RESILIENCE IN HAITI Octobre 2015 - François Grünewald Groupe URD
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RESILIENCE IN
HAITI
François Grünewald
Groupe URD
Octobre 2015
Groupe URD (Urgence-Réhabilitation-Développement)
La Fontaine des Marins
26170
Plaisians
France
Tel : +33 4 75 28 29 35
www.urd.org
This report is the result of a series of missions in
Haiti since 1980. During these missions, the
changes affecting the island were observed, the
impacts of different types of chocks (manmade or
linked to natural events) analyzed in details and
the national and international responses evaluated.
While being in Haiti during these difficult periods,
the Author had the chance to encounter
extraordinary people, to witness the sufferings but
also the impressive resilience of the Haitian
people. It is impossible to name all those
encountered, but they should be ensured of the
gratitude of the Author of this report.
About the Author: François Grunewald
Engineer in agriculture science and specialised in rural economy, François Grunewald spent 35 years in development,
emergency and post disaster rehabilitation projects in Africa, Asia, Central Europe, and Central/Latine America, as
well as at HQ levels. He worked with NGO, UN and ICRC. In 1997, he became chairman of Groupe URD (Urgence-
Rehabilitation-Developpement). François Grunewald has been, among others, team leader for the of the Post Mitch
inter NGO iterative evaluation process from 1999 to 2001; of the DFID Darfur evaluation, of the evaluation of the
French response to the Tsunami, of the IASC evaluation of the International response to the crisis in the Horn of
Africa and of many evaluations before and after the Haiti 2010 earthquake and more recently in Sahel and Mali. He
carried out several pieces of work on Ebola and on the Syria crisis. He wrote numerous articles and contributed books
and specialized publication on the evaluation and quality management of humanitarian aid. fgrunewald@urd.org
Table of contents
Table of contents ............................................................................................................................2
1. OBJECTIVE OF THIS COUNTRY CASE STUDY .................................................................5
2. METHODOLOGY .....................................................................................................................5
3. THE HAITIAN CONTEXT .......................................................................................................6
3.1. The risk context: a history of resilience and vulnerability in Haiti .....................................6
3.2. The components of resilience in Haiti .................................................................................9
3.3. Efforts in disaster risk management: an historical perspective .........................................12
3.4. Efforts in Nutrition and food security ...............................................................................14
4. LESSONS LEARNT: AID AND RESILIENCE IN HAITI ....................................................15
4.1. Development aid: the premium for resilience ...................................................................15
4.2. Humanitarian aid and its influence on resilience ..............................................................15
4.3. Risk knowledge and prevention measures ........................................................................18
4.4. The institutional set up, national involvement and coordination ......................................19
4.5. CBDRR .............................................................................................................................21
4.6. The cholera issue ...............................................................................................................22
4.7. Funding issues ...................................................................................................................22
4.7.1. Role of the Haitian Government ................................................................................22
4.7.2. Role of development donors ......................................................................................22
4.7.3. Role of Humanitarian donors .....................................................................................23
4.8. The promising regional factor ...........................................................................................24
5. ENGAGING FOR RESILIENCE.............................................................................................25
5.1. Multi factorial analysis of Haiti’s resilience .....................................................................25
5.2. The disaster resilience approach as an entry point ............................................................25
5.3. Some recommendations ....................................................................................................26
6. GENERAL CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................30
ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................................31
Annex N°1: Programme of the mission .......................................................................................31
Annex N°2: consulted Documentation .........................................................................................31
Annex N°3: Risk mapping ...........................................................................................................42
Annex N°4: Major disasters in Haiti ............................................................................................45
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Many Haitians survive in precarious economic conditions in an environment prone to a myriad of slow- and rapid-onset disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, landslides, drought). Natural disasters and vulnerabilities (extreme poverty, deep inequality, weak institutional structure, lack of infrastructure, environmental degradation, etc.) are in a dialectic interaction where the fist one exacerbates vulnerabilities which in retro-action exacerbate the impact of natural disasters.. In this highly diversified country, “resilience equations” (the combination of factors increasing or weakening resilience), “risk profiles” and disaster preparedness measures differ significantly between urban and rural contexts. In the face of these uncertainties and threats, preparedness strategies and coping mechanisms have been developed at all levels (community, institutions and civil society). In the past 20 years, there has been a significant effort in DRR and Haiti presented a sophisticated Action plan at the Kobe conference in 2005. The conjunction of cyclones and flooding in 2008 followed by the massive earthquake and cholera outbreak in 2010 put Haiti on the international community’s radar screen and raised awareness of the importance for all stakeholders to consider Disaster resilience. This succession of disasters has been the catalyst for a series of new opportunities for Haiti to reinforce its national DRM system and for all stakeholders (National Authorities as well as Technical and Financial Partners) to engage vigorously in the Resilience Agenda. The earthquake led to 12th of January 2010 offered an extraordinary opportunity for strategic support being provided to the National institutions, especially the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC), where the efforts carried out by NGO, the International Federation of the Red Cross and UN agencies were complemented by important investment made by the European Union, the US South Command and a few bilateral donors. Community Based Disaster Risk Management has been a critical element of Haiti’s global DRM strategy for the last decade. As a result, many communities know how to react and apply DRM recommendations to save their lives and protect their families. In these areas, local institutions have better understanding of their role and are able to replicate the skills acquired during the projects. Capacities and skills are constantly tested by major and minor events that make Haiti a good place for programme learning and strategy improvement. These efforts crystallized with the initiative of the Disaster Resilience Political Champions (UNDP, OCHA, USAID, EU, World Bank, Japan CARICOM, DFID). rapidly joined by the Haitian Prime Minister and supported by a Groupe de Suivi Technique led by the MPCE and the Ministry of Interior (DPC) at the request of the PM’s office. This initiative is both a strategic entry point into the broader resilience agenda and an operational opportunity to demonstrate that, when united and well coordinated, the aid sector and all levels of the National Authorities can deliver its “duty of care” and support “the ability of a system (individual, household, community or society) to withstand, recover or even become stronger from exposure to critical incidents or shocks” (Tulane, 2011).
