Scenarios for Governance Breakdown and Violent Conflict in the EU's Neighbourhood - GPPi
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Scenarios for
Governance
Breakdown and Europe’s External Action and the Dual Challenges
of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders
Violent Conflict VISUALIZING
SCENARIOS
in the EU’s
Neighbourhood
Sarah Bressan*, Johannes Gabriel**,
Philipp Rotmann* and Dominic Seefeldt**
* Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
** Foresight Intelligence
Scenarios for Governance
Breakdown and Violent Conflict
in the EU’s Neighbourhood
This booklet presents 13 scenarios for governance breakdown and violent
conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood which were created in the context of the
For more information: EU-LISTCO research project.
www.eu-listco.net
Scenarios are plausible thought experiments about alternative future
Visualizations based on the findings of the developments. Each is useful for learning something new about a topic and its
‘Report on Four Threat-Scanning Workshops’,
co-authored by Sarah Bressan, Johannes uncertain future. Useful scenarios are not probable or likely from a current
Gabriel, Philipp Rotmann & Dominic Seefeldt perspective because they necessarily diverge from current expectations. The
(GPPi). usefulness of a scenarios lies in the eyes of its creators. To their authors, each
Visuals produced by Oriol Farrés (CIDOB). offers new perspectives and a deeper understanding of the topics in question.
Published in August 2019
We hope this booklet helps readers learn something new, broaden their
horizons and think differently about the scenario topics. We would, however,
ask all readers to recognize the origin of the scenarios as briefly described
below. This is crucial for their understanding, as the scenarios cannot and were
never meant to offer a neutral perspective on future developments.
This project has received funding from the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research
and innovation programme under grant
agreement no. 769886.
The Origin of the Scenarios
The scenarios below are the result of four threat-scanning exercises North Africa: This exercise focused on regional risks in the EU’s
with expert participants about potential governance breakdown and southern neighbourhood, including in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, and Libya. Participating experts decided to build scenarios for
violent conflict in the European Union’s neighbourhood. Each
Tunisia and Libya. Starting in early 2019, the exercise looked ahead to
deliberately focuses on developments that may be considered
2024.
surprising or even unlikely, but plausible. The chosen time horizon for
each exercise was five years into the future (looking from 2018–19
Out-of-Control Technologies: This exercise covered diffuse risks
ahead to 2023–24) in order to anticipate threats for the European
that are not geographically contingent or are non-territorial in nature.
Union in a way that is timely with respect to the dynamics of the policy
Namely, these risks are related to out-of-control technologies that have
process and the reaction speed of most relevant policy instruments for
become independent of their origin and creators, whether by design or
foreign services. The scenarios are intended to help enhance the EU’s
accident. Starting in early 2019, the exercise looked ahead to 2024.
capacity to prevent these threatening developments or to prepare for
them – a main concern of the EU-LISTCO project. Scenarios are produced in a structured group process, because only
collectively can people break out of their individual mindsets, current
A small group of experts (between 8 and 15) participated in each of the expectations and common sense of what the future might hold. The
four exercises, which were conducted in part online and in part at a scenarios are the result of a methodologically guided and facilitated
workshop. The groups consisted of EU-LISTCO researchers with process in which a diverse group of experts share and integrate their
relevant regional or sectoral expertise, additional experts from Europe views, perspectives and knowledge in order to learn from each other
and the focus regions, and policymakers from cooperating foreign and to explore plausible (not probable) future developments. The
services (France, Germany, Italy, and the EU EEAS). The four process and methodology that were utilized to create the scenarios are
workshops took place between June 2018 and May 2019 in Jerusalem, described in Sarah Bressan, Johannes Gabriel, Philipp Rotmann and
Berlin, Paris, and Brussels, and covered the following geographical and Dominic Seefeldt’s, "Report on Four Threat Scanning Workshops", EU-
thematic areas: LISTCO Deliverable 2.3, August 2019 (available from the authors).
Middle East: In order to be open to a multitude of potential risk
factors and threats, the exercise focused on the ‘region between the
Eastern Mediterranean and Afghanistan’. Starting in mid 2018, the
looked ahead to 2023.
Eastern Neighbourhood: This exercise focused on regional risks in
the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, including the countries of the EU’s
Eastern Partnership – which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine – and on the Russian
Federation. Starting in late 2018, the exercise looked ahead to 2023.
Scenarios for Governance Breakdown and Violent Conflict in the EU’s Neighbourhood Middle East 1. To the Brink of an Arab World War 2. How the Hashemites Lose Control of Jordan 3. Yankee Goes Home Eastern Neighbourhood 4. Russian Reboot 5. When Putin's Away, the Mice Will Play 6. Russian Red Button North Africa 7. Libyan Drought and China’s Rescue 8. Libyan Drought and International Neglect 9. Tunisia’s Vicious Cycle 10. Tunisia Between the Crescent and the Gun Out-of-control Technologies 11. DATA Revival 12. RoboDaddy 13. Closed Bubbles, Open Net
Scenarios (2019-2023)
MIDDLE EAST
Scenario 1
To the Brink of an Arab World War Core scenario created on 22 June 2018
2019 2020: Civil war in Iraq
2020 In Iraq, the formalization of the alliance with Iran is understood as cemen- Tipping Point 2: If the govern-
Tipping Point 1: An Iraqi
ting the claim of Shi’ite sectarian political blocs to power, contradicting all ment fails to provide security on
government that is perceived to be 2019: Shi’ite alliance revived 2020: The crown prince fails previous promises of cross-sectarian politics and putting the final nail in the its own and instead relies on
firmly taking Tehran’s side – In 2019, Iran completely pulls out of By 2020, Mohammed bin Salman’s coffin of failed post-ISIL reconciliation. In response to local armed protests official Iranian military support as
rather than continuing its balan- the nuclear deal. European efforts to talk of reforms in Saudi Arabia are across the country, in which angry young Sunni Arabs apparently link up a last-ditch effort to prevent a
cing act between Riyadh and stabilize the treaty have failed. Iran increasingly seen as empty promises with remnants of ISIL terrorist groups, Sadr’s government formally invites breakdown of security governan-
Tehran – has enormously dama- unofficially restarts its nuclear by the Saudi population. Rising Iranian military support to prevent a complete breakdown of security gover- ce, the result is violent conflict in
ging effects on two levels: Domes- weapons program. In reaction, an unemployment leads to protests and nance. Beefing up the numerous but militarily ineffective Popular Mobiliza- several of Iraq’s regions. Even
tically, it shatters the Sunni majo- increasingly worried US administra- civil unrest, particularly among tion Forces, additional Iranian militias from the region move into Iraq, along worse, bringing in Iran triggers a
rity’s as well as the many other tion bolsters the number of Ameri- disadvantaged populations such as with their Revolutionary Guard handlers, to control the mostly Sunni Arab disproportionate Saudi response,
minorities’ fragile trust in a can troops in the region. Meanwhile, the Shi’a in the Eastern Province, but protesters. This proves to be an explosive mix that quickly spawns a set of and therefore heightens the risk of
cross-sectarian polity that is in Baghdad, protracted negotiations also among elite groups previously full-blown armed rebellions by Sunnis against a Shi’a-dominated state and violent conflict at the regional
committed to dealing fairly with between political blocs produce an marginalized by the crown prince. its foreign allies. The call for help to Tehran, intended to restore control, has level. With Iraq in a precarious
all groups, and thus erodes the al-Sadr government that begins to
backfired and tipped Iraq back into insurgency [TP2]. state of political recovery from the
Iraqi state’s legitimacy among maneuver Iraq slowly and, at first, war with the Islamic State, it
most of its population. Across informally into a Shi’ite alliance would take little to tip the fragile
Sunni Arab states, it amplifies with Iran [TP1]. balance back into violent conflict.
