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Research Report
Prioritisation and Sequencing of Council Mandates:
Walking the Walk?
A wide view of the Security Council
chamber ahead of a 25 September
Executive Summary
2019 meeting. (UN Photo/Manuel
Elias)
The Security Council, the UN Secretariat and The report finds that the examples analysed do
external assessments have emphasised how better not show a clear trend towards greater prioritisation
prioritisation and sequencing of Council mandates and sequencing. Moreover, the potential for greater
could contribute to the effectiveness of peace oper- prioritisation and sequencing to shape more effec-
2020, No. 1
20 January 2020
ations. Building on examples from several peace tive implementation has been insufficiently explored.
operations—including peacekeeping and special Although ten of the 17 peace operations whose man-
This report is available online at
securitycouncilreport.org. political missions—this report identifies the obsta- dates are renewed regularly by the Council articu-
cles that the Council and the Secretariat face in late some sort of prioritisation within their tasks, the
For daily insights by SCR on evolving
Security Council actions please applying these concepts. While acknowledging the meaning of this concept remains unclear.The report
subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” structural challenges, the report makes recommen- provides elements for a definition of both concepts.
series at whatsinblue.org or follow
@SCRtweets on Twitter. dations that would pave the way for incremental On the one hand, a prioritisation effort has to be clear
changes in how the Council, the Secretariat and as to the strategic objectives of the operation, focus on
field missions approach the mandating process. a limited number of tasks and be able to anticipate
Security Council Report Research Report January 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 1Executive Summary
the future inclusion (and funding) of revised pri- in their own terms, and re-evaluate their
1 Executive Summary orities based on the evolution of the conflict and usefulness. One of the most difficult issues
2 What is Prioritisation and the judgment of the mission. On the other hand, remains resolving the tension between man-
Sequencing? Theory and a sequencing effort should determine a logical date content that is politically acceptable to
Practice progression of the mandate through time, ensur- key stakeholders, and content which is oper-
7 Challenges to Achieve ing its adequacy to address the situation on the ationally necessary. Addressing these routine
Prioritisation and Sequencing ground. In order to be effective, this progression dynamics at play in the current mandating
16 Ideas to overcome existing needs to be laid out initially in line with the stra- system requires the Secretariat to provide
challenges tegic guidance of the Council, but with sufficient genuinely frank advice and the Council to
20 Conclusion flexibility to be adjusted over time. devote most of its attention, when negoti-
The Secretariat, the Council and member ating mandates, to endorsing the strategic
states should aim to define these concepts direction for the mission.
What is Prioritisation and Sequencing? Theory
and Practice
The need to design clear, credible and success in performing certain mandated tasks.
achievable mandates—a precursor “Sequenced and prioritised mandates”, the
to recommendations for mandate report concluded, “will allow missions to
prioritisation and sequencing—has long develop over time rather than trying to do
featured in peacekeeping discussions: as everything at once, and failing”2.
early as 2000, the report of the Panel on In a 25 November 2015 presidential
UN Peace Operations, which was chaired statement, the Council declared its
by Lakhdar Brahimi, expressed concern at willingness to pursue more prioritisation
the credibility and achievability of Council when evaluating, mandating and reviewing
mandates, particularly their provisions peace operations and to consider sequenced
on protection of civilians. The high and phased mandates, where appropriate,
expectations that these create, the report when evaluating existing UN peace
argued, establishes a potentially large operations or establishing new ones.3
mismatch between the objective and the However, the Council has not followed
resources available to meet it. through systematically on its stated intention.
In 2015, the report of the High-Level At a Council open debate on 28 March
Independent Panel on Peace Operations 2018, Secretary-General António Guterres
(HIPPO) observed that mandates had announced the launch of “Action for
become lengthier, more specific and Peacekeeping” (A4P), an initiative aimed
prescriptive, and at times less realistic, at renewing states’ political commitment to
manageable and achievable. It maintained peacekeeping operations. Guterres urged
that “too often, mandates and missions are Council members to put an end to mandates
produced on the basis of templates instead that look like “Christmas trees”, arguing
of tailored to support situation-specific that the UN Mission in South Sudan
political strategies”1. The Secretariat and the (UNMISS) could not possibly implement
Council had been unable to overcome the its 209 mandated tasks. “By attempting too
challenges posed by so-called “Christmas- much, we dilute our efforts and weaken our
tree mandates”, overloaded with too many impact,” he said.4
disparate tasks. This, the HIPPO report The clearest and most recent support by
noted, was influenced by the lack of restraint member states for mandates that respond
of Council members—and those lobbying to concerns expressed in reports from
them—in pushing specific issues without Brahimi through HIPPO is found in the
due consideration given to the prospects of Declaration of Shared Commitments, whose
1 S/2015/446, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), 17 June 2015, p.9
2 Ibid., p.10
3 S/PRST/2015/22, 25 November 2015, p.3
4 S/PV.8218, 28 March 2018, p.3
2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report January 2020What is Prioritisation and Sequencing? Theory and Practice
development was led by the UN Secretariat immediate priorities” and develop more statement on 25 November 2015, declaring its
and endorsed by 152 member states and four accurate longer-term budget projections willingness to pursue more prioritisation and
organisations. It includes the commitment “to of mandate implementation costs.7 The to consider sequenced and phased mandates,
provide clear, focused, sequenced, prioritized document warned that a sequenced roll- where appropriate.10
and achievable mandates by the Security out must not lead to partial implementation The Council has embraced the notion
Council matched by appropriate resources; of mandates, however, and that it would of sequencing in principle, but has found it
to seek measures to enable greater coherence work only if there is a commitment by the difficult to apply to existing missions. While
between mandates and resources; and to Council and the Fifth Committee regarding no new UN peacekeeping operation has been
support the implementation of Security the availability of resources for the second established since 2015, sequenced approaches
Council resolutions through bilateral and phase of deployment. are evident in the design of the UN Mission
multilateral engagements”.5 The HIPPO report proposed a broader in Colombia in 2016 and its 2017 successor,
The Declaration also includes the two-stage, sequenced mandating process. Its the UN Verification Mission, both Special
Secretariat’s commitment to propose recommendation was aimed at helping design Political Missions (SPMs).11
parameters to the Council for the sequencing more effective, situation-specific missions
and prioritisation of mandates. Although the with realistic, streamlined and prioritised The prioritisation of Council mandates
concepts of prioritisation and sequencing tasks. It advocated establishing “an initial The clearest statement of the importance of
are often discussed together—arguably a mandate with an overall political goal, a prioritisation is found in the HIPPO report:
sequenced mandate has to be based on certain limited number of initial priority tasks and an namely, that Council mandates should
priorities—what follows is an attempt to break explicit planning mandate that requests the have “fewer priorities, fewer tasks and better
down their main characteristics. Secretary-General to return within six months sequencing”.12 The report advocated for
with a proposal for sequenced activities the field to lead on the review of mandates,
The sequencing of Council mandates based on a limited number of achievable major course corrections or shifts in mission
The Brahimi report considered the issue benchmarks for mission performance”. This strategy and concepts of operations. A sound
of sequencing purely in respect of troop would allow for an initial presence on the prioritisation should emerge as part of the two-
deployment to peacekeeping missions. It ground, with time for consultations with the stage sequenced approach described above.
