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REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK - CSCAP
CSCAP
REGIONAL
SECURITY
OUTLOOK

     2020
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK - CSCAP
COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION                             EDITOR
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC                                          Ron Huisken
                                                             Adjunct Associate Professor,
Established in 1993, the Council for Security Cooperation    Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the premier Track Two         Australian National University
organisation in the Asia Pacific region and counterpart
to the Track One processes dealing with security issues,
namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East             EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers            Kathryn Brett
Plus Forum. It provides an informal mechanism for            Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
                                                             Australian National University
scholars, officials and others in their private capacities
to discuss political and security issues and challenges
facing the region. It provides policy recommendations to
                                                             EDITORIAL PANEL
various intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional and
international meetings and establishes linkages with         Anthony Milner
institutions and organisations in other parts of the world   CSCAP Australia
to exchange information, insights and experiences in the     Ric Smith
area of regional political-security cooperation.             CSCAP Australia
                                                             Philips Vermonte
                                                             CSCAP Indonesia
                                                             Jusuf Wanandi
                                                             CSCAP Indoensia

Front cover image
Source: Jan Huisken, EPA, ASEAN Secretariat,                 LETTER FROM THE
Dong-A Ilbo, and Andrew Harnik.                              CO-EDITORS
                                                             On behalf of CSCAP, we are pleased to
Back cover image
                                                             present the CSCAP Regional Security
Source: Jan Huisken                                          Outlook (CRSO) 2020. Inaugurated in
                                                             2007, the CRSO volume is now in its
                                                             fourteenth year.

                                                             The CRSO brings expert analysis
                                                             to bear on critical security issues facing
                                                             the region and points to policy-relevant
                                                             alternatives for Track One (official)
CSCAP thanks the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific           and Track Two (non-official) to advance
                                                             multilateral regional security
Affairs, The Australian National University, for their
                                                             cooperation.
support for this publication
                                                             The views in the CRSO 2020 do
Designed and printed by CanPrint Communications,             not represent those of any Member
Canberra, Australia.                                         committee or other institution and are
                                                             the responsibility of the individual
                                                             authors and the Editor. Charts and
                                                             images in the CRSO 2020 do not
ISBN: 978-0-642-60698-3
                                                             necessarily reflect the views of the
                                                             chapter authors.
Copyright © 2019 by CSCAP
www.cscap.org                                                Ron Huisken and Kathryn Brett
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK - CSCAP
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020

CONTENTS
Regional Security Outlook
4    Introduction – Ron Huisken
9    United States – Siddharth Mohandas
13   China – Wu Xinbo
16   Japan – Yoshihide Soeya
20   India – Sana Hashmi
23   Russia – Alexander Lukin
27   EU – Alice Ekman
30   ROK – Choi Kang
34   Australia – Brendan Taylor
37   Indonesia – Dewi Fortuna Anwar
41   Thailand – Pongphisoot Busbarat
45   Malaysia – Cheng-Chwee Kuik
49   Singapore – William Choong
52   Philippines – Aileen San Pablo Baviera
56   Vietnam – Le Dinh Tinh
60   New Zealand – B.K. Greener
64   Myanmar – Zeyar Oo
68   Cambodia – Chheang Vannarith
72   Laos – Sulathin Thiladej

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CSCAP
The Regional Security Outlook 2020:
A prolonged US-China two-step has left us questioning
interdependence
Ron Huisken
                                                                                                    many take solace in the belief that
                                                                                                    the world’s nuclear arsenals present
                                                                                                    a formidable barrier to major power
                                                                                                    war. This contention has merit but
                                                                                                    must be twined with the reality that,
                                                                                                    for the first time in history, these
                                                                                                    weapons may have given humankind
                                                                                                    the capacity to make a mistake from
                                                                                                    which it cannot recover. Given the
                                                                                                    further reality that humankind tends
                                                                                                    to make all the mistakes available
                                                                                                    to it, the exclusive effect of nuclear
                                                                                                    weapons must be to reinforce our
                                                                                                    collective determination to navigate
                                                                                                    these challenging times using
July 31, 2019. Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He (right) with US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer   accommodation and compromise plus
(third left) and US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin (second left) in Shanghai. Credit AP.          a frank assessment of everyone’s role
                                                                                                    in getting to where we are.
Just a year ago, the CSCAP Outlook                       gains since World War 2, not least,
                                                                                                    The present clash between the US
highlighted what it termed ‘the                          in much of East Asia. It may be more
                                                                                                    and China is arrestingly sharp and
end of ambiguity and denial’ about                       accurate to say, however, that the
                                                                                                    deep not only because the stakes
whether the United States and                            fundamental question that the contest
                                                                                                    are so high and the parties so
China saw themselves as engaged                          has exposed is whether dependable
                                                                                                    profoundly different – most critically,
in an adversarial contest for global                     agreement is possible on the range
                                                                                                    perhaps, in terms of philosophies
pre-eminence. Over the course of                         of tools and mindsets that states can
                                                                                                    on governance – but also because
2019, the rivalry between these two                      legitimately bring to the competition.
                                                                                                    it has been brewing over several
mega-states remained a primary                           If the answer is yes, interdependence
                                                                                                    decades of increasingly intimate and
cause of the deepening division and                      will continue to be accepted and
                                                                                                    complex interaction. In 1944-45,
antagonism that characterised the                        welcomed; if not, then some
                                                                                                    when the US had a uniquely clean
international system. Most of the                        significant degree of disengagement
                                                                                                    slate to put the broad management of
papers assembled in this edition of                      will be seen as indispensable to the
                                                                                                    international affairs on a new footing,
Outlook confirm this judgement.                          national interest.
                                                                                                    President Roosevelt insisted – over
China’s singular fusion of                               We should not be too surprised or          objections from the UK and USSR
authoritarian governance and a                           dismayed by this development.              who had particular interests in Tibet
market economy (dubbed ‘state                            Rapid and significant change in the        and Xinjiang respectively – that
capitalism’) is being viewed by the                      distribution of power have ranked          China be among the select group of
US and others as fundamentally                           as the supreme challenge for the           major powers that would be tasked
incompatible with traditional notions                    international community throughout         with special responsibilities for the
of fair and productive competition.                      recorded history. It is not easy to        maintenance of international order
Opinion and assessment have tended                       get it right and to preserve stability     and stability. Within a few years,
to focus on the so-called ‘rules-                        and peace. Although history never          Mao Zedong’s communist movement
based order’ as the primary arena                        really repeats itself, too many broadly    had seized power in China, entered
of dispute, despite this order having                    comparable episodes in the past            into an alliance with the USSR and
fostered spectacular and widespread                      have ended in major wars. Today,           joined it in endorsing North Korea’s