deep-seated fears of Iranian 2021
domination and thus fuels an 2019: Nuclear arms race
escalatory spiral that would be In response to the Iranian nuclear 2021: Repression in Saudi Arabia
very hard to control. revival and early signs of Iraq being Due to the catastrophic humanitarian situation in
drawn into a more and more threate- Yemen, tens of thousands of Yemenis – both Shi’a and
ning Shi’ite alliance run by Tehran, Sunni – flee into Saudi Arabia. In 2021, furthered by
Riyad approaches the Pakistani the civil unrest and the challenges of managing the
government for help with a Saudi growing Yemeni refugee population in Saudi Arabia,
nuclear program. A constant stream Shi’ite refugees and Saudi Shi’ites suffer a series of
of rumours about progress in both atrocities. These reports become a rallying cry among
the Iranian and the Saudi nuclear Shi’a clerics across the region. There are rumours of
programs further fuels already clandestine Iranian military support to Shi’a under-
existing tensions in the region. ground groups in Saudi Arabia and, in turn, more
repression by the Saudi security forces.
2022
2022: Iran-Saudi standoff
In response to several synchronized terrorist attacks
2023 Tipping Point 3: The deploy-
against high-profile targets in Saudi Arabia in early ment of Iranian and Saudi forces
2022, the regime in Riyadh mobilizes forces along at the Iraqi-Saudi border amid
2023: The standoff escalates the Saudi-Iraqi border to prevent further “Iranian
April 2023: Violent skirmishes at the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia extreme tensions all but guaran-
infiltration”. Iran responds in kind, deploying larger tees violent incidents and their
Governance breakdown and claim the lives of several Saudi and Iranian soldiers. As Iran mobilizes more IRGC formations to the Iraqi side of the border. With
violent conflict forces, there are attacks on Iranian critical infrastructure: electricity produc- spiralling out of control into a
Iraq in a state of civil war – and all its neighbouring major regional war. Existing
tion, water supplies, and enhanced oil recovery. Iran holds Saudi Arabia states involved in the conflict – tensions run high.
- Armed rebellion and insur- responsible and hints at nuclear escalation, which gets the US involved and violent conflicts across the region
gency in Iraq. Saudi and Iranian forces face each other at the escalate; simmering tensions
in turn triggers Russia to send 50 aircrafts to Iran. Israel calls up its reser- border for a year. A single random border incident
vists and the Israeli Defense Force alert is set to the highest level. spark additional violent conflicts.
- Breakdown of nuclear near Hafar Al-Batin leads to escalations in 2023 [TP3].
non-proliferation regimes
2023: Displacement and regional collapse
and nuclear arms race.
The region is on the brink of complete governance breakdown. Existing
- Escalation of violent conflict violent conflicts (e.g., in Iraq, Syria and Yemen) begin to escalate. Meanwhi-
in Iraq, Syria and Yemen and le, there is an increasing risk of violent conflict in countries like Lebanon,
related governance break- with the potential for mass displacement of tens of millions of people
down. toward Europe (including the many who previously found safe haven in
Lebanon).
2023: Europe has failed
The economic consequences for the region are devastating. Conflict preven-
tion has failed once more, and European foreign policy makers are out of
options: just coping with the refugee influx, the economic effects, and the
politics of ensuring Israel’s survival pushes EU governance to its limits and
beyond. Peace and stability along Europe’s southeastern neighbourhood
will be out of reach for years to come.
Scenarios (2019-2023)
MIDDLE EAST
Scenario 2
How the Hashemites Lose Control of Jordan Core scenario created on 22 June 2018
2019 2019: Conservative backlash 2020 back against the annexations and
Pushed by an initiative of Queen Saudi Arabia’s custodian role.
2019: Jordanians divided Rania, women are given equal 2020: An unholy alliance Trend 2: The growing fragility
Trend 1: The constitutive In 2019, the Palestinian Authority is In 2020, an ultra-hawkish Israeli
citizenship. This is the final straw 2020: Challenged custodianship of the Palestinian Authority and
political bargain between the two in deep financial trouble and cannot government sees the Palestinian
for some ultra-conservative demago- Amidst the deteriorating economic increasing pressure in Israel to
key groups of Jordanian society – pay public sector wages. The Hashe- Authority as too weak to resist and,
gues who weave the loan and female situation in Jordan, grievances abandon the two state solution
‘East Bankers’ and ‘West Bankers’ mite Kingdom is helping them with without any objection from Saudi
citizenship into a divisive narrative between East Bankers (broadly and annex the settlements drive a
– is under pressure, and tensions a line of credit that, given its own Arabia, annexes settlements in the
of wealth being handed out, social speaking, the more established and wedge into Jordanian-Israeli
have surfaced every few years. fiscal situation, is at once too limited West Bank [Trend 2]. There are
hierarchy being compromised, and conservative group, who stand to relations. Jordan loses its prior
to make a major difference for conservative values being abando- unconfirmed reports of Israeli-Saudi lose more from the end of Saudi direct and indirect influence over
Ramallah but sufficient to exacerba- ned to please Palestinians and negotiations about custodianship of patronage) and West Bankers (domi- the Israeli government to modera-
Governance breakdown and te Jordan’s domestic tensions women. Many East Bank conservati- holy places in and around Jerusalem nant in the private sector and thus te its policies.