argued for mandates to be sequenced in host government, civil society and, to the The HIPPO report called on the Council
the initial stages of mission establishment extent possible, parties to the conflict, and to resist the inclusion of tasks in mandates
to allow the Secretariat to identify troops for the development of detailed assessments unless founded upon a clear and convincing
for deployment, and that the Council keep with partners. Secretariat proposals would rationale, justified by well-identified needs
in draft form any mandating resolution need to be prioritised on the basis of “a and the feasibility of timely implementation. It
that contemplated a sizeable force until the realistic assessment of political commitments, warned against those recommendations from
Secretary-General was able to confirm that the comparative advantage of UN peace the Secretary-General that reflect an arbitrage
such commitments had been received. The operations and others, the conditions on the of departmental interests rather than genuine
report warned against deploying partial ground and realistic prospects of success”8, prioritisation. The report stated that for
forces incapable of solidifying a fragile peace, according to HIPPO, with the initial many important issues, “the conditions may
which “would first raise and then dash the proposals then being adjusted in light of not be right in the initial phase of a mission,
hopes of a population engulfed in conflict available capabilities and resources, as well and consequently sequenced and prioritised
or recovering from war and damage the as discussions among the Council, TCCs/ approaches are necessary to respond to needs
credibility of the UN as a whole”.6 PCCs and the Secretariat to forge a common on the ground at an opportune stage”.13
The 2009/2010 New Horizon reform understanding about the mission, “ideally in As mentioned, in recent years the Council
initiative also identified the criticality of a fairly informal and interactive format”9. has embraced, at least rhetorically, the need
a sequenced roll-out in the context of the Prioritised and sequenced mandates to prioritise tasks within the mandates it has
deployment of a new UN peacekeeping featured prominently in a briefing by authorised. Of the 17 current peace operations
mission, looking beyond the issue of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that the whose mandates are renewed regularly, ten
troop availability. According to the UN UK organised on 20 November 2015, at articulate what Council members identify as
document “Charting a New Horizon for UN which the Secretary-General presented his some sort of prioritisation among their tasks.
Peacekeeping”, a sequenced mission roll- HIPPO implementation report and endorsed Six lay out specifically what the Council
out “would enable mission leaders, planners the recommendations regarding sequenced considers strategic objectives for the operation,
and support systems to respond faster to mandates. The Council adopted a presidential sometimes in very broad terms.
5 Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-declaration-en.pdf
6 S/2000/809, Report of the Panel on the UN Peace Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report), 21 August 2000, p.11
7 A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, July 2009, p.19
8 S/2015/446, HIPPO Report, 17 June 2015, p.60
9 Ibid., p.61
10 S/PRST/2015/22, 25 November 2015, p.3
11 See page 11 below for a full description.
12 S/2015/446, HIPPO Report, 17 June 2015, p.52
13 Ibid., p.60
Security Council Report Research Report January 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 3What is Prioritisation and Sequencing? Theory and Practice
MISSION HOW ARE OBJECTIVES ARTICULATED? HOW ARE REFERENCES TO PRIORITISATION
ARTICULATED?
MINUSCA Decides that MINUSCA’s strategic objective is to support the cre- Division between priority (S/RES/2448, op.39) and other tasks (S/
ation of the political, security and institutional conditions conducive RES/2448, op.40) “bearing in mind that these […] are mutually
to the sustainable reduction of the presence of, and threat posed by, reinforcing”. Furthermore, the mandate identifies additional tasks
armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and (S/RES/2448, op.41).
robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeep-
ing (S/RES/2448, op.36).
MINUSMA Decides that the primary strategic priority of MINUSMA remains to Division between priority tasks (op.28) and, without impeding on its
support the implementation of the [2015 Peace and Reconciliation] capacity to implement its priority tasks, MINUSMA is authorised to
Agreement… and further decides that the second strategic priority use its existing capacities to assist in implementing two “other tasks in
of MINUSMA is to facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive a streamlined and sequenced manner, bearing in mind that priority
politically-led Malian strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercom- and secondary tasks are mutually reinforcing” (S/RES/2480, op.29).
munal violence, and re-establish State authority, State presence and
basic social services in Central Mali (S/RES/2480, op. 20).
MONUSCO The strategic priorities of MONUSCO are to contribute to two Division between priority (S/RES/2463, op.29) and other tasks (S/
objectives: the protection of civilians and support to the stabilisation RES/2463, op.30), the latter to be pursued “in a streamlined and
and strengthening of State institutions in the DRC and key gover- sequenced manner, and in support of the [Mission’s] strategic
nance and security reforms (S/RES/2463, op. 23). These objectives priorities”.
are further specified in op.29 (i) and (ii).
