Policy Paper Go big or go home - How to make European industrial policy work - Bertelsmann Stiftung
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Policy Paper
Go big or go home 25 May 2021
How to make European industrial policy work #IndustrialPolicy
#EUInvestment
Nils Redeker, Jacques Delors Centre #Recovery
When it comes to industrial policy, the EU remains big in ambition but
meager in substance. This is not surprising. With its renewed strate-
gy, the EU Commission aims to follow the international trend towards
more active industrial policy. However, it has to do so within a frame-
work that was designed to discourage – indeed even prevent – the in-
vestment-centered policies at the heart of the current discussion. For
the EU’s industrial strategy to really have teeth, it needs new financial
instruments, a stronger macroeconomic focus on growth and employ-
ment and better governance. I
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 What is industrial policy and why are we debating it now?. . . . . . . . . 1
2
What does the EU plan on industrial policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3
Three levers to make EU industrial policy work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 EU industrial policy needs new financial instruments. . . . . . . . . 4
3.2
The EU needs to pursue broader macroeconomic
goals through a wider set of projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 EU industrial policy needs better governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
On the same topic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
II
Introduction
On May 5, the European Commission published the long-awaited update to its “For the moment,
new industrial strategy. Yet, even though industrial policy has made a striking the strategy remains
comeback in the public policy debate and the Commission has declared the strate-
big in ambition but
gy as a core initiative of its tenure, the update offers little that can pass for new, let
meager in substance.”
alone novel. The Commission has done a lot of work analyzing strategic depend-
encies and the needs of important ecosystems but spent little effort on how to
address them. For the moment, the strategy remains big in ambition but meager
in substance.
It is hard to blame the Commission for this. EU industrial policy suffers from two
fundamental challenges that are difficult to overcome in a couple of communica-
tions. First, the EU lacks the resources to pursue an ambitious investment-oriented
strategy. Second, member states remain divided on what they want from indus-
trial policy. While some push for big investments, others caution against subsidy
races and economic divergence. The conflicts among member states and within
the Commission were one of the main reasons why the strategy was postponed
several times. They also help to explain why the final outcome is underwhelming.
This paper argues that if the strategy is to grow some teeth, three fundamental
changes are needed. First, real industrial policy is not available on the cheap. To
implement industrial policies in line with the stated ambitions, the EU needs new
financial instruments. Second, the EU must raise its game when it comes to solving
the macroeconomic trade-offs and accounting for the distributional consequenc-
es of industrial policies. The current focus on global competitiveness makes it hard
to achieve broader economic goals and instead concentrates any direct benefits
among a handful of member states and small segments of the labor market. To
become an attractive strategy, the portfolio of projects needs to be broadened to
pursue goals such as employment and cohesion. Finally, the Commission needs to
take on board the governance challenges of industrial policy. To convince skeptics
of more targeted public investment, the strategy should develop a more credible
framework to avoid sinking money and falling prey to political capture.
1 What is industrial policy and why are we
debating it now?
Defining industrial policy is not a trivial task. Broadly speaking, industrial poli-
cies aim to stimulate economic activity in specific sectors or promote structural
change (Rodrik 2008). The term is, thus, not so much about instruments as about
goals. Whenever policymakers intervene in the economy with the declared objec-
tive of reaching a specific industry-related goal (e.g. safeguarding international
competitiveness, reducing the carbon footprint of industry or increasing jobs in
manufacturing) they are in principle pursuing industrial policies.
Industrial policies can, therefore, cover the entire palette of economic policymak-
ing that is conducive to reaching these goals. Industrial policy can be horizontal
(i.e. general policies that affect the entire economy such as tax cuts for all R&D
expenses or carbon pricing) or vertical (i.e. measures that target specific sectors,
1/11firms or technologies such as targeted business subsidies or import tariffs). It can
be pursued through regulation or via public spending. Depending on the goal at
hand, industrial policy may comprise any government action from subsidies via
infrastructure spending to setting trade policy or environmental standards.
