Pay-for-Performance Models for Teachers and Administrators

 
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    Pay-for-Performance Models for Teachers and
                   Administrators

    The following research brief presents an overview of three aspects of the pay-for-
    performance concept in education: the structure of such programs, the criteria on
    which awards are based, and the amount of awards. We include summaries of
    thirteen state and district pay-for-performance models as examples.

MARKET EVALUATION   SURVEYING    DATA ANALYSIS   BENCHMARKING      ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY
HANOVER RESEARCH                                                                                                  FEBRUARY 2012

                                           Pay-for-Performance Models

            “The single greatest factor in student achievement lies in the effectiveness of teachers
            and leaders.”1 In fact, a recent study from the Milwaukee Public Schools discovered
            that 75 percent of the effect a school has on a student can be attributed to the
            individual teacher, while only 25 percent of the effect can be attributed to the school. 2
            The belief in the validity of these statements has led to a recent surge in the growth
            and popularity of performance-based compensation systems for public school
            teachers and principals in the United States, as these initiatives are believed to attract
            and retain high quality teachers to low-achieving schools.

            The success rates of these systems vary considerably; some programs have a
            measurably positive effect on school quality and teacher engagement, and others do
            not seem to affect any change at all. North Carolina, for example, has had an
            incentive system called the “Teacher Bonus Program” in place since the late 1990s,
            which awards cash bonuses to teachers in schools that improve their students’ test
            scores by a determined amount. A recent study by Thomas Ahn and Jacob Vigdor of
            the University of Kentucky and Duke University, respectively, showed that the
            program has decreased absenteeism among teachers and raised standardized test
            scores.3 Another similarly structured program in New York City, however, was
            canceled after it was shown to have no measurable effect on student achievement.
            The program also failed to improve teacher instructional technique or absenteeism
            levels, especially at larger schools with more teachers where the opportunity for, and
            incidence of, “freeloading” was higher.4

            Despite the uncertain track record of incentive systems and the controversy
            surrounding them, many local and state education agencies are taking
            advantage of the government’s renewed focus on the issue of teacher
            effectiveness and performance-based compensation models in order to develop new
            systems of their own or build upon existing systems. Of the federal programs that are
            making funds available to support these efforts, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) is
            the most prominent. Since its creation in 2006, TIF has made hundreds of millions of

            1 “Application for Grants: Louisiana Department of Education.” U.S. Department of Education, p. 38.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100109.pdf
            2 “Application for Grants: Chicago Public Schools.” U.S. Department of Education, p. 40.

                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100127.pdf
            3 Duffy, F. “Researchers: School-Level Incentives Unite the ‘Tortoise and Hare.’” Education Week Teacher, 29

                June 2011.
            http://blogs.edweek.org/teachers/teaching_now/2011/06/researchers_school-
                level_incentives_unite_the_tortoise_and_the_hare.html?qs=group+incentive
            4 Sawchuk, S. “Study Finds Few Gains in Schoolwide Pay Program.” Education Week Teacher Beat, 3 February

                2011.
            http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2011/02/schoolwide_bonus_pay_and_poten.html?qs=group+i
                ncentive

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            dollars in five-year grants available to education agencies that develop incentive plans
            with a performance-related component.5

            The following research brief discusses the structure of pay-for-performance models,
            the criteria used to determine incentive rewards, and the typical amounts of
            performance pay. To highlight the actual implementation of pay-for-performance
            models, the final section contains a table examining the variety in pay-for-
            performance models across thirteen district and state initiatives. Key findings from
            this brief are as follows:

                 Incentive systems may reward either individuals or groups of people ranging
                  in size from just a few employees to all of the employees in a school. Most
                  incentive systems that offer group rewards also offer individual rewards,
                  although the opposite is not always the case. Also, many incentive systems
                  offer cumulative and/or tiered rewards. In some models, employees can
                  accumulate multiple bonuses by meeting criteria in different categories, and in
                  others, each category is divided into different award levels, so that the size of
                  the award corresponds to the standard attained by the employee.