violent conflict between its two main population ves rally to the firebrands, taking [TP1]. In response to ‘disrespectful’ far more affected by the whims of
groups, so-called East Bankers who part in protests growing in numbers comments from leading Jordanian the economy, not to mention enra-
Active radical militant groups trace their lineage back to regional as the year goes by, while the Palesti- politicians about repression in Saudi ged about the Saudi-Israeli alliance
in Jordan; potential break- tribes, including Bedouins and nian Authority becomes weaker and Arabia, Riyadh discontinues aid to against the Palestinian Authority)
down of security governance Houranis, and so-called West weaker. Jordan, which in response pushes are exacerbated by the conflict with
and civil war. Bankers, descendents of Palestinian Saudi Arabia and the embarrassing
refugees who arrived in Jordan after weakness of the Hashemites in the
1948 [Trend 1]. Most West Bankers face of the double Israeli and Saudi
support the loan as a means of challenge to their claim to custo-
solidarity with their Palestinian dianship of Islam’s holy places in
countrymen, while most East Jerusalem.
Bankers see it as a waste of their
taxes on a corrupt and ineffective
institution. Tipping Point 1: Israeli annexa-
tion of the West Bank settlements
would be a critical juncture.
2021 Combined with the Hashemites’
claim to custodianship over the
2021: Corruption scandal holy sites of Islam in Jerusalem
In 2021, growing economic pains being exposed as hollow, it deals a
force Jordan to comply with strict powerful blow to the dynasty’s
World Bank conditions that hurt the domestic legitimacy and upend
lower-income population in particu- one of the few unifying mechanis-
lar. As a corruption scandal invol- ms linking West Bankers’ Palesti-
ving the queen’s real estate business nian solidarity with East Bankers’
breaks, a huge drop in investor religious conservatism.
2023: Hashemites contested and confidence drags the economy
militants striving 2021: East Bankers against the further down while social grievances
Rumours that the assassins are Hashemites increase. In an attempt to regain the
military officers exacerbate cracks As polarization between East and West initiative, the court appoints a
within the army and security servi- Bankers deepens, the court is losing reformist East Banker as the new
ces. As Sunni radicals in Jordan 2023 support from its erstwhile East Bank prime minister, only to be turned
begin to mobilize and manage to constituencies. Retired East Bank down in the most embarrassing way
manipulate members of minor 2023: Attack on the king military officers issue a joint state- possible. At a press conference, the
branches of the Hashemite family On May 15, 2023, a bomb explodes in ment critical of the Queen, blaming appointee publicly declines, impl-
into verbal attacks on the govern- the centre of a huge military parade her corruption scandal for the econo- ying that the Hashemites should
ment, Tehran and Damascus issue attended by the King and Queen of mic crisis. The statement helps solidi- clean up their own mess – a thinly
very similar statements in support Jordan to celebrate the centennial of fy the conservative protest movement veiled jab at the queen’s corruption
of the Palestinian people against the the Emirate of Transjordan. Days of among East Bankers against Palesti- scandal that is immediately ampli-
Israeli annexation, openly calling botched crisis management due to fied by conservative firebrands Tipping Point 2: An appoint-
nians, the corrupt and progressive ment that breaks with the long
out the incapacitated King Abdullah the lack of trust between the newly queen, and Western meddling. One ‘worried’ about the country losing its
II for betraying the Palestinian appointed West Banker PM and the moral compass. Abdullah II ends up tradition of prime ministers being
day, Israel assassinates a prominent drawn from the East Banker elite
cause. Global actors jump in and call East Bank-dominated security figure in Islamist terror networks – a appointing a West Banker prime
for calm, but they are unsure what to establishment seal the fate of the minister who is tasked with imple- ‘hurts’ East Bankers who feel
Jordanian tribal leader – on Jordanian already under siege from West
do as the political, social and mili- Hashemites’ loss of control over soil. This is further evidence of the menting the unpopular World Bank
tary schism opens up the country to Jordanian politics: once the court is reforms [TP2]. Bankers and ‘their’ Palestinian
dynasty’s weakness, and escalates the Authority. In combination with
the further entrenchment of radical forced to confirm the king’s survival East Bankers’ protests. Rumours of a
militant groups, the breakdown of (albeit severely incapacitated) and economic pressure and a progres-
military coup arise. In a desperate sive queen, this undermines social
security governance, the legitimate the queen’s murder, the West attempt to figure out who his
creation of binding rules and quite Bankers rally to ‘their’ king while trust and accelerates the loss of
supporters are, the king tries to public legitimacy.
possibly a full-scale civil war. East Bankers abandon the dynasty. reorganize the military.
Scenarios (2019-2023)
MIDDLE EAST
Scenario 3
Yankee Goes Home Core scenario created on 22 June 2018
2020 2020: Isolationism continues
2019: Disguised Nuclear aspirations
2019 In response, Turkey, Israel, and
In the US, Trump is voted out of
Tipping Point 1: Major cuts to 2020: Palestinian governance dete- office, but isolationist politics
2019: The Americans retreat Saudi Arabia each begin to discuss
US military aid and force posture riorates continue under the new administra-
In her farewell speech in the fall of strategic autonomy openly. All three
would destabilize brittle dictators- In 2020, the Palestinian National tion, as congress is gridlocked. As
2019, Angela Merkel calls out Donald launch huge civilian nuclear
hips such as Sisi’s Egypt (see 2021) Authority collapses. To prevent unemployment in the US hits a new
Trump for his ‘irresponsible’ foreign programs ‘to invest in a post-fossil
and create a power vacuum. The governance breakdown and in high, the Dow Jones plummets, and
policy, while sources close to her future’, a thin disguise that does
likely results would include both a response to domestic pressures, the the dollar falls, the US begins a
leak an unguarded remark in which nothing to stop the speculation
nuclear arms race and a chaotic Israeli government annexes settle- phased military withdrawal from the
she calls Trump ‘a total idiot’. about three-way nuclear breakout in
and further destabilizing jocke- ments in and around Hebron, while Middle East.
Domestically, Trump is under the near to mid-term future.
ying for new alliances. Hamas takes over basic service
pressure since US debt has risen to
delivery alongside international aid
$25 trillion, the Israeli Prime Minis- 2021
agencies in the rest of the West
ter pronounced the Trump Peace
Bank.