UNAMID Recalls the two-pronged approach supported in resolution 2363, Follows up on the recommendation of an AU-UN Special Report
which focuses on military protection, explosive remnants of war and decides that UNAMID has three redefined strategic priorities
clearance and emergency relief in the Jebel Marra area and, in other (S/RES/2429, op. 11).
areas of Darfur where there has not been recent fighting, an approach
that focuses on stabilising the situation, supporting the police and
helping to build rule of law institutions whilst continuing to pro-
tect civilians, mediating intercommunal conflict and following up on
security sector reform-related issues (S/RES/2429, op. 2).
UNIFIL The Council calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent The resolution includes language “bearing in mind the strategic pri-
ceasefire and a long-term solution based on several principles and orities and recommendations” identified by the Secretary-General
elements (S/RES/1701, op. 8). following two review processes (in 2012 and 2017), but these are not
spelled out (S/RES/2433, pp.24)
UNSMIL Decides to extend the mandate of UNSMIL to exercise mediation In addition to the mediation and good offices mandate in op.1, the
and good offices to support: (S/RES/2434, op.1): Council further decides that UNSMIL, within operational and secu-
• an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue; rity constraints, should also undertake five other tasks (S/RES/2434,
• continued implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement; op.2).
• consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrange-
ments of the Government of National Accord;
• subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the
constitutional process and the organisation of elections
UNMISS N/A The resolution emphasises that protection of civilians must be given
priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources
within the mission (S/RES/2459, op.14).
UNAMA N/A The resolution outlines the mandate of UNAMA “with a particular
focus on [six] priorities” (S/RES/2405, op. 6) and three additional
priority areas in coordination with UN Agencies, Funds and Pro-
grammes (S/RES/2405, op. 7).
4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report January 2020What is Prioritisation and Sequencing? Theory and Practice
MISSION HOW ARE OBJECTIVES ARTICULATED? HOW ARE REFERENCES TO PRIORITISATION
ARTICULATED?
UNAMI N/A UNAMI shall prioritise the provision of advice, support, and assis-
tance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive,
political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation
(S/RES/2470, op. 2).
UNIOGBIS N/A The Council endorses the Secretary-General’s recommendations
regarding the reconfiguration of UNIOGBIS and the reprioritisa-
tion of its tasks according to three phases: (S/RES/2458, op 2):
• Phase I (electoral phase)
• Phase II (post-electoral phase)
• Phase III (transition phase)
The Council requests UNIOGBIS to focus, in particular, on three
priorities (S/RES/2458, op 5) and assist, coordinate and lead inter-
national efforts in five areas (S/RES/2458, op 6).
The ways in which task-prioritisation of tasks is specified in the resolution. While cannot accomplish by itself, but also links
attempts have been carried out differ greatly prioritisation provides useful guidance its performance to decisions primarily
and illustrate the absence of a commonly- to the mission leadership, retaining most taken elsewhere. As closely as some of the
agreed definition of this concept. In mission tasks, even as secondary, fails to regional and subregional actors may work
some cases, prioritisation is explicit. The address the problem posed by “Christmas- with UN mediators on, say, the Central
mandates of the UN Multidimensional tree mandates”. African Republic or South Sudan, their
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the The table below shows the division between differences may be substantial on critical
Central African Republic (MINUSCA), priority and the rest of the tasks identified in issues, including accountability and human
the UN Organization Stabilization Mission the mandates of three peace operations.14 rights. The Brahimi report described how
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo often the Secretariat “found itself required
(MONUSCO), and MINUSMA all to execute mandates that were developed
differentiate between sets of priority tasks and elsewhere [by non-UN peacemakers] and
other tasks that are “mutually reinforcing”. delivered to it via the Security Council with
These mandates include references to the but minor changes”.15
implementation of secondary tasks as long On the protection of civilians, the
as they do not impede the mission’s capacity Brahimi report, written in the wake of critical
to implement priority tasks (MINUSMA), protection failures in Rwanda and Bosnia-
and request the Secretary-General to reflect Herzegovina, expressed concerns about
the prioritisation in the deployment of the the credibility and achievability of blanket
mission and to align budgetary resources protection of civilians mandates in contexts
accordingly (MONUSCO and MINUSCA). where UN peacekeepers could not protect
However, despite being explicit, they are not more than a small fraction of civilians, “even
always clear. The mandate of MINUSCA, if directed to do so”.16 This potentially large
for example, differentiates among priority, Two objectives considered a priority in mismatch between objective and capacities
other and additional tasks, without several peace operations are support to the remains today. Regarding MONUSCO and
explaining the different expectations of each. political process and protection of civilians. MINUSCA, the Secretariat has repeatedly
In other cases, the references to priorities The political and operational challenges raised concerns about the gap between
are more general. For example, although associated with both these general objectives mandate and resources. The 2017 strategic
the UNMISS mandate emphasises that were already foreseen in the Brahimi report. review emphasised the impact of budgetary
protection of civilians must be given priority In many operations where providing support reductions on MONUSCO’s capabilities
in decisions about the use of available to the political process is a key priority, to implement its protection mandate in a
capacity and resources within the mission, the UN is not in the driver’s seat, which country roughly the size of Western Europe,
beyond this assertion, no hierarchical order not only hands the mission an objective it where state actors are often as much of a
14 For comparison purposes, the tasks considered are those identified by the Council as priorities. Many of those can be subdivided into more concrete tasks at the
operational level.
