The 2014 Sochi olympics and russia's civil Society
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The 2014 Sochi Olympics and Russia’s Civil Society
by Robert W. Orttung and Sufian Zhemukhov,
The George Washington University
Abstract This article examines the impact of mega-events on civil society. Based on a case study of the 2014
Sochi Olympics, it concludes that mega-events provide a way for state-business alliances to impose their de-
velopment preferences on society with little oversight or accountability. Environmental groups, in particular,
find few opportunities to influence decisions. Nevertheless, activism is not completely futile because, in some
cases, groups can use events like the Olympics as a platform to score small victories and to develop experience
that can be applied in subsequent confrontations. Additionally, mega-events expand the repertoire of Russian
organizations by giving them a central focus around which they can organize, though to date, they have not
taken advantage of these opportunities.
W hat is the relationship between civil
society groups and the organizers of
mega-events such as the Olympics? Activ-
South Korea just before the 1988 Seoul Games.
Political protests in the summer of 1987 called
into question Korea’s ability to host the games
ists in the field, and academics investigating the next year and the unprecedented interna-
them, have come to mutually contradictory tional media attention on the country facili-
conclusions. One side focuses on how civil so- tated the declaration of military ruler Presi-
ciety groups can use the massive investment dent Chun Doo Hwan on 29 June 1987 to step
made in the Olympics by others as a platform down and call direct elections in December
through which they can hijack the interna- 1987 (Pound, 2008). With an eye to such global
tional media spotlight to promote progressive leverage, international non-governmental or-
change that the event organizers did not plan ganizations (NGOs), such as Human Rights
(Price, 2008). The other side argues that mega- Watch, regularly seek to capture the media at-
events work in just the opposite way – allow- tention of the Olympics to affect change on a
ing states and corporations to limit the input wide range of issues, including labor abuses,
of civil society while they take advantage of media repression, religious freedom, and civil
the scale and limited time frame afforded by liberties (Worden, 2008). The Games are also
Olympic planning to act with little public seen as a mechanism for promoting environ-
oversight or scrutiny (Lenskyj, 2008). mental awareness and developing a green
Efforts by civil society groups to exploit lifestyle in the host countries and among those
the Olympics to promote their own agendas who attend or view the competition on tele-
take advantage of the fact that the Games vision. Even if efforts to promote such causes
stand at the nexus of a country’s domestic and are not immediately successful, the Olympics
foreign policy. Olympic hosts decide to bid for provide a rallying point around which civil so-
the Games, in part, because they are interest- ciety organizations can develop experience to
ed in boosting their international image (Bur- use in future campaigns (Fors, 2009).
bank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2001), which While the Olympics may provide civil so-
makes them susceptible to pressure from the ciety groups with a platform to promote their
international community. The most celebrated causes, they also hand the state and corpora-
example of an Olympic event encouraging de- tions tools for limiting society’s ability to ex-
mocratization was the end of military rule in ercise oversight and hold the officials account-
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 26Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
able. Researchers like Bent Flyvbjerg and his The Olympic mega-event and state-
colleagues describe a world of “design by society relations in Russia
deception,” in which mega-projects are fre-
quently approved even though their sponsors Sports mega-events are typically defined
underestimate costs, overestimate benefits, in the academic literature as “large-scale cul-
overvalue local development effects, and un- tural (including commercial and sporting)
dervalue environmental impacts (Flyvbjerg, events, which have a dramatic character, mass
2006). Once a city wins a bid for the Olympics, popular appeal and international significance
it has seven years to get ready. Since there is (Roche, 2000).” Such events have significant
no flexibility in the schedule – the Opening consequences for the host city, region, or
Ceremony must take place at the appointed country in which they occur and attract exten-
time – officials often shortcircuit ordinary sive media coverage (Horne & Manzenreiter,
accountability processes as they determine 2006, p. 2). The Olympics and a handful of oth-
resource allocations in democratic countries er events make it possible to reach a “global
(Lenskyj, 2008) and use the Olympic cloak to television” audience that is both large in size,
legimitize their actions in authoritarian coun- numbering in the billions, and includes view-
tries, where there is little public accountabil- ers willing to interrupt their daily routine for
ity even under normal conditions. One recent the event (Spa, Rivenburgh, & Larson, 1995,
study concluded: “There is, in other words, a p. 209). Mega-projects are the massive infra-
well-established pattern here, spanning me- structure ventures, usually driven by public
ga-events, continents, and regime types. The funding, associated with making such events
pattern is one where corporate profit and ef- possible.
fective delivery are valued more highly in Our definition of civil society distin-
event hosting than the values of participatory guishes it from the state and corporations
democracy or social justice (Hayes & Karami- (Cohen & Arato, 1994). In particular, we focus
chas, 2012, p. 21).” on the organizations that serve as intermedi-
This article will seek to sort out these con- aries between citizens, on one side, and state
testing versions of the relationship between and corporations, on the other (Henry, 2010).
civil society and mega-events in authoritarian This definition of civil society is particularly
conditions by examining the role of Russian useful in authoritarian Russia, where the state
environmental organizations in the prepara- frequently works closely with chosen corpora-
tions for the 2014 Sochi Olympics. When does tions against broader public interests.