                 The measures that determine eligibility for incentive pay depend on the
                  type of award and the recipient of the award. Awards at the school level
                  are usually based on student achievement or improvement on tests while class
                  observations and involvement in leadership activities have greater weight in
                  the determination of individual awards.

                 Currently the most popular way of measuring the effect that schools and
                  teachers have on student achievement is value-added modeling, which
                  isolates the effect of specific teachers, groups of teachers, and schools on a
                  student by controlling for other influences on the student, such as prior
                  achievement and family characteristics.6 The use of this type of performance
                  measure in pay-for-performance models, however, draws criticism from many
                  scholars. It requires a great deal of data sophistication on the part of the
                  district or state, and may require outside assistance from a company or
                  organization that specializes in data analysis.

                 The actual amount of incentive pay for high-performing teachers,
                  teams, and schools varies between districts and states. The maximum
                  amount that an individual can earn through bonuses in the districts examined
                  for this brief range from $2,000 to $16,000. The average awards as found by a

            5 “Teacher Incentive Fund: Funding.” U.S. Department of Education.
            http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/funding.html
            6 Ibid. p. 9.

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                       survey by the National Center on Performance Incentives are similarly
                       disparate by individual earning the award.

            Incentive System Structure

            Performance-based pay systems rely on three structural elements: (1) the individual or
            group whose performance will be measured; (2) the input and output measures used
            to evaluate performance; and (3) the scope of staff who are eligible to participate in
            the performance-based system.

                             Structural Elements of a Performance-Based Pay System

                        Unit of                           Measures of
                                                                                        Incentive Eligibility
                     Accountability                       Performance

                • Determine whose                  • Determine what input             • Determine both the
                  performance is to be               and output measures                scope of eligible staff
                  measured: individual,              are used to evaluate               as well as percentage of
                  group, or a hybrid of              performance                        those eligible staff who
                  the two models                                                        may receive
                                                                                        performance increases
                                                                                        in a given year

            There are several different types of awards that may be included within this
            performance-based pay system structure, including performance-related pay,
            knowledge- and skills-based pay, career ladders, and market-based pay.7 Performance-
            based pay rewards instructional staff for student achievement, as measured by, for
            example, standardized test scores or value-added assessments. Knowledge- and skills-
            based pay rewards instructional staff for certain activities or qualifications, such as
            participation in professional development programs. Many incentive systems
            incorporate an instructor hierarchy in some form; teachers are rewarded for taking on
            additional responsibilities that correspond to specific positions in this hierarchy. This
            career ladder pay provides teachers with defined professional goals and usually
            encourages collaborative and mentoring activities. Finally, market-based pay is offered
            to teachers and leaders who fill positions in high-need academic areas and schools.
            Many incentive systems integrate two or more of these incentive types.

            Incentives may be awarded both at the individual level and the group level. Both
            models have benefits and drawbacks. Individual-level awards tend to lead to
            increased performance on the part of the individual, who has sole responsibility over
            7   Heyburn, S., Lewis, J. and Rigger, G. “Compensation Reform and Design Preferences of Teacher Incentive
                 Fund Grantees.” The National Center of Performance Incentives, March 2010: p. 4.
                 http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/2010_Heyburn_etAl_TeacherIncen
                 tiveGrantees1.pdf

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            his or her situation, and also encourage the best employees to stay on at their
            institution while putting (implicit) pressure on lower-performing employees to leave.8
            However it is difficult to accurately measure one individual’s impact on student
            success, and, even if that were not the case “rewarding teachers for their individual
            performance is also contrary to the highly collaborative nature of teaching and may
            even reduce the incentive to cooperate with others.”9