Plan ‘dead on arrival’ only a month 2021: Conservative Sunni alliance Tipping Point 2: The emergen-
previously, and he is about to kick In 2021, deprived of US budgetary ce of a broader crescent of elected
off his re-election campaign. He aid for the military, Sisi and his Islamist governments might fall to
takes the opportunity to announce regime fall to street protests and its more radical elements. In such
via Twitter that all US troops in the mass desertions from the security a case, massive human rights
Middle East will be called home. forces. After weeks of turmoil, the violations and attacks on aid
military announces elections which workers could become increasin-
are held reasonably freely and bring gly normal (governance break-
a further radicalized Muslim down), as a result of which
Brotherhood (MB) back to power. millions of people would move
The MB government in Cairo forms towards Europe’s borders in fear of
a new political alliance with Hamas, discrimination, terror and genoci-
which is further strengthened in de (violent conflict).
2022, as Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and
US Congress cuts military aid to the Hamas are joined by like-minded
region – including Israel – by 50 parties in Jordan, Kuwait and Tuni-
percent. [TP1] sia. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have Tipping Point 3: Turkey
active and functioning civilian leaving NATO is read by the
nuclear programs [TP2]. By the region’s governments as a signal
middle of the year, Turkey formally that Ankara is reverting to tradi-
leaves NATO. In response, Israel and tional power politics. Given the
Saudi Arabia start negotiations on a open historical wounds left by the
formal regional security alliance Ottoman legacy across the Arab
[TP3]. world as well as the more recent
experiences in Iraq and Syria,
many see this prospect as an
additional reason to achieve
2023 effective deterrence capabilities
directed at Turkey, in addition to
2023: Nuclear aspirations other regional competitors. It
2023: Collapse ‘Liberated’ from US hegemony, the 2023: ‘Infidels gone’ therefore compels both an accele-
The strengthened radical Islamic Middle East is in the middle of a 4 July 2023: As the American flag is ration of the arms race and of the
narrative has practical consequences three-way nuclear arms race that lowered for the last time in the mushrooming of ‘alliances of
on the street. A series of killings of takes place in the shadows but is handover ceremony of what used to necessity’ (e.g., Israel/Saudi
aid workers and international civil clearly out of control. In addition to be the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet head- Arabia).
servants leads international aid Israel’s thinly disguised nuclear quarters in Juffair, Bahrain, TV
organizations, the European Union, force, ‘purely civilian’ nuclear images of the stars and stripes in the
and the United Nations to slowly programs in Iran, Saudi Arabia and evening sun on America’s Indepen-
Governance breakdown and withdraw from the region, leaving Turkey appear to be competing with dence Day are watched with deafe-
violent conflict critical gaps in governance in their an energy and determination not ning cheers on streets and public
- Breakdown of nuclear wake, particularly in terms of basic fully explained by the region’s new squares anywhere from Cairo to
non-proliferation regimes service delivery. Kurdish leaders and appreciation of climate change Tehran. ‘We have won, infidels
and nuclear arms race. ISIL campaign against Yezidis and representatives of religious minori- alone. Behind the scenes, journalists gone!’, say the banners of ISIL
others now seems merely a ‘minor ties across the region are busy and analysts are whispering about supporters, whose latest political
- Critical gaps in basic service prelude’. With oil prices plummeting touring the capitals of Europe in impending live tests of nuclear leader proclaims an ‘Independence
delivery; humanitarian crisis and the dollar at an all-time low, the search of support against the weapons by any of the three regional Day of the Arab World’ as the United
across the region. region is in full humanitarian and ‘coming genocide’ at the hands of powers, while governments are busy States hand over their second-to-last
economic crisis – right on Europe’s Islamic extremists – an image of the jockeying for position in volatile military base in the region (save
doorstep. future compared to which the 2014 alliances. 4,000 troops stationed in Qatar).
Scenarios (2019-2023)
EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD
Scenario 4
Russian Reboot Core scenario created on 8-9 November 2018
2019
2019: Electoral fraud
2020 Tipping Point 1: Putin's social contract is dead.
2019 is also an election year in many Once Putin’s government is no longer able to provide economic
2019: Trade war
Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. 2020: EU cuts all funds relief to the poor, it has to break the almost exclusively material
In 2019, Trump’s trade war escalates
Across the board, ballots are marred After the success of illiberal parties in social contract which underpins the highly personalized
further. Russia and China jointly
by irregularities. Civil society the 2019 European Parliament elections, regime in Russia. The decision to brutally crack down on
impose higher tariffs on American
organisations in Ukraine heavily micro-financial assistance by the EU to protests amplifies public discontent and drives opposition
exports. WTO-led negotiations reach
criticize Petro Poroshenko’s victory, EaP countries is ended in 2020. groups underground (security governance breakdown). Some
an impasse as neither party is willing
after his militant supporters disrup- of the new tech oligarchs take advantage of the collapse of
to move. The global economy suffers.
ted opponents’ rallies and were Putin’s legitimacy and that of his regime. They provide the
observed stuffing countless ballot missing leadership and organizing capabilities to transform
2020: Russians take to the streets
boxes. Developments in Georgia, undirected and easily controlled protests into a serious disrup-
The Russian state is increasingly unable to
Moldova and Armenia mirror those tive force. So long as the regime’s mechanisms for buying
pay for its vast pension system and freezes
in Ukraine. The election irregulari- loyalty remain inaccessible due to the continuing global
Governance breakdown and the salaries of state employees. First
ties lead to a freeze of high-level recession, this threatens the regime’s survival and increases the
violent conflict 2019: Recession pains protests arise in major cities. The rally
dialogues with the EU and the 2019 likelihood of governance breakdown in many sectors and many
In combination with continuing 'round the flag phenomenon – which was
EU-EaP summit is rescheduled. parts of the country.
Reconquering of territories EU sanctions, the trade conflict bolstered by the Ukraine conflict and the
and the resulting global recession annexation of Crimea – on which Putin’s
by Ukraine, causing civilian
– through plunging energy prices regime has capitalized no longer suffices
and military casualties and a
as one of the most potent links – to control the population. Russia’s dormant
humanitarian crisis. civil society is ready to take action against
hurt both the Russian state and
Russian oligarchs’ access to their the government – and just waiting for a
foreign assets. leading figure.