Of course, the idea that governments intervene in the economy to produce cer- “Industrial policy
tain outcomes is nothing new. In fact, most horizontal and regulatory forms of
today is mostly
industrial policy are so ubiquitous that they are hardly ever debated as such. What
discussed as sus-
has changed in recent years, however, is that some forms of industrial policy have
made a comeback within the political debate. This includes, above all, the idea that tained targeted
governments should use fiscal resources to vertically support long-term structural public investment.”
change in specific sectors or industries. In that sense, industrial policy today is
mostly discussed as sustained targeted public investment.
The reasons for this renaissance are threefold:
• Better data and more sophisticated methods have dispelled the long-hold cli-
ché that such interventions always fritter away taxpayer money and entrench
ineffective structures (Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich 2010; Criscuolo et al.
2019; Lane 2020). So, while the economic literature, for a long time, has mostly
preached principled restraint, the academic debate is now increasingly shift-
ing towards creating the conditions for industrial policies to succeed (Aiginger
and Rodrik 2020).
• There is a growing conviction amongst policy makers that the structural chal-
lenges of climate as well as technological change require state intervention
(Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; Mazzucato 2015). Market failures in both do-
mains require broad government investment and justify spending public mon-
ey to spur technological innovation and diffusion as well as to mitigate or elim-
inate avoid the dangers climate change. presents.
• Geopolitics have changed the picture. The rise of China is often seen as a direct
consequence of its broad deployment of industrial policies and many state-
backed Chinese firms now directly compete with European companies in key
sectors (Redeker and Stahl 2020). As a consequence, policymakers in the EU are
not only concerned that Europe could lose the absolute benefits of high-value
added jobs and production in Europe. There is also a growing conviction that
the resulting dependencies on foreign inputs in key areas of production pose
risks and could be weaponized in geopolitical conflicts (Freudlsperger, Knudsen,
and Redeker 2020).
2/112 What does the EU plan on industrial policy?
There are thus good reasons why industrial policy features high on the EU’s policy
agenda. However, the new investment-oriented policies discussed above do not
come naturally to the EU because it has so far harbored a twin bias against such
policies:
• First, the EU has a lot of regulatory competences but only limited financial re-
sources. This has propelled it in the past towards favoring regulatory over invest-
ment-oriented industrial policy tools. From harmonizing regulation and setting
common standards to exercising its exclusive competences on trade and compe-
tition, the EU has a lot of instruments available to set the framework conditions
for private investment. However, it lacks resources to pursue joint investment
strategies. The EU’s budget is small, famously inflexible and the by-far the larg-
est items – regional funds and common agriculture policy – remain co-managed
with member states.
• Second, a central part of the single market agenda was to restrict investment-cen- “A central part
tered industrial policies at national level. To avoid subsidy races between mem- of the single
ber states, the Treaties have introduced strict limits on national state aid and put
market agenda
the Commission in charge of making sure that exemptions are only granted if
state support does not distort competition. As a result, average state aid provi-
was to restrict
sion in the EU has declined from about 3% in the 1970s to about less than 0.75% investment-
of GDP in the 2010s and remains low in global comparison (European Commis- centered indus-
sion 2019; Landesmann and Stöllinger 2020). By design, the EU is, therefore, bi- trial policies
ased towards preventing rather than promoting national investment-oriented at national level.”
industrial policies.
The current debate puts the EU in an odd spot: It has increased the pressure on the
EU to formulate a common response to the return of industrial policies but forces
it to do so within a framework that was explicitly designed to discourage – indeed
to prevent – the kind of policies that seem the most effective. The strategy docu-
ments show how difficult it is to navigate this discrepancy.
The tone of both the original strategy and the recent update is highly ambitious.