15 S/2000/809, Brahimi Report, 21 August 2000, p.10
16 Ibid., p.11
Security Council Report Research Report January 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 5What is Prioritisation and Sequencing? Theory and Practice
threat to the population as the armed groups situations”, urging the Council to refrain order to be effective, such progression needs to
they are supposed to combat.17 MONUSCO from sending an operation into danger with be laid out initially in line with the strategic
has acknowledged the limits of what it can unclear instructions.The report also famously guidance of the Council, and retain enough
achieve in terms of physical protection, emphasised the particular responsibility of flexibility to be adjusted over time.
which resulted in a shift towards protection the Secretariat in telling the Security Council
through early warning, prevention and, where “what it needs to know, not what it wants to Focusing on the objectives is critical in
required, the projection of military force. hear” about peace operations.19 peace operations, since it sets their strategic
However, most Council resolutions add The New Horizon report reiterated direction. Although the table on page 4 shows
no qualifiers to the protection of civilians- that clear and achievable mandates are the an effort to articulate mission objectives in
related language in mandating resolutions, foundation of an effective mission strategy and recent years, the main focus of mandates
contributing to outsized expectations. concluded that although Council members had remains the delineation of tasks. To begin to
Despite the challenges in achieving these worked “to provide clearer and more precise address this, Council members—and others—
objectives, support to the political process direction to UN peacekeeping operations… could insist on discussing with the Secretariat
and protection of civilians continue to be core mission tasks have proliferated”.20 The report the overall direction of the mission ahead of
elements of peace operations. differentiated between strategic direction, negotiations on mandate renewals. A more
In addition to the prioritisation of which is critical for mission planning, and the strategic articulation of objectives would
thematic tasks, peace operations are inclusion of too many detailed tasks, which spark questions about how every mandated
sometimes tasked to prioritise some activities can end up obscuring the overall objectives of task and mission component supports the
within particular geographical areas in their the operations. The notion of strategic clarity achievement of those aims, while avoiding
theatre of operations. The deployment of should not be conflated with excessive focus Council micromanagement. This could be
MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade on detail, which can be detrimental to the a preliminary stage to an eventual shift in
in eastern DRC in 2013, the authorisation clarity of the text. mandating practice that stops at the strategic
of a Juba-based Regional Protection Force Although notions such as clarity, level, defining objectives while leaving the
in UNMISS in August 2016 and narrowing- achievability, consistency and adaptability discussion of tasks, or how the objectives will
down the focus of UNAMID’s operations to are highlighted in discussions of peace be achieved, to the Secretariat.
Jebel Marra in 2018 are decisions, formalised operations’ mandates, prioritisation and Recent attempts at prioritisation have
in resolutions, giving the senior leadership of sequencing efforts are unlikely to achieve seen the characterisation of almost all
the mission direction on the Council’s main those single-handedly. mandated tasks as priority tasks. When
geographic priorities and providing a way to everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.
sort broad mandated tasks. Elements for a definition A sound prioritisation effort needs to be clear
From the examples above, it seems clear regarding the criticality of the different tasks,
A general call for clarity and that support in principle for prioritisation based on a consultative process between the
achievability and sequencing of mandates has not been Council and the Secretariat. This means
Permeating the proposals for prioritised matched by an effort by the Secretariat and identifying a handful of tasks as priorities
and sequenced mandates is a call for overall the Council to define these concepts and according to their relevance at that particular
clarity and precise direction. Referring to identify how they can be used in a more juncture, and being clear about expectations
the complexity of the tasks assigned to peace systematic way. Below are two proposed of other, non-priority tasks if they are still
operations as they evolved beyond traditional definitions and an explanation of their key included in the mandate. As part of the
peacekeeping into multidimensional missions, elements. process to establish the core priorities of the
the Brahimi report also noted the difficulties of • A prioritisation effort has to take as its mission, it is important for the Council to
accomplishing their objectives. Most failures starting point clarity on the strategic objectives understand the interplay among mandated
of the UN have occurred, it said, because of the operation, focus on a limited number of tasks and the implicit tradeoffs. In contexts
the Council and member states “crafted areas and be able to anticipate the inclusion where peace operations are tasked to
and supported ambiguous, inconsistent and of revised priorities based on the evolution of support the extension of state authority
under-funded mandates and then stood back the conflict and the judgment of the mission. A while brokering agreements involving armed
and watched as they failed, sometimes even meaningful prioritisation necessarily has to be groups, or support the development of state
adding critical public commentary as the linked to the allocation of resources. capacities while promoting accountability,
credibility of the UN underwent its severest the potential for mandate elements to
tests”.18 The report advocated for mandates • A sequencing effort should determine a log- counteract each other should be discussed
that reflected “the clarity that peacekeeping ical progression of the mandate through time frankly before their adoption. Other tensions
operations require for unity of effort when and ensure its adequacy to address the situa- that can arise in mandate implementation
they deploy into potentially dangerous tion on the ground and its likely evolution. In may include encouraging local reconciliation
17 S/2017/826, 29 September 2017, pp.8-9
18 S/2000/809, Brahimi Report, 21 August 2000, p.44
19 Ibid., p.12
20 A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, July 2009, p.10
6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report January 2020What is Prioritisation and Sequencing? Theory and Practice
efforts while also supporting nation-wide processes. In order to assuage this concern, For prioritisation and sequencing
political processes, or how the current push sensible prioritisation efforts need to efforts to be sound, they need to be based
for mobility and agility in peace operations anticipate the inclusion of revised priorities on an assessment of needs, adapted to the
affects the trust that must develop if staff are (whether new ones or the expansion of old evolution of the conflict according to the
to deepen their community engagement. ones) as the mission progresses. While the judgment of the mission and the advice from
A factor in discussions of mandate set of priorities may be limited to a 6-12 the Secretariat. The Council is an eminently
prioritisation and sequencing is the month timeframe, the Council could set out political body and will not always heed
potential for some thematic issues, unless a vision beyond mandate expiry, and convey Secretariat advice, but the Secretariat has
specified in detail in mandating resolutions, the understanding that it will consider the critical responsibility for developing and
to be overlooked or deprioritised in the Fifth favourably the inclusion of certain tasks at communicating the best possible options.
Committee and even in internal planning the appropriate time.