EASTERN
2021
NEIGHBOURHOOD RUSSIA
2021: New oligarchs rising 2021: Closing the hatches
2023 Newly emerging economic and Witnessing the instability in Russia,
2023: Red revolution industrial elites in Russia see an political leaders across the region are
By 2023, political assassinations and opportunity to oust Putin and the old weary of revolutionary spill overs. In
2023: Vultures circling mysterious disappearances prevail. post-Soviet oligarchs by reforming attempts to maintain order, they take
The United States sees the political National and international media Russia in a way that both aligns with measures to centralize power and
turmoil as both a risk and an oppor- frame the movement as the ‘Red their economic interest and satisfies halt good governance reforms,
tunity, and finally gives in to Polish Revolution’ for its bloodiness. By their political ambitions [TP1]. By thereby disempowering civil society.
and Baltic demands for US bases. January of 2023, it has become clear late 2021, members of this elite start
Ukraine reclaims the Donbas to Putin that his position is untena- providing financial support to
‘People’s Republics’, which are now ble. He accepts early elections, existing protest groups and organise
without Russian financial and manages to negotiate immunity with them to join forces.
military support. The reunification the leaders of the protests, and is
of Ukraine ends a long-standing war, forced into exile.
but tensions are high as Russia has The early elections that make Pavel
been challenged and defeated in its Durov president of the Russian
own neighbourhood [TP3]. Federation are seen as legitimate. 2022
OSCE observers invited to monitor
the process do not witness any 2022: China reaches out
systematic election fraud. 2022: Crackdown backfires China sees the opportunity and
Tipping Point 3: The Kremlin’s preoccupation with domes- Internet tycoon Pavel Durov has invites Eastern Partnership coun-
tic problems and the sense of political support by the US 2022: Unpaid wages, mass protests become the leading figure of a tries to its 16+1 and Belt and Road
enables an aggressive government in Kyiv to try to reconquer In the summer of 2022, the Russian Russia-wide movement. Numerous Initiative. Belarus is the only notable
lost territories (violent conflict), causing civilian and military government fails to pay the wages other businessmen are leading local exception to the region’s Chinese
casualties, a humanitarian crisis and additional tensions with of the armed forces [TP2]. This groups – first concentrated in Turn, pursuing warmer relations
Russia that might not accept defeat. leads to mass desertions and some western cities and later spreading with the EU and the US.
cases of ex-service members east and to rural areas. This spread is
joining the protests are reported. A accompanied by an increase in
group of former police officers violence. Desperate authorities
starts providing the organizers completely lose control over the
with equipment and knowledge population and protestors violently
Tipping Point 2: A failure to pay wages in the security
about the government’s crowd and oppose oppression.
sector is the final nail in the coffin of a regime that has lost
riot control tactics.
popular legitimacy. Significant xenophobia leads to discrimi-
nation and violence against minorities. However, social trust
among the ethnic Russian, Orthodox Christian-dominated
majority population remains high as events trigger historical
memories of previous challenges of anarchy and civil war. In
fact, once regime legitimacy is lost, high social trust might lead
to a strong and cohesive civil society, which would make regime
change more likely.
Scenarios (2019-2023)
EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD
Scenario 5
When Putin's Away, the Mice Will Play Core scenario created on 8-9 November 2018
2019
In the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, 2020-2021: Baku looks East
the global recession leads to cuts in
2022
As the Russian government is preoc-
2019: Recession drives polarization social spending, further aggravating cupied with domestic turmoil, the
In 2019, the trade war between the US, poverty and increasing the polariza- Azerbaijani government is unhinde- 2022: ‘Reunifications’
the EU and China intensifies and tion between wealthy local elites and red in deepening its ties with China. With Russia looking inward, Eastern Partnership
creates a durably unfavourable global poor populations. The gradual increa- In September 2021, Aliyev III and his countries develop plans to oppose the Kremlin, with
trading climate that heavily contribu- se in oil prices exacerbates these Chinese counterpart Xi Jingpin sign a few to no consequences. In 2022, the new Ukrainian
tes to the start of a global recession. A tensions as the people feel the higher free trade agreement, further cemen- president orders his troops to reconquer the ‘occupied’
long-standing feeling of discontent prices at the pumps. ting China’s influence in the region. Donbas [TP2]. Although the first phase of the offensive
among populations that have not seen At the same time, Baku is seeing the causes a high number of military and civilian casual-
tangible benefits from globalization is ties, the lack of Russian support quickly forces the
amplified. Populist movements across 2020 first returns on investment from the
separatists to surrender. Acknowledging the ethnic and
trans-Anatolian gas pipeline. The hike
the West exploit feelings of economic in oil prices, China’ economic influen- linguistic composition of Ukraine, and to avoid further
insecurity and a perceived loss of 2020: Opposition’s rebirth humiliating the defeated, Kyiv grants the region
The feeling of general exaspera- ce, and close collaboration with
identity – partly created by increasing increased political autonomy within a newly establi-
migration – to gain power. tion and exhaustion translates Turkey enables the Azerbaijani 2021 shed Ukrainian Federation.
into Russian public discontent. economy to flourish against the
Opposition leaders in Russia and global trend.
2021: Crackdown Emboldened by his economic prowess and by Ukraine's
in Belarus take advantage of the Putin and Lukashenko try to secure their military success, Aliyev III takes to consolidating his
social unrest, politicize the power by cracking down on opposition power and decides to take back Nagorno-Karabakh
movements, and start pressing the movements. However, putting popular through a bloody military offensive, along with
government to step down. opposition leaders in jail only fans the changing the constitution and the legal status of the
flames of discontent, as do desperate region.
assassinations of individual leaders.
REST OF THE EASTERN
WORLD NEIGHBOURHOOD RUSSIA Tipping Point 1: Once Putin’s government is no
longer able to provide economic relief to the poor, it
has to break the almost exclusively material social
contract which underpins his rule. The decision to
brutally crack down on protests amplifies public
Governance breakdown
discontent and drives opposition groups under-
and violent conflict ground (security governance breakdown). Losing
2023: EU stops aid
- Ukrainian military Not only the people of Russia buy-in from key oligarchs sets the stage for a major
offensive to reconquer are on the streets: so are those and potentially very violent breakdown of the regime
of other Eastern Partnership (which would result in a complicated constellation of
Donbas, causing military 2023: Chaos looming in 2022: Strongmen cling to power
countries, especially in Belarus, governance breakdowns in different sectors and
and civilian casualties. Russia In 2022, Putin declares a state of
places).