            It is primarily for this reason that some education agencies choose to adopt team-
            based incentive systems. Team-based incentive systems are those that reward
            members of a specified group for achieving a collective goal. The group may vary in
            size from two employees to all employees, and may be composed of any combination
            of individuals—for example, rewarded teams could be an entire school, grade-level
            groups of teachers, departmental groups of teachers, “or some combination
                 “Rewarding teachers for their        thereof.”10 The teams may be assembled by
             individual performance is contrary to alottery,
                                                        variety of methods such as a random
                                                              selection by a school administrator,
               the highly collaborative nature of     or even self-assembly by the teachers
               teaching and may even reduce the       themselves.
                incentive to cooperate with others.”
                                                         Team-based incentives, unlike individual-
            level rewards, tend to “promote social cohesion, feelings of fairness, and
            productivity norms.”11 They also tend to result in a knowledge transfer from higher-
            performing individuals to lower-performing individuals, thus encouraging mutual
            learning. Moreover, team rewards “create a dynamic in which peers hold each other
            accountable.”12 However, team-based incentives do lead to some potential
            problems. There is evidence that under this incentive structure, while the
            performance of lower-ability teachers improves, performance among the higher-
            ability teachers may decrease. Also, the knowledge that the reward depends on the
            performance of an entire group causes some members of the group to contribute less
            or nothing at all to the effort, since they can depend on the others to do the work for
            them. Finally, team-based incentive systems do not take into account variation in
            teacher effectiveness. The most effective teachers are not recognized, and may decide
            to leave the school system or profession.

            The summary of state and district pay-for-performance systems at the end of this
            brief demonstrates the range of accountability units acting within incentive structures.

            8 “Evaluating and Rewarding the Quality of Teachers: International Practices.” Organization for Economic Co-
                operation and Development: 2009. p. 71.
                http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/Springer_Balch_OECD_Chapter.p
                df
            9 Ibid. p. 72.
            10 Ibid.
            11 Ibid. p. 73.
            12 Marshall, K. “Merit Pay or Team Accountability?” Education Week Commentary, 30 August 2010.

            http://www.marshallmemo.com/articles/Kim%20Marshall%20Ed%20Week%20Sept.%201,%202010.pdf

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            For example, New York City Public Schools provides an example of the school-
            based incentive system. Within this district, 205 schools participated in an incentive
            program which rewarded individual teachers based on overall school performance.
            Schools were assigned a letter grade based on their overall progress in four categories.
            Schools that received “A”s and “B”s were eligible for rewards. However, the program
            was canceled in its third year, in January 2011, after only 13 percent of schools met
            basic proficiency thresholds for bonuses.13

            On the other hand, Fort Worth Independent School District’s PEAK Rewards
            Program takes the idea of rewarding individuals for group performance and
            specializes it. Instead of teachers receiving incentive pay for overall school
            performance, they receive awards based on participation in a four-tiered team
            structure. The four levels of teams on a school campus are:

                     1. Campus team: all teachers, instructional staff, and leadership at a school
                     2. Grade-Content team: all teachers across a content-grade
                     3. Vertical team: teachers in different grade levels working in the same areas
                     4. Horizontal teams: teachers working across content areas

            The aMAzing educators program developed within Boston Public Schools and
            Springfield Public Schools combines team incentives and individual incentives.
            School-wide financial rewards are given to all school staff if the school meets student
            growth targets. Individual rewards are given to teachers who take on additional
            leadership roles, demonstrate their effectiveness in performance evaluations, and/or
            commit to remaining in the school for an additional two years to operate “model
            classrooms.”