REPORT 1. OBJECTIVE OF THIS COUNTRY CASE STUDY The present Haiti case study is part of a larger review of resilience undertaken by Groupe URD. It aims at capitalizing the lessons learnt from the ongoing efforts and discussions taking place in Haiti at large and in the context of the Disaster Resilience Political Champions initiative. It will explore the different elements of the “resilience equation” (combination of factors influencing resilience) in Haiti and give concrete and tangible examples of successful or promising Resilience Friendly initiatives, both in the Disaster Risk resilience area under the Political Champions umbrella and in other sectors. It is important to review these experiences to shed light on Haiti’s contribution to the current debate about resilience. The review will underline both success stories and challenges, two important elements that could contribute, if properly utilized and addressed, to replication and scaling up of Resilience programming. 2. METHODOLOGY The methodology for the mission is based on five axes: Exploring stakeholders’ views of “resilience”. The consultant was able to meet the National authorities at both the central level (Primature, DPC, CNSA, CIAT, UCLBP) and local levels (inter-communal, municipal and CASEC levels). He also met representatives from UN agencies (HC/RC office, OCHA, UNDP, FAO, UNICEF), INGO (OXFAM, ACTED, TdH, MdM, MEDAIR, HI, Helvetas, CARITAS, ACF) and National NGOs (ITEKA, FOKAL). He was also able to meet Haitian academics (sociologists), research institutions (Groupe URD) and donors (Swiss aid, DG ECHO, EC delegation). Annex 1 presents the mission programme and the list of people met. Understanding the dynamics triggered by the Disaster Resilience Champions Initiatives: Haiti is one of the pilot countries of this initiative which was launched in April 2013. It is producing a lot of very interesting learning points which need to be recorded. Reviewing literature on resilience-related issues produced in the Haitian context. Some interesting reports and studies produced both before and since the 12 January earthquake are worth taking into account. Annex N°2 presents the key documents consulted in the course of the mission. Exploring a series of options and tools to assess and follow the effects and hopefully, in time, the impact of existing “resilience-friendly initiatives”. Direct field experience gathered over 16 field missions in Haiti : Some of these missions took place 30 years ago, in the field of rural development, others took place prior to the earthquake (2004, 2006 and 2009) and rest have taken place since January 2010.
3. THE HAITIAN CONTEXT
3.1. The risk context: a history of resilience and vulnerability in Haiti
The high level of exposure to risk of disaster has been regularly highlighted years ago in several
reports (OXFAM, 1984, DPC 2004, etc.). The resilience agenda, which recently became
prominent in the aid discourse, reinforces this point. It also obliged to revisit specific elements of
the Haitian context.
With its very diversified landscape and its complex agro-ecological features, Haiti is a country
where, in the past, farmers used their ingeniosity to create sophisticated agrarian systems. In the
plains, there were large sugar cane, rice and banana plantations, while in the more mountainous
inlands, there were small landowners involved in food crops (maize, beans, root crops, peanuts) or
cash crops (coffee, orchards). The double cropping which was possible because of the climate
increased the population’s capacity to resist short-term difficulties.
Things started to change when a series of events structurally weakened the functioning of this
initially rather resilient rural economy.
- The weakening of the farmer “cash machine”: the crisis of the Creole pig and its impact on
deforestation and urbanization. When the killing of the Creole pig was promulgated as a
measure of animal health to prevent the contamination of the US porcine industry by porcine
pest, nobody anticipated the dramatic impact this measure would have on the Haitian rural
economy. The Creole pig was indeed a “cash machine” for farmers: zero investment, low
input, rapid prolificacy and a capacity to produce meat and fat using domestic waste and other
detritus. Although many farmers tried to save some of this essential farm capital, many could
not. Without this “cash machine”, many had to rely on wood cutting, charcoal making and
migration to Port au Prince to survive. The curve of deforestation and uncontrolled
urbanization became rapidly exponential. This resulted in a degraded environment, unsafe
urban and peri-urban areas and an impoverished rural population with reduced resilience.
- Haiti’s entry into the non-regulated economy: the coffee crisis and its impact on rural poverty.
In the early 1990s, the large-scale plans for coffee production development in Vietnam started
to deliver high quantities of coffee in a less and less regulated market. Prices went down
instantaneously and farming economies based on coffee exports in many countries such as
Ethiopia and Haiti went into crisis. The coffee sector in Haiti was no longer a significant
source of income for the country (less tax for the State) and many of its farmers. Similar
problems were encountered in the rice sector (St Marc and Gonaives plains). Here again, the
last resort was charcoal production and a rural to urban exodus. Haiti has become increasingly
dependent on food imports, worsening the trade deficit and increasing aid dependence. Recent
estimates1 are that the country now imports 60% of its total food for consumption, including
80% of its rice (in which Haiti was once self-sufficient). The food price riots in the pre-
earthquake Port-au-Prince in 2008 show the fragility of the system.
