POPULISM AND FASCISM AN EVALUATION OF THEIR SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES - MA THESIS IN PHILOSOPHY - UVA SCRIPTIES
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Populism and Fascism
An evaluation of their similarities and differences
MA Thesis in Philosophy
University of Amsterdam
Graduate School of Humanities
Titus Vreeke
Student number: 10171169
Supervisor: Dr. Robin Celikates
Date: 04-08-2017
1Table of Contents
Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 3
1. Ideology ............................................................................................................................................. 8
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 8
1.2 Populism and fascism as ideologies ........................................................................................................ 9
1.3 The Dichotomies of Populism and Fascism ........................................................................................... 13
1.4 Culture and Nationalism in Populism and Fascism ............................................................................... 19
1.5 The Form of the State and its Role in Security ...................................................................................... 22
1.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 25
2. Practice ................................................................................................................................................ 28
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 28
2.2 Organizational structure of populism and fascism and the importance of leadership ......................... 29
2.3 Propaganda and the use of media ........................................................................................................ 35
2.4 Role of Emotion ..................................................................................................................................... 40
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 43
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 45
Literature ................................................................................................................................................. 48
2Introduction
In recent years, populism has been a popular and highly debated topic. With the electoral successes of
populist leaders and parties all around the world, the media as well as the scientific community have
jumped on the subject to analyse its role and place in Western democracies. In some of the discussions in
the media, populism is being discussed alongside fascism. The opinions on the subject are diverse. Some
of the articles highlight similarities between populism and fascism, arguing that populism is a new, modern
form of fascism. A column in the Dutch newspaper ‘De Volkskrant’ (Huseman 2017) for example, warns
for the extreme polarization in politics. The author argues that this polarization is partially caused by the
rising populist parties and compares this situation to the 1930’s, when the European fascist leaders started
their rise to power. Another Dutch article in newspaper ‘Vrij Nederland’ (Broer 2017) points out several
similarities between populism and fascism, using observations on fascism from an article by political
scientist Robert Paxton (2004). The discussed similarities between populism and fascism include the
creation of a common enemy, taking on the role of the victim and emphasizing a commonly felt social
crisis.
There are however, also plenty of newspaper articles and columns that defend populism from
these accusations and attempt to correct them by pointing out differences between populism and fascism.
An article in another Dutch Newspaper ‘Trouw’ (Klijn and Te Sla 2010), states that the common assimilation
of populism and fascism distorts the discussion surrounding populism by focusing on the wrong attributes
of populism. Populism, the authors claim, is much less extreme than fascism and has no true ideological
standpoints as fascism is known to have. We would be better off discussing populism and its standpoints
separately rather than merely making comparisons with the extremist ideology of fascism.
I do not agree with this last statement. I believe the debate that is stirred up by these comparisons
is an interesting one and it is why I explore it more thoroughly in this thesis. The various authors seem to
prioritize and interpret features of populism and fascism differently. There is no denying that there are
some characteristics of contemporary populism that are reminiscent of fascism, but are they the same?
Or are they so minutely similar that a comparison quickly becomes an exaggeration of the similarities. In
this paper I investigate populism and fascism alongside each other. Ultimately, I aim to distil whether an
assimilation of populism to fascism is justifiable and on what features this assimilation holds or falters. I
discuss the ideologies over the course of two chapters that address the ideology and practice of populism
and fascism. I will introduce the specific contents of the chapters in detail in the respective introductions
but I will start with a more general overview here.
3The first chapter contains a discussion of the ideological differences and similarities between populism
and fascism. Both ideologies are difficult to typify as ideologies for their own separate reasons. Populism
is generally understood as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde 2004: 544), which means that the ideology
does not carry a complete idea of how society should be organized. Instead populism relies on an
attachment to other, full ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism or socialism (Freeden 1998: 752) to
answer these questions. The result of this is that populism comes in many forms, depending on what
ideology it attaches to. Nevertheless, the populist ‘shell’ has very distinct ideological properties which lend
themselves to a comparison with fascism. Fascism as an ideology is somewhat problematic because of the
strong historical connotations attached to the ideology. Although fascism should be understood as a full
ideology (Eatwell 2013, Griffin 1991, Pinto 1986, Sternhell 2008), there is little literature that discusses the
ideology as a concept detached from the historical reality. Most literature discusses the concept in tandem
with German and Italian fascism, thereby clouding the general features of fascist ideology with details that
might be relevant to the specific example, but not necessarily for fascism in general. For these two reasons,
the difference in ‘fullness’ of the ideology and the historical connotations of fascism, populism and fascism
as ideologies are not as straightforward to compare as it might seem.
To work around the difficulties of populism being such a diverse ideology, I focus my discussion on
Western European right-wing populism. Western Europe is starting to develop a rich tradition of right-
wing populism as virtually all Western European countries are home to a successful populist party or
movement (Johansson 2014). Furthermore, most of these parties share a great deal of features. They
generally rely on strong leadership, they are anti-immigration and they oppose globalizing trends and
institutions like the European Union. By centring the ideological discussion on European populism I am
able to provide a clear, concise overview of a common populist ideology. However, this means that my
conclusions are not universally applicable. Although some of my observations regarding populism address
general features of the ideology and could be indicative of more general trends I will not attempt to
generalize my conclusions. My research is centred around West European populism specifically and as
such I have no grounds to make claims beyond that scope.
The common practice of relating fascism to history when discussing the ideology, is difficult to
circumvent. I want to clarify that I do not wish to write a historical account of populism and fascism, nor
relate them historically. I compare the ideologies without considering their genesis or historical relation. I
therefore distil from the literatures those features of fascism that are commonly found in all or most fascist
regimes that have existed, and that have come to be understood as general features of fascism.