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                                                                                                Deng maxim about being patient and
                                                                                                keeping a low profile into the major
                                                                                                public policy theme of peaceful rise
                                                                                                (later, peaceful development). For
                                                                                                nearly a decade, until towards the
                                                                                                end of the Bush administration in
                                                                                                2008, Beijing’s incessant message
                                                                                                was that its economic and political
                                                                                                revival would not disrupt or threaten
                                                                                                the fortunes of other states, a pledge
                                                                                                based in part on lessons learned from
                                                                                                an exhaustive examination of the
                                                                                                experience with rising powers in the
                                                                                                past.
                                                                                                As the Clinton administration drew
October 1, 2019. National Day Parade, Xi, Jiang, Hu. Credit Ng Han Guan / AP.                   to a close it was characterising China
                                                                                                as a ‘strategic partner’, whereas the
invasion of the South in June 1950.                    energies on building a functioning       Republican presidential candidate in
The US and China were the principal                    economy. The accelerating success of     2000, George W. Bush, contended that
combatants in that conflict, emerging                  this transformation, linked strongly     China was a ‘strategic competitor’.
as bitter enemies. China and the                       to a receptive US market, has become     This stark contrast can be traced
USSR essentially left the US to cope                   the stuff of legends. The expectation    back to the break-up of the Soviet
with the inconclusive aftermath                        that these economic practices would      Union in 1991, thrusting the US into
of the Korean War but then also                        have a wider liberalising influence      the condition of unipolarity. The end
experienced the complete collapse of                   – more a hope than a precondition        of the Cold War led spontaneously
their own bilateral relationship by                    for continuing to facilitate China’s     to a strong and persistent public
1959-60. More than a decade later,                     economic revival – were sharply          demand in America for a major ‘peace
in 1972, came the spectacular US-                      deflated in June 1989. Almost            dividend’, including sharp reductions
Chinese accommodation, splitting the                   coincidently, the USSR allowed the       in US forces stationed overseas in
communist side of the Cold War and                     Berlin wall to be breached and its       Europe and Northeast Asia. Many
enlarging the strategic space within                   partners in the Warsaw Pact to make      analysts had marvelled at the
which China could manoeuvre in                         their own choices, a process that        durability of the bipartisan consensus
comparative safety.                                    culminated in the spectacular break-     in the US that sustained its costly
                                                       up of the USSR itself in December        and dangerous global security
After Mao’s death in 1976, China’s
                                                       1991. These events effectively marked    posture. Here was an early and clear
new paramount leader, Deng Xiao
                                                       the end of the special US-China          sign that the American public was not
Ping, took the country down the
                                                       relationship forged in 1972.             only aware of this burden but eager
road of ‘reform and opening up’ –
                                                                                                to seek relieve from it. Moreover, the
or away from Socialist planning                        The US basically persisted with
                                                                                                White House in 1991-92 was disposed
toward a market economy attached                       the posture of engaging China and
                                                                                                to respond favourably to this public
to the global trading community.                       relations were rebuilt over the course
                                                                                                pressure. President George H.W.
Taking China down this path took                       of the 1990’s but arguably never
                                                                                                Bush began to speak of a ‘new world
great courage and skill. A key                         regained the qualities of tentative
                                                                                                order’ and of a minimalist future US
plank of Deng’s political platform                     partnership from the 70’s and 80’s.
                                                                                                military posture – ‘just enough’, he
was the notion of a ‘window of                         The Clinton administration in its
                                                                                                said, to meet its security obligations –
strategic opportunity’ – an external                   second term acknowledged China’s
                                                                                                that would leave room for significant
environment that was reliably stable                   major power status and urged it
                                                                                                reductions in prevailing expectations
because of the US-Soviet nuclear                       to also accept the responsibilities
                                                                                                of future military expenditure.
stalemate and China’s favourable                       associated with that status. China
location between the superpowers                       appeared to respond positively to this   At the same time in the Pentagon,
(effectively a recipient of US extended                positioning and its implications. In     however, an entirely different US
deterrence) – that made it ‘safe’ for                  collaboration with American think-       response to the end of the Cold
the Party to focus its resources and                   tankers, Beijing developed a famous      War and the advent of unipolarity

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                                                                                                 document because Cheney was
                                                                                                 now Vice-President of the United
                                                                                                 States and Wolfowitz the Deputy
                                                                                                 Secretary of Defense. Second, it
                                                                                                 represented a strikingly abrupt but
                                                                                                 considered conceptual revolution
                                                                                                 in America’s security outlook that
                                                                                                 its authors regarded as already a
                                                                                                 decade late, even as they recognised
                                                                                                 that its implementation would again
                                                                                                 be deferred. Finally, China would
                                                                                                 have begun to think hard about how
                                                                                                 the trajectory of its re-emergence
                                                                                                 might be complicated by this new
                                                                                                 predisposition in Washington.
                                                                                                 But then came 911 and the fateful
                                                                                                 propensity to place regime change
                                                                                                 in Iraq at the heart of America’s
                                                                                                 response. Also in 2001, China
                                                                                                 completed the arduous process of
                                                                                                 qualifying for membership of the
January 7, 2009. President George W. Bush (centre), meets with (from left) former President      WTO, a platform for the continued
George H.W. Bush, President-elect Barack Obama, and former Presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy     prodigious growth in its GDP and
Carter in the Oval Office.
                                                                                                 exports to magnitudes that dwarfed
was taking shape. Informed by                         presidential elections of 2000 when a      earlier export-led economic miracles
neoconservative thinking, Secretary                   conservative think tank re-issued a        in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
of Defense Richard Cheney and                         version of it as a potential Republican
                                                                                                 The transformation in China’s
a senior official, Paul Wolfowitz,                    policy guideline.
                                                                                                 economic capacities that these
were instrumental in crafting a
                                                      There is little doubt that President       circumstances helped to facilitate
posture that contended (a) that the
                                                      Bush was made familiar with and was        fed, 15 years later, into the widely-
circumstances demanded that the US
                                                      attracted to the thrust of this security   shared view that the US had failed
overtly declare its intention to lead
                                                      posture – in June 2002 he asserted         utterly to anticipate that stoic
the world and to preserve the liberal
                                                      that ‘America has, and intends to          adherence to its traditional posture of
global order it had been instrumental
                                                      keep, military strengths beyond            enabling emerging economies to have
in creating , (b) that the US should
                                                      challenge … limiting (international)       privileged access to US markets might
declare its intention to preserve
                                                      rivalries to trade and other peaceful      prove unsustainable in the case of
unassailable military superiority, and
                                                      pursuits’. In addition, the first          China. By 2002-03, however, Beijing
(c) it should be a priority to preclude
                                                      major security policy document             was again sensing that a further
in all regions of importance to the
                                                      prepared by the new administration         ‘strategic window of opportunity’ lay
US the emergence of a hostile major
                                                      – the Quadrennial Defense Review           ahead, allowing the state to pursue
power capable of harnessing the
                                                      released in early October 2001 –           its priority objectives without undue
full capacities of that region (initial
                                                      constituted a sweeping pivot to Asia       concerns about complications on the
drafts of the proposal cited Germany
                                                      to address the emerging challenge          foreign and security policy fronts or a
and Japan as indicative historical
                                                      from China, utterly demoting               concerted effort to change the ground
examples). The authors deemed this
                                                      Europe and the Near East that had          rules on trade.
agenda to be within US capacities and
                                                      for decades outweighed the Asian
strongly supportive of US interests.                                                             In retrospect, it seems that China
                                                      theatre. Although this intent was
A draft of this document was leaked                                                              resolved to drive through the ‘window
                                                      swept aside by the attacks on 911,
in 1991 and provoked widespread                                                                  of opportunity’ – that the vagaries
                                                      QDR 2001 remains relevant to the
outrage within and beyond the US. It                                                             of democracy and Islamic terrorism
                                                      present narrative for several reasons.
was disowned by the White House as                                                               had conspired to keep open for more
                                                      First, it had the same intellectual
a wholly internal Pentagon document,                                                             than a decade – with all deliberate
                                                      impetus as the 1991-92 Pentagon
and then vanished until the                                                                      speed and using the full panoply of