Both list a wide set of goals for EU policy in the area ranging from climate neutral-
ity by 2050 to dealing with the economic consequences of the pandemic and safe-
guarding the competitiveness of European businesses. The update adds fostering
the resilience of some critical supply chains and emphasizes the need to reduce
dependencies on foreign inputs in strategic areas. Yet, both documents contain
little by way of concrete and novel measures to substantiate their ambitions.
Much of their focus is on regulation and restating a well-established agenda. For
example, last year’s strategy reiterated the EU’s long-standing objective of deep-
ening the single market by removing regulatory barriers. It also reaffirmed the
Commission’s emphasis on working towards a better-integrated Capital Markets
Union (CMU) and announced new environmental and safety standards, for exam-
ple, for batteries, textiles and recyclable products. The May 2021 update comple-
ments these familiar pledges with new reports and monitoring devices to check
harmonization progress and adds improved European intellectual property rights
to the regulatory agenda.
3/11On trade, the strategy includes some new measures such as tools to mitigate the
distortive effects of foreign subsidies in the single market.1 The update follows up
with a detailed analysis of Europe’s strategic dependencies and announces moves
to start exploring “international partnerships and cooperation to address them”
without going into much detail on what this would look like in practice.
On investment, the documents largely rely on existing European programs and
budget items. To finance its industrial strategy the Commission by and large sin-
gles out Horizon Europe, the Digital Europe Program and InvestEU. Moreover, more
national resources are supposed to be mobilized through so so-called Important
Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs). This framework – which has been
in place since 2006 – relaxes state aid rules for private-public partnerships in mul-
ti-country projects “which make an important contribution to economic growth,
jobs and the competitiveness of the EU.” So far, the instrument has only been used
twice – once for a joint project on microelectronics (started in 2018 by Germany, It-
aly and Spain) and once for the new Battery alliance (kicked off in 2019 by Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden).
Last year’s strategy encouraged member states to add new projects to the list
including joint investments in hydrogen, low carbon industries and cloud com-
puting and announced a revision to some of the rules on the eligibility criteria
to make them clearer. This year’s update reiterated the need for more IPCEIs and
declared the possibility for some co-financing through the European budget. In
addition, the new document also announces a review of European state aid rules
on environmental subsidies.
Overall, the Commission’s recent industrial strategy and its update reflect a grow-
ing gap between rhetoric and reality in European industrial policymaking: The
EU is attempting to follow the international trend towards more active invest-
ment-oriented industrial policy but it lacks the means to support these ambi-
tions with concrete policy measures. To overcome these constraints, fundamental
changes are needed.
3
Three levers to make EU industrial policy work
Three things are necessary to make EU industrial policy work: new financial in-
struments; a stronger macroeconomic focus on growth and employment; better
governance.
3.1 EU industrial policy needs new financial instruments
European industrial policy needs common resources. The current lack of funding “The current lack
forces the EU to choose between going small or going national. Both are bad op- of funding forces
tions. Going small would mean that EU industrial policy makes do with the limited the EU to choose
resources it has. In practice, this implies focusing investment efforts on a couple between going small
of hand-picked initiatives. However, industrial policy projects are meant to take
or going national.
societally desirable risks the private sector is unwilling to take. By design, they are
therefore risky bets and some of them will fail. To be successful, industrial policies
Both are bad options.”
1
European Commission (2021): Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of
the COUNCIL on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. Brussels, 05.05.2021. 4/11therefore need to be able to spread risks through a diversified set of projects (e.g.
Hallegatte, Fay, and Vogt-Schilb 2013). Operating under tight budget constraints,
in contrast, concentrates risks on a few initiatives and makes it politically difficult
to abandon underperforming undertakings.
This problem could have been temporarily mitigated by accessing the addition-
al funds available from the Recovery Instrument (RI). In fact, the €360 billion in
grants provided under the RI opens the door in principle for member states to
invest in common projects. However, appetite by member states for cross-country
investment(s) seems limited and in any case the RI only allows for a short-term
splash. The funds need to be fully committed by 2023 and spent by 2026. A tempo-
rary instrument, therefore, hardly provides a good set-up for the sustained long-
term investment needed.