Nevertheless, I will at times make use of historical examples to clarify the features I describe. On the same
4note, I will make references to recent events and debates surrounding populists to strengthen my
arguments. It must be clear however, that the goal of these examples is not to define the ideologies, but
to indicate and visualize their general features.
The first chapter consists of three sections. I will introduce them shortly here, a more detailed
overview can be found in the introduction of the chapter. The first section contains a general description
of populism and fascism as ideologies. I introduce the key components of the ideologies and I discuss the
important concepts that I will use throughout the rest of the chapter. In the second section I address the
importance of dichotomies in populist and fascist ideology. Especially populist ideology is characterized by
its Manichean world view. Using theory on inclusion and exclusion by West European populists I discern
and discuss several populist dichotomies, like the people versus the elite and producers versus parasites,
and I show to what extent these dichotomies play a role in fascist ideology. The third section addresses
the role of culture and nationalism. I argue that whereas culture is the central reference point for populists,
the nation is what matters most for fascists. In the fourth and final section I discuss the relation of populism
and fascism to the state and their role in security, specifically focusing on the role of violence in the
ideologies. The preferred form of the state differs between populist and fascist ideology. Although
populism stands in a complicated relationship to representative democracy, it does not advocate
totalitarianism like fascist ideology does. Furthermore, both ideologies highly value security and law and
order, but this has different implications when it comes to the use of violence. Fascism idealizes the active
use of violence and often attributes therapeutic value to it. Populism, like all the common ideologies in
contemporary Western democracies, condones violence as a means of providing security. However,
populists do not actively pursue or encourage the use of violence.
As a general conclusion to this chapter, I argue that the assimilation of populism and fascism on
the basis of ideology is understandable, but cannot be justified. Because of the similarities that exist, it is
not surprising that the two ideologies are often compared to each other. However, when taking a closer
look at these similarities one will find that there are large differences in what the ideologies prioritize in
their relation to culture, state and society.
In the second chapter I turn to a discussion of the practice of populists and fascists. Some
clarifications are in order. With practice, I do not mean the practical undertakings of various historical
regimes or movements. As explained earlier, I do not intend to write a historical account addressing
specific historical events. Instead, what I mean by practice is the general and visible conduct of populist
and fascist parties or movements in the public sphere. Things like propaganda usage and interaction with
the media and the electorate are topics that will be given considerable attention. To accomplish a
5description of practice without solely relying on historical examples, I reference the works of several
important critical theorists. Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, Norbert Guterman and Franz Neumann have
analysed fascist leadership, propaganda and other techniques from a historically neutral perspective. This
makes their work an excellent tool for my purposes. It allows me to describe the workings of fascism
without directly describing historical realities. However, as is the case in the first chapter, I will at times
reference examples from history to clarify and validate the arguments I make.
The second chapter consists of three related sections. The first section contains a discussion of the
organizational structures of populist and fascist parties and movements. I structure this discussion around
three themes: organization, factionalism and leadership. Especially leadership is of key importance for
understanding the structures of the parties and movements. Both the organization and the degree of
factionalism are strongly affected by the importance of the leader. Leadership itself plays a similar role for
populism and fascism. Leaders are a key part of creating a bond between the masses and the movements
they represent. There are differences however. The bond between leader and followers for populism is
one sided, flowing from the electorate towards the leader. In fascism, the bond exists between leader and
followers, but also amongst the members of the mass who identify with each other through their love of
the leader. In the second section I discuss the role of media and propaganda for populism and fascism. I
argue that the current state of the media and the existence of social media allow populists to engage with
their audience in a manner that resembles fascist propaganda. Sensationalist media with a preference for
negative news enable populists to highlight and validate their discontent with certain societal problems.
Both populism and fascism strive under this general state of discontent. Finally, in the third section I
address the role of emotion in populism and fascism by discussing resentment and anxiety. Resentment
plays an important role in creating the common enemy that is pivotal for both populism and fascism.
Anxiety in the population creates the conditions in which populism and fascism can operate. When faced
with anxiety, people tend to look to a strong leader for redemption.
Altogether, the sections lead me to conclude that populism and fascism are highly similar in
practice. There are some minor discrepancies, but in every discussed aspect the general mechanisms and
practices are comparable. However, the question that remains is whether this means populism can be
assimilated to fascism. I believe we cannot draw this conclusion. Instead it is fascism that relies on populist
practices. Populism being a thin-centred ideology, influenced the fascist practices by attaching itself to the
ideology. This is a possible explanation for the frequent comparisons between populism and fascism. They
look and feel the same, but it is not populism that is modelled after fascism. Instead populism has always
been present in fascism and as such they are easily associated with each other.
6This conclusion for a large part informs the general conclusion of this paper. On an ideological level,
populism and fascism show some similarities but not enough to fully equate them with each other. Some
parts of the ideology, like the idealization of violence, are too far apart to warrant this comparison.
However, because of the similarities in practice as well as some smaller ideological similarities, the
comparison is understandable. As mentioned, the question is whether this is because of populism
modelling after fascism or because of fascism inherently carrying populist attributes. From my research I
conclude that it is the latter. The thin-centred nature of populist ideology allows attachment to other
ideologies, as it did to fascism. Fascist leaders made use of populist techniques and rhetoric, but this does
not mean that contemporary populists are fascist because they use these same techniques and rhetoric.
In the case of contemporary Western European populists, the thin-centred ideology has not attached itself
to fascist ideology as the discrepancy between what these populists stand for and what fascism stands for
is too large.