            As can be seen, there is great variety in the units of accountability contained within
            pay-for-performance systems. Yet at the same time, a survey conducted by the
            National Center on Performance Initiatives in fall 2009 of TIF-funded pay-for-
            performance models demonstrates that models structured around the individual and
            the school levels and the individual, team, and school levels are by far the most
            prevalent. The survey findings are detailed in the table below.14

            13 “What New York City’s Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us About Pay for
                Performance.” Rand Corporation. 2011. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9596/index1.html
            14 “Compensation Reform and Design Preferences of Teacher Incentive Fund Grants.” National Center on

                Performance Initiatives. p. 10.
                http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/2010_Heyburn_etAl_TeacherIncen
                tiveGrantees1.pdf

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                              Units of Accountability for Performance-Based Awards
                                                                 Number of            Percent of TIF
                              Unit of Accountability
                                                                 TIF Sites                Sites
                               Individual and school                14                     50%
                            Individual, team, and school            9                     32.1%
                                   Individual only                  2                      7.1%
                                     School only                    2                      7.1%
                                 Team and school                    1                      3.6%
                                Individual and team                 0                       0%
                                     Team only                      0                       0%

            Lastly, there are two main types of incentive system structures: rank-order
            tournaments and fixed performance contracts.15 Rank-order tournaments offer a
            set number of awards to the employees or groups of employees that perform the best
            relative to their peers, while fixed performance contracts define certain standards of
            performance and reward all employees who meet them. The former model is
            generally less popular than the latter because it can lead to competition among
            teachers.

            Evaluations and Incentive Criteria

            U.S. states and the Department of Education have placed heavy emphasis on the use
            of value-added student learning measurements in teacher evaluations and
            performance-based pay systems. Value-added analysis uses multiple years of
            student performance data to determine the projected growth trajectory of
                                                       individual students and to isolate the
             Value-added performance measures effects of specific teachers. Many states
                                                       receiving either Race to the Top or Teacher
                 appear to be among the most           Incentive Fund grants report the
            common type of measure to be used in implementation of both formative and
                  pay for performance models           summative assessment measures in
                                                       evaluating student growth. Summative tests
            include statewide standardized exams of certain grade levels and academic areas,
            while formative assessments may include continuous and/or less formal strategies to
            evaluate student progress in all grades and developmental areas.

            It is no surprise that districts distribute awards based on student academic
            performance. In addition to this, awards may be granted to teachers who acquire
            knowledge and skills or assume extra responsibilities and duties. Our analysis of a
            sampling of state and district performance-based pay systems highlights the use of

            15   Heyburn, S., Lewis, J. and Rigger, G. “Compensation Reform and Design Preferences of Teacher Incentive
                  Fund Grantees.” The National Center of Performance Incentives, March 2010: p. 9.
                  http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/2010_Heyburn_etAl_TeacherIncen
                  tiveGrantees1.pdf

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            value-added/growth measures in pay-for-performance models, as well as other
            measures, including:

                       Graduation rates
                       Attendance rates
                       Perception data (student and staff surveys)
                       Teacher and principal/administrator observations
                       State standardized test scores and/or district end-of-course assessments (not
                        related to growth)

            However, value-added performance measures appear to be among the most common
            type of measure used in pay-for-performance models. A review of performance
            models used in TIF grantees reiterates this trend, noting that 17 of 33 TIF grantee
            sites use value-added performance measures. “Simpler approaches, including gains,
            proficiency gains (movement across proficiency categories), average achievement, and
            proficiency rate” were used less often in pay-for-performance models.16 The table
            below summarizes results from the study.17

             Performance Measures for Performance-Related Awards, by Enrollment Size
                                             of Site
                                                              # of
                  Type of Performance           # of Small                 # of Large     Total # of
                                                             Medium
                     Measurement                  Sites                       Sites         Sites
                                                              Sites
                    Value-added                       2         9               6            17
                        Gain                          1         0               1            2
                 Movement across
                                                      1          1              1             3
               proficiency thresholds
             Proficiency or attainment
                                                      2          1              1             4
                        rates
            Gain/movement/attainment
                                                      1          3              2             6
                     combined
             Individual learning plans                1          0             0              1
                       Total                          9         14             11            33

            Despite the popularity of the value-added performance measures in pay-for-
            performance models, many scholars and educators have identified inefficiencies and
            weaknesses with these measures. First, critics argue the ineffectiveness of value-added
            systems due to their reliance on standardized testing results. Scholars further
            criticize the evaluation methods of the value-added system for its assumption that
            curricula are vertically aligned to allow for accurate assessments of student growth

