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CSCAP
REGIONAL
SECURITY
OUTLOOK
2020
COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION EDITOR
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC Ron Huisken
Adjunct Associate Professor,
Established in 1993, the Council for Security Cooperation Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the premier Track Two Australian National University
organisation in the Asia Pacific region and counterpart
to the Track One processes dealing with security issues,
namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Kathryn Brett
Plus Forum. It provides an informal mechanism for Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University
scholars, officials and others in their private capacities
to discuss political and security issues and challenges
facing the region. It provides policy recommendations to
EDITORIAL PANEL
various intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional and
international meetings and establishes linkages with Anthony Milner
institutions and organisations in other parts of the world CSCAP Australia
to exchange information, insights and experiences in the Ric Smith
area of regional political-security cooperation. CSCAP Australia
Philips Vermonte
CSCAP Indonesia
Jusuf Wanandi
CSCAP Indoensia
Front cover image
Source: Jan Huisken, EPA, ASEAN Secretariat, LETTER FROM THE
Dong-A Ilbo, and Andrew Harnik. CO-EDITORS
On behalf of CSCAP, we are pleased to
Back cover image
present the CSCAP Regional Security
Source: Jan Huisken Outlook (CRSO) 2020. Inaugurated in
2007, the CRSO volume is now in its
fourteenth year.
The CRSO brings expert analysis
to bear on critical security issues facing
the region and points to policy-relevant
alternatives for Track One (official)
CSCAP thanks the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific and Track Two (non-official) to advance
multilateral regional security
Affairs, The Australian National University, for their
cooperation.
support for this publication
The views in the CRSO 2020 do
Designed and printed by CanPrint Communications, not represent those of any Member
Canberra, Australia. committee or other institution and are
the responsibility of the individual
authors and the Editor. Charts and
images in the CRSO 2020 do not
ISBN: 978-0-642-60698-3
necessarily reflect the views of the
chapter authors.
Copyright © 2019 by CSCAP
www.cscap.org Ron Huisken and Kathryn Brett
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020
CONTENTS
Regional Security Outlook
4 Introduction – Ron Huisken
9 United States – Siddharth Mohandas
13 China – Wu Xinbo
16 Japan – Yoshihide Soeya
20 India – Sana Hashmi
23 Russia – Alexander Lukin
27 EU – Alice Ekman
30 ROK – Choi Kang
34 Australia – Brendan Taylor
37 Indonesia – Dewi Fortuna Anwar
41 Thailand – Pongphisoot Busbarat
45 Malaysia – Cheng-Chwee Kuik
49 Singapore – William Choong
52 Philippines – Aileen San Pablo Baviera
56 Vietnam – Le Dinh Tinh
60 New Zealand – B.K. Greener
64 Myanmar – Zeyar Oo
68 Cambodia – Chheang Vannarith
72 Laos – Sulathin Thiladej
3
CSCAP
The Regional Security Outlook 2020:
A prolonged US-China two-step has left us questioning
interdependence
Ron Huisken
many take solace in the belief that
the world’s nuclear arsenals present
a formidable barrier to major power
war. This contention has merit but
must be twined with the reality that,
for the first time in history, these
weapons may have given humankind
the capacity to make a mistake from
which it cannot recover. Given the
further reality that humankind tends
to make all the mistakes available
to it, the exclusive effect of nuclear
weapons must be to reinforce our
collective determination to navigate
these challenging times using
July 31, 2019. Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He (right) with US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer accommodation and compromise plus
(third left) and US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin (second left) in Shanghai. Credit AP. a frank assessment of everyone’s role
in getting to where we are.
Just a year ago, the CSCAP Outlook gains since World War 2, not least,
The present clash between the US
highlighted what it termed ‘the in much of East Asia. It may be more
and China is arrestingly sharp and
end of ambiguity and denial’ about accurate to say, however, that the
deep not only because the stakes
whether the United States and fundamental question that the contest
are so high and the parties so
China saw themselves as engaged has exposed is whether dependable
profoundly different – most critically,
in an adversarial contest for global agreement is possible on the range
perhaps, in terms of philosophies
pre-eminence. Over the course of of tools and mindsets that states can
on governance – but also because
2019, the rivalry between these two legitimately bring to the competition.
it has been brewing over several
mega-states remained a primary If the answer is yes, interdependence
decades of increasingly intimate and
cause of the deepening division and will continue to be accepted and
complex interaction. In 1944-45,
antagonism that characterised the welcomed; if not, then some
when the US had a uniquely clean
international system. Most of the significant degree of disengagement
slate to put the broad management of
papers assembled in this edition of will be seen as indispensable to the
international affairs on a new footing,
Outlook confirm this judgement. national interest.
President Roosevelt insisted – over
China’s singular fusion of We should not be too surprised or objections from the UK and USSR
authoritarian governance and a dismayed by this development. who had particular interests in Tibet
market economy (dubbed ‘state Rapid and significant change in the and Xinjiang respectively – that
capitalism’) is being viewed by the distribution of power have ranked China be among the select group of
US and others as fundamentally as the supreme challenge for the major powers that would be tasked
incompatible with traditional notions international community throughout with special responsibilities for the
of fair and productive competition. recorded history. It is not easy to maintenance of international order
Opinion and assessment have tended get it right and to preserve stability and stability. Within a few years,
to focus on the so-called ‘rules- and peace. Although history never Mao Zedong’s communist movement
based order’ as the primary arena really repeats itself, too many broadly had seized power in China, entered
of dispute, despite this order having comparable episodes in the past into an alliance with the USSR and
fostered spectacular and widespread have ended in major wars. Today, joined it in endorsing North Korea’s
4
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020
Deng maxim about being patient and
keeping a low profile into the major
public policy theme of peaceful rise
(later, peaceful development). For
nearly a decade, until towards the
end of the Bush administration in
2008, Beijing’s incessant message
was that its economic and political
revival would not disrupt or threaten
the fortunes of other states, a pledge
based in part on lessons learned from
an exhaustive examination of the
experience with rising powers in the
past.
As the Clinton administration drew
October 1, 2019. National Day Parade, Xi, Jiang, Hu. Credit Ng Han Guan / AP. to a close it was characterising China
as a ‘strategic partner’, whereas the
invasion of the South in June 1950. energies on building a functioning Republican presidential candidate in
The US and China were the principal economy. The accelerating success of 2000, George W. Bush, contended that
combatants in that conflict, emerging this transformation, linked strongly China was a ‘strategic competitor’.
as bitter enemies. China and the to a receptive US market, has become This stark contrast can be traced
USSR essentially left the US to cope the stuff of legends. The expectation back to the break-up of the Soviet
with the inconclusive aftermath that these economic practices would Union in 1991, thrusting the US into
of the Korean War but then also have a wider liberalising influence the condition of unipolarity. The end
experienced the complete collapse of – more a hope than a precondition of the Cold War led spontaneously
their own bilateral relationship by for continuing to facilitate China’s to a strong and persistent public
1959-60. More than a decade later, economic revival – were sharply demand in America for a major ‘peace
in 1972, came the spectacular US- deflated in June 1989. Almost dividend’, including sharp reductions
Chinese accommodation, splitting the coincidently, the USSR allowed the in US forces stationed overseas in
communist side of the Cold War and Berlin wall to be breached and its Europe and Northeast Asia. Many
enlarging the strategic space within partners in the Warsaw Pact to make analysts had marvelled at the
which China could manoeuvre in their own choices, a process that durability of the bipartisan consensus
comparative safety. culminated in the spectacular break- in the US that sustained its costly
up of the USSR itself in December and dangerous global security
After Mao’s death in 1976, China’s
1991. These events effectively marked posture. Here was an early and clear
new paramount leader, Deng Xiao
the end of the special US-China sign that the American public was not
Ping, took the country down the
relationship forged in 1972. only aware of this burden but eager
road of ‘reform and opening up’ –
to seek relieve from it. Moreover, the
or away from Socialist planning The US basically persisted with
White House in 1991-92 was disposed
toward a market economy attached the posture of engaging China and
to respond favourably to this public
to the global trading community. relations were rebuilt over the course
pressure. President George H.W.
Taking China down this path took of the 1990’s but arguably never
Bush began to speak of a ‘new world
great courage and skill. A key regained the qualities of tentative
order’ and of a minimalist future US
plank of Deng’s political platform partnership from the 70’s and 80’s.
military posture – ‘just enough’, he
was the notion of a ‘window of The Clinton administration in its
said, to meet its security obligations –
strategic opportunity’ – an external second term acknowledged China’s
that would leave room for significant
environment that was reliably stable major power status and urged it
reductions in prevailing expectations
because of the US-Soviet nuclear to also accept the responsibilities
of future military expenditure.
stalemate and China’s favourable associated with that status. China
location between the superpowers appeared to respond positively to this At the same time in the Pentagon,
(effectively a recipient of US extended positioning and its implications. In however, an entirely different US
deterrence) – that made it ‘safe’ for collaboration with American think- response to the end of the Cold
the Party to focus its resources and tankers, Beijing developed a famous War and the advent of unipolarity
5
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document because Cheney was
now Vice-President of the United
States and Wolfowitz the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. Second, it
represented a strikingly abrupt but
considered conceptual revolution
in America’s security outlook that
its authors regarded as already a
decade late, even as they recognised
that its implementation would again
be deferred. Finally, China would
have begun to think hard about how
the trajectory of its re-emergence
might be complicated by this new
predisposition in Washington.
But then came 911 and the fateful
propensity to place regime change
in Iraq at the heart of America’s
response. Also in 2001, China
completed the arduous process of
qualifying for membership of the
January 7, 2009. President George W. Bush (centre), meets with (from left) former President WTO, a platform for the continued
George H.W. Bush, President-elect Barack Obama, and former Presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy prodigious growth in its GDP and
Carter in the Oval Office.
exports to magnitudes that dwarfed
was taking shape. Informed by presidential elections of 2000 when a earlier export-led economic miracles
neoconservative thinking, Secretary conservative think tank re-issued a in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
of Defense Richard Cheney and version of it as a potential Republican
The transformation in China’s
a senior official, Paul Wolfowitz, policy guideline.
economic capacities that these
were instrumental in crafting a
There is little doubt that President circumstances helped to facilitate
posture that contended (a) that the
Bush was made familiar with and was fed, 15 years later, into the widely-
circumstances demanded that the US
attracted to the thrust of this security shared view that the US had failed
overtly declare its intention to lead
posture – in June 2002 he asserted utterly to anticipate that stoic
the world and to preserve the liberal
that ‘America has, and intends to adherence to its traditional posture of
global order it had been instrumental
keep, military strengths beyond enabling emerging economies to have
in creating , (b) that the US should
challenge … limiting (international) privileged access to US markets might
declare its intention to preserve
rivalries to trade and other peaceful prove unsustainable in the case of
unassailable military superiority, and
pursuits’. In addition, the first China. By 2002-03, however, Beijing
(c) it should be a priority to preclude
major security policy document was again sensing that a further
in all regions of importance to the
prepared by the new administration ‘strategic window of opportunity’ lay
US the emergence of a hostile major
– the Quadrennial Defense Review ahead, allowing the state to pursue
power capable of harnessing the
released in early October 2001 – its priority objectives without undue
full capacities of that region (initial
constituted a sweeping pivot to Asia concerns about complications on the
drafts of the proposal cited Germany
to address the emerging challenge foreign and security policy fronts or a
and Japan as indicative historical
from China, utterly demoting concerted effort to change the ground
examples). The authors deemed this
Europe and the Near East that had rules on trade.
agenda to be within US capacities and
for decades outweighed the Asian
strongly supportive of US interests. In retrospect, it seems that China
theatre. Although this intent was
A draft of this document was leaked resolved to drive through the ‘window
swept aside by the attacks on 911,
in 1991 and provoked widespread of opportunity’ – that the vagaries
QDR 2001 remains relevant to the
outrage within and beyond the US. It if democracy and Islamic terrorism
present narrative for several reasons.
was disowned by the White House as had conspired to keep open for more
First, it had the same intellectual
a wholly internal Pentagon document, than a decade – with all deliberate
impetus as the 1991-92 Pentagon
and then vanished until the speed and using the full panoply of
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REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020
its mammoth Belt and Road Initiative The abrupt reconfiguration of US
in 2013 (although its grandeur policy objectives effectively drew a
has initially been diminished by line under the posture of engagement
modalities for project selections and of China that had endured since 1972.
implementation that were seen as Washington was characteristically
deficient in terms of transparency, transparent, declaring the era of
accountability, and engagement selfless US leadership of the liberal
with partners, issues that President international order, including
Xi in April 2019 promised would assuming primary responsibility to
be addressed); and in 2014-15, the counter international terrorism, to
frantic construction of seven new be over. Instead, the US would again
islands in the South China Sea focus its full attention and energies
ahead of an international tribunal on competition with rival major
assessing the merits of competing powers, above all on the perceived
June 29, 2019. G20 in Osaka Japan. President national claims in this body of ocean. comprehensive challenge, particularly
Donald J. Trump joins Xi Jinping, President of the Some of these created islands now from China but also Russia, to ‘shape
People’s Republic of China, at the start of their
bilateral meeting. Credit Official White House host significant military capabilities, a world antithetical to US values and
Photo by Shealah Craighead / Flickr. helping to propel China’s historical interests’.
claim to virtually all of this sea space
Despite the divisiveness of the Trump
– a claim alleged to date back more
policy options open to it. It stepped era, this newly declared confrontation
than 1000 years – into perhaps the
past a deliberate effort by the Bush has significant bipartisan support.
major dark cloud over the ‘China
administration in 2004 to offer China It is initially (since mid-2018) being
dream’ of national rejuvenation.
greater recognition of its new status played out primarily as a ‘trade war’,
in world affairs, sensing that the These are some of the key trends and alongside negotiations seeking to
‘responsible stakeholder’ proposal developments of the post-Cold War construct a bridge that will reliably
was skewed toward China sharing era that shaped the US presidential span the stark asymmetries in
more responsibility rather than more elections in 2016 and the breath- the instincts of and policy options
power. When the Global Financial taking victory of Donald Trump. After available to the two sides in the
Crisis of 2008-09 dealt a further body 18 months of boisterous, divisive and arenas of trade and technological
blow to US standing in the world, somewhat incoherent posturing on innovation.
that window was thrown wide open, what Make America Great Again
More than a year of negotiations
bringing into consideration outcomes actually meant and where it had
have been inconclusive. They have
that had seemed to fall far over the come from (much of it directed at
neither confirmed nor precluded that
horizon and enticing China to strive America’s allies and friends and
the stark differences between China
even harder to take full advantage involving a haemorrhaging of US
and the US on the principles and
of these fortuitous circumstances. A soft power comparable to that which
practice of governance can be bridged
sustained effort over both terms of occurred over the period 2002-08
to sustain constructive economic
the Obama administration to get new under the Bush administration),
entanglement. By November 2019,
understandings on some of China’s the administration towards the
as Outlook went to press, the most
distinctive trade policy practices (the middle of 2018 swung its attention
likely outcome was an indefinite
so-called structural issues, including unambiguously toward China.
pause on new tariffs and agreement
the subsidisation of state-owned China’s domestic agenda in the years
to defer consideration of the so-
enterprises, intellectual property leading up to 2017-18 involved a
called structural issues. Perhaps
protection and forced technology comprehensive campaign to reaffirm
the most promising outcome of
transfers) was deflected and deferred, the absolute authority of the Party.
these negotiations is the stronger
but contributed nonetheless to an This objective was firmly extended
appreciation on both sides, first, that
overt ‘rebalancing’ of US economic, to include the business and trade
any agreement will require difficult
foreign, and security policy in 2011-12 community, sharpening the sense
concessions and, second, that if a
to present a more concerted defence that the Chinese model of state
deal is not achieved or proves to
of US interests in the broader Asia capitalism was structurally skewed to
be incapable of sustaining mutual
Pacific region. China then launched preclude open and fair competition.
confidence in an equitable trading
two stunning geopolitical initiatives:
relationship, either or both sides
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may look to de-coupling the two the trends highlighted here. More Finally, Outlook has in the past urged
economies – prioritising security particularly, it is unlikely that they ASEAN to more directly exploit its
and sovereignty considerations would contest what appears to be privileged role in hosting the key East
and minimising economic the most important conclusion to be Asian multilateral security processes
interdependence. The costs of such drawn from it, namely, that for long- to press the major powers to step up
a move could prove calamitous, not standing reasons both states share the quest for durable solutions to
simply in economic terms but also in deep responsibility for the prevailing the issues generating division and
terms of a heightened risk that the state of affairs between them. hostility. ASEAN centrality and being
bilateral relationship writ large will in the ‘driver’s seat’ cannot remain
There is a further dimension of
become darker and more dangerous, as concepts with a special meaning
today’s international scene that
a progression that would inevitably linked exclusively to the origins and
warrants particular attention.
suck in many other states. Economic evolution of the ASEAN Regional
We have now seen many years of
and security interests cannot be Forum since 1994. These concepts
discussion about the scale of the
rigorously compartmentalised, they also have a literal meaning that
transformation in the distribution
overlap and intersect. ASEAN has been somewhat reluctant
of economic, military, and political
to embrace. This year, however, has
The ambitious Regional weight in the international
seen two important steps in the right
Comprehensive Economic Partnership system and its significance for the
direction – the direction of greater
– seven years in the making – was ‘international order’ – that body
transparency and the protection
finalised and its conclusion announced of norms, principles, laws, and
of multilateralism. The first was
in the margins of the ASEAN and regulations that has evolved to
Singapore Prime Minister Lee’s
East Asia Summits in Bangkok in manage the intersection of states
address to the Shangri-La Dialogue
November 2019, both confirming and beyond their sovereign borders.
in June 2019. The assessment and
consolidating the status of these fora There is a detectable undercurrent
diagnosis he offered was insightful
as consequential regional gatherings. in this discussion that, as this
and refreshingly direct. This is an
How this milestone accomplishment international order has been or is
example that the ASEAN chair could
might play into the US-China in the process of being overtaken,
consider following in respect of the
trade dispute is difficult to gauge. the visible or tangible evidence of
East Asia Summit and the ASEAN
The conclusion of RCEP, because its existence should be regarded as
Regional Forum. The second was
it includes China, may loosen the so much obsolete clutter. This is an
ASEAN’s assertive step, at the ARF
logjam in the US-China negotiations. exceedingly foolish perspective on the
in Bangkok in June 2019, to take
Although the US-China agenda seems international order – a perspective
the increasingly popular but also
significantly more generic, there may perhaps most conspicuous in recent
controversial regional descriptor of
be elements in RCEP that suggest times in the field of nuclear arms
‘Indo-Pacific’ and position it within
new ways of looking at some issues control – and one that political leaders
the traditions of the regional security
on the US-China agenda. India was need to ensure gains no further
processes it had pioneered.
a founding participant in the RCEP traction. Whatever one’s views on the
negotiations but declined to join the extant international order, one has a
pact at the last moment, expressing responsibility to recall the enormity of
concerns about the vulnerability the events that preceded and inspired Ron Huisken
of major sectors of its large (and its creation. There can be no appetite Adjunct Associate Professor, Strategic &
potentially massive) economy to to risk repeating these events in order Defence Studies Centre, ANU
Chinese imports. A US-China trade to create an opportunity for a new
agreement may well tip the scales and designer to replicate something close
give India sufficient confidence to sign to what we already have. Clearly,
on to RCEP. the same discipline must apply to the
authors of the current order. That
This is a necessarily selective and
order may have a significant inbuilt
subjective account of the primary
capacity to adapt and renew itself
currents in world affairs over the
but there has to be a willingness to
past several decades. Many readers
consider more overt mechanisms
would recast the story in major ways.
to effect necessary adaptation and
It is unlikely, however, that they
revision.
would discount all or even most of
8
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020
The New Normal: Rising US-China Competition and Uncertainty
in Asia
Siddharth Mohandas
January 30, 2019. White House. US Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, senior staff and cabinet members meet with Chinese Vice Premier
Liu He and members of his delegation for trade talks. Credit Andrea Hanks / Flickr.
After three years of the Trump real record and answered largely in foreign policy. At the same time,
administration, we can start to move the affirmative. No longer do we need however, US allies and partners
beyond the many questions the to ask what Trump might do, we can in Asia have not been spared the
election of Donald Trump provoked look at what he has actually done. administration’s severe gaze. Even
to some preliminary answers. Was he where allies have successfully
What we find is that the Trump
truly willing to risk a massive trade managed Trump administration
administration has fundamentally
war with China? Would he really demands, unpredictable new
shifted the US-China relationship
follow through on rhetoric questioning gambits on trade and security have
in a more competitive and even
the value of alliances and existing left foreign capitals off balance. On
confrontational direction. US
trade deals? Would he actually North Korea, the White House’s
policy focus on China extends far
embrace North Korean dictator Kim commitment to pursuing diplomacy
beyond trade to encompass a range
Jong-un? What were once concerned has appeared firm but there are signs
of economic, security, technology,
and somewhat speculative questions that Pyongyang is growing impatient
and ideological issues that are now
about how disruptive Trump would with the pace of progress. Hanging
increasingly at the centre of American
be can now be compared against a over all of this is what promises to
9
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be a bitter and acrimonious political mutual recrimination between the economic, and domestic policies –
season in the United States as two sides accompanied by start-and- was closely studied for signals about
the country heads to the polls in stop efforts to restart stalled talks. As whether continued confrontation
November 2020. This, then, is the of this writing, a ‘phase one’ deal that was the White House’s intention or
new normal in Washington’s Asia rolls back some US tariffs in return whether there were in fact limits to
policy – rising confrontation with for Chinese purchases of American Washington’s new, more assertive
China and uncertainty throughout agricultural products seems possible. approach. Pence did offer some
the rest of Asia regarding the extent However, a comprehensive trade deal reassuring words, saying, ‘the United
of escalation, its impact throughout that resolves Washington’s structural States does not seek confrontation
the region, and whether the political complaints about the Chinese with China’ and that the goal of
winds will shift. economy is highly unlikely. administration policy was not to
decouple the United States and
The greatest risk to the security The Trump administration also
China. But, arguably more tellingly,
outlook in Asia in the year ahead is significantly expanded the scope of
the vast majority of the content of
that the changes we have seen in US-China competition to include
Pence’s speech was an extension
US Asia policy cannot be managed technology trade and investment –
of his 2018 remarks. He castigated
effectively either in Washington or in most notably by putting in place a
China for its industrial policies,
the region. Specifically, while there is ban on selling critical US components
cyberespionage, and intellectual
widespread justification and support to Huawei and launching a global
property theft – also critiquing
for a tougher US policy approach campaign to shut the company
US companies for ‘kowtow[ing]’ to
toward China, the challenge for both out of 5G infrastructure efforts.
the Chinese Communist Party for
Washington and Beijing will be to The US Commerce Department
market access. He criticised China’s
find a new framework that prevents is further set to issue regulations
activities in the South China Sea
necessary competitive policies from banning the export of ‘emerging
and East China Sea. He denounced
totally undermining the security and foundational’ technologies to
China’s treatment of its own
and economic benefits of US-China China. The Trump administration
citizens, particularly in Xinjiang. He
relations. For allies and partners ramped up its criticism of China’s
reaffirmed US support for Taiwan and
throughout the region, the question is human rights record, particularly
proclaimed US support for protestors
how to deal with the unpredictability with respect to Xinjiang and Hong
in Hong Kong. In short, Pence spent
of an increasingly distracted and Kong, and sanctioned Chinese
far more time identifying areas of
depleted Trump administration. And officials responsible for repression
disagreement than agreement.
on North Korea, while Washington’s in Xinjiang as well as Chinese
pursuit of diplomacy has been a technology companies that have aided If continued confrontation is the likely
welcome change from ‘fire and fury,’ surveillance there. The White House shape of US-China relations in the
policymakers must remain prepared has announced plans for a major arms year ahead, even in the event of a
to deal with a sudden return to sale to Taiwan. Washington regularly small trade deal, the danger for the
tensions. condemns the Belt and Road region is that this process could spiral
Initiative and promotes US and allied into unrestrained and destabilising
US-China: A New Era of Competition.
funding alternatives. And, opening competition. To be clear, the
2019 featured a parade of tough, even
a new front in US-China relations, relationship needed to be rebalanced
unprecedented actions by the Trump
the administration has denounced and there is widespread support
administration against China. After
Chinese efforts to influence US public in the United States for a more
levying tariffs on $250 billion USD
opinion and is aggressively engaging reciprocal US-China relationship.
worth of Chinese goods at the end
in counterespionage efforts. The sum Indeed, this is one of the few areas of
of 2018, Donald Trump promised
total of these actions has been to bipartisan consensus in Washington,
to tariff an additional $300 billion
confront China in almost every aspect with leading Democratic members
of products – nearly the entirety
of its policies. of Congress joining with Republican
of China’s exports to the United
colleagues in proposing legislation
States – if a trade agreement was Thus, US Vice President Mike Pence’s
designed to push back on China. The
not reached. Negotiators had seemed October 2019 speech on US-China
challenge for Washington and Beijing
close to striking a deal in May 2019 relations – a sequel to his speech a
is to find some way to preserve
but, in the White House’s telling, year earlier that provided the Trump
stability in the overall relationship
China walked away from the table. administration’s comprehensive
as it becomes more competitive, to
Since then, there has been much indictment of China’s foreign,
10REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020
maintain global economic growth been satisfied and it will continue to country. The Trump administration is
that depends on trade and integrated press allies and partners on a range reportedly demanding a 500 percent
supply chains, and to find ways to of issues, in turn putting pressure on increase in South Korea’s payment,
cooperate on common challenges Washington’s diplomatic standing in promising a high stakes and highly
such as climate change. As the two Asia. contentious negotiation with the
sides retreat to their corners and potential to break the alliance.
South Korea provides a striking
mutual trust plummets, there is little
example of the ups and downs of Japan’s experience has been similar
evidence that this is happening.
dealing with Trump’s Washington. to that of South Korea. Tokyo
Allies and Partners: Uncertainty Seoul successfully renegotiated the has concluded a ‘phase one’ trade
Reigns. For US allies and partners, Korea-US Free Trade Agreement agreement of its own that appears
the challenge has been how to making some largely cosmetic to have mollified Washington and
manage a mercurial president concessions while giving Trump the held off – for now – Donald Trump’s
and a more unconstrained United appearance of a ‘win’. This successful threat to levy tariffs on all Japanese
States that demands support for defusing of a complex trade issue auto exports. However, Japan too
its China policy, changes in trade has not been matched, however, has to renew its Special Measures
flows, and greater contributions in the security realm. Just a year Agreement in 2021. The US-South
to mutual defence. Asian capitals after concluding a previous pact, the Korea talks will set a precedent for
have responded with a variety of United States and South Korea are US-Japan discussion and it could be a
negotiating gambits and some have renegotiating a Special Measures worrisome one. Against this backdrop,
had some success in striking deals Agreement that determines the extent Japan-South Korea relations
with Washington. But there is no of Seoul’s funding contribution for the have deteriorated over a dispute
sign that the administration has presence of US troops based in the concerning reparations for wartime
Jun 30, 2019. President Donald J. Trump and Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un in Freedom House at the Korean DMZ. Credit Shealah
Craighead, White House / Flickr.
11CSCAP
forced labour and Washington has remaining who can restrain the may come after. A major concern is
appeared to be largely a bystander in president’s impulses. that North Korea may take more
the process. The US alliance system provocative action in 2020 – whether
North Korea: Pursuing Diplomacy
in Northeast Asia – the linchpin of a return to long-range missile testing
for Now. A third risk to the security
America’s regional security presence – or perhaps even a resumption of
outlook in Asia in 2020 is a rapid
is under unprecedented pressure and nuclear testing. With diplomacy
return of tensions between the
further strain constitutes a major risk seemingly discredited, it would be no
United States and North Korea.
in 2020. surprise if the United States swung
Donald Trump’s unprecedented
back sharply in response and tensions
The trajectory of US-India step of meeting with North Korean
again spiked.
relations has been positive across leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore
administrations since 2000 and there in June 2018 was largely welcomed There is little question that the
has been continued warmth under in the region – despite misgivings Trump administration has met its
Trump and Indian Prime Minister about what exactly the United goal of disruption in foreign policy.
Narendra Modi. However, a series of States would gain from the meeting Growing US-China confrontation
disputes – over trade and e-commerce, – because it marked a decisive break characterises almost every aspect
India’s plans to purchase S-400 from the threats of ‘fire and fury’ of the bilateral relationship and,
missiles from Russia and oil from of the previous year and allowed crucially, this approach has
Iran, and New Delhi’s strategy for concerns about imminent conflict bipartisan support in the United
5G expansion – have all combined to on the Korean Peninsula to recede. States. Allies and partners must
create an atmosphere of uncertainty However, the diplomatic spectacle prepare for abrupt new shifts in
in the bilateral relationship. of the Trump-Kim summit quickly security relations and trade. US-
Similarly, while US-ASEAN relations devolved into an impasse between North Korea relations have swung
have been for the most part stable, the two governments as working level from threats of war to reality-TV
countries in Southeast Asia have still talks proceeded fitfully. Washington diplomacy and could yet swing back
had to deal with unpredictable trade demanded immediate and concrete to tension again. The most pressing
actions and erratic diplomacy by the steps toward denuclearisation while question at this stage is whether
administration. Trump skipped the Pyongyang has demanded far- these disruptions are temporary or
East Asia Summit for the second reaching sanctions relief – both have more fundamental. The evidence of
year in a row and the most recent been disappointed. This resulted in the past year is that instability is not
summit featured the lowest-level the failed Hanoi summit in February a passing phenomenon but the new
American delegation ever, feeding 2019 where Trump walked away from normal against which all regional
perceptions of American distraction the table, citing Kim’s failure to make capitals must plan.
and retrenchment. Countries across meaningful concessions.
the region are teetering on the edge
The situation since Hanoi has been
of recession as the US-China trade
war grinds on. Even as Washington
an unstable equilibrium. North Siddharth Mohandas
Korea has broken its self-imposed Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for New
touts its concept of a free and open American Security and former Principal
moratorium on missile testing,
Indo-Pacific and supports maritime Deputy Director of Policy Planning at the
launching a number of short-range US Department of State
rights in the South China Sea,
missiles. The Trump administration
countries such as Vietnam have found
has responded largely by downplaying
themselves unexpectedly threatened
the significance of the missile tests
with or subjected to trade actions.
and stating its continued interest
What all of the foregoing issues have in diplomacy. This has not mollified
in common is uncertainty about US Pyongyang and North Korean officials
intentions and staying power. While on a number of occasions have stated
a perennial concern among nervous that the Trump administration
US allies and partners, these have must produce concessions by the
taken on a greater force as the end of 2019 or face unspecified
Trump administration operates more consequences. There is, however, little
erratically – particularly in the face of evidence that the White House has a
impeachment – and it is evident that diplomatic plan in place to manage
there are few if any senior officials the situation or a plan for what
12REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020
Sino-US strategic competition and Asia-Pacific security
Wu Xinbo
Throughout 2019, the single most technology and even cultural and also raised the prospect of conflict,
important development impacting educational exchanges, seriously intended or not, with the People’s
on Asia-Pacific regional security straining the overall bilateral Liberation Army (PLA) in this region.
has been the intensifying strategic relationship. While the Trump
On the Taiwan issue, the Trump
competition between China and administration utilises the trade
administration is also pushing
the United States. As enunciated war as an important leverage in
the envelope more boldly. For the
in its reports on National Security pursuing strategic rivalry with China,
pro-Taiwan influence within the
Strategy and National Defense Beijing senses a determination on
administration, Taiwan stands as a
Strategy released respectively in the part of Washington to reorient
uniquely important source of leverage
December 2017 and early 2018, the its entire China policy towards a
in the US strategic competition
Trump administration defined China more competitive and confrontational
with China. For those who want to
as a major competitor/rival and stance. In fact, the trade war
pressure China on trade and other
jumpstarted strategic competition and the approach the Trump
issues, Taiwan serves as a useful
with Beijing. The year of 2019 administration has adopted have
and convenient card. Moreover, as
witnessed the full play of Trump’s brought China’s trust towards the US
Taiwan enters the next campaign
new strategy towards China: the to a historical low. On the security
season, Washington favours the
protracted and expanding trade front, Washington has been trying
incumbent leader Tsia Ing-wen and
war, the rising standoff in the South to exert more pressure on Beijing in
is willing to take necessary measures
China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea by conducting
to promote her chances. In August,
the unfolding of the US Indo-Pacific more active and provocative Freedom
Washington announced the sale of
strategy and the prospect of the US of Navigation Operations (FONOS),
66 F-16V fighters to Taiwan worth a
deploying intermediate-range missiles strengthening its military presence,
total of $8 billion, the single largest
in the Western Pacific. encouraging the involvement of its
arms deal in the history of US arms
allies and partners, and promoting
The trade war with China launched sale to the island. Washington also
security cooperation with surrounding
by the Trump administration in keeps strengthening US-Taiwan
countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia,
July 2018 quickly escalated to an ties by increasing all kinds of
Indonesia, etc. Determined to employ
unprecedented level and extended cooperation and exchanges with
the cost-imposing strategy towards
into 2019. Characterised by Taipei. The most provocative action
China and to be more risk-taking in
escalation, intermittent negotiation taken by the Trump administration
the South China Sea, the US military
and stalemate, the trade war spilled is that US Department of Defense’s
has not only increased tensions but
over into the fields of investment, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report treats
China unveiled its new H-6N long-range strategic bomber with aerial refuelling capability at the National Day military parade held in Beijing on October 1,
2019. Credit DEFPOST.
13CSCAP
Taiwan as a ‘country’, which signals has been actively seeking to deploy in China and ASEAN countries should
a deliberate attempt to shift the the Asia-Pacific region intermediate not compromise ‘the third party’s
US policy from ‘One China’ to ‘One range missiles (conventional but also interests’ in South China Sea.
China, One Taiwan’. Indeed, Taiwan’s likely nuclear) so as to augment its Moreover, China continues to make
internal political development and deterrence capability vis-a-vis China. efforts to improve ties with its two
the evolving US Taiwan policy are Should this occur, it will seriously major neighbours, India and Japan.
coalescing to foment a serious crisis in undermine the strategic stability in In October 2019, Chinese President Xi
the Taiwan Strait. the region and stir up a new round of Jinping went to India for the second
arms competition. To be sure, China informal summit meeting with Indian
In June 2019, the Pentagon released
is unlikely to join the US and Russia Prime Minister Modi, following
the US Indo-Pacific Strategy
in negotiating a new version of INF their first informal summit meeting
Report which outlined the goals
treaty. Beijing may instead respond in China in 2018. The two leaders
and approaches of the doctrine.
by further building up its missile agreed to expand bilateral cooperation
The document defines China as a
arsenal and even reconsider the while managing their differences
revisionist power and asserts that
‘no-first-use’ position in its nuclear more cautiously. President Xi also
‘[t]he Indo-Pacific increasingly is
doctrine. plans to visit Japan in the spring
confronted with a more confident
of 2020, as Sino-Japanese relations
and assertive China that is willing Confronted with the ever-growing
remain on a positive trajectory.
to accept friction in the pursuit of strategic competition launched by
a more expansive set of political, the Trump administration, including To be sure, for many regional
economic, and security interests.’ the forging ahead of its Indo-Pacific countries, US allies and partners
Indeed, the US Indo-Pacific strategy strategy, Beijing has responded by alike, it is not desirable to choose
sets China as the primary target, taking a series of measures to dilute sides between US and China. While
with its strategic design and means and offset the impact of US actions. some of them have to maintain close
of implementation having a matching First and foremost is the deepening security ties with Washington, they
focus. The quadruple cooperation of security cooperation with Russia. also need to keep robust economic
among the US, Japan, Australia and In addition to conventional forms ties with Beijing. In fact, as China
India (QUAD) serves as the backbone of arms transfer and joint military becomes more influential in regional
of the strategy, aimed at dealing with exercises, China and Russia seek affairs, forging comprehensive
China’s naval activities from the to promote mutual military action relations with China is a must. Just
Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and coordination. For instance, in as Singaporean Prime Minister
on the one hand, and competing with July 2019, Chinese and Russian air Lee Hsien Loong noted at the 2019
China’s Belt and Road Initiative on forces held their first joint aerial Shangri-La Dialogue, ‘In a new Cold
the other. In addition to QUAD, the patrol in Northeast Asia, involving War, there can be no clear division
US also stepped up efforts to engage two bombers from each side. It is between friend and foe.’ In response
South Asian countries such as Sri reported that Russia is also helping to the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy,
Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh China create its missile early warning ASEAN released a paper outlining its
as well as the Pacific Islands, in an system. Meanwhile, China has own vision of the Indo-Pacific concept,
unvarnished endeavour to check been actively pushing forward the stressing the ongoing need for
China’s expanding ties with those negotiation with ASEAN member ASEAN centrality and inclusiveness,
countries. states of the Code of Conduct (COC) and underlining its reservation
in the South China Sea, in an earnest toward the intention behind
Compared with Obama’s Rebalance
effort to stabilise the situation in Washington’s strategic initiative. The
to Asia strategy, the Indo-Pacific
the region and improve relations ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
strategy launches geo-political and
with ASEAN countries. Beijing also proposed to seek cooperation
geo-economic competition with China
expressed the hope that negotiation with other regional members in four
in a much broader geographical
of the COC be concluded by 2021. areas, i.e., maritime cooperation,
context, while pinning down China
In July 2019, all parties concerned connectivity, UN Sustainable
as the major target also pushes many
finished the first reading of the Development Goals 2030, and
countries in the region to choose sides
Single Draft Negotiating Text of the economic development, suggesting
between Washington and Beijing.
COC, marking a major step forward that ASEAN and China can continue
As the US formally withdrew from
in the COC consultations, in spite to cooperate in many fields, as they
the Treaty on Intermediate-Range
of Washington’s repeated warning have already done over the years.
Nuclear Forces (INF), Washington
that the COC negotiation between Growing Sino-US discord has also
14REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020
cast a shadow over their coordination denuclearisation and the building of in both bilateral and regional
and cooperation in dealing with the a permanent peace mechanism on contexts. Bilaterally, the two parties
Democratic People’s Republic of the peninsula, the lack of well-tuned should keep the growing strategic
Korea (DPRK) nuclear issue. Since coordination between the two most competition healthy and benign, as
the first Trump-Kim meeting held in important external players only bodes a malign rivalry will inevitably lead
Singapore in June 2018, Washington ill for the future. to antagonism and overt conflict.
has turned to diplomatic engagement Regionally, they should avoid drawing
The Asia-Pacific has entered a
with Pyongyang to advance the goal lines and encouraging members of
period of profound changes set off
of the DPRK’s denuclearisation, yet the region to split into rival camps,
by shifts in the power balance as
with little progress so far. On the otherwise the economically most
well by adjustments of strategy and
other hand, ties between Beijing and dynamic region will gradually lose
policy settings by regional players.
Pyongyang have warmed up quickly its momentum for growth and
Managing major power competition
following Kim Jong-Un’s first visit integration. Third, the most urgent
and dealing with hot spot issues top
to China in March 2018. To some issue for China-US security relations
the regional security agenda, while
extent, the improved atmosphere is crisis avoidance and management.
Sino-US interactions hold the key.
and growing exchanges between As noted above, the risk of a serious
To be sure, competition between
the two countries renders Beijing crisis and conflict over either the
Beijing and Washington will continue
more influence over Pyongyang, South China Sea or Taiwan is
to unfold and likely intensify, and
encouraging the latter to continue growing against the backdrop of an
the challenge for both countries as
to freeze nuclear and long-range overall relationship that is strained
well as the entire region is how to
missile tests, and to seek progress and characterised by historically low
manage such rivalry. Here are some
in negotiations with Washington in levels of trust. It is important that
suggestions. First and foremost,
improving DPRK-US ties as well as the US conducts FONOS in South
it is imperative for China and the
pursuing denuclearisation on the China Sea with more caution rather
US to delineate the boundary of
Korean peninsula. Nonetheless, than more provocation, and refrains
their competition. For one thing,
compared with the first year of from crossing the red line of ‘One
robust economic ties benefitting both
the Trump administration when China’ policy while enhancing ties
countries should not be decoupled
Beijing and Washington pursued with Taiwan. For any crisis avoidance
or seriously downgraded, as some
robust and effective coordination and management effort to succeed,
hawkish people in the Trump team
and cooperation on the North good communication at the strategic
have advocated. It is very likely that
Korean issue, since 2018, the level and effective management at
China will emerge as the world’s
quality of Sino-US interactions the tactical level are indispensable.
largest economy over the coming
has plummeted as serious frictions Yet, as overall relations between
decade, so restricting economic
arose in their bilateral ties. Given Beijing and Washington fell from
relations with China under the logic
the fact that a long and bumpy road cooler to freezing, there has been a
of relative gains will only cause the
lies ahead for the DPRK’s complete notable shortage of communication
US to lose tremendous business
and exchanges between both the
opportunities. Moreover, although
two national security teams and
economic interdependence does
senior defence personnel, while crisis
not necessarily prevent contention
management mechanisms are not
from occurring between countries
well coordinated. Needless to say,
(actually close economic ties tend to
such a precarious situation needs to
be a major source of frictions), it does
be redressed as soon as possible.
raise the cost of conflict and therefore
can act as a useful buffer. For Sino-
US relations, vigorous economic
exchanges have been an important Wu Xinbo
strategic pillar and should be Professor & Director, Center for American
preserved for the long-term interests Studies Dean, Institute of International
Studies Fudan University
of both countries and many others,
even though they are undergoing
September 25, 2019. Haiyang Shiyou 982. a tough period of rebalancing.
Beijing has deployed a new oil rig in the
Second, China and the US should
disputed waters of the South China Sea. Credit
Weibo / SCMP. exercise strategic self-restraint
15CSCAP
Indo-Pacific: From Strategy to Vision
Yoshihide Soeya
November 4, 2019. Bangkok, Thailand. Heads of State and Government of the Member States of ASEAN, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea, gathering at the 22nd ASEAN Plus Three Summit. Credit ASEAN.
The concept of Indo-Pacific has now released his concept of a ‘security Vietnam in November 2017. Since
become a catchphrase of the times, diamond,’ a network of allies then, both Tokyo and Washington
a reference point in discussing formed by Japan, the United States, began to use the term ‘Free and Open
regional politics and security. It Australia and India, and clearly Indo-Pacific (FOIP),’ as a strategic
is not clear, however, that there intended to counterbalance China. concept directed against the Chinese
is widespread agreement in the This initial move has come to be BRI launched by President Xi Jinping
region on its scope or its role vis-à- regarded, rightly so, as the baseline of (originally as ‘One Belt One Road’) in
vis rising China in general and its Abe’s regional outlook and Japanese 2013.
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in strategy, including Abe’s version
At some point in 2018, however,
particular. Australian intellectuals of Indo-Pacific. In August 2016
the Japanese government stopped
were among the first (around 2010) at the Sixth Tokyo International
calling FOIP a strategy and re-
to introduce the concept of Indo- Conference on African Development
labelled it as a vision. In mid-2019,
Pacific and depicted it essentially (TICAD VI) held in Nairobi, Prime
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
as inclusive, embracing both China Minister Abe declared, ‘Japan bears
Japan summarised the principles of
and India as the central causes of the responsibility of fostering the
the FOIP vison into three domains: 1)
the rising importance of the Indian confluence of the Pacific and Indian
promotion and establishment of the
Ocean. Thus, the Pacific Ocean to Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a
rule of law, freedom of navigation,
its east and the Indian Ocean to place that values freedom, the rule
and free trade; 2) pursuit of economic
its west have come to be seen as an of law, and the market economy, free
prosperity (by improving connectivity
integral region, Indo-Pacific. In this from force or coercion, and making it
in three areas: physical connectivity
initial conception of Indo-Pacific by prosperous’.
through quality infrastructure;
Australia, Japan and China were both
US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson people-to-people connectivity through
treated as key players, making their
followed suit in October 2017, with a education, training and friendship;
difficult bilateral relationship a factor
substantial reference to ‘Indo-Pacific’ and institutional connectivity
of uncertainty for the stability and
in his address at the Centre for through harmonisation and common
prosperity of the broader region.
Strategic and International Studies rules including EPA/FTA); and 3)
At about the same time, in December in Washington D.C. The following commitment to peace and stability
2012, Japanese Prime Minister month, President Donald Trump (by such means as capacity-building,
Shinzo Abe came back to power also used ‘Indo-Pacific’ in his speech humanitarian assistance and disaster
for the second time, and promptly to the APEC summit in Da Nang, relief, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism,
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