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REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020

                                                     its mammoth Belt and Road Initiative       The abrupt reconfiguration of US
                                                     in 2013 (although its grandeur             policy objectives effectively drew a
                                                     has initially been diminished by           line under the posture of engagement
                                                     modalities for project selections and      of China that had endured since 1972.
                                                     implementation that were seen as           Washington was characteristically
                                                     deficient in terms of transparency,        transparent, declaring the era of
                                                     accountability, and engagement             selfless US leadership of the liberal
                                                     with partners, issues that President       international order, including
                                                     Xi in April 2019 promised would            assuming primary responsibility to
                                                     be addressed); and in 2014-15, the         counter international terrorism, to
                                                     frantic construction of seven new          be over. Instead, the US would again
                                                     islands in the South China Sea             focus its full attention and energies
                                                     ahead of an international tribunal         on competition with rival major
                                                     assessing the merits of competing          powers, above all on the perceived
June 29, 2019. G20 in Osaka Japan. President         national claims in this body of ocean.     comprehensive challenge, particularly
Donald J. Trump joins Xi Jinping, President of the   Some of these created islands now          from China but also Russia, to ‘shape
People’s Republic of China, at the start of their
bilateral meeting. Credit Official White House       host significant military capabilities,    a world antithetical to US values and
Photo by Shealah Craighead / Flickr.                 helping to propel China’s historical       interests’.
                                                     claim to virtually all of this sea space
                                                                                                Despite the divisiveness of the Trump
                                                     – a claim alleged to date back more
policy options open to it. It stepped                                                           era, this newly declared confrontation
                                                     than 1000 years – into perhaps the
past a deliberate effort by the Bush                                                            has significant bipartisan support.
                                                     major dark cloud over the ‘China
administration in 2004 to offer China                                                           It is initially (since mid-2018) being
                                                     dream’ of national rejuvenation.
greater recognition of its new status                                                           played out primarily as a ‘trade war’,
in world affairs, sensing that the                   These are some of the key trends and       alongside negotiations seeking to
‘responsible stakeholder’ proposal                   developments of the post-Cold War          construct a bridge that will reliably
was skewed toward China sharing                      era that shaped the US presidential        span the stark asymmetries in
more responsibility rather than more                 elections in 2016 and the breath-          the instincts of and policy options
power. When the Global Financial                     taking victory of Donald Trump. After      available to the two sides in the
Crisis of 2008-09 dealt a further body               18 months of boisterous, divisive and      arenas of trade and technological
blow to US standing in the world,                    somewhat incoherent posturing on           innovation.
that window was thrown wide open,                    what Make America Great Again
                                                                                                More than a year of negotiations
bringing into consideration outcomes                 actually meant and where it had
                                                                                                have been inconclusive. They have
that had seemed to fall far over the                 come from (much of it directed at
                                                                                                neither confirmed nor precluded that
horizon and enticing China to strive                 America’s allies and friends and
                                                                                                the stark differences between China
even harder to take full advantage                   involving a haemorrhaging of US
                                                                                                and the US on the principles and
of these fortuitous circumstances. A                 soft power comparable to that which
                                                                                                practice of governance can be bridged
sustained effort over both terms of                  occurred over the period 2002-08
                                                                                                to sustain constructive economic
the Obama administration to get new                  under the Bush administration),
                                                                                                entanglement. By November 2019,
understandings on some of China’s                    the administration towards the
                                                                                                as Outlook went to press, the most
distinctive trade policy practices (the              middle of 2018 swung its attention
                                                                                                likely outcome was an indefinite
so-called structural issues, including               unambiguously toward China.
                                                                                                pause on new tariffs and agreement
the subsidisation of state-owned                     China’s domestic agenda in the years
                                                                                                to defer consideration of the so-
enterprises, intellectual property                   leading up to 2017-18 involved a
                                                                                                called structural issues. Perhaps
protection and forced technology                     comprehensive campaign to reaffirm
                                                                                                the most promising outcome of
transfers) was deflected and deferred,               the absolute authority of the Party.
                                                                                                these negotiations is the stronger
but contributed nonetheless to an                    This objective was firmly extended
                                                                                                appreciation on both sides, first, that
overt ‘rebalancing’ of US economic,                  to include the business and trade
                                                                                                any agreement will require difficult
foreign, and security policy in 2011-12              community, sharpening the sense
                                                                                                concessions and, second, that if a
to present a more concerted defence                  that the Chinese model of state
                                                                                                deal is not achieved or proves to
of US interests in the broader Asia                  capitalism was structurally skewed to
                                                                                                be incapable of sustaining mutual
Pacific region. China then launched                  preclude open and fair competition.
                                                                                                confidence in an equitable trading
two stunning geopolitical initiatives:
                                                                                                relationship, either or both sides

