South Sudan - Strategic Programme Document Danish Refugee Council 2017 2019
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South Sudan
Photo; Demelash Defar, seeds distribution at Lelo payam, Malakal county
Danish Refugee Council
Strategic Programme Document
2017 - 2019
Contents
.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
List of acronyms ............................................................................................................................................................... 3
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 4
2. Situational analysis .................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.1 general analysis ................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Political and security ......................................................................................................................................... 5
2.3 Economic and social .......................................................................................................................................... 6
2.4 Conflict analysis ................................................................................................................................................... 7
2.5 Displacement analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 9
2.6 Capacity and willingness of duty bearers ............................................................................................ 10
2.7 Humanitarian needs ....................................................................................................................................... 11
2.8 Humanitarian access ...................................................................................................................................... 12
3. DRC vision and objectives .................................................................................................................................. 13
3.1 Vision ............................................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Programmatic and operational objectives ........................................................................................... 14
3.3 Critical operational principles ..................................................................................................................... 16
4. Capability ..................................................................................................................................................................... 17
4.1. Relations with key stakeholders and partners ................................................................................. 17
4.2. DRC’s capacity ................................................................................................................................................. 17
5. Risk Matrix .............................................................................................................................................................. 20
6. Annex ........................................................................................................................................................................ 21
6.1 Map of area of operation ............................................................................................................................. 21
6.2 Response framework objectives South Sudan .................................................................................. 22
6.3 DRC risk matrix and mitigation actions ................................................................................................ 24
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 2
List of acronyms AVR Armed Violence Reduction BFU Budget Follow Up CCCM Camp Coordination and Camp Management CBO Community Based Organization CDRS Community Driven Recovery and Safety CHS Core Humanitarian Standards CME Conflict Management Education CSC Community Safety Committees CSP Community Safety Plans CoC Code of Conduct COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement DRC Danish Refugee Committee DDG Danish Demining Group ERW Explosive Remnants of War FSL Food Security and Livelihood GBV Gender Based Violence HR Human Resources ICWG Inter Cluster Working Group IGA Income Generating Activity IGAD Governmental Authority on Development IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action MDF Maban Defence Force M&E Monitoring & Evaluation MRE Mine Risk Education NFI Non Food Item NGO Non-Governmental Organization NMAA National Mine Action Authority NNGO National Non-Governmental Organization PoC Protection of Civilians PWSN People With Special Needs RMF Risk Management Framework RRC Relief and Rehabilitation Commission RRA Relief and Rehabilitation Authority SOP Standard Operating Procedure SPD Strategic Development Plan SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLA-iO Sudan People’s Liberation Army – in Opposition SPLA/N Sudan People’s Liberation Army/North SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement TGoNU Transitional Government of National Unity ToT Trainer of Trainers UN United Nations UNMISS United Nation Mission In South Sudan UXO Unexploded Ordinance WFP World Food Programme DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 3
1. Introduction
DRC’s Strategic Programme Document (SPD) provides the general rationale and fully integrated
objectives for DRC’s South Sudan response to current conflict and displacements. The SPD defines
the strategies within a three year frame. It provides the broad view over the displacement situation.
In 2016, Danish Refugee Council (DRC)1 has changed its global response framework. The change
signals DRC’s reinforced profile focusing on three strategic programme platforms:
• Emergency response aimed at saving lives,
• Solutions to displacement aimed at ensuring lasting integration in all displacement scenarios and
• Root causes aimed at preventing displacement triggers and causes
DRC started operating in South Sudan in 2005 following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Mine
action programming by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) began in 2006. In South Sudan DRC has
proven technical and organizational capacity in multi sector and integrated emergency responses –
for both refugees and IDPs - the components of which include: Camp Coordination and Camp
Management (CCCM); protection and GBV; emergency and transitional shelter; NFI distributions; food
security and livelihoods, including income generating activities (IGAs), agricultural support and farmer
field schools, Mine Action and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR). DRC has ongoing projects and
operational bases in: Maban, Pariang, Bentiu, Malakal and Melut, see below table. In Malakal and
Bentiu, DRC has presence in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites, operating from humanitarian
hubs, located within the UNMISS bases, from which activities in the PoCs and counties are supported.
Table 1: Current DRC operation bases in South Sudan
Location
Satellite Outreach
State main Target group
base location
base
Doro, Refugee, IDP, host community and
Maban Gendrassa, Kaya
Batil communities affected by UXO
KhorAdar,
Dethoma’s, IDP in PoC, IDP and host
Upper Nile Melut - Malek, New community and communities
state Paloich School, affected by UXO
Melut PoC
Wau Malakal town, IDP in PoC, IDP and host
Malakal
Shilluk, Fashoda, Manyo community and communities
PoC
Kodok county affected by UXO
Bentiu town,
IDP in PoC, IDP and host
Bentiu Rubkona town,
- community and communities
PoC Guit, Koch,
affected by UXO
Unity state Mayom counties
Pariang
(Ayuong - Pamir Refugee, and host community
Thok)
DDG Roving - - Communities affected by UXO
1
Danish Demining Group is a technical Mine Action Division within the Danish Refugee Council
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 4
2. Situational analysis
2.1 general analysis
The key situational analysis by DRC in South Sudan is presented in the next sections. In summary the
situation is characterized by ongoing civil war, with continuous conflict in numerous parts of the
country of varying intensity, and a very fragile and conflict ridden political establishment.