- From the mid 80s, the increased number of extreme weather events and their effect on
weakened ecosystems became a major threat to the rural sector and poor urbanized areas.
1 Sarah Curran, Earth Institute, Columbia University. http://cgsd.columbia.edu/2012/06/16/domestic-production-vs-
imports-for-rice-in-haiti-a-delicate-balance-to-strike/
These developments have had ecological, economic and social consequences:
- widespread poverty, both rural and urban, making life very harsh and the capacity of the
different livelihood systems to allow people to move forwards very limited
- significant food insecurity in many rural areas, while urban systems seemingly a bit more
able to provide some types of safety nets (daily labor, etc.);
- major environmental degradation leading to simultaneous decrease in yields and increase in
disaster susceptibility
- uncontrolled urbanization which pushes people to settle in at risk areas and create a complex
socio-political mechanism linked to illicit economy and easily available for political
manipulations.
All these factors make Haiti a very fragile territory where climatic hazards regularly turn into
humanitarian disasters (Annex 4 presents a list of disasters since 1684).
A country at risk
The emergency cycle has been never-ending in Haiti over the past twenty years, due to natural events,
epidemics and social and political instability. Between 1900 and 2004, Haiti was the victim of 50 major
natural disasters including 17 hurricanes, 26 severe floods, and seven droughts. The country lies on
the primary pathway of tropical storms that originate in the Atlantic and strike Caribbean islands every
hurricane season, causing fatalities from floods and mudslides, increasing in severity and frequency as
forest cover decreases. Low-elevation coastal lands, where population and infrastructure are concentrated,
are highly prone to hurricanes, storm surges, flooding, erosion and salinization. The densely populated
slum districts of Haiti’s coastal cities are particularly vulnerable, as seen in the disastrous floods of 2004 in
Gonaïves and other areas. The high level of vulnerability and dependence on international funds, which has
only been made worse by the earthquake, has left Haiti in a state of chronic crisis which require from the
aid programmes a constant analysis and adaptation to the context. The fact that one crisis comes after
another disrupt the continuity of the programme and easily sweep away the benefits from the past.
And there is likely more risk ahead: Growing scientific evidence shows new climate trends and
new climate risks patterns in Haiti. The INC and NAPA established that annual average
temperature across the country is expected to rise in the range of 0.8°C to 1°C by 2030 and in the
range of 1.5°C to 1.7°c by 2060. These changes are predicted to be accompanied by increasing
rainfall variability, decrease in precipitation in the range of -5.9% to -20% by 20302 and increased
frequency and intensity of extreme floods and droughts events. Haitian observations tend to
confirm these scientific findings: people report dry seasons that last longer, and shorter but more
intense rainy seasons. Anticipated increase in sea levels and sea surface temperatures are also
likely to be primary causes for increased beach erosion, salinization of fresh water aquifers and
estuaries, coastal erosion and increased coral reef bleaching throughout the Island. There is also a
trend that suggests increased frequencies of hurricanes. The North Atlantic has shown a
significant increase in hurricane intensities and duration as part of a 30-year trend. Rising sea
surface temperatures and the trend in hurricane patterns are undoubtedly linked to global climate
change. Recent researches revealed that Haiti's southern peninsula presents a heightened
vulnerability to hurricanes compared to the rest of the country.
2Figures from UNDP proposal “Support Program for Adaptation to Climate Change and Vulnerability Reduction based on
ecosystem management of upper watersheds and coastal areas”
Southern districts of South, Grand’Anse, South-East , and West “départements” are particularly at
risk from extreme tropical storms events. These climatic changes and their associated risks pose a
direct threat to coastal settlements and infrastructures.
The history of the last 30 years is also a history of political turbulences, state fragility, regular
international interventions and the establishment of the UN Integrated mission. All these elements
negatively impact on the State Legitimacy and State capacity to assume its responsibility and duty
of care
It was in this already economically, institutionally and socially fragile context that an earthquake
of magnitude 7 on the Richter scale hit Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area on 12 January
2010, killing almost 230 000 people and leading to the displacement of more than 2 million
people. Several months later, the country was affected by one of the worst cholera epidemics
globally in recent decades which killed more than 8000 people3.
PROBLEM TREE
CRISIS
Impossibility Continuation Continued Increased migration
of sustainable of costly economic and and brain drain
engagement humanitarian and environmental
in LRRD crisis management degradation Increased influence of
processes programmes mafia networks
Return of accentuation of Loss of credibility
crisis-generating pauperisation by Haitian institutions
dynamics process
Failure or major difficulties
of food security
programmes
Repeated difficulties
of implementing
programmes Lack of knowledge management
within international and
Haitian institutions
Lack of evaluation Lack of analysis Lack of evaluation
mechanisms within of the management of capacity within
organisations previous crises Haitian and international institutions
CRISES
Risk of loss of credibility Very degraded Fragility of human
of the Haitian political environmental resources within
sphere resources Haitian institutions
3 http://www.hpnhaiti.com/site/index.php/nouvelles/19-haiti--cholera/10759-haiti-sante-28577-cas-de-cholera-enregistres-de-janvier-a-octobre-
2013-selon-mspp
3.2. The components of resilience in Haiti
The Political Champions Group in Haiti developed an approach on disaster resilience in Haiti4
which identifies various circles to distinguish between the core elements of disaster resilience
versus components of an enabling environment for resilience in general.
The Resilience approach of the Disaster Resilience Political Champions in Haiti
Resilience is defined as: the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist,
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects in a timely and efficient manner, including
through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. The resilience of
a community in respect to potential hazard events is determined by the degree to which the community
has the necessary resources and is capable of organizing itself both prior to and during times of need5.