71. Ideology
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter I discuss what similarities and differences exist between populism and fascism on an
ideological level. Both ideologies are difficult to capture in their own way. Populism is a thin-centred
ideology, meaning its shape depends for a large part on the ideology it attaches itself to. Fascism is a full
ideology, however the interpretations of fascism are highly diverse and often depend on what historical
period or regime the concept is related to. In order to investigate populism as a specific ideology, I have
limited myself to investigating the ideology of Western European right-wing populism. The dominant form
of populism in Western Europe has a great deal of features that are ideological in their own right which
allows me to treat European populism as a specific ideology. As for fascism, I remain as historically neutral
as possible but I will at times make references to National Socialism and Italian fascism. It has been argued
that these two regimes are the only truly fascist regimes that have existed in Europe (Payne 1980: 4). There
were many fascist movements and parties throughout the rest of Europe, but none of them rose to power.
Because of this, nearly all literature on fascism discusses the ideology using historical facts that often refer
to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. I distil from these literatures those points that are general for fascist
ideology but I cannot avoid the use of historical examples to clarify these points.
I discuss and compare populist and fascist ideology over the course of four sections. In the first
section I address populism and fascism separately from each other. I explain the difference between thin-
centred and full ideologies and introduce some of the key concepts that I use in the remainder of this
chapter. Introducing them beforehand allows me to make comparisons without continuously having to
clarify the concepts making the remaining sections more concise and to the point. In the second section I
address the inherent dichotomies that are present in both populism and fascism. Making use of theory of
inclusion and exclusion I go over several dimensions that shape the way populism in particular creates and
upholds sharp oppositions between groups in society. I relate these oppositions to a variety of theoretical
claims concerning fascism.
The third section contains a discussion of the role of culture and nationalism in populist and fascist
ideology. Culture is a key concept for populism especially; much of the Western European populist rhetoric
revolves around the protection of culture. Using an example from Dutch politics, I argue that culture is the
most important value in populist ideology. In fascism this is less clear, there the nation is the single most
important entity and culture is only part of this nation. Culture is valuable for fascism, but the main
difference between populism and fascism in regards to culture, is that populism tries to preserve an
8existing culture whilst fascism idealizes a previous culture and tries to restore it to its former glory. The
fourth and final section contains a discussion of populism’s and fascism’s ideas on the form and role of the
state. Populism stands in a complex relation towards liberal representative democracy as it relies on it to
some degree, but at the same time undermines some of its principles. The populist rhetoric and emphasis
on the existence of a general will enables ‘representation without participation’ (Müller 2014: 487) which
slightly pushes the ideology towards a totalitarian outlook on the state and society. The differences to
fascism are still large however. Fascism does away with any pretence of representation and takes the elite
to be more capable of deciding what is good for society. As for the role of the state I have chosen to discuss
one topic in particular. Both fascism and populism strongly emphasise the importance of law and order
and security, for this reason a comparison regarding the way security is treated becomes interesting. This
is especially true when considering the role of violence in providing security and stability for a nation. Here
we find a final important difference between populist and fascist ideology. Fascism often attributes some
kind of therapeutic value to physical violence and thus promotes usage of violence for the good of the
nation. Populism, like all other dominant ideologies in Western European democracies, condone reactive
violence for the sake of security, but cannot be said to promote active engagement in violence for its
therapeutic value, nor for the accomplishment of political goals.
1.2 Populism and fascism as ideologies
Populism and fascism are both concepts that have been interpreted in various ways. In the media and the
public debate, the term populism is often used to describe either demagogism, opportunism or a mix of
both (Mudde 2004: 542). A column in Dutch newspaper ‘Algemeen Dagblad’ for example, lists ‘short term
thinking, strong language and cheap sentiment’ (De Jong 2017) as the defining qualities of populism.
Although demagogism and opportunism are often present within populist movements, in academic
literature they are not taken as the defining qualities of populist ideology. Recently, a number of media
seem to have picked up on this, dedicating articles (NOS.nl 2017, Giebels 2017) to explaining what the
academic understanding of populism is, which might indicate a shift in the common understanding of
populism.
Fascism, as explained in my introduction, is often discussed as a form of rule rather than as a
distinct ideology. When discussed in this manner the concept is usually related to historical regimes and
periods, most commonly the fascist regimes that emerged before and during the Second World War
(Neumann 2009; Payne 1980; Renton 1999). Interpreting Fascism as a form of rule however, undermines
9the potential for a fruitful comparison to populism. Populism is not a regime and comparing ideology to
practice would be pointless. Fascism however, might also be interpreted as an ideology. One that might
well be applicable to various regimes or political movements, but is only connected to, rather than
entangled with them. In the coming paragraphs I clarify how I interpret and define both populism and
fascism for the sake of their comparison. In tandem, I introduce several of the key components of both
ideologies that will be discussed over the course of this paper.
The dominant interpretations of populism as demagogy or opportunism refer to several features
that are commonly present in populist parties. Certainly, populist parties are often demagogical. Their
leaders tend to employ simplistic language and appeal to emotions to win people over (Mudde 2004: 542).
On the same note, opportunism is a property that is far from uncommon amongst populist parties. The
term is used to describe policies or promises that aim to quickly please the electorate. Rather than
rationally considering the best options for society, an appeal is made to what people would want most
(Mudde 2004: 542). Populists thereby disregard the costs or problems attached to these wishes. These
features however, are not integral to populism as an ideology. Instead they are tactics or strategies
commonly employed by populists to navigate the political arena. I will pay closer attention to them in the
second chapter where I discuss and compare the practice of populism and fascism.