            16   Ibid. p. 12.
            17   Ibid.

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            over a multi-year period.18 Various research studies have determined that year-to-
            year curriculum variation is significant, and that the process of creating
            appropriate longitudinal scales to compare test scores can introduce more error into
            the analyses of student growth and educator effectiveness.19

            A further criticism of value-added student assessment measures is that missing testing
            data may jeopardize the validity of the analysis. As research has demonstrated that
            lower achieving students are more likely to have missing test scores, the failure to
            properly address this lack of information may lead to selection bias if these missing
            scores are omitted from the analysis. An analysis of this nature would result in
            disproportionately low performance scores for lower achieving students, while high
            achieving students would continue to increase an education gap. However, value-
            added programs do not require complete testing data from each student, but use that
            information that is available to “invisibly predict” missing scores. Proponents of
            value-added analysis argue that this strategy helps to eliminate selection bias and
            “might lead to particular efficiency gains relative to other approaches when missing
            data are substantial.”20

            Additional concerns relating to the accuracy of student data is the challenge of
            accurately linking students with teachers and the general lack of transparency of the
            value added system. In response to these arguments, less complicated methods have
            been developed that are vulnerable to various potential problems and have yielded
            ineffective results. In general, these simplistic models could not analyze multiple years
            of student data and over-identified only highly effective and highly ineffective
            teachers. An article from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
            Development notes that “it is critical that school systems understand the problems
            and limitations of their management information systems insofar as they relate to the
            creation of [a value-added system].”21 Problems frequently found in value-added
            systems include the mismatch of student and teacher data, multiple teachers with
            responsibility for the same student, unclear team or group composition, a lack of data
            or the capacity to measure the actual value added by a teacher, and bonuses awarded
            to the wrong educator or denied to the right one.

            18 Doran, Harold C. and Steve Fleischman. “Challenges of Value-Added Assessment.” Educational Leadership,
                Nov 2005. Vol. 63, No. 3. Pp. 85-87.
                http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational_leadership/nov05/vol63/num03/Challenges_of_Value-
                Added_Assessment.aspx
            19 Ibid.
            20 Sanders, William L., et al. “A Response to Criticisms of SAS EVAAS.” SAS. Nov 2009. P.p.5.

                http://www.sas.com/resources/asset/Response_to_Criticisms_of_SAS_EVAAS_11-13-09.pdf
            21 “Evaluating and Rewarding the Quality of Teachers: International Practices.” Organisation for Economic

                Cooperation and Development, 2009, p. 19.
                http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/Springer_Balch_OECD_Chapter.pdf

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            Award Amounts

            Incentive pay for high-performing teachers, teams, and schools varies among districts
            and states. There does not appear to be a methodology by which program developers
            determine the appropriate amount of incentive. Some incentives are stated as
            percentages of a teacher’s salary, while others are in fixed dollar amounts. Many
            systems allow teachers to be eligible for partial incentives based on their degree of
            success in meeting established criteria. For instance, in the now-defunct New York
            City Public Schools scheme, teachers would receive a full bonus of $3,000 if the
            school received an “A” on its district scorecard. For those in schools reaching a grade
            of “B,” teachers received $1,500. In Fort Worth Independent School District,
            teachers are eligible for a nearly 24 percent bonus over their average salary.
            Additional financial incentives of $1,000 to $4,000 are offered to staff members at
            targeted schools. In Boston and Springfield School Districts, teachers are able to earn
            over 18 percent (Boston) and 28 percent (Springfield) of their salary in additional
            compensation.