DRC is anticipating that since the dramatic setback to the peace process in July 2016, the South
Sudan context is set to be characterised by conflict and uncertainty. With the Transitional
Government of National Unity (TGoNU) apparently on its knees, it is expected that South Sudan will
continue to face high insecurity and violence, lack of governance and justice, collapsed economic
situation, food insecurity in majority of the population, increase of displacement, very limited return
of South Sudanese refugees back in country. Intercommunal tension is likely to become more and
more entrenched in South Sudan, with rifts emerging between tribal groups who were not add odds
in previous years. Therefore flexibility in strategy and programme design, allowing for adaptability of
activities and planned interventions, is needed in the coming years. In anticipation of further
deterioration, DRC intends to explore remote management options as a means to ensure continued
programme continuity, should this be needed.
2.2 Political and security
The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was signed in August 2015. It was brokered
by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and with heavy international
pressure including threat of sanctions. The Transitional Government of National Unity
(TGoNU) was formed and with the arrival of the First Vice President and opposition leader
Riek Machar in April the expectations of the population grew.
In the period between April and July 2016 the TGoNU were not able to show that
controversial issues were being discussed or agreed upon. The main controversial issue being
President Kiir’s 28 states decree of October 2015, which undermined the terms of the peace
agreement and sought to side-line tribal groups in South Sudan to the advantage of the
Dinka.
In line with the terms of the peace agreement, in advance of his return to Juba, First Vice
President Machar’s SPLA-IO were permitted to deploy a lightly armed contingent to ensure
his security. However, in July 2016 widespread clashes erupted in in Juba when forces loyal
to President Kiir and forces loyal to First Vice President Machar clashed at the Presidential
Palace. A period of three days of sustained fighting followed – including a host of heavy
weapons and attack helicopters – that resulted in the departure of the First Vice President
and his surviving troops out of Juba.
After the departure of Riek Machar from Juba, the president was fast to announce a new First
Vice President; Taban Deng of Unity state. The appointment was condemned as illegal and
illegitimate by Machar, but keen for the Opposition to be represented in the transitional
government, the international community, in time, accepted the appointment. The move split
the Opposition along two lines; those loyal to Riek Machar (SPLA-IO 1) and those loyal to
Taban Deng (SPLA-IO 2), with Machar retaining most of his supporters – especially at the
grass roots level.
At the political level the frequent reshuffles or dismissals of senior political figures will
increase instability, especially as these give the impression to be in favour of individuals with
military backgrounds belonging to specific ethnic groups, known to be favourable to President
Kiir’s government.
Restructuring of political and administrative systems and setups can occur with no prior
notice, and may have significant impact on existing power agreements.
A number of people or groups are known to be close to the president and providing advice,
including Paul Malong (Chief of General Staff - SPLA) and Jieng Dinka Council of Elders. Both
are highly influential forces with a vested interest in ensuring the Dinka continue to dominate
the political system of South Sudan.
Factions and separations within Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army – in Opposition (SPLA-iO) and
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 5other armed groups2 are likely to become more pronounced. The number of separate armed
groups is increasing and defections between groups are common.
The affiliation in the region remains complex and fluid, the governments of Uganda, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Sudan and Eritrea have stakes in stability in South Sudan, though the support and
affiliation could be changing depending on the context.
As a consequence of the fighting and de-stabilisation of Juba in July, the UN passed a
resolution to deploy a 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force (RPF) that will fall under the
command structure of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The plan has been
controversial and rejected by some top political figures due to the perception that extra
foreign peacekeepers will further undermine South Sudan’s sovereignty. Foreign governments
have been supporting the plan of the UN Security Council and as such the deployment may
take place in 2017. However, the government is likely to resist the deployment of the RPF
and it is not yet clear where the 4,000 troops will come from and when they might arrive.
Since the July clashes and as a direct result of its opposition to the RPF, the government has
been active in stirring up anti-UN sentiment in South Sudan. UN personnel now face
additional measures in order to be able to gain access to the country. Harassment and
violence targeted at UN personnel in some parts of the country has occurred, and is likely to
continue. The international community in general is also likely to suffer harassment from the
government as the economic situation worsens and mistrust of foreigners – particularly
regional Africans and Americans – rises.
In 2016 there have been numerous cases of people going missing or targeted assassinations,
either of those working in the media who are outspoken or those who are politically
challenging the Government’s position.
Increase, continuation and spreading of violence in insecure areas like Southern Unity and
Upper Nile state. However in 2016, the conflict has proliferated away from the more
‘traditional’ theatres, and into previously unaffected locations like Northern Bahr el Gazal, and
the Greater Equatoria region.
Besides that the abduction and violation of women in and around the PoC sites is increasing.
Public demonstrations – usually uncommon in South Sudan – could occur with greater
frequency if disgruntlement with the country’s politics and economic issues grow.
House to house searches for weapons and people are likely to increase, and so are the
arbitrary arrests and detentions of national staff.
Crime levels in urban areas are increasing, especially in Juba. This includes carjacking,
compound robberies and increasing use of (sometimes fatal) violence.
Illegal roadblocks will become more common, especially in rural areas/roads, demanding food
or valuables. Extortion is already common in South Sudan and set to become more
widespread as a means of supplementing the incomes of police and security personnel.
The limited stability is highly dependent on individuals, so even minor incidents such as
illness have the potential to destabilize things quickly.