The only alternative to going small therefore remains to lift the restrictions on na-
tional state aid. However, going national would be inefficient. Decisions on whether
projects with European value-added are funded or not should be based on EU-lev-
el economic considerations, not on whether the respective national government
considers it viable or is able to afford them. If, for example, it makes sense from
a European perspective to use solar energy for the production of European green
hydrogen, realizing this should not hinge on whether governments in the sunnier
parts of Europe happen to have the political will and the resources to invest in it.
Moreover, state aid rules are restrictive for good reasons and simply relaxing them
would risk unfair competition, economic divergence and political conflict. The Com-
mission’s push to widen the scope of IPCEIs, for example, has already been wel-
comed by France and Germany but has raised criticism from other member states
which stressed the “risk of disproportionately harming competition” and empha-
sized that “not all members states have the same financial or human resources
to participate.” Relaxing state aid rules, thus, tends to pitch the interest of some
member states against those of others. Politically, this is a recipe for deadlock.
To escape a choice between two evils, EU industrial policy therefore needs new finan- “To escape a choice
cial instruments. One immediate measure would be to change the funding structures between two evils,
of IPCEIs. Under the current framework, national state aid rules are relaxed but mem-
EU industrial policy
ber states still fund their own companies or project parts. To really open the frame-
needs new financial
work for all member states and make sure that funds are deployed in the economi-
cally most useful way, this should be changed into a joint funding structure in which instruments.”
participating states pay into a common pot that finances projects across all countries.
Beyond the narrow scope of IPCEIs, the need for common industrial policy, however,
also underlines the need for far broader reforms of the EU’s fiscal resources. The
Recovery Instrument has settled the question whether the EU can raise common
debt to fund common expenditures (Guttenberg, Hemker, and Tordoir 2021). At the
moment, this option is clearly limited in time and restricted to the consequences of
the pandemic. However, joint projects that safeguard European public goods such
as the green transition, economic resilience and global competitiveness provide a
textbook example for why the EU needs a permanent successor to the Recovery In-
strument. Without the option to finance European industrial policy projects more
flexibly and/or, where appropriate, through common debt, the EU will remain on
the defensive against deep-pocketed competitors such as China or the US. 5/11Summary: European industrial policy needs common funding.
• Short-term: change the funding structures of IPCEIs into common pots
that fund projects in all participating countries
• Long-term: work on a permanent successor to the Recovery Instrument (RI)
that allows for raising common debt to finance joint industrial policy projects
3.2 The EU needs to pursue broader macroeconomic goals through a
wider set of projects
Second, EU industrial policy needs a stronger focus on growth and employment.
One of the main ways in which industrial policies work is that they create artificial
rents for private actors. By, say, investing public money in charging stations for
electric vehicles (EVs), policymakers create the conditions for EV manufacturers
to make money by selling such cars. Of course, by putting money into charging
stations, the state also decides not to spend it somewhere else. While allocative in
nature, industrial policies, thus, have distributional consequences and the ques-
tion of who benefits from state support is central.
On paper, the Commission tends to portray its current approach as a catch-all “The focus on glob-
strategy that delivers more jobs, competitiveness, cohesion and the structural al competitiveness
transition all at the same time. In practice, however, the strong focus on global
risks concentrating
competitiveness and high-tech sectors risks concentrating the strategy’s direct
the strategy’s direct
benefits amongst a relatively small number of regions, firms and workers.
benefits amongst a
Figure 1: Distribution of high-tech intensive regions across Europe. relatively small num-
ber of regions, firms
and workers.”
Own calculations based on Eurostat (2021).