Challenges to Achieve Prioritisation and Sequencing
The dissatisfaction of Council members mandates], the context surrounding the starting point for fresh negotiations. The aim
with Christmas-tree mandates has been a original ones, including the provision of a is to make agreement on a new resolution
recurring issue discussed in informal settings, security umbrella, and the conditions for its easier, politically and practically. In practice,
as reflected in the takeaways of the Finnish transition and exit will become increasingly the Council generally adds text and tasks to
workshop “Hitting the Ground Running”, difficult. If the goal post keeps changing, so existing mandates, rather than re-assessing
organised every year for current and incoming to speak, there will be consequences as to whether all the mission’s tasks still contribute
Council members. In these discussions the when the desired end state can be reached.”22 to achieving the strategic objectives defined
tension is apparent between a formulaic way Some heads of mission have asked the by the Council. The limited time over which
of looking at peacekeeping operations and an Council to avoid an excessive focus on detail negotiations take place (an average of ten
approach tailored to every context. Among the in mission tasks and leave adequate flexibility days), and their format (Council members
issues members criticised in 2016, for example, in mandates for missions to adapt to shifts hold one or two rounds in person and
were how mandates contain too many tasks on the ground without needing mandate negotiations continue bilaterally or over
that are frequently unrealistic and lack any revision.The importance of flexibility has also email), encourage text-based discussions
prioritisation or sequencing. Participants been raised by member states highlighting rather than strategic thinking.
discussed the need to incorporate feedback the need for “flexible timelines”23 and The Council usually renews mandates
from the field in the mandating process. Other “opportunities to make course corrections annually or every six months. Members
factors they identified as contributing to the when things are not working”.24 have floated the idea of moving beyond
length of mandating resolutions included However, despite criticism of Christmas- such short timeframes and developing a
the particular interest of certain members in tree mandates and endorsement of prioriti- multi-year frame of reference, anticipating
specific thematic issues, the weight of agreed sation and sequencing, several factors make the needs of the host country and the
language that is easier to carry forward implementation a challenge. projected adjustments over time. This would
than renegotiate, the insufficiently political not necessarily mean longer mandates, but
character of the texts and the lack of guidance rather a common Council vision for the
on how to write a good resolution.21 THE SECURITY COUNCIL mission’s strategic direction over the coming
Occasionally, heads of peace operations few years, adjustable as needed. For now, no
have expressed frustration with the way in The mandating process and its concrete initiative has been tabled in this
which the Council adds to mission mandates. limitations regard.26 Currently, Council members think
Briefing the Council on 12 February 2010, The Council’s own working methods can beyond mandate cycles mainly when mission
the Special Representative of the Secretary- be a hurdle for the emergence of collective transition is in sight.
General and head of the UN Mission in thinking and results-based decision-making.25 Despite knowing the significant impact
Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Løj, said: “If new Among the challenges is the automatic use that their statements and actions can have
tasks are being continuously added [to the of the previous mandating resolution as a on the ground, and the commitment to
21 S/2016/506, 26 May 2016, pp.27-28
22 S/2015/446, HIPPO Report, 17 June 2015, p.60
23 S/PV.8218, March 28, 2018, p.42
24 S/PV.8064, 5 October 2017, p.18
25 For more analysis on the mandating process, please see “Is Christmas Really Over? Improving the Mandating of Peace Operations”, Security Council Report, February
2019.
26 It was proposed in a Dutch-Ivorian draft resolution on mandating negotiated in late 2018, which was ultimately not tabled.
Security Council Report Research Report January 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 7Challenges to Achieve Prioritisation and Sequencing
support the implementation of Security into how language translates into action. MINUSMA: A new stated strategic priority,
Council resolutions through bilateral A better understanding of how mandates but without additional capabilities
and multilateral engagements27, Council are implemented could result in restraint In 2019, the Council created a second strategic
members only rarely express much by Council members in pushing specific priority for MINUSMA focusing on the situation
willingness to exert political leverage issues without considering how they will be in the centre of Mali. In particular, MINUSMA
throughout the lifecycle of peace operations executed. Most Council interaction with was tasked “to facilitate the implementation of a
(through visiting missions, press and mission-based actors is with the head of comprehensive politically-led Malian strategy to
presidential statements) beyond the critical mission, where discussion usually focuses protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence,
moment of mandate renewal. In a 1 March on political issues rather than operational and re-establish State authority, State presence
2019 press conference ahead of the Franco- matters that the mission may be facing. and basic social services in Central Mali”29. The
German joint presidencies, Ambassador Once a year, the Council is briefed by some primary strategic priority remained support
François Delattre (France) discussed the heads of military and police components; to the implementation of the 2015 Agreement
mandating process and noted that the otherwise, engagement with other mission- on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Council
Council seems to “vote and forget”, moving based actors is limited. There are near- members had grown increasingly concerned
on immediately to other pressing matters annual informal meetings with heads of with the deterioration of the situation beyond the
after adopting a new resolution. This is in human rights components, as well as regular north, which was the initial geographic focus of
part a product of the heavy workload of the meetings by the Informal Expert Group on the mission. In late March, the Council’s visiting
Council, and its many competing priorities. the Protection of Civilians and on Women, mission to Mali coincided with the massacre in
Peace and Security, which hold working-level the village of Ogossagou, central Mali, of 160
The ambivalent role played by discussions ahead of mandate renewals. Fulani civilians, including women and children,
penholders Although the Council’s openness to reportedly by Dogon armed elements (Dozos). In
In recent years, the P3 have divided most input from civil society from countries on its June, an apparently retaliatory attack against the
situation-specific agenda items among agenda has increased, through Arria-formula Dogon village of Sobane Da in central Mali killed
themselves, each taking the role of the meetings and in formal briefings and debates, 35 civilians.
so-called “penholder”. This informal these encounters rarely delve into mandate This additional priority did not respond to a
arrangement, often presented as a way to adjustment discussions. recommendation of the Secretary-General, but
promote continuity and efficiency, goes Among the opportunities for increased to the positions articulated by Council members.