The government facilitated return to places of origin (i.e. moving people from Dinka ethnicity
from Juba to counties and states that was originally their ancestor’s land) was controversial
since these people might not have lived in these locations for generations, though can be
anticipated to be continued strategy of government in the next 12 months.
Due to increased fighting between different armed groups, ERW contamination as a result of
artillery fire continues to be created, including alleged laying of new landmines in insecure
areas.
There is an abundance of small arms available amongst the civilian population in South
Sudan.
The continuation of loss of lives, violations of human right and depravation is affecting the
population sentiment, which is becoming bitter in certain areas. On top of the sentiment and
constitution of violence increased numbers of civilians are experiencing Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder, which is left unidentified and untreated, which influences erratic human behaviour.
2.3 Economic and social
South Sudan is in a deep economic crisis with multifaceted and wide implications, and there are
limited prospects for this to change in the near future. Some of the effects of the crisis include:
2
Other major armed groups are not mentioned like the militia under David Yau Yau and Johnson Olony are not
mentioned, however DRC is monitoring the different groups closely
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 6 Hyper Inflation and USD shortages: Price increase, undermine mechanisms that deliver
humanitarian assistance through the local market. As a result many contracts with suppliers
are currently in USD. The wider food security of the population is very likely to deteriorate
further; and procurement will need to source more and more items outside of the country
due to unavailability locally or unrealistic local pricing. The local currency, SSP, is becoming a
non-preferred currency.
Dollar shortages have already lead to collapse or withdrawal of companies operating in South
Sudan such as water bottling and food companies.
Both the price and production of oil continues to reduce, lowering revenue for the country.
Paloich is the only working oil field in the country at the moment,
Salary payments for civil servants, military, police are infrequent and several months behind
schedule, leading to increased crime and alternative ‘income generation’ methods.
Supplies and supply routes are disrupted due to conflict, leading to a narrower selection of
items on markets, shortages of basic items such as sorghum and huge price increases.
Continuation of frequency of fuel shortages expected, INGOs storing fuel will increasingly
become targets for theft.
Borders are being closed during sensitive periods, affecting supply routes and population
movement, particularly the Uganda and Sudan border, which was the case in July fighting
when all routes to Uganda and Kenya closed.
The financial constraints due to the high inflation have effect in a number of areas:
Healthcare (and medicine shortages)
Banking (cash shortages)
Education
Construction and infrastructure projects grind to a halt
Power shortages are prevalent
Taxation and penalties on INGOs especially is likely to continue. With the validation of the
NGO Bill and the creation of the 28 states, NGO will face closer monitoring of the government
and additional administrative duties and costs.
As a direct consequence of the high insecurity, disrupted markets and hyperinflation, the
South Sudan population is facing severe food insecurity. 6.1 Million people are in need of
assistance of which 4.8 million people are food insecure.3
The humanitarian funding is 42% unmet for 2016.
Due to the instability, continuation of violence in different localities in country, the mass
migration, the dilapidating basic services, the social fabric is diminishing at local and national
level.
More civilians are likely to self-impose curfews4 as the worsening economic situation leads to
normal citizens being targeted for crime; economic migration increases.
Health problems including cholera, malaria, kala-azar and other outbreaks will most likely
continue especially during rainy season.
Due to active fighting there is a continuation of loss of infrastructure. In 2016 there has been
an increase in stealing and looting medical drugs and destruction of health facilities.
2.4 Conflict analysis
During the year of 2016 the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the formation of the Transitional
Government of National Unity collapsed with the violent outbreak of fighting in early July. As a result
of the fighting the First Vice President and opposition leader Riek Machar and his troops left Juba and
ultimately South Sudan. A large number of political consensus and discussions remained unsolved
(including the issue around the 28 states). The situation in country which was already fragile and
rigged with active war in several locations remains uncertain and extremely fragile.
Map 1: Map shows current fighting and high insecure areas in South Sudan
3
Humanitarian Bulletin South Sudan, OCHA, issue 15, 5 October 2016
4
National DRC Juba staff indicate they stay in their compounds after dark
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 75
Related aspects in terms of security for citizens in South Sudan include:
SPLA structure is likely to increasingly fracture, and simultaneously the number of
uncontrolled armed groups that will align themselves to one or the other parties to the
conflict will increase.
The three states (Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei) where the violence and fighting was most
pronounced in 2014 and 2015 will most likely continue to be the conflict affected.
However other states especially the Equatorias and Norther Bahr el Gazal are also expected
to see continued violence and deteriorate and destabilise further.
The fracturing of groups, formation of new alliances or weakening of existing alliances have
been seen to lead to new trouble spots and shifting front lines at short notice. At the same
time previous conflict areas are experiencing a decrease in conflict levels.
Forced recruitment and child recruitment is seen to continue by all parties in many areas of
the country.
The usual seasonal pattern to the conflict is reducing due to weaponry changes which allow
for continuation of fighting even during the rains, though dry season will still experience
higher movements and intensity of fighting.
The relationship between SPLA and the United Nations Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS) is
likely to further deteriorate.
Ethnic targeting or violence between communities is likely to increase as political differences
are increasingly running along ethnic lines and seized upon by opposing sides to mobilise
supporters against one another
Inter-communal disputes, particularly those driven by agro-pastoralist conflicts resulting from
competition for grassland, water and migration routes account for 37 percent of all violent
incidents and 50 percent of all fatalities recorded by GRSS and UNMISS in South Sudan.