A proposed working definition of disaster resilience in Haiti would be grounded in the ability of: the
country (communities, households, institutions and investments) to reduce exposure and vulnerability
to disaster risk; and when disasters occur, to anticipate and minimize the impact of disturbances
experienced as a result of shocks and stresses caused, in a manner that does not compromise the long-
term development prospects of its population. However, disasters in Haiti should not just be seen as
‘external shocks’ , therefore a disaster resilience strategy in Haiti has to also target the root causes of
disaster risk.
Yet, in parallel to this operational approach, it is important to keep in mind the broader
perspective. Studies of vulnerability and resilience underline the importance of certain forms of
“capital” that contribute to resilience:
Social Capital is what keeps a society together. It includes societal features, institutional set up
and the quality and legitimacy of governance.
- Societal features - In Haiti, everybody recognizes the importance of solidarity at the village
or neighborhood levels when disaster strikes. Neighbor to neighbor assistant is always
present and is complemented at a more global level with the Diaspora and people who have
migrated within Haiti. However, Haitian societal solidarity is complex. The forces of
societal cohesion and solidarity are combined with a variety of economic, political,
religious, anthropological and sociological factors, which create another set of circles of
solidarity. The role of priests and Hogans, for instance, should not be underestimated.
Understanding these tensions and circles of solidarity either connected to land rights, to
political affiliations or cultural and religious issues is essential to understand resilience in
Haiti and to engage in resilience programming in the long term.
- Human capital - This is at the crossroads between several components of the three forms of
capital and forces us to take into account other elements such as the “individual factor”
(linked to psychosocial issues, family trajectories, etc.). This can also be partly connected to
psychosocial resilience. The way death and bodies were dealt with after the earthquake has
affected the collective subconscious of the survivors. The cholera crisis and the taboos that it
highlighted about how bodies were managed, burial methods in this highly contagious
context and the risk of stigmatization of survivors and the families of victims showed very
clearly that these cultural dimensions need to be taken into account in crisis management.
4
Concept note on disaster resilience in Haiti
5 International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2009).
- The Institutional set up: During the mission, there were permanent reminders of the
importance of the national institutions. State, infra-state and decentralized institutions are
essential ingredients of any process to build resilience. But alone, they will rapidly meet
certain limits and they also need a strong and organized civil society. Haiti’s network of
very competent NGOs at both national level (FOKAL, FONKOSE, ITEAKA, etc) and
regional level (Paysan Papay) is a key asset. But, as was regularly pointed out, these civil
society institutions need a State which is able to play its normative and regalian role. As part
of Haiti’s institutional decentralisation process, the national DRM system has been
decentralized down to local and departmental levels through the strengthening of the
Direction de la Protection Civile’s offices at the department level and the Haitian Red Cross
local committees. This has significantly enhanced disaster resilience as it has connected
communities with the national system.
However, the institutional resilience of these different bodies is itself challenged due to the
absence of an effective and equitable fiscal system. At the different levels of these state
institutions, the payment of salaries and basic running costs, such as office rent, printing
paper and fuel for cars and motorbikes is regularly a problem, thus preventing these
institutions from functioning and reducing their legitimacy.
- The quality and legitimacy of governance: At the lower part of the pyramid, the way
mayors, CASEC nd ASEC are selected, named or elected significantly influences their
legitimacy and the quality of their interactions with the population. The complex process
that led to the Presidential elections, the nomination of the government and its validation by
the Parliament was a clear impediment to the rapid reestablishment of state authority after
the earthquake. Now that this phase is over, the state is now engaging more vigorously in
terms of “duty of care”. Efforts made to reestablish the Sectoral Tables and most recently to
create the Sectoral Table on Disaster Management should be seen from this angle. Indeed,
governments are well aware of the fact that they will pay dearly in political terms for a badly
managed disaster (and even more so in the age of web-based social networks). Many donors,
such as the European Commission, have made providing support to governance one of their
main priorities.
Economic Capital: Haiti’s economic capital is based on several pillars: agriculture based “value
chains”, informal petty trade, small handicrafts and informal service delivery, a large import-
export sector controlled by a limited number of national companies, the aid system and its
“redistribution chain” and remittances from the Diaspora (around US$ 1.2 Billion compared to
around US$ 500 million from international assistance before the earthquake6). In the countryside
and in many parts of Port-au-Prince, more than 70% of the population has to live on less than 2
US$/day7, which means they have an extremely weak capacity to invest even in street retailers.
The dynamism of micro-finance institutions prior to the earthquake was one of the responses to
that situation. Projects such as HOPE 1 and 2 in the industrial sector and WINNER in the rural
one are rying to develop industries and modernized agricultures but are too dependent on the
global economy and local politics to properly function.