            The maximum amount that an individual can earn through bonuses in the districts
            examined for this brief range from $2,000 to $16,000. The average awards as found
            by a survey by the National Center on Performance Incentives are similarly disparate
            by individual earning the award. The table below highlights the fact that there is no
            real standard amount of incentive award amongst those districts offering them.22

                            Incentive Award Amounts for School Personnel at TIF Sites
                                                                                        Other                   Non-
                                      Administrators            Teachers             Instructional          Instructional
                                                                                      Personnel              Personnel
                                                           Minimum Award
                   Mean                     $1,639               $877                      $420                 $303
                  Minimum                    $50                  $50                       $50                  $50
                  Maximum                   $5,000              $4,000                    $1,500                $500
                                                           Maximum Award
                   Mean                     $8,632              $8,016                    $1,547                $2,456
                  Minimum                    $800               $1,030                     $400                  $400
                  Maximum                  $34,875             $30,350                    $6,500                $6,500

            22   “Evaluating and Rewarding the Quality of Teachers: International Practices.”. Op.cit. p. 13.

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                           Summary of Sample Pay for Performance Initiatives

                      Name of          Size of         Unit of                                                 Maximum
      District                                                              Performance Measures
                      Program         Program       Accountability                                           Size of Bonus
                                                                       -Growth models using
                                                                       standardized test scores
                                                                       -Graduation rates
                                                                       -District pre- and post-tests
    Boston and                                                         -Student work samples
                                                                                                                 $14,000
    Springfield                                                        -Annual surveys and interviews
                      aMAzing                       -School                                                     (Boston);
      School                          22 schools                       -Teacher observations and
                      educators                     -Individual                                                  $15,000
     Districts                                                         evaluations
                                                                                                              (Springfield)
      (MA)23                                                           -Evidence of participation in
                                                                       leadership roles
                                                                       -Commitment to stay at school
                                                                       for two years and have classroom
                                                                       serve as “model classroom”
                                                                       -No Child Left Behind Adequate
                                                                       Yearly Progress benchmarks
                                                                       -Value-added growth models
                                                                       using statewide or national
                                                                       standardized test scores
   Butler County                                                       -Student satisfaction surveys
                                                    -School
      School                                                           -Evidence of striving towards
                      PayPLUS          6 schools    -Team                                                            —
      District                                                         positive school culture
                                                    -Individual
       (AL)24                                                          -Evidence of participation in
                                                                       leadership roles
                                                                       -Attendance (perfect)
                                                                       -Teacher/principal observations
                                                                       and evaluations
                                                                       -National Board certification
                                                                       -Standardized test scores
   Duval County         MAP
                                                    -School            -District pre- and post-test            $6,300 (per
      Public          Program,
                                       6 schools    -Team              achievement data                       individual on
     Schools         G.R.E.A.T.
                                                    -Individual        -Teacher observations and                  team)
      (FL)25         Expectations
                                                                       evaluations

            23 Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. “Application for New Grants Under
                the Teacher Incentive Fund Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100151.” 6 July 2010. P. e1.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100151.pdf
            24 Butler County Board of Education. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund

                Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100075.” 6 July 2010. p. e1.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100075.pdf
            25 Duval County Public Schools. “Application for Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund Program. CFDA

                #84.285A. PR/Award #385A100121.” 6 July 2010, p. e1.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100121.pdf