In the current power vacuum state authorities do not interfere in local conflicts including the
wide spread cattle-raiding and associated violence, which is likely to get worse.
Intercommunal tensions are very likely to be exploited as part of the current broader conflict.
This will include groups that were previously ‘outside’ of the past conflicts.
5
Conflict and Displacement Analysis, Weekly Brief, IOM, 5 October 2016
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 82.5 Displacement analysis
Since the onset of the new civil war of mid December 2013 until 16 th September 2016 more than one
million South Sudanese refugees are sheltering in neighbouring countries6. Of these, more than
185,000 South Sudanese have fled since fresh fighting broke out in the capital, Juba, on 8 July.7
The number of South Sudanese arriving daily into Uganda has reached new peaks, with an average
of 2,854 arriving each day in September, compared to 1,594 in August and 1,727 in July 2016. There
has also been an increase in arrivals in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has now received
40,000 South Sudanese refugees since July 2016. More than 32,000 South Sudanese have arrived
into the Gambella region of Ethiopia in recent weeks, seeking assistance and protection.8
Of the people remaining in South Sudan 6,1 million are in need of assistance, 1,6 million are
internally displaced and 4,8 million are food insecure 9. There is a sharp spike of need in new areas,
such as Eastern Equatoria or Western Bahr el Gazal, where malnutrition rates in some places are
reaching dangerous levels. More than 200,00010 11 people are still sheltering in the Protection of
Civilian (PoC) sites inside the UNMISS compounds i.e. 16% of the overall total of internally displaced
people in South Sudan. 1,3 Million IDPs remain scattered in various locations, including in hard to
reach areas.
The active fighting in geographic areas is in direct correlation to displacement. In 2016 a number of
locations, previously not affected by active fighting, has been dragged into war of the two main
armed groups i.e. Maridi, Mundri, Yambio, Nzara, Tambur in Western Equatoria, Yei, Kajo Keji,
Lainya, Morobo, Juba in Central Equatoria, Magwi, Torit, Kapoeta in Eastern Equatoria, Wau, Raja in
Western Bahr el Gazal. The original conflict areas of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states still face high
insecurity. The displacement pattern is quite diverse and depends on resources and protection
options. The majority of people move on foot and may prefer to settle as close as possible to their
area of origin, while others seek protection in neighbouring countries.
Map 2: Map on displacement movement
12
6
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2016/9/57dbb5124/number-south-sudanese-refugees-reaches-1-
million-mark.html
7
http://ethiopia.iom.int/regional-impact-south-sudan-crisis-growing-civilians-flee-insecurity
8
Humanitarian Bulletin South Sudan, OCHA, issue 15, 5 October 2016
9
http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-detail-forms/ipcinfo-news-detail/en/c/421964/
10
Registered people in PoC, in some PoCs registration of new arrivals has stopped though people have been
arriving the in the PoC.
11
CCCM Cluster Weekly Situation Report, South Sudan, 26 September - 02 October 2016
12
Emergency dashboard, WFP, September 2016
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 9Unfortunately, continued conflict with shifting geographic focus will most likely result in more people
being displaced in the years to come. Many have already been displaced several times, and resources
and coping-strategies are depleting. There is also evidence that with the high levels of food insecurity
in many parts of the country people are not only attracted to the PoCs for the physical protection but
also due to the availability of food and other humanitarian goods and services.
Assessments suggest that recent arrivals to PoCs cite food distribution as one of the primary
motivations. The current number of IDPs in the PoCs is around 200,000 but in view of the above, this
number is unfortunately expected to increase over the coming year. Increased humanitarian
assistance provided outside the PoCs may help decrease the number of new arrivals. However in view
of the access constraints to operating outside the PoCs it is not likely that humanitarian interventions
can reach all critical areas and people are still expected to arrive to the PoCs.
In the coming years any large-scale return seems unlikely and most people currently in displacement
are likely to remain in displacement. However it is also observed that with shifting geographical
intensity of conflicts, some people do return to areas that have become relative peaceful, for planting
purpose. In the case of Bentiu PoC, people residing in the PoC returned to their planting fields before
the season and the registered people in the PoC dropped. However, when fighting resumed in the
counties people returned to the PoC.
In addition to the many internally displaced, South Sudan is also host to approximately 262,000
refugees13 from neighbouring countries of which refugees from Sudan account for approximately
220,000 people hosted in refugee camps in Upper Nile and Unity States. Sudanese refugees are not
returning in large numbers, but anecdotal evidence shows that there might be movement towards
camps in Ethiopia. The SPLA/N continues to forcefully recruit in the camps of Maban. New refugees
have continued to arrive throughout 2016, with some significant periodic influxes occurring in
particular into Unity State, as people have fled on-going conflict, including aerial bombardments in
Blue Nile State, Sudan. Similar influxes can be expected in the coming years.
2.6 Capacity and willingness of duty bearers
There is a significant lack of capacity and willingness amongst national authorities to ensure that
basic services and institutions are available to all citizens. However, the relationship and willingness of
county level authorities and ministries is good. DRC works constructively with several governing
bodies like Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Commissioner of Refugees, National Mine Action
Authorities, Labour Office, Relief Rehabilitation Commission (government) and Relief and
rehabilitation Authority (RRA) which is a similar department in opposition held areas. A number of
designated coordinating bodies lack the capacity to fulfil their roles due to reduced support in
resources (capital, human, training). Due to the situation in the country, humanitarian aid is seen as
a bargaining chip.