where oligarchs are deserting The economic crisis – despite emergency in Russia and mobilizes
the regime like in Russia. the high oil prices – has left the country’s security forces to arrest
- Military offensive and
Regime collapse becomes a the Russian economy in dire ‘every’ opposition leader and
casualties in Nagor- possibility. The media is straits. The Russian people dismantle the strongest fractions of
no-Karabakh. reporting that EU financial are dissatisfied with everyday the protest movements in order to
assistance is going directly into economic insecurity as well as restore stability. Meanwhile, Lukas-
- Security governance the pockets of local elites, Putin’s perceived inability to henko alters the constitution in
and security sector explaining respective leaders’ restore Russian prestige. order to use emergency powers to
governance breakdown disinterest in reforms. EU Large protest movements ‘pacify the country’ thus following
(see Schröder, 2018) in Commission President Weber resume under new leadership the same strategy [TP1]. It works: in
major Russian cities. terminates all financial aid from the oligarchic class, who both countries, the organized
programs to Eastern Partner- feel that Putin’s time is over. oppositions have their backs broken
ship countries. 1991-style chaos looms. and cannot take effective collective 2022: NATO deadlock
action for some time. These major shifts in the geopolitical
2023 equilibrium are also facilitated by
However, the damage has already the inaction of NATO, which is
2023: Oil and populism: rising been done. The public is on the blocked by the growing number of
together streets and even pro-government member countries with populist
Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz, forces increasingly question the governments on both sides of the
disrupting the global oil supply. The ability of the leadership to safely Atlantic. [TP2]
price of oil immediately skyrockets steer the country out of the crisis.
and then stabilizes at $150 per barrel.
The high oil price further exacerba-
tes the global economic crisis. World
politics are dominated by populist Tipping Point 2: The Kremlin’s preoccupation
movements. The US is at the with domestic problems as well as NATO’s internal
forefront of this development: deadlock enable militant governments in Ukraine
Washington has almost completely and Azerbaijan to start new military offensives to
upheld the ‘America First’ principle reconquer lost territories (violent conflict), causing
and retired from world affairs, civilian and military casualties, humanitarian crises,
focusing instead on internal admi- and disruptions in energy flows (in Azerbaijan).
nistrative efforts to fix its domestic
economy.
Scenarios (2019-2023)
EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD
Scenario 6
Russian Red Button Core scenario created on 8-9 November 2018
Tipping Point 1: Putin’s resigna-
tion without the prospect of an
immediate strong successor sparks 2021
enormous political uncertainty in
Moscow. It is seen and used as a 2021: Who’s in charge? 2021: NATO’s nuke scare
window of opportunity for aggressive A period of turmoil follows. For months NATO members are increasingly
state and non-state actors in the 2020 and months, the world is left wondering desperate to see an end to the
region to turn long-standing territo- who is really in charge in Russia, as no instability in Russia. They want a
rial claims into new realities on the successor to Putin is named. Behind the safe pair of hands in control of the
2020: Putin resigns
ground, including by (re-)starting scenes, negotiations between the Russian nuclear arsenal. With
The popular protests reach unprece-
violent conflicts. competing elite groups drag on and on. Islamist terrorism on the rise inside
dented levels, until the new oligarchs
Meanwhile, the world is getting ever Russia, the fear of nuclear terrorism
manage to convince Igor Sechin,
more nervous. ‘Who controls Russia’s is palpable around the world:
Putin’s right-hand man, and other key
nukes?’ is becoming an ever more whoever controls the Red Button in
securocrats to abandon the president
common headline in the global news. Moscow has to be trustworthy.
in favour of a new political settlement.
Islamists in the North Caucasus take
Putin resigns in late 2020 [TP1].
advantage of the distraction of
Moscow’s security apparatus and step
up their terrorist campaigns with covert
support from Iran. Similarly to NATO
2019 and China, Iran sees Russian instability
as a stepping stone for increasing its
influence in the region.
2019: Russia’s new oligarchs
Falling oil prices put the Russian state
and its ability to uphold its social
contract under heavy strain. Simme-
ring popular discontent is activated by 2022 2022: Saber-rattling
a new generation of oligarchs who got By 2022, agricultural and manufacturing magnates in
rich in agriculture and manufacturing, 2022: Russia’s oil price shock Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia control the only functio-
and who uses the protests to challenge An unexpected drop in oil prices to ning and cost-effective industries as the falling oil price
Governance breakdown and the old oil and gas oligarchs. As the $8 per barrel in January 2022 deals has pulled the rug from under the old guard. They spend
economic sanctions imposed on the the final blow to the government's freely to buy political influence. In order to legitimize
violent conflict
old elites by the EU are still in place, collapsing finances. Already strug- their power grab in the eyes of the public, they force their
the new generation manages to gling to pay pensions, the govern- respective countries’ political leaderships to solve
Conflicts in Donbas, Trans-
mobilize financial assets faster and ment has to print money to avoid unpopular territorial conflicts. Similarly, NATO finds a
nistria, Abkhazia, South can therefore outspend and out-orga- ceasing payments altogether. golden opportunity amidst the long moment of Russian
Ossetia, and Nagorno-Kara- nize the old guard. Inflation quadruples within weeks instability and offers membership to Ukraine, Georgia
bakh reignite. and leads to far-reaching political and Moldova.
consequences: protests re-emerge Pushed forward by the newly empowered oligarchs, and
and swell rapidly in both their emboldened by the continuing turmoil in Russia [TP2]
frequency and magnitude. and the offer of joining NATO [TP3], all three govern-
ments launch military offensives to federalize their
EASTERN respective disputed territories by force. As Moscow
NEIGHBOURHOOD RUSSIA remains distracted by domestic turmoil, its allies are left
without Russian support and therefore vulnerable. Kyiv
quickly restores control over the separatist parts of the
Donbas, while Moldova annexes Transnistria and
2023: Belarus goes West
In a surprising turn of events, a 2023 Georgia retakes control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
pro-Western leader comes to power
in Belarus, marking the end of 2023: Safety in Sechin
Lukashenko’s 27 year reign. The upcoming Russian elections
attract international attention. After
Vladimir Putin’s unexpected resig- Tipping Point 2: Building on and far exceeding TP1
nation and months of political in impact, protracted domestic turmoil in Russia leads
2023: Armenia loses 2023: Stability over democracy infighting, Igor Sechin emerges as to previously stalemated conflicts gaining in heat as
Armenia finds itself on the losing Ukrainians, Moldovans and Geor- the likely new president of the militant state and non-state actors seek to use the
end of the geopolitical shift in gians rally around their victorious Russian Federation (albeit only after opportunity to create new facts on the ground (violent
Eastern Europe. Without Russian leaders – presidents and prime some back-channel facilitation by conflict).