“platforming” work, allowing civil society Typically Russia’s environmental groups
groups to change the narrative of the Games did not have anywhere near the resources or
that was designed by state and corporate organizational infrastructure of the Olympic
Olympic organizers for other purposes? When backers, making their interaction asymmetri-
do states and corporations prevail in using cal. The Olympics add to the conventional
mega-events in ways that limit the role of civil repertoire of the protest movement in Russia
society? Ultimately, this article concludes that and benefit civil society because the Games
mega-events create opportunities that civil so- deliver a specific event around which organi-
ciety can exploit as well as new constraints on zations can mobilize. Moreover, the Olympics
its activities. provide a set of ideals that the Russian author-
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 27Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
ities claim to support and the members of civil the key activists, forcing their emigration, or
society can hold them to these ideals. the use of violence against them), harassment
For Russia’s civil society, a central ques- (intrusive legal or regulatory investigations,
tion is to decide whether to play by the re- hacker attacks on their websites), cooption
gime’s rules and work inside the system or (enducing groups to support regime prefer-
instead to devote their resources to pressuring ences), ignoring, and even incorporating their
the regime from outside, using street protests input into the decision-making processes.
and other means (Kozlovsky, 2013). Partici-
pating within the system is difficult because The Environmental Movement
the regime elites have stacked the rules in in Sochi
their favor, making it extremely difficult for
the opposition to win a contested election or Environmental issues present a useful test
gain access to meaningful decision-making of whether the Olympics serve as a platform
processes. Even established democracies have for civil society groups to promote progres-
blocked access by environmental groups. In sive causes or a mechanism for states and cor-
several Olympic cities, the organizers set up porations to circumvent such input. The IOC
consultative bodies to work with civil society had little interest in environmental issues be-
groups and incorporate their input. However, fore the 1990s, but the 1992 Albertville Games
it is not clear whether these groups had any were an environmental disaster, prompting
real power to make changes in the ways that the Olympic movement to revise its policy and
the Games were organized or were just de- add the environment as the movement’s third
signed to neutralize unwanted public criti- pillar, along with sport and culture. There is
cism. In fact, some activists charge that the some anticipation that having environmental
authorities’ motivation behind establishing standards could promote international norms
such groups is to prevent the opposition from diffusion and raise expectations among do-
having any impact on the management of the mestic constituencies of a cleaner environ-
Games (Shaw, 2008, p. 11). Given the small ment (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012).
chance of success, it is difficult to mobilize The environmental stakes for the Sochi
Russian citizens to participate in such “sys- Olympics are high because the infrastruc-
temic” activities. Protests, on the other hand, ture construction associated with the Winter
can be dangerous for participants since they Olympics has a greater impact on the natural
risk being beaten or arrested, making it diffi- setting than the construction associated with
cult to turn out people in numbers that will the Summer Games, even though the Summer
make a difference in the political system. Giv- Games usually have a higher profile and more
en the choice between these poor alternatives, participants. The Winter Games take place
most Russian citizens decide not to participate in mountainous areas that are more ecologi-
at all (Howard, 2002). cally fragile than the urban locations where
In contrast to the relatively resource-de- summer events are held and usually require
prived civil society organizations, the Russian the construction of a man-made setting that
state has an extensive tool kit that it can use is more difficult to manage (Dansero, Corpo,
in responding to citizen-led initiatives. These Mela, & Ropolo, 2012). Likewise, the winter
responses range from repression (arresting events concentrate large numbers of people in
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 28Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
small places, which can put severe stresses on and Athens 2004, the events did not leave an
the surroundings. Sochi’s ecological footprint ecological legacy (Karamichas, 2012). In nei-
is bigger than for most Games because its bid ther place did the Olympics result in a culture
proposed an ambitious plan that would de- change or the adoption of strategies to protect
liver all new sporting facilities and extensive the environment. In preparation for the 2004
infrastructure construction, including a new Athens Olympics, Greece altered its constitu-
airport terminal, construction of railway and tion in order to limit forest protection (article
roads from coast to mountains, roads in the 24.1), ultimately circumscribing the power of
mountain area linking the sites, and signifi- environmental and citizen initiative groups
cant upgrades to Sochi’s sewer and electric- (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 16). Similarly,
ity systems. Competitors from Austria, which the Beijing Games failed to stimulate a long-
also sought to host the Games, argued that the term solution to that city’s air pollution prob-
use of existing structures in Salzberg would lems (Rich, 2012).