Military, police and armed militia are underperforming with regards to their responsibilities to rights
holders. Their interests are currently tied to broader political dynamics, and therefore often result in
widespread abuse of power and direct targeting of the civilian population. Armed forces and police
presence at the local level is not assuring, as they are regularly aggressive and intoxicated and
unable to carry out their core security function of enforcing rule of law. Recruitment of youth is an
issue throughout the country representing a clear departure from the mandate of these duty bearers.
Solicitation for bribes and engagement in corrupt activities is rampant as the armed forces find
alternative coping mechanism to the deteriorated economic situation. Police capacities are rendered
useless in heavily militarised contexts, where the military effectively takes over responsibility for
policing (at times, through force/intimidation, eg, Yei). Conversely, in its areas of operations DDG has
forged a working relationship with military and police to ensure clearance of mines and ERW, in some
cases finding them to be effective key informants regarding the whereabouts of dangerous items.
The judiciary in South Sudan consists of both statutory and traditional bodies that handle different
levels of civil / criminal cases. Statutory capacity remains very weak outside of Juba, and at all levels
actors within judiciary rarely hold a strong understanding of due process, the Rule of Law or basic
tenants of international human rights / humanitarian law. DRC has some experience working directly
13
UNHCR Operational update, 18/2016, 30th September 2016
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 10with the judiciary through its Protection programme in Maban. In this case willingness to develop understanding of these principles has been strong, with DRC staff providing trainings to the County Prosecutor. Generally, however, the disconnect between statutory and criminal law in practice remains substantial. Given traditional norms prevailing in many areas of South Sudan, traditional courts often treat victims of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) unfavorably, allowing room for acts of SGBV to be committed with relative impunity. UNMISS, the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan with a Chapter 7 mandate, has a strained relationship with humanitarian actors and the IDPs residing in the PoC. The population is increasingly depending on the humanitarian community to provide basic services – as well as physical protection within the UNMISS PoC sites. Within the PoC, the capacity of the UNMISS is high, though the willingness and credibility is under investigation with numerous incidents in 2016 where UNMISS is not exercising its mandate to protect when people are being violated. UNMISS has also exhibited a different philosophy to those of humanitarian agencies. There is a variance of position on whether or not to encourage IDPs to move out of the PoC sites. In view of the civil war, and the involvement of duty bearers in the warring factions, DRC will remain careful in the collaboration with duty bearers over the coming year. Most of the interaction with duty bearers will be limited to negotiations for access to deliver assistance to the people in need. 2.7 Humanitarian needs Many IDPs are facing poor prospects for return, not only due to continued insecurity, but also due to loss of housing, assets and livelihoods and destruction of infrastructure and services in their areas of origin. The majority of IDPs will most likely remain in displacement for the years to come. Even if majority of the IDPs have been in displacement since late 2013 their needs vary according to where they are displaced and which resources are available to sustain their survival. The IDPs in the PoCs largely depend on support from the international community for their survival. They have come to the PoCs for protection along with food, shelter, health, water, sanitation and other basic services delivered within the PoCs. Generally women, youth, children and elderly are the most vulnerable and have the highest needs for both protection and life-saving interventions. However, majority of IDPs are located outside of the PoCs, residing within host communities, in collective centers, or in make shift spontaneous settlements. Generally their needs are as basic as those of the IDPs in the PoCs (protection and survival) but there are variations depending on their relations with the hosts, and livelihood opportunities in the displacement locations. The IDPs living with host families or within host communities are generally provided with some form of physical protection and have been allowed access to basic resources for survival. However with time these resources are also being depleted. In these contexts depletion of and competition for scarce resources is a big risk and potential point of conflicts between IDPs and hosts. Generally the IDPs are more vulnerable than their hosts, but needs are to a large extent similar between hosts and the displaced and evolve around basic protection, livelihoods and access to services such as water points, health facilities and education. To mitigate conflict, assistance should not be targeted to IDPs only, but should be given with a view to also support the capacity to function as well as host community. The majority of the refugee population in Upper Nile and Unity states have been in displacement since 2011, and are falling into the category of “protracted displacement”. Generally their most basic needs are being met in the well-established camps, but a clear decrease in services and support has occurred in the past years, including a substantial reduction in WFP food rations, due primarily to funding constraints. In both locations (Maban and Pariang) tensions between the host and refugees communities are growing over natural resources exploitation due to the environmental degradation. DRC’s work in the refugee locations is increasingly moving towards promoting and implementing activities that focus on longer-term solutions and support sustainability and greater self-reliance – including in terms of food-security, income generation and community self-management -, which will support refugees while in displacement and also prepare them better for durable solutions – whether this is through local integration or through return. Supporting self-reliance will be a key priority in all DRC’s refugee response interventions in the coming years. Furthermore, increasing a sense of interdependence between groups experiencing tensions (eg. through shared local markets) will help to promote peaceful coexistence. Besides addressing root causes, the location of Maban where a DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 11