6
ODI, 2013
7
World Bank, 2012Ecological capital: Seriously degraded rural and urban environments create risk factors which enter into negative synergy not only with extreme events, but, more worryingly, with more banal deviations in the patterns of tropical events. The vegetation cover is often too weak to maintain the soil on slopes and biomass in the upper parts of watersheds no longer acts as a buffer to rainfall, which either immediately gets transformed into rapidly uncontrolled runoff or triggers landslides, destroying crops and human settlements. These major environmental degradation including deforestation, soil erosion, siltation, water contamination, salinization of rivers, loss of soil fertility and desertification, leads to simultaneous decrease in yields and increase in disaster susceptibility”. When acute poverty and the absence of medium-term perspectives becomes the norm for a large segment of the population, coping strategies which have a negative impact on the environment are widely adopted as natural resources are often the “last common good” available to make a living. This accentuates the degradation of ecological systems and aggravates the situation, sometimes beyond repair. Loss and degradation of ecological capital does not only mean increased vulnerability to disasters, such as when tropical storms cause flash floods in eroded upper watersheds that wash down on poor riverine and coastal floodplain communities. It also means that goods and services from natural ecosystems that were once relied on by rural communities (e.g. drinking water, fertile soil) and urban communities (e.g. charcoal, prevention of dam siltation) decline, worsening socio-economic vulnerability. Degraded environment The environmental balance maintained by indigenous communities began to shift with French colonization and planting of large areas of sugar, indigo, cotton and other products. By 1770, as coffee prices rose in international markets, planting of coffee began on mountain slopes. After the Haitian Revolution, trees were felled to service a debt incurred through the treaty signed in 1825 by which France would recognize Haiti's independence in exchange for 150 (later reduced to 90) million gold Francs8. Agricultural production for export to Europe and the United States continued, and forests were felled for logs and wood for carpentry and construction. During the US occupation from 1915 US growers took land, sometimes with the cooperation of Haitian leaders to expel small farmers. An analysis9 states that 266,600 acres were in the hands of American investors by 1929, including large new sisal and rubber plantations, which altered the hydrology and soil chemistry of these regions. Massive devastation was caused by Hurricane Hazel in 1954, and after this deforestation sped up, as logging concessions were expanded to supply charcoal to the growing population of Port-au- Prince.10 Mining companies such as the Haitian subsidiary of Reynolds, which mined bauxite from the Miragoâne region, and Sedren, a US-Canadian company which extracted copper outside Gonaïves withdrew in the 1980s without rehabilitating areas degraded by their mining activities. Current estimates are that only 2% of forest cover remains in once verdant Haiti. Small farmers have played a significant role in deforestation in recent decades, in a downward spiral of poverty and environmental degradation, clearing land for cash crops and livestock pasture, or resorting to felling trees to produce charcoal, used by most urban dwellers, in order to survive. Declining yields, population pressure, fragmentation of plots and insecure land tenure worsen this situation. The 2010 earthquake caused displacement of population into highly vulnerable areas. Deforestation is also a governance issue, with illegal logging occurring from protected areas with logs being trucked to supply markets in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien. 8 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=haiti_536 9 Article written by Marc-Arthur Fils-Aimé, director of the Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque (ICKL) (www.icklhaiti.org), a global partner of The United Church of Canada. It was published in Living Faithfully in the Midst of Empire (www.united- church.ca/economic/globalization/report) a report to General Council 39 in 2006. 10 Malik, Boulos A. "Forestry". A Country Study: Haiti (Richard A. Haggerty, editor). Library of Congress Federal Research Division (December 1989).
Other methodologies have been developed to understand resilience in Haiti and to scrutinize how
it can be affected by development and humanitarian aid. One of the most sophisticated so far is the
work done by Tulane University and The State University of Haiti. This work, which was carried
out as part of the preparation for a large quantitative impact evaluation of the international
response to the 12th of January earthquake, identifies several criteria that could be used to analyze
the resilience of individuals.
The seven dimensions of Resilience (model developed by Tulane university and the Université d’Etat
d’Haiti for their evaluation of the international response to the 12/01/2010 earthquake)
3.3. Efforts in disaster risk management: an historical perspective
This chapter describes the experience of Haiti in Disaster risk management and its different facets
over a period which starts at the end of the 70ies. There have been numerous Disaster Risk
Reduction11 efforts in Haiti in the past. These have involved many different approaches linked in
one way or another to the three key capitals mentioned above:
Ecological Capital: Development actors’ approach to ecological capital in Haiti has largely been
through watershed management, river course protection and reforestation. This approach has been
implemented through many different projects over the last 30 years (World Bank, IADB, NGO12,
bilateral and private13 donors14, farmers organizations15). While its results at the local level are
interesting (tree cover increase, anti-erosion schemes preventing landslides and river course
management with gabions), it remains globally insufficient to cope with the major effects of
“negative coping strategies” and climate change.