limit environmental impact if their site were Sochi’s experience with the Games seems
chosen (International Olympic Commission, to be in line with previous Olympic experience
2007, p. 69). regarding environmental protections: great
Practice has not lived up to the ideals es- promises are made up front, but there is little
poused in the concept of a “Green Games.” At implementation afterwards (Müller, 2013). In
the Torino 2006 Games, organizers set up the its bid for the Games, the Sochi organizers
Environmental Consultative Assembly with claimed that “Sochi has developed an inte-
representatives of 13 environmental organi- grated and inclusive system for managing nat-
zations and 10 local government institutions. ural resources by working closely with public
The group was helpful in identifying problems authorities and non-governmental organiza-
with the Olympics and disseminating infor- tions (Sochi 2014, 2007, p. 31).” However, the
mation. However, it had little actual impact on small but vocal environmental movement in
the organization of the Games beyond reduc- Russia has criticized the deleterious impact
ing the number of snow-making machines to the construction and associated activities will
limit their environmental toll (Dansero, et al., have on the natural surroundings of the city
2012). An analysis of the 2000 Sydney Games and the nearby ecology, including land allo-
found that the bid laid out extensive environ- cation, water pollution, waste management,
mental protections, but the New South Wales and other consequences of intensified human
government legislation created loopholes and use. Even before the IOC accepted Sochi’s ap-
conflicts with the original guidelines, result- plication to host the Games, a group of 47 en-
ing in what watchdog Green Games Watch vironmental groups from across Russia asked
2000 described as “selective compliance” to the IOC to reject Sochi’s proposal (Kavkazskii
environmental requirements (Caratti & Fer- uzel, 2007). The activists wrote that they had
raguto, 2012). Residents affected by Olympic nothing against hosting the Games in Russia,
construction could not file lawsuits against but rejected the high environmental price of
them and the project managers did not have bringing the event to Sochi. They noted that
to file the usual environmental impact assess- seven venues were planned to be created in
ments (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012). Another the Sochi National Park and the buffer zone
assessment found that in the cases of Sydney to the UNESCO World Heritage Site Cauca-
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 29Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
sus State Biosphere Preserve. This problem, percent in October 2006 to 57 percent by No-
combined with the lack of positive environ- vember 2010 (Müller, 2012). In spite of their
mental evaluations, the failure to take public promises to cooperate, the authorities ignored
opinion into account in making management the main requests of the environmentalists.
decisions, and the violation of numerous Rus- Already in 2008 the Ministry of Natural Re-
sian environmental laws in preparation for the sources and Ecology changed the zoning of
Games formed the core of the complaints in an the Sochi National Park to allow construction
“anti-bid book” prepared by several environ- there (Shevchenko, 2013), a decision that was
mental groups (Avtonomnoe Deistvie, Dru- reinforced on July 14, 2009, when the Sochi
zhina okhrany prirody MGU, Institute “Kolle- City Council adopted a new general plan for
ktivnoe deistvie”, & Maikopskoe otdelenie the city’s development confirming this change
VOOP, 2007). (Perova, Karpova, & Aminov, 2009).
Once the bid was accepted, Sochi’s green The big international environmental
movement lodged a number of complaints groups World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and
about the Games and the construction asso- Greenpeace originally worked with the author-
ciated with them. In evaluating the bid, the ities, but subsequently became disillusioned
commission expressed hope for continued with the state’s failure to follow through on
dialogue with environmental NGOs on litiga- environmental measures discussed. On July 3,
tion that they had pending against the govern- 2008, Igor Chestin, head of the World Wildlife
ment. However, such state-society dialogue Fund’s Russia chapter, and Ivan Blokhov, a
seemed unlikely in practice because the bid representative of Greenpeace, met with Putin
committee assured the IOC that “any action in Sochi and he agreed to move the bobsled
by the Supreme Court would have no effect on run and alpine Olympic Village from their
construction schedules and development of planned location on the Grushev Ridge. After
Olympic venues (International Olympic Com- this meeting, Putin seemed to think that the
mission, 2007).” Games would now have the environmental-
As noted above, a central dilemma for ists’ stamp of approval and Deputy Prime
environmental organizations is whether to Minister Aleksandr Zhukov declared that the
work with the event organizers in the hopes organizations had no more claims against the
that they can reduce the environmental impact Sochi sites (Naumov, 2008).
