead to radicalisation
PST considers it highly unlikely that activists associated with
the climate, the environment or nature conservation will try
to carry out terrorist acts in Norway in 2022. We expect that
The threat from left-wing extremists activism related to these issues in Norway will continue to
be non-violent. For certain individuals, however, the climate
It is considered highly unlikely that left-wing extremists will situation may be perceived as an urgent existential threat.
try to perpetrate terrorist acts in 2022. Thus, the topic still has a potential for radicalising individuals.
In Norway, left-wing extremism will continue to be a marginal Many in Norway and abroad are committed when it comes
phenomenon with few active groups. The left-wing extremists’ to issues involving the climate, the environment and nature
ideological convictions are grounded in the glorification of conservation. We find that issues involving these topics capture
violence advocated by various brands of Communism, anar- people’s interest, regardless of whether or not they adhere to
chism and anti-fascism. We still expect a small scale of new a particular ideology. As a result, support and commitment
recruitment to the groups that exist in Norway. may have a wide embrace, meaning there will be a vast array
of views on the use of policy instruments.
The struggle against right-wing extremism will continue to
be the unifying cause for left-wing extremists in Norway. Most of those involved in these areas in Norway employ legal
Norwegian left-wing extremists have a broad interpretation of means, e.g., demonstrations and protests. Some groups and
right-wing extremism as a phenomenon. Their stereotype of individuals will nonetheless turn to the use of illegal means like
the enemy therefore includes everyone from organised right- vandalism and disturbing the peace. In some cases, certain
wing extremist groups to groups of right-wing radicals and politicians and those with differing opinions will be subject to
individuals. harassment and threats.
The struggle against right-wing extremism will continue to be
the unifying cause for left-wing extremists in Norway.
Some left-wing extremists will continue to carry out politically
motivated acts of violence and to confront and publicly harass
individuals they consider to be right-wing extremists. This
feeds continued polarisation between the groups. Several
left-wing extremists also include the police in their stereotype
of the enemy, although mainly when the police are deployed
to protect freedom of expression, e.g., during demonstrations.26 27
The threat against dignitaries
More negative attention directed at Norwegian
authorities on the part of extremists
Norwegian authorities definitely fit the stereotype of the
enemy as perceived by right-wing extremists, meaning that
The threat Dignitaries are dignitaries 5) are among the potential targets for any right-wing
5)
defined as members extremist terrorist act. Right-wing extremists accuse the
of the Royal family, authorities and politicians of treason. Historically, the Labour
Party in particular has been ascribed responsible for this. We
against
the Government,
MPs and Supreme expect that key politicians from the Labour Party will play a
Court justices. The more prominent part in the right-wing extremist stereotype of
report also covers the enemy now that Labour is the largest party in the coalition
government.
dignitaries
certain politicians
who do not fit the
definition of dig- In recent years, we have also registered an increase in activity
nitaries, but who among people with anti-government convictions. To those who
are in a vulnerable advocate anti-government ideas, the State and dignitaries play
position by virtue a large part in the stereotype of the enemy.
of being politicians.
We expect that topics related to the authorities’ handling of
It is considered unlikely that Norwegian the Covid-19 pandemic will continue to incite hatred of the
dignitaries will be the target of serious acts authorities in some individuals in 2022. Right-wing extremists
and individuals who expound anti-government convictions
of violence or terrorism in 2022. However, stand united in their resistance against the authorities’ handling
certain development trends indicate that of the Covid-19 pandemic, which is expected to continue for
the duration of the pandemic.
there is growing danger that dignitaries will
be subjected to spontaneous, less serious Ongoing threat activity on the part of individuals
without ideological platforms
acts of violence and confrontations. Norwegian dignitaries and politicians will continue to be the
targets of smears, hate speech, threats and other undesirable
attention from individuals without any ideological platform.
As a rule, those behind such activities have been mobilised
by personal frustrations and life crises that they blame on the
authorities. Experience shows that many of them have mental
issues caused by a perceived experience of justifiable anger.
Other topics expected to result in threats against the authori
ties include matters perceived as incursions on individuals’
private lives. Examples of this may include political debates on
issues that involve child welfare, direct and indirect taxes, the
climate, the environment and nature conservation, as well as
immigration and integration.
Social media help spread such threat messages to a larger
audience. As a result, these messages can have a knock-on
effect, provoking others to make new hateful and threatening
statements. Ultimately, this could lead certain individuals to
consider the use of violence against dignitaries to be justified.You can also read