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                      Name of          Size of         Unit of                                                 Maximum
      District                                                              Performance Measures
                      Program         Program       Accountability                                           Size of Bonus
                                                                       -Value-added growth modeling              $14,000
    Fort Worth
                                                                       using standardized test scores           (teacher);
   Independent          PEAK                        -Team (four
                                                                       -Campus Scorecard                         $10,000
      School           Rewards        15 schools    different kinds)
                                                                       -Individual Development and            (principal at
     District          Program                      -Individual
                                                                       Evaluation Scorecard                   high school
      (TX)26
                                                                       -Observations and evaluations              level)
                                                                       -Value-added growth modeling
                                                                       using standardized test scores
                                                                       -Teacher Effectiveness Measure,
   Memphis City
                                                    -School            an evaluation system in progress
     Schools         In the Zone      28 schools                                                                      —
                                                    -Individual        that incorporates measures of
      (TN)27
                                                                       student learning growth, teacher
                                                                       observations, surveys, and teacher
                                                                       content knowledge
                                                                       -Standardized test scores
                                                                       -Completion of a portfolio and
   Round Rock        Round Rock
                                                                       oral presentation
   Independent      Incentives for                                                                               $10,000
                                                    -School            -Evidence of participation in
      School           Superior        7 schools                                                              (teacher and
                                                    -Individual        leadership roles
     District         Education                                                                                 principal)
                                                                       -Participation in collaborative
      (TX)28           (RRISE)
                                                                       meetings
                                                                       -Observations and evaluations
                                                                       -School-wide reward structure
                                                                       -Rewards based on a “report
    New York         School-Wide                                       card” grade given to each school
    City Public      Performance                                       -Rewards based on scholastic            $3,000 per
                                     205 schools    -School
     Schools29          Bonus                                          achievement, attendance, school       union member
       (NY)            Program                                         environment as measured by
                                                                       surveys, and growth compared to
                                                                       prior years and peer schools

            26 Fort Worth Independent School District. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund
                Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100138.” 6 July 2010, p. e5.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100138.pdf
            27 Memphis City Schools. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund Program. CFDA

                #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100144.” 6 July 2010, p. e7.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100144.pdf
            28 Round Rock Independent School District. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund

                Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100065.” 6 July 2010, p. e3.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100065.pdf
            29 “New York City’s School-Wide Performance Bonus Program.” Center for Educator Compensation Reform.

                October 2010. http://cecr.ed.gov/pdfs/summaries/CECR_CS_NYC_PerfBonusProgram.pdf

© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice                                                                    12
HANOVER RESEARCH                                                                                                   FEBRUARY 2012

                      Name of           Size of          Unit of                                                    Maximum
      District                                                                 Performance Measures
                      Program          Program        Accountability                                              Size of Bonus
                                                                          -Student progress measured by
                                                                          Terra Nova and ACT
                                                                          standardized tests
                                                                          -Teacher evaluation via classroom
      Ohio
                    Ohio Teacher                      -Individual         observation, standards-based
    Department
                     Incentive        105 schools     -Team               evaluation, and other measures              $4,000
        of
                       Fund                           -School             -Other measures of progress
    Education30
                                                                          include graduation rate,
                                                                          performance index scores, ACT
                                                                          college readiness scores, AP
                                                                          participation rates
                                                                          -60% of teacher evaluation based
                                                                          on classroom observation, 40%
      School
                     Empowering                                           on student learning gains as
    District of
                      Effective                                           measured by standardized tests
   Hillsborough                            254        -Individual                                                          —
                      Teachers                                            -500 district-developed end of
    County31
                      Initiative                                          course examinations, testing
        (FL)
                                                                          student performance in all
                                                                          subjects including music and art
                                                                          -Seven criteria for evaluation
                                                                          based on national leadership
                                                                          standards
                                                                          -Four-level evaluation rubric to
                        PULSE                                             identify phases of
     Pittsburgh       (Pittsburgh                                         accomplishment
       Public           Urban                         -Individual         -Evaluated standards include the
                                           65                                                                         $2,000
      Schools         Leadership                      (principals only)   principal’s management of and
        (PA)          System for                                          vision for learning, his
                     Excellence)32                                        relationship with the community,
                                                                          the application of ethics and
                                                                          integrity, and his ability to engage
                                                                          school staff in leadership
                                                                          initiatives

            30 “Application for New Grants Under TIF Program, Ohio DOE.” Department of Education. 2010.
                http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100100.pdf
            31 Steele, J. et al. 2010. Incorporating Student Performance Measures into Teacher Evaluation Systems.” Rand

                Corporation. P. 14. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/pdf/student_teacher_eval.pdf
            32 “PULSE.” Pittsburgh Public Schools.