growing IDP population is also present, will need to be supported to implement resilience building and integrated programming. For Pariang, a new trend is being observed that migrants are on the move between southern counties of Unity to cross the border in Sudan. The ethnic tensions of the migrant population and the residents of the area are an area of concern. In places where return is potentially possible it is often hindered by mine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination. Mine Risk Education (MRE), survey of contaminated areas and clearance is needed to allow for return to these areas. Furthermore clearance is essential in areas where productive activities are prevented due to existence of mines/ERW. Compounding this problem is the fact that there remains a substantial information gap regarding mine/ERW contamination in South Sudan, particularly in areas recently affected by conflict. As restrictive security and operating contexts have moved humanitarian mine action operators away from systematically assessing the scale and location of contamination in any given area, the extent of unknown hazards further impedes the ability of affected communities to prevent mine-/ERW-related injury or death. Given weaknesses in the nationally-managed Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), more must be done in 2017 to better analyse contamination that is bearing the greatest impact on affected populations, to prioritise limited resources available within the Mine Action sector. 2.8 Humanitarian access Access continues to be difficult, and unpredictable. In the locations where DRC has a base contingency planning is in place to cater for emergency situations and to enable effective allocation of responsibilities between humanitarian actors to address a sudden influx of population. In order to respond to emergency situations in new locations, there is a great need to be able to react quickly to deliver aid to those most in need. The establishment of roving emergency teams will aim to address those needs, when other humanitarian actors are not present or slow to respond. There will continue to be areas that have huge needs that are challenging to access, either due to insecurity or bureaucratic impediments. Staff movement or staff selection will be further affected by increasing fracturing and ethnic separation of the conflict. This means that DRC may be unable to recruit preferred candidates, or may not be able to send national relocatable staff or international staff of certain nationalities to support in specific areas. DRC has remote management plans in place as part of the contingency plan. In an emergency situation where international and re-locatable staff are being removed form base, measures have been put in place to ensure basic activities will continue with national staff. This is in line with the nationalisation plan and as part of the exit strategy. DRC is also keen to invest in working with local groups and CBO/NNGOs. The presence and capacity of CBO/NNGOs is weak, nevertheless CBO/NNGOs can have major impact in reaching difficult to reach communities due to presence and local language capabilities. In the PoCs no CBO/NNGOs are present but through the CCCM coordination local groups are keen to work towards a better living environment. DRC is keen to work to strengthen the capacity of some of the groups to build on social fabric and ownership of the PoC residents. DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 12
3. DRC vision and objectives
3.1 Vision
DRC South Sudan vision is that durable solutions have been achieved for displaced
populations and basic rights are respected.
The programme objectives for the period 2017-2019 are articulated around the DRC’s global response
framework, reformulated and contextualized to the South Sudan situation.
1. Response to emergencies: To save lives and alleviate suffering among displaced people and
their hosts
2. Solutions to displacement: To reduce displacement related risks and support and facilitate
solutions
3. Addressing root causes: To promote peaceful, inclusive and resilient societies and address
root causes to displacement
These three objectives are rooted in the core DRC protection mandate and in the DDG framework for
Armed Violence Reduction (AVR). They are designed to be implemented in complementarity and
throughout all contextual displacement scenarios. Given the unpredictable context of South Sudan the
SPD will focus primarily on 2016 programme priorities. DRC will remain focused on the IDPs and
refugees. For both caseloads there will be a focus on also including service provision to hosting
communities with a view to reduce the risks from resource-based conflicts. Conflict mitigation
measures will be applied in these settings.
Figure 1: DRC response framework
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 133.2 Programmatic and operational objectives
Objective One
To save lives and alleviate suffering among displaced people and their hosts
This objective relates to the platform on providing emergency assistance. The emergency response
objective is designed around the three-tier approach;
1. Mobile emergency protection monitoring team. This team that addresses emergencies in
country where DRC does not have a current presence. The approach will involve quick
exercise of protection monitoring and light footprint, to ensure people’s protection concerns
in the emergency situation are being recorded and humanitarian actors are informed about
the protection needs of the people;
2. Multi sector emergency response team. In case the immediate needs of the people in the
emergency situation, of which the mobile emergency protection monitoring team provided
information, are not being addressed by other humanitarian actors;
3. Continuation of programme interventions of camp coordination and camp management,
shelters and protection and responding to emergencies occurring in the locations DRC is
currently operative (i.e. Maban, Pariang, Bentiu, Malakal and Melut).
The emergency response is designed around the changing context in South Sudan. The current
states, where DRC has a base, are fragile, highly insecure and often faced with immediate
emergencies of a displaced population. However, in the broader scope of South Sudan, dire needs
are also occurring in states and counties previously known as more stable.
In order for DRC to remain relevant and a humanitarian actor responding to needs, the mobile
emergency protection monitoring team is addressing needs in locations where DRC does not have a
base (and is not necessarily considering setting up a base). The response will be fast to initiate other
humanitarian actors to provide services to address immediate needs. DRC’s mobile emergency
protection monitoring team will be focussing on protection monitoring, assessing needs, information
gathering and dissemination to clusters and other stakeholders.
DRC might consider intervening with a multi sector emergency response team under the second tier
when other humanitarian actors indicate they will not be able to address the identified needs of a
population. An emergency light weight NFI kit will be distributed to People With Special Needs
(PWSN) in this approach, until the regular NFI pipeline of the UN is in action. This team will have
community construction or shelter, protection monitoring and coordination expertise and food
security and livelihoods kits. This will be an intervention where DRC does not require to set up a
base.