beyond the drafting of Council outcomes exposure to direct perspectives from the field Although France advocated distinguishing
to include calling for meetings and leading are the visiting missions that the Council between “primary” and “second” strategic
visiting missions. It tends to discourage carries out regularly. Here, Council members priorities to keep the focus in northern Mali, others
members from taking initiatives on country are able to gather first-hand information proposed to have two strategic priorities of equal
situations for which they do not hold the not only from mission headquarters, but significance. In the end, the distinction remained.
pen, and, when new crises emerge, elected from regional offices as well. In addition An additional challenge in the implementation
members often expect one of the P3 to take to their familiar interlocutors, Council of this new priority will be to focus more on the
the lead.28 Penholders can be reluctant to members can hear from the wider mission centre while continuing to devote close attention
acknowledge negative trends in countries leadership including the Deputy Special to the north, without additional troops and with
within their sphere of influence: until Representatives of the Secretary-General, fewer resources than those originally proposed
2013, the US was reluctant to criticise the the Chief of Staff, the Force Commander, by the Secretary-General to the Fifth Committee.
government of South Sudan, and despite the Police Commissioner and section chiefs
the deterioration of the situation in the from the peace operation, in addition to The mirage of linearity
centre of Mali starting in 2016, France has the UN Country Team. Visits can also be The emphasis on sequencing may reinforce
continued to prioritise the north of Mali in carried out by a group of experts sitting in the idea that conflict situations can be
MINUSMA’s mandate. the Council in their national capacity in approached in a linear way. Categories
advance of a mandate renewal. There is no designating particular sets of tasks—
Limited insight regarding mandate guarantee, however, that the various experts— protection of civilians, rule of law, mediation—
implementation also from the Fifth Committee and subsidiary can be misleading if considered as standalone
Mandating is an eminently political organs of the Council—will exchange views and self-contained. The categories are useful
exercise. One of the challenges that Council or coordinate their recommendations. constructs to discuss complex processes, but
members encounter when approaching their interconnectedness is real, reflecting the
mandate renewals is their limited insight breadth of fundamental changes required
27 Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-declaration-en.pdf
28 On 13 November 2018, the E10 and incoming five Council members sent a letter to the Council President emphasising the need for fair burden-sharing and an equal
distribution of work among all Council members. In January 2019, several co-penholder arrangements were introduced, including Germany and the UK for Libya sanc-
tions and UNAMID.
29 S/RES/2480, 28 June 2019, p.6
8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report January 2020Challenges to Achieve Prioritisation and Sequencing
in host societies for sustainable peace. In During negotiations, the UK and the US called of progress in the preceding months and the
reviewing how to mandate peace operations, for a further decrease in troop levels and a role that MINUSMA plays in supporting
the Council will have to reconcile the more modest increase of police. France and other security presences deployed in Mali and
emphasis on sequencing on the supply-side most other Council members took the view the region. In a 3 April presidential statement,
with the need for flexibility on the demand- that the situation in the DRC, particularly during the Council requested the Secretary-General
side.This could also be mitigated by a sharper the upcoming election period, did not allow for to provide “options for a potential significant
focus on objectives than on tasks. lowering the troop levels. adaptation of MINUSMA”. The request,
As the divisions became clear, France, the which was largely a result of negotiations
Politics often override other penholder, proposed to elicit the views of the between France and the US, was made with
considerations Secretariat as to the feasibility of further troop the stated aim of “enhancing [MINUSMA’s]
Among the key limitations of the Secretariat’s reductions. A Secretariat official then told Council effectiveness to support the implementation
role in soundly advising the Council members informally that while they stood by of the Agreement through a greater focus
regarding mandate adjustments is the agency maintaining the troop ceiling in accordance with on priority tasks, without jeopardizing the
of the Council and its inclination to disregard the Secretary-General’s report, reducing the stability of Mali and its region, MINUSMA’s
Secretariat advice if in conflict with political actual troop numbers by a further 500 would central role in supporting the implementation
realities. This is further complicated by still allow them to carry out the mandate. In of the Agreement, as well as MINUSMA’s
divisions among Council members regarding addition, the official suggested that instead of capacity to interact with other security
peace operations’ mandates. increasing the personnel level of formed police presences”.31 In a 31 May report, the
The Secretariat is caught between a rock units, the mission could reinforce its police Secretary-General advised against any major
and a hard place. On the one hand, it is told presence through inter-mission cooperation with reduction in the capacity of MINUSMA and
to be frank and not to bow to concerns about a temporary deployment from a neighbouring stated that he did not recommend any major
what the market can bear.30 On the other peacekeeping operation. changes “with regard to the nature of the
hand, that approach may be unrewarding: In the end, resolution 2348 lowered the troop MINUSMA mandate or the Mission’s overall
the Secretariat has to navigate political ceiling from 19,815 to 16,215. Actual troop-levels strength”.32 The report identified potential
divisions in the Council so as not to alienate were already almost 3,000 troops under the troop changes including the redeployment of 650
key stakeholders and provide options that ceiling as a result of prior troop departures, but the personnel and two formed police units and
address the divergent Council sensitivities new figure still required the mission to remove the the creation of a quick reaction capability
while ensuring that they do not undermine equivalent of a full battalion. The resolution also within the mission. In the end, the Council
the work of the peace operations. The final provided for the deployment of additional formed did not significantly modify the mandate,
decision, always, remains the Council’s, which police units via temporary reinforcements from although it added a second strategic priority
constrains the influence that the Secretariat other missions, although these never materialised. for the mission regarding the situation in
has in the decision-making process. Although Council members eventually sought out the centre, which was not in the Secretary-
Secretariat advice informally, they were looking General’s report.