A very clear and usable definition of populism as an ideology has been provided by political
scientist Cas Mudde. He defines populism as ‘An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated
into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde
2004: 543, italics in original). There are two aspects of this definition that stand out. First and foremost,
populism is highly Manichean, it takes society to be filled with polar opposites. The pure people stand in
direct opposition to the corrupt elite, there is no room for fluidity or compromise in this ‘with us or against
us’ mentality. I would like to point out that the people versus elite dichotomy is not the only antagonism
affiliated with populism. Producerism is a rhetoric closely attached to American populism but in the past
decades it has gained traction in European populism as well. This rhetoric divides society into a group of
producers that is weighed down by a group of ‘parasites’ who feed off their labour (Jamin, 2011: 27).
Producerism is particularly interesting as it provides populist with an opportunity to circumvent racism
whilst still targeting specific groups of outsiders. I come back to producerism in the next section where I
discuss the material dimension of populist exclusionism towards groups of outsiders. Secondly, there is an
emphasis on the general will that is reminiscent of Rousseau’s political theory. It is unclear where this
general will comes from. Yet according to populist parties, the general will exists and the populist leaders
10claim to be its representatives. This claim to knowledge of the general will puts populism in a strange
relationship to liberal, representative democracy (Müller 2014). As I will explain in the final section of this
chapter, it allows for ‘representation without participation’ which is at awe with an important principle of
liberal democracy.
There is one final remark on populism made by Mudde that is key to understanding the concept
as an ideology. According to Mudde, populism is only a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde 2004: 544). Thin-
centred ideologies exhibit a ‘restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ (Freeden
1998: 750). Thin-centred ideologies are incapable of providing their own answers to grand societal
questions that you would expect from full ideologies. Instead, they attach themselves to other, full
ideologies in order to fill these gaps. In the case of populism, ‘the people’ are the core of the ideology. All
other important aspects of populism flow from this core concept: the elite are the people’s polar opposite
and the general will emerges from the people. This strong focus on the people however, does not provide
populism with a way to fully answer questions of social justice, distribution of resources and society wide
conflict management. To answer these questions, thin-centred ideologies need a ‘host’. They can attach
themselves to a wide variety of other, full or thin-centred, ideologies in order to find the answers they
need. This means that populism can come in many different shapes and sizes. Depending on what other
ideologies it is paired with, the outlook of populist parties can differ greatly. It is one of the reasons why
there are so many different types of populism. Left-wing populism, right-wing populism, or even green
populism are all very real outings of the populist mind-set, though their ideas when it comes to organizing
society often differ greatly. Any connection made by the media between populism and fascism has always
revolved around extreme right-wing populism. For this reason my discussion of populism will address this
type of populism in Europe specifically.
Fascism is typically understood as a full ideology (Eatwell 2013, Griffin 1991, Pinto 1986, Sternhell
2008). Nonetheless there seems to be little consensus over what exactly constitutes fascist ideology. In
most literature the ideology is discussed in tandem with historical events, pointing towards specific
examples found in National Socialism or Italian fascism to describe its ideology. This results in a concept
that has different meanings depending on what specific example it is referring to rather than a singular
definition that would help in the historically neutral comparison I intend to make. There are however
several distinct features that are present in all types of fascism and they can provide some insight into
what could be seen as the core of fascist ideology. At its core, fascism is made up of three overlapping, yet
distinct themes (Eatwell 2013: 595). The first is ‘the new man’, the second is fascism’s holistic nationalism
11and the third is its quest for a Third Way. I will introduce them here and explore them more thoroughly in
the coming sections where I relate them to common features of populism.
The term ‘the new man’ refers mainly to the inherent aim of creating a new type of leadership and
a ‘true-racial community’ thereby uniting the people (Eatwell 2013: 603). This aim dominated fascist
ideology when it entered the European scene at the start of the 20th century (Eatwell 2013: 602). The quest
for new leadership was somewhat paradoxical however. On the one hand it was elitist, picturing a new
elite or a ‘leader of genius’ that should rule the people. Hitler himself even claimed that ‘the parliamentary
principle of majority rule sins against the basic aristocratic principle of Nature’ (Hitler 1977: 73-74). Yet on
the other hand, it was a strong move against the established elite who relied upon this majority rule. The
goal to create new leadership thus meant installing a new elite to replace the establishment and rid of
democratic majority rule.
Holistic nationalism is a form of nationalism that is based on an ethnic conception of the nation
(Eatwell 2000: 413). It stresses the opposition of the more important national people towards the ‘Other’
and defends a traditional conception of community. Holistic nationalism takes different forms in the fascist
regimes that have existed. In Nazism, holistic nationalism took shape as biological racism and a total
opposition of the producing national people against the ‘parasitic’ Jewish community (Eatwell 2013: 604).
Mussolini took a more cultural approach and had a strong belief in the usage of myth to stress the ethnic
roots of Italians and create a national unity. The Italian state created myths like the cult of Romanità, which
told Italians that they were proud descendants of ancient Rome. These myths served a dual purpose. They
unified the often divided Italians and taught them lessons on the importance of duty and great leaders
(Eatwell 2013: 605). Race certainly played its part in Italian fascism but it was not as dominant as in its
German counterpart. The main strand of racial thinking in Italy revolved around Europeanism. Mussolini’s
colonial ambitions are often portrayed as an attempt at achieving the military power that he deemed
necessary for the defence of Italian and European culture which was allegedly threatened by ‘other
coloured races’ (Griffin 1995: 59).