11
Not to be confonded with Disaster risk resilience
12 GRET, Projet Magnan Salagnac dans les années 70-80
13 http://quixote.org/programs/haiti-reborn (depuis la fin des années 90)
14 Agence Française de développement (AFD)
15 Paysans de Vallue, Mouvement Paysan Papaye, etc.)Too often, sustaining the impact of these efforts is impossible as tree protection, dike maintenance and road drainage require an impulse and means that cannot come from the communities alone. The inadequacy of small-scale attempts at reforestation has been acknowledged by the government, which launched a campaign in 2013 to plant 50 million trees a year, aiming to reach forest cover of 4.5% by 2016; and 8% to 10% in 2023, and combining this with a forest social initiative to ensure small farmers benefit from agroforestry. The portfolio of projects managed by UNDP and financed by the Global Environment Facility focuses on a territorial or landscape approach to vulnerability reduction based on ecosystem management, and includes upstream policy work to improve the enabling environment (developing monitoring capacity and harmonizing legislation), as well as work on the ground in protected areas, production landscapes and vulnerable coastal areas. The success of all interventions to reduce ecological vulnerability is closely tied to that of broader sustainable development initiatives – to reduce poverty, enhance agricultural productivity, provide alternative energy sources, improve security of land tenure, and promote good governance and enforcement Social Capital: Support to institutional and community-based disaster management capacities has also been widely developed. Community-based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) is the most commonly used tools to develop and strengthen social capital. The development of the Haitian Red Cross Volunteers, the creation of the Emergency Intervention Teams at the village level, etc., has enhanced the capacity of grass roots groups to be part of daily efforts all over the country to ensure surveillance, alertness and responsiveness in relation to risks. However, these volunteers also have to earn income to feed their families and might not always be available to be mobilised. The efforts and investments in CBDRR are beginning to pay off and behaviour is progressively changing in communities and Community Based Organizations regarding the importance of DRR. This social capital that has been progressively built up needs to be further nurtured. Institutional Capital: Compared to a few decades ago, tremendous progress in DRR has been made and recognized by all stakeholders (communities, institutions, and partners). The Haitian Red Cross established in 1932, the Organisation pré désastre et de secours (OPDES) created in 1987 and the Direction de la Protection Civile (created en 1997) were the precursors of current systems. By supporting civil protection and the national DRM system in 1998, DIPECHO, the EU Humanitarian office’ instrument for DRR, has encouraged partners and donors (WB, EU, USAID, UNDP) to invest resources which have consecutively and considerably increased the local and national disaster preparedness capacities of the country. At the institutional level the DPC and the Haitian Red Cross have received significant funding from different donors, especially from DG ECHO (under DIPECHO), USAID and bilateral donors and have largely increased their response capacities at departmental and local levels. Very rapidly, the limits of voluntary service are reached and local administration has to take over. The local DPC teams under the Delegates and Municipal Authorities are particularly essential in keeping a core capacity at the department level and further down. At the departmental, communal and local levels the DPC structures rely on volunteer service and are made up with a mix of public administration people who do not have a specific background in civil protection. Most of the structures still lack means and resources to pay the recurrent costs, to renew their equipment and to appropriately respond to their mandate. Many of them have to find their own strategy to create a sustainable resource base to limit their dependence to external funding mechanisms. The departmental structures may often have fewer capacities than the communal and local structures which receive more support from the community-based DRM projects.
3.4. Efforts in Nutrition and Food Security
In a largely agrarian economy, where local food production is often fragile and where local
supplies are frequently disrupted by disasters, rural food and nutrition security are critical
elements of resilience.
Agriculture has been largely left aside from development aid in the last decades despite a few
interesting success stories such as the dairy food chain launched by the NGO Agronomes et
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (AVSF). This situation led to the launch in 2009 of the Global Plan
on Nutrition and Food Security for Haiti by DG ECHO. Recently, there has been growing interest
in food security and agriculture. A number of programmes have been launched by the national
authorities (such as the ABA GRANGOU project which aims to reduce malnutrition by half by
2025 through a series of agriculture interventions), and there has been increased funding from the
EC’s DG Dev and other bilateral and multilateral donors. More investment is being programmed
in agriculture and food production, in particular in irrigated areas, in order to support the food
value chain, including food processing and trade.
A set of programmes specifically targeting the most vulnerable segments of the population are
also being launched:
- Social Security nets for normal situations where high levels of vulnerability prevail;
- School cantines;
- Resource transfers in cash and in kind, based as much as possible on local production to
stimulate local agriculture, or Cash for work;
The national policy on agriculture will ensure that proper attention is paid to food production in
order to increase food security at all levels, from the household to the national level. This will
require increased funding of the agricultural sector, the development of local savings and credit
institutions and the promotion of agronomic research into stress resistant crops. Special attention
will be paid to securing land tenure for small landholders as they play a major role in local food
and nutrition security.4. LESSONS LEARNT: AID AND RESILIENCE IN HAITI
The lessons learnt concern the five key areas where interactions with resilience are important to
take into account
- The role of development aid;
- The impact of humanitarian aid on resilience;
- Risk knowledge and preventive measures;
- The institutional set up;
- The community-based component.
- The regional approach
Vulnerability reduction is a key aspect of the initiative as well. It is not sufficiently reflected or
analyzed in the report.
4.1. The crucial role of development aid in building resilience
There is no doubt that economically and ecologically sound development which is socially
equitable, gender-balanced and risk-informed is central to the resilience of households,
communities, and countries. Development of this kind gives the State legitimacy and gives
meaning to the OECD’s Paris Principles. In Haiti, due to the fragility of the State for so many
years, and the recurrence of social and political crises, the Haitian State has been largely
circumvented by the aid system, which has preferred to focus and work through NGOs and civil
society, thus further delegitimizing the national institutions. This has changed and the main
development actors are now fully engaging with the Haitian State.
4.2. Humanitarian aid and its influence on resilience
This chapter is underlining some of the difficulties encountered by a aid system ill prepared to
deal with massive urban disasters. Much progress have been since and experience from Haiti is
being used in other “at risk contexts”. While this paragraph focuses on humanitarian aid, the other
sectors of aid (development, institutional support, etc.) have also to do their own introspections
and to identify how it contributed, positively or negatively, to the pre-earthquake situation and to
the post earthquake recovery supposed to deliver much needed resilience.
One of the most critical lessons learnt again from Haiti, especially from the response to the 12th of
January earthquake, is that humanitarian aid is not “ impact neutral” on the resilience of a society,
its members and its institutions. Even if its initial “life saving” objective is recognized, the fact
that humanitarian aid can have, depending on its design, a negative impact on people’s and
institutional resilience (Tulane, 2011) is extremely worrying. Creating dependency, weakening or
perverting indigenous survival strategies by introducing the “aid factor” in the equation and
reducing the legitimacy of national institutions have all been mentioned in several reports in the
last 20 years. Many of these lessons are not new, but Haiti has put them back on the table
(Grunewald & Binder, 2010, Groupe URD, 2011, Tulane, 2011).The fact that the aid system did not realize that displacement to the countryside just after the
earthquake could have been supported and made sustainable had a highly significant impact on
population dynamics. As aid remained concentrated in Port-au-Prince, many Haitians who sought
shelter after the earthquake in their rural areas of origin went back to the city, leaving a
decapitalized rural society behind them.