Overlooking Secretariat for alternatives to the recommendations originally Efforts by host states to influence
Recommendations: The MONUSCO 2017 made by the Secretary-General. internal processes within missions, in the
Renewal Furthermore, the Council sometimes Secretariat, and in the positions of certain
An example of this dynamic took place when seeks out the Secretariat as an arbiter and member states can also undermine the
the Council, through resolution 2348, renewed source of options when divisions among impact and independence of Secretariat
the mandate of MONUSCO on 31 March 2017. its members make it difficult to find a way input.33 For example, the preferences of the
The report of the Secretary-General did not forward. This became apparent in the Sudanese government significantly shaped
recommend any changes to the troop ceiling, Council’s consideration of the mandate of UNAMID in 2004. Then-Under-Secretary-
and in fact acknowledged that MONUSCO MINUSMA in 2019. Following a visiting General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-
could establish a sufficient military presence mission to Mali, it was clear that the US and Marie Guéhenno said that the government
in all high-risk areas at once to satisfactorily France had different perspectives on mandate of Sudan negotiated the mandate for
fulfil its mandate within its existing resources. renewal.While all Council members expressed UNAMID in such a way that “it had ample
Furthermore, it recommended increasing the frustration at the pace of implementing means to control the pace of transition [from
authorised ceiling for the police component the peace agreement, the US advocated an AU mission to a hybrid UN-AU mission],
from 1,050 to 1,370 personnel in light of the risk significant changes to the mandate whereas and to decide whether it wanted the mission
of violence related to the upcoming elections. France pushed for staying the course in light to be a success or failure”.34
30 S/2015/446, HIPPO Report, 17 June 2015, p.39
31 S/PRST/2019/2, 3 April 2019, p.3
32 S/2019/454, 31 May 2019, p.12
33 For a survey of the impact of host state consent (or lack thereof) in UN peace operations, see Sebastian, Sofia and Gorur, Aditi, UN Peacekeeping and Host-State
Consent, Stimson Center, 2018.
34 Guéhenno, Jean-Marie, The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), p.200.
Security Council Report Research Report January 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 9Challenges to Achieve Prioritisation and Sequencing
As shown in the examples above, the should withdraw by the end of the two-year their judgment regarding the particularities
Council’s prioritisation and sequencing period, the P3 and others said that the 2020 of certain situations.
efforts have often been based on guidance timeline was not absolute, and should be However, this is not always the case. In
from the Secretariat. When this guidance conditioned on success in addressing the drivers a context in which drafting is monopolised
has not been heeded, it has often been as of conflict in Darfur. For example, resolution 2429, by penholders, adding language on these
a result of the political interests of one or adopted on 13 July 2018, included a caveat that thematic priorities becomes a critical
more key Council members, as opposed to this timeline would be respected “provided that objective, particularly for elected members,
a philosophical disagreement about how to there is no significant change in the security to show impact in Council negotiations and
address the conflict most effectively. situation in Darfur and key indicators are leave a mark on legislative documents. This
fulfilled”.37 These indicators are in the areas of can also be influenced by pressure from parts
UNAMID: The interplay of politics, security sector reform, the rule of law, durable of the Secretariat lobbying Council members
benchmarks and indicators solutions for displaced host communities, the bilaterally in pursuit of particular sectoral
Benchmarks and accompanying indicators immediate delivery of services for internally agendas. It is also fuelled by a not-unfounded
are often presented as an objective way of displaced persons, and human rights. Following fear that the deletion (or non-inclusion) of a
assessing the implementation of mandates the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir in April certain task in a resolution may have negative
and of making sure that the Council bases 2019, on 27 June resolution 2479 decided “to consequences for the possibility of its future
its understanding of a particular situation on extend, temporarily and exceptionally, the period activation, and may be perceived as political
information from the ground. However, they are of drawdown for UNAMID’s military personnel… opposition to those tasks, instead of a matter
political tools, and tensions between Council in order to maintain the Mission’s self-protection of timing and relevance. A UN official
members frame the way these are used. As a capacities”.38 highlighted that while some may be willing
UN official said, “benchmarks are often used as The 11 December 2018 presidential to go back to basics on peace operations—
a fig leaf over a time-based exit”.35 statement also requested that an upcoming politics and protection, “member states
In the case of UNAMID, even though the strategic review give particular priority to have become attached to all these bells and
Council laid out in July 2018 the timeline for the progress against the benchmarks and indicators whistles” and are unlikely to let them go now
mission to exit on 30 June 2020 and liquidate focused on protection of civilians, particularly that they “own” them.41
by December 2020, divergences have persisted relating to internally displaced persons and
regarding the transition. In order to react to a returning refugees, human rights, rule of law, Presence of potential risks
proposal of benchmarks and indicators by the humanitarian situation, and disarmament, A potential risk of prioritisation and
the Secretary-General, in late 2018 Council demobilisation and reintegration “to help guide sequencing is its use to deprioritise critical
members negotiated a presidential statement the Security Council’s considerations on the mission tasks that are out of favour for some
circulated by the UK. Although the initial draft future of UNAMID’s mandate”.39 Addressing the member states or perceived as a nuisance by
welcomed the Secretary-General’s report different perspectives regarding benchmarks, host governments, typically including human
and endorsed the benchmarks and indicators the special report of the AU Chairperson and the rights monitoring or rule of law-related tasks.
contained in it, this endorsement was removed, Secretary-General on a strategic assessment Some Council members have called
and ultimately the statement only took note of of UNAMID proposed “that the benchmarks for caution when trying to sequence and
the report.36 Language was added stating that be streamlined to serve as long-term progress prioritise mandates. When the MINUSCA
while some of the proposed benchmarks and indicators, beyond the departure of UNAMID”40 mandate was established in April 2014,
indicators are of more immediate priority, others along three priority areas: political process, it identified the priority tasks on which
reflect longer-term peacebuilding objectives institution-building and long-term support to the mission had to focus initially. It also
in Darfur, reflecting divisions among Council stabilisation. mandated MINUSCA and the Secretariat to
members regarding the exit of the mission and start planning additional tasks “as conditions
the achievability of these benchmarks. Although The attachment to thematic issues permit”42 including support to security sector
on other occasions the Council has closely tied An ongoing Council trend is the attachment reform and vetting processes and seizing and
benchmarks to measurable progress on the of some members to specific thematic disposing of arms violating the arms embargo.