The Third Way refers to the economic dimension of fascist ideology. Naming it the ‘Third Way’ is
a reference to the goal of finding a middle ground between the two dominant strands of economic thought
in the early and mid-20th century. Prominent Fascist thinkers aimed to develop an economic system
between capitalism and socialism (Eatwell 2013: 606). They emphasised the need for socio-economic
equality but wanted to maintain private property. This essentially resulted in an authoritarian welfare state
that lacked the liberal freedoms we associate with most welfare states today (Eatwell 2013: 607). The
promises made by liberal democracies regarding these freedoms were generally viewed as illusions, false
12promises made by the rich to maintain their economic positions. This distrust opened the path for an
economically totalitarian state that disregarded a distinction between state and civil society and
legitimized its own meddling in private spheres by referring to the national interest (Eatwell 2013: 608).
These three general facets of fascism provide important grip for the discussions to come as they allow me
to discuss fascism as historically neutral as possible. In the next section I use them to compare the most
common dichotomies of populist ideology to those of fascist ideology.
1.3 The Dichotomies of Populism and Fascism
As explained in the previous section, populism is an ideology of oppositions. Populist parties continuously
stress the differences and perceived struggles between ‘the people’ and other groups like the elite or
immigrants. In this section I explore in more detail what dichotomies are typical of the populist ideology
and identify to what extent these dichotomies exist in fascist ideology. An article by Cas Mudde and
Cristobal Kaltwasser (2013) assesses populism on the basis of inclusion and exclusion of certain groups in
society. These concepts of inclusion and exclusion are excellent tools to assess the dichotomies of
populism as it is through inclusion and exclusion that opposing groups are created by populists. I therefore
use their assessments of contemporary European populism as a foundation for identifying which
dichotomies are created through inclusion or exclusion and to what extent these dichotomies can be found
in fascist ideology.
‘The pure people’ is a concept that is central to virtually all populism in the world, yet who is
included in this group and how populists intend to treat this group varies. Much of these differences are
determined by how inclusionary or exclusionary the populist party in question is. In Latin-America for
example, populism tends to be more inclusionary whilst European right-wing populism is known for its
exclusionary approach (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Exclusionary and inclusionary approaches have
three dimensions: material, political and symbolic. The stances populist parties take on these dimensions
determine who are a part of ‘the people’ and how they intend to treat those who are included or excluded
from this group.
The degree of exclusionism or inclusionism on the material dimension is determined by the
distribution of monetary and non-monetary state resources to specific groups in society (Mudde and
Kaltwasser 2013: 158). Exclusionary policy excludes specific groups from access to these resources.
Conversely, inclusionary policy provides greater access to these resources for specific groups. On the
political dimension, exclusion and inclusion refer to the possibility for and degree of political participation
13and public contestation for specific groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 161). Much like on the material
dimension, exclusion on the political dimension means that specific groups are denied participation and
are deliberately excluded from arenas of public contestation. Political inclusion targets specific groups to
increase their participation and representation. Finally, the symbolic dimension is what sets the
boundaries of who is included in ‘the people’, who is considered ‘the elite’ and who belongs to neither of
these categories. Much of this is determined by rhetoric (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 164). By referring
to ‘we’ or ‘us’ when referring to specific groups, they are implicitly included in ‘the people’. Referring to
elites, immigrants or other groups as ‘them’ or ‘they’, automatically excludes them from the group that
the populists try to represent. European right-wing populism has a specific position for each of these
dimensions and they relate to fascism in their own way.
Material exclusion/inclusion
On the material dimension European populists are generally exclusive (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 160).
European societies tend to be relatively egalitarian. Socio-economic differences exist, but even members
of the economically weakest groups in society can usually rely on a welfare state that provides them with
stable conditions to lead autonomous lives. The prime focus of European populists is to protect these
conditions, which are allegedly threatened by outside forces. Immigrants and refugees are said to feed off
the generous welfare programs which leaves less resources for the native people who should be protected,
rather than exploited for the good of outsiders. Populists present the effect of immigration on welfare as
a zero-sum game: whatever benefits the outsider, burdens the natives. This narrative has often been called
welfare chauvinism. Welfare is strongly supported, but non-native groups are to be excluded from any
welfare policy (Karapin 1998: 221).
Welfare chauvinism is comparable, though not identical, to the rhetoric of producerism.
Producerism divides society into two antagonistic groups of ‘parasites’ and ‘producers’ whose interests
oppose each other. Parasites exploit the wealth produced by the producers but do not participate in the
production of this wealth. The group of parasites can be subdivided into two categories: ‘parasites from
above’ and ‘parasites from below’. Parasites from above generally correspond to the elite. Politicians,
globalists and bankers have all been made out to be parasitic by various populist leaders (Jamin 2011: 28).
Parasites from below are a group of lazy people, unwilling to contribute to society and its wealth. Typically
they are the unemployed, welfare recipients, immigrants, but also those that benefit from state resources
like subsidized artists. Strangely enough it has been shown that high unemployment rates have a positive
effect on the electoral success of right-wing populist parties (Givens 2005: 78). It seems that even though
14the producerist rhetoric employed by populist condemns the unemployed, they still feel attracted to
populist parties. The most common explanation for this is captured by the losers of globalization thesis.
Unemployment of the native population is blamed by populists on increasing globalization and immigrants
taking jobs. For the unemployed, this provides a convenient explanation for their economic situation. Since
populist parties attack this globalization and immigration, it is not surprising that the unemployed ‘losers
of globalization’ choose to vote for them. In their minds, they are not parasites but victims of a globalizing
world.