Several reports16 underlined the fact that the institutionalization of the “camp system” approach
with its aid mechanisms concentrating high levels of resources in the camps rather than facilitating
a neighbourhood approach beyond the perimeter of the tented camps, became an hindrance for
proper strategic thinking. While UN-HABITAT underlined very early on that this approach will
slow down the rehabilitation of neighbourhoods, it was largely un-heard.
Similarly the focus on T-Shelters which used up key financial resources which are lacking now for
more permanent solutions, the inappropriateness of many “cash for work” programmes that
disturbed the local labour market, etc. have been frequently mentioned in several reports (see
bibliography). As it has been largely documented in the work carried out by Tulane University and
the Haitian State University, these choices made by aid agencies are not “resilience neutral” for
the populations. Their analysis of the impact of current humanitarian practices on the 6 dimensions
of resilience follows a “theory of change” model presented below. The most challenging elements
regarding the effects of aid on resilience which have emerged from many of these studies are:
- The frequent inadequacy of the response, due to the imposition of an external standardized
approach rather than being based on a diagnosis of the specific local context. This was
particularly obvious in certain areas (WASH, Food Aid, T-Shelters, etc.);
- The frequently mentioned limited dialogue with the population and civil society structures
due to the systematic use of English (see reports in the consulted document annex) and the
security rules preventing sufficient access to the population, especially during the first year;
- The functioning of aid in silos limits the chance to develop the much needed multi-sectorial
response coordinated on an “area based’ approach;
- The damaged reputation of national and municipal institutions;
- The perversion of local mechanisms of CBO apparition and evolutions is often the result of
agencies which support the emergence of CBO to help them implement programmes rather
than identifying existing local NGO networks they could support;
- Alteration of the functioning of the economic system by the creation of aid dependent
market niches;
- Blocking the situation in camps by creating aid dependency. Many “ghost camps” come
back to life when there is aid distribution in the pipeline.
16
IASC evaluations three month after the earthquake (2010), Tulane evaluation (2011), Dutch evaluation (2011),
Swiss aid evaluation (2011), DG ECHO evaluations (2011)The impact of shocks and humanitarian aid on resilience (model developed by Tulane university and the Université d’Etat d’Haiti for their evaluation of the international response to the 10/01/2010 earthquake)
The most challenging elements regarding resilience evolution emerging from many of these
studies are:
- Degraded legitimacy of national institutions;
- Perversion of local mechanisms of CBO apparition and evolutions by substituting newly
created local institutions fully utilized for relief delivery to existing more socially rooted
CBO: facilitation of access to relief items became the rule of the game, rather than the more
classical social fabric support and problem solving efforts.
- Alteration of the functioning of the economic system by the creation of aid dependant
market niches. In many areas, local masons where just substituted by rapid “prefabricated
house” installers.
- The freezing of the evolution of the situation of the camps by creating aid dependency and
the incorporation of aid in coping mechanisms during the first years. With the process of
camp populations slowly finding solutions, many “phantom camps” come back to life when
there is aid distribution in the pipeline.
If one lesson is to be learnt from these difficulties, it is that contextual understanding should go
beyond traditional risk assessments, which are largely undertaken using “hard sciences”
(meteorology, seismology, engineering, etc.), and should include how societies view and react to
disasters, which is an area where social sciences would do wonders.
The important fact is that all these lessons have been properly learnt. The new Humanitarian
Indicative Programme (HIP) of DG ECHO is very much taking into account not only the new
DRR policy of the Commission, but also the new Resilience policy recently adopted by the
European Council17.
4.3. Risk knowledge and prevention measures
Resilience and disaster risk management, and ways of dealing with these, are significantly
different in urban and rural contexts.
The relatively recent demographic concentration18 of people in cities, especially in Port-au-Prince,
as a result of accelerated urbanization, has created new patterns of risk, exposure and
vulnerability. The urban micro economy, the important links between the urban population and the
Diaspora and the new means of communication and social networks19 used by young urban
Haitians are part of a new facet of resilience which is beginning to appear20. Micro-zoning, urban
planning, proper codes of construction and the promotion of appropriate building methods, as well
as the design and management of water, sewage and energy networks are highly specific in urban
contexts. Key activities for urban disaster resilience include retrofitting hospitals and schools and
identifying mechanisms for water, sanitation and electricity which continue to function under a
“degraded mode” (mode dégradé) that maintains their key functions.
17
Foreign Affair Council Conclusion of the EU Approach to Resilience (Doc 9325/13). Action Plan for Resilience in
Crisis Prone Countries ( period 2013-2020) launched in June 2013 (SWD (2013) 227).