DRC will maintain its presence in three PoC sites (Bentiu, Malakal and Melut) and spontaneous
settlements around Melut, and the refugee settings in Maban and Pariang and the surrounding areas
around these locations. Continuation of programme interventions of camp coordination and camp
management, provision and repair and maintenance of emergency shelters and protection
monitoring, identification of PWSN and provision of individual assistance will remain activities under
this objective. The experiences over the last year have shown that emergency situations regularly
occur in these fragile locations. The humanitarian coordination of these locations is functioning and
thorough contingency planning is in place to address emerging influx of population and immediate
needs. DRC will be responding with technical expertise through protection monitoring, case
management and mainstreaming in conjunction with CCCM and shelter/NFI assistance to the newly
displaced population under this objective.
Objective two
To reduce displacement related risks and support and facilitate solutions
The objective relates to the existing displaced population sides where DRC is providing services in the
refugee locations (Maban and Pariang) and in the IDP locations (Malakal, Bentiu and Melut). The
populations are likely to remain in the areas in the coming years. The various population groups are
providing different reasons for the inability to return (i.e. insecurity, destruction of property, ethnic
DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 14politics, etc.) and hence DRC is considering the displacement as protracted and is addressing needs on the medium term. Durable solutions to displacement are commonly understood as being integration, repatriation and resettlement. However DRC South Sudan, under this objective, is including upholding the rights of people while in protracted displacement, avoiding further displacement and working towards dismantling barriers to future solutions – and facilitating interim or medium-term solutions for persons in protracted displacement. In the coming years DRC will be building up a level of self-reliance for these displaced groups through livelihoods and skills training support and strengthening of local groups. This will improve the self- reliance capacities of the population so that when return or local integration eventually becomes possible, people are better prepared. DRC’s agricultural activities including provision of seeds and tools, demonstration gardens and trainings, including the use of Farmer Field School (FFS) methodology are solutions oriented and will focus on improving the access of vulnerable households to high quality farming inputs and sustainable food production This will contribute to the adoption of improved agricultural practices inter-alia enhanced agricultural productivity. DRC will be laying a foundation for longer term solutions driven programming in the county, in which current operations by most humanitarian actors are only limited to population in IDP settlements. The most vulnerable population will also be supported with Cash for Work activities, which will serve to boost household income during the lean season and improve access to the markets by enhancing liquidity. Through Cash for Work rehabilitation of essential communal infrastructure will improve the peaceful co-existence of host and refugee communities. In Maban, DRC will support youth from the refugee and host community in establishing small scale commercialised irrigation agriculture along the riverine belt. This is aimed at tapping on market opportunities provided by the many humanitarian actors in Bunj town and the town population which is cut off from external markets by the conflict. In the refugee locations DRC will also work towards transitional shelter and community infrastructure. DRC will be exploring the opportunities and viability of increased use of cash assistance in urban programming. Feasibility and location will be developed through a consultancy in order to guide appropriate intervention design. In hard to reach locations, in Upper Nile and Unity State (for example Kodok), where humanitarian access remains highly constrained, DRC is increasing support. DRC aims to provide shelter and community infrastructure support adapted to local community’s traditions. The shelter will be to assist the most vulnerable people. These will be expected to complement Food Security and livelihood Cash for Work activities. DRC will continue to advocate for increased assistance to the population. DDG will provide a roving response capacity in Unity and Upper Nile States. DDG will prioritize clearance of areas contaminated with mines and ERW where they restrict access to displaced populations by DRC and other international organizations working in different sectors, as well key transit routes to key socio-economic assets (eg. education/water facilities). Similarly, Mine Risk Education (MRE) equipping at-risk populations with knowledge and behaviors that can avoid injury or death will further reduce vulnerabilities amongst displaced and host populations. DDG will continue to build on successes achieved with MRE delivery by delivering Training of Trainers (ToT) sessions to local partners to increase the reach of lessons risk reduction strategies taught by its teams. Objective three To promote peaceful, inclusive and resilient societies and address root causes to displacement This objective is a longer term ambition to address root causes of displacement and conflict. The situation of South Sudan is in many locations not suitable for longer term interventions, nonetheless the areas of Maban and Pariang have been relatively unaffected by the South Sudan civil war (though has seen violence relating to forces of Sudan and host communities). In order to address the root causes of local level conflicts DRC/DDG will pilot and upscale the Community Driven Recovery and Safety (CDRS) approach in its current areas of operation. This will be achieved through activities DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 15
aimed at improving local level governance, enhancing employment opportunities, social services and security for conflict affected populations. DRC will continue to promote the transfer of vocational and life skills to vulnerable youths and women in Pariang and Maban counties respectively. The support will enable vulnerable groups to become self-reliant, through improvement of household income and livelihood options but the key aim of the activity is to bring together refugee and host community members in joint programming to promote peaceful co-existence. By strengthen women’s capacities and self-reliance is not for the sole purpose of reducing vulnerabilities. It needs to be noted that vulnerable women are not necessarily contributing to conflict, however they are considered to play a role in peacebuilding and are role models for the youth. DRC is working on Natural Resource Management to address root causes of environmental depletion conflicts between the refugee and host communities in Maban and Pariang. Depletion of communities’ resilience and their inability recover after exposure to shocks and resultant stresses has contributed to recurrent conflicts over limited resources, lack of traditional conflict resolution mechanism, lack of access to justice for aggrieved persons and overdependence on humanitarian aid for