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may look to de-coupling the two            the trends highlighted here. More          Finally, Outlook has in the past urged
economies – prioritising security          particularly, it is unlikely that they     ASEAN to more directly exploit its
and sovereignty considerations             would contest what appears to be           privileged role in hosting the key East
and minimising economic                    the most important conclusion to be        Asian multilateral security processes
interdependence. The costs of such         drawn from it, namely, that for long-      to press the major powers to step up
a move could prove calamitous, not         standing reasons both states share         the quest for durable solutions to
simply in economic terms but also in       deep responsibility for the prevailing     the issues generating division and
terms of a heightened risk that the        state of affairs between them.             hostility. ASEAN centrality and being
bilateral relationship writ large will                                                in the ‘driver’s seat’ cannot remain
                                           There is a further dimension of
become darker and more dangerous,                                                     as concepts with a special meaning
                                           today’s international scene that
a progression that would inevitably                                                   linked exclusively to the origins and
                                           warrants particular attention.
suck in many other states. Economic                                                   evolution of the ASEAN Regional
                                           We have now seen many years of
and security interests cannot be                                                      Forum since 1994. These concepts
                                           discussion about the scale of the
rigorously compartmentalised, they                                                    also have a literal meaning that
                                           transformation in the distribution
overlap and intersect.                                                                ASEAN has been somewhat reluctant
                                           of economic, military, and political
                                                                                      to embrace. This year, however, has
The ambitious Regional                     weight in the international
                                                                                      seen two important steps in the right
Comprehensive Economic Partnership         system and its significance for the
                                                                                      direction – the direction of greater
– seven years in the making – was          ‘international order’ – that body
                                                                                      transparency and the protection
finalised and its conclusion announced     of norms, principles, laws, and
                                                                                      of multilateralism. The first was
in the margins of the ASEAN and            regulations that has evolved to
                                                                                      Singapore Prime Minister Lee’s
East Asia Summits in Bangkok in            manage the intersection of states
                                                                                      address to the Shangri-La Dialogue
November 2019, both confirming and         beyond their sovereign borders.
                                                                                      in June 2019. The assessment and
consolidating the status of these fora     There is a detectable undercurrent
                                                                                      diagnosis he offered was insightful
as consequential regional gatherings.      in this discussion that, as this
                                                                                      and refreshingly direct. This is an
How this milestone accomplishment          international order has been or is
                                                                                      example that the ASEAN chair could
might play into the US-China               in the process of being overtaken,
                                                                                      consider following in respect of the
trade dispute is difficult to gauge.       the visible or tangible evidence of
                                                                                      East Asia Summit and the ASEAN
The conclusion of RCEP, because            its existence should be regarded as
                                                                                      Regional Forum. The second was
it includes China, may loosen the          so much obsolete clutter. This is an
                                                                                      ASEAN’s assertive step, at the ARF
logjam in the US-China negotiations.       exceedingly foolish perspective on the
                                                                                      in Bangkok in June 2019, to take
Although the US-China agenda seems         international order – a perspective
                                                                                      the increasingly popular but also
significantly more generic, there may      perhaps most conspicuous in recent
                                                                                      controversial regional descriptor of
be elements in RCEP that suggest           times in the field of nuclear arms
                                                                                      ‘Indo-Pacific’ and position it within
new ways of looking at some issues         control – and one that political leaders
                                                                                      the traditions of the regional security
on the US-China agenda. India was          need to ensure gains no further
                                                                                      processes it had pioneered.
a founding participant in the RCEP         traction. Whatever one’s views on the
negotiations but declined to join the      extant international order, one has a
pact at the last moment, expressing        responsibility to recall the enormity of
concerns about the vulnerability           the events that preceded and inspired      Ron Huisken
of major sectors of its large (and         its creation. There can be no appetite     Adjunct Associate Professor, Strategic &
potentially massive) economy to            to risk repeating these events in order    Defence Studies Centre, ANU
Chinese imports. A US-China trade          to create an opportunity for a new
agreement may well tip the scales and      designer to replicate something close
give India sufficient confidence to sign   to what we already have. Clearly,
on to RCEP.                                the same discipline must apply to the
                                           authors of the current order. That
This is a necessarily selective and
                                           order may have a significant inbuilt
subjective account of the primary
                                           capacity to adapt and renew itself
currents in world affairs over the
                                           but there has to be a willingness to
past several decades. Many readers
                                           consider more overt mechanisms
would recast the story in major ways.
                                           to effect necessary adaptation and
It is unlikely, however, that they
                                           revision.
would discount all or even most of

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REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020

The New Normal: Rising US-China Competition and Uncertainty
in Asia
Siddharth Mohandas

January 30, 2019. White House. US Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, senior staff and cabinet members meet with Chinese Vice Premier
Liu He and members of his delegation for trade talks. Credit Andrea Hanks / Flickr.

After three years of the Trump                        real record and answered largely in                    foreign policy. At the same time,
administration, we can start to move                  the affirmative. No longer do we need                  however, US allies and partners
beyond the many questions the                         to ask what Trump might do, we can                     in Asia have not been spared the
election of Donald Trump provoked                     look at what he has actually done.                     administration’s severe gaze. Even
to some preliminary answers. Was he                                                                          where allies have successfully
                                                      What we find is that the Trump
truly willing to risk a massive trade                                                                        managed Trump administration
                                                      administration has fundamentally
war with China? Would he really                                                                              demands, unpredictable new
                                                      shifted the US-China relationship
follow through on rhetoric questioning                                                                       gambits on trade and security have
                                                      in a more competitive and even
the value of alliances and existing                                                                          left foreign capitals off balance. On
                                                      confrontational direction. US
trade deals? Would he actually                                                                               North Korea, the White House’s
                                                      policy focus on China extends far
embrace North Korean dictator Kim                                                                            commitment to pursuing diplomacy
                                                      beyond trade to encompass a range
Jong-un? What were once concerned                                                                            has appeared firm but there are signs
                                                      of economic, security, technology,
and somewhat speculative questions                                                                           that Pyongyang is growing impatient
                                                      and ideological issues that are now
about how disruptive Trump would                                                                             with the pace of progress. Hanging
                                                      increasingly at the centre of American
be can now be compared against a                                                                             over all of this is what promises to