delivery of the mandate, the benchmarks in this issues, for which they become champions. At a 20 November 2015 meeting, Lithuania
case were broader. This is sometimes a natural consequence of expressed concerns about the impact
To add to the lack of clarity, while some priorities that member states were advancing of MINUSCA’s sequencing potentially
Council members emphasised that the mission multilaterally before joining the Council, or downgrading the mission’s capacity to
35 Interview by SCR and Stimson, June 2019.
36 S/PRST/2018/19, 11 December 2018, p.2
37 S/RES/2429, 13 July 2018, op.2
38 Resolution 2479, 27 June 2019, op.2
39 S/PRST/2018/19, 11 December 2018, p.2
40 S/2019/445, 30 May 2019, p.12
41 Stimson interview, June 2019
42 Resolution 2149, 10 April 2014, op.31
10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report January 2020Challenges to Achieve Prioritisation and Sequencing
support security sector reform at a time when of adding a new task to the mandate, which of the mandate. The question is likely to
this task “could not be more urgent”.43 included asking for clarifications in a become whether making long lists of tasks
In the last few years some Council meeting of Council members under “any more organised is sufficient, or the Council
members have expressed frustration with other business” the morning of the adoption. should go beyond this and discard long lists
peace operations, often linked to their costs, The final version of resolution 2364, which of tasks altogether, by for example focusing
and have promoted a renewed focus on was unanimously adopted, preserved more on objectives, as suggested above.
the delivery of results. During negotiations language from a task included in a previous
on the 2018 renewal of UNIOGBIS, the resolution that spoke generally about support Aligning the expectations on the
US advocated exerting pressure on the to the redeployment of the MDSF and demand-side with the plans on the
government of Guinea-Bissau by taking incorporated a new operative paragraph supply-side
a hard look at the mission. In a report, the outlining the precise nature of the support In establishing or renewing peace
Secretary-General’s acknowledged that that MINUSMA was expected to continue to operations, a challenge is to arrive at a
the political impasse continued to hinder provide specifying that this would take place shared understanding by the Council, the
progress in key areas of the security sector, “within existing resources”. The Council’s Secretariat and domestic actors on the
but did not recommend changes to the ambiguity in presenting a new task as part of elements to prioritise or sequence. This
mandate in this regard.44 However, a decision an old task to make it acceptable to the US, is not easy, as these actors often pursue
was made to remove two tasks from the and without linking it to additional resources, divergent agendas, but in the case of the
mission’s mandate: the provision of strategic went against the initial recommendation of Council’s engagement on Colombia, they
and technical advice and support to security the Secretary-General regarding the need to aligned to allow the establishment of
sector reform and rule of law strategies, enhance MINUSMA support on that front. missions with clear mandates that were
and the provision of strategic and technical Although ambiguity may be needed to achievable and responded to a logical
advice to law enforcement and criminal and achieve compromise under certain conditions, sequence agreed by the parties.
penitentiary systems. In explaining the vote, the Council should be clear about the overall
a US representative stated that “[w]ith a political strategy pursued by the mission and UN Missions in Colombia: A Sequenced
streamlined mandate, the mission can focus those aspects of the resolution that are most Approach
even more on its good offices to help deliver critical to it. This could include the Council’s A clear example of the sequencing of mandates
an end to the stalemate”.45 diagnosis of the causes of the conflict and was the Council’s consideration of the UN Mission
how the mission is expected to address them. in Colombia (2016-2017) and its successor,
Ambiguous by design The input of the Secretariat in this process is the UN Verification Mission in Colombia
While clarity may be presupposed as a key fundamental, as is the role and expertise of (2017-present). Their mandates were quite
objective of mandating resolutions, this is not the UN country team. distinct, and they responded to different needs
always the case. Many Council resolutions expressed by the parties during the negotiation
feature ambiguous language as a way of Shorter mandates do not mean more of the peace agreement. The UN Mission in
overcoming divisions among members. focused mandates Colombia was responsible for the monitoring
Instead of solving a particular issue, the One way in which the push for more focused and verification of the laying-down of arms,
Council kicks the can down the road in and achievable mandates has been pursued and coordinated a tripartite mechanism that
the hope that field actors will be able to has been by shortening mandate resolutions. monitored and verified adherence to the definitive
decode the text. A December 2016 Stimson Recent streamlining efforts made by the bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities
Center report argued that lack of clarity and Council (including by the UK on AMISOM agreed to by the parties. Its successor, the UN
guidance on stabilisation mandates had led and UNFICYP in 2019, and Japan on Verification Mission in Colombia, is mandated to
MONUSCO and MINUSCA to ignore them UNAMA in 2017) have mostly focused on verify the implementation of several measures
as mission objectives altogether.46 reducing the quantity of words used to convey of the peace agreement, including the political,
Ahead of the 2017 MINUSMA renewal, certain messages, without substantially economic and social reincorporation of the
the Secretary-General recommended that modifying mandate content. former members of the guerrilla group Fuerzas
MINUSMA enhance its support to the As the Council and the Secretariat Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército
Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) undertake the effort to define parameters del Pueblo (FARC-EP); personal and collective
in order to accelerate their operational for the prioritisation and sequencing of security guarantees; and comprehensive
effectiveness and redeployment throughout mandates, a critical element will be agreeing programmes on security and protection
the country.47 During negotiations, there was on how much detail is helpful to have in a measures for communities and organisations
US opposition over the financial requirements resolution, and how that relates to the scope in conflict-affected areas. Following the end
43 S/PV.7564, 20 November 2015, p.20
44 S/2018/110, 9 February 2018, p.9
45 S/PV.8194, 28 February 2018, p.4
46 Gorur, Aditi, “Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions”, Stimson Center, December 2016, p.20
47 S/2017/478, 6 June 2017, p.15
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