survival. Displacement of population has also contributed to immense pressure on land and its resources threatening the existence of the communities who live in it. A recent NRM study authorised by DRC in Pariang, underscored the appalling situations of the effects of refugee settlement in the area over the past five years. DRC will establish Natural Resource Management community groups in both locations and support them in establishment of tree nurseries, and growing tree seedlings. Fast maturing tree species (3-5 years) will be promoted to ensure quick impact of the project in the medium and long term. Additional measure, such as awareness creation on tree harvesting methodologies, allows the trunk to regenerate after the harvesting of trees for domestic and commercial purposes. A successful joint DRC/DDG intervention is the strengthening of the joint courts in Maban, where traditional South Sudanese, Sudanese and South Sudan judiciary are working together on rule of law in the four camps of Maban and the host communities. DRC’s Protection Team is working to establish joint courts combining different traditional legal systems, to provide a platform for refugee/host groups in tension to resolve disputes in accordance with commonly accepted legal standards. The DDG team will provide complementary technical support, conducting community level survey that can ensure the legal ‘terms of reference’ established between refugee and host representatives fully reflect community-level preferences regarding rule of law and justice provision. DDG will also meet with representatives within Maban’s local police force to sensitize them on the new agreements made between refugee and host groups. DDG under its Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) programming will launch Community Safety Planning (CSP) processes in Maban that will build community mechanisms that can map conflict patterns, identify risks and capacities within target communities, and through an inclusive safety process, plan how the safety of the community can be improved. DDG will establish Community Safety Committees (CSCs). The CSP process allows communities to decide on the assistance required by DRC and other international organisations. Whilst interventions could vary for this reason, DRC’s analysis of the local contexts in Maban and Pariang has concluded that the interventions will likely include delivery of Conflict Management Education (CME). DRC/DDG will conduct targeted trainings aimed at providing individuals at risk of engaging conflict or violent crime with personal strategies for avoiding recourse to these actions as a means of addressing disputes. Target population for the three objectives Internally Displaced People Refugees Refugee and IDP hosting communities People at risk from explosive remnants of war and armed violence 3.3 Critical operational principles Protection is a specific programme intervention in its own right both within the refugee and IDP Responses where DRC is carrying out monitoring and advocacy activities. However in all programmes DRC works with a rights-based approach hence protection of rights of IDPs and refugees is at the core of DRC strategy and engagement in South Sudan. DRC South Sudan Strategic Programme Document (SPD) 2017 – 2019 16
Conflict sensitivity: Drawing on DDG AVR conflict sensitivity expertise, DRC has previously
been able to carry out regular conflict analysis and design programmes in conflict sensitive
manner. DRC will also draw on its conflict prevention and transformation inputs in line with its
experience in implementing CDRS in different locations globally.
Rights based approach: DRC works with a rights-based approach in programming, hence
protection of rights of refugees and IDPs is at the core of DRC’s activities.
Age, gender and diversity: Project participants are not homogenous and it is important that
DRC take into account the wide range of vulnerabilities amongst the target communities when
DRC designs, monitors and evaluates programmes as activities have different impacts on different
members of the community. In assessments DRC continues to take age, gender and diversity
into account through disaggregated data collection and monitoring.
Accountability towards stakeholders and the communities served: DRC has developed
and implemented a humanitarian accountability action plan to improve accountability to project
participants – in line with Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) requirements. In order to ensure
accountability and transparency across the board, a Code of Conduct mechanism is implemented
and functioning. By late 2017, DRC South Sudan will conduct a self-assessment exercise to check
compliance with the Core Humanitarian Standards. Should any critical compliance gaps be
identified these will be addressed.
Beneficiary participation: Ensuring participation of project participants is an integral
operational approach that will be employed in all DRC humanitarian activities. Within both the
refugee and IDP responses DRC has been instrumental in the set up and management of
dialogue and communication platforms within displaced communities and with host communities.
Do No Harm: All activities will be carried out with a ‘Do-No-Harm’ approach. The DRC team will
utilize conflict sensitive programming tools that search for connectors within community groups
and understand the dividers or potential triggers for escalating tensions.
4. Capability
4.1. Relations with key stakeholders and partners
DRC maintains good relations with the host government at county levels of the administration as well
as at the national level where a relationship is required. This includes Ministries of Forestry and
Agriculture, Planning, the County Commissioners, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), and
labour offices. The Mine Action and AVR teams have regular contact both in the field and at a
national level with NMAA. Due to the current conflict DRC are maintaining relations as needed but
currently not entering into any capacity building or strong relations. DRCs activities will be
implemented in close cooperation with other agencies, including UNHCR and IOM and through the
clusters. DRC will also remain a member of the NGO forum in South Sudan.
DRC is an active participant in clusters relating to DRC technical expertise. DRC participates in the
national and state level clusters in protection, FSL, CCCM, shelter/NFI plus the sub-clusters of GBV
and urban FSL and DDG in the mine action sub-cluster. The support departments are active in the
logs cluster and the HR working groups. In addition, DRC is co-lead at national level of the refugee
coordination meeting and hence participates as co-lead in the national ICWG. In the field locations
DRC continues to participate and be co-lead in several state protection clusters.
4.2. DRC’s capacity
The mandate of DRC rest upon the principles enshrined in the relevant bodies of law: international
humanitarian law, international human rights law and refugee law. DRC works within the applicable
domestic legal framework of South Sudan, and seek registration with relevant government
authorities; DRC is a registered NGO in the country. Acceptance from communities and authorities is
essential to operate and is largely ensured through a participatory approach in programming and
systematic conflict and context analyses.
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