Interestingly, the producerism rhetoric maintains the idea that parasites from above and below
share a bond or some form of tacit agreement (Jamin 2011: 28). The elite that aspires to globalism, open
borders and the free movement of people share interests with the refugees and immigrants that are
accused of feeding off Western nations’ wealth. Producerism is a powerful discourse for populists because
it does not challenge people for what they are, like traditional racism would. Instead it attacks people’s
actions and pushes the principle of ‘those who work should be better rewarded’ (Jamin 2011: 28), which
is much easier to accept by an electorate. Furthermore the narrative allows for a simultaneous attack on
the elite as well as on groups of ‘outsiders’ based on the same grounds, further accentuating ‘the people’
as a homogeneous and exploited group.
Aspects of producerism can also be found in fascist ideology, but they are more dispersed and
unconnected than in the producerist rhetoric that is typical of populist ideology. There is no notion of a
bond between the elite and other parasitic groups, yet aversion to the elite as well as to parasitic groups
is present separately from each other. Two elements of populist producerism are present in fascist
ideology. However, their meaning differs significantly in fascist ideology from their populist counterparts.
The first element is the producer versus parasite dichotomy, but instead being defined solely on the basis
of economic criteria, parasites are defined in terms of race. Hitler for example described the Jews as
‘parasites’. Not only because they were feeding off the labour of hardworking Germans, but also because
he believed they saw themselves as the master race and were involved in a plot to undermine the German
state from within (Eatwell 2013: 604). The second element is the aversion to the established elite.
Fascism’s anti-elitism is not as widespread as populism’s however. In fascist ideology, the elite are still
attributed major political roles. I will discuss this in more detail in the next part of this section where I
address political exclusion and inclusion.
Populism thus involves dichotomies that were also present in fascism, but defines the opposing
groups differently and expresses the dichotomies as a more complete narrative. Populism stitches
together the aversion against the elite and non-native groups and turns it into a rhetoric that allows for an
15attack against both groups simultaneously. Furthermore, materialist considerations are far less
individualist in fascist ideology. Fascist regimes were battling against capitalism and communism
simultaneously which resulted in authoritarian welfare states which were hardly concerned with
guaranteeing individual well-being (Eatwell 2013: 608). In Western European countries individual
economic situations are a primary concern and an easy way for populist parties to rally ‘the people’ behind
them.
Political exclusion/inclusion
On the political dimension, European right-wing populism has both exclusive and inclusive properties
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 162). Depending on the group, European populist parties take a different
stance. To its national people, they tend to be inclusive. Many populists have propagated various forms of
direct democracy. They often favour referendums and call for citizen initiatives to circumvent the
traditional political arenas that are dominated by the elite. Populists thereby claim to give a voice to a
‘silent majority’ that cannot effectively voice their concerns and opinions in political arenas. It must be
noted however, that the populist ideology actually stands in opposition to direct democracy (Müller 2014:
484). Populists claim to represent the people who are uniform in their wants and needs, opposed only by
illegitimate intruders into our politics. Because of this, any outcome of direct democracy is predefined in
the eyes of the populist. If the outcome does not correspond to the general will, the intruders are to blame.
This paradoxical stance towards direct democracy also applies to representative democracy, I will discuss
it in more detail in the third section of this chapter where I address the relation of populism and fascism
to democratic institutions. Promoting direct democracy however, is a useful tool for showing your trust in
the native people and correspondingly your distrust in the political elite. When it comes to ‘aliens’, most
populist parties are much less enthusiastic about granting political rights. They generally strive for a nativist
democracy, where the native people are the ones steering the state (Mudde 2007: 151).
A mantra often employed by Marine Le Pen, leader of the French right-wing populist party Front
National (FN), perfectly captures both sides of this political in- and exclusion. The slogan ‘return the word
to the people’ (rendre la parole au peuple), contains an emphasis on political inclusion of the people, as
well as on the perceived political dominance of the elite. In the populist discourse employed by Le Pen,
the people are the native, common people of France. Immigrants and the political elite are symbolically
excluded from this group. This slogan thus implies that the word is currently not with the French people
and must be returned to them by Le Pen. She is thus politically inclusive towards ‘the people’ whilst being
politically exclusive to those who do not belong to this group. These outsiders are essentially the political
16elite and any ‘aliens’. This attitude is typical of European right-wing populism. Geert Wilders, the leader of
the Dutch populist party ‘Party for Freedom’ (PVV), campaigned with the slogan ‘make the Netherlands
ours again’ (Nederland weer van ons). Although this slogan is more culturally focused than Le Pens, the
implicated antagonism of the native people versus the elite and outsiders is the same. Both slogans are
clear examples of how populists make use of dichotomies to gain support. By stressing that the common
man has little influence over political affairs or is losing their native culture, the groups of antagonists are
automatically formed.
Fascist ideology diametrically opposes populism when it comes to the inclusion of the people in
politics. The concern of fascist regimes with the creation of a ‘new man’ was primarily aimed at establishing
a new type of leadership (Eatwell 2013: 602). As much as this aim was anti-establishment in the sense that
it targeted the dominant political elite, it was not anti-elitist. No fascist regime expected the new form of
leadership to arise from the people. Rather, the people were portrayed as a mob in need of ruling as they
themselves were incapable of understanding complex societal problems. Fascist ideology does not
celebrate the common sense of the people like populist ideology does, nor does it aim to include them in
political decision making. On the contrary, fascism aims to break down majority rule and takes on
aristocratic ideals of a small, competent elite that makes all decisions. Nearly all fascist parties and
movements rely on strong leadership by an unelected elite who gather around a single, highly dominant
leader (Payne 1980: 13). As such, political exclusion stretched across every part of the population and the
distinction between native people and outsiders that is so important for the political in- and exclusionism
of populism loses its significance.