                http://www.pps.k12.pa.us/14311043013230450/lib/14311043013230450/PULSE_Executive_Summary.p
                df

© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice                                                                        13
HANOVER RESEARCH                                                                                             FEBRUARY 2012

                      Name of          Size of         Unit of                                                 Maximum
      District                                                              Performance Measures
                      Program         Program       Accountability                                           Size of Bonus
                                                                       -Two classroom observation
                                                                       periods are required each year
                                                                       -Value-added growth modeling
    Oregon City      Performance                                                                                 $8,200
                                                                       using standardized test scores
      School            Based                       -Individual                                                (teachers)
                                           6                           -Evaluation based on leadership
     District33     Compensation                    -School                                                     $16,000
                                                                       activities such as mentoring,
       (OR)            System                                                                                 (principals)
                                                                       leading a model classroom,
                                                                       participating in peer review, and
                                                                       facilitating leadership group.
                                                                       -Evaluation based 50% on
                                                                       student achievement, 50% on
                                                                       performance
                                                                       -Performance measured by
                                                                       preparation for instruction and
                                                                       delivery of instruction, need-
                                                                       based intervention, leadership,          Salary of
     Harrison
                      The E&R                                          and professionalism. Based on          $90,000 per
      School
                         Plan                       -Individual        two annual observations.                 year; max
     District                             25
                    (Effectiveness                  -School            -Multiple measures of student           increase of
      Two34
                     and Results)                                      achievement used by grade and           $10,000 in
       (CO)
                                                                       subject level. School performance     salary per year
                                                                       accounts for a small portion.
                                                                       -Teachers move up through nine
                                                                       effectiveness levels which
                                                                       determine their salary, rather than
                                                                       receiving salary based on years of
                                                                       service.

            33 “Performance Based Compensation System and Teacher Leadership.” Oregon City Public Schools.
                https://wiki.orecity.k12.or.us/groups/chalkboardclassprojectwiki/wiki/ec6de/
            34 “E&R Teacher Pay for Performance Plan.” Harrison School District Two.

                http://www.harrison.k12.co.us/departments/human-resources/eandr

© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice                                                                     14
HANOVER RESEARCH                                                                                           FEBRUARY 2012

                        Name of        Size of         Unit of                                              Maximum
      District                                                           Performance Measures
                        Program       Program       Accountability                                        Size of Bonus
                                                                     -Individual responsibilities
                                                                     -Instructional performance based
                                                                     on classroom observation.
                                                                     Master teachers are eligible for a
                                                                     20% salary bonus, mentor and
                                                                     career teachers eligible for a 30%
                                                                     salary bonus.
                                                                     -Student achievement measured
                                                                     through a value-added growth
                                                                     model. Administrative teams
                                                                     bonus structures are based on
                                                                     school value added student
      South                                                                                                  $10,000
                                                                     growth (75%) and the school
     Carolina                                                                                                (overall)
                         South                                       program review rating (25%).
    Department                            71        -Individual
                      Carolina TAP                                   Master and mentor teachers who
        of                                                                                                   $14,000
                                                                     teach areas tested on state test
    Education35                                                                                           (administrators)
                                                                     eligible for 20% salary bonus
                                                                     based on student growth, career
                                                                     teachers are eligible for 30%
                                                                     salary bonus.
                                                                     Master, mentor, and career
                                                                     teachers who teach areas not
                                                                     tested on state test eligible for
                                                                     range of 20%-35% of salary
                                                                     based on school performance on
                                                                     state tests.
                                                                     -Average scores on multiple
                                                                     evaluations of classroom teaching

            35   “South Carolina TAP (SC TAP).” South Carolina State Department of Education.
                  http://ed.sc.gov/agency/se/School-Transformation/TAP/?CFID=5136069&CFTOKEN=57042306

© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice                                                                   15
HANOVER RESEARCH                                                                              FEBRUARY 2012

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