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be a bitter and acrimonious political      mutual recrimination between the            economic, and domestic policies –
season in the United States as             two sides accompanied by start-and-         was closely studied for signals about
the country heads to the polls in          stop efforts to restart stalled talks. As   whether continued confrontation
November 2020. This, then, is the          of this writing, a ‘phase one’ deal that    was the White House’s intention or
new normal in Washington’s Asia            rolls back some US tariffs in return        whether there were in fact limits to
policy – rising confrontation with         for Chinese purchases of American           Washington’s new, more assertive
China and uncertainty throughout           agricultural products seems possible.       approach. Pence did offer some
the rest of Asia regarding the extent      However, a comprehensive trade deal         reassuring words, saying, ‘the United
of escalation, its impact throughout       that resolves Washington’s structural       States does not seek confrontation
the region, and whether the political      complaints about the Chinese                with China’ and that the goal of
winds will shift.                          economy is highly unlikely.                 administration policy was not to
                                                                                       decouple the United States and
The greatest risk to the security          The Trump administration also
                                                                                       China. But, arguably more tellingly,
outlook in Asia in the year ahead is       significantly expanded the scope of
                                                                                       the vast majority of the content of
that the changes we have seen in           US-China competition to include
                                                                                       Pence’s speech was an extension
US Asia policy cannot be managed           technology trade and investment –
                                                                                       of his 2018 remarks. He castigated
effectively either in Washington or in     most notably by putting in place a
                                                                                       China for its industrial policies,
the region. Specifically, while there is   ban on selling critical US components
                                                                                       cyberespionage, and intellectual
widespread justification and support       to Huawei and launching a global
                                                                                       property theft – also critiquing
for a tougher US policy approach           campaign to shut the company
                                                                                       US companies for ‘kowtow[ing]’ to
toward China, the challenge for both       out of 5G infrastructure efforts.
                                                                                       the Chinese Communist Party for
Washington and Beijing will be to          The US Commerce Department
                                                                                       market access. He criticised China’s
find a new framework that prevents         is further set to issue regulations
                                                                                       activities in the South China Sea
necessary competitive policies from        banning the export of ‘emerging
                                                                                       and East China Sea. He denounced
totally undermining the security           and foundational’ technologies to
                                                                                       China’s treatment of its own
and economic benefits of US-China          China. The Trump administration
                                                                                       citizens, particularly in Xinjiang. He
relations. For allies and partners         ramped up its criticism of China’s
                                                                                       reaffirmed US support for Taiwan and
throughout the region, the question is     human rights record, particularly
                                                                                       proclaimed US support for protestors
how to deal with the unpredictability      with respect to Xinjiang and Hong
                                                                                       in Hong Kong. In short, Pence spent
of an increasingly distracted and          Kong, and sanctioned Chinese
                                                                                       far more time identifying areas of
depleted Trump administration. And         officials responsible for repression
                                                                                       disagreement than agreement.
on North Korea, while Washington’s         in Xinjiang as well as Chinese
pursuit of diplomacy has been a            technology companies that have aided        If continued confrontation is the likely
welcome change from ‘fire and fury,’       surveillance there. The White House         shape of US-China relations in the
policymakers must remain prepared          has announced plans for a major arms        year ahead, even in the event of a
to deal with a sudden return to            sale to Taiwan. Washington regularly        small trade deal, the danger for the
tensions.                                  condemns the Belt and Road                  region is that this process could spiral
                                           Initiative and promotes US and allied       into unrestrained and destabilising
US-China: A New Era of Competition.
                                           funding alternatives. And, opening          competition. To be clear, the
2019 featured a parade of tough, even
                                           a new front in US-China relations,          relationship needed to be rebalanced
unprecedented actions by the Trump
                                           the administration has denounced            and there is widespread support
administration against China. After
                                           Chinese efforts to influence US public      in the United States for a more
levying tariffs on $250 billion USD
                                           opinion and is aggressively engaging        reciprocal US-China relationship.
worth of Chinese goods at the end
                                           in counterespionage efforts. The sum        Indeed, this is one of the few areas of
of 2018, Donald Trump promised
                                           total of these actions has been to          bipartisan consensus in Washington,
to tariff an additional $300 billion
                                           confront China in almost every aspect       with leading Democratic members
of products – nearly the entirety
                                           of its policies.                            of Congress joining with Republican
of China’s exports to the United
                                                                                       colleagues in proposing legislation
States – if a trade agreement was          Thus, US Vice President Mike Pence’s
                                                                                       designed to push back on China. The
not reached. Negotiators had seemed        October 2019 speech on US-China
                                                                                       challenge for Washington and Beijing
close to striking a deal in May 2019       relations – a sequel to his speech a
                                                                                       is to find some way to preserve
but, in the White House’s telling,         year earlier that provided the Trump
                                                                                       stability in the overall relationship
China walked away from the table.          administration’s comprehensive
                                                                                       as it becomes more competitive, to
Since then, there has been much            indictment of China’s foreign,

                                                              10
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020

maintain global economic growth                        been satisfied and it will continue to                 country. The Trump administration is
that depends on trade and integrated                   press allies and partners on a range                   reportedly demanding a 500 percent
supply chains, and to find ways to                     of issues, in turn putting pressure on                 increase in South Korea’s payment,
cooperate on common challenges                         Washington’s diplomatic standing in                    promising a high stakes and highly
such as climate change. As the two                     Asia.                                                  contentious negotiation with the
sides retreat to their corners and                                                                            potential to break the alliance.
                                                       South Korea provides a striking
mutual trust plummets, there is little
                                                       example of the ups and downs of                        Japan’s experience has been similar
evidence that this is happening.
                                                       dealing with Trump’s Washington.                       to that of South Korea. Tokyo
Allies and Partners: Uncertainty                       Seoul successfully renegotiated the                    has concluded a ‘phase one’ trade
Reigns. For US allies and partners,                    Korea-US Free Trade Agreement                          agreement of its own that appears
the challenge has been how to                          making some largely cosmetic                           to have mollified Washington and
manage a mercurial president                           concessions while giving Trump the                     held off – for now – Donald Trump’s
and a more unconstrained United                        appearance of a ‘win’. This successful                 threat to levy tariffs on all Japanese
States that demands support for                        defusing of a complex trade issue                      auto exports. However, Japan too
its China policy, changes in trade                     has not been matched, however,                         has to renew its Special Measures
flows, and greater contributions                       in the security realm. Just a year                     Agreement in 2021. The US-South
to mutual defence. Asian capitals                      after concluding a previous pact, the                  Korea talks will set a precedent for
have responded with a variety of                       United States and South Korea are                      US-Japan discussion and it could be a
negotiating gambits and some have                      renegotiating a Special Measures                       worrisome one. Against this backdrop,
had some success in striking deals                     Agreement that determines the extent                   Japan-South Korea relations
with Washington. But there is no                       of Seoul’s funding contribution for the                have deteriorated over a dispute
sign that the administration has                       presence of US troops based in the                     concerning reparations for wartime

Jun 30, 2019. President Donald J. Trump and Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un in Freedom House at the Korean DMZ. Credit Shealah
Craighead, White House / Flickr.