Symbolic exclusion/inclusion
On the symbolic dimension, European right-wing populism mainly focusses on the exclusion of non-native
groups. The symbolic exclusion of these groups is almost always centred on cultural elements and excludes
any group that is not part of the ethnic people. Illegal aliens, legal non-citizens, citizens of foreign decent
and ethnic minorities are all spoken of as though they are in opposition to the native groups (Mudde and
Kaltwasser 2013: 166). This exclusion happens predominantly through the use of language. There are many
examples of outings by populist leaders that are indicative of this separation. Perhaps one of the most
famous and exemplary ones from Dutch politics is an outing done by Geert Wilders in 2006. Roughly two
years after a horrific tsunami struck the coastlines of the Indian Oceans, Wilders gave an interview in which
he warned Dutch politicians and citizens for a ‘tsunami of Islamization’ (tsunami van Islamisering) that
would strike the Netherlands. In the same interview, Wilders addressed criminality in the Netherlands and
17stated that there is a direct link between the behaviour of Moroccan ‘street terrorists’ (straatterroristen)
and their religion and culture (Ten Hoove and Du Pré 2006).
The symbolic strength of these statements is evident. The natural disaster in the Indian Ocean was
still fresh in everyone’s mind and the Netherlands is a country with a past of flood related disasters.
Additionally, the word terrorist obviously evokes negative associations. By binding together in a couple of
sentences natural disaster, Islam, terrorists and Moroccan culture, Wilders symbolically attacks the whole
of Islam and poses it as a threat to Dutch culture. Whether or not a Muslim belongs to the group of
criminal, street terrorizing Moroccans, the association made with their religion and culture makes it that
any Muslim becomes part of the attacked group. This is both an example of symbolic exclusionism as well
as of speech techniques employed by populist leaders. As a means of symbolic exclusionism, using charged
language to attack certain groups clearly excludes them from the group the populist parties are claiming
to represent. The example above is an obvious one, but as explained near the start of this section, symbolic
exclusionism can also be more subtle. The for populists common way of referring to Muslims and non-
natives as ‘them’ or ‘they’, whilst addressing native groups as ‘we’ or ‘us’ already implies a strict and
exclusionary separation.
This symbolic forming of a national group posed against any excluded group, is also an important
facet of fascist ideology. Propaganda played a crucial role in virtually all fascist regimes and its purpose
was often to create national unity. I will pay more attention to fascist propaganda in the second chapter
as it is one of the most important techniques employed by fascist regimes. The aim of the propaganda is
ideological however. An important feature of fascist ideology is its holistic nationalism. The nation is the
single most important entity in any fascist regime and its foundation is the ethnic, national people. In some
cases, like in Nazi Germany, this national unity was formed racially in opposition to the Jews. Others, like
fascist Italy, relied more on myths of a national people. The commonality however, is that the national
people were always intentionally created through the use of symbols, myths or stories about the people
and their enemies. Fascist regimes place a large emphasis on meetings, marches, ceremonies and visual
symbols to create a rigorous national community (Payne 1980: 11).
To a certain extent, most right-wing European populist parties can also be classified under the
banner of holistic nationalism. Although perhaps these parties make less of an effort to actively construct
a national people, they do appeal to this group in the majority of their arguments. Furthermore they make
a strict separation between this group and groups of ‘Others’, often through the use of symbolic language.
Thus in terms of symbolic exclusion and inclusion populism and fascism share several characteristic. There
is a subtle difference however. For fascist ideology the symbolic inclusion and even creation of the national
18people is of a greater concern than the exclusion of other groups. Symbolic exclusion of the ‘Other’ is
obviously a part of this, but it happens in name of creating national unity through a common enemy. For
populism, symbolic exclusion has priority over inclusion. Populist parties generally aim to exclude certain
groups. Whomever feels represented by the populist leader becomes part of the people he claims to
represent. The emphasis in populism is more on the other groups with a national people as a result,
whereas fascism focusses on the national people and uses these groups of outsiders as a tool for
unification. In the next section I discuss holistic nationalism and its role for populism and fascism in more
detail. For now it is important to realize that it is the foundation of most, if not all, symbolic exclusion and
inclusion for both ideologies.
1.4 Culture and Nationalism in Populism and Fascism
Although I already touched on nationalism and the role of culture in the previous section I would like to
address them more thoroughly. In the coming paragraphs I discuss the importance of culture and
nationalism for populist and fascist ideology. Culture is a particularly elusive concept as its meaning differs
for populism and fascism. Instead of providing universal definition I discuss the meaning and role of culture
for specifically populist and fascist ideology. It has an important place in both ideologies, but there are
significant differences. Populist parties stress the importance of national culture and claim it needs
protecting from outside forces. Fascist regimes on the other hand, put more emphasis on the nation as a
‘higher’ power. Culture in fascist ideology is both a part of the nation, and a tool for creating a unified
national people. Furthermore, populism stresses the protection of an existing, national culture that is in a
process of rapid deterioration, whilst fascism idealizes a previously existing culture that has already been
corrupted by the elite and needs reinstating to unite the nation.
Culture is a central theme in the rhetoric of the right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. A
popular explanation for the relatively high amount of support for populist by the working class argues that
this support stems from an aversion to or fear of non-native culture and its effect upon the native culture
(Oesch 2008: 369). Populist parties treat the culture of their respective nation as being under threat from
outside forces. This argument is directed against two groups of ‘intruders’, those from ‘within’ and those
from ‘outside’ (Oesch 2008: 352). Intruders from within are immigrants, guest-workers, refugees or any
other group on the territory that does not belong a nations ethnic group. Intruders from outside are
supranational political institutions like the European Union or the United Nations. Populist parties aggress
against both these types of intruders on the basis of them interfering or changing the nation’s culture.