or to confront it head on through protests. Ob- However, what seemed like a good start
servers of mega-event planning have argued quickly fell apart. By 2010 the relationship
that the process is primarily top-down and had turned adversarial because the WWF felt
citizens’ participation typically consists of re- that decisions agreed to at meetings with the
acting to plans developed elsewhere (Hayes authorities simply were not enforced (World
& Karamichas, 2012, p. 22). There was little Wildlife Fund, 2010a). The group noted, in
citizen input in the U.S. games held in Los An- particular, that the construction of the com-
geles, Salt Lake City or Atlanta (Burbank, et bined road/railroad from Adler to Krasnaya
al., 2001). In the case of Sochi, public opinion Polyana, the largest infrastructure project of
polling shows that participation and consulta- the Olympic effort worth more than $6 billion,
tion in planning have been marginal and lo- began without a sufficient analysis of the en-
cal support for the Games has shrunk from 86 vironmental impact. At that time, the United
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 30Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) sian Railroads, state-controlled corporations
warned that the organizers were not doing with little public oversight (United Nations
enough to compensate for the environmen- Environmental Programme, 2011).
tal damage that the construction was causing Activists working on environmental
(United Nations Environmental Programme, issues surrounding the Russian Olympics
2010). Subsequent efforts by UNEP to set up risked their own personal safety. One of the
a dialogue between the environmental NGOs most prominent activists fighting against en-
and the authorities in October 2010 failed, vironmental damage caused by the Olympics
according to WWF, Greenpeace, Ecological is Suren Gazaryan, who represents Ecologi-
Watch on the Northern Caucasus (a group cal Watch on the Northern Caucasus. Along
that had consistly opposed the authorities) with his colleague Andrei Rudomakha, he
and other social organizations, because “as was detained by the authorities for several
with previous Missions, the bureaucrats either hours when he tried to block the illegal log-
ignored the meetings, created obstacles for the ging of protected trees in the construction of
participation of society, or sent people with the road/railroad linking Adler and Krasnaya
no power to make decisions to the meetings Polyana in August 2009 (World Wildlife Fund,
(World Wildlife Fund, 2010b).” In one case, 2009). Gazaryan also spoke out against the use
the bureaucrats started a meeting that had of timber from the Sochi National Park and
been planned for 2 pm at 11 am without warn- warned about the dangers of the dumps being
ing the NGOs in advance, thereby making it created near Sochi. At the end of 2012, Gazary-
impossible for them to participate. By January an fled Russia for Estonia fearing imminent
2011 the NGOs refused to meet with UNEP be- arrest for his efforts to expose the construction
cause they felt that such meetings would not of a billon dollar vacation home in Krasnodar
solve environmental problems “but could be Krai, allegedly for Putin, and protests against
used for the purpose of providing ‘green pub- illegal logging around the governor’s dacha1.
lic relations’ for the Olympics (World Wildlife In a situation where the state authori-
Fund, 2011).” ties were both the key decision makers and
A major problem for the environmental unwilling to respond to ecological concerns,
organizations is that Russia has hollowed out the environmental movement largely gave
the institutions that typically organize Olym- up its efforts to protest the games and the
pic Games, turning them into facades, and infrastructure construction around them. Af-
shifting power to other organizations that ter 2009, WWF declared that “these Olympic
have even less accountability to the public games will never be ‘green,’ since they have
(Robertson, 2011, pp. 194-197). In its January already caused irreparable damage to unique
2011 mission report to Moscow and Sochi, the ecosystems,” although they still held out hope
UNEP itself complained that its main part- in that “there is still a chance to minimize fur-
ner, and the institution that is supposed to be ther negative consequences and carry out ter-
implementing the environmental plans, the ritorial compensatory measures (expanding
Sochi 2014 Organizing Committee, in fact has and creating special nature preserves) (World
little control over the construction and devel-
opment of the facilities and that real power lies 1 See his blog: http://gazaryan-suren.live-
with organizations like Olympstroy and Rus- journal.com/, particularly http://gazaryan-suren.
livejournal.com/105213.html
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 31Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
Wildlife Fund, 2010c).” Activities by other not ecological (Shevchenko, 2013). While all
groups also petered out. The Institute for Col- these cases represent victories for the envi-
lective Action lists no Sochi related protests in ronmental groups, it is also possible that the
2013 through August 152 though the Ecological organizers decided to curtail the projects for
Watch on the Northern Caucasus continues to a variety on non-ecology related business rea-
post news of environmental damage caused sons because it no longer made sense to pro-
by the Olympic construction at its website ceed with the projects.