18
http://www.mgm.fr/PUB/Mappemonde/M388/p6-8.pdf
19
important at the time of the disaster with the mobilization of NTIC networks with google, Husaidi, Sahanna
20
http://wiki.sahanafoundation.org/lib/exe/fetch.php/iscram_2010_sahana_haiti.pdfBeyond “disaster resilience”, the complex issue of the resilience of the urban economy and its non-formal components requires specific attention and is not currently addressed in the “resilience debate” in Haiti. Resilience in Haitian cities is linked to a great extent to the functioning of the informal sector, as national industry is so underdeveloped. In Haiti, the capacity of petty trade, small-scale handicrafts and local services to get back on their feet after disasters is simply astonishing and demonstrates a high level of resilience. Support for micro-finance schemes and the injection of cash helped these different parts of the informal sector to start up again restart. The resumption of the Western Union and other cash transfer systems helped people to access again remittances from the Diaspora. It also showed that when schemes like this exist before a disaster, people are better equipped to recover rapidly. The aid system also significantly contributed to cash transfer through different type of programmes and many lessons have been learnt both on the potential and on the limits of these systems. One key lesson is that the earlier the aid cash transfer programme connect with local mechanisms (including banks transfer, credit cards, telecom-based resources transfer, etc), the more effective are the programmes). Identifying proactively the best way to ensure this type of resource transfer would go a long way in the direction of resilience. It would require much more investment in social sciences to properly understand the social dynamics of Port-au-Prince’s complex and fluid urban society and its different faces, from wealthy Petion Ville to complicated Cité Soleil and Upper Martisan. This understanding could then help to build a more resilient urban sector. The movement of people going to work during the day, both within cities and between cities and rural and periurban areas is critical to understand. Indeed it adds a specific dimension to the situation at the time when the disaster struck. Who is where? On that sad evening of January 2010, many people did not know who exactly was at home, at school, in the street of at work at the time of the quake. This created a significant anxiety for many and was a dramatic paralysing factor affecting the capacity of individuals to bounce back The aid sector in Haiti has had a strong “rural bias” for a number of decades and therefore is more familiar with rural social features and with the effects of disasters in rural contexts such as landslides, floods, drought and the destruction of tree cover by hurricanes. It is critical to understand how urban-rural links affect both positively or negatively the “global resilience”. Indeed, the critical relations in terms of flow of labour, cash and food, combined with the strong family links between the recently urbanized populations and its rural roots not can create not only “family safety nets based on solidarity, but also essential supply lines for food. The economic and food security of the urban populations and of their rural and peri-urban neighbours are extremely interdependent; when the city gets cold, the neighbouring rural peripheries cough. Transforming these interactions (each relying on the other for critical functions) into a factor of resilience is one of the challenges of the day At the time when the new urbanization parameters of Port au Prince are discussed at the highest level and with CIAT and UCLBP. 4.4. The institutional set up, national involvement and coordination Haiti does not lack coordination mechanisms: the main mechanisms that regulated aid in the past were development donor coordination mechanisms such as the GACI (Groupe d’Appui de la Communauté Internationale, the Humanitarian Country team, the Cluster system and the Sectoral tables. The Tables sectorielles have in the past been the main mechanisms regulating aid.
In 1999, the Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (SNGRD) was established in Haiti.21The SNGRD consists of 26 governmental and non-governmental institutions involved in disaster preparedness and response. Its work is facilitated through a permanent secretariat. Policy development and decision-making lie with the Comité National de Gestion des Risqueset des Désastres (CNGRD) which is led by the Ministry for the Interior. Therefore, the Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales (MICT) has the main responsibility for risk and disaster management. The MICT executes this responsibility through the Direction Générale and the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC). The DPC is responsible for operational coordination and is thus often described as the government’s OCHA. The DPC is present at the national, provincial and municipal levels. In emergencies, the Centre d’Opération d’Urgence (COU), bringing together the members of the SNGRD’s permanent secretariat and the DPC, is responsible for disaster response. Before the earthquake, the link between the government’s approach of the “tables sectorielles” and the international cluster system was unclear. Furthermore, there were little efforts by the Inter- Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team and OCHA had clarified the link between the “table approach” and the cluster approach as well as the delineation of MINUSTAH’s and OCHA’s roles with respect to humanitarian coordination. Many humanitarian organizations already demonstrated a general resistance to cooperating with the government. This limited cooperation with government was even more the rule than the exception during the months after the 12/01 earthquake . This has changed recently and is the only way to show respect for national structures, safeguard acceptance for international presence in the longer term and allow for knowledge transfer and capacity strengthening. After the earthquake, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was created as a means to facilitate coordination between the Haitian Authorities and the donors. As the system had to be changed after the elections, new Haitian-led structures were created. The CAED, the Cadre de Coordination de l’Aide Externe au Developpement is the key tool for donor-government interaction in regard to reconstruction and development. The UCLBP is in charge of the coordination of the efforts for reconstruction of Port au Prince. Aid planning processes such as UNDAF can also contribute to the collective efforts22. Due to the waves of events over the past 30 years,, there were consistent, difficulties in coordination difficulties between the aid system and national institutions. While significant progress has been made since the earthquake, the limited involvement of the Haitian institutions in the design of many externally driven projects and their lack of participation in the monitoring of activities continues to limit the sense of ownership and the development of national expertise and institutional memory. Systematic reporting by international DRM actors to national institutions unfortunately remains insufficient23. This situation is often explained by the long procedures to get approval from the central level. In some departments, the establishment of DPC structures required more than a year and NGOs had to implement their activities in the absence of national interlocutors. Many progresses have been made since the earthquake. Global investment in supporting the DPC has been massive, with UN (UNDP, OCHA, WFP, the clusters -CCCM/shelter and protection), the Red Cross International Movement (IFRC, British Red Cross, French Red Cross), NGO 21 See Annex 2 for an organizational chart of the SNGRD 22 There has not been an UNDAF since 2009 in Haiti 23 Interview with Haitian official
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