Much of the current strategy focuses on geo-economically important high-tech
sectors such as semi-conductors, microchips, data cloud technology and space en-
gineering. On the one hand, this has implications for where projects will be fund-
ed. To maximize the competitiveness of such sectors, these projects will need to
be placed in regions where other high-tech industries exist and undertakings can
benefit from agglomeration and spill-over (cluster) effects (Moretti 2019). Howev-
er, Figure 1 shows that this also means that support will need to be funneled into
relatively rich regions with comparatively little slack in local labor markets. As a re-
sult, the direct employment effect will be small and concentrated in core countries. 6/11On the other hand, the focus on geoeconomic competitiveness also has implica- tions for the distributional benefits of industrial policy at project level. As an ex- ample, Figure 2 plots labor intensity and average wages in microelectronics and battery production – two areas in which the EU plans to invest – compared to all other sectors in the EU. Both sectors are relatively capital-intensive and offer high average wages. Compared to other possible sectors, industrial policies in these areas are, therefore, likely to mainly benefit capital owners and result in relatively little direct jobs growth for relatively high-income employees. Figure 2: Labor intensity and average wages of selected industrial policy sectors. Figures show distribution across all sectors (NACE 2) in the EU. The respective sectors (C2610; C2611; C2680; C2620; C2720) are colored in blue. Source: own calculations based on Eurostat (2021). Data from 2018. This does not mean that investments with concentrated direct beneficiaries are futile and there are good arguments – not least their central importance in down- stream supply chains –to justify targeted investments in areas such as microchips and batteries. What is problematic, however, is that the Commission’s current fo- cus on these sectors buries the trade-offs under the language of common Europe- an interests and disregards other important policy goals such as stimulating em- ployment growth. Given that Europe is facing its deepest recession in decades, it is striking that the industrial strategy comes with very little analysis of the broader macroeconomic impact of the planned projects. For the EU’s industrial strategy to deliver on the broader macroeconomic goals it has set for itself, it needs equally a broader set of projects and a stronger focus on growth and employment. To do so, the EU should first analyze the expected growth and employment multipliers of all potential projects with a special focus on what kinds of jobs are likely to be created and where. Such an analysis could complement current documents that focus on mapping strategic dependencies. This analysis should then be an important factor in picking projects such as IPCEIs and weighing the overall portfolio of industries and sectors that benefit from Eu- ropean resources. Support for capital-intensive industries in which direct bene- fits are concentrated need to be complemented with industrial policies in sectors with higher job intensity. The projected IPCEI on green hydrogen, for example, is not only likely to result in a greater geographical spread as it requires high-tech manufacturing and the production of climate-neutral energy along coast lines and in the European South. Depending on how this energy is produced it could further offer employment opportunities for less-skilled workers (Muro et al. 2019). In the short run, already planned projects with a broader set of direct beneficiar- 7/11
ies should, therefore, be prioritized. In the long run, expected employment effects
should be a key priority when selecting future European industrial projects.
Summary: Industrial policy has important distributional implications and the
EU’s focus on geo-economic competitiveness risks concentrating the internal
benefits amongst few regions, firms and employees.
• Analyze the expected internal growth and employment multipliers of all
projects under consideration with a special focus on what jobs are going to
be created and where.
• Complement projects with concentrated direct beneficiaries with invest-
ments that have broader growth and employment effects.
3.3 EU industrial policy needs better governance
Finally, EU industrial policy needs better governance. While there is a growing con- “Getting industrial
viction that targeted investment policies are needed, getting this right remains policy right remains
complicated and comes with tangible risks of government failure. Many member complicated and
states and parts of the Commission, therefore, remain highly skeptical of a return
comes with tangible
to naïve dirigisme and picking European winners. These concerns are valid and
need to be addressed.
risks of government
failure.”