support, it is exposed to uncoordina- ministers as much as the oligarchs key NATO countries as well as
ted attacks from competing Azerbai- behind them – who gain enormous China). NATO members signal their
jani forces. The Nagorno-Karabakh legitimacy. Corruption becomes even support for Vladimir Putin’s former
conflict reignites and further more rampant, while EU-supported counsellor while taking advantage of
undermines Russia's influence in its governance reforms stall. Increased Tipping Point 3: NATO encouragement for offensive
the handover of power to increase its
near abroad. stability, the resolution of the military action, if given inadvertently and potentially in
military presence in the South
respective territorial conflicts, and ignorance about local political dynamics, may be the
Caucasus.
popular satisfaction make sure that final straw for Eastern European governments to pick a
Brussels keeps quiet as democracy military conflict with the respective separatist forces.
and transparency are further
undermined.Scenarios (2019-2024)
NORTH AFRICA Libyan Drought and China’s Rescue Core scenario created on 18-19 February 2019
Scenario 7
Tipping Point 1: The catastrophic
2020 2020: Gulf in crisis 2020: No refuge in Egypt
Due to a low oil price and stalled As coastal cities provide no refuge, but
economic shock to the main humani- progress on the Saudi Vision 2030 and rather discrimination and violence,
2020: Haftar’s victorious march 2020: EU deadlock
tarian funders (primarily the EU) other key reform projects, the Gulf is some Southern Libyan refugees begin
After taking over the El Sharara oil field The number of refugees trying to
cripples aid actors to such an extent equally inward-looking. Saudi Crown to move toward Egypt. However,
and the major southwestern city of reach Europe increases because the
that they could not respond to a new Prince Mohammed bin Salman lacks Libya’s neighbour is occupied with its
Sabha, Haftar’s Libyan National Army eastern border to Egypt is closed. The
crisis – especially one with challen- the funds to deliver on his ambitious own crisis: The 2020 drought hits the
(LNA) marches into Tripoli and ousts higher number of refugees leads to
ging security and logistical condi- promises and responds to growing country very hard and forces the
the Presidency Council and the Govern- more polarization in the EU and
tions. popular opposition with massive regime to focus on the immediate-
ment of National Accord (GNA). GNA further strains the relationships
crackdowns. The violent repression needs of its own population, putting a among EU members, who fail to agree
Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj flees to
broadens opportunities for Islamist lot of pressure on Egyptian public on a common refugee policy.
Italy.
terrorists to interrupt oil production at services and finances. With its favou-
Governance breakdown and the kingdom’s main production sites red faction now in power in Libya,
violent conflict 2020: Droughts and militias (the main source of liberalization, Cairo presses for stricter controls on
In the wake of Haftar’s seizure of modernization and the loss of the both sides of the Libyan-Egyptian
- Violent conflict in Libya. power, Southern Libya and parts of kingdom’s moral compass, according border to limit the number of people
-Humanitarian crisis; food Egypt as well as other North African to the terrorists’ YouTube manifesto). seeking to cross and to prevent ‘jihadi
and water shortages. countries are hit by a drought that leads The toxic mix of popular unrest, terror infiltration’. Tipping Point 2: The longstanding
to severe food and water shortages. In threats and state repression spills over failure to build effective institutions
-Armed opposition in Chad Libya, thousands of people move north to the rest of the Gulf, refocusing the and integrate competing power
marches into N’Djamena, to the coast, where the new LNA Gulf regimes’ military and security 2021 centers into a sustainable political
government is overwhelmed by the capabilities on domestic developments settlement makes Libyan governance
deposing President Déby.
looming humanitarian disaster while and leaving no attention or funds for dependent on a strong, charismatic
trying to fend off the pressure from their Libyan allies [TP1]. Global 2021: The LNA loses control leader. Once he loses power, gover-
southern militias trying to re-establish oil output declines. In 2021, Khalifa Haftar’s death breaks nance breakdown follows.
themselves on the coast. open the charade that was the LNA
government [TP2]. A lack of internatio-
nal support, a progressive decrease in
2020: Empty aid pockets water supply, open fighting between
The international aid community fails militias, and the Libyan administra-
to attract sufficient funding to mount a tion’s lack of capacity leads to gover-
costly new operation in an insecure nance breakdown in Libya. Haftar’s
Libya and benefit even low numbers of successor, former LNA Chief of Staff
beneficiaries in need. The EU in Abdel Salem Al-Hassi, struggles to
particular is hit by a huge economic impose his authority and effectively
and social crisis that is triggered by an respond to the situation. The popula-
EU-US trade war and a 2019 crash of the tion is starving while tribal militias
Italian economy. Part of the resulting and jihadi groups from all parts of the
austerity agenda includes slashing country compete for dwindling
humanitarian spending, which leaves resources along the coast. With a
Libya and other drought-affected humanitarian crisis on the one hand,
countries to fend for themselves. and territorial struggle between
competing armed groups on the other,
Al-Hassi effectively loses control of the
country.
2022-24
2024 2022-2024: China steps in
2024: Libya is stable, thanks to China 2023 An increasingly insecure oil supply as
well as the global ripple effects of the
By 2024, Libya adopts a Chinese-su-
2023: The anti-Western alliance European economic crisis spark
pported development model, which
In 2023, at a summit in Ankara, Putin, increased demand for Libyan oil in
helps Al-Hassi keep water and food
Xi, Erdoğan, and Assad unveil an Asia, particularly in China. In 2022,
shortages to a minimum, thereby
official anti-Western alliance. In a China offers humanitarian assistance
contributing to his legitimacy in the
little-noticed part of the summit in exchange for the right to exploit
eyes of the Libyan population and the
statement, they condemn the presi- Libyan oil fields. After weeks of talks
different tribes.
dent of Chad for repeatedly postpo- with the LNA government, Chinese
ning presidential elections that were armed forces land in Libya to deliver aid
Tipping Point 3: The coup in Chad meant to be held in 2021, and recogni- as well as military assistance. By
exemplifies how actors engaged in ze a parliamentary opposition leader helping Abdel Salem Al-Hassi to regain
order competition at the global level as Chad’s interim president. A few control of and tighten his grip over the
could exploit one of the many simme- weeks later, supported by Chinese country, Beijing entrenches itself
ring conflicts in ways that turn special forces, Chad’s armed opposi- further. By the end of the year,
elements of the liberal order tion marches into N’Djamena and Al-Hassi’s LNA neutralizes all remai-
(elections) against its proponents deposes the sitting president, Idriss ning pockets of resistance in Tripoli.