19Culture in the populist sense refers to some form of national identity that is shared amongst the original
inhabitants of a country. Because of this, it becomes a very broad and rather vague term. It includes the
national people’s norms, values, customs, traditions and cultural symbols (Tonkers et al. 2008: 7). As
mentioned, populists claim it to be under threat from groups of outsiders and in need of protecting. To
indicate the meaning and importance of culture for populist parties I would like to dedicate a few
paragraphs to a recent example of a cultural debate in the Netherlands and the reaction of the Dutch
populist party PVV. The debate concerning ‘Black Pete’ (Zwarte Piet) has kept the Netherlands in its grip
for several years to date. The controversy surrounding Black Pete existed for quite some time before, but
the discussion really picked up in 2013 and has since then been a hot topic in the Netherlands. It gained
international traction in 2015 when the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination published a report urging the Netherlands to rid of Black Pete (Sengupta 2015). Before I
discuss the populist reaction to this discussion I will shortly introduce the debate.
A popular Dutch holiday celebrates a good Samaritan named Sinterklaas who is comparable,
though not identical, to the internationally more well-known Santa Claus. Sinterklaas has a large group of
black helpers, Black Petes, who aid him in the distribution of presents and candy. In the festivities
surrounding the Sinterklaas holiday, people dress up as Black Pete for the amusement of children. They
do so by painting their faces black and wearing black afro wigs and golden earrings. The aforementioned
United Nations report stated that ‘the character of Black Pete is sometimes portrayed in a manner that
reflects negative stereotypes of people of African descent and is experienced by many people of African
descent as a vestige of slavery’ (CERD 2015: 4).
When in 2013 similar accusations first gained significant attention from Dutch media, a part of the
Dutch community was outraged. A Dutch Facebook group named ‘Pietition’ (Pietitie) received over a
million likes within a day. The arguments against Black Pete were felt by many as an attack on Dutch culture
and tradition and a significant portion of the defenders of Black Pete perceived immigration and the multi-
cultural society as major contributors to this attack. In the eyes of the defenders of Black Pete, the holiday
had never been problematic. Thus why should it suddenly be so, if not for the influx of uninformed
outsiders? This is a classic ‘us against them’ argument that is commonly found in populist rhetoric and the
PVV did not hesitate to join the debate. In 2014 the PVV proposed the ‘Black Pete law’ (Zwarte Piet-wet)
(Tweede Kamer 2014) which according to the party should be installed to safeguard the cultural tradition
of the Sinterklaas holiday. In the proposal, PVV leader Geert Wilders and his partisan Martin Bosma
stressed the importance of Black Pete for the Dutch cultural traditions and the Dutch identity. Changing
20anything about the Sinterklaas holiday in favour of ‘a small group of people’ (Tweede Kamer 2014) directly
impedes upon Dutch culture and sweeps away the Dutch identity.
This reaction is exemplary of the strong emphasis on culture that is typical of populist ideology. It
shows how identity and culture are tightly entangled in the populist rhetoric and how they are supposedly
threatened by groups that do not share this identity. The example is even more striking because it also
shows the perception that culture is under threat from intruders from outside as well as outsiders from
inside. The involvement of the UN provided the perfect opportunity for the PVV to aggress against the UN
for interfering with Dutch culture and traditions (Wilders 2013), whilst the heated debate provided the
PVV with opportunities to blame a small group of ‘anti-racists’ for a campaign against Dutch culture (Duk
and Den Hartog 2017). It is important to stress that although populist leaders generally view culture as
being in the process of changing, they do not label it as already completely corrupted. National culture,
embodied by traditions like Sinterklaas, needs some degree of restoring, but it still exists by virtue of the
native people and should be cherished and protected (Tonkers et al. 2008: 4). Although this culture is
under constant attack from multiculturalist influences, it has not yet been overrun completely.
In fascist ideology, the concept of culture takes a different form. As opposed to culture defining
the national identity like in populism, nationhood is the primary collective identity in fascist ideology
(Bayraktar 2002: 28). During the rule of both Nazism and Italian fascism, cultural forms were used to
promote the nationalist ideologies of these regimes. In Nazism, there was a strong emphasis on the folk
culture which was perceived to be the essence of the nation (McWilliam 2008: 417). In Italy, Mussolini
idealized Roman culture and history as the ‘guiding star’ for the Italian nation (Gentile 1990: 245). Culture
was comprised of the stories, songs and other artistic outings describing culturally better times. These
stories portrayed the nation and made it a lively and bonding entity in the minds of the people. In short,
the cultural sphere was ‘a weapon in promoting a nationalist ideology’ (McWilliam 2008: 414).
This attitude towards culture also indicates the inherent discontent of fascism with existing
culture. The idealizing of past cultures is a way of expressing discontent with the dominant culture. Fascism
believes there to be a ´true´ culture that is suppressed by the current one and it needs to be promoted to
ultimately take over the dominant, but corrupted culture. ‘Fascism is a genus of modern politics which
aspires to bring about a total revolution in the political and social culture of a particular national or ethnic
community. (…) Generic fascism draws its internal cohesion and affective driving force from a core myth
that a period of perceived decadence and degeneracy is imminently or eventually to give away to one of
rebirth and rejuvenation in a post-liberal new order’ (Griffin 2002: 24). The emphasis placed on rebirth in
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