To minimize the risk that industrial policy falls prey to political capture and sink-
ing good money into bad projects, research usually suggests four principles: first,
working closely with a broad set of market actors to gather information and iden-
tify the relevant investment needs; second, formulating clear and measurable tar-
gets for what should be achieved; third, keeping support as horizontal as possible
to avoid picking winners; and, fourth, having a transparent exit plan when invest-
ments don’t work out (Aiginger and Rodrik 2020). The new strategy falls short of
establishing such provisions.
Much of the Commission’s effort focuses on the first point, that is, gathering infor-
mation and working closely with the private sector to identify investment needs.
The new update comes with an in-depth analysis of strategic dependencies and
the main challenges in 14 important ecosystems.2 Similarly, IPCEIs are usually ac-
companied by so-called Industrial Alliances that comprise representatives from in-
dustry, trade unions and NGOs and consult policymakers on the implementation
of industrial plans.
However, there is little in the strategy on how to measure success, avoid favoring
specific undertakings or exit projects if they do not pan out.3 Responsibilities for
EU funds for industrial policies remain scattered across a host of different pro-
grams and directorates depending on the funding sources used. Likewise, the gov-
ernance of IPCEIs as the main instrument for member state-driven investments
2
European Commission (2021): Annual Single Market Report 2021. Brussels, 05.05.2021.
3
The new update introduced some key performance indicators (KPIs) that are supposed to
track the progress of the overall strategy but the indicators are so macro that it is hard to
see how one would establish a direct link to any political efforts 8/11is decided ad hoc4 and, so far, usually comprises representatives from each par-
ticipating state, industry officials and “guests” from the European Commission.
There is no guideline on what the powers of these supervisory boards are, how
they base their assessments of success and what they do if targets are not met.
Finally, recent media reports about direct negotiations between DG GROW and
the CEOs of big microchip producers over the conditions for possible investments
in the EU have fueled the notion that the current strategy could open the door for
old-school forms of picking winners.5
To convince the skeptics of a more assertive European industrial strategy, the EU
needs to take the governance of industrial policy much more seriously. First, in-
dustrial policy needs clear targets and exit plans. As part of its review of the rules
governing IPCEIs the Commission should, for example, make it mandatory to in-
clude a clear set of targets and schedules that have to be met to sustain public
funding. These plans also need to spell out rules for when and under what circum-
stances targets may be adapted or changed and include exit strategies for each
underperforming undertaking. Above all, if European resources are on the line, the
Commission should also have an active say within the supervisory boards of IPCEIs
and similar provisions should apply to all industrial policy projects that benefit
from European funding.
Second, EU industrial policy needs strong provisions against political capture and “EU industrial
picking winners. Research shows that support is most effective if it is not tailored policy needs strong
to specific firms or undertakings but works in tandem with competition by draw-
provisions against
ing as many firms as possible into the targeted sectors (Aghion et al. 2015). All EU
political capture and
industrial policy making therefore should include clear rules ensuring that public
funds are provided on equal terms to all companies active in the sector in question. picking winners.”
On the one hand, this applies to existing programs such as IPCEIs or projects fund-
ed by the European budget. On the other hand, it should be included as a general
rule for all future EU industrial policy projects.
Summary: Doing industrial policy right hinges upon tight governance. The cur-
rent strategy fails to incorporate central lessons learned from the literature.
• Equip all industrial policy projects that include European resources with
clear plans on targets, reviews and potential exit strategies.
• Include strong provisions against picking winner modes in all forms of EU
industrial policy making.
4
Nicolaides (2020): An Important (and so far, Unique) Project of Common European Interest.
12.02.2020.
5
Politico (2021): Breton to discuss new chip plant with Intel CEO, TSMC next week. Brussels,
23.04.2021. 9/11Literature
• Aghion, Philippe et al. 2015. “Industrial Policy and Competition.” American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(4): 1–32.
• Aiginger, Karl, and Dani Rodrik. 2020. “Rebirth of Industrial Policy and an Agenda
for the Twenty-First Century.” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 20(2):
189–207.