(http://ewnc.org/) even though the Russian se-
curity services searched their office and e-mail Conclusion
on March 27, 2013, and warned them to regis-
ter as a “foreign agent” (Human Rights Watch, The experience of environmental groups
2013) under repressive anti-NGO legislation in the preparations for the Sochi Olympics
Russia adoped in 2012. confirms the expectation that an alliance of
Despite these overall setbacks, civil soci- state and corporation interests can use a me-
ety groups have won some victories. In one of ga-event to propel their pro-development in-
the most prominent triumphs, the residents of terests while minimizing the extent of public
Kudepsta protested against the construction input. Although Russia’s overall political cli-
of a gas-powered power plant from May 2012 mate is hostile to NGO input in public-policy
to April 2013. In May 2013, when it was clear making, the Olympic time frame and expecta-
that construction would not be completed in tions of a global audience provide an excuse
time for the Olympics, Deputy Prime Minis- for the authorities to further curtail the role of
ter Dmitry Kozak announced that the project civil society. In this sense, the Olympics did
would be removed from the Olympic program not live up to the expectations of those who
and that all construction would be stopped saw the Games as a platform to promote a va-
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). He claimed that riety of progressive causes.
the electricity would not be needed after all. However, while the environmental
Protesters were also able to block the construc- groups had little overall impact on the prepara-
tion of a second port that would only create tions for the Games, they were able to limit the
surplus shipping capacity that could not be extent of the environmental impact by block-
utilized (Shevchenko, 2013). Similarly pro- ing the construction of some facilities that had
tests blocked the Evraziiskii company and its been included in the Olympic plans. In these
French partner Degremont from constructing limited cases, citizen action had consequences.
a 4 billion ruble factory to burn sludge. The Such experience helps Russian groups to de-
firms claimed the factory as part of the Olym- velop skills and knowledge that will accumu-
pic program and hoped to get state support. late over time. The key question in defining
However, societial groups opposed the plant future state-society relations, though, will be
and what seemed like a sure thing in 2010 was whether the regime learns to better deploy its
cancelled in 2011, when the Russian govern- repressive arsenal just as quickly as the civil
ment declared that burning such waste was society groups learn to focus their protests.
2 http://www.ikd.ru/taxonomy/term/92,
accessed August 15, 2013
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 32Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
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Shevchenko, D. (2013). Pechalnyi rekordy chi-2014. Retrieved from http://www.wwf.ru/
Sochinskoi Olympiady. Ekologiya i prava(50), resources/news/article/7412
16-21. World Wildlife Fund. (2010c). Olimpia-
Euxeinos 12 (2013) 34Robert W. Orttung, Sufian Zhemukhov
da-2014 v gorode Sochi. Retrieved from http:// About the Authors:
wwf.ru/about/positions/sochi2014
World Wildlife Fund. (2011). WWF i Grin- Dr. Robert W. Orttung (PhD UCLA) is
pis ne budut vstrecht’sya s YuNEP v Sochi. Associate Research Professor and Assistant
Retrieved from http://www.wwf.ru/resources/ Director of the George Washington University
news/article/7728 Elliott School of International Affairs’ Institute
for European, Russian, and Eurasian Stud-
ies. His most recent publications include the
co-edited books Energy and the Transformation
of International Relations (Oxford University
Press, 2009) and Russian Energy Power and For-
eign Relations: Implications for conflict and coop-
eration (Routledge, 2009).
e-mail: rorttung@gmail.com
Dr Sufian N. Zhemukhov (PhD Institute
of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian
Academy of Sciences) is Post-Doctoral Scien-
tist at the Institute of European, Russian, and
Eurasian Studies at the George Washington
University. Some of his recent publications in-
clude: “Dancing the Nation in the North Cau-
casus,’ Slavic Review, vol. 62, no.2 (Summer
2013), (co-author with Charles King); “The
Birth of Modern Circassian Nationalism,” Na-
tionalities Papers, Issue 40 (Spring 2012); and
“One Thousand Years of Islam in Kabarda: An
Experiment in Periodization,” Anthropology
and Archaeology of Eurasia, vol.49, no. 4 (Spring
2011).
e-mail: zhemukho@gwu.edu
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