                                                                              11
CSCAP
forced labour and Washington has            remaining who can restrain the            may come after. A major concern is
appeared to be largely a bystander in       president’s impulses.                     that North Korea may take more
the process. The US alliance system                                                   provocative action in 2020 – whether
                                            North Korea: Pursuing Diplomacy
in Northeast Asia – the linchpin of                                                   a return to long-range missile testing
                                            for Now. A third risk to the security
America’s regional security presence –                                                or perhaps even a resumption of
                                            outlook in Asia in 2020 is a rapid
is under unprecedented pressure and                                                   nuclear testing. With diplomacy
                                            return of tensions between the
further strain constitutes a major risk                                               seemingly discredited, it would be no
                                            United States and North Korea.
in 2020.                                                                              surprise if the United States swung
                                            Donald Trump’s unprecedented
                                                                                      back sharply in response and tensions
The trajectory of US-India                  step of meeting with North Korean
                                                                                      again spiked.
relations has been positive across          leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore
administrations since 2000 and there        in June 2018 was largely welcomed         There is little question that the
has been continued warmth under             in the region – despite misgivings        Trump administration has met its
Trump and Indian Prime Minister             about what exactly the United             goal of disruption in foreign policy.
Narendra Modi. However, a series of         States would gain from the meeting        Growing US-China confrontation
disputes – over trade and e-commerce,       – because it marked a decisive break      characterises almost every aspect
India’s plans to purchase S-400             from the threats of ‘fire and fury’       of the bilateral relationship and,
missiles from Russia and oil from           of the previous year and allowed          crucially, this approach has
Iran, and New Delhi’s strategy for          concerns about imminent conflict          bipartisan support in the United
5G expansion – have all combined to         on the Korean Peninsula to recede.        States. Allies and partners must
create an atmosphere of uncertainty         However, the diplomatic spectacle         prepare for abrupt new shifts in
in the bilateral relationship.              of the Trump-Kim summit quickly           security relations and trade. US-
Similarly, while US-ASEAN relations         devolved into an impasse between          North Korea relations have swung
have been for the most part stable,         the two governments as working level      from threats of war to reality-TV
countries in Southeast Asia have still      talks proceeded fitfully. Washington      diplomacy and could yet swing back
had to deal with unpredictable trade        demanded immediate and concrete           to tension again. The most pressing
actions and erratic diplomacy by the        steps toward denuclearisation while       question at this stage is whether
administration. Trump skipped the           Pyongyang has demanded far-               these disruptions are temporary or
East Asia Summit for the second             reaching sanctions relief – both have     more fundamental. The evidence of
year in a row and the most recent           been disappointed. This resulted in       the past year is that instability is not
summit featured the lowest-level            the failed Hanoi summit in February       a passing phenomenon but the new
American delegation ever, feeding           2019 where Trump walked away from         normal against which all regional
perceptions of American distraction         the table, citing Kim’s failure to make   capitals must plan.
and retrenchment. Countries across          meaningful concessions.
the region are teetering on the edge
                                            The situation since Hanoi has been
of recession as the US-China trade
war grinds on. Even as Washington
                                            an unstable equilibrium. North            Siddharth Mohandas
                                            Korea has broken its self-imposed         Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for New
touts its concept of a free and open                                                  American Security and former Principal
                                            moratorium on missile testing,
Indo-Pacific and supports maritime                                                    Deputy Director of Policy Planning at the
                                            launching a number of short-range         US Department of State
rights in the South China Sea,
                                            missiles. The Trump administration
countries such as Vietnam have found
                                            has responded largely by downplaying
themselves unexpectedly threatened
                                            the significance of the missile tests
with or subjected to trade actions.
                                            and stating its continued interest
What all of the foregoing issues have       in diplomacy. This has not mollified
in common is uncertainty about US           Pyongyang and North Korean officials
intentions and staying power. While         on a number of occasions have stated
a perennial concern among nervous           that the Trump administration
US allies and partners, these have          must produce concessions by the
taken on a greater force as the             end of 2019 or face unspecified
Trump administration operates more          consequences. There is, however, little
erratically – particularly in the face of   evidence that the White House has a
impeachment – and it is evident that        diplomatic plan in place to manage
there are few if any senior officials       the situation or a plan for what

                                                              12
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020

Sino-US strategic competition and Asia-Pacific security
Wu Xinbo
Throughout 2019, the single most                         technology and even cultural and                         also raised the prospect of conflict,
important development impacting                          educational exchanges, seriously                         intended or not, with the People’s
on Asia-Pacific regional security                        straining the overall bilateral                          Liberation Army (PLA) in this region.
has been the intensifying strategic                      relationship. While the Trump
                                                                                                                  On the Taiwan issue, the Trump
competition between China and                            administration utilises the trade
                                                                                                                  administration is also pushing
the United States. As enunciated                         war as an important leverage in
                                                                                                                  the envelope more boldly. For the
in its reports on National Security                      pursuing strategic rivalry with China,
                                                                                                                  pro-Taiwan influence within the
Strategy and National Defense                            Beijing senses a determination on
                                                                                                                  administration, Taiwan stands as a
Strategy released respectively in                        the part of Washington to reorient
                                                                                                                  uniquely important source of leverage
December 2017 and early 2018, the                        its entire China policy towards a
                                                                                                                  in the US strategic competition
Trump administration defined China                       more competitive and confrontational
                                                                                                                  with China. For those who want to
as a major competitor/rival and                          stance. In fact, the trade war
                                                                                                                  pressure China on trade and other
jumpstarted strategic competition                        and the approach the Trump
                                                                                                                  issues, Taiwan serves as a useful
with Beijing. The year of 2019                           administration has adopted have
                                                                                                                  and convenient card. Moreover, as
witnessed the full play of Trump’s                       brought China’s trust towards the US
                                                                                                                  Taiwan enters the next campaign
new strategy towards China: the                          to a historical low. On the security
                                                                                                                  season, Washington favours the
protracted and expanding trade                           front, Washington has been trying
                                                                                                                  incumbent leader Tsia Ing-wen and
war, the rising standoff in the South                    to exert more pressure on Beijing in
                                                                                                                  is willing to take necessary measures
China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits,                     the South China Sea by conducting
                                                                                                                  to promote her chances. In August,
the unfolding of the US Indo-Pacific                     more active and provocative Freedom
                                                                                                                  Washington announced the sale of
strategy and the prospect of the US                      of Navigation Operations (FONOS),
                                                                                                                  66 F-16V fighters to Taiwan worth a
deploying intermediate-range missiles                    strengthening its military presence,
                                                                                                                  total of $8 billion, the single largest
in the Western Pacific.                                  encouraging the involvement of its
                                                                                                                  arms deal in the history of US arms
                                                         allies and partners, and promoting
The trade war with China launched                                                                                 sale to the island. Washington also
                                                         security cooperation with surrounding
by the Trump administration in                                                                                    keeps strengthening US-Taiwan
                                                         countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia,
July 2018 quickly escalated to an                                                                                 ties by increasing all kinds of
                                                         Indonesia, etc. Determined to employ
unprecedented level and extended                                                                                  cooperation and exchanges with
                                                         the cost-imposing strategy towards
into 2019. Characterised by                                                                                       Taipei. The most provocative action
                                                         China and to be more risk-taking in
escalation, intermittent negotiation                                                                              taken by the Trump administration
                                                         the South China Sea, the US military
and stalemate, the trade war spilled                                                                              is that US Department of Defense’s
                                                         has not only increased tensions but
over into the fields of investment,                                                                               Indo-Pacific Strategy Report treats

China unveiled its new H-6N long-range strategic bomber with aerial refuelling capability at the National Day military parade held in Beijing on October 1,
2019. Credit DEFPOST.