• Becker, Sascha O, Peter H Egger, and Maximilian von Ehrlich. 2010. “Going NUTS:
The Effect of EU Structural Funds on Regional Performance.” Journal of Public
Economics 94(9–10): 578–90.
• Criscuolo, Chiara, Ralf Martin, Henry G Overman, and John Van Reenen. 2019.
“Some Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy.” American Economic Review 109(1):
48–85.
• European Commission. 2019. State Aid Scoreboard 2019. Brussels.
• Freudlsperger, Christian, Edward Knudsen, and Nils Redeker. 2020. “Trans
atlantic Trade Post-Trump: Priorities for a Pragmatic Reset.” Jacques Delors
Centre Policy Paper.
• Guttenberg, Lucas, Johannes Hemker, and Sander Tordoir. 2021. “Everything Will
Be Different: How the Pandemic Is Changing EU Economic Governance.” Jacques
Delors Centre Policy Paper (February): 1–5.
• Hallegatte, Stéphane, Marianne Fay, and Adrien Vogt-Schilb. 2013. “Green In-
dustrial Policies – When and How.” World Bank Policy Research Working Papers
(October): 26.
• Jaffe, Adam B., Richard G. Newell, and Robert N. Stavins. 2005. “A Tale of Two
Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy.” Ecological Economics
54(2–3): 164–74.
• Landesmann, Michael, and Roman Stöllinger. 2020. “The European Union’s
Industrial Policy: What Are the Main Challenges?” wiiw Policy Notes and Reports
36(January).
• Lane, Nathaniel. 2020. “The New Empirics of Industrial Policy.” Journal of Indus-
try, Competition and Trade 20(2): 209–34.
• Mazzucato, Mariana. 2015. “The Green Entrepreneurial State.” SWPS 2015 28.
• Moretti, Enrico. 2019. “The Effect of High-Tech Clusters on the Productivity of Top
Inventors.” NBER Working Paper (12610): No. 26270.
• Muro, Mark, Adie Tomer, Ranjitha Shivaram, and Joseph Kane. 2019. “Clean
Energy Jobs.” Brookings Paper Metropolitan Policy Program (April).
• Redeker, Nils, and Anna Stahl. 2020. “Pushed by the Pandemic – Shaping
Europe’s Changing Geo-Economic Relations with China.” Jacques Delors Centre
Policy Paper.
• Rodrik, Dani. 2008. “Normalizing Industrial Policy.” World Bank – Commission
on Growth and Development Working Paper Series.
10/11On the same topic • Lucas Guttenberg, Johannes Hemker, Sander Tordoir Everything will be different: How the pandemic is changing EU economic governance Jacques Delors Centre, Policy Brief, February 2021 • Anke S. Obendiek Take back control? Digital sovereignty and a vision for Europe Jacques Delors Centre, Policy Paper, May 2021 • Nils Redeker, Anna Katharina Stahl Pushed by the pandemic: Shaping Europe’s relations with China Jacques Delors Centre, Policy Paper, November 2020 • Henrik Enderlein, Nils Redeker, Lucas Guttenberg Beyond Industrial Policy: New Growth for Europe Jacques Delors Centre, Policy Paper, October 2019 Hertie School gGmbH • Chairman of the Supervisory Board: Bernd Knobloch • Chairman of the Board of Trustees: Frank Mattern • Managing Director: Prof. Mark Hallerberg, PhD, Dr. Axel Baisch • Registered Office: Berlin • Trade Register: Local Court, Berlin-Charlottenburg HRB 97018 B • Hertie School – founded and supported by the non-profit Hertie Foundation Image © Sam Moqadam, Source: Unsplash Friedrichstraße 194 Online: delorscentre.eu D – 10117 Berlin E-Mail: info@delorscentre.eu Tel.: +49 (0)30/259 219 107 Twitter: @delorsberlin 11/11
You can also read