(Déby’s Western allies) and tip a Déby, despite desperate attempts by Russia applauds the Chinese initiative
volatile local military balance to spark the French and US commandos to while Western powers are left to witness
or escalate violent conflict. organize the defence (violent conflict). a major power shift in the region and
[TP3] their corresponding loss of influence.Scenarios (2019-2024)
NORTH AFRICA Libyan Drought and International Neglect Core scenario created on 18-19 February 2019
Scenario 8
2019: Crisis averted 2019: A new beginning speech, the new defence minister and
Beginning in the autumn of 2019, The international community feels de-facto power behind the no-name
a series of heat waves hit southern
Tipping Point 1: Massive resource 2019 ready to turn the page after many prime minister, Khalifa Haftar,
shortages and the absence of mitiga- Libya. Major inland oases such as difficult years and seeks to make the celebrates the start of a new era of
ting governance measures exacerbate Ubari and Sabah dry up, causing water UN’s temporary truce permanent at an stability and prosperity for Libya. The
2019: Peace in Libya? shortages and the disruption of food
conflict. In this case, the lack of The results of the June 2019 Libyan international conference in Tripoli. international community considers
attention to these effects leads to production [TP1]. The deterioration of Under the headline ‘Libya 2020: A New the Libyan case closed, withdraws the
general elections are contested. The the situation is camouflaged by the
escalating violent conflict between polls are marred by irregularities and Beginning,’ a new constitution is to be UN political mission and reduces
the Tuareg and Tebu in 2024. relative well-being of the coastal ratified while ‘foreign meddlers’ are to diplomatic attention. [TP2]
no candidate manages to secure a population and the appearance of
convincing majority. Several political agree to respect Libyan sovereignty
political progress. The ‘National and stop interfering. Initially sceptical
camps claim victory. To add to the Reconciliation Government’ is stable
confusion, the head of the Libyan about ceding ground to a strongman
and manages to effectively organize like Haftar, Algiers acquiesces to the
National Army, Khalifa Haftar, holds a
Governance breakdown and press conference in his Tobruk head-
the provision of rudimentary public decision as its own leadership is 2021
violent conflict services along the coast, thus crafting threatened by popular protests and
quarters and announces that he will not an impression of slow and steady
accept the election results. In order to political deadlock over Bouteflika’s 2021: Climate crisis Tipping Point 2: Premature
- Food and water shortages; progress which dominates journalists’ succession during 2019 and 2020. For
prevent the situation from spiraling out and embassies’ reporting about Libya. In 2021, the climate crisis in southern withdrawal of international support
widespread disease; humani- of control, the United Nations (UN) steps Egypt, Haftar is a powerful ally in its Libya worsens. Week after week brings and attention exacerbates the limita-
tarian crisis; complete gover- in and brokers a power-sharing ‘Natio- fight against radical Islamist groups in new heat records. In June, mercury tions of information collection and
nance breakdown. nal Reconciliation Government’ that the region, so his central role allows soars to 59°C in many parts of the analysis regarding key developments
includes all of the biggest factions of Cairo to stand back. In his concluding country. Food and water shortages outside the central geographic
- Violence between Tuareg the Libyan conflict, including the one become severe and the basic needs of regions, and on other issues than
and Tebu communities. led by Haftar. The next few months are people in the south are no longer met those considered most political. It also
peaceful and encouraging. The popula- (sectoral, regional governance break- creates long lead times for manda-
- Fighting over access to oil tion’s and the international communi- down). The number of people leaving ting, funding and physically establi-
ty’s expectations are high. their homes inland to move to the shing a new aid operation once the
fields.
coast grows by the day, straining the need becomes apparent.
government’s resources and jeopardi-
zing public service provision even in
the coastal cities. The slums around
Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi expand
rapidly.
2021: Libya abandoned
The catastrophic handling of the
situation reveals the Libyan bureau-
cracy’s limitations. The initial
optimism about the new political
regime is quickly replaced by the
realization that, without international
support, it neither has the financial
means nor the management capacity
Tipping Point 4: In a system that to deal with this new crisis. Internatio-
depends on oil revenue to fund basic nal donor fatigue and institutional
governance services, violent conflict deadlocks in the EU and UN mean that
around oil fields leads to a feedback discussions over a new humanitarian
effect: leakages contaminate vulnera- aid operation in Libya drag on for
ble aquifers and oil production many months.
ultimately stops, which sparks 2023 2022
comprehensive governance break-
down if no other governance provi- 2024
ders step in. 2022-2023: Reliance on oil backfires 2022: Backsliding into disaster
Haftar’s death also sparks open factio- Haftar’s death in early 2022 fundamentally changes the dynamic between the
2024: Failed state nal fighting over who gets to physically governmental factions and precipitates a major political crisis that ultimately leads
By 2024, Libya is in a situation similar to control the Libyan oil fields (violent to the crumbling of the National Reconciliation Government. The political turmoil
Tipping Point 3: Very weak conflict) [TP3], which leads to multiple further postpones international engagement as additional actors must be consulted
Somalia at the worst point of its recent
governance by a mix of competing oil leakages, polluting fossil waters in for security assessments. This coincides with the most severe heat wave to hit the
history, with only a few pockets of
state and non-state actors without any the oil crescent [TP4]. As a result, in country yet. Shortages in the south become even more severe. The lack of food and
effective governance left in the biggest
effective institutions turns into early 2023, oil production is put on clean drinking water causes the outbreak of multiple diseases, leading to thousands
coastal cities. In the south, the violent
governance breakdown once the standby in an attempt to prevent of deaths while international aid operations remain stymied by the constant shifts
conflict between the Tuareg and Tebu
temporarily effective role of strong, another ecological catastrophe, which in militia control in the coastal cities. In addition, resource scarcity reignites violent
escalates as resources become scarcer.
charismatic leadership is lost. This would further aggravate the water conflicts between the southern Tuareg and Tebu communities. Those fleeing the
The National Reconciliation Govern-
tipping point is the result of a longs- shortages. However, without the oil violence start swelling the ranks of climate refugees trying to reach the already
ment is in place on paper only, as the
tanding failure to build effective revenue, the government is unable to overcrowded coastal cities. In addition, more and more migrants from Libya’s
economic meltdown has left state
institutions and integrate competing provide any governance services or even southern neighbours cross the border and make their way to the coastal areas for
institutions without any resources.
power centres into a sustainable pay its own salaries, leaving members the same reasons.
Governance in cities is provided by a
political settlement. (This tipping of militias and the security services as
growing number of non-state actors, be
point is the result of the same factors well as big parts of the population to
it tribes or the radical Islamist groups
that create TP2 in Scenario 7.) fend for themselves (comprehensive
competing for local power.
governance breakdown).You can also read