                                                                                 13
CSCAP
Taiwan as a ‘country’, which signals       has been actively seeking to deploy in   China and ASEAN countries should
a deliberate attempt to shift the          the Asia-Pacific region intermediate     not compromise ‘the third party’s
US policy from ‘One China’ to ‘One         range missiles (conventional but also    interests’ in South China Sea.
China, One Taiwan’. Indeed, Taiwan’s       likely nuclear) so as to augment its     Moreover, China continues to make
internal political development and         deterrence capability vis-a-vis China.   efforts to improve ties with its two
the evolving US Taiwan policy are          Should this occur, it will seriously     major neighbours, India and Japan.
coalescing to foment a serious crisis in   undermine the strategic stability in     In October 2019, Chinese President Xi
the Taiwan Strait.                         the region and stir up a new round of    Jinping went to India for the second
                                           arms competition. To be sure, China      informal summit meeting with Indian
In June 2019, the Pentagon released
                                           is unlikely to join the US and Russia    Prime Minister Modi, following
the US Indo-Pacific Strategy
                                           in negotiating a new version of INF      their first informal summit meeting
Report which outlined the goals
                                           treaty. Beijing may instead respond      in China in 2018. The two leaders
and approaches of the doctrine.
                                           by further building up its missile       agreed to expand bilateral cooperation
The document defines China as a
                                           arsenal and even reconsider the          while managing their differences
revisionist power and asserts that
                                           ‘no-first-use’ position in its nuclear   more cautiously. President Xi also
‘[t]he Indo-Pacific increasingly is
                                           doctrine.                                plans to visit Japan in the spring
confronted with a more confident
                                                                                    of 2020, as Sino-Japanese relations
and assertive China that is willing        Confronted with the ever-growing
                                                                                    remain on a positive trajectory.
to accept friction in the pursuit of       strategic competition launched by
a more expansive set of political,         the Trump administration, including      To be sure, for many regional
economic, and security interests.’         the forging ahead of its Indo-Pacific    countries, US allies and partners
Indeed, the US Indo-Pacific strategy       strategy, Beijing has responded by       alike, it is not desirable to choose
sets China as the primary target,          taking a series of measures to dilute    sides between US and China. While
with its strategic design and means        and offset the impact of US actions.     some of them have to maintain close
of implementation having a matching        First and foremost is the deepening      security ties with Washington, they
focus. The quadruple cooperation           of security cooperation with Russia.     also need to keep robust economic
among the US, Japan, Australia and         In addition to conventional forms        ties with Beijing. In fact, as China
India (QUAD) serves as the backbone        of arms transfer and joint military      becomes more influential in regional
of the strategy, aimed at dealing with     exercises, China and Russia seek         affairs, forging comprehensive
China’s naval activities from the          to promote mutual military action        relations with China is a must. Just
Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean        and coordination. For instance, in       as Singaporean Prime Minister
on the one hand, and competing with        July 2019, Chinese and Russian air       Lee Hsien Loong noted at the 2019
China’s Belt and Road Initiative on        forces held their first joint aerial     Shangri-La Dialogue, ‘In a new Cold
the other. In addition to QUAD, the        patrol in Northeast Asia, involving      War, there can be no clear division
US also stepped up efforts to engage       two bombers from each side. It is        between friend and foe.’ In response
South Asian countries such as Sri          reported that Russia is also helping     to the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy,
Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh         China create its missile early warning   ASEAN released a paper outlining its
as well as the Pacific Islands, in an      system. Meanwhile, China has             own vision of the Indo-Pacific concept,
unvarnished endeavour to check             been actively pushing forward the        stressing the ongoing need for
China’s expanding ties with those          negotiation with ASEAN member            ASEAN centrality and inclusiveness,
countries.                                 states of the Code of Conduct (COC)      and underlining its reservation
                                           in the South China Sea, in an earnest    toward the intention behind
Compared with Obama’s Rebalance
                                           effort to stabilise the situation in     Washington’s strategic initiative. The
to Asia strategy, the Indo-Pacific
                                           the region and improve relations         ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
strategy launches geo-political and
                                           with ASEAN countries. Beijing            also proposed to seek cooperation
geo-economic competition with China
                                           expressed the hope that negotiation      with other regional members in four
in a much broader geographical
                                           of the COC be concluded by 2021.         areas, i.e., maritime cooperation,
context, while pinning down China
                                           In July 2019, all parties concerned      connectivity, UN Sustainable
as the major target also pushes many
                                           finished the first reading of the        Development Goals 2030, and
countries in the region to choose sides
                                           Single Draft Negotiating Text of the     economic development, suggesting
between Washington and Beijing.
                                           COC, marking a major step forward        that ASEAN and China can continue
As the US formally withdrew from
                                           in the COC consultations, in spite       to cooperate in many fields, as they
the Treaty on Intermediate-Range
                                           of Washington’s repeated warning         have already done over the years.
Nuclear Forces (INF), Washington
                                           that the COC negotiation between         Growing Sino-US discord has also

                                                            14
REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020

cast a shadow over their coordination            denuclearisation and the building of       in both bilateral and regional
and cooperation in dealing with the              a permanent peace mechanism on             contexts. Bilaterally, the two parties
Democratic People’s Republic of                  the peninsula, the lack of well-tuned      should keep the growing strategic
Korea (DPRK) nuclear issue. Since                coordination between the two most          competition healthy and benign, as
the first Trump-Kim meeting held in              important external players only bodes      a malign rivalry will inevitably lead
Singapore in June 2018, Washington               ill for the future.                        to antagonism and overt conflict.
has turned to diplomatic engagement                                                         Regionally, they should avoid drawing
                                                 The Asia-Pacific has entered a
with Pyongyang to advance the goal                                                          lines and encouraging members of
                                                 period of profound changes set off
of the DPRK’s denuclearisation, yet                                                         the region to split into rival camps,
                                                 by shifts in the power balance as
with little progress so far. On the                                                         otherwise the economically most
                                                 well by adjustments of strategy and
other hand, ties between Beijing and                                                        dynamic region will gradually lose
                                                 policy settings by regional players.
Pyongyang have warmed up quickly                                                            its momentum for growth and
                                                 Managing major power competition
following Kim Jong-Un’s first visit                                                         integration. Third, the most urgent
                                                 and dealing with hot spot issues top
to China in March 2018. To some                                                             issue for China-US security relations
                                                 the regional security agenda, while
extent, the improved atmosphere                                                             is crisis avoidance and management.
                                                 Sino-US interactions hold the key.
and growing exchanges between                                                               As noted above, the risk of a serious
                                                 To be sure, competition between
the two countries renders Beijing                                                           crisis and conflict over either the
                                                 Beijing and Washington will continue
more influence over Pyongyang,                                                              South China Sea or Taiwan is
                                                 to unfold and likely intensify, and
encouraging the latter to continue                                                          growing against the backdrop of an
                                                 the challenge for both countries as
to freeze nuclear and long-range                                                            overall relationship that is strained
                                                 well as the entire region is how to
missile tests, and to seek progress                                                         and characterised by historically low
                                                 manage such rivalry. Here are some
in negotiations with Washington in                                                          levels of trust. It is important that
                                                 suggestions. First and foremost,
improving DPRK-US ties as well as                                                           the US conducts FONOS in South
                                                 it is imperative for China and the
pursuing denuclearisation on the                                                            China Sea with more caution rather
                                                 US to delineate the boundary of
Korean peninsula. Nonetheless,                                                              than more provocation, and refrains
                                                 their competition. For one thing,
compared with the first year of                                                             from crossing the red line of ‘One
                                                 robust economic ties benefitting both
the Trump administration when                                                               China’ policy while enhancing ties
                                                 countries should not be decoupled
Beijing and Washington pursued                                                              with Taiwan. For any crisis avoidance
                                                 or seriously downgraded, as some
robust and effective coordination                                                           and management effort to succeed,
                                                 hawkish people in the Trump team
and cooperation on the North                                                                good communication at the strategic
                                                 have advocated. It is very likely that
Korean issue, since 2018, the                                                               level and effective management at
                                                 China will emerge as the world’s
quality of Sino-US interactions                                                             the tactical level are indispensable.
                                                 largest economy over the coming
has plummeted as serious frictions                                                          Yet, as overall relations between
                                                 decade, so restricting economic
arose in their bilateral ties. Given                                                        Beijing and Washington fell from
                                                 relations with China under the logic
the fact that a long and bumpy road                                                         cooler to freezing, there has been a
                                                 of relative gains will only cause the
lies ahead for the DPRK’s complete                                                          notable shortage of communication
                                                 US to lose tremendous business
                                                                                            and exchanges between both the
                                                 opportunities. Moreover, although
                                                                                            two national security teams and
                                                 economic interdependence does
                                                                                            senior defence personnel, while crisis
                                                 not necessarily prevent contention
                                                                                            management mechanisms are not
                                                 from occurring between countries
                                                                                            well coordinated. Needless to say,
                                                 (actually close economic ties tend to
                                                                                            such a precarious situation needs to
                                                 be a major source of frictions), it does
                                                                                            be redressed as soon as possible.
                                                 raise the cost of conflict and therefore
                                                 can act as a useful buffer. For Sino-
                                                 US relations, vigorous economic
                                                 exchanges have been an important           Wu Xinbo
                                                 strategic pillar and should be             Professor & Director, Center for American
                                                 preserved for the long-term interests      Studies Dean, Institute of International
                                                                                            Studies Fudan University
                                                 of both countries and many others,
                                                 even though they are undergoing
September 25, 2019. Haiyang Shiyou 982.          a tough period of rebalancing.
Beijing has deployed a new oil rig in the
                                                 Second, China and the US should
disputed waters of the South China Sea. Credit
Weibo / SCMP.                                    exercise strategic self-restraint

                                                                   15
CSCAP
Indo-Pacific: From Strategy to Vision
Yoshihide Soeya

November 4, 2019. Bangkok, Thailand. Heads of State and Government of the Member States of ASEAN, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea, gathering at the 22nd ASEAN Plus Three Summit. Credit ASEAN.

The concept of Indo-Pacific has now                   released his concept of a ‘security                    Vietnam in November 2017. Since
become a catchphrase of the times,                    diamond,’ a network of allies                          then, both Tokyo and Washington
a reference point in discussing                       formed by Japan, the United States,                    began to use the term ‘Free and Open
regional politics and security. It                    Australia and India, and clearly                       Indo-Pacific (FOIP),’ as a strategic
is not clear, however, that there                     intended to counterbalance China.                      concept directed against the Chinese
is widespread agreement in the                        This initial move has come to be                       BRI launched by President Xi Jinping
region on its scope or its role vis-à-                regarded, rightly so, as the baseline of               (originally as ‘One Belt One Road’) in
vis rising China in general and its                   Abe’s regional outlook and Japanese                    2013.
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in                     strategy, including Abe’s version
                                                                                                             At some point in 2018, however,
particular. Australian intellectuals                  of Indo-Pacific. In August 2016
                                                                                                             the Japanese government stopped
were among the first (around 2010)                    at the Sixth Tokyo International
                                                                                                             calling FOIP a strategy and re-
to introduce the concept of Indo-                     Conference on African Development
                                                                                                             labelled it as a vision. In mid-2019,
Pacific and depicted it essentially                   (TICAD VI) held in Nairobi, Prime
                                                                                                             the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
as inclusive, embracing both China                    Minister Abe declared, ‘Japan bears
                                                                                                             Japan summarised the principles of
and India as the central causes of                    the responsibility of fostering the
                                                                                                             the FOIP vison into three domains: 1)
the rising importance of the Indian                   confluence of the Pacific and Indian
                                                                                                             promotion and establishment of the
Ocean. Thus, the Pacific Ocean to                     Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a
                                                                                                             rule of law, freedom of navigation,
its east and the Indian Ocean to                      place that values freedom, the rule
                                                                                                             and free trade; 2) pursuit of economic
its west have come to be seen as an                   of law, and the market economy, free
                                                                                                             prosperity (by improving connectivity
integral region, Indo-Pacific. In this                from force or coercion, and making it
                                                                                                             in three areas: physical connectivity
initial conception of Indo-Pacific by                 prosperous’.
                                                                                                             through quality infrastructure;
Australia, Japan and China were both
                                                      US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson                    people-to-people connectivity through
treated as key players, making their
                                                      followed suit in October 2017, with a                  education, training and friendship;
difficult bilateral relationship a factor
                                                      substantial reference to ‘Indo-Pacific’                and institutional connectivity
of uncertainty for the stability and
                                                      in his address at the Centre for                       through harmonisation and common
prosperity of the broader region.
                                                      Strategic and International Studies                    rules including EPA/FTA); and 3)
At about the same time, in December                   in Washington D.C. The following                       commitment to peace and stability
2012, Japanese Prime Minister                         month, President Donald Trump                          (by such means as capacity-building,
Shinzo Abe came back to power                         also used ‘Indo-Pacific’ in his speech                 humanitarian assistance and disaster
for the second time, and promptly                     to the APEC summit in Da Nang,                         relief, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism,

